[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 112 (Friday, August 12, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: August 12, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, we are on the pending amendment, that is
the amendment by the Senator from Virginia, the Senator from Florida,
the Senator from Arizona, to establish a Presidential Commission.
Momentarily the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Specter], will address
it. But in the meantime, I suggest perhaps our colleague from New York
be given an opportunity.
Mr. DeCONCINI. How much time does the Senator from Arizona have
remaining on the bill?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona controls 21 minutes
on the bill; 12\1/2\ minutes on the pending amendment.
Mr. DeCONCINI. I yield to the Senator from New York 10 minutes on the
bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized for 10
minutes.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, it is with no pleasure I rise on this
occasion. Rather, I rise with a sense of responsibility to the
committee and to the body, to recount experiences of another time in
which the intelligence community has been very much less than candid
and open with respect to matters that the Intelligence Committee should
have been informed about.
There has been some discussion in recent days concerning the failure
of the intelligence community to notify the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence of the new headquarters of the National Reconnaissance
Office. This is not new. This is not the first time such a thing has
happened, nor will it be, I fear, the last such incident, while the
existing culture--if I could use that large word--of the intelligence
community, of the national security state, of the secrecy system, stays
in place.
I served for 8 years on the Intelligence Committee. I joined it the
first year after it was created. And in those 8 years I was very
closely associated with Barry Goldwater, a man revered in this
institution not least because he was incapable of lying. For 4 years I
was the vice chairman of the committee and he was chairman and we spent
a very great deal of time together. At that time there was an
understanding, which I am sure exists today, that there are some
matters which, if the chairman and vice chairman are notified about, it
can be considered that the Senate has been informed. Unfortunately,
this is an Agency which has lied to Congress before. Egregiously.
Perhaps the most extraordinary example was the concerted campaign
launched in the spring of 1984 when it emerged that the Central
Intelligence Agency had mined harbors in Nicaragua--arguably a
violation of international law and treaty, but inarguably a significant
anticipated action. As I recall the language of the statute, ``the
committee will be informed of significant anticipated activities.'' We
were not.
The world knew about the mining of the harbors immediately--it was
the intention that the world should know. But that our Government had
done this, was not known.
In the spring, the Wall Street Journal reported that this had been an
action of the Agency--Mr. David Rogers, specifically. Barry Goldwater
was outraged. He had not been told of something as important as the
mining of the Nicaraguan harbors, and he so stated. Whereupon the
Agency began what Robert R. Simmons, the former staff director of the
committee, said ``can only be described as a domestic disinformation
campaign against the U.S. Congress in which they alleged that the
intelligence committees had been fully briefed on the harbor mining
program.'' The attack on Chairman Goldwater was vicious.
They went to the New York Times--which was concerned about this--and
told the Times that, no, Senator Goldwater was informed. It is simply
that Senator Goldwater is not as keen as he may once have been; that he
does not remember everything that happens; that, in effect, senility
had set in. And the Times--given the seriousness of the charge and the
manifest sincerity with which they were told by Agency officials,
regretfully, reported that the Senator has begun to lose it. Repeatedly
the Agency claimed that he was told, he just cannot recall having been
told. It was a lie, an audacious lie, about a revered Member of this
body. And faced with it, and the proposition that it was not going to
be retracted, I--then acting chairman in Senator Goldwater's absence--
announced I would resign in protest.
When the announcement appeared--it was Easter time and Senator
Goldwater was in the Far East--it caused something of a ruckus. And, in
time, the then-director, Mr. William J. Casey, came to the committee,
we then met up on the 4th floor of the Capitol here, and apologized. He
acknowledged the committee had not been adequately informed.
Part of the disinformation operation involved an address given at the
Naval Academy--the Naval Academy, I say to Senator Warner--where we
teach standards of truthfulness. Mr. McFarland, then National Security
Adviser to the President, went to the Naval Academy and told the cadets
that Senator Goldwater and the committee had been informed--lied to the
cadets.
Subsequently, Mr. McFarland testified before the Iran-Contra
Committees on May 12, 1987--we are now more than 3 years from then. In
many ways, Iran-Contra arose out of the mining of the harbors, money
was cut off, and so forth.
Here is an exchange between Senator Sarbanes and Mr. McFarland who, I
want to say, has made clear he wished he had never done any of those
things.
Reading from transcript:
Mr. Sarbanes. Did you know about the mining of the
Nicaraguan harbor?
Mr. McFarland. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sarbanes. Did you think that should have been consulted
with the Intelligence Committees?
Mr. McFarland. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sarbanes: It wasn't done.
Mr. McFarland: No, sir.
But the disinformation campaign almost prevailed and never really got
resolved.
Following that episode, Director Casey signed the agreements
negotiated with the Intelligence Committees which came to be known as
the Casey accords. They were specifically designed to see that
something like the mining of the harbors never happened again without
the committee being informed. Not that the President could not do what
he ordered done, but the committee would be informed.
One was signed while Mr. Goldwater and I were chairman and ranking
member, and another one was signed a year later. Whereupon the Agency
proceeded to lie to the committees again. During all of this period,
the Iran-Contra episode took place and the committee was never
involved. Indeed, a second agreement was made the following year which
confirmed how well it was working, but it was never informed.
Madam President, I discussed this disinformation matter with Mr.
Gates when he was under consideration for the post of--Madam President,
may I have 2 additional minutes, if I may ask Senator DeConcini?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Boxer). Does the Senator yield 2 minutes?
Mr. DeCONCINI. I yield up to 5 minutes and I ask the time come off
the pending amendment.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Madam President, I will not take that much time.
At the time Mr. Gates was being considered for the Director of the
Agency, I raised with him specifically the question of the
disinformation campaign directed against Senator Goldwater, and he
undertook to look into this and to clear up the record, which now all
agree Mr. Casey and Mr. McFarland had lied about Barry Goldwater.
Mr. Gates did not do a thing. He was there, I recall, for 4 years and
never lifted a finger to say the Agency had done what it ought never
have done and what it ought not do again.
If I can say, Dean Acheson saw all this coming. In his book,
``Present at the Creation,'' he wrote:
I had the gravest foreboding about this organization and
warned the President that * * * neither he, the National
Security Council, nor anyone else would be in a position to
know what (the CIA) was doing or to control it.
It is a simple thought that secrecy corrupts. It corrupts analysis.
Two years before the Berlin Wall came down, the CIA formally estimated
the per capita gross domestic product in East Germany to be higher than
West Germany. In his memoir, George P. Shultz, Secretary of State,
recalls in 1986 when then President Reagan and he were thinking that
perhaps they might have some success with Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Gates,
then the Director of Intelligence, informed him, Mr. Secretary, ``the
Soviet Union is a despotism that works.''
You can reach out and touch the day that the Soviet Union would
collapse but, no, secrecy inhibits the correction of error. The error
simply gets compounded and extended, and it leads to events such as
misleading the Congress. It has done so in the past and will do so in
the future, so long as it continues.
The secrecy system is still in place. You may know that we have an
Information Security Oversight Office which counts the annual creation
of secrets. Its most recent report shows that last year, 6,408,688
secrets were created. Can you imagine that we know there were 6,408,688
secrets created last year, a 1-percent increase in the first year of
the Clinton administration?
This will go on until we do something about it, addressing it
directly. We have created a Commission on Protecting and Reducing
Government Secrecy, which is even now in the process of being
assembled. I understand Mr. Hamilton in the House has agreed to be on
the Commission and I have done so on the Senate side. Other Members of
Congress and private citizens will be appointed. The mission of the
Commission is of singular importance to the Republic. It is no less
than examining ways to reclaim the liberties of the people. I welcome
the proposal by the Senator from Virginia for a review of current
intelligence needs. I ask to be made a cosponsor.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, will the Senator yield on my time?
We will most assuredly add him as a cosponsor. His cosponsorship has
a special meaning because he has, again, served on this committee some
8 years, and has identified himself over these many years with the
Intelligence Committee.
But also, Madam President, as I conceived of the idea of the
Presidential Commission, I thought back on the Social Security
Commission, which was one of the most successful in the 16 years I have
been privileged to serve in this body. That is a Commission that laid
down a format that was quite readily adopted by the Congress and the
executive branch.
The distinguished Senator from New York has a far clearer
recollection of the work done by that Commission. And given the fact
that this administration at the moment is not wholeheartedly in support
of the idea of the Senator from Virginia of a Presidential Commission,
I wonder if he might address that Commission and how it could likewise
have a parallel effect on supporting this Commission.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Yes. The Nation's largest domestic program, the Social
Security Administration, was in imminent danger of bankruptcy. It would
have shaken the society in an extraordinary way. The danger was not
perhaps as grave as was perceived, but the unthinkable would have
occurred: The checks would not go out.
President Reagan, with the vigorous assistance of the then majority
leader, Mr. Baker, and Mr. O'Neill, the Speaker of the House, assembled
a Commission, a bipartisan Commission, with representatives of the
President, the House, the Senate, and with Alan Greenspan as our
executive director, now the distinguished head of the Federal Reserve,
and Senator Dole, who was a leading member. It took us a year to get
our work done.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from New York
that his 5 minutes he was yielded has expired.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I ask for 1 additional minute.
Mr. DeCONCINI. I yield 1 additional minute from the pending
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time is yielded.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. As Senator Dole said, when you first hear about these
matters, they seem insoluble. And many people thought this whole Social
Security thing could never ever be sound in the first place. But he
said the more you learn--it had taken a lot of learning and reading--we
can fix this thing. He said it the day after he had been reelected, in
the Chamber, sitting right over there. He had written an article in the
New York Times to that effect.
I went up to him. I said, ``We cannot officially work it out.'' I
said, ``We can fix this thing, can't we? Do you think so? Why don't
we?'' And with the help of James A. Baker III, in about 10 days' time
it was done.
But a lot of learning had taken place, a lot of facts had been
assembled, and it was bipartisan. And it was something that was not
forced on the President. To the contrary, the President welcomed the
solution in the end. A secure Social Security System emerged.
If I may say, the last of the recommendations to be concluded was
that the Social Security Administration be an independent agency. The
Senate adopted a conference report to that effect about 2 weeks ago.
The House did yesterday afternoon by a unanimous vote. This kind of
unanimity comes out of the bipartisanship and cross-relationship
between the Congress and the Executive.
I think we have an excellent idea. It is not a moment too soon. And I
wish the Senator very well, every success, and I am honored to be a
cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will state that the Senator's time
has now expired, and the Senator from Virginia has no further time
remaining on this amendment.
Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, would the distinguished Senator seeking
recognition just allow me to thank my colleague from New York.
My understanding is the Senator from Pennsylvania is now to be
recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. The Senator has 15 minutes.
The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I thank the Chair.
At the outset, I compliment the distinguished chairman, Senator
DeConcini, and the distinguished ranking member, Senator Warner, for
their leadership of the Intelligence Committee and for bringing to the
floor the Intelligence Authorization Act and the pending amendment for
the creation of an independent commission to review the roles and
capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community, which I support.
The public may wonder why a commission is necessary, but the fact is
that the work of the Senate and the House, too, is so involved with so
many varied matters that a review by a commission, which can spend the
time necessary, is very much in the national interest.
I am glad to see that the final report date has been advanced from
December 31, 1996 to March 1, 1996. It would have been my hope that the
commission could have finished its work at an earlier date so we would
have the advantage of their thinking, but it does take time for
clearances. It is important that the commission have enough time to do
its work right, but the sooner the better.
I had the privilege of serving on the Intelligence Committee for some
6 years and have been off the committee now for 3\1/2\ years and look
forward to rejoining the Intelligence Committee next year, hopefully as
the chairman, assuming a Republican majority, or in the absence of a
Republican majority, then as the vice chairman.
The committee has very, very important work to do. The comments I
wish to make today--and I had hoped to be here earlier today but was
working with a group meeting on health insurance--relate to the threat
of terrorism and how we are going to deal with terrorism and the need
institutionally to establish an international criminal court.
Our overhead satellites tell us a great deal, but the most important
work is done by what is called in the trade ``HUMINT,'' which means
human intelligence. I believe that past limitations of funds set back
the intelligence community on human intelligence which is a very slow,
time-consuming process to build agents who have the capacity to work
within the networks of the terrorists and to work within the networks
of those who are planning ill for the world, to find out what is going
on so that we can respond.
The recent incident with Aldrich Ames has set back human intelligence
even further by his disclosures and by the tragedy of so many of
intelligence agents being murdered, being eliminated.
I am hopeful that the intelligence community will work on this very
time-consuming, difficult matter to reestablish HUMINT.
With the decrease of international hijacking of airplanes, there may
be a public perception that terrorism is on the wane. But the fact is,
as disclosed by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
international terrorism is on the increase, with some 427 terrorist
incidents worldwide last year, which represents a significant increase
over the 362 incidents in 1992. The Director of Central Intelligence,
James Woolsey, pointed out in open testimony the activities of Iran in
continuing to support the Lebanese Hezbollah who are violently opposing
progress on the Mideast Peace Accord between Israel and the PLO and now
between Israel and Jordan.
We saw the recent bombings of the Israeli Embassy and Jewish Center
in Buenos Aires which is linked to foreign terrorism. We saw not too
long ago, the bombing of the World Trade Center.
Terrorism remains an enormous problem internationally. What has to be
understood publicly is that just because the incidence of international
hijackings has decreased, the security of innocent civilians has not
increased. Unfortunately, the public focus is too short-lived, and that
is understandable because there are so many problems that confront the
country. But those of us in Washington who work on intelligence must
pursue the threat in a professional, systematic manner.
One area on which we have not had the progress is in the
establishment of an international criminal court which I have spoken
about many times during my 14 years in this body and which the Senate
and the House have endorsed on many occasions.
Quite candidly, it has not received the support of either Republican
or Democrat administrations. If we are to stem the tide of
international crimes, it is very important that we move ahead to
institutionalize a mechanism to deal with such crimes--an international
criminal court. We do have a war crimes tribunal which has been set up
for the crimes against humanity and probable genocide in Bosnia. The
Senate has debated, as has the House, many times trying to take action
against these atrocities. We talk about bombing, which has been
limited. We talk about land operations, which have been rejected for
very practical reasons. We talk about unilaterally lifting the arms
embargo.
But one thing we could do--which we owe victims of war crimes in
Bosnia--is not so complicated. It is to bring the war criminals to
trial and to show that there is an international rule of law. The
United Nations, with U.S. support, did establish a war crimes tribunal
and finally laboriously a chief prosecutor. The court must now act.
I took the floor a year ago to earmark some $3 million for the war
crimes tribunal to investigate and gather evidence together. The
Senate, the House and the administration ought to be pushing much
harder for prosecutions and accountability.
Now we have the atrocities in Rwanda. I am gratified to note that the
Secretary of State has called for an international criminal court to
try the war criminals in Rwanda. But we cannot expect a war crimes
tribunal to be established for each and every violation of
internationally accepted law. The solution is to establish a permanent
international court. There was strong public support years ago for such
a court with the hijacking of the Achille Lauro and the murder of Leon
Klinghoffer, and for what happened when Abu Abbas left Egypt on an
airliner to Tunisia, was forced down in Italy, where Abbas was released
by Italian authorities, later tried in absentia, and finally received a
30-year jail sentence, which meant absolutely nothing.
I had an opportunity back in 1986 to discuss the incident with the
then Prime Minister of Italy, Prime Minister Craxi and then with
Yugoslavian President Mojsov, who were concerned about the terrorism
implications for their country. Had we had an international criminal
court, I think the Italians, the Yugoslavs or Egypt would have turned
over Abbas to an international criminal court.
There is a matter of national sovereignty, and Egypt was not prepared
to turn over Abu Abbas to the United States. When the Egyptian airliner
was forced down in Sicily, there was a standoff between United States
military personnel and Italian military personnel, and, as a result, we
did not get our hands on Abu Abbas for trial in the United States.
Questions had been raised at that time of whether the United States had
jurisdiction over terrorism committed against U.S. citizens abroad.
Fortunately, we did correct U.S. law with the 1984 Omnibus Crime
Control Act, which gives U.S. courts jurisdiction over hijackers,
terrorists, and the 1986 Terrorist Prosecution Act which I introduced
and which was passed after the terrorist murders in the Rome and Vienna
airports.
We also need a permanent international criminal court to try
international drug traffickers.
Examples for this need are the incidents of international drug
dealers residing in Colombia, and the U.S. difficulty in gaining their
extradition to the United States. Former President Gaveria of Colombia
told me that it would have been easier to extradite and try these
criminals in an international criminal court.
I would like to focus now on the enormous problem of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, chemical, and
biological, and their missile delivery systems. In North Korea we have
good reason to believe that a nuclear bomb is being developed but have
insufficient proof to really confront the North Koreans. The same
nuclear weapons development problem was true in Iraq and with the so-
called ``Big Gun,'' it is true in India, Pakistan, and Iran.
Those are problems of overwhelming importance in nations with despots
like Saddam Hussein, the despots who run Iran, and the uncertainty and
unpredictability in North Korea's reaction as to efforts to persuade
them to comply with international conventions such as the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. There is still a great and concerted need for
intelligence, especially human intelligence even when these violations
are not hitting the front pages.
So I think the Intelligence Authorization Act is important. I think
the creation of the new independent commission can give us further
insight. But I think most importantly, we have to work institutionally
to develop human intelligence, and institutionally we have to work to
develop the international criminal court.
I look forward next year to joining the Intelligence Committee. We
will be losing a valued member in Senator DeConcini who will
regrettably be leaving this body after 18 years of distinguished
service. I think that the Intelligence Committee has done outstanding
work. It is obvious that vigilance and oversight is necessary at all
times especially in light of the recent disclosures about the building
of the new NRO establishment. But these are items which have to be
addressed.
I look forward to working with my colleagues on these important
issues in the future.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I thank the Senator from
Pennsylvania. Indeed, he will be a valuable member of the committee.
Certainly he will be on the committee next year, and we look forward to
his real leadership.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. DeCONCINI. Yes.
Mr. WARNER. I join the distinguished chairman in commending our
colleague. Indeed, I had the pleasure of serving on the committee at
the same time that he served.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank my colleagues for those generous comments. I
look forward to the serving on the committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield the remaining 3 minutes
and 31 seconds?
Mr. SPECTER. I yield that time to my colleague from Utah, Senator
Hatch, and more time, if necessary, off my time.
Mr. DeCONCINI. I have no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
Mr. HATCH. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that my remarks
are considered as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Chair inquires how much time the Senator may use?
Mr. HATCH. I am not sure.
Mr. DeCONCINI. May I inquire? How long does the Senator anticipate?
Mr. HATCH. I do not know. It will not be very long; maybe 10 minutes.
Mr. DeCONCINI. I do not want to object to the Senator from Utah, but
we are trying to pass this bill and vote by 1 o'clock. We have one more
amendment. We have a 30-minute limitation. Could the Senator restrict
that to 5 minutes?
Mr. HATCH. I do not know if I can. But I will certainly try.
Mr. GRAMM. Madam President, reserving the right to object, maybe I
should notify my colleagues. I would like to have an opportunity to
speak for 5 minutes. I will limit it strictly to 5 minutes. It is not
my objective to hold up this bill. But I would like to make a comment
on another subject. The time in which I speak will be strictly limited
to 5 minutes.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Will the Senators let us just put in some statements,
and yield the time on the pending Warner amendment? Then we will ask
for some 5 minutes time before we go to the next amendment.
Mr. HATCH. Sure.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, the pending amendment is the Warner
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
commission on the roles and capabilities of the U.S. intelligence
community
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I rise in support of the amendment
offered today by Senators Warner and Graham to create a Commission on
the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
I give Senator Warner, the distinguished vice chairman of the Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Senator Graham, who has made an
extremely valuable contribution as a member of the committee, the
lion's share of the credit for this initiative. They have for some time
now believed such an effort is needed.
I have come to agree with them. Indeed, it has been my hope that the
DCI might have initiated such a review, but this has not happened, and,
plain and simply, I am tired of waiting. I believe this amendment
represents a better way to go.
Madam President, there have been significant changes in the
intelligence community since the end of the cold war. There have been
personnel reductions and reallocations of resources carried out by
individual agencies.
Bu what we are thus far lacking and what is, in my opinion, sorely
needed, is an overall revalidation of the roles and capabilities of the
intelligence community in the post-cold-war world. We need to have an
objective, hard-headed look at the fundamentals: at what we expect
intelligence agencies to do, at what levels they should be resourced,
at what capabilities they must retain for the future. Everything should
be on the table.
I do not think this can be achieved by the executive branch looking
at itself, nor do I think the congressional oversight committees have
the capability to do what is needed.
What this amendment proposes is a bipartisan commission with 17
members. Nine would be appointed by the President; two by the majority
and minority leaders of the Senate, respectively, and two by the
Speaker and minority leader of the House of Representatives,
respectively. The President would designate a chairman. The Commission
would be empowered to hire its own staff and not have to rely on staff
from the intelligence agencies.
The end result of its work would be a report to the President and the
Congress. To the extent possible, the report would be unclassified and
made available to the public. There would necessarily be a classified
supplement which would not be made public but which would be provided
to the President and the intelligence committees.
The amendment provides the Commission with sufficient time to do its
job. These are difficult issues and should not be assessed in a rush.
The amendment provides that the final report of the Commission be
submitted no later than March 1, 1996. Given the time which will be
required for the appointment and security processing of the members of
the Commission, we think this will allow more than a year for the
Commission to do its substantive work.
Madam President, in my tenure on the Intelligence Committee and in
particular during these last 2 years when I've served as chairman, it
has become increasingly clear to me that the political consensus that
we once had for this function has eroded and continues to erode. We
need a new consensus. We need a new rationale--a revalidation of the
approach we have been taking by a group of objective, hard-headed
people, with no axe to grind and no stake in the outcome. This is what
we contemplate in this Commission.
I am convinced this amendment will serve the interests of both the
executive and legislative branches and urge my colleagues to support
it.
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I am pleased to support the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995. This bill does not
reduce the intelligence budget by as much as I believe it should. It
does represent, however, a sincere effort by the Intelligence Committee
to identify those programs that can most readily be cut back without
any harm to the national security.
This bill, as amended, will deal with problems that our audit team
uncovered in its recent investigation of the new headquarters building
for the National Reconnaissance Office. We held a hearing on this
subject on Wednesday, where high officials and veteran NRO personnel
admitted that the building project should have been presented to the
committee as a separate budget item. The witnesses also agreed that,
now that the NRO is publicly acknowledged, there would be no reason for
covert procurement of a building such as this one in the future.
The DeConcini-Warner amendment, which is similar to the Bryan and
Boren amendments to the Defense appropriations bill, will ensure that
these problems do not occur in the future. I am happy to support it.
The Intelligence Authorization Act, as amended today, will also bring
about needed reforms in the counterintelligence and security field. And
it will mandate a presidential commission to examine the roles and
missions of our intelligence agencies.
I am especially pleased that we will make it easier for intelligence
agencies to track the financial and travel activities of their
employees with access to the most sensitive information. Such
activities are far better indicators of possible security problems than
are the political and sexual questions that security officers have
pursued in the past.
I am also pleased that we are moving to create a system of court
orders for physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes. The
executive branch conducts secret searches of people's homes and offices
today, based upon a constitutionally suspect claim of presidential
powers which are then delegated to the Attorney General. I think that
is a terrible way in which to handle such an intrusive technique.
By contrast, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which was
established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, has
consistently passed constitutional muster for the control of foreign
intelligence wiretaps, which are a similarly invasive technique.
Allowing the FISA court to handle physical searches will enable us to
bring judicial supervision to an area that surely warrants it.
I should add that I do hope some changes will be made to the physical
search provision in conference. For example, the bill before us would
allow a person who is in a legal proceeding to object to the use of
seized documents only if that person owned the documents or the
premises that were searched. But someone could easily have documents
about you that were not owned by you, but either were written by you or
were authoritative records concerning you.
I think that in such a case, if the Government is going to use those
documents against you in a legal proceeding, you should be permitted to
contest the legality of the search. I say this especially because the
Government will be allowed to undertake that search without showing
probable cause that a crime has been committed.
At a recent hearing of the House Intelligence Committee, former
Department of Justice official Kenneth Bass had some additional
suggestions for the conference committee. He would broaden the
circumstances in which a defense attorney may gain access to the
documents underlying a physical search order. And he suggests that when
the Government seeks a court order authorizing an intelligence search,
an officer of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court be instructed
to act as an ``advocate of the target arguing against the warrant.''
All these ideas, which arose after our mark-up, can and should be
addressed in conference.
The intelligence authorization bill will put into law a new
interagency structure for handling counterintelligence issues. The old
system was clearly broke, and the many mistakes surrounding the Aldrich
Ames espionage case merely underscore the tragic lack of coordination
and cooperation between the various executive branch agencies that
handle personnel security and counterespionage matters.
The bill we approve today will give the new National
Counterintelligence Policy Board a permanent chairman, rather than
relying upon a rotating chair that can only be a prescription for drift
and inaction in future years. I can readily believe that a rotating
chair was the best that the White House could get competing agencies to
accept. But that is no reason for the Congress to limit its efforts to
improve counterintelligence policy making. We will do the country a
real service by giving that board one chair, and the Attorney General
is as fair a person as you are likely to find for the task.
I am a cosponsor of the Warner-Graham-DeConcini bill to establish a
Presidential commission on the roles and missions of our intelligence
agencies, so I am delighted to see that idea added to the budget bill
today. We may not all agree on how well U.S. intelligence is doing or
on how much money to spend on it, but all of us know that a careful
look is needed at the role of intelligence after the cold war.
The commission we are proposing will be named largely by the
President, but will also have members from the House and Senate. I
think it will give the President and the country a fresh view of what
intelligence is needed, and how to meet those needs.
Let me note, however, that we do not want the intelligence agencies
to just stand around while this commission considers their fate. If
there are changes or reforms that an agency knows it should make, it
should go right ahead and make them. This commission will be no excuse
for drift and inaction.
Let me turn now to the issue of disclosing the total figure for the
intelligence budget. Last year, of course, the Senate passed a ``sense
of Congress'' provision calling on the President to find a means of
disclosing that figure. I regret that we were forced to drop that
provision in conference.
Three things have happened since then to give me confidence that
we will eventually win on this issue. First, on November 22 of last
year, 11 leaders of Congress joined me in urging the President to
disclose the budget figure. The nine Democrats and two Republicans who
signed that letter included the majority leader of the Senate, the
Speaker and majority leader of the House of Representatives, the
chairmen of both the Senate and House Intelligence Committees, and no
fewer than six former chairmen or vice chairmen of the Senate
Intelligence Committee. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, tht the
text of that letter be included in the Record.
The second hopeful sign was a letter of March 23, 1994, from the
Director of Central Intelligence, Jim Woolsey, to our vice chairman,
Senator John Warner. My colleagues may recall that in last year's
debate on this issue, one of Senator Warner's major points was that
other countries do not disclose how much they spend on intelligence.
That did not bother me, because I am not frightened by the thought of
America being a pioneer. We were the first country to establish
congressional oversight of intelligence, and now we see more and more
countries following our lead.
A month after he raised that argument, Senator Warner asked the DCI
to study other countries' practices and report back to us. Director
Woolsey's reply listed seven countries that do disclose their
intelligence budget totals, including Australia, New Zealand, Norway,
Greece and--most recently--our closest intelligence partner, the United
Kingdom. Now, I still do not believe that we should be bound by the
practices of other countries. But I am delighted to see this specious
argument die a peaceful death and to report to my colleagues that more
recent statements by opponents of disclosure carefully omit any
discussion of what our allies are doing.
Finally, Mr. President, I take heart from the recent vote on this
issue in the House of Representatives. I am sorry that the House
rejected an amendment proposed by House Intelligence Committee Chairman
Dan Glickman to require disclosure of the budget total. But I am very
pleased that the margin of defeat was only 27 votes. That compares very
favorably with the 95-vote margin by which a weaker proposal was
defeated just 1 year ago. It demonstrates, in my view, that the march
of history is in our direction.
The bill before us today does not contain any provision regarding
budget disclosure. Based on last year's experience, moreover, I know
that passage of such a provision by the Senate will not achieve our
purpose in the face of the recent vote in the House. I will not take up
my colleagues' time, therefore, by proposing disclosure language today.
I am confident, however, that within a year or so, a freshman
Democratic Senator from Ohio will join a majority of his colleagues in
both houses in enacting legislation to strike this modest, but needed,
blow for the American people's right to know how the Government is
spending their money.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Congress of the United States,
Washington, DC, November 22, 1993.
The President of the United States,
The White House Office, Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC
Dear Mr. President: Last February, Senator Metzenbaum sent
you a letter proposing that the Executive branch disclose to
the public the aggregate amount requested and authorized for,
and spent on, intelligence and intelligence-related
activities. We are writing you now to reinforce that message
and to urge you to take decisive action on this issue.
The world has changed greatly since the Cold War days in
which the norm of strict secrecy on the intelligence budget
was established. We no longer face a monolithic enemy with a
massive intelligence establishment that might somehow use
this information to harm us. Neither can we rely upon
unquestioning public support for secret operations or for the
budgets to support them.
You and your administration are well aware of this. In your
campaign and in your months in office, you have stood for
both greater openness and greater economy in our government.
You have also begun the process of drafting a new Executive
order on classified information, even as the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense have
created a Joint Security Commission to recommend more
rational and economical means of defining and protecting the
information that truly requires secrecy in order to protect
the national security.
We believe that in the post-Cold War world, and especially
in a time of budget stringency when national priorities are
being reexamined, the level of intelligence spending
(although not the details) must be open to the public. In the
absence of a legitimate security justification, the norms of
our democratic system require that the public be informed.
We stand with you on the need for new approaches in a
changed world. We hope you will bring that spirit of change
to the issues of intelligence budget disclosure.
Sincerely yours,
Thomas S. Foley, Richard A. Gephardt, Dan Glickman, Dave
Durenberger, David L. Boren, Howard M. Metzenbaum,
George J. Mitchell, Daniel K. Inouye, Dennis DeConcini,
Patrick Leahy, Frank Murkowski, Daniel Patrick
Moynihan.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that a
statement by the administration in opposition to, I am sorry to say,
our Commission; to section 3 of the bill; and to requiring Senate
confirmation of the CIA general counsel, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record as follows:
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management
and Budget,
Washington, DC, August 12, 1994.
Statement of Administration Policy
s. 2082--intelligence authorization act for fiscal year 1995--(de
concini (d) az)
The Administration supports S. 2082, but opposes this
provision requiring the President to nominate and the Senate
to confirm the General Counsel of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA). All General Counsels serving in the
Administration, whether or not the Senate confirms them, are
held to the highest standards of professional responsibility.
The Administration, while deeply committed to the principles
of accountability embodied in the congressional oversight
process and to the rule of law, does not believe Senate
confirmation of the CIA General Counsel is required at this
time.
In addition, the Administration would oppose amendments
that would mandate the manner in which counterintelligence
activities are coordinated within the Executive branch. The
Administration is implementing a Presidential Directive that
provides for the reorganization of U.S. counterintelligence
policy management and coordination. This Directive makes the
necessary improvements to U.S. counterintelligence efforts.
The Administration is committed to conducting a review of
intelligence roles and missions through the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). This review will
be undertaken in full consultation with the Congress. The
Administration would oppose amendments that would mandate the
establishment of a new Commission for this purpose.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that any time
that this Senator has remaining on the pending Warner amendment be
applied to the manager's time on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, parliamentary inquiry: It is this
Senator's understanding that the yeas and nays have been ordered on the
Warner amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
Mr. WARNER. Accordingly then, I ask unanimous consent that this
amendment be temporarily laid aside.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Now, Madam President, the bill is open for further
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, to inform the Senate, it is the
intention of the distinguished chairman and myself to offer another
amendment which would require perhaps 30 minutes equally divided
between the two of us. I, of course, will be a cosponsor of the
amendment in which we would debate. And then the Senate could, soon
after other developments could occur, would vote in about 45 minutes.
The first vote will be on the Warner amendment, the second vote would
be on the DeConcini-Warner amendment, and then the third vote would be
on final passage of the bill itself.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and
ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the remaining time on the
previous amendment is yielded.
Amendment No. 2557
(Purpose: To require a review of the National Reconnaissance Office
Headquarters Building project, the application of existing DOD
procurement and contracting procedures to the construction of buildings
or facilities and specific congressional authorization and
appropriations for the project before more funds are expended)
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and
ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Arizona [Mr. DeConcini], for himself, Mr.
Warner, Mr. Baucus, Mr. D'Amato, and Mr. Metzenbaum, proposes
an amendment numbered 2557.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 11, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following
new section:
SEC. 504. LIMITATIONS ON FUNDING OF THE NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) Review of Project; Compliance with DOD Procurement and
Contracting Procedures.--Of the funds made available by this
Act for the National Reconnaissance Office under the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section
102 of this Act--
(1) $50,000,000 out of the Miscellaneous Support account of
the Mission Support Consolidated Expenditure Center may not
be obligated or expended until the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense have completed a
review of the National Reconnaissance Office Headquarters
Building project and the results of such review have been
disclosed to the congressional intelligence committees; and
(2) no such funds made available by this Act may be
obligated or expended for the purchase of any real property,
or to contract for any construction or acquisition, in
connection with the construction of buildings or facilities,
unless (and to the extent that)--
(A) such purchase or contract is made or entered into in
accordance with the policies and procedures applicable to
other elements of the Department of Defense; or
(B) the President determines that the national security
interest of the United States requires that such policies and
procedures shall not apply to a particular purchase or
contract and reports such determination in accordance with
subsection (b).
(b) Waiver Procedures.--Not later than 30 days after making
a determination under subsection (a)(2)(B), the President
shall report in writing the determination to the
congressional intelligence committees.
(c) Specific Authorization and Appropriations Required.--
Except to the extent and in the amounts specifically provided
in an Act authorizing appropriations and in an appropriation
Act, no funds made available under any provision of law may
be obligated or expended for the National Reconnaissance
Office Headquarters Building project if such funds would
cause the total amount obligated or expended for such project
to exceed $310,000,000.
(d) Definitions.--As used in this section:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
(2) National reconnaissance office headquarters building
project.--The term ``National Reconnaissance Office
Headquarters Building project'' means the project for the
headquarters buildings of the National Reconnaissance Office,
situated at the so-called Westfields site, and includes all
construction and improvement of facilities (including `fit
up') and all actions related to the acquisition of land,
communications, computers, furniture and other building
furnishings, and vehicle parking facilities.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the
pending amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Order of Procedure
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the pending
amendment be set aside, and that we proceed in morning business to
accommodate the Senator from Utah for not to exceed 8 minutes, and the
Senator from Texas for 5 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WARNER. Madam President, reserving the right to object, it would
appear to me that in fairness to the Senate as a whole, given the
schedule, that we ought to indicate, the chairman and I, that we would
interpose objection to any further matters which might take the
Senate's attention from this bill and the amendments.
Mr. HATCH addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
The Chair would ask the two managers, do they wish to reserve their
15 minutes each on the DeConcini-Warner amendment?
Mr. DeCONCINI. That is correct.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. We will now proceed to morning business for 8
minutes to the Senator from Utah, and 5 minutes to the Senator from
Texas.
Mr. HATCH. I thank you. I will not take the full 8 minutes.
____________________