[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 116 (Wednesday, August 17, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: August 17, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
               BEWARE OF U.S. TROOPS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

                                 ______


                             HON. TOM DeLAY

                                of texas

                    in the house of representatives

                       Wednesday, August 17, 1994

  Mr. DeLAY. Mr. Speaker, despite repeated assurances by administration 
officials that any discussion of deployment of United States soldiers 
to the Golan Heights is premature, there is reason to believe that in 
the event of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria, American 
troops will be dispatched to the Middle East. In fact, when Secretary 
of State Warren Christopher was asked whether United States troops on 
the Golan might be part of any Israeli-Syrian agreement, his response 
was, absolutely. This would be the first major stationing of U.S. 
forces there since the catastrophic 1983 Beirut deployment.
  The possibility of such a deployment raises serious concerns about 
the safety of United States troops, the sustainability of such a 
mission, and the longterm security of Israel. I would like to submit 
for the Congressional Record an article that appeared in the Houston 
Chronicle on August 5 by Yoram Ettinger entitled, ``Doubt a U.S. 
Presence on Golan is Sustainable.'' I encourage my colleagues and 
administration officials to read it, as it makes a number of very 
important points about the risks of such a plan.

              [From the Houston, Chronicle, Aug. 5, 1994]

             Doubt a U.S. Presence on Golan Is Sustainable

                          (By Yoram Ettinger)

       Former U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin suggested at a June 
     meeting in Tel Aviv that a current proposal to deploy U.S. 
     troops on the Golan Heights--following total evacuation by 
     Israel--will have to be in the magnitude of a brigade in 
     order to be significant. Under current Pentagon guidelines, 
     he noted, such an initiative would constitute a strain on the 
     U.S. military, since it would require preparing a division--
     one-tenth of all American forces. Aspin indicated that if the 
     scope of the deployment would be limited to the monitoring 
     presence in Sinai, ``then it would be trivial.''
       In addition, Rep. Lee Hamilton, D-Ind., chairman of the 
     House Committee on foreign Affairs, has recently indicated 
     that a survey is already under way to determine the specific 
     locations of a U.S. peacekeeping force on the Golan.
       Such a force would, supposedly, constitute an essential 
     reassuring component. It would ostensibly be essential in 
     light of:
       (a) Syrian leader Hafex Assad's military potential and his 
     record of brutality and unpredictability.
       (B) The short-lived tenure of hundreds of Mideast inter-
     Muslim political agreements.
       (C) The violently abrupt nature of their abrogation.
       (D) Israel's risk-taking by giving away the Golan.
       However, in order to bolster a potentially vulnerable 
     accord, a U.S. presence on the Golan is required to be a 
     durable, long-term and political/military sustainable 
     undertaking. Moreover, it is required to be compatible with 
     U.S. interests, lest it be summarily withdrawn, thus 
     upsetting a fragile arrangement and undermining the prospects 
     for real peace. Is the deployment of U.S. peacekeepers 
     (monitoring or combat, unilateral or multinational) 
     consistent with such requirements?
       A Washington power broker agreed with me last week that the 
     question of a complete withdrawal from the Golan should be 
     decided by Israel voters. He stated, however, that the fate 
     of U.S. peacekeepers and their implications for U.S. national 
     security should be debated by the American public and the 
     appropriate congressional committees, independent of Israel's 
     stance. I believe that public debate should go forward with 
     the following in mind.
       Unlike U.S. observers in Sinai (22,000 square miles of 
     empty desert), U.S. personnel on the Golan (450 square miles) 
     would be situated about 25 miles from two of the most 
     notorious training/operational centers of international 
     terrorism and narco-terrorism: Damascus and the Damascus-
     controlled Beqa Valley (``Medellin Drug Cartel East''). 
     Unlike ordinary U.N. forces, U.S. servicemen on the Golan 
     would serve as a lightning rod for these terrorists.
       U.S. observers in Sinai are located on the Red Sea across 
     from Saudi Arabia, a relatively predictable ally of the 
     United States. On the other hand, a Golan contingency--
     stationed in a neighborhood the size of a small U.S. 
     congressional district--would border Lebanon, a microcosm of 
     Mideast volatility, violence, fragmentation and Islamic and 
     Arab nationalist, anti-U.S. sentiments.
       Moreover, the Sinai presence is situated between Israel and 
     Egypt, which is ruled by a pro-U.S., relatively moderate Arab 
     regime. However, a Golan contingency would separate Israel 
     from Syria, a traditional ally of Iran, North Korea, Cuba and 
     Somalia's Col. Mohammed Aideed. Damascus has also 
     demonstrated its capability to defy the United States, as 
     evidenced by the devastation of the Marine headquarters in 
     Beirut, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, etc.
       Furthermore, the safe location of the Sinai monitors and 
     their distance from Israeli and Egyptian military forces, 
     puts them out of the line of fire should a clash occur. On 
     the other hand, the Golan forces would be geographically 
     sandwiched between Israel and its mightiest Arab neighbor, 
     Syria, a few miles away from its armory, infantry and 
     artillery.
       Moreover, terrorist proxies of hostile, radical regimes 
     (Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, etc.) could target U.S. 
     servicemen. They could also preserve the element of 
     deniability, while intimidating Washington, constraining its 
     ability to respond to provocations elsewhere (e.g. the 
     Persian Gulf area) and extorting political concessions.
       In the absence of an effective U.S. combat force (which is 
     precluded--even theoretically--by the diminished overall size 
     of the U.S. military), one may predict a possible withdrawal 
     of the peacekeepers in the face of hostage-taking and 
     casualties. Such a withdrawal would be perceived as another 
     retreat following Beirut, Somalia and Haiti. It would further 
     erode the U.S. posture of deterrence, shrinking its public 
     support for future well-thought-out and globally essential 
     overseas military involvement.
       While on the Golan, U.S. presence would constrain Israel by 
     forcing her to coordinate preemptive and reactive operations 
     with the United States, thus inadvertently shielding 
     terrorists operating outside the Golan. It would also deny 
     the United States the benefits from Israel's ``unauthorized 
     actions'' (e.g., the 1981 bombing of Iraqi's nuclear 
     reactor).
       In fact, requiring Israel to seek prior approval in 
     countering belligerence would strain U.S. relations with 
     Israel. At the same time, appearing to have enabled Israel to 
     act freely would damage U.S.-Arab ties. However, as 
     demonstrated by the precedent of the 1982/83 U.S. episode in 
     Lebanon, and as is evidenced by Mideast complexities, one can 
     expect the undermining of the relationship between the United 
     States and both sides, which is essential to the achievement 
     of a genuine peace.
       In addition, a U.S. presence at a stormy junction bordering 
     Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and numerous terrorist groups, 
     could draw the United States unwillingly into regional and 
     costly inter-Arab and inter-Israel disputes, expanding the 
     scope of these conflicts, otherwise confined to local 
     significance (e.g., Somalia). It would certainly deepen the 
     involvement of Russia (which has resumed strategic 
     cooperation with Syria), France (which still views Lebanon as 
     a French auxiliary) and other powers, further exacerbating 
     global and regional tensions at the expense of U.S. concerns.
       Keeping in mind the American public reaction to the U.S. 
     military involvement in Lebanon and Somalia, and recognizing 
     the likely pitfalls of a U.S. force on the Golan, such an 
     undertaking would probably be neither durable, nor long term, 
     nor politically/militarily sustainable. Thus, a political 
     arrangement predicated upon such a tenuous component would 
     ultimately imperil regional stability, threaten U.S. 
     interests and jeopardize the quest for a solid, long-term 
     peace in the Middle East.

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