[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 112 (Friday, August 12, 1994)]
[Page S]
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[Congressional Record: August 12, 1994]
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  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, we are on the pending amendment, that is 
the amendment by the Senator from Virginia, the Senator from Florida, 
the Senator from Arizona, to establish a Presidential Commission.
  Momentarily the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Specter], will address 
it. But in the meantime, I suggest perhaps our colleague from New York 
be given an opportunity.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. How much time does the Senator from Arizona have 
remaining on the bill?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona controls 21 minutes 
on the bill; 12\1/2\ minutes on the pending amendment.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I yield to the Senator from New York 10 minutes on the 
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized for 10 
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, it is with no pleasure I rise on this 
occasion. Rather, I rise with a sense of responsibility to the 
committee and to the body, to recount experiences of another time in 
which the intelligence community has been very much less than candid 
and open with respect to matters that the Intelligence Committee should 
have been informed about.
  There has been some discussion in recent days concerning the failure 
of the intelligence community to notify the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the new headquarters of the National Reconnaissance 
Office. This is not new. This is not the first time such a thing has 
happened, nor will it be, I fear, the last such incident, while the 
existing culture--if I could use that large word--of the intelligence 
community, of the national security state, of the secrecy system, stays 
in place.
  I served for 8 years on the Intelligence Committee. I joined it the 
first year after it was created. And in those 8 years I was very 
closely associated with Barry Goldwater, a man revered in this 
institution not least because he was incapable of lying. For 4 years I 
was the vice chairman of the committee and he was chairman and we spent 
a very great deal of time together. At that time there was an 
understanding, which I am sure exists today, that there are some 
matters which, if the chairman and vice chairman are notified about, it 
can be considered that the Senate has been informed. Unfortunately, 
this is an Agency which has lied to Congress before. Egregiously.
  Perhaps the most extraordinary example was the concerted campaign 
launched in the spring of 1984 when it emerged that the Central 
Intelligence Agency had mined harbors in Nicaragua--arguably a 
violation of international law and treaty, but inarguably a significant 
anticipated action. As I recall the language of the statute, ``the 
committee will be informed of significant anticipated activities.'' We 
were not.
  The world knew about the mining of the harbors immediately--it was 
the intention that the world should know. But that our Government had 
done this, was not known.
  In the spring, the Wall Street Journal reported that this had been an 
action of the Agency--Mr. David Rogers, specifically. Barry Goldwater 
was outraged. He had not been told of something as important as the 
mining of the Nicaraguan harbors, and he so stated. Whereupon the 
Agency began what Robert R. Simmons, the former staff director of the 
committee, said ``can only be described as a domestic disinformation 
campaign against the U.S. Congress in which they alleged that the 
intelligence committees had been fully briefed on the harbor mining 
program.'' The attack on Chairman Goldwater was vicious.
  They went to the New York Times--which was concerned about this--and 
told the Times that, no, Senator Goldwater was informed. It is simply 
that Senator Goldwater is not as keen as he may once have been; that he 
does not remember everything that happens; that, in effect, senility 
had set in. And the Times--given the seriousness of the charge and the 
manifest sincerity with which they were told by Agency officials, 
regretfully, reported that the Senator has begun to lose it. Repeatedly 
the Agency claimed that he was told, he just cannot recall having been 
told. It was a lie, an audacious lie, about a revered Member of this 
body. And faced with it, and the proposition that it was not going to 
be retracted, I--then acting chairman in Senator Goldwater's absence--
announced I would resign in protest.
  When the announcement appeared--it was Easter time and Senator 
Goldwater was in the Far East--it caused something of a ruckus. And, in 
time, the then-director, Mr. William J. Casey, came to the committee, 
we then met up on the 4th floor of the Capitol here, and apologized. He 
acknowledged the committee had not been adequately informed.
  Part of the disinformation operation involved an address given at the 
Naval Academy--the Naval Academy, I say to Senator Warner--where we 
teach standards of truthfulness. Mr. McFarland, then National Security 
Adviser to the President, went to the Naval Academy and told the cadets 
that Senator Goldwater and the committee had been informed--lied to the 
  Subsequently, Mr. McFarland testified before the Iran-Contra 
Committees on May 12, 1987--we are now more than 3 years from then. In 
many ways, Iran-Contra arose out of the mining of the harbors, money 
was cut off, and so forth.

  Here is an exchange between Senator Sarbanes and Mr. McFarland who, I 
want to say, has made clear he wished he had never done any of those 
  Reading from transcript:

       Mr. Sarbanes. Did you know about the mining of the 
     Nicaraguan harbor?
       Mr. McFarland. Yes, sir.
       Mr. Sarbanes. Did you think that should have been consulted 
     with the Intelligence Committees?
       Mr. McFarland. Yes, sir.
       Mr. Sarbanes: It wasn't done.
       Mr. McFarland: No, sir.

  But the disinformation campaign almost prevailed and never really got 
  Following that episode, Director Casey signed the agreements 
negotiated with the Intelligence Committees which came to be known as 
the Casey accords. They were specifically designed to see that 
something like the mining of the harbors never happened again without 
the committee being informed. Not that the President could not do what 
he ordered done, but the committee would be informed.
  One was signed while Mr. Goldwater and I were chairman and ranking 
member, and another one was signed a year later. Whereupon the Agency 
proceeded to lie to the committees again. During all of this period, 
the Iran-Contra episode took place and the committee was never 
involved. Indeed, a second agreement was made the following year which 
confirmed how well it was working, but it was never informed.
  Madam President, I discussed this disinformation matter with Mr. 
Gates when he was under consideration for the post of--Madam President, 
may I have 2 additional minutes, if I may ask Senator DeConcini?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Boxer). Does the Senator yield 2 minutes?
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I yield up to 5 minutes and I ask the time come off 
the pending amendment.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, I will not take that much time.
  At the time Mr. Gates was being considered for the Director of the 
Agency, I raised with him specifically the question of the 
disinformation campaign directed against Senator Goldwater, and he 
undertook to look into this and to clear up the record, which now all 
agree Mr. Casey and Mr. McFarland had lied about Barry Goldwater.
  Mr. Gates did not do a thing. He was there, I recall, for 4 years and 
never lifted a finger to say the Agency had done what it ought never 
have done and what it ought not do again.
  If I can say, Dean Acheson saw all this coming. In his book, 
``Present at the Creation,'' he wrote:

       I had the gravest foreboding about this organization and 
     warned the President that * * * neither he, the National 
     Security Council, nor anyone else would be in a position to 
     know what (the CIA) was doing or to control it.

  It is a simple thought that secrecy corrupts. It corrupts analysis. 
Two years before the Berlin Wall came down, the CIA formally estimated 
the per capita gross domestic product in East Germany to be higher than 
West Germany. In his memoir, George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, 
recalls in 1986 when then President Reagan and he were thinking that 
perhaps they might have some success with Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Gates, 
then the Director of Intelligence, informed him, Mr. Secretary, ``the 
Soviet Union is a despotism that works.''
  You can reach out and touch the day that the Soviet Union would 
collapse but, no, secrecy inhibits the correction of error. The error 
simply gets compounded and extended, and it leads to events such as 
misleading the Congress. It has done so in the past and will do so in 
the future, so long as it continues.
  The secrecy system is still in place. You may know that we have an 
Information Security Oversight Office which counts the annual creation 
of secrets. Its most recent report shows that last year, 6,408,688 
secrets were created. Can you imagine that we know there were 6,408,688 
secrets created last year, a 1-percent increase in the first year of 
the Clinton administration?
  This will go on until we do something about it, addressing it 
directly. We have created a Commission on Protecting and Reducing 
Government Secrecy, which is even now in the process of being 
assembled. I understand Mr. Hamilton in the House has agreed to be on 
the Commission and I have done so on the Senate side. Other Members of 
Congress and private citizens will be appointed. The mission of the 
Commission is of singular importance to the Republic. It is no less 
than examining ways to reclaim the liberties of the people. I welcome 
the proposal by the Senator from Virginia for a review of current 
intelligence needs. I ask to be made a cosponsor.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, will the Senator yield on my time?
  We will most assuredly add him as a cosponsor. His cosponsorship has 
a special meaning because he has, again, served on this committee some 
8 years, and has identified himself over these many years with the 
Intelligence Committee.
  But also, Madam President, as I conceived of the idea of the 
Presidential Commission, I thought back on the Social Security 
Commission, which was one of the most successful in the 16 years I have 
been privileged to serve in this body. That is a Commission that laid 
down a format that was quite readily adopted by the Congress and the 
executive branch.
  The distinguished Senator from New York has a far clearer 
recollection of the work done by that Commission. And given the fact 
that this administration at the moment is not wholeheartedly in support 
of the idea of the Senator from Virginia of a Presidential Commission, 
I wonder if he might address that Commission and how it could likewise 
have a parallel effect on supporting this Commission.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Yes. The Nation's largest domestic program, the Social 
Security Administration, was in imminent danger of bankruptcy. It would 
have shaken the society in an extraordinary way. The danger was not 
perhaps as grave as was perceived, but the unthinkable would have 
occurred: The checks would not go out.
  President Reagan, with the vigorous assistance of the then majority 
leader, Mr. Baker, and Mr. O'Neill, the Speaker of the House, assembled 
a Commission, a bipartisan Commission, with representatives of the 
President, the House, the Senate, and with Alan Greenspan as our 
executive director, now the distinguished head of the Federal Reserve, 
and Senator Dole, who was a leading member. It took us a year to get 
our work done.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from New York 
that his 5 minutes he was yielded has expired.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I ask for 1 additional minute.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I yield 1 additional minute from the pending 
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time is yielded.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. As Senator Dole said, when you first hear about these 
matters, they seem insoluble. And many people thought this whole Social 
Security thing could never ever be sound in the first place. But he 
said the more you learn--it had taken a lot of learning and reading--we 
can fix this thing. He said it the day after he had been reelected, in 
the Chamber, sitting right over there. He had written an article in the 
New York Times to that effect.
  I went up to him. I said, ``We cannot officially work it out.'' I 
said, ``We can fix this thing, can't we? Do you think so? Why don't 
we?'' And with the help of James A. Baker III, in about 10 days' time 
it was done.
  But a lot of learning had taken place, a lot of facts had been 
assembled, and it was bipartisan. And it was something that was not 
forced on the President. To the contrary, the President welcomed the 
solution in the end. A secure Social Security System emerged.
  If I may say, the last of the recommendations to be concluded was 
that the Social Security Administration be an independent agency. The 
Senate adopted a conference report to that effect about 2 weeks ago. 
The House did yesterday afternoon by a unanimous vote. This kind of 
unanimity comes out of the bipartisanship and cross-relationship 
between the Congress and the Executive.
  I think we have an excellent idea. It is not a moment too soon. And I 
wish the Senator very well, every success, and I am honored to be a 
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will state that the Senator's time 
has now expired, and the Senator from Virginia has no further time 
remaining on this amendment.
  Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, would the distinguished Senator seeking 
recognition just allow me to thank my colleague from New York.
  My understanding is the Senator from Pennsylvania is now to be 
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. The Senator has 15 minutes.
  The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I thank the Chair.
  At the outset, I compliment the distinguished chairman, Senator 
DeConcini, and the distinguished ranking member, Senator Warner, for 
their leadership of the Intelligence Committee and for bringing to the 
floor the Intelligence Authorization Act and the pending amendment for 
the creation of an independent commission to review the roles and 
capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community, which I support.
  The public may wonder why a commission is necessary, but the fact is 
that the work of the Senate and the House, too, is so involved with so 
many varied matters that a review by a commission, which can spend the 
time necessary, is very much in the national interest.
  I am glad to see that the final report date has been advanced from 
December 31, 1996 to March 1, 1996. It would have been my hope that the 
commission could have finished its work at an earlier date so we would 
have the advantage of their thinking, but it does take time for 
clearances. It is important that the commission have enough time to do 
its work right, but the sooner the better.
  I had the privilege of serving on the Intelligence Committee for some 
6 years and have been off the committee now for 3\1/2\ years and look 
forward to rejoining the Intelligence Committee next year, hopefully as 
the chairman, assuming a Republican majority, or in the absence of a 
Republican majority, then as the vice chairman.
  The committee has very, very important work to do. The comments I 
wish to make today--and I had hoped to be here earlier today but was 
working with a group meeting on health insurance--relate to the threat 
of terrorism and how we are going to deal with terrorism and the need 
institutionally to establish an international criminal court.
  Our overhead satellites tell us a great deal, but the most important 
work is done by what is called in the trade ``HUMINT,'' which means 
human intelligence. I believe that past limitations of funds set back 
the intelligence community on human intelligence which is a very slow, 
time-consuming process to build agents who have the capacity to work 
within the networks of the terrorists and to work within the networks 
of those who are planning ill for the world, to find out what is going 
on so that we can respond.
  The recent incident with Aldrich Ames has set back human intelligence 
even further by his disclosures and by the tragedy of so many of 
intelligence agents being murdered, being eliminated.
  I am hopeful that the intelligence community will work on this very 
time-consuming, difficult matter to reestablish HUMINT.
  With the decrease of international hijacking of airplanes, there may 
be a public perception that terrorism is on the wane. But the fact is, 
as disclosed by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
international terrorism is on the increase, with some 427 terrorist 
incidents worldwide last year, which represents a significant increase 
over the 362 incidents in 1992. The Director of Central Intelligence, 
James Woolsey, pointed out in open testimony the activities of Iran in 
continuing to support the Lebanese Hezbollah who are violently opposing 
progress on the Mideast Peace Accord between Israel and the PLO and now 
between Israel and Jordan.
  We saw the recent bombings of the Israeli Embassy and Jewish Center 
in Buenos Aires which is linked to foreign terrorism. We saw not too 
long ago, the bombing of the World Trade Center.
  Terrorism remains an enormous problem internationally. What has to be 
understood publicly is that just because the incidence of international 
hijackings has decreased, the security of innocent civilians has not 
increased. Unfortunately, the public focus is too short-lived, and that 
is understandable because there are so many problems that confront the 
country. But those of us in Washington who work on intelligence must 
pursue the threat in a professional, systematic manner.
  One area on which we have not had the progress is in the 
establishment of an international criminal court which I have spoken 
about many times during my 14 years in this body and which the Senate 
and the House have endorsed on many occasions.
  Quite candidly, it has not received the support of either Republican 
or Democrat administrations. If we are to stem the tide of 
international crimes, it is very important that we move ahead to 
institutionalize a mechanism to deal with such crimes--an international 
criminal court. We do have a war crimes tribunal which has been set up 
for the crimes against humanity and probable genocide in Bosnia. The 
Senate has debated, as has the House, many times trying to take action 
against these atrocities. We talk about bombing, which has been 
limited. We talk about land operations, which have been rejected for 
very practical reasons. We talk about unilaterally lifting the arms 
  But one thing we could do--which we owe victims of war crimes in 
Bosnia--is not so complicated. It is to bring the war criminals to 
trial and to show that there is an international rule of law. The 
United Nations, with U.S. support, did establish a war crimes tribunal 
and finally laboriously a chief prosecutor. The court must now act.
  I took the floor a year ago to earmark some $3 million for the war 
crimes tribunal to investigate and gather evidence together. The 
Senate, the House and the administration ought to be pushing much 
harder for prosecutions and accountability.
  Now we have the atrocities in Rwanda. I am gratified to note that the 
Secretary of State has called for an international criminal court to 
try the war criminals in Rwanda. But we cannot expect a war crimes 
tribunal to be established for each and every violation of 
internationally accepted law. The solution is to establish a permanent 
international court. There was strong public support years ago for such 
a court with the hijacking of the Achille Lauro and the murder of Leon 
Klinghoffer, and for what happened when Abu Abbas left Egypt on an 
airliner to Tunisia, was forced down in Italy, where Abbas was released 
by Italian authorities, later tried in absentia, and finally received a 
30-year jail sentence, which meant absolutely nothing.
  I had an opportunity back in 1986 to discuss the incident with the 
then Prime Minister of Italy, Prime Minister Craxi and then with 
Yugoslavian President Mojsov, who were concerned about the terrorism 
implications for their country. Had we had an international criminal 
court, I think the Italians, the Yugoslavs or Egypt would have turned 
over Abbas to an international criminal court.
  There is a matter of national sovereignty, and Egypt was not prepared 
to turn over Abu Abbas to the United States. When the Egyptian airliner 
was forced down in Sicily, there was a standoff between United States 
military personnel and Italian military personnel, and, as a result, we 
did not get our hands on Abu Abbas for trial in the United States. 
Questions had been raised at that time of whether the United States had 
jurisdiction over terrorism committed against U.S. citizens abroad.
  Fortunately, we did correct U.S. law with the 1984 Omnibus Crime 
Control Act, which gives U.S. courts jurisdiction over hijackers, 
terrorists, and the 1986 Terrorist Prosecution Act which I introduced 
and which was passed after the terrorist murders in the Rome and Vienna 
  We also need a permanent international criminal court to try 
international drug traffickers.
  Examples for this need are the incidents of international drug 
dealers residing in Colombia, and the U.S. difficulty in gaining their 
extradition to the United States. Former President Gaveria of Colombia 
told me that it would have been easier to extradite and try these 
criminals in an international criminal court.
  I would like to focus now on the enormous problem of the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, chemical, and 
biological, and their missile delivery systems. In North Korea we have 
good reason to believe that a nuclear bomb is being developed but have 
insufficient proof to really confront the North Koreans. The same 
nuclear weapons development problem was true in Iraq and with the so-
called ``Big Gun,'' it is true in India, Pakistan, and Iran.
  Those are problems of overwhelming importance in nations with despots 
like Saddam Hussein, the despots who run Iran, and the uncertainty and 
unpredictability in North Korea's reaction as to efforts to persuade 
them to comply with international conventions such as the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. There is still a great and concerted need for 
intelligence, especially human intelligence even when these violations 
are not hitting the front pages.
  So I think the Intelligence Authorization Act is important. I think 
the creation of the new independent commission can give us further 
insight. But I think most importantly, we have to work institutionally 
to develop human intelligence, and institutionally we have to work to 
develop the international criminal court.
  I look forward next year to joining the Intelligence Committee. We 
will be losing a valued member in Senator DeConcini who will 
regrettably be leaving this body after 18 years of distinguished 
service. I think that the Intelligence Committee has done outstanding 
work. It is obvious that vigilance and oversight is necessary at all 
times especially in light of the recent disclosures about the building 
of the new NRO establishment. But these are items which have to be 
  I look forward to working with my colleagues on these important 
issues in the future.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I thank the Senator from 
Pennsylvania. Indeed, he will be a valuable member of the committee. 
Certainly he will be on the committee next year, and we look forward to 
his real leadership.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Yes.
  Mr. WARNER. I join the distinguished chairman in commending our 
colleague. Indeed, I had the pleasure of serving on the committee at 
the same time that he served.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank my colleagues for those generous comments. I 
look forward to the serving on the committee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield the remaining 3 minutes 
and 31 seconds?
  Mr. SPECTER. I yield that time to my colleague from Utah, Senator 
Hatch, and more time, if necessary, off my time.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that my remarks 
are considered as in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Chair inquires how much time the Senator may use?
  Mr. HATCH. I am not sure.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. May I inquire? How long does the Senator anticipate?
  Mr. HATCH. I do not know. It will not be very long; maybe 10 minutes.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I do not want to object to the Senator from Utah, but 
we are trying to pass this bill and vote by 1 o'clock. We have one more 
amendment. We have a 30-minute limitation. Could the Senator restrict 
that to 5 minutes?
  Mr. HATCH. I do not know if I can. But I will certainly try.
  Mr. GRAMM. Madam President, reserving the right to object, maybe I 
should notify my colleagues. I would like to have an opportunity to 
speak for 5 minutes. I will limit it strictly to 5 minutes. It is not 
my objective to hold up this bill. But I would like to make a comment 
on another subject. The time in which I speak will be strictly limited 
to 5 minutes.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Will the Senators let us just put in some statements, 
and yield the time on the pending Warner amendment? Then we will ask 
for some 5 minutes time before we go to the next amendment.
  Mr. HATCH. Sure.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, the pending amendment is the Warner 
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

   commission on the roles and capabilities of the U.S. intelligence 

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I rise in support of the amendment 
offered today by Senators Warner and Graham to create a Commission on 
the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
  I give Senator Warner, the distinguished vice chairman of the Select 
Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Graham, who has made an 
extremely valuable contribution as a member of the committee, the 
lion's share of the credit for this initiative. They have for some time 
now believed such an effort is needed.
  I have come to agree with them. Indeed, it has been my hope that the 
DCI might have initiated such a review, but this has not happened, and, 
plain and simply, I am tired of waiting. I believe this amendment 
represents a better way to go.
  Madam President, there have been significant changes in the 
intelligence community since the end of the cold war. There have been 
personnel reductions and reallocations of resources carried out by 
individual agencies.
  Bu what we are thus far lacking and what is, in my opinion, sorely 
needed, is an overall revalidation of the roles and capabilities of the 
intelligence community in the post-cold-war world. We need to have an 
objective, hard-headed look at the fundamentals: at what we expect 
intelligence agencies to do, at what levels they should be resourced, 
at what capabilities they must retain for the future. Everything should 
be on the table.
  I do not think this can be achieved by the executive branch looking 
at itself, nor do I think the congressional oversight committees have 
the capability to do what is needed.

  What this amendment proposes is a bipartisan commission with 17 
members. Nine would be appointed by the President; two by the majority 
and minority leaders of the Senate, respectively, and two by the 
Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives, 
respectively. The President would designate a chairman. The Commission 
would be empowered to hire its own staff and not have to rely on staff 
from the intelligence agencies.
  The end result of its work would be a report to the President and the 
Congress. To the extent possible, the report would be unclassified and 
made available to the public. There would necessarily be a classified 
supplement which would not be made public but which would be provided 
to the President and the intelligence committees.
  The amendment provides the Commission with sufficient time to do its 
job. These are difficult issues and should not be assessed in a rush. 
The amendment provides that the final report of the Commission be 
submitted no later than March 1, 1996. Given the time which will be 
required for the appointment and security processing of the members of 
the Commission, we think this will allow more than a year for the 
Commission to do its substantive work.
  Madam President, in my tenure on the Intelligence Committee and in 
particular during these last 2 years when I've served as chairman, it 
has become increasingly clear to me that the political consensus that 
we once had for this function has eroded and continues to erode. We 
need a new consensus. We need a new rationale--a revalidation of the 
approach we have been taking by a group of objective, hard-headed 
people, with no axe to grind and no stake in the outcome. This is what 
we contemplate in this Commission.
  I am convinced this amendment will serve the interests of both the 
executive and legislative branches and urge my colleagues to support 
  Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I am pleased to support the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995. This bill does not 
reduce the intelligence budget by as much as I believe it should. It 
does represent, however, a sincere effort by the Intelligence Committee 
to identify those programs that can most readily be cut back without 
any harm to the national security.
  This bill, as amended, will deal with problems that our audit team 
uncovered in its recent investigation of the new headquarters building 
for the National Reconnaissance Office. We held a hearing on this 
subject on Wednesday, where high officials and veteran NRO personnel 
admitted that the building project should have been presented to the 
committee as a separate budget item. The witnesses also agreed that, 
now that the NRO is publicly acknowledged, there would be no reason for 
covert procurement of a building such as this one in the future.
  The DeConcini-Warner amendment, which is similar to the Bryan and 
Boren amendments to the Defense appropriations bill, will ensure that 
these problems do not occur in the future. I am happy to support it.
  The Intelligence Authorization Act, as amended today, will also bring 
about needed reforms in the counterintelligence and security field. And 
it will mandate a presidential commission to examine the roles and 
missions of our intelligence agencies.
  I am especially pleased that we will make it easier for intelligence 
agencies to track the financial and travel activities of their 
employees with access to the most sensitive information. Such 
activities are far better indicators of possible security problems than 
are the political and sexual questions that security officers have 
pursued in the past.
  I am also pleased that we are moving to create a system of court 
orders for physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes. The 
executive branch conducts secret searches of people's homes and offices 
today, based upon a constitutionally suspect claim of presidential 
powers which are then delegated to the Attorney General. I think that 
is a terrible way in which to handle such an intrusive technique.
  By contrast, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which was 
established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, has 
consistently passed constitutional muster for the control of foreign 
intelligence wiretaps, which are a similarly invasive technique. 
Allowing the FISA court to handle physical searches will enable us to 
bring judicial supervision to an area that surely warrants it.
  I should add that I do hope some changes will be made to the physical 
search provision in conference. For example, the bill before us would 
allow a person who is in a legal proceeding to object to the use of 
seized documents only if that person owned the documents or the 
premises that were searched. But someone could easily have documents 
about you that were not owned by you, but either were written by you or 
were authoritative records concerning you.
  I think that in such a case, if the Government is going to use those 
documents against you in a legal proceeding, you should be permitted to 
contest the legality of the search. I say this especially because the 
Government will be allowed to undertake that search without showing 
probable cause that a crime has been committed.
  At a recent hearing of the House Intelligence Committee, former 
Department of Justice official Kenneth Bass had some additional 
suggestions for the conference committee. He would broaden the 
circumstances in which a defense attorney may gain access to the 
documents underlying a physical search order. And he suggests that when 
the Government seeks a court order authorizing an intelligence search, 
an officer of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court be instructed 
to act as an ``advocate of the target arguing against the warrant.'' 
All these ideas, which arose after our mark-up, can and should be 
addressed in conference.
  The intelligence authorization bill will put into law a new 
interagency structure for handling counterintelligence issues. The old 
system was clearly broke, and the many mistakes surrounding the Aldrich 
Ames espionage case merely underscore the tragic lack of coordination 
and cooperation between the various executive branch agencies that 
handle personnel security and counterespionage matters.
  The bill we approve today will give the new National 
Counterintelligence Policy Board a permanent chairman, rather than 
relying upon a rotating chair that can only be a prescription for drift 
and inaction in future years. I can readily believe that a rotating 
chair was the best that the White House could get competing agencies to 
accept. But that is no reason for the Congress to limit its efforts to 
improve counterintelligence policy making. We will do the country a 
real service by giving that board one chair, and the Attorney General 
is as fair a person as you are likely to find for the task.
  I am a cosponsor of the Warner-Graham-DeConcini bill to establish a 
Presidential commission on the roles and missions of our intelligence 
agencies, so I am delighted to see that idea added to the budget bill 
today. We may not all agree on how well U.S. intelligence is doing or 
on how much money to spend on it, but all of us know that a careful 
look is needed at the role of intelligence after the cold war.
  The commission we are proposing will be named largely by the 
President, but will also have members from the House and Senate. I 
think it will give the President and the country a fresh view of what 
intelligence is needed, and how to meet those needs.
  Let me note, however, that we do not want the intelligence agencies 
to just stand around while this commission considers their fate. If 
there are changes or reforms that an agency knows it should make, it 
should go right ahead and make them. This commission will be no excuse 
for drift and inaction.
  Let me turn now to the issue of disclosing the total figure for the 
intelligence budget. Last year, of course, the Senate passed a ``sense 
of Congress'' provision calling on the President to find a means of 
disclosing that figure. I regret that we were forced to drop that 
provision in conference.
  Three things have happened since then to give me confidence that 
we will eventually win on this issue. First, on November 22 of last 
year, 11 leaders of Congress joined me in urging the President to 
disclose the budget figure. The nine Democrats and two Republicans who 
signed that letter included the majority leader of the Senate, the 
Speaker and majority leader of the House of Representatives, the 
chairmen of both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, and no 
fewer than six former chairmen or vice chairmen of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, tht the 
text of that letter be included in the Record.

  The second hopeful sign was a letter of March 23, 1994, from the 
Director of Central Intelligence, Jim Woolsey, to our vice chairman, 
Senator John Warner. My colleagues may recall that in last year's 
debate on this issue, one of Senator Warner's major points was that 
other countries do not disclose how much they spend on intelligence. 
That did not bother me, because I am not frightened by the thought of 
America being a pioneer. We were the first country to establish 
congressional oversight of intelligence, and now we see more and more 
countries following our lead.
  A month after he raised that argument, Senator Warner asked the DCI 
to study other countries' practices and report back to us. Director 
Woolsey's reply listed seven countries that do disclose their 
intelligence budget totals, including Australia, New Zealand, Norway, 
Greece and--most recently--our closest intelligence partner, the United 
Kingdom. Now, I still do not believe that we should be bound by the 
practices of other countries. But I am delighted to see this specious 
argument die a peaceful death and to report to my colleagues that more 
recent statements by opponents of disclosure carefully omit any 
discussion of what our allies are doing.
  Finally, Mr. President, I take heart from the recent vote on this 
issue in the House of Representatives. I am sorry that the House 
rejected an amendment proposed by House Intelligence Committee Chairman 
Dan Glickman to require disclosure of the budget total. But I am very 
pleased that the margin of defeat was only 27 votes. That compares very 
favorably with the 95-vote margin by which a weaker proposal was 
defeated just 1 year ago. It demonstrates, in my view, that the march 
of history is in our direction.
  The bill before us today does not contain any provision regarding 
budget disclosure. Based on last year's experience, moreover, I know 
that passage of such a provision by the Senate will not achieve our 
purpose in the face of the recent vote in the House. I will not take up 
my colleagues' time, therefore, by proposing disclosure language today.
  I am confident, however, that within a year or so, a freshman 
Democratic Senator from Ohio will join a majority of his colleagues in 
both houses in enacting legislation to strike this modest, but needed, 
blow for the American people's right to know how the Government is 
spending their money.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                Congress of the United States,

                                Washington, DC, November 22, 1993.
     The President of the United States,
     The White House Office, Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, 
       Dear Mr. President: Last February, Senator Metzenbaum sent 
     you a letter proposing that the Executive branch disclose to 
     the public the aggregate amount requested and authorized for, 
     and spent on, intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities. We are writing you now to reinforce that message 
     and to urge you to take decisive action on this issue.
       The world has changed greatly since the Cold War days in 
     which the norm of strict secrecy on the intelligence budget 
     was established. We no longer face a monolithic enemy with a 
     massive intelligence establishment that might somehow use 
     this information to harm us. Neither can we rely upon 
     unquestioning public support for secret operations or for the 
     budgets to support them.
       You and your administration are well aware of this. In your 
     campaign and in your months in office, you have stood for 
     both greater openness and greater economy in our government. 
     You have also begun the process of drafting a new Executive 
     order on classified information, even as the Director of 
     Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense have 
     created a Joint Security Commission to recommend more 
     rational and economical means of defining and protecting the 
     information that truly requires secrecy in order to protect 
     the national security.
       We believe that in the post-Cold War world, and especially 
     in a time of budget stringency when national priorities are 
     being reexamined, the level of intelligence spending 
     (although not the details) must be open to the public. In the 
     absence of a legitimate security justification, the norms of 
     our democratic system require that the public be informed.
       We stand with you on the need for new approaches in a 
     changed world. We hope you will bring that spirit of change 
     to the issues of intelligence budget disclosure.
           Sincerely yours,
         Thomas S. Foley, Richard A. Gephardt, Dan Glickman, Dave 
           Durenberger, David L. Boren, Howard M. Metzenbaum, 
           George J. Mitchell, Daniel K. Inouye, Dennis DeConcini, 
           Patrick Leahy, Frank Murkowski, Daniel Patrick 

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that a 
statement by the administration in opposition to, I am sorry to say, 
our Commission; to section 3 of the bill; and to requiring Senate 
confirmation of the CIA general counsel, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record as follows:

         Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
           and Budget,
                                  Washington, DC, August 12, 1994.

                   Statement of Administration Policy

   s. 2082--intelligence authorization act for fiscal year 1995--(de 
                            concini (d) az)

       The Administration supports S. 2082, but opposes this 
     provision requiring the President to nominate and the Senate 
     to confirm the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency (CIA). All General Counsels serving in the 
     Administration, whether or not the Senate confirms them, are 
     held to the highest standards of professional responsibility. 
     The Administration, while deeply committed to the principles 
     of accountability embodied in the congressional oversight 
     process and to the rule of law, does not believe Senate 
     confirmation of the CIA General Counsel is required at this 
       In addition, the Administration would oppose amendments 
     that would mandate the manner in which counterintelligence 
     activities are coordinated within the Executive branch. The 
     Administration is implementing a Presidential Directive that 
     provides for the reorganization of U.S. counterintelligence 
     policy management and coordination. This Directive makes the 
     necessary improvements to U.S. counterintelligence efforts.
       The Administration is committed to conducting a review of 
     intelligence roles and missions through the President's 
     Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). This review will 
     be undertaken in full consultation with the Congress. The 
     Administration would oppose amendments that would mandate the 
     establishment of a new Commission for this purpose.

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that any time 
that this Senator has remaining on the pending Warner amendment be 
applied to the manager's time on this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, parliamentary inquiry: It is this 
Senator's understanding that the yeas and nays have been ordered on the 
Warner amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. Accordingly then, I ask unanimous consent that this 
amendment be temporarily laid aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Now, Madam President, the bill is open for further 
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, to inform the Senate, it is the 
intention of the distinguished chairman and myself to offer another 
amendment which would require perhaps 30 minutes equally divided 
between the two of us. I, of course, will be a cosponsor of the 
amendment in which we would debate. And then the Senate could, soon 
after other developments could occur, would vote in about 45 minutes. 
The first vote will be on the Warner amendment, the second vote would 
be on the DeConcini-Warner amendment, and then the third vote would be 
on final passage of the bill itself.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and 
ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the remaining time on the 
previous amendment is yielded.

                           Amendment No. 2557

  (Purpose: To require a review of the National Reconnaissance Office 
    Headquarters Building project, the application of existing DOD 
procurement and contracting procedures to the construction of buildings 
      or facilities and specific congressional authorization and 
     appropriations for the project before more funds are expended)

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and 
ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. DeConcini], for himself, Mr. 
     Warner, Mr. Baucus, Mr. D'Amato, and Mr. Metzenbaum, proposes 
     an amendment numbered 2557.

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 11, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following 
     new section:

                   RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.

       (a) Review of Project; Compliance with DOD Procurement and 
     Contracting Procedures.--Of the funds made available by this 
     Act for the National Reconnaissance Office under the 
     classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 
     102 of this Act--
       (1) $50,000,000 out of the Miscellaneous Support account of 
     the Mission Support Consolidated Expenditure Center may not 
     be obligated or expended until the Director of Central 
     Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense have completed a 
     review of the National Reconnaissance Office Headquarters 
     Building project and the results of such review have been 
     disclosed to the congressional intelligence committees; and
       (2) no such funds made available by this Act may be 
     obligated or expended for the purchase of any real property, 
     or to contract for any construction or acquisition, in 
     connection with the construction of buildings or facilities, 
     unless (and to the extent that)--
       (A) such purchase or contract is made or entered into in 
     accordance with the policies and procedures applicable to 
     other elements of the Department of Defense; or
       (B) the President determines that the national security 
     interest of the United States requires that such policies and 
     procedures shall not apply to a particular purchase or 
     contract and reports such determination in accordance with 
     subsection (b).
       (b) Waiver Procedures.--Not later than 30 days after making 
     a determination under subsection (a)(2)(B), the President 
     shall report in writing the determination to the 
     congressional intelligence committees.
       (c) Specific Authorization and Appropriations Required.--
     Except to the extent and in the amounts specifically provided 
     in an Act authorizing appropriations and in an appropriation 
     Act, no funds made available under any provision of law may 
     be obligated or expended for the National Reconnaissance 
     Office Headquarters Building project if such funds would 
     cause the total amount obligated or expended for such project 
     to exceed $310,000,000.
       (d) Definitions.--As used in this section:
       (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
     ``congressional intelligence committees'' means the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
       (2) National reconnaissance office headquarters building 
     project.--The term ``National Reconnaissance Office 
     Headquarters Building project'' means the project for the 
     headquarters buildings of the National Reconnaissance Office, 
     situated at the so-called Westfields site, and includes all 
     construction and improvement of facilities (including `fit 
     up') and all actions related to the acquisition of land, 
     communications, computers, furniture and other building 
     furnishings, and vehicle parking facilities.

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the 
pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.

                           Order of Procedure

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the pending 
amendment be set aside, and that we proceed in morning business to 
accommodate the Senator from Utah for not to exceed 8 minutes, and the 
Senator from Texas for 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, reserving the right to object, it would 
appear to me that in fairness to the Senate as a whole, given the 
schedule, that we ought to indicate, the chairman and I, that we would 
interpose objection to any further matters which might take the 
Senate's attention from this bill and the amendments.
  Mr. HATCH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  The Chair would ask the two managers, do they wish to reserve their 
15 minutes each on the DeConcini-Warner amendment?
  Mr. DeCONCINI. That is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We will now proceed to morning business for 8 
minutes to the Senator from Utah, and 5 minutes to the Senator from 
  Mr. HATCH. I thank you. I will not take the full 8 minutes.