[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 112 (Friday, August 12, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: August 12, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the order previously entered, the 
Senate will proceed to the consideration of S. 2082, which the clerk 
will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 2082) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 1995, for the intelligence activities of the U.S. 
     Government and for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement 
     and Disability System, and for other purposes.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which had been reported 
from the Committee on Armed Services, with amendments, as follows:
  [The parts of the bill intended to be stricken are shown in boldface 
brackets, and the parts of the bill intended to be inserted are shown 
in italic.]

                                S. 2082

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 1995''.
                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 1995 for the conduct of the intelligence activities of 
     the following elements of the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Department of State.
       (8) The Department of the Treasury.
       (9) The Department of Energy.
       (10) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (11) The Central Imagery Office.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1995, 
     for the conduct of intelligence activities of the elements 
     listed in such section, are those specified in the classified 
     Schedule of Authorizations prepared by the committee of 
     conference to accompany S. 2082 of the One Hundred Third 
     Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations described in 
     subsection (a) shall be made available to the Committees on 
     Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and 
     to the President. The President shall provide for suitable 
     distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of 
     the Schedule, within the executive branch of Government.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--The Director of Central 
     Intelligence may authorize the employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number of such personnel 
     authorized for employment for fiscal year 1995 under section 
     102 of this Act, if the Director determines that such action 
     is necessary to the performance of important intelligence 
     functions, except that such number may not, for any element 
     of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number 
     of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such 
     element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority 
     granted by subsection (a).
       (c) Intelligence Community Defined.--As used in subsection 
     (a), the term ``intelligence community'' has the same meaning 
     given to that term by section 3(4) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4)).

     SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of 
     the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1995 the 
     sum of $106,300,000. Of the amounts made available under this 
     subsection, funds made available for the Advanced Research 
     and Development Committee and the Environmental Task Force 
     are authorized to remain available until September 30, 1996.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The Community Management 
     Account of the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized 
     221 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1995. Such 
     personnel of the Community Management Account may be 
     permanent employees of the Community Management Account or 
     personnel detailed from other elements of the United States 
     Government.
       (c) Reimbursement.--During fiscal year 1995, any officer or 
     employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces 
     who is detailed to the Community Management Account staff 
     from another element of the United States Government shall be 
     detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such 
     officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a 
     nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than 1 year for 
     the performance of temporary functions as required by the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 1995 the sum of $198,000,000.
                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated by 
     this Act for the salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits 
     of Federal employees, there are authorized to be appropriated 
     such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary 
     to cover increases in those benefits authorized by law for 
     fiscal year 1995.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON THE CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       The authorizations of appropriations contained in this Act 
     do not constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution of the United States or by the laws of the 
     United States.

     SEC. 303. REPEAL OF RESTRICTION ON INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION 
                   WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

       Section 107 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1987 (Public Law 99-569) is repealed.

     SEC. 304. REPORT REGARDING MANDATORY RETIREMENT FOR 
                   EXPIRATION OF TIME IN CLASS.

       (a) Report Required.--Not later than December 1, 1994, the 
     Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the 
     congressional defense and intelligence committees [of 
     Congress] a report setting forth a legislative proposal, 
     coordinated as appropriate with elements of the intelligence 
     community, which would provide for mandatory retirement for 
     expiration of time in class, comparable to the applicable 
     provisions of section 607 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 
     (22 U.S.C. 4007), for all civilian employees of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence elements of 
     the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. The report shall 
     include an assessment of the advisability and feasibility of 
     instituting such a mandatory retirement policy, and of 
     alternative means to achieve the objectives of a mandatory 
     retirement policy. The report shall also include an 
     assessment from the Secretary of Defense of the impact of a 
     mandatory retirement policy for intelligence community 
     civilian employees on all other Department of Defense 
     civilian employees.
       (b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       (1) the term [``intelligence committees of Congress''] 
     ``congressional defense and intelligence committees'' means 
     the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of 
     Representatives, the Defense Subcommittees of the Committees 
     on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (2) the term ``intelligence community'' has the same 
     meaning given to that term in section 3(4) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4)).
                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. AMENDMENT OF SECTION 4(a) OF THE CIA ACT OF 1949.

       Section 4(a) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
     (50 U.S.C. 403e(a)) is amended in subparagraphs (A) and (C) 
     of paragraph (5), by striking ``not the result of vicious 
     habits, intemperance, or misconduct on his part,'' each place 
     it appears.

     SEC. 402. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

       (a) Position Established.--The Central Intelligence Agency 
     Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new section:


          ``GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

       ``Sec. 20. (a) There is a General Counsel of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency appointed from civilian life by the 
     President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
       ``(b) The General Counsel of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency is the chief legal officer of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency.
       ``(c) The General Counsel of the Central Intelligence 
     Agency shall perform such functions as the Director of 
     Central Intelligence may prescribe.''.
       (b) Pay for Position.--Section 5315 of title 5, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

        ``General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.

                     TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

     SEC. 501. CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE.

       (a) Amendments of the National Security Act of 1947.--(1) 
     Section 105(b)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-5(b)(2)) is amended by striking ``a central 
     imagery authority'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``the 
     Central Imagery Office''.
       (2) Section 106(b) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)) is 
     amended--
       (A) in the subsection caption, by striking out ``Central 
     Imagery Authority'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``Central 
     Imagery Office''; and
       (B) by striking out ``Central Imagery Authority'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``Central Imagery Office''.
       (b) Civilian Personnel Management for the Central Imagery 
     Office.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Secretary of 
     Defense may exercise the authorities set forth in sections 
     1601 and 1604 of title 10, United States Code, pertaining to 
     civilian officers and employees in the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency, with respect to civilian officers and employees of 
     the Central Imagery Office.
       (2)(A) Civilian personnel administrative support for 
     officers and employees of the Central Imagery Office shall 
     remain a responsibility of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (B) The authority provided in section 1604(e)(1) of title 
     10, United States Code, may, with respect to civilian 
     officers and employees of the Central Imagery Office, be 
     delegated by the Secretary of Defense only to the Deputy 
     Secretary of Defense.

     SEC. 502. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF CERTAIN MAPS, CHARTS, AND 
                   GEODETIC DATA.

       Section 2796(b)(1)(C) of title 10, United States Code is 
     amended by inserting ``jeopardize or interfere with ongoing 
     military or intelligence operations, or'' after 
     ``disclosed,''.

     SEC. 503. AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH A NATIONAL PUBLIC 
                   INFORMATION CENTER.

       Of the funds made available to the Secretary of Defense 
     under this Act, the Secretary is authorized during fiscal 
     year 1995 to expend not more than $3,000,000 to establish a 
     National Public Information Center for the purpose of--
       (1) surveying, collecting, storing, distributing, and 
     presenting unclassified information, including information 
     retained by Government agencies as of the date of enactment 
     of this Act;
       (2) providing support for training in decision-making, and 
     for professional education in the Department of Defense and 
     the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947); and
       (3) informing more broadly the American public.
               TITLE VI--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

     SEC. 601. DISCLOSURE OF CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS FOR 
                   COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PURPOSES.

       Section 608 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 
     1681f) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Notwithstanding'' and inserting ``(a) 
     Disclosure of Certain Identifying Information.--
     Notwithstanding''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(b) Disclosures to the FBI for Counterintelligence 
     Purposes.--
       ``(1) Consumer reports.--Notwithstanding the provisions of 
     section 604, a consumer reporting agency shall furnish a 
     consumer report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation when 
     presented with a written request for a consumer report, 
     signed by the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, or the Director's designee, which certifies 
     compliance with this subsection. The Director or the 
     Director's designee may make such a certification only if the 
     Director or the Director's designee has determined in writing 
     that--
       ``(A) such records are necessary for the conduct of an 
     authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation; and
       ``(B) there are specific and articulable facts giving 
     reason to believe that the consumer whose consumer report is 
     sought is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, as 
     defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).
       ``(2) Identifying information.--Notwithstanding the 
     provisions of section 604, a consumer reporting agency shall 
     furnish identifying information respecting a consumer, 
     limited to name, address, former addresses, places of 
     employment, or former places of employment, to the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation when presented with a written 
     request, signed by the Director or the Director's designee, 
     which certifies compliance with this subsection. The Director 
     or the Director's designee may make such a certification only 
     if the Director or the Director's designee has determined in 
     writing that--
       ``(A) such information is necessary to the conduct of an 
     authorized counterintelligence investigation; and
       ``(B) there is information giving reason to believe that 
     the consumer has been, or is about to be, in contact with a 
     foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, as defined in 
     section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).
       ``(3) Confidentiality.--No consumer reporting agency or 
     officer, employee, or agent of such consumer reporting agency 
     may disclose to any person, other than those officers, 
     employees, or agents of such agency necessary to fulfill the 
     requirement to disclose information to the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation under this subsection, that the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation has sought or obtained a consumer report or 
     identifying information respecting any consumer under 
     paragraph (1) or (2), nor shall such agency, officer, 
     employee, or agent include in any consumer report any 
     information that would indicate that the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation has sought or obtained such a consumer report 
     or identifying information.
       ``(4) Payment of fees.--The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     shall, subject to the availability of appropriations, pay to 
     the consumer reporting agency assembling or providing credit 
     reports or identifying information in accordance with 
     procedures established under this title, a fee for 
     reimbursement for such costs as are reasonably necessary and 
     which have been directly incurred in searching, reproducing, 
     or transporting books, papers, records, or other data 
     required or requested to be produced under this subsection.
       ``(5) Limit on dissemination.--The Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation may not disseminate information obtained 
     pursuant to this subsection outside of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, except to the Department of Justice as may be 
     necessary for the approval or conduct of a foreign 
     counterintelligence investigation, or, where the information 
     concerns a person subject to the Uniform Code of Military 
     Justice, to appropriate investigative authorities within the 
     military department concerned as may be necessary for the 
     conduct of a joint foreign counterintelligence investigation.
       ``(6) Rules of construction.--Nothing in this subsection 
     shall be construed to prohibit information from being 
     furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to 
     a subpoena or court order, or in connection with a judicial 
     or administrative proceeding to enforce the provisions of 
     this Act. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to 
     authorize or permit the withholding or information from 
     Congress.
       ``(7) Reports to congress.--On a semiannual basis, the 
     Attorney General of the United States shall fully inform the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence and 
     the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the 
     Senate concerning all requests made pursuant to paragraphs 
     (1) and (2).
       ``(8) Damages.--Any agency or department of the United 
     States obtaining or disclosing credit reports, records, or 
     information contained therein in violation of this subsection 
     is liable to the consumer to whom such records relate in an 
     amount equal to the sum of--
       ``(A) $100, without regard to the volume of records 
     involved;
       ``(B) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a 
     result of the disclosure;
       ``(C) if the violation is found to have been willful or 
     intentional, such punitive damages as a court may allow; and
       ``(D) in the case of any successful action to enforce 
     liability under this subsection, the costs of the action, 
     together with reasonable attorney fees, as determined by the 
     court.
       ``(9) Disciplinary actions for violations.--If a court 
     determines that any agency or department of the United States 
     has violated any provision of this subsection and the court 
     finds that the circumstances surrounding the violation raise 
     questions of whether or not an officer or employee of the 
     agency or department acted willfully or intentionally with 
     respect to the violation, the agency or department shall 
     promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether or not 
     disciplinary action is warranted against the officer or 
     employee who was responsible for the violation.
       ``(10) Good-faith exception.--Any credit reporting agency 
     or agent or employee thereof making disclosure of credit 
     reports or identifying information pursuant to this 
     subsection in good-faith reliance upon a certificate of the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation pursuant to provisions of 
     this subsection shall not be liable to any person for such 
     disclosure under this title, the constitution of any State, 
     or any law or regulation of any State or any political 
     subdivision of any State.
       ``(11) Limitation of remedies.--The remedies and sanctions 
     set forth in this subsection shall be the only judicial 
     remedies and sanctions for violation of this subsection.
       ``(12) Injunctive relief.--In addition to any other remedy 
     contained in this subsection, injunctive relief shall be 
     available to require compliance with the procedures of this 
     subsection. In the event of any successful action under this 
     subsection, costs together with reasonable attorney fees, as 
     determined by the court, may be recovered.''.

  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the committee 
amendments will be agreed to en bloc.
  The committee amendments were agreed to en bloc.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, there is a 60-
minute time limitation on debate on the bill, with up to 20 minutes of 
that time for opening statements of the managers. Certain amendments as 
stated on page 2 of today's Calendar of Business are the only 
amendments that will be in order. They will be considered under the 
time limits specified.
  Mr. DeCONCINI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona [Mr. DeConcini].


                    privilege of the floor--s. 2082

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent Joe Sanchez be 
permitted the privilege of the floor during the course of S. 2082.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I am pleased to join with my 
distinguished colleague and vice chairman of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence, Senator Warner, is presenting to the Senate the 
intelligence authorization bill for fiscal year 1995.
  Senator Warner and I came to the leadership positions on this 
committee at the beginning of this Congress, and we will both 
relinquish our positions at the end of this Congress. I am leaving the 
Senate, of course, and Senator Warner's 8-year term on the committee 
will expire. Although our tenure in these positions has been relatively 
limited, the last 2 years have been active and, I believe, productive 
years for the committee. A great deal of the credit for this goes to 
the senior Senator from Virginia. We have worked well together in 
addressing what is a complex and often problematic area: the activities 
of U.S. intelligence agencies.
  Senator Warner has been a partner and we have supported each other, 
compromised, and found what we felt was the best interests for the 
intelligence community in the oversight responsibilities of our 
committee.
  This has been and continues to be a difficult period for the 
intelligence community whose role continues to evolve and whose 
capabilities continue to adjust in the wake of the cold war. Clearly, 
the world remains an uncertain and dangerous place. Our policymakers 
face problems that seem more difficult to deal with, more intractable, 
than those of the cold war period. It is no longer so easy to predict 
where U.S. military forces will be deployed round the world or to 
predict the nature of the threat they can expect to face. Few would 
argue, in the face of such uncertainty, that we can afford to eliminate 
our capacity to gather information when such information might mean the 
difference between life and death of our military service men and 
women, or mean we take the wrong diplomatic path on a matter of crucial 
importance to our security.

  At the same time, I think most would agree there is room to scale 
back an intelligence community which over a period of years has grown 
to considerable proportions largely to deal with the threat to United 
States security posed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.
  I think the Senate should appreciate the degree to which the 
intelligence community has been scaled back. This will, in fact, be the 
fifth consecutive year that the President's budget request for the 
National Foreign Intelligence Program will be cut by the Congress. 
Overall, the authorization recommended by the committee for fiscal year 
1995 is over 13 percent less than the 1990 appropriation for national 
intelligence in real terms--fiscal year 1995 dollars since 1990. More 
importantly, we are recommending cuts to terminate, rather than just 
scale back, some programs and activities which have significant out-
year costs; so, in these cases, a dollar saved in fiscal year 1995 
means additional savings in future years.
  There have been even greater reductions in personnel. In 1992, 
Congress mandated an across-the-board cut of 17.5 percent in civilian 
personnel to be achieved by fiscal year 1997. These reductions are well 
on track. Indeed, recent administration decisions will extend the 
downsizing to achieve reductions of at least 22.5 percent by the end of 
the decade. Personnel costs represents a significant proportion of the 
overall budget, and therefore we cannot bring the budget under control 
without bringing the number of intelligence employees down as well.
  While the level of funding recommended by the committee for fiscal 
year 1995 remains classified pursuant to executive branch policy, 
suffice it to say we are recommending a reduction of almost $300 
million to the administration request for national intelligence 
activities. The administration's request itself represented a slight 
reduction over the amount appropriated for the previous fiscal year 
when adjusted for inflation.
  Thus, Mr. President, we are recommending a budget somewhat below last 
year's appropriated level. It is not a deep cut but it is a cut 
nonetheless. We have reduced in places we can and have added funding in 
a few places where we think it is needed. The bottom line is that we 
believe this level of funding will preserve a substantial, flexible, 
and forward-looking intelligence capability adequate to support the 
national security needs of the country during the next fiscal year.
  Mr. President, I must say to my colleagues that while I do not see 
the justification for increases in intelligence in the near term, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to find places to cut, particularly 
given the current assumptions and philosophical 
underpinnings that form the basis for program and budget 
decisions by the executive branch in this area.
  This is one of the principal factors which prompted me to support the 
creation of the new Commission on Intelligence, which we will propose 
as an amendment to this bill. Senator Warner conceived of this and 
believed it was the right thing to do earlier than I did, I must admit. 
And I have been convinced by his leadership that, indeed, we should 
have such a commission.
  I think the time has come for the role of the intelligence agencies 
to be reevaluated. I think the time has come for the assumptions which 
underlie the resourcing of intelligence to be reexamined. A new 
consensus needs to be developed.
  The executive branch could do this if it wanted. The oversight 
committees of the Congress could do this if they wanted. But I believe 
that a review conducted by either branch would not have the credibility 
with the other or, for that matter, with the American people.
  What is needed, in my view, is a hardheaded, objective review of the 
fundamentals by a group of outsiders, by smart people, respected people 
who have no vested interest in preserving the status quo and no ax to 
grind. If Senator Warner and I can leave the committee having set this 
in motion, I believe we will have left a very valuable legacy.
  Mr. President, before giving the floor to our distinguished vice 
chairman, let me briefly summarize the key provisions in this bill.
  Principally, of course, the bill authorizes appropriations for fiscal 
year 1995 for: First, the intelligence activities of the U.S. 
Government; second, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
Disability System; and third, the community management account of the 
Director of Central Intelligence. It also authorizes the personnel 
ceilings as of September 30, 1995, for the intelligence activities of 
the United States and for the community management account of the 
Director of Central Intelligence. The funding and personnel levels 
which are authorized for intelligence activities are contained in a 
classified schedule of authorizations that are given the force of law 
by the bill itself.
  The bill also would repeal the limitation regarding intelligence 
cooperation with South Africa contained in section 107 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1987. Motivated by a 
concern that the intelligence services of South Africa were playing an 
instrumental role in preserving the apartheid system against internal 
opposition forces, in 1986 Congress prohibited the United States 
intelligence agencies from engaging in any form of cooperation with the 
Government of South Africa ``except activities which are reasonably 
designed to facilitate the collection of necessary intelligence.''
  With the advent of majority rule in South Africa, the committee 
believes it appropriate to repeal the longstanding statutory limitation 
on intelligence cooperation. Indeed, it is in the interests of the 
United States to have the flexibility to cooperate as may be 
appropriate with the newly elected South African Government to foster 
the development of democratic institutions and processes. U.S. 
intelligence may be able to contribute. We can provide assistance to 
the intelligence and security services which emerge under the newly 
elected South African Government to establish internal management and 
administrative systems. We can help these agencies improve 
accountability and oversight, and, as may be applicable, to adapt to 
any legislative oversight that may be established.
  The bill also contains a provision requiring appointment by the 
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, of the General 
Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. The committee believes that 
the position of CIA General Counsel warrants Senate confirmation. Not 
only would this requirement provide greater assurance that the position 
would not be politicized, it would improve the stature and importance 
of the office within the Agency itself.
  The bill also contains a provision to permit the Secretary of Defense 
to provide civilian personnel management for the Central Imagery Office 
consistent with existing authority for the Defense Intelligence Agency 
subject to certain conditions.
  I will address the Aldrich Ames espionage case and the legislative 
steps the committee has approved to address CIA-FBI counterintelligence 
problems after the statement of my good friend and vice chairman of the 
committee, Senator Warner.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The senior Senator from Virginia [Mr. 
Warner] is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I express my appreciation to my 
distinguished friend and partner, Senator DeConcini. We have worked 
together as full partners. In some areas, we have had disagreements, 
but we have always been able to reconcile what we thought was in the 
best interest of our country and that of the Senate. I hope as the 
record of the achievements of this committee during the 2-year period 
under his stewardship are examined, from a historical perspective, that 
they will reflect credit on this Senator as he departs his career in 
the U.S. Senate.
  I am pleased to join our distinguished chairman in recommending 
approval of S. 2082, the intelligence authorization bill for the fiscal 
year 1995. While I would have preferred, and indeed I supported at 
various times, a higher funding level for intelligence activities, I 
nevertheless believe this bill is an outstanding step forward in our 
Nation's intelligence capabilities.
  Although it contains a reduction of approximately $300 million from 
the administration's request, which I supported, it does provide 
funding in excess of the budget request in four very critical areas:
  First, intelligence support to U.S. military operations. Ever since 
our performance in the gulf region, we have been conscious of the need 
to increase the ability to get real-time intelligence to our troops in 
forward deployed areas. General Schwarzkopf, I think, made a lasting 
contribution in this area when he came back from that war and debriefed 
the Senate and the House on the need to have increased support for our 
military operations, and we have made an advancement in that area.
  Second, activities to reduce the critical problem of the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is a subject on 
which I and many other Members of this body have spoken very often and, 
indeed, the Presiding Officer, who is a member of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, has addressed the subject of proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.
  There is no threat to our Nation or any other nation in this world of 
any greater magnitude than the proliferation of chemical, biological 
and, indeed, weapons with fissionable material. I am glad that we made 
advances in that area.
  Third, efforts to improve our counterintelligence capability. I 
anticipate a very lively and constructive debate on this bill today 
with regard to a piece of legislation that has been very carefully 
considered by our committee and, indeed, by a number of Senators not on 
our committee. The regrettable incidence of the Ames case brought to 
our attention the need to make legislative--and I emphasize 
legislative--improvements in this area. For many years, the executive 
branch--and, indeed, it extends over a number of Presidencies--have 
tried to deal with these issues by Executive order and other regulatory 
procedures. It simply, Mr. President, has not worked effectively, and 
we saw that in the crisis that occurred as a result of the Ames case.
  Fourth, the advanced R&D initiatives which will keep our intelligence 
capabilities on the cutting edge. This Nation is recognized the world 
over as a superpower and much of that is dependent upon our ability to 
maintain a strong research and development base to place our Nation in 
the very forefront of technology across a wide range of subjects. And, 
indeed, this week we saw quite a controversy over a certain building. 
We may have occasion to address that later. But there was no dispute 
throughout that controversy of the essential work that is being 
performed by the persons who will hopefully soon enter that complex of 
buildings and continue their efforts to keep the United States on the 
cutting edge of technology.
  At this point, however, I would like to sound a note of caution 
concerning any further reductions to the intelligence budget. I believe 
that we are dangerously close to compromising the ability of our U.S. 
intelligence community to perform its many obligations.
  The overall level of intelligence spending has been declining in real 
terms for each of the last 5 years. In fact, the budget submitted this 
year by the administration contained a real reduction of approximately 
2 percent from last year's appropriated level. Our committee further 
reduced that request.
  Overall funding for the intelligence community has shrunk by over 13 
percent in real terms since 1989. Personnel cuts have been even more 
dramatic. Between 1991 and the year 2001, it is projected that we will 
achieve a force reduction of 25 percent if we continue as now planned. 
I personally, just speaking for myself, am not confident that that is 
the right direction to go. Nevertheless, that is the course we are on 
under the current administration's plan.
  If achieved, one-quarter of the positions that existed as of 1991, in 
the intelligence community, will be eliminated in this decade. These 
reductions are taking place against a backdrop of increased conflict 
around the world and ever-increasing reductions in the U.S. defense 
budget. At such a time, our need for intelligence could well be even 
greater, and I say that because of the historical record of how 
intelligence performs as a force multiplier in terms of our military 
structure.
  It is elementary, Mr. President. Take a battalion of fighting men and 
women on the front. To the extent that they have intelligence superior 
to the adversary they face, the fewer we will need to engage that 
adversary, or the fewer assets we would need to repel that adversary.
  So intelligence does serve as a force multiplier and, indeed, it 
serves to protect, to afford a greater measure of protection to our 
forward deployed fighting forces.
  Overall funding for the intelligence community has shrunk, as I say, 
by 13 percent in real terms since 1989. I question whether or not we 
should remain on this course, but nevertheless we have this budget this 
year. It has been thoroughly reviewed by our committee, and we are here 
today to proceed on the bill.
  These reductions are taking place, Mr. President, against a backdrop 
of increased conflict around the world and ever-increasing reductions 
in our U.S. defense budget. Several weeks ago, the Intelligence 
Committee received testimony from the Defense Intelligence Agency which 
revealed that there are currently 64 trouble spots or, in their 
terminology, ``hot spots,'' worldwide, geographic areas in which there 
is killing taking place, where there is open and active combat.
  It is interesting to compare this level of 64 today to that of, say, 
maybe 7 or 8 years ago when the DIA computed that there were less than 
half that number of trouble spots in the world.
  That indicates the level of difficulty that we face in terms of our 
leadership role as a nation, and our responsibility as a legislative 
branch to give adequate support to the men and women of the Armed 
Forces, who, from time to time, are called upon to engage in the cause 
of freedom in these hot spots around the world.
  Such a world presents the intelligence community with new, diverse 
and complex challenges. Instead of the overwhelming focus we had for so 
many years on the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the intelligence 
community is now called upon to provide expertise and information on 
trouble spots around the globe. Maintaining a viable intelligence 
capability in a rapidly changing world is not easy. It is not 
inexpensive.
  Some have argued that the intelligence budget should be subject to 
reductions proportionate to those taken in the overall defense budget. 
I disagree. Again, I point out historically that intelligence has 
served as a force multiplier of our military capability. Intelligence 
provides the U.S. military and U.S. policymakers with a critical edge 
over our potential adversaries. I ask my colleagues to consider how 
many lives were saved, for example, during World War II, due to the 
fact that the United States and Great Britain were able to crack the 
codes of both the German and the Japanese forces. More recently, United 
States intelligence played a critical role in helping United States and 
allied forces defeat Iraq with a minimum of losses to our side compared 
to those experienced by the enemy.
  The idea that intelligence is a force multiplier that should be 
protected in a period of declining budgets is certainly not a new one. 
It is proven historically. Let me make another historical reference. In 
1947, as the U.S. military was drawing down in the aftermath of World 
War II, Adm. Chester Nimitz wrote the following:

       It is my desire to preserve, to the maximum practicable 
     extent, the Directorate of Naval Communication organization 
     and strength and, if possible, to get them more help. The 
     greater the contraction of the Navy, the more important our 
     DNC and communication intelligence become.

  That was his view of intelligence in 1947, and it is my view of 
intelligence here in 1994.
  Admiral Nimitz believed then, indeed as I do today, that intelligence 
and communication capabilities are more, not less important during a 
period of declining military budgets and force structure. I will 
strongly oppose any efforts to further reduce this intelligence budget.
  As the chairman mentioned, we will be offering two important 
amendments to this authorization bill, and indeed, we have formed our 
partnership to try to move the cutting edge in this very important 
area. We made those movements, we drew up this bill, and we submit it 
to our colleagues today based on many hours of long and careful 
analysis, not only of the situation today, not only of the situation 
generated by the Ames case, but historically the problems that have 
confronted the intelligence agencies of our Government. Likewise, we 
draw on the very valuable work generated by our predecessors in the 
leadership on the Intelligence Committee, Senator Cohen and Senator 
Boren, and indeed a certain committee under their jurisdiction which 
provided very valuable insight in this area.
  The first is legislation to strengthen the counterintelligence 
capabilities of the United States. In the wake of the arrest of Aldrich 
Ames, it became clear that legislative changes were needed to assist 
the Government in deterring potential spies and in detecting espionage 
activity when deterrence fails. Since today's turncoat traitors are 
primarily motivated, indeed, according to their own admissions, largely 
by the dollar bill, the legislation which the committee adopted focuses 
on the financial activities of individuals with security clearances in 
our intelligence system, providing for Government access to financial 
and travel records. These initiatives draw upon groundwork laid by 
Senators, as I said, Boren and Cohen, the former chairman and vice 
chairman of our committee.
  Now, at the heart of this initiative is a recognition that in going 
into the financial background of those who have volunteered --and every 
one of them is a volunteer--to take on these tasks in special areas of 
the highest secrecy in our Government, we will have the ability to 
probe into their personal affairs, particularly their financial 
affairs. And it is my hope they understand we do this to protect them 
and to protect their work, and it is essential in terms of our national 
security that they yield some measure of their own personal privacy to 
achieve a balanced ability by this country to protect ourselves from 
spies within our own ranks.
  We believe that this legislation is a necessary step forward in our 
efforts to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information critical to 
our national security. We must do all we can to stop future turncoats 
in our country from betraying our national secrets.
  The second amendment which we will be sponsoring is the Warner-
Graham-DeConcini bill to establish a Presidential commission to examine 
the roles and missions of the intelligence community. A post-cold-war 
bottom-up review of our intelligence agencies is long overdue. In fact, 
the review which we are calling for would represent the first time 
since the passage of the National Security Act of 1947--that piece of 
legislation which created the Central Intelligence Agency--that any 
Presidential commission will have examined overall the CIA and the 
other entities associated with it.
  I am most appreciative of the important contributions made to this 
legislation, an idea that I came up with with both Senators Graham and 
DeConcini.
  I should like to thank the chairman for the cooperative spirit with 
which we conduct the committee's work, especially the budget 
deliberations.
  As with any piece of legislation, the bill before us today does not 
contain everything that the chairman or I might desire. Rather, it is 
the result of extensive deliberations and, indeed, a measure of 
compromise. The committee has produced a very balanced and appropriate 
set of recommendations, and I commend our chairman for his effective 
leadership. Also, I express my thanks now to the very dedicated staff 
that we have on the Senate Intelligence Committee.


                           Amendment No. 2553

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I now send to the desk under the 
previous order a managers' amendment offered by Senator Warner and 
myself and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. DeConcini], for himself and 
     Mr. Warner, proposes an amendment numbered 2553.

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under 
``Amendments Submitted.'')
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, the committee amendment that Senator 
Warner and I now offer would insert, with one modification which I will 
explain momentarily, the text of S. 2056--which was reported by the 
committee on June 30--as a new title of the authorization bill. In our 
view, this amendment is significant legislation which would vastly 
improve the ability of the Government to detect and prosecute 
espionage.
  It is, quite simply, what needs to be done in the wake of the Ames 
case.
  We all recognize that no law will stop a person bent on betraying his 
or her country from finding a way to do so. But there are things we can 
do to make a person think twice about it, that increase the odds they 
will be detected and successfully prosecuted. That is the objective of 
this amendment.
  It is a moderate proposal, which carefully balances the Government's 
needs against the civil liberties of our citizens. Indeed, there were a 
number of proposals suggested to the committee which were not accepted 
because of civil liberties concerns. At the same time, this amendment 
is focused on those gaps in the system where experience has shown there 
are problems.
  This legislation was originally introduced by Senator Warner and 
myself at the request of the administration. With the exception of one 
provision which I will address in a moment, the administration fully 
supports it. The Intelligence Committee reported the bill by a vote of 
15 to 2, and the two Senators who voted not to report the bill did so 
on the basis of the administration's reservations about the one section 
I alluded to. In short, the amendment has widespread, bipartisan 
support.
  Before summarizing the provisions of the amendment as a whole, let me 
say a few words about section 3, regarding the coordination of 
counterintelligence activities, which the administration has not 
endorsed and which is the section we have modified somewhat since S. 
2056 was reported.
  The language at issue in this section requires the heads of 
departments and agencies within the executive branch to notify the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation immediately when they have information 
which indicates that classified information is being, or may have been 
deliberately disclosed to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power; and then to consult with the FBI with respect to appropriate 
follow-up actions. The language goes on to say that once the FBI 
undertakes an investigation, it shall be given complete and timely 
access to the records and employees of the agency concerned.
  The purpose of this language is to ensure that departments and 
agencies do not take administrative actions on their own initiative 
which interfere with or preclude possible criminal prosecution, and to 
ensure that once a criminal investigation has been opened, the FBI 
receives complete and timely cooperation.
  This is not to say that a criminal investigation by the FBI will 
always be warranted by these circumstances or that it will not be 
outweighed by other U.S. interests. The point of this language is only 
to ensure that all of these interests get sorted out by the agencies 
concerned without one department or agency unilaterally taking actions 
that delay or prejudice a possible criminal investigation.
  My colleagues may well assume that what this language contemplates is 
already standard operating procedure. That is certainly what I thought.
  But I regret to say, Mr. President, that this is not the way the 
system has operated. The Select Committee on Intelligence has now held 
several hearings on this subject. Our staff has been briefed on 36 
cases over the last 10 years where coordination has been a problem. We 
have found there are cases where the failure to bring the FBI in a 
timely way has delayed, and sometimes even precluded, a criminal 
prosecution. We have found cases where the failure to provide the FBI 
with access to records and personnel in a timely manner has delayed 
bringing culprits to justice. We also found cases where the performance 
of the FBI, in coordinating its investigative activities with affected 
departments and agencies, has itself been deficient.
  In this regard, the bill as modified imposes reciprocal obligations 
upon the Federal Bureau of Investigation to work closely with other 
departments and agencies on counterintelligence matters.
  Mr. President, the American people have a right to expect that 
departments and agencies will work cooperatively with the FBI on 
matters of national security. They have a right to expect that 
bureaucratic pettiness and turf fights will not impede or preclude 
bringing a spy to justice.
  The administration has taken the position that this legislation is 
unnecessary. It points to a new Presidential directive which creates a 
bureaucratic structure to ensure timely and thorough coordination of 
counterintelligence activities and asks us to give it time to work. I 
would like to believe that creating new interagency committees and 
assigning an FBI agent to the CIA are going to take care of this 
problem.
  But, Mr. President, if past experience is any indication, this is not 
going to solve the problem.
  As a matter of fact, over 10 of them over the last 25 or 30 years. We 
have had memoranda of understanding, some quite explicit, arising out 
of incidents where espionage cases have had great publicity, and we 
have had bureaucratic structures. Yet, the problem persists. The Ames 
case is the best example today where there was in fact the 1988 
memorandum of understanding, that now most recently has been 
declassified, which specifically directed the agency, in the case the 
CIA, to turn over all information at any time that they had a suspicion 
that any of their employees might be giving information to someone of 
another foreign government. Yet, Mr. Ames operated from 1985 until 
1993. It was not until 1993, actually in 1991, when finally a task 
force was joined together between the FBI and the CIA, but even then 
the FBI did not have all of the information which the CIA had.
  So there has to be a better way. And memoranda of understanding, even 
though they can be explicit, in bureaucratic structures have not 
worked, and we have to take a more aggressive position.
  There is not one word in what we propose that is inconsistent with 
what the administration says are its objectives. Rather, this language 
complements and strengthens the bureaucratic structure established by 
the administration.
  I might add that in the unlikely event there might be a situation 
where a serious counterintelligence matter could not be notified to the 
FBI, the bill would permit the President to authorize a waiver of the 
requirement so long as the oversight committees were advised within 30 
days that there had been such a waiver--not what the facts or the 
circumstances were, just that the waiver had been exercised--and when 
national considerations permitted, were advised of the reason which 
prompted such a waiver by the President.
  So we took into consideration the administration's caution in 
infringing on the Executive right to have such confidentiality in 
counterespionage. The President can do so.
  Senator Warner and I, as well as a solid majority on our committee, 
have come to believe that legislation is needed here. I remain hopeful 
that the administration will reach the same conclusion by the time we 
get to conference.
  Now, let me turn to the rest of the amendment and summarize what is 
in it.
  Section 2 requires the President to issue a new Executive order 
within 180 days setting minimum uniform standards for access to 
classified information. At present, these standards vary from agency to 
agency. The bill also provides that the new Executive order shall 
require written consents from all persons with security clearances 
permitting authorized investigative agencies to have access to their 
financial and travel records during the period of their access to 
classified information and 5 years thereafter in accordance with the 
criteria established by the bill. The new Executive order also will 
require reporting of certain financial and travel data by persons in 
particularly sensitive positions. Both the nature of the reporting and 
the determination of what positions require such reporting are left to 
the discretion of the executive branch.
  This was brought clearly out in the Ames case, Mr. President, where 
there was some information that had been derived by investigators 
within the CIA, never turned over or very lately turned over, to the 
FBI. And yet, there was not any disclosure that was required by law 
that brought this to their attention. This would be different.
  Section 2 permits authorized investigative agencies to obtain 
financial and travel records if certain limited criteria are met and 
such request is certified by at least an assistant secretary level of 
the department or agency concerned. Private or governmental entities 
who receive such requests are prohibited from divulging that such a 
request has been made to others.
  I have already described a portion of section 3 on 
counterintelligence coordination. In addition, this section establishes 
a national counterintelligence policy board under the National Security 
Council to develop policy for the President in this area and to resolve 
disputes between agencies. The board would be chaired by the Attorney 
General and consist of the Secretary of Defense, Director of Central 
Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, and the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs.

  Section 4 of the amendment gives the FBI access to consumer credit 
reports in counterintelligence cases based upon a letter from the FBI 
Director or Deputy Director certifying that the subject of the request 
is an agent of a foreign power. Recipients of such requests are 
prohibited from divulging such requests to the subject or others. 
Similar legislation passed the Senate last year but was never enacted.
  Section 5 of the amendment gives the Attorney General authority to 
provide rewards up to $500,000 for information leading to espionage 
arrests, similar to the authority the Attorney General has in the 
terrorism area.
  Section 6 gives Federal courts jurisdiction over espionage where the 
conduct involved took place outside the United States. This has 
occasionally been an obstacle in the past.
  Section 7 makes the criminal forfeiture provisions for espionage 
consistent with those provided by law in the drug area. In essence, 
this provision would allow a court to substitute other property of a 
defendant in an espionage case where the defendant has deliberately 
moved the proceeds of his or her espionage activities beyond reach of 
the court.
  Section 8 permits the attorney General to deny retirement benefits to 
employees of the U.S. Government convicted of espionage in foreign 
courts provided the Attorney General certifies that due process was 
provided and sufficient evidence to prove a violation of U.S. law. 
There has been at least one case where the United States was compelled 
to pay retirement benefits in these circumstances.
  Section 9 is a particularly significant change to existing law, Mr. 
President. It would require that physical searches for intelligence 
purposes be carried out pursuant to a court order, rather than pursuant 
to the approval of the Attorney General.
  It may come as a surprise to many of my colleagues to learn that the 
executive branch carries out warrantless physical searches within the 
United States for intelligence purposes. Such searches are not common, 
but they happen. Indeed, the Attorney General authorized such a search 
in the course of the Ames investigation.
  The Intelligence Committee believes there are compelling reasons to 
establish statutory procedures for the conduct of physical searches to 
collect foreign intelligence information similar to those used for 
electronic surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
of 1978.
  In the absence of legislation, the executive branch will continue 
conducting physical searches without a judicial warrant based upon the 
approval of the Attorney General. The committee does not believe this 
arrangement provides adequate protection for the constitutional rights 
of U.S. citizens. Searches carried out under a court order would 
provide such protection. The special court established under the 
foreign intelligence surveillance act of 1978 is comprised of seven 
Federal district court judges appointed by the chief justice of the 
United States. The statutory requirements which must be met by the 
Government before an order approving an electronic surveillance can be 
issued by this court are detailed and comprehensive. The 
constitutionality of such orders has been upheld by every Federal court 
which has considered the issue since 1978.
  The constitutionality of warrantless intelligence searches, on the 
other hand, remains unresolved. There is no authoritative judicial 
opinion upholding the legality of such searches. Any defendant in an 
espionage case who is confronted with evidence obtained by an 
intelligence search can be expected to challenge the legality of such 
search. Should a court rule against the Government, a successful 
prosecution could be seriously jeopardized.
  Such a ruling would also leave those Federal officers in the Justice 
Department and FBI who approved and carried out such search potentially 
liable to civil suits by the defendant for violation of his or her 
civil rights. The committee is advised that such officers routinely 
purchase personal liability insurance at their own expense to guard 
against such contingency.
  Thus, from the standpoint of protecting the constitutional rights of 
Americans, from the standpoint of bringing greater legal certainty to 
this area, from the standpoint of avoiding problems with future 
espionage prosecutions, and from the standpoint of protecting Federal 
officers and employees from potential civil liability, we think the 
legislation is desirable and necessary.
  Finally, Mr. President, section 10 of the amendment provides for a 
new criminal offense making it a misdemeanor for Government employees 
knowingly to remove classified materials to an unauthorized location 
with the intent to retain them at such location. This form of 
misconduct was evident in the Ames case. In fact, many in Government 
believe this to be a widespread practice.
  Indeed with an interview I had with Mr. Ames, he indicates there is 
no security in taking documents in and out of the Central Intelligence 
Agency. Others have confirmed that as well. There is no inspection of a 
bag, or a purse, or a briefcase as one walks in or out, and there is no 
penalty, by law, if you take something outside. There was, under 
Admiral Turner as the CIA director, a spot check of bags that came in 
and out with employees of the CIA. There was some resentment, but 
indeed it made people think that you should not be taking classified 
information home without authority. And now the law would be clarified.
  The unauthorized removal and retention of classified materials at an 
unsecure location inherently increases the risk that such materials 
will be disclosed to unauthorized persons. Some employees may even 
decide to stockpile classified documents waiting for the opportunity to 
sell them.
  Senator Kerrey offered this amendment at markup, and I believe it 
makes sense. There ought to be criminal sanctions for this type of 
conduct in order to provide greater deterrence and to provide a grounds 
for prosecution in appropriate cases.
  Also, Mr. Ames is a person who had a well-known drinking problem. And 
yet, outside of several references and one counseling session, was 
there anything but promotion in job ratings, even though there was a 
considerable case and Mr. Ames was very clear about his drinking 
problem. He did not drink all the time, but when he drank, apparently 
he really drank, to the extent that he would pass out at functions and 
on the way home be taken to the hospital. Yet, there was no reprimand 
of Mr. Ames. There was caution and one counseling session.
  So there is obviously need of better security, better leadership at 
the CIA to institute policies and directions that are going to make a 
difference.
  The Ames interview further convinced me that we can do a better job 
in the counterintelligence area. However, we need to have one agency 
clearly in charge of investigation, an agency with trained 
investigators. Investigators at the CIA are not criminal investigators. 
They are investigators. FBI investigators are trained differently. They 
understand what they have to go after when they need or might need to 
do a criminal investigation. This amendment, that is proposed by 
Senator Warner and myself, would provide this role to the FBI in this 
statute.
  No more MOU's, no more Executive orders that are well intended and 
meant to be effective, but indeed permit an Ames case, a Howard case, a 
Pollard case, and many other cases to continue to function.
  Will this legislation stop this? I cannot say to my colleagues that 
it will. But, indeed, it is going to place the best criminal 
investigators that we have available to the Federal Government into 
this process at the very earliest point of view and, as I pointed out, 
there is ample protection; if the President believes that there is some 
instance where they do not want the information turned over to the FBI, 
he can so waive.
  The Congress and the American people want and deserve accountability. 
This amendment that is offered in behalf of the Senator from Virginia 
and myself, I believe, does just that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, again, I wish to compliment the 
distinguished chairman. We did work together on this. There were times 
when I think individuals of less determination and perhaps less 
conviction might have folded their tents and just gone along with what 
appeared to be the wisdom that has prevailed for so many years on this 
issue. But we want to break new ground because we think it is essential 
that new ground be broken.
  I am proud of the achievements that we have made thus far, and I am 
ever so hopeful today that our colleagues will accept the challenge 
that we are going to present to them.
  Madam President, this legislation is a result of many months of work 
by the Intelligence Committee in concert with the executive branch to 
correct what we perceive as a number of problems revealed in the Ames 
case.
  I am pleased to report that with the exception of section 3, which I 
will address specifically here momentarily, the administration supports 
this very important piece of legislation. Unfortunately, the Ames case 
makes painfully clear that the espionage threat against the United 
States did not end with the cold war. There are still people, American 
citizens, American citizens entrusted with the highest secrets that 
this country possesses; yes, there are citizens who will for one reason 
or another step forward and share those secrets and thereby compromise 
the security of our great Nation.
  Unlike the spies of the forties, fifties, and sixties who were often 
motivated by ideology or perhaps other intellectual motivations, 
today's turncoats are overwhelmingly motivated by the dollar.
  For this reason, our counterintelligence legislation focuses on the 
financial activities of persons with access to this body of highly 
classified information. This legislation provides valuable tools for 
deterring espionage activity and detecting violations when deterrence 
fails.
  The amendment before the Senate would require all executive branch 
employees who are granted a security clearance to consent to Government 
access to their financial and travel records, and this can be done on a 
spot-check basis, without notice.
  Employees with access to particularly sensitive classified 
information--and for those following this debate, there are a number of 
levels of classification of information, so we are talking about 
particularly sensitive classified information, as determined by our 
President--would be required to provide reports on their financial and 
travel information.
  A key provision of this bill prohibits the private sector--for 
example, banks, brokerage houses, and travel agencies--from disclosing 
that the Government has made a request for access to financial and 
travel records. This provision prevents employees from being tipped off 
that they are under scrutiny.
  Madam President, employees with access to classified information must 
be willing to accept certain personal disclosures as a condition of 
employment. In an area as sensitive and critical as the Nation's 
security, the scales must tip in favor of protecting our Nation's 
secrets. Our bill accomplishes that objective.
  Other key aspects of this bill include a provision granting the 
Attorney General the authority to provide rewards of up to $500,000 for 
information leading to espionage arrests and a provision extending the 
criminal forfeiture provisions of the drug enforcement statute to the 
proceeds of espionage.
  This legislation is certainly not a panacea. It will not be an 
absolute deterrence against those who, for what reason we know not, 
decide to spy and betray our Nation.
  There is no law, Madam President, no framework of law today, 
tomorrow, or in the future, which can keep pace with the vagaries of 
human nature. But this legislation is a strong step forward to try to 
stop or limit espionage activities.
  If the authorities provided in this legislation had been in effect 
during the investigation of the Ames case, it is my judgment that in 
all likelihood this case could have been detected and brought to 
prosecution, perhaps years earlier.
  At this point, I would like to acknowledge the pioneering efforts by 
Senators Boren and Cohen in this area. I am hopeful that momentarily 
the Senator from Maine will join us and speak to this legislation.
  In 1989, these two Senators established a panel of outside experts--
it was known as the Jacobs Panel--to study the statutory framework for 
the conduct of U.S. counterintelligence activities and to recommend 
legislative proposals. Many of the recommendations of the Jacobs Panel 
are incorporated in this amendment.
  It is interesting--I have asked those two distinguished Senators why 
they did not press forward at that time with these initiatives, and 
they can speak best for themselves--but apparently they felt that, with 
the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, there was not the 
feeling of urgency in this country to address this issue.
  I acknowledge that in all likelihood, these two Senators would have 
gone forward had they thought the time was right to pursue 
counterintelligence legislation. Well, the time is right now. And I am 
pleased to join with Senator DeConcini and the majority of the members 
of our committee to bring it forward.
  Madam President, I would like to address the provision of this bill 
which has generated, somewhat to my surprise, a large measure of 
controversy. Section 3 deals with the coordination of 
counterintelligence activities within the executive branch.
  It became clear during the committee's examination of the Ames case 
that there were serious and longstanding problems with coordination 
between the CIA and the FBI regarding the investigation of 
counterintelligence cases, including the case of Aldrich Ames.
  It is my belief that when the after action reports are completed on 
the Ames case, we will find that the failure of the CIA and the FBI to 
fully cooperate on this investigation, that failure of cooperation, in 
measure, was responsible for a delay of several years in positively 
identifying Aldrich Ames as a spy.
  Section 3 of the committee amendment attempts to correct this 
coordination problem by more clearly defining the conditions under 
which the FBI must be notified of possible compromises of classified 
information.
  And, as a corollary, there is a comparable provision for notification 
by the FBI of other departments and agencies of such 
counterintelligence information as might pertain to them.
  This section specifically requires agency and department heads to 
ensure that the FBI is notified whenever it becomes apparent that 
classified information has been deliberately disclosed to a foreign 
government or agent of a foreign government. And, in turn, the FBI, as 
I mentioned previously, is required to keep an affected agency advised 
of the progress of FBI counterintelligence investigations of any 
employee of that agency.
  Mr. President, the reason for my putting into legislation the 
provisions of section 3 dealing with CIA-FBI cooperation originates in 
the long history of fractious relations between the CIA and FBI on 
counterintelligence agencies.
  Frankly, no matter how hard we have tried to pursue an analysis of 
why these two groups of highly dedicated employees, albeit in different 
agencies, albeit on different payrolls, but who have equally strong 
motivations to stop counterintelligence activities, equally strong 
motivations to stop it and to protect this Nation, why they have not 
been able to work together, I think, will forever remain a mystery. 
Today the situation appears to be better than in the past. But, 
nevertheless, a problem remains.
  The committee has been briefed on numerous cases in which the CIA's 
failure to notify the FBI in a timely manner concerning a 
counterintelligence case has led to a delay and/or compromise of an 
investigation.
  I would like to quote from a 1986 Senate Intelligence Committee 
report entitled, ``Meeting the Espionage Challenge: A Review of the 
United States Counterintelligence and Security Program.''
  Madam President, the report states:

       Another aspect of counterintelligence awareness is the 
     knowledge by agency security officials of when to bring a 
     matter to the attention of a U.S. counterintelligence agency. 
     In the Edward Lee Howard case, CIA security officials failed 
     to alert and involve the FBI in a timely fashion.

  If I may repeat that:

       In the Edward Lee Howard case, CIA security officials 
     failed to alert and involve the FBI in a timely fashion.

  That is the U.S. Senate. Many of the Members here today were here in 
1986 addressing this counterintelligence problem specifically.
  The report goes on:

       The CIA has taken steps recently to guard against a 
     recurrence of this problem.

  So the Senate apparently received certain assurances that the problem 
would not occur again.
  Continuing to quote from the report:

       The FBI should continue to work closely with security 
     officials of all U.S. Government agencies to ensure that they 
     understand the requirements and guidelines. A good example is 
     the Pollard case, where the Naval Investigative Service 
     brought in the FBI at an early stage. The committee is 
     pleased that the Navy has given a commendation and a monetary 
     award to the official who was responsible for bringing to the 
     FBI the Pollard case promptly when certain questionable 
     behavior was first observed.
       The lessons of the Howard and Pollard cases should be 
     extended to all departments and agencies that handle highly 
     sensitive information. Interagency procedures for reporting 
     suspicious conduct to the FBI should be strengthened.
       Moreover, the Howard and Pelton cases demonstrate that 
     former employees with grievances or financial problems can 
     compromise our most sensitive national security programs. 
     Individuals who choose to work in positions as sensitive as 
     those occupied by a Howard or a Pelton should expect to be 
     held to a higher security obligation than personnel with 
     access to less sensitive information. Therefore, the FBI 
     should be informed when employees with access to extremely 
     sensitive information resign or are dismissed under 
     circumstances indicating potential motivation for espionage.
       The decision as to whether the circumstances justify 
     investigations in varying degrees should be made by the FBI 
     in light of its counterintelligence experience, not by the 
     employing agency. Interagency procedures should be 
     established to address borderline cases.

  This body spoke ever so clearly in 1986 about the need for the 
executive branch to recognize the potential for these problems and to 
take such steps as were necessary. Nevertheless, the delays in 
apprehending Aldrich Ames occurred for the very, very reason that was 
recited in the 1986 Senate report.
  Successive administrations--and indeed this is not a political 
problem. This is not a Clinton administration problem; this is not a 
Bush administration problem; this is not a Reagan administration 
problem, exclusively. It goes back throughout the long history of the 
working relationship between these agencies.
  Successive administrations have attempted to solve this problem by 
Executive orders, memorandums of understanding between various agencies 
and, to a lesser extent, legislation. Since 1947, there have been no 
less than 10 attempts to deal with this issue. And yet, the Ames case 
shows us that lack of coordination continues.
  Madam President, may I take the time of this body to read the 10 
instances in which either legislation or an Executive order or a 
memorandum of understanding were utilized in attempts to solve this 
coordination problem.
  First, the National Security Act of 1947; then Section 603 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act of fiscal year 1990; then Executive 
Order 12333; then National Security Directive 47; National Security 
Council Directive 5; Attorney General-DCI procedures and FBI CI 
Activities Overseas, 1982; FBI-CIA MOU Regarding Activities of CIA 
Officers of CI Concern, 1988; Attorney General Guidelines for FBI 
Espionage Investigations of U.S. Diplomatic Mission Personnel Abroad, 
1990; FBI-CIA Supplemental MOU regarding CI Activities Abroad, 1992; 
CIA-State MOU on CI Response Abroad, 1989.
  Time and time again, the executive branch has tried to deal with this 
problem, but the problem still exists.
  Madam President, it is clear that we need legislation in this area 
now, and I am ever so hopeful that this body will agree with us today.
  This history documents why another administrative fix to this problem 
simply will not work. Any administrative solution would be far too 
dependent on the personalities of the individuals in charge of CIA and 
the FBI at the various times that these cases come up.
  We have individuals of the best of intentions at the head of the CIA 
today and at the head of the FBI. But tomorrow--and I am not suggesting 
that either may be replaced, but eventually all are replaced and there 
is a rotation of these individuals who serve as the head of these 
respective agencies and departments. That is the nature of how the 
executive branch functions. We cannot have these important areas 
dependent upon the respective personalities of the individuals in 
charge of the various departments and agencies.
  Those personalities may interact at one period of time in a very 
cooperative spirit. Yet the same personalities may not cooperate in a 
subsequent situation. So this important area cannot depend on 
personalities and good intentions. It must be based on bedrock, sound 
law. Any administrative solution would be far too dependent upon the 
personalities of the individuals in charge of the CIA and FBI if we 
continue the course that we are following at the present time.
  For months the chairman and I negotiated in the best of good faith 
with top administration officials concerning legislative language which 
would be acceptable to the administration. We went to the White House 
repeatedly. We came very close to agreement. But unfortunately, for 
reasons that can best be explained by those who wish to espouse the 
administration's position, the administration still feels they can 
solve this problem with yet another Executive order.
  The potential damage to our national security is far too great for 
the Senate to ignore this issue any longer. We must go on record 
acknowledging that there is a problem. The problem is with us today--it 
will be with us tomorrow and well into the future--of individuals who 
want to break ranks and spy. And the only way to correct it in my 
judgment, and that of the distinguished chairman of this committee and 
the majority, is to do it legislatively.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I yield such time as may be required by 
the Senator from Nebraska.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, might I add the Senator from Nebraska 
has taken a very active role in the affairs of the committee, and the 
chairman and I are grateful.
  Mr. KERREY. I thank my friend from Virginia.
  Madam President, the distinguished Senator from Virginia has covered 
many of the areas that are in this piece of legislation. I intend to 
deliver a short statement in support of the bill, indicating what is in 
it that I think is important, and also discuss briefly the National 
Reconnaissance Building and the process leading to its 
declassification.
  I rise in strong support of the bill that is now before us, the 
intelligence authorization bill for fiscal year 1995. In the course of 
crafting this bill, the Intelligence Committee has had outstanding 
leadership from Senator DeConcini and Senator Warner.
  It is not easy to produce an intelligence authorization these days. 
The cold war consensus about the roles and missions of the intelligence 
community now seems far away. There is real controversy today about 
what the community should be doing and how it should be organized, and 
the Intelligence Committee could not be deaf to that controversy. At 
the same time, our task was more finite: to authorize intelligence 
programs and activities that will protect America and warn our 
policymakers about the forces that threaten our country, and also to 
guide the change that is ongoing in the intelligence community. Our 
committee essentially funds the President's request in monetary terms. 
We disagree with some of the administration's priorities for specific 
programs, but we do not disagree about the dangers of the new world 
disorder and the need for good intelligence to warn us about them.
  We read often in the press that the intelligence community is stuck 
in a cold war posture and has changed little since the fall of the 
wall. Do not believe it. Under Jim Woolsey's leadership the 
Intelligence agencies are covering new targets and providing more value 
to policymakers than ever. But further change is needed, and this bill 
supports change in two important ways.
  First, we need change in the way the community does 
counterintelligence, the way it catches spies and keeps secrets. The 
Ames case is the most recent event to demonstrate that we need to give 
law enforcement authorities every possible tool to catch and prosecute 
those who would betray their country. That is why there are provisions 
in this bill to require that the FBI be promptly informed when 
espionage is apparent. At the same time, the bill recognizes that in 
some particularly sensitive cases, the information relating to the case 
might have to be very closely held, to protect sources or vital 
information. So the bill gives the President flexibility to waive the 
FBI notification requirement on what the committee hopes will be rare 
occasions.
  Second, we need to support the intelligence community's efforts to 
come to grips with this changed world by giving them and ourselves the 
benefit of the insights of a broad range of experts and national 
leaders. This bill contains provisions to create a joint Presidential-
congressional commission to do just that. Senator Warner and Senator 
DeConcini recognize that it is time for a fundamental review of the 
roles and missions of the intelligence community, and they also 
correctly understand that the administration and Congress can not stop 
their ongoing business to conduct the root-and-branch review that is 
required. So I agree with my chairman and vice chairman that we need a 
joint commission, and that it should take about a year to go back to 
first principles. My hope for this commission is that it will 
contribute a new direction for intelligence, but I think it has an even 
bigger task--an even more important task, and that is to restore the 
consensus in our country that we need intelligence, that the country 
must be able to collect secrets and analyze secrets and act covertly in 
the world, and that some secrets are worth keeping. The cold war 
consensus on national security and secrecy has badly frayed over the 
years. If in the course of discussion surrounding the commission work, 
a new consensus can be formed,
  I will be proud to have been an original cosponsor of this provision.


                            nro headquarters

  Madam President, I would also like to comment on a defense 
intelligence issue that has created much controversy in the Senate and 
in the country: the new headquarters of the National Reconnaissance 
Office in Chantilly, VA.
  Many of our colleagues are angry about the size and scope of the 
project and about the fact that the Intelligence Committee was not 
given clear and consistent information about the project. Further, the 
declassification of the project on Monday came, inevitably, as a 
surprise to many, and nobody likes to be surprised by a project of this 
size. A reaction seems to be forming to punish the intelligence 
community or the NRO or CIA because of this project. Let me suggest, 
two points.
  First, we should calm down and count to 10 before we punish in this 
case, because the intelligence community and administration have acted 
very responsibly in recent days in bringing this matter into public 
view.
  Second, in focusing on punishment and on closing barn doors long 
after the horses have gone, we may overlook the larger issue here, 
which is the fundamental question of what should be classified in order 
to protect our country from the real enemies that threaten us, and what 
information should be declassified so the public can know how their 
money is spent.
  Do not misunderstand me. I agree with my colleagues who are concerned 
about the size and lavishness of this project, and I would have much 
preferred that the NRO would have approached Congress about this 
project years ago in a straightforward manner, like any GSA or military 
construction project. I also believe that our congressional oversight 
could have been much better. But things could be worse. First, I do not 
think there was a conscious effort here to deceive Congress. Second, at 
least we have some buildings to show for the money. The buildings are 
excess to the NRO's need, they are nicer than most Government 
buildings, but they exist and they are on 70 acres of land that will 
only grow in value.
  We all know that this Congress and this Government very often puts a 
lot of money into things that have no value and at the end of the day 
people say we just wasted our money. In this case at least we have a 
hard asset to show for it. We have had expensive Federal court houses 
go way over budget without anywhere near the criticism that we are now 
heaping on the intelligence community. To go public when you know 
criticism is coming is, in my view, a brave act.
  When it became apparent to Director Woolsey and Deputy Defense 
Secretary Deutch that the Senate Intelligence Committee had problems 
with this project, they agreed with this Senator that public disclosure 
and public discussion were the way to go. they did not have to do that. 
They could have kept the wraps on this building. But they took the bold 
decision to open it up the administration backed them. As a 
consequences we are able to discuss it in public. That decision 
required a willingness to part with the old ways of the cold war and 
ask anew the question: given the new threat environment, what do we 
keep from our enemies and as a result the American people and what do 
we fully disclose?
  We should greet a bold decision like this one with praise. Instead, 
we and all together, the news media seize on what they told us and 
bludgeon them for their honesty.
  I will say, if I was a senior intelligence official and witnessed the 
pillorying of the NRO of the last few days, it would be a cold day in 
hell before I voluntarily declassified anything. That is not the 
response we should seek to create, if we are truly interested in having 
an intelligence community that can protect America against today's 
threats.
  When we encourage the intelligence agencies to hunker down and go to 
the ground, we also postpone the establishment of a new consensus in 
America that some secrets are important to our security and must be 
kept secret.
  By declassifying information that no longer needs to be kept secret 
and by demonstrating that the Government does not use secrecy to cover 
up its embarrassments, we are giving greater protection to the secrets 
that must be kept. Therefore, Madam President, I urge that we encourage 
this process of declassification and openness, rather than lurk in the 
undergrowth waiting to ambush whoever practices it. Our most urgent 
business in this field is to determine and rank the threats that face 
America today and make sure our intelligence resources are properly 
dedicated against them.
  Our next priority, almost as important, is to reconstruct the 
national consensus that intelligence is necessary and secrets must be 
kept. Before we rush to punish the intelligence community about this 
headquarters, let us think about these larger matters and how our 
reaction affects them.
  Madam President, again, I want to thank the distinguished Senator 
from Virginia and the distinguished Senator from Arizona. The 
distinguished Senator from Virginia has been a very calm and reassuring 
hand in all this. As always, in cases like this where you are charting 
a new ground--and that is exactly what is happening; there is no 
roadmap in this transaction. We are literally into territory where 
there is no previous precedent we can cite and say, ``Well, we are 
going to do it like we did in 1991, 1990 or some previous times. In 
these kinds of environments, what is needed is a steady hand on the 
tiller, somebody who knows how to operate a compass and stay calm when 
the ambush occurs, when the firefight begins.
  I must say, I am very proud to be able to say that the distinguished 
Senator from Virginia, all the way through this process, was able to 
say, ``OK, men, let's stay calm here. We've got a problem. There is a 
way to solve this problem. We don't need to rush to judgment. We don't 
need to be impulsive. We don't need to do things quickly here. 
Understand, this is something vital to the national security interest 
of our country.''
  Our business is to make sure our intelligence communities can do 
their job to protect the American people from real threats in the 
world. I appreciate very much the leadership of the Senator from 
Virginia.
  Mr. COHEN. Madam President, the chairman and vice chairman have 
described their amendment in detail, and I will not repeat what they 
have said.
  I would like to recount some of the history behind this legislation, 
though, to emphasize that it is not a reflexive response to events that 
have been in the headlines in recent months.
  When Boris Yeltsin gave his memorable speech to a joint session of 
Congress in 1991, he bluntly declared, ``No more lies.'' Perhaps 
because of the thunderous applause that followed, many Americans seem 
to have misheard him to say ``no more spies.'' We now know better.
  The point, though, is that we should have known all along. If anyone 
got the impression that the end of the cold war meant there would be no 
one left to come in from the cold, they did not get that impression 
from Moscow. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Warsaw Pact, 
Soviet and later, Russian intelligence officials clearly stated that 
they were still hard at work and even were getting more aggressive at 
such matters as stealing business secrets.
  The CIA, the FBI, and others warned that the end of the cold war 
would produce no decline in espionage against the United States and, 
indeed, might lead to an increase since some Americans might be more 
comfortable selling secrets to countries that no longer appear to 
threaten us.
  During the 1980's, more spies were unmasked than during any other 
decade in our history. Most were clerks, analysts, military personnel, 
and other low- to mid-level employees with access to our most important 
secrets and a willingness to sell those secrets to the highest bidder. 
Only one-tenth of them were recruited. Nine out of ten were volunteers, 
initiating contact with a foreign intelligence service.
  When Senator Boren and I became chairman and vice chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee, we were very familiar with these issues, having 
participated in the committee's counterintelligence review following 
the arrest of the Walker spy ring, which resulted in the committee's 
1986 report, Meeting the Espionage Challenge. Determined to see that 
this challenge was, in fact, met and not just studied, we convened a 
panel of wisemen with significant experience in government, the law, 
and industry to identify ways to improve the Nation's 
counterintelligence system without sacrificing the personal liberties 
our national security apparatus is meant to protect.
  This panel--which was led by Eli Jacobs and included such prominent 
individuals as Warren Christopher, Lloyd Cutler, Arthur B. Culvahouse, 
Sol Linowitz, Adm. Bobby Imman--worked closely with the intelligence 
committee and the Intelligence Community for a year in reviewing past 
espionage cases and identifying means to deter, detect, and prosecute 
such cases in the future. It is important to note that this effort was 
not a response to a single incident like the Ames case. Rather, it 
involved a systematic review of a large number of cases that occurred 
over a period of decades.
  And based upon the committee's work and the Jacob Panel's report, we 
introduced legislation designed to deter Americans from spying and 
detect and prosecute those who were not deterred.
  Given the pecuniary motives of today's spies, that bill sought to 
improve the chance that warning lights would start flashing when 
Americans handling highly classified information lived beyond their 
means. Or, as was noted in a 1990 statement that is particularly 
pertinent in light of the Ames cases, ``if a guy goes from a Vega to a 
Jaguar in a year's time, something's wrong'' and should be detected.
  We concluded that the FBI should be given greater access to financial 
and foreign travel records of persons who are cleared to handle top 
secret information and for 5 years thereafter. While constituting a 
moderate loss of privacy for those handling highly classified 
information, this would create an important deterrent to those tempted 
to spy and a new tool to catch those who do. Being entrusted with the 
Nation's secrets is a privilege for which the Nation can and should ask 
reasonable sacrifice.
  A second significant change we proposed was to establish uniform 
requirements for access to highly classified information, which today 
can vary widely from one agency to another. According to a recent 
report by a panel appointed by the CIA and the Pentagon, information on 
a certain technology was subject to discretionary controls by the 
Department of Energy but protected with deadly force by one of the 
military services. Similar, if less extreme, variations exist in 
agencies' requirements for obtaining security clearances.
  Beside creating wasteful redundancies, this permits weak links in the 
chains of security guarding our secrets. It even opens the opportunity 
for a person to shop around for a security clearance. Jonathan J. 
Pollard, who pleaded guilty in 1986 of spying for Israel, was denied 
employment by the CIA in 1977 because of security concerns only to be 
hired 2 years later as a civilian Navy intelligence analyst.
  Other measures identified included better enabling the Government to 
confiscate spies' ill-gotten gains; establishing jurisdiction in U.S. 
courts for espionage acts committed abroad; allowing monetary rewards 
for information leading to the arrest or conviction of spies or 
prevention of espionage; closing gaps in our espionage laws; and 
subjecting foreign intelligence physical searches to the same court 
order process required for electronic surveillance under the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act.
  It is quite possible that had that legislation been adopted when it 
was first introduced in 1990, Aldrich Ames would have been caught much 
sooner. Equally important, unknown persons now spying or considering 
doing so could be caught or deterred before causing grievous and costly 
damage.
  Unfortunately, as the cold war thawed, the resulting flood of 
goodwill for our former enemies swept away support for improving 
counterintelligence. While thoroughly vetted by the Jacobs Panel, 
public hearings by the Intelligence Committee, and Justice Department 
reviews, the bill languished in the 101st and 102d Congresses, 
misperceived as the remnants of an anachronistic cold war agenda.
  At the time, we asked whether it would take another security disaster 
such as that involving Felix Bloch before Congress would be spurred to 
take action. As the Ames case regrettably reveals, the answer was yes.
  After Mr. Ames reminded us that spying for dollars will continue as 
long as we entrust secrets to fallible human beings, there finally was 
a broader recognition of the need for Congress to remedy our 
counterintelligence system.
  Among others, Senators DeConcini and Warner, the present chairman and 
vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, introduced legislation 
that picked up provisions of the bill Senator Boren and I introduced in 
the 101st, the 102d and the 103d Congresses. Senators DeConcini and 
Warner were kind enough to allow Senator Boren and me to testify to 
their committee on these various bills, and the legislation the 
committee reported in June--now before the Senate as the pending 
amendment--paralleled even more closely the bill we have pursued for so 
long, with further improvements made by the constructive suggestions of 
the Justice Department and the intelligence community.
  While it is regrettable that it required a major counterintelligence 
failure, it is gratifying that this legislation has now garnered the 
kind of broad support in Congress and the executive branch it has long 
merited. And I commend the chairman and vice chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee for taking advantage of the favorable 
circumstances for pressing this legislation forward. It is long 
overdue, and we should act now before this subject moves out of the 
public's mind and off Congress's legislative agenda.
  I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank my distinguished colleague. 
Those kind remarks, coming from the Senator from Nebraska, have a 
particular meaning, because he has displayed a measure of courage which 
has received appropriate recognition in years past.
  I am grateful that he is willing to continue to serve on the 
Intelligence Committee as I and Senator DeConcini step down. It is my 
hope that perhaps he will have the opportunity to take a leadership 
role in the affairs of that committee in the years to come.


                Amendment No. 2554 to Amendment No. 2553

(Purpose: To improve the information available to the Congress and the 
                public on foreign industrial espionage)

  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk in the 
second degree. I do so on behalf of the Senator from Maine, Mr. Cohen, 
and I ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is in order 
at this time. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for Mr. Cohen, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2554 to amendment No. 2553.

  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of the amendment, add the following:

     SEC.   . REPORTS ON FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE.

       (a) In General.--(1) In order to assist Congress in its 
     oversight functions with respect to this Act and to improve 
     the awareness of United States industry of foreign industrial 
     espionage and the ability of such industry to protect against 
     such espionage, the President shall submit to Congress a 
     report that describes, as of the time of the report, the 
     following:
       (A) The respective policy functions and operational roles 
     of the agencies of the executive branch of the Federal 
     Government in identifying and countering threats to United 
     States industry of foreign industrial espionage, including 
     the manner in which such functions and roles are coordinated.
       (B) The means by which the Federal Government communicates 
     information on such threats, and on methods to protect 
     against such threats, to United States industry in general 
     and to United States companies known to be targets of foreign 
     industrial espionage.
       (C) The specific measures that are being or could be 
     undertaken in order to improve the activities referred to in 
     subparagraphs (A) and (B), including proposals for any 
     modifications of law necessary to facilitate the undertaking 
     of such activities.
       (D) The threat to United States industry of foreign 
     industrial espionage and any trends in that threat, 
     including--
       (i) the number and identity of the foreign governments 
     conducting foreign industrial espionage;
       (ii) the industrial sectors and types of information and 
     technology targeted by such espionage; and
       (iii) the methods used to conduct such espionage.
       (2) The President shall submit the report required under 
     this subsection not later than 6 months after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.
       (b) Annual Update.--Not later than 1 year after the date 
     referred to in paragraph (2) of subsection (a), and on the 
     expiration of each year thereafter, the President shall 
     submit to Congress a report updating the information referred 
     to in paragraph (1)(D) of that subsection.
       (c) Form of Reports.--To the maximum extent practicable, 
     the reports referred to in subsections (a) and (b) shall be 
     submitted in an unclassified form, but may be accompanied by 
     a classified appendix.
       (d) Report Under Defense Production Act.--Section 
     721(k)(1)(B) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 
     App. 2170(k)(1)(B)) is amended by inserting ``or directly 
     assisted'' after ``directed''.
       (e) Definition.--For the purposes of this section, 
     ``foreign industrial espionage'' means industrial espionage 
     conducted by a foreign government or by a foreign company 
     with direct assistance of a foreign government against a 
     private United States company and aimed at obtaining 
     commercial secrets.

  Mr. COHEN. Madam President, the amendment I am offering addresses the 
problem of industrial espionage committed by or with the assistance of 
foreign intelligence services.
  I am not going to suggest that foreign industrial espionage is the 
greatest difficulty American industry faces in seeking to succeed in 
the global market. But it is a real problem that costs the U.S. economy 
billions of dollars annually and appears to be growing rapidly.
  It is also a problem that has attracted far too little attention to 
date. As a result, efforts to deal with it are grossly inadequate. To 
far too great an extent, foreign industrial espionage has been an issue 
of concern to those who specialize in intelligence matters rather than 
those who are engaged in business.
  Some larger companies are acting to protect themselves, but most 
American businesses are not--including many of the smaller firms which 
give birth to so much of our new technology.
  The cases reported in the media abound. A South Korean computer 
company penetrates an American competitor with a mole who plants a bug 
in the United States company's fax machine. A Japanese company recruits 
an American executive with a drug habit to support, buying sensitive 
bidding information and other commercial secrets. Maintenance workers 
walk into a U.S. company's office overseas and reprogram the telephone 
switching equipment to enable outsiders to eavesdrop on the company's 
phone calls. An American scientist goes from labcoat to turncoat, 
selling foreign pharmaceutical companies trade secrets that had cost 
$750 million in research and development costs to acquire.
  While much industrial espionage is solely the work of private firms, 
in many cases foreign governments assist or even direct economic spying 
activities.
  French intelligence has long engaged in a large-scale industrial 
espionage program, penetrating foreign businesses, intercepting their 
telecommunications, and conducting a reported 10 to 15 breakins each 
day at Parisian hotels to copy documents business people have left in 
their rooms. The information acquired is passed on to French industry.
  The Governments of Japan, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
other allies, as well as such countries as China are also reported to 
spy on behalf of their countries' industry.
  ``All of America's major foreign competitors [have] the full weight 
of their governments' diplomatic and intelligence resources thrown 
behind their nationals' companies or consortia, especially ones in 
heavy offshore competition,'' former senior CIA official George Carver 
said 3 years ago.
  The situation is only getting worse as ``foreign intelligence 
services have turned from politics to economics [with] the United 
States as their prime target,'' CIA Director Robert Gates warned in 
1992.
  The U.S. Government has taken steps to make American industry better 
informed of the foreign industrial espionage threat and to assist it to 
defend itself.
  Most of these efforts, however, are focused on the defense industry, 
which has long been targeted by Soviet and other hostile intelligence 
services. While some progress in protecting nondefense industry has 
been made in the last few years, the general posture of the Federal 
Government remains a reactive one--at best telling nondefense industry 
that ``we're ready to help if you come to use with a problem.'' In my 
view, the Government should adopt an aggressive approach, going out to 
industry to explain what the problem is and how to guard against it.

  To its credit, the FBI did produce in late 1992 a small pamphlet to 
raise business travelers' awareness of the industrial espionage threat 
overseas. The value of the pamphlet, however, was undermined by its 
almost exclusive focus on industrial espionage by communist or formerly 
communist countries, which few view as economic competitors and to 
which fewer still travel.
  The General Accounting Office summed up the situation well in 1992 
testimony: ``The efforts of (intelligence and criminal justice) 
agencies do not appear to be sufficiently coordinated to adequately 
protect U.S. industry against economic espionage.''
  The Justice Department has acknowledged weaknesses in its ability to 
deal with the threat, noting in a July 1992 letter:

       The Attorney General has a limited ability to counter the 
     unfair economic advantages being realized by foreign 
     businesses and industries (through industrial espionage). 
     Therefore, legislation providing additional ``economic 
     espionage'' investigative jurisdiction to the Attorney 
     General is warranted at this time.

  I have considered various legislative options for addressing the 
problem of foreign industrial espionage. The amendment I am offering 
today, however, accepts a GAO recommendation that before seeking to 
legislate, Congress should generate a broader public dialogue and a 
comprehensive review of how the Federal Government is organized to 
fight this threat. This will help to ensure that legislative and other 
remedies adopted will be effective and not just the fodder for flacks.
  My amendment would do three things:
  First, it would require a one-time report reviewing:
  First, the respective roles of the various agencies in identifying 
and countering foreign industrial espionage threats;
  Second, the means by which the Federal Government communicates to 
U.S. industry information on these threats and on methods to protect 
against them;
  Third, specific measures to improve the Government's internal 
functioning to counter foreign industrial espionage and its 
communication with industry on such espionage; and
  Fourth, information on the nature of the threat, including the number 
and identity of foreign governments conducting industrial espionage, 
industrial sectors and information and technologies being targeted for 
espionage, and espionage methods used.
  Second, my amendment would require an annual update, but only on the 
nature of the threat, so that the business community and Congress would 
be aware of trends in the threat.
  Third, my amendment would clarify existing requirement for a 
quadrennial report on foreign industrial espionage targeting critical 
technologies to ensure that report examines not only espionage directed 
by foreign governments but also that directly assisted by foreign 
governments.

  I want to emphasize that nothing in my amendment advocates offensive 
industrial espionage activities against foreign companies, which is 
opposed by the U.S. intelligence community and most of the U.S. 
business community.
  I would also emphasize that I generally oppose burdening the 
executive branch with reporting requirements. In fact, Senator Levin 
and I are engaged in an effort to repeal as many congressional imposed 
reporting requirements as possible.
  But this does not mean that all reports should be opposed. Under the 
right circumstances, reporting requirements can stir the executive 
branch to action, provide the basis for much needed legislation, or 
help alter public behavior. I believe that the reports required by this 
amendment fall into this category.
  The need for the amendment is highlighted by the wide chasm between 
the executive branch's rhetoric and action on the primacy of economic 
issues such as this.
  When the Clinton administration assumed power, it created with much 
fanfare the National Economic Council. Deliberately modeled on the 
National Security Council, this new White House based operation was 
meant to give substance to the campaign rhetoric that in the post-cold-
war world economic issues would assume the central focus occupied by 
security issue during the long twilight struggle.
  One would have hoped that a complex issue such as this affecting the 
health of the Nation's economy and involving many Government agencies 
that traditionally do not deal with each other would have been 
precisely the type of problem to be tackled by the National Economic 
Council. Unfortunately, that does not appear to be the case.
  I am hopeful that by compelling the review required by this 
amendment, we can energize the administration to adopt a more active 
role in addressing this threat. And by alerting the media and, through 
it, the business community to the nature of and trends in the threat, 
the private sector will adopt a more active role in protecting itself 
and in cooperating with the Federal Government to counter the threat 
more effectively.
  In the words of the GAO, how these issues are decided may have a 
dramatic effect on the economic future of America.
  Madam President, I refer those interested in this subject to my 
statement of March 10 (S2731), which includes the various documents and 
articles I have referenced or quoted today.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, the chairman and I are quite willing to 
accept this amendment. If that may be the case, we shall determine from 
a parliamentary standpoint the voting later on.
  May I say, Madam President, I thoroughly agree with the distinguished 
Senator from Maine that the Government should adopt an aggressive 
approach in explaining to industry what the problem is.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I have spoken to the distinguished chairman 
of the Select Committee on Intelligence about the provisions of this 
legislation that would amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
of 1978 to establish court order procedures to govern searchers for 
foreign intelligence purposes conducted in the United States.
  I know that the ACLU and others oppose any legislation in this area 
in the hope that constitutional uncertainty surrounding whether the 
executive branch has some inherent authority to conduct warrantless 
searches for foreign intelligence purposes will act as a deterrent on 
the extent of such activity.
  I would prefer that the Congress establish a fair statute protective 
of the privacy rights of Americans and sensitive to the delicate 
balance that is needed between the secrecy that necessarily surrounds 
our foreign intelligence activities and the openness that is essential 
to due process, good government and government accountability. I would 
prefer a statute with strict accountability, with punishment to deter 
and compensate for abuse, and with the maximum openness possible.
  If we are going to have a court process to serve as a check on 
executive branch excursions into searches for foreign intelligences 
purposes in the United States and against Americans, we need to be sure 
that it is an effective check and that the deck is not stacked against 
individual rights of privacy. the procedures in the bill seem more 
intent on securing the privacy of the proceedings than the privacy of 
individuals. They are virtually all done ex parte and in camera without 
the person or persons whose privacy rights are being affected having 
any notice or opportunity to contest the government's actions. Even 
where the Government has commenced criminal proceedings, the Attorney 
General can opt to foreclose any adversary procedure to test the 
Government's submission, assertions or certifications.
  Furthermore, the special court is required to approve the 
Government's requests unless it can sua sponte determine them to be 
clearly erroneous. This clearly erroneous standard for review has no 
place in these proceedings. This standard of review relegates the 
special court to determining little more than whether the application 
papers are in suitable form.
  There may be other procedures worth considering to ensure that lower 
court and appellate review of these matters is vigorous and reflects 
the board sensitivity to first and fourth amendment rights that the 
Nation and other Federal appellate court judges embody.

  I think we should carefully consider the suggestions recently made by 
Kenneth C. Bass III, who was the initial Counsel for Intelligence 
Policy, at the Department of Justice during the Carter administration. 
These suggestions came after Senate hearings had concluded and after 
the Senate Select Committee had already reported this bill. He 
acknowledges that surveillance of U.S. persons for foreign intelligence 
purposes involves a delicate judgmental process and admits that nothing 
in our present procedures insures that difficult legal issues and close 
questions will be fully aired and presented for judicial scrutiny.
  Mr. Bass suggests that in a small number of cases involving U.S. 
persons as targets of applications for searches for foreign 
surveillance purposes it would be possible for the court to appoint an 
independent counsel to examine an application devoid of the identity of 
the target and intelligence sources and to appear before the court to 
present arguments against the issuance of a surveillance order. This 
guardian at litem approach holds promise and should be fully explored 
before final passage of any bill.
  In addition, I am also troubled that activities protected by the 
first amendment of the Constitution of the United States are allowed to 
form any basis to target a U.S. person for a foreign intelligence 
search. Historically, it has been in this area where the abuses have 
come. The temptation to target political dissidents is often too great 
to resist. We can do better.
  Finally, I think that the provisions governing congressional 
oversight can and should be strengthened and improved. This is an area 
where we are being asked to rely upon the procedures adopted by the 
Congress to protect the rights of Americans to feel safe and secure 
from surveillance by their own government. As the peoples' 
representatives we must demand greater accountability and provide more 
extensive oversight in this fundamental area. Thus, for a start I would 
recommend that oversight reporting be required of both the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Attorney General independently 
and that such reports be made to the Judiciary Committees of the House 
and Senate, as well as to our Intelligence Committees. Moreover, such 
reports should include more than the total numbers of applications and 
orders but also critical information about those applications, 
including the total number of Americans searched, and an accounting of 
agency requests that did not result in applications.
  I have other suggestions, which I am sharing with Chairman DeConcini 
and Vice Chairman Warner. I have been assured by the chairman that he 
intends to consult with me and others who are concerned about these 
provisions in preparation for a House-Senate conference and before 
agreeing upon a conference report or seeking final passage. I have 
great respect, admiration and affection for the Senator from Arizona.
  The chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence has requested 
that we expedite Senate passage of the committee's bill at this time so 
that important reforms to the National Security Act to improve our 
counterintelligence and security posture have a chance to be enacted 
this year. In the wake of the Ames case, the bombing of the World Trade 
Center, and the apparent breakdowns in our foreign intelligence 
efforts, I share with him a desire to expedite necessary corrective 
action. In light of his personal assurances and the special 
circumstances that preclude extended debate, I will honor his request 
and not insist upon extensive debate. I rise to make clear my concerns 
about the procedures to govern court orders for searches for foreign 
intelligence purposes within the United States so that we can proceed 
in good faith to attempt to fashion an improved bill that can command 
the support of the Senate and the American people.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, we have reviewed this amendment. I 
think the Senator from Virginia has explained it in some detail, and we 
are prepared to accept the amendment on the part of the majority.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I urge its adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Murray). Is all time yielded back?
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I yield back my time on the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2554) was agreed to.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2555

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and 
ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment will be in 
order at this time.
  The clerk will report the amendment.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. DeCONCINI] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2555 to amendment No. 2553.

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of the amendment, add the following:
       Not less than $10 million from the NSA base budget shall be 
     transferred to U.S. Army signals intelligence activities 
     directed at counternarcotics targets. A detailed operations 
     plan with special emphasis on the United States/Mexico border 
     and including the participation of the National Security 
     Agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal 
     Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Customs Service, shall 
     be provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
     and the House permanent Select Committee on Intelligence not 
     later than November 15, 1994. This plan shall include a 
     detailed description of the planned targets and the type of 
     intelligence collection, dissemination, analysis and tasking 
     that will be included in these operations.

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, this amendment provides for transfer 
of $10 million from the base for better utilization of technical assets 
of the U.S. intelligence community, specifically in expertise of 
national security agencies on the war on drugs.
  I offer this as a second-degree amendment. I think it has been 
cleared on the other side of the aisle.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, it has been cleared, and I urge adoption 
of the amendment.
  The PRESIDENT OFFICER. Is there further debate? Is all time yielded 
back?
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I yield back the time, Madam President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2555) was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  Mr. DOLE. Will the Senator withhold.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Arizona withhold his 
request?
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I withdraw the request.
  Mr. DOLE. Madam President, was leaders' time reserved?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, it was.
  Mr. DOLE. I ask that I be permitted to use part of that leader time, 
with my remarks not to interfere with the debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.

                          ____________________