[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 112 (Friday, August 12, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: August 12, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.


                     Amendment No. 2553, as amended

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I yield the remainder of the time on 
the pending amendment of the managers.
  I ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate? If not, the question 
is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2553), as amended, was agreed to.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote by 
which the amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2556

 (Purpose: To establish a commission on the roles and capabilities of 
   the United States intelligence community, and for other purposes)

  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for himself, Mr. 
     Graham, Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Metzenbaum, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Cohen, 
     Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Boren, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Baucus, Mr, 
     Durenberger, Mr. Pell, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Hatch, Mr. 
     Johnston, Mr. Bumpers, and Mr. Kerry, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2556.

  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of the bill, add the following new title:
  TITLE ____--COMMISSION ON THE ROLES AND CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED 
                     STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

     SEC. ____01. ESTABLISHMENT.

       There is established a commission to be known as the 
     Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States 
     Intelligence Community (hereafter in this title referred to 
     as the ``Commission'').

     SEC. ____02. COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATIONS.

       (a) Membership.--(1) The Commission shall be composed of 17 
     members, as follows:
       (A) Nine members shall be appointed by the President from 
     private life, no more than four of whom shall have previously 
     held senior leadership positions in the intelligence 
     community.
       (B) Two members shall be appointed by the Majority Leader 
     of the Senate, of whom one shall be a Member of the Senate 
     and one shall be from private life.
       (C) Two members shall be appointed by the Minority Leader 
     of the Senate, of whom one shall be a Member of the Senate 
     and one shall be from private life.
       (D) Two members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the 
     House of Representatives, of whom one shall be a Member of 
     the House and one shall be from private life.
       (E) Two members shall be appointed by the Minority Leader 
     of the House of Representatives, of whom one shall be a 
     Member of the House and one shall be from private life.
       (2) The members of Commission appointed from private life 
     under paragraph (1) shall be persons of demonstrated ability 
     and accomplishment in government, business, law, academe, 
     journalism, or other profession, who have a substantial 
     background in national security matters.
       (b) Chairman.--The President shall designate one of the 
     members appointed from private life to serve as Chairman of 
     the Commission.
       (c) Period of Appointment; Vacancies.--Members shall be 
     appointed for the life of the Commission. Any vacancy in the 
     Commission shall not affect its powers but shall be filled in 
     the same manner as the original appointment.
       (d) Deadline for Appointments.--The appointments required 
     by section subsection (a) shall be made within 45 days after 
     the date of enactment of this Act.
       (e) Meetings.--(1) The Commission shall meet at the call of 
     the Chairman.
       (2) The Commission shall hold its first meeting not later 
     than four months after the date of enactment of this Act.
       (f) Quorum.--Nine members of the Commission shall 
     constitute a quorum, but a lesser number of members may hold 
     hearings, take testimony, or receive evidence.
       (g) Security Clearances.--Appropriate security clearances 
     shall be required for members of the Commission who are 
     private United States citizens. Such clearances shall be 
     processed and completed on an expedited basis by appropriate 
     elements of the executive branch of Government and shall, in 
     any case, be completed within 90 days of the date such 
     members are appointed.

     SEC. ____03. DUTIES OF THE COMMISSION.

       (a) In General.--It shall be the duty of the Commission--
       (1) to review the efficacy and appropriateness of the 
     activities of the United States intelligence community in the 
     post-Cold War global environment; and
       (2) to prepare and transmit the reports described in 
     section __04.
       (b) Implementation.--In carrying out subsection (a), the 
     Commission shall specifically consider the following:
       (1) What should be the roles and missions of the 
     intelligence community in terms of providing support to the 
     defense and foreign policy establishments.
       (2) Whether the roles and missions of the intelligence 
     community should extend beyond the traditional areas of 
     providing support to the defense and foreign policy 
     establishments, and, if so, what areas should be considered 
     legitimate for intelligence collection and analysis, and 
     whether such areas should include for example, economic 
     issues, environmental issues, and health issues.
       (3) What functions, if any, should continue to be assigned 
     the Central Intelligence Agency and what capabilities should 
     it retain for the future.
       (4) Whether the existing organization and management 
     framework of the Central Intelligence Agency provide the 
     optimal structure for the accomplishment of its mission.
       (5) Whether existing principles and strategies governing 
     the acquisition and maintenance of intelligence collection 
     capabilities should be retained and what collection 
     capabilities should the Government retain to meet future 
     contingencies.
       (6) Whether intelligence analysis, as it is currently 
     structured and executed, adds sufficient value to information 
     otherwise available to the Government to justify its 
     continuation, and, if so, at what level of resources.
       (7) Whether the existing decentralized system of 
     intelligence analysis results in significant waste or 
     duplication, and, if so, what can be done to correct these 
     deficiencies.
       (8) Whether the existing arrangements for allocating 
     available resources to accomplish the roles and missions 
     assigned to intelligence agencies are adequate.
       (9) Whether the existing framework for coordinating among 
     intelligence agencies with respect to intelligence collection 
     and analysis and other activities, including training and 
     operational activities, provides an optimal structure for 
     such coordination.
       (10) Whether current personnel policies and practices of 
     intelligence agencies provide an optimal work force to 
     satisfy the needs of intelligence consumers.
       (11) Whether resources for intelligence activities should 
     continue to be allocated as part of the defense budget or be 
     treated by the President and Congress as a separate budgetary 
     program.
       (12) Whether the existing levels of resources allocated for 
     intelligence collection or intelligence analysis, or to 
     provide a capability to conduct covert actions, are seriously 
     at variance with United States needs.
       (13) Whether there are areas of redundant or overlapping 
     activity or areas where there is evidence of serious waste, 
     duplication, or mismanagement.
       (14) To what extent, if any, should the budget for United 
     States intelligence activities be publicly disclosed.
       (15) To what extent, if any, should the United States 
     intelligence community collect information bearing upon 
     private commercial activity and the manner in which such 
     information should be controlled and disseminated.
       (16) Whether counterintelligence policies and practices are 
     adequate to ensure that employees of intelligence agencies 
     are sensitive to security problems, and whether intelligence 
     agencies themselves have adequate authority and capability to 
     address perceived security problems.
       (17) The manner in which the size, missions, capabilities, 
     and resources of the United States intelligence community 
     compare to those of the Governments of the United Kingdom, 
     Canada, Australia, France, Israel, Russia, and Germany.
       (18) Whether existing collaborative arrangements between 
     the United States and other countries in the area of 
     intelligence cooperation should be maintained and whether 
     such arrangements should be expanded to provide for increased 
     burdensharing.
       (19) Whether existing arrangements for sharing intelligence 
     with multinational organizations in support of mutually-
     shared objectives are adequate.

     SEC. ____04. REPORTS.

       (a) Initial Report.--Not later than two months after the 
     first meeting of the Commission, the Commission shall 
     transmit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
     report setting forth its plan for the work of the Commission.
       (b) Interim Reports.--Prior to the submission of the report 
     required by subsection (c), the Commission may issue such 
     interim reports as it finds necessary and desirable.
       (c) Final Report.--No later than March 1, 1996, the 
     Commission shall submit to the President and to the 
     congressional intelligence committees a report setting forth 
     the activities, findings, and recommendations of the 
     Commission, including any recommendations for the enactment 
     of legislation that the Commission considers advisable. To 
     the extent feasible, such report shall be unclassified and 
     made available to the public. Such report shall be 
     supplemented as necessary by a classified report or annex, 
     which shall be provided separately to the President and the 
     congressional intelligence committees.

     SEC. ____05. POWERS.

       (a) Hearings.--The Commission or, at its direction, any 
     panel or member of the Commission, may, for the purpose of 
     carrying out the provisions of this section, hold hearings, 
     sit and act at times and places, take testimony, receive 
     evidence, and administer oaths to the extent that the 
     Commission or any panel or member considers advisable.
       (b) Information From Federal Agencies.--The Commission may 
     secure directly from any intelligence agency or from any 
     other Federal department or agency any information that the 
     Commission considers necessary to enable the Commission to 
     carry out its responsibilities under this section. Upon 
     request of the Chairman of the Commission, the head of any 
     such department or agency shall furnish such information 
     expeditiously to the Commission.
       (c) Postal Services.--The Commission may use the United 
     States mails and obtain printing and binding services in the 
     same manner and under the same conditions as other 
     departments and agencies of the Federal Government.
       (d) Subcommittees.--The Commission may establish panels 
     composed of less than the full membership of the Commission 
     for the purpose of carrying out the Commission's duties. The 
     actions of each such panel shall be subject to the review and 
     control of the Commission. Any findings and determinations 
     made by such a panel shall not be considered the findings and 
     determinations of the Commission unless approved by the 
     Commission.
       (e) Authority of Individuals To Act for Commission.--Any 
     member or agent of the Commission may, if authorized by the 
     Commission, take any action which the Commission is 
     authorized to take under this title.

     SEC. ____06. PERSONNEL MATTERS.

       (a) Compensation of Members.--Each member of the Commission 
     who is a private United States citizen shall be paid at a 
     rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of 
     basic pay payable for level V of the Executive Schedule under 
     section 5316 of title 5, United States Code, for each day 
     (including travel time) during which the member is engaged in 
     the performance of the duties of the Commission. All members 
     of the Commission who are Members of Congress shall serve 
     without compensation in addition to that received for their 
     services as Members of Congress.
       (b) Travel Expenses.--Each member of the Commission shall 
     be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of 
     subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies 
     under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States 
     Code, while away from their homes or regular places of 
     business in the performance of services for the Commission.
       (c) Staff.--
       (1) In general.--The Chairman of the Commission may, 
     without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States 
     Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, 
     appoint a staff director and such additional personnel as may 
     be necessary to enable the Commission to perform its duties. 
     The appointment of a staff director shall be subject to the 
     approval of the Commission. No member of the staff shall be a 
     current officer or employee of the intelligence community.
       (2) Compensation.--The Chairman of the Commission may fix 
     the pay of the staff director and other personnel without 
     regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of 
     chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, relating to 
     classification of positions and General Schedule pay rates, 
     except that the rate of pay fixed under this paragraph for 
     the staff director may not exceed the rate payable for level 
     V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title 
     and the rate of pay for other personnel may not exceed the 
     maximum rate payable for grade GS-15 of the General Schedule.
       (d) Detail of Government Employees.--Upon request of the 
     Chairman of the Commission, the head of any Federal 
     department or agency may detail, on a non-reimbursable basis, 
     any personnel of that department or agency to the Commission 
     to assist it in carrying out its administrative and clerical 
     functions, except that no person shall be detailed to the 
     staff of the Commission who is an officer or employee of an 
     intelligence agency.
       (e) Procurement of Temporary and Intermittent Services.--
     The Chairman of the Commission may procure temporary and 
     intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, 
     United States Code, at rates for individuals which do not 
     exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay 
     payable for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 
     5316 of such title.
       (f) Administrative and Support Services.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall furnish the Commission, on a non-
     reimbursable basis, any administrative and support services 
     requested by the Commission consistent with this title.

     SEC. ____07. PAYMENT OF COMMISSION EXPENSES.

       The compensation, travel expenses, per diem allowances of 
     members and employees of the Commission, and other expenses 
     of the Commission shall be paid out of funds available to the 
     Director of Central Intelligence for the payment of 
     compensation, travel allowances, and per diem allowances, 
     respectively, of employees of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency.

     SEC. ____08. TERMINATION OF THE COMMISSION.

       The Commission shall terminate one month after the date of 
     the submission of the report required by section __04(c).

     SEC. ____09. DEFINITIONS.

       For purposes of this title--
       (1) the term ``intelligence agency'' means any agency, 
     office, or element of the intelligence community;
       (2) the term ``intelligence community'' shall have the same 
     meaning as set forth in section 3(4) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)); and
       (3) the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' 
     refers to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
     and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives.

  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I would like to read the distinguished 
list of cosponsors that have joined in this legislation. First, the 
Senator from Florida [Mr. Graham], a very valued Member of the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, who will momentarily address this bill; the 
distinguished chairman, the Senator from Arizona [Mr. DeConcini]; 
Senator Metzebaum; Senator Chafee, Senator Cohen; Sen ator Kerrey; 
Senator Boren; Senator Lugar; Senator Bryan; Senator Baucus; Senator 
Durenberger; Senator Pell; Senator Lautenberg; Senator Hatch; Senator 
Johnston; Senator Bumpers; and Senator Kerry.
  I ask unanimous consent that the record may remain open until 2 
o'clock today, within which time other Senators desiring to be noted as 
original cosponsors may do so.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, in the wake of the Ames case, and the 
demise of the Soviet Union, and the Warsaw Pact, many tough questions 
regarding the effectiveness of our intelligence agencies and their 
proper role in a post-cold-war world are being asked by Members of 
Congress and the public. These questions deserve careful, sustained, 
and detailed consideration by a group which is independent of the 
intelligence community independent of the Congress and the executive 
branch.
  In my view, an independent review is long overdue. The Defense 
Department has been subject to a variety of reviews that have helped it 
to keep pace with a changing strategic environment. These reviews have 
included the Goldwater-Nichols Act largely conducted by the Senate 
Armed Services Committee under the leadership of Senator Nunn; the 
Bottom-Up Review, largely conducted under the aegis of the Secretary of 
Defense, Secretary Aspin; and an ongoing Presidential Commission on the 
Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. By contrast, the Intelligence 
Community has not had an independent top-to-bottom review since it was 
established in 1947.
  I would like to reiterate that point.
  The CIA came into being in 1947, and not since the initial 
legislation establishing it has there been a Presidential commission to 
examine that agency and other related agencies. So that is why it is 
timely, I think, to undertake a thorough review. That is the precise 
reason that I came forward with this concept, and I am pleased to be 
joined by some distinguished Members of the Senate.
  I happen to believe that an independent commission will validate the 
continued need for a robust intelligence structure to support U.S. 
national security interests.
  Again, Madam President, the concept of the Commission is not in any 
way to be perceived as a criticism of the employees who are now 
performing these valued duties. I think if you were to submit to them 
the question of whether or not their functions, individually and 
collectively, should be reviewed in the context of the functions of 
others in like agencies and departments, they would agree it is timely 
to look at these matters collectively.
  Nevertheless, the Commission may well recommend changes that 
eliminate some duplication and waste that is in the system today. 
Indeed, I am confident it is there. I think many of the employees who 
devote their lives and careers to intelligence would be the first to 
acknowledge that some corrections are now timely.
  An independent review--or, as we call it in Government, a scrub--of 
the existing structure, would provide both the Congress and the 
American people with assurances that our intelligence organizations and 
activities are consistent with our great Nation's values, budgets, and 
goals.
  It is not the intent of the sponsors to prevent the implementation of 
changes already being contemplated. Counterintelligence reforms, for 
example, should be implemented immediately. So should the reforms 
underway in the Directorate of Intelligence, which were enumerated by 
Director Woolsey recently. These are limited efforts which do not 
include a review of the fundamental missions and organization of the 
intelligence community.
  My colleagues should be aware that the administration has indicated 
its opposition to this amendment, preferring instead to have a study of 
the intelligence community conducted by the President's Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board, commonly referred to as PFIAB.
  I and the other sponsors of this amendment, however, believe that a 
study staffed by current employees of the intelligence community would 
not be as credible as one under the independent aegis of a Presidential 
commission. A PFIAB study would not provide the fully independent 
review which is required at this critical time.
  I should also point out that the executive branch, as a rule, does 
not share PFIAB documents with Congress, it being an executive branch 
agency, and that is quite proper within the framework of our laws and 
precedence. So congressional committees could not have, perhaps, the 
full opportunity to review a PFIAB report.
  Recently I asked to see a PFIAB report, which I have reason to 
believe is an excellent report, on Somalia. Senator Levin and I, at the 
direction of the leadership of the Armed Services Committee, are 
performing a report on that subject. But I was denied, understandably, 
because of executive branch privilege. That is a clear example.
  Our amendment has a number of important features:
  First, the commission established by this amendment would review the 
full range of issues that have arisen concerning the intelligence 
community in recent years. For example, the commission would be charged 
with examining the roles and missions of the intelligence community, as 
well as its budget.
  Second, the commission would be comprised of 4 Members of Congress, 
appointed by the leadership, as well as 13 individuals from the private 
sector, 9 appointed by the President, and 4 by the congressional 
leadership. To ensure an independent perspective, the private sector 
individuals must have a strong background in the national security 
arena, but a majority of them cannot have previously held senior 
leadership positions in the intelligence community.
  Third, this amendment stipulates that no member of the commission 
staff shall be a current employee of the intelligence community.
  Finally, the commission has been given sufficient time to conduct a 
thorough review and develop recommendations for Congress and the 
President. I am hopeful that my colleagues will support this amendment.
  Madam President, before the distinguished Senator from Florida, who 
is my principal cosponsor, addresses this amendment, I ask for the yeas 
and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. GRAHAM addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER. I yield such time as the distinguished Senator from 
Florida may require.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Madam President, I thank my colleague and copartner in 
the development of this amendment, the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia.
  As he has so well said, the intelligence community in the United 
States is largely a product of World War II and the events immediately 
after World War II leading to the cold war. The CIA was formed during 
the administration of President Truman and has proceeded for the 
intervening almost half century, largely operating on the same 
principles that were in existence at the time of its creation.
  Some of those principles were that our enemy was the large empire of 
the Soviet Union; that it was an empire which was difficult to 
penetrate; it was an empire which encouraged the development of 
technology as a means of gathering information; it was a period of time 
in which we had relationships with special allies, largely the result 
of experiences during World War II; our intelligence community was an 
activity which was largely provider rather than user oriented.
  Those were some of the characteristics which, for a half century, 
served this Nation well, as we were dealing with the Soviet Union. Now 
we are in a new era, and we need to ask a new set of questions, such 
as: What will be the needs of the users of our intelligence? Who will 
be the users of our intelligence? How do we best provide for their 
needs?
  I came to this need for a study of the future of our intelligence 
community, Madam President, during the course of our budget 
considerations in the Intelligence Committee. Without breaching any of 
the confidentiality of those discussions, I was struck with the fact 
that we were largely focused on highly specific, relatively technical 
questions, when the questions we ought to have been asking were: What 
is it we are trying to accomplish? How will this particular allocation 
of resources move us toward the achievement of those objectives? How do 
we evaluate whether we have accomplished the objectives or are moving 
in a direction toward their attainment?
  Some of the subissues that come out of that analysis will include 
questions such as: What will be the role of our intelligence community 
in providing economic intelligence, in addition to its traditional 
foreign policy and national security orientation? What will be the 
changes required in our selection of personnel for our intelligence 
community at a time when the intelligence community is at least 
stagnating and may be constricting as a result of budget constraints?
  And as we begin to move more toward intelligence that human beings 
gather, rather than intelligence acquired through machines, I have been 
dismayed, Madam President, in a number of visits to our Embassies and 
intelligence stations around the world, that there was not more 
diversity in who our intelligence agents are.
  If you are in a country which is largely Hispanic, or largely of 
African origin, you would think that we would be in a better position 
to gather human intelligence if we had people who were personally more 
conversant with and expressed the language, the culture, the background 
of that particular country. One of the unique things about America is 
that we are so diverse and therefore have the ability to draw upon a 
wide range of backgrounds of Americans who can serve American interests 
in societies with which they have some special affinity. Those are the 
kinds of questions which I hope this intelligence commission will 
pursue.
  Madam President, as the Senator from Virginia indicated----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Virginia has 
expired.
  Mr. WARNER. The distinguished chairman and I yield such additional 
time from our managers' allocation as our colleague from Florida may 
desire, recognizing that we will need some additional time, both of us. 
So I hope that will not exceed 6, 7, or 8 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield time from the bill?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes, that is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida may continue.
  Mr. GRAHAM. I appreciate the generosity of my colleague from 
Virginia. I will not intrude on that generosity to even the extent that 
he suggested.
  I would like to reiterate some of the concerns that the Senator from 
Virginia expressed relative to the alternative to that which we have 
presented. I am pleased that in the administration, in the intelligence 
community, and in the Congress there is a recognition that there needs 
to be this indepth study of the mission and role of the intelligence 
community in the post-cold-war era.
  The alternative to doing it in the manner that is suggested in this 
amendment is to have it done through the Presidential Commission on 
Foreign Intelligence, which is an agency within the White House which 
has been in existence to assist the President in his evaluation of 
intelligence activities.
  I believe that the format that is being presented to the Senate today 
is a superior method of achieving and securing support for a 
comprehensive examination of our Intelligence Commission of our 
intelligence community for at least three reasons.
  First, the structure that we are suggesting includes both 
representatives of the executive branch and of the legislative branch. 
If the report of the Commission is to have the maximum degree of 
sustained support by the public and by the Government, I believe that 
it would be enhanced by having all of those persons who will eventually 
have to be involved in implementation of the policy involved in the 
establishment of those new policies.
  Second, I think that it is important that the membership be people 
who are primarily selected because of the vision of the questions of 
what we need to have for the future of our intelligence community, that 
they can bring to this task.
  The President's advisory agency has in the past largely been assigned 
specific technical responsibilities, important responsibilities but 
generally focused on question of the appropriate technology for a 
particular type of information gathering.
  I believe that while those questions are critical to the tactical 
implementation of whatever recommendations are made the questions that 
we hope will be asked and answered are of a higher level of concept, of 
basic function, direction and necessary steps in order to achieve goals 
for our intelligence community.
  Third, it is important that there be an independent staff. In the 
past, the President's advisory agency has been staffed by professionals 
from the Central Intelligence Agency. That staff was arguably 
appropriate given the focused nature of the questions that they were 
asked to answer, but I believe that if we are going to be looking 
comprehensively at all components of the intelligence community for a 
long period into the future that the Commission's report would have a 
great degree of credibility if it had a staff that was not seen as 
being predisposed to any particular component of the intelligence 
community or predisposed to the way in which the intelligence community 
had conducted itself in the past.
  Madam President, I believe this is important business that we are 
discussing today. It represents a significant part of our Nation's 
effort at maintaining an effective not only foreign policy and national 
security policy but increasingly an economic policy.
  I believe that the Senator from Virginia and those who have joined 
with him have given us an effective road map as to how to get the right 
questions asked and answered and I hope that our colleagues will concur 
and this amendment will be adopted.
  Madam President, with the introduction of this amendment, we have the 
opportunity to lay the groundwork for a pivotal change in the 
intelligence community. This amendment will establish a blue-ribbon 
commission to take a fresh look at the roles, missions, and resources 
of the intelligence community, to refine the objectives and renew the 
vitality of this essential capability.
  The intelligence community as we know it has developed largely during 
and since World War II. For most of this period, we had a clear, 
identifiable enemy. The collapse of the Soviet Eastern bloc, however, 
presents a dramatically changed world. We now face several simultaneous 
crisis areas around the globe. Regional instability presents a variety 
of new threats each day.
  Our intelligence needs are different today than just a few years ago. 
As we reduce our defense spending, the focus on intelligence as a force 
multiplier becomes even greater.
  Yet, my sense is that the intelligence community has not confronted 
and adjusted to this reality. The timing is right with the changes 
brought about by the post-cold-war era, to readdress the functions and 
structure of the intelligence community.
  Agencies within the intelligence community have been studied, but a 
comprehensive study of the entire community has not been undertaken 
since its establishment. In addition, implementation of the 
recommendations has been limited.
  This amendment offers the advantages of an independent and 
collaborative approach to achieve the most effectiveness. The proposed 
commission has the independence to freely and comprehensively assess 
intelligence activities and develop a paradigm for an intelligence 
community that can better address today's and tomorrow's requirements. 
A collaborative, bipartisan approach with both executive and 
legislative branch involvement with nine members appointed by the 
President, and eight members appointed by congressional leadership--
four Members of Congress and four members from the private sector--
ensures that recommendations will have support from both areas and can 
easily be acted upon.
  These members are the most critical element of the Commission's 
credibility and effectiveness. These members--charged with the 
responsibility for an essential redirection of the intelligence 
community--must be knowledgeable, respected individuals with 
appropriate stature; with a background in national security affairs; 
and with a desire to develop a blueprint to refine our intelligence 
collection, analysis and management. In keeping with the spirit of the 
Commission, partisan alliances should be surpassed. Issues should be 
addressed in the best interest of the Nation to effect a new course for 
the intelligence community. The Commission will have the necessary 
independence to take a new look at the intelligence community and 
consider these key elements:

  First, what should the role of the intelligence community be, not 
only for defense and foreign policy support, but should roles extend 
into other areas such as economic intelligence; second, do resources--
human, material, and funding--appropriately correspond with the 
Nation's requirements, including contingencies; third, are intelligence 
efforts properly focused for today's environment as well as poised to 
address future needs.
  A particular concern is whether recruitment, training, and promotion 
policies of the intelligence community are properly focused to provide 
the human resources needed to fulfill current and future requirements.
  Human intelligence, as a potential source, is increasing, especially 
in the numerous emerging hot spots around the world where other means 
of intelligence gathering may be limited. But this source is useful 
only if we adapt our resources, drawing on the diversity available 
within our Nation. To accomplish this, the intelligence community must 
relinquish outmoded cultures and break through to a new mind set which 
more adequately addresses national requirements.
  In a separate effort, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the 
Armed Forces is beginning their review with recommendations expected by 
May 24, 1995. This Commission will review intelligence product use and 
value as a threat assessment for the military services, and, if needed, 
develop recommendations. Our proposed Commission on the Roles and 
Capabilities of the Intelligence Community should assess these findings 
and to the extent that it is pertinent, develop recommendations.
  The Commission proposed in this amendment will conduct an 
independent, comprehensive evaluation with executive and legislative 
branch collaboration, providing an opportunity for a pivotal change 
which could serve to strengthen the support and renew the vitality of 
this vital capability essential for our Nation's security.
  Madam President, I look forward to creation of this Commission and 
the recommendations it will provide.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank our distinguished colleague from 
Florida. He has worked with me every step of the way on this amendment 
and provided some very valuable concepts which have been incorporated 
into the amendment.
  Madam President, I anticipate at this time that the distinguished 
Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Specter] desires to address the Senate 
under the time allocation accorded him on this amendment.
  Mr. SPECTER. I will in a few minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Recognizing that the Senator from Pennsylvania is not 
ready to proceed, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, what is the business before the Senate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is considering S. 2082 under a time 
agreement.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask the distinguished chairman of the 
committee whether he would be willing to yield me 2 minutes on an 
unrelated matter.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I certainly yield to the Senator from 
Delaware 2 minutes of the manager's time.
  if the Senator wants some more time, since we are waiting for another 
Senator who is coming over to speak, I will yield him additional time 
or we go outside the bill.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from 
Delaware be permitted to speak as if this morning business for 5 
minutes and the time not be allotted against the time on the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Delaware is recognized 5 minutes.

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