[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 126 (Monday, September 12, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: September 12, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
         U.S. POLICY ON SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND ITS REPROCESSING

                                 ______


                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                       Monday, September 12, 1994

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, on March 17 I wrote to the Department of 
State and the Department of Energy seeking clarification of U.S. 
domestic and international policy regarding spent nuclear fuel and its 
reprocessing.
  On April 14, I received a reply from the Department of State. On 
August 17, I received a reply from the Department of Energy.
  I would like to bring to the attention of my colleagues this exchange 
of letters. The testimony mentioned in Assistant Secretary Sherman's 
letter is not printed here; it is available separately from the 
Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, 
and Human Rights. The text of the correspondence follows:

                                     Committee on Foreign Affairs,


                                     House of Representatives,

                                   Washington, DC, March 17, 1994.
     Hon. Robert L. Gallucci,
     Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, 
         Department of State, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Secretary: I am writing with regard to the 
     administration's draft environmental assessment which 
     proposes urgent return to the U.S. of spent nuclear fuel from 
     foreign research reactors. I would appreciate your 
     articulation of how such returns of spent fuel will promote 
     U.S. nonproliferation objectives.
       I would like to seek clarification of U.S. domestic and 
     international policy regarding spent nuclear fuel and its 
     reprocessing.
       Will the U.S. resume development of new low-enriched 
     uranium (LEU) fuels to enable reactor conversion from high-
     enriched uranium (HEU)?
       Does the U.S. plan to require all its own research reactors 
     to convert from HEU to LEU fuels in accord with U.S. policy 
     for foreign research reactors?
       What is the U.S. doing to determine the status of spent 
     fuel in countries that did not respond to DOE's survey of 
     foreign research reactors (such as Iran, Pakistan, and South 
     Korea)?
       What is U.S. policy toward reprocessing HEU, as well as 
     other fissile material?
       What is U.S. policy toward reprocessing of fissile 
     materials by other countries?
       Do you support or oppose such reprocessing when it is for 
     civilian purposes?
       Could you share with the Committee public statements on 
     your policy with respect to foreign reprocessing for civilian 
     purposes?
       A similar letter is being sent to the Honorable Thomas P. 
     Grumbly, Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental 
     Restoration and Waste Management, and I would appreciate a 
     coordinated response.
       I appreciate your efforts in addressing this important 
     issue.
       With best regards,
           Sincerely,
                                                  Lee H. Hamilton,
                                                         Chairman.
                                 ______



                                     U.S. Department of State,

                                   Washington, DC, April 14, 1994.
     Hon. Lee H. Hamilton,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
         Representatives.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of March 17, 
     1994, about the Administration's draft environmental 
     assessment of urgent-relief acceptance of foreign research 
     reactor spent fuel, and the relationship of such returns of 
     spent fuel to U.S. nonproliferation objectives. This letter 
     responds to your questions relating to the international 
     policy aspects of U.S. policy on return of the spent nuclear 
     fuel from foreign research reactors. The Department of Energy 
     (DOE) will respond to those questions specific to reactor 
     conversions and the status of HEU in other countries.
       The Department of Energy is in the process of preparing an 
     Environmental Impact Statement on a policy to accept from 
     foreign research reactors of up to 15,000 spent nuclear fuel 
     elements containing uranium enriched in the United States. 
     The proposed policy would be in effect for a period of up to 
     fifteen years. This Environmental Impact Statement is 
     scheduled to be released in draft form for public comment by 
     the end of December 1994, and the final Environmental Impact 
     Statement is to be completed by the end of June 1995. In the 
     interim, to meet the urgent needs of certain foreign research 
     reactor operators and to avoid failure of a key United States 
     nuclear weapons nonproliferation objective of minimizing the 
     use of highly enriched uranium in civil programs, DOE 
     proposes to accept a small number of foreign research reactor 
     spent fuel elements for storage in an existing DOE wet 
     storage facility.
       The State Department strongly supports the efforts of DOE 
     to return a limited number of research reactor spent fuel 
     elements under the Environmental Assessment. We believe that 
     failing to take back these spent fuel elements would harm the 
     Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program and 
     damage the ability of the U.S. to pursue its policy of 
     minimizing the civil use of highly enriched uranium, as well 
     as our broader nonproliferation agenda.
       The Environmental Assessment is being undertaken as part of 
     a broader United States efforts to prevent the spread of 
     nuclear weapons to additional countries, which is a 
     fundamental foreign policy and national security objective of 
     the United States. A key element of United States 
     nonproliferation policy has been to minimize the use of 
     highly enriched uranium (HEU)--a nuclear weapons usable 
     material--in civil nuclear programs worldwide. Research 
     reactors are of particular concern in this endeavor because 
     the major civil use of HEU is as fuel in nuclear research 
     reactors--reactors that are used for basic science research 
     and the production of radioisotopes for medical, agricultural 
     and industrial uses.
       In order to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons 
     proliferation posed by commerce in HEU to fuel research 
     reactors, the United States in the past adopted two mutually 
     dependent policies, the Reduced Enrichment for Research and 
     Test Reactors (RERTR) program and the Offsite Fuels Policy. 
     The RERTR program, initiated in 1978 and still ongoing, is 
     aimed at reducing the demand for HEU by developing high 
     density, low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels--not directly 
     usable in nuclear weapons--to replace the HEU fuels used in 
     both domestic and foreign research reactors.
       Forty-two research reactors which use or formerly used HEU 
     of United States origin and which operate at power levels 
     equal to or greater than 1 megawatt have been key 
     participants in the RERTR program since the late 1970s. The 
     program has helped to bring about the conversion to LEU fuel 
     of a significant number of these reactors. Many of the 
     remaining reactors are involved in extensive technical 
     cooperation with Argonne National Laboratory in addressing 
     the various studies and evaluations that are part of the LEU 
     conversion process.
       Fifteen of the 42 reactors have been fully or partially 
     converted and three reactors have ordered LEU fuel elements 
     for conversion. Three of these reactors are technically 
     unable to utilize the LEU fuels that are currently available, 
     two reactors do not need to be refueled because their cores 
     will last for the lifetime of the facility, and three 
     reactors have been or plan to be shutdown. One reactor 
     which had been reluctant to convert has indicated its 
     willingness to covert to LEU fuel if DOE agrees to take 
     back its spent fuel. The remaining fifteen reactors are in 
     various stages of the conversion process.
       Although substantial effort has been invested by reactor 
     organizations, the LEU conversion process in not 
     irreversible. The Offsite Fuels Policy offered reactor 
     operators a lower cost and simpler solution for managing 
     research reactor spent fuel than would have otherwise been 
     available, and thus was seen by the operators, at least after 
     the initiation of the RERTR program, as an essential quid pro 
     quo for incurring the substantial, technical and financial 
     expenses of converting to LEU fuel. Foreign governments and 
     reactor operators have indicated since the beginning of the 
     RERTR program that their willingness to participate in that 
     program was contingent upon the willingness of the United 
     States to continue to accept spent fuel from their research 
     reactors. The United States accepted HEU spent fuel under the 
     Offsite Fuels Policy until 1988, when the policy lapsed. (In 
     1992, the United States also allowed the Offsite Fuels Policy 
     for LEU spent fuel to lapse. The latter policy was 
     established in 1986 as an incentive for research reactors to 
     convert to LEU fuels under the RERTR program.)
       Because the United States has not been in a position to 
     take back HEU fuel for over five years, several foreign 
     research reactor operators have run out of storage capacity 
     for their spent fuel. If the United States is unable to 
     accept any near-term foreign research reactor spent fuel 
     shipments, several reactor operators soon will be forced for 
     safety and regulatory reasons to shut down their reactors or 
     ship their spent fuel to the United Kingdom for reprocessing.
       The consequences of reactor shutdown resulting from a 
     failure by the United States to accept near-term shipments of 
     foreign research reactor spent fuel would reach well beyond 
     the impacts on affected reactors. It is likely that other 
     reactor operators, believing that the United States had not 
     proven to be a reliable partner, would seek alternatives to 
     reliance on the United States until indigenous solutions for 
     their spent fuel storage issues could be found. Reduced 
     reliance on the United States likely would result in the 
     abandonment of the RERTR program by many of the foreign 
     participants, thus foreclosing the longer-term policy choices 
     to be determined after completion of the Environmental Impact 
     Statement. Indeed, some foreign research reactor operators 
     have stated categorically that, if the United States is 
     unable to accept any near-term spent fuel shipments, they 
     would terminate their participation in the RERTR program, and 
     rely on HEU fuels in the future. Their reasoning is based in 
     large part on the fact that the reprocessing option is only 
     available for HEU fuel, as discussed below.
       To avoid shutdown, some reactor operators likely would ship 
     some of their spent fuel to the United Kingdom for 
     reprocessing. Forcing reactor operators to pursue the 
     reprocessing option to avoid shutdown, however, would 
     engender a number of consequences adverse to United States 
     nonproliferation interests. First, if a research reactor were 
     forced to reprocess in order to avoid shutting down, the 
     reactor operator and the foreign government involved would 
     likely perceive that the United States has not kept its part 
     of the bargain which, in their view, was and remains a key 
     condition for their participation in the RERTR program.
       Second, while the United States government has full 
     confidence in the physical protection and safeguards systems 
     in place at the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority's 
     reprocessing facility in Dounreay, Scotland, reprocessing of 
     spent fuel containing HEU would likely mean that the research 
     reactors pursuing this option would continue operations on 
     the HEU fuel cycle. The research reactor licensing 
     authorities require research reactors to have in place 
     specific means of disposing of their spent fuel, and neither 
     Dounreay nor any other available facility is currently 
     accepting aluminum clad research reactor spent fuel 
     containing LEU for reprocessing. Hence, the research reactors 
     would have to continue to use HEU fuels. This may result in 
     reactor operators delaying or canceling plans to convert to 
     HEU, or, in some cases, reconverting from LEU to HEU fuels, a 
     result which would be directly antithetical to the goal of 
     minimizing the civil use of HEU, and would likely foreclose 
     the longer-term policy choices to be made after completion of 
     the Environmental Impact Statement.
       With regard to your question concerning U.S. policy toward 
     reprocessing of fissile materials by other countries for 
     civilian purposes, the United States believes that the 
     growing of quantities of separated plutonium have the 
     potential to raise concerns for the nonproliferation regime. 
     We are urging other nations with programs for the civil use 
     of plutonium to limit the stockpiling of such plutonium. In 
     this connection, I note the joint statement of President 
     Clinton and President Yeltsin of January 14, 1994, in which 
     the two Presidents agreed to cooperate with each other and 
     also with other states to elaborate measures designed to 
     prevent the accumulation of excess stocks of fissil materials 
     and over time to reduce such stocks.
       However, the United States does not encourage the civil use 
     of plutonium and, accordingly, does not itself engage in 
     plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear 
     explosive purposes. However, the United States has made it 
     clear that we will not oppose the use of plutonium in civil 
     nuclear programs in Western Europe and Japan where there are 
     well established programs and where states have made 
     comprehensive commitments. We are also engaged in discussion 
     with other states on the need to limit and ultimately reduce 
     and eliminate excess plutonium.
       At the same time, the United States actively discourages 
     reprocessing in areas of instability and high proliferation 
     risk such as the Korean pensinsula. The U.S. policy toward 
     reprocessing HEU is the same as our policy toward 
     reprocessing LEU.
       I am enclosing a copy of testimony by Robert J. Einhorn, 
     Deputy Assistant Secretary for Non-proliferation, Bureau of 
     Political Military Affairs, Department of State, March 23, 
     1994, before the subcommittee on International Security, 
     International Organization and Human Rights which addresses 
     in greater depth a number of the questions you have raised in 
     your letter.
       I hope this letter is responsive to your concerns. Please 
     do not hesitate to call me if you have any questions.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Wendy R. Sherman,
                         Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
                                  ____

                                     Committee on Foreign Affairs,


                                     House of Representatives,

                                   Washington, DC, March 17, 1994.
     Hon. Thomas P. Grumbly,
     Assistant Secretary for Environmental Restoration and Waste 
         Mangement, Department of Energy, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Secretary: I am writing with regard to the 
     Administration's draft environmental assessment which 
     proposes urgent return to the U.S. of spent nuclear fuel from 
     foreign research reactors. I would appreciate your 
     articulation of how such returns of spent fuel will promote 
     U.S. nonproliferation objectives.
       I would like to seek clarification of U.S. domestic and 
     international policy regarding spent nuclear fuel and its 
     reprocessing.
       Will the U.S. resume development of new low-enriched 
     uranium (LEU) fuels to enable reactor conversion from high-
     enriched uranium (HEU)?
       Does the U.S. plan to require all its own research reactors 
     to convert from HEU to LEU fuels in accord with U.S. policy 
     for foreign research reactors?
       What is the U.S. doing to deterine the status of spent fuel 
     in countries that did not respond to DOE's survey of foreign 
     research reactors (such as Iran, Pakistan, and South Korea)?
       What is U.S. policy toward reprocessing HEU, as well as 
     other fissile material?
       What is U.S. policy toward reprocessing of fissile 
     materials by other countries?
       Do you support or oppose such reprocessing when it is for 
     civilian purposes?
       Could you share with the Committee public statements on 
     your policy with respect to foreign reprocessing for civilian 
     purposes?
       A similar letter is being sent to the Honorable Robert L. 
     Gallucci, Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs, 
     Department of State, and I would appreciate a coordinated 
     response.
       I appreciate your efforts in addressing this important 
     issue.
       With best regards,
           Sincerely,
                                                  Lee H. Hamilton,
                                                         Chairman.
                                 ______



                                         Department of Energy,

                                  Washington, DC, August 17, 1994.
     Hon. Lee H. Hamilton,
     Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Your letter of March 17, 1994, to 
     Assistant Secretary Grumbly has been referred to my Office 
     for a response. We appreciate your interest in the 
     Department's draft environmental assessment proposing the 
     urgent return of spent nuclear fuel of U.S. origin from 
     foreign research reactors. I note that a similar letter, 
     containing the same questions, was sent to Robert L. Gallucci 
     at the Department of State, and we have coordinated our 
     responses. The Department of Energy's responses will address 
     the first three questions which are primarily of a technical 
     nature. The Department of State will respond to the remaining 
     questions which deal with U.S. policy.
       Regarding your question about the Department's intentions 
     to resume development of new low-enriched uranium (LEU) 
     fuels, I am pleased to inform you that we are pursuing 
     funding for this effort. Funding required is estimated to be 
     about $19,650,000 over a period of 6 years. If this new fuels 
     development effort is successful, the new LEU fuels with 
     sufficiently high uranium density would be available to 
     permit conversion of additional foreign and domestic 
     reactors. Conversion costs would be in addition to the 
     development costs.
       Concerning the conversion of U.S. reactors, at the 
     inception of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test 
     Reactor (RERTR) program, there were eighteen university 
     research reactors in the United States using highly enriched 
     uranium (HEU) fuels. These reactors were ordered by the 
     Nuclear Regulatory Commission to convert from HEU fuel to 
     LEU, and eight have completed conversion to LEU fuel. Eight 
     other university reactors are in various stages of the 
     conversion process, and two reactors cannot convert using the 
     LEU fuels that are currently available.
       The Department of Energy (DOE) reactors utilizing HEU fuels 
     with steady state power levels exceeding one megawatt thermal 
     are shown in the enclosure. One other U.S. Government 
     reactor, operated by the Department of Commerce, uses HEU 
     fuel and cannot be converted with the LEU fuels now 
     available.
       The DOE questionnaire, that you refer to in your letter, 
     was designed to elicit information from those reactors that 
     might be facing possible shutdown due to urgent operational 
     or spent fuel storage problems. It was sent to the 42 
     research reactors with power levels equal to or greater than 
     1 megawatt because these are the types of reactors which are 
     of nonproliferation concern due to their present or former 
     use of HEU (it was also sent to a number of TRIGA reactors). 
     Thirteen reactors in nine countries apparently chose not to 
     respond to the questionnaire. We assumed that these reactors 
     did not require urgent relief for their spent fuel problems.
       DOE intends to contact all research reactors of all power 
     levels using HEU or LEU fuel of U.S. origin, including those 
     which did not respond to this initial questionnaire, as part 
     of the process of preparing the Environmental Impact 
     Statement for the estimated 15,000 spent fuel elements 
     eligible for return during the 10-15 year period. Obtaining 
     the cooperation of some countries in retrieving their spent 
     fuel may require substantial diplomatic efforts. We will 
     request assistance in these efforts from the Department of 
     State.
       We appreciate your interest in these important issues and 
     will be glad to respond to any further questions you may 
     have.
           Sincerely,
                                                  John G. Keliher,
                                                         Director.

                      DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY REACTORS UTILIZING HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM FUELS                     
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Power level                                                                  
            Reactor                 (megawatts            Current status                 Conversion status      
                                     thermal)                                                                   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Advanced neutron source (ANS)..            303    Conceptual design complete,     No qualified fuel.            
                                                   line item construction                                       
                                                   project requested in FY 1995                                 
                                                   budget.                                                      
Advanced test reactor..........            250    Operational...................  No qualified fuel.            
Experimental breeder reactor-II             62.5  Operational, planned for        No qualified fuel.            
                                                   shutdown beginning FY 1995.                                  
High flux isotope reactor......             85    Operational, to be replaced by  No qualified fuel.            
                                                   the ANS.                                                     
High flux beam reactor.........             30    Operationl, to be replaced by   No qualified fuel.            
                                                   the ANS.                                                     
Brookhaven medical research                  3    Operational...................  Feasbile to convert, not      
 reactor.                                                                          funded due to higher         
                                                                                   priorities and budget        
                                                                                   constraints.                 
Annular core research reactor..              2    Operational...................  Feasible to convert, funding  
                                                                                   to be requested.             
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                                                   

                          ____________________