[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 112 (Friday, August 12, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
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[Congressional Record: August 12, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. DeCONCINI addressed the Chair.


                           Amendment No. 2557

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mathews). The question is on the DeConcini 
amendment No. 2557.
  The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I want to talk about the amendment.
  I first want to say the purpose of the amendment offered by the 
Senator from Virginia and myself is to place certain limits upon the 
funds authorized by the bill for the National Reconnaissance Office of 
the Department of Defense. The amendment provides that of the funds 
being authorized for the NRO, $50 million from the miscellaneous 
support category, may not be expended until the executive branch review 
of the NRO headquarters project is completed.
  It also caps total spending for the NRO complex at $310 million. And 
how did we come to that figure? We came to that figure through a 
thorough staff review initiated by this committee. The result of that 
review was that our audit team found that the budget for the NRO 
project was $347 million.
  Now, when we looked back, we got into this discussion: Did we know or 
did we not know?
  In November 1992, a NRO briefing to staff included their plan to 
proceed with construction of four office towers and that the cost would 
be $175 per square foot. This meant that they estimated a cost of $186 
million for the construction project excluding utilities, taxes, 
communication equipment, furniture, office supplies and a margin.
  When our staff went to the NRO several months ago, we got an estimate 
of $347 million for the project. Now, all of a sudden, since that was 
exposed and declassified, at the credit of the President of the United 
States himself, the cost has come down to $310 million.
  That is what this amendment says. ``Fine, Mr. NRO; we hope that that 
is what you really want to live by,'' and that is exactly what the 
amendment does.
  The recent controversy over the NRO building project has been fierce, 
and I want to make sure we stay focused on the real problem. The NRO 
slid incrementally into a major project in a manner that never made the 
true dimensions, most importantly the cost, clear to the Congress of 
the United States. Maybe the NRO made this information known to the 
House; maybe the House knew that this was a $347 million project and 
just signed off on it. Maybe the Members said, ``Have a grand project. 
Do what you want.'' We did not know.
  The only clear indication was the November 1992 NRO briefing which 
indicated that the project cost was $186 million, and now we know the 
project budget is actually $347 million. In the few days since that we 
disclosed this information, the NRO suddenly reports that the budget is 
down to $310 million.
  This construction project is a major initiative. One would be quite 
cynical to say that a $347 million complex is not a major initiative. 
It was a major initiative. Even today, the budget is a moving target. 
We do not know what it is. There has been no accountability here, and 
we are trying to put it in this amendment.
  In today's austere budget environment, with Government facilities 
being closed around the country, it is especially troubling for this 
organization and the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Woolsey, to 
attempt to justify this by saying, ``Well, times have changed. In those 
days, it was OK--in 1990, 1991. We didn't have to tell anybody. Because 
this was a classified operation, we did not need to tell anybody.''
  That is what the oversight committees are for. They have cleared 
staff to work with and protect classified information. Our staff and 
Members were cleared to be briefed and they were not thoroughly briefed 
on this project.
  And Mr. Faga, the former NRO Director, was recently quoted in the 
press as saying, ``I know the Senate committee was briefed.'' Well, 
between 1991, 1992, and 1993, Mr. Faga never once mentioned it before 
the Senate Intelligence Committee in closed briefings. His deputy, Mr. 
Hill, mentioned it once in 1992, with two lines. And those two lines do 
not mention even the amount. The only insight into this project's cost 
came from a few questions that were asked by astute Senators and staff 
in 1991 and 1992. Yet the answers came back in one sentence or two 
sentences.
  The House apparently agrees with the NRO and the DCI concluding, 
``Oh, it's OK.'' The former CIA Director, Mr. Gates, came up one time 
and mentioned the project. Four lines in 1991, that is all we had.
  Now, if that is adequate notice, believe me, something had better 
change in the intelligence community or the American public is not 
going to support even this reduced expenditure.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of critical 
events and selected statements that were made at our recent Senate 
hearing on this matter, as well as the House hearing, be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                        NRO Headquarters Project

       The overriding concern that was raised by our review of the 
     NRO headquarters project was accountability. Accountability 
     refers to the fact that the NRO, like all government 
     agencies, has an obligation to be answerable, and to justify 
     the expenditures of taxpayer dollars. The oversight 
     committees in this case were the only ones to whom the NRO 
     was accountable. Because the NRO used overt procurement 
     procedures rather than established government facility 
     procurement procedures--MILCON or GSA procedures--no body 
     else was looking--not the DCI, not the CIA, not DOD, 
     certainly not the internal NRO IG, no one but the oversight 
     committees. The information they provided to us fell far 
     short of a complete picture, particularly in terms of the 
     project's cost.
       Our committee never knew, at any time, in any form, that as 
     of 1992 when the NRO adopted a total collocation plan, the 
     project price tag would be upwards to $347 million. The bits 
     and pieces of cost information that we had was piece-mill, 
     and, at times, contradictory.
       The NRO submitted a narrative description of the 
     construction project, beginning in the fiscal year 1993 
     budget submission, but at no time, did the NRO submit for our 
     approval a comprehensive budget for this project. Instead, 
     the project's budget was included in what is known as the 
     base budget. The base budget is a consolidation of all funds 
     required to ``maintain current capabilities.'' Funding for 
     any new project or capabilities are supposed to be segregated 
     so that they may be considered and separately approved.
       Our Committee knew that the NRO was reorganizing. We 
     encouraged that reorganization.
       We knew that the NRO was building a permanent facility in 
     Northern, VA. They told us.
       We knew, based on the NRO's Fiscal Year 1993 budget 
     request, that the NRO was planning to build 800,000 square 
     feet of office space for the collocation.
       We knew, based on the NRO's Fiscal Year 1994 budget 
     request, that they had decided on total collocation and 
     planned to build 4 buildings, with about 1 million square 
     feet, which they were constructing in western Fairfax County, 
     Va.
       In fact, we thought we knew the project's price tag. In 
     November of 1992, about 2 months after the construction 
     project's construction contracts were let, the NRO came 
     forward to request some additional money for this 
     construction project. At that time they briefed our staff on 
     the scope and cost of the complex. They told us that they had 
     decided that it was necessary to build 4 towers to implement 
     the total collocation option recommended by the most recent 
     studies. And they told us that the Westfields Porject cost 
     would be $175 per square feet. That would have made the 
     project cost $186 million. That cost, they told us, covered 
     everything except taxes, utilities, communication equipment, 
     furniture, office supplies, and margin.
       The $186 million cost was the last cost information we had 
     until we raised concerns in October 1993 about the lack of 
     information on certain projects in the NRO's base budget. To 
     that end, in our Fiscal Year 1994 Intelligence Authorization 
     Act we pointed out our dissatisfaction, and asked the 
     intelligence community display project-related costs in the 
     base budget.
       In fact, we had so many concerns about many of the 
     Intelligence Community's facilities, and facility projects 
     that we did a special review in November 1993 in which we 
     asked every intelligence organization to report on its 
     facilities. It was that review that prompted us in April of 
     1994 to launch a specific review of the new NRO headquarters 
     project.
       What would have happened in this case, to ensure effective 
     NRO accountability, is simple. In September of 1990 when the 
     NRO decided that the best collocation option was to build a 
     facility in Fairfax County VA they should have come forward 
     with a plan. The plan should have included the options 
     considered, the costs of the options, the option selected 
     with justification. For example:
       They should have told us how much that plan would cost and 
     how long it would take.
       In addition, since they wanted to ``protect the option of 
     total collocation'' they should have told us that total 
     collocation would mean approximately 1 million square feet, 
     which would house X number of NRO employees and X number of 
     NRO contractors. That plan should have included a projected 
     cost and schedule.
       With that information in hand, we would have had something 
     on which to hold the NRO accountable. And we could have made 
     an informed decision and provided approval prior to the 
     project's initiation. If at a later time the cost went up, 
     the schedule changed, or the scope or design changed, the NRO 
     should have come back to us, justified the proposed change, 
     identified the cost, and once again sought approval.
       To have had this level of information is not 
     micromanagement. It is good government, and the right and 
     responsibility of the Congressional oversight committees. We 
     should have had this type of information if this had been a 
     $3 million facility, and we certainly should have had this 
     level of information in this case, for a $347 million 
     facility.


                  info from hearings and news articles

       Senate Aug. 10 hearing, Mr. Roger Marsh, the NRO 
     Headquarters Project director stated: ``We have been 
     negligent, clearly negligent, for not showing the budget 
     breakout for this project.''
       Senate Aug. 10 hearing, Mr. Jeffrey Harris, the current 
     director of the NRO stated: ``In hindsight, [the costs buried 
     in the NRO's operation's budget] should have been broken out 
     specifically. It [carrying a construction project in an 
     operation's budget] won't be done in the future.''
       Senate hearing, according to DCI Woolsey, ``If this 
     (building) were begun today, . . .  there's no question it 
     would be done differently.''
       The DCI, in Thursday's House hearing, acknowledged that the 
     4 buildings were more space than the NRO required. He stated 
     that the 4 buildings could effectively be used with other 
     agencies, and that the NRO planned to bring more people in 
     from other agencies to utilize the extra space.
       The Deputy Director of the NRO, in our hearing on 
     Wednesday, said that while the NRO needed some additional 
     space beyond 3 towers, they knew they did not need the amount 
     of space they provided when they built the forth tower.
       Senate Aug 10 hearing, Deputy NRO director Jimmy Hill 
     stated, ``We have tried to respond every time the committee 
     has asked a question . . . clearly in this case there was a 
     lack of communication.''
       Senate Aug 10 hearing, Mr. Marsh, NRO project director, `` 
     . . . We clearly have missed the mark for your expectations 
     for how we break this specific project budget out.''
       In Thursday's House hearing, Rep. Combest stated: 
     ``[Senate] Members and staff need to do their homework.'' We 
     don't disagree. In this case, based on the information 
     provided to us, we thought we knew the total project cost. 
     In fact, we thought we knew the project's price tag. In 
     November of 1992, about 2 months after the construction 
     project's construction contracts were let, the NRO came 
     forward to request some additional money for this 
     construction project. At that time they briefed our staff 
     on the scope and cost of the complex. They told us that 
     they had decided that it was necessary to build 4 towers 
     to implement the total collocation option recommended by 
     the most recent studies. And they told us that the 
     Westfields Project cost would be $175 per square feet. 
     That would have made the project cost $186 million. That 
     cost, they told us, covered everything except taxes, 
     utilities, communication equipment, furniture, office 
     supplies, and margin.
       In Wednesday's Senate hearing Secretary Deutch stated: 
     ``Whenever there is an identifiable project, I think it 
     should be separately identified in a budget account and 
     defended in front of this and other committees straight 
     forwardly. Regardless of its intelligence character I think 
     it should be separately identified.
       Sen. DeConcini asked him specifically if that would apply 
     to this kind of project. He replied, ``yes.'' In response to 
     Senator Baucus's questions during our hearing, and regarding 
     what our committee was told about this project in 1992 and 
     1993, Director Woolsey said, ``As the costs were refined, 
     some of the other costs I believe were not provided in a 
     fashion that was readily available for the committee to get 
     at the detail * * *''

  Mr. DeCONCINI. This amendment goes further and removes the authority 
of the Director of Intelligence to authorize such buildings.
  Mr. Woolsey did not authorize these buildings. This did not happen on 
his watch. He is not responsible.
  What he is responsible for, in my judgment, is trying to defend such 
an operation at either $347 million or $310 million.
  Let me just point out, there were roughly 68 acres that were 
purchased by the NRO back in 1991. They told us the other day, when 
Senator Warner and I were out there, that they decided to buy an 
additional 4 acres. We said, ``Oh, that is nice. Are you going to build 
a fifth or sixth building?'' No, but it so happens the plan they 
submitted to the planning and zoning people of Fairfax County includes 
the option for two more buildings, and there may be an explanation.
  Why did they buy the 4 acres? They did not want a neighbor. They did 
not want a motel sitting on the corner. By this time, this is a 
declassified operation. You mean to tell me they could not provide 
security for that motel? So they went out and bought 4 additional 
acres, averaging $8.13 per square foot. That is roughly over $300,000 
per acre for land they are not going to use. This is the taxpayers' 
money being spent.
  The CIA Director wants to defend that as a proper notification to the 
committee.
  There was no notification. Senator Boren, the past chairman, said he 
never was notified of it. As a matter of fact, Senator Boren had a 
reprogramming request for $22 million that was signed, and he told me 
just the other day that it is not his signature on it.
  I make no accusations that anybody did anything improper, but I point 
out that never did Senator Boren admit that he had any notice of 
this. And I know that Senator Warner--at least I believe--and myself 
had no notice that there was a $347 million project going on out there 
until we found it out through the very astute auditors on our 
committee. These auditors were commissioned by Senator Warner and 
myself to go out to the CIA and the other intelligence communities and 
assess what all their facilities were. You would think that would be 
pretty easy. It is not easy. It is very classified as to where they are 
and how many there are. It is a difficult task to get information on 
these facilities.

  When we finally got out there to review this facility, they did 
answer our questions. But they knew we were on to something and they 
started to be defensive. To the credit of Mr. Harris, when he came 
before our committee he said, ``We made a mistake. We are not going to 
do that again.'' And Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Deutch, to his 
credit, said, ``It should not have happened. We should have had notice 
and it will not happen again.'' And the President deserves credit as 
well. When this was brought to his attention, within 1 week he 
declassified the whole project because he believes, as I believe, that 
the American public deserve to know where their taxpayer dollars are 
going to go. And we in the Congress have a right to say yes or no. We 
are the ones who appropriate the money. We are the ones who authorize 
these projects. And this was not authorized in any specific form 
whatsoever, at least not by the Senate Intelligence Committee.
  If it was done in the House, well and good. Apparently the House 
Members are happy about spending $347 million on this project with no 
specific funding authorization, and they are saying this is simply an 
effort by the Senate to be derogatory towards the director--that is 
nonsense. My colleagues over there know that.
  I hope the Members of the Senate will pass this bill. I hope if 
anything comes out of this, there is truly the commitment from NRO, 
that we got from Mr. Harris, that in the base budget they will not have 
such an initiative for any infrastructure spending without being 
specific. Mr. Deutch and Mr. Woolsey confirmed their commitment to that 
procedure.
  Why was this project declassified? It was declassified because the 
President of the United States--not Mr. Woolsey--the President of the 
United States insisted it be declassified. As a matter of fact, Mr. 
Woolsey advocated to the White House, to the Hill staff members, as 
well as one Senator that it be classified for another 18 months. 
Fortunately, that Senator, I am told, said, ``You have 18 hours, as far 
as I am concerned, to get this project declassified.'' And the 
President went ahead and ordered the declassification so we could talk 
about this and prevent this kind of expenditure without thorough 
information and congressional approval.
  People ask me today how many more buildings are out there? I hope 
there are none, and I do not want to leave any inferences that there 
are. But, frankly, when you disguise this kind of elephant in the 
middle of a football field, and no authority to do it, it makes me 
wonder. No wonder the American public is sick and tired of the agencies 
that deal with our national security spending money in such a manner 
without authority of the U.S. Congress.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let me go back and recite once again 
certain procedures, steps which I think, certainly for this Senator, 
help to bring this situation into proper focus. The chairman and I 
periodically meet with our audit staff. Those meetings of course are 
available for all members of the committee but, quite understandably, 
committees leave to their chair and cochair--ranking--the 
responsibility for daily activities. We had charged, the chairman and 
I, the audit staff--we charged them to go out and make an audit.
  I remember it well. I was the only Senator in the room. Others had 
not arrived. I received this briefing. I then turned to staff present 
and the audit staff and said, ``In my judgment there are some serious 
questions raised. No. 1, why is there nothing in our record to reflect 
total cost? No. 2, why nothing to reflect total size?''
  On the point of size, there is a million square feet in this 
conglomerate of four rather large buildings. Having had some 
recollection of the size of the Pentagon--I served in that building for 
over 5 years--I ascertained the Pentagon is 5 million square feet, 
usable square feet. All of a sudden we are building, for one relatively 
small segment of our overall intelligence community, an entity which is 
roughly, approximately one-fifth the size of the Pentagon.
  That I found very troubling. So I recommended to Chairman DeConcini 
we promptly write the executive branch, DOD, CIA, and get those facts 
which we felt necessary to determine this project in terms of its full 
size and scope. That letter went out on July 29.
  I then joined the chairman in a second letter to the executive 
branch, suggesting this matter be declassified.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have those two letters 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                                      U.S. Senate,


                             Select Committee on Intelligence,

                                   Washington, DC, August 4, 1994.
     Hon. R. James Woolsey,
     Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence 
         Agency, Washington, DC
       Dear Director Woolsey: The Select Committee on Intelligence 
     will convene a closed hearing on Wednesday, August 10, 1994 
     at 10:30 a.m. in Room 219, Senate Hart Office Building, to 
     review the process utilized by the National Reconnaissance 
     Office [NRO] to notify Congress, secure the necessary 
     funding, and initiate construction of its new headquarters 
     complex in Chantilly, Virginia. The Committee also intends to 
     examine how remaining construction and future use of the 
     facility can be managed for maximum cost-effectiveness. We 
     would like to invite you to testify at the hearing, and also 
     request your assistance in making available as witnesses Mr. 
     Jeffrey Harris, Director of the NRO; Mr. Jimmie Hill, Deputy 
     Director of the NRO; and Mr. Roger Marsh, Chief of the NRO's 
     Mission Support Organization. We have also invited the 
     Honorable John M. Deutch, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to 
     appear as a witness.
       We plan to conduct the hearing in two panels. The first 
     panel, consisting of Mr. Harris, Mr. Hill, and Mr. Marsh, 
     will be asked to review the history of and rationale for the 
     project, including decisions regarding project size and the 
     process by which Congress was informed of the project. The 
     second panel, consisting of yourself and Secretary Deutch, 
     will discuss what options are available to reduce the 
     project's cost and increase its usefulness, including the 
     colocation of other Intelligence Community functions at this 
     site. Members will also want to hear testimony addressing the 
     issue of whether or not the Intelligence Community should 
     retain the special authority which is being utilized to 
     construct this facility.
       We believe that prompt public disclosure of this project is 
     in the best interest of the Intelligence Community. We urge 
     you to quickly declassify the essential facts--the location, 
     organization, size, and cost of this project--by the time of 
     the hearing.
       Thank you for your attention to our request.
           Sincerely,
     Dennis DeConcini,
       Chairman.
     John W. Warner,
       Vice Chairman.
                                  ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                             Select Committee on Intelligence,

                                   Washington, DC, August 4, 1994.
     Hon. John M. Deutch,
     Deputy Secretary of Defense,
     Pentagon, Washington, DC
       Dear Mr. Secretary: The Select Committee on Intelligence 
     will convene a closed hearing on Wednesday, August 10, 1994, 
     at 10:30 A.M. in Room 219, Senate Hart Office Building, to 
     review the process utilized by the National Reconnaissance 
     Office (NRO) to notify Congress, secure the necessary 
     funding, and initiate construction of its new headquarters 
     complex in Chantilly, Virginia. The Committee intends to 
     examine how remaining construction and future use of the 
     facility can be managed for maximum cost-effectiveness. We 
     would like to invite you to testify at the hearing. We are 
     also inviting the Honorable R. James Woolsey, Director of 
     Central Intelligence; Mr. Jeffrey Harris, Director of the 
     NRO; Mr. Jimmie Hill, Deputy Director of the NRO; and Mr. 
     Roger Marsh, Chief of the NRO's Mission Support Organization; 
     to appear as witnesses.
       We plan to conduct the hearing in two panels. The first 
     panel, consisting of Mr. Harris, Mr. Hill, and Mr. Marsh, 
     will be asked to review the history of and rationale for the 
     project, including decisions regarding project size and the 
     process by which Congress was informed of the project. The 
     second panel, consisting of yourself and Director Woolsey, 
     will discuss what options are available to reduce the 
     project's cost and increase its usefulness, including the 
     colocation of other Intelligence Community functions at this 
     site. Members will also want to hear testimony addressing the 
     issue of whether or not the Intelligence Community should 
     retain the special authority which is being utilized to 
     construct this facility.
       We believe that prompt public disclosure of this project is 
     in the best interest of the Intelligence Community. We urge 
     you to quickly declassify the essential facts--the location, 
     organization, size, and cost of this project--by the time of 
     the hearing.
       Thank you for your attention to our request.
           Sincerely,
     Dennis DeConcini,
       Chairman.
     John W. Warner,
       Vice Chairman.
                                  ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                             Select Committee on Intelligence,

                                    Washington, DC, July 29, 1994.
     Hon. R. James Woolsey,
     Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence 
         Agency, Washington, DC.
       Gentleman: We recently asked our Committee's Audit Team to 
     review the National Reconnaissance Office's headquarters 
     construction initiative, known as the Westfields project. The 
     Audit Team spent two months working with NRO officials 
     examining the project's requirements, cost, schedule, 
     management procedures and internal controls, and has recently 
     reported their conclusions to us.
       We were shocked and dismayed to learn that the facility 
     cost for the new NRO headquarters at Westfields may reach 
     $350 million by completion, nearly double the amount most 
     recently briefed to the Committee. In fact the total 
     anticipated cost of this project, under its current 
     configuration, was never effectively disclosed to our 
     Committee, either in the annual budget submissions or in 
     related briefings. We consider the NRO's failure to 
     coordinate and communicate with this Committee on this large, 
     sensitive and very expensive project to reflect disregard for 
     this Committee's oversight responsibilities for intelligence 
     operations and funding.
       In order to address these concerns and further explain the 
     NRO's actions with regard to the new Westfields complex, we 
     request that you provide us with the following information:
       1. An explanation of why the Committee was not fully 
     informed of the scope and cost of this project, consistent 
     with facility construction requirements for other 
     intelligence organizations such as CIA and NSA.
       2. Reasons why the NRO failed to use either Military 
     Construction or General Services Administration support for 
     the Westfields construction project.
       3. Reasons why the NRO included this activity in the base 
     budget rather than presenting it as a new initiative, as the 
     CIA had done for its new headquarters project at Langley.
       4. Steps which can be taken immediately to reduce the costs 
     of this project, consistent with the NRO reorganization and 
     Intelligence Community's overall budget reduction 
     initiatives.
       5. Ways to efficiently utilize the excess space and unused 
     land which will be available upon completion of the 
     Westfields complex, so as to realize cost savings for the 
     U.S. Government.
       6. Reasons why the new NRO headquarters project remains a 
     covert procurement operation, and your plans to manage 
     inadvertent or directed disclosure of the NRO's ownership of 
     this facility.
       Please provide your written answers to our committee within 
     7 days of your receipt of this letter. You may direct your 
     response to Ms. Pat Hanback, who can be reached at 202-224-
     1700 if you have any questions.
       Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.
           Sincerely,
     Dennis DeConcini,
       Chairman.
     John Warner,
       Vice Chairman.

  Mr. WARNER. By declassifying this project what I wanted to do was 
make an assessment of the executive branch response before we went out 
in public with this project. I joined the chairman on a Monday morning 
on-site inspection. Then that afternoon I was notified by committee 
staff that certain members of our committee desired to have a press 
conference. I had hoped we would not get into the public domain with 
this until we had a chance to assess the executive branch responses, 
for the reason we could have narrowed whatever gap existed at that 
time--and which still remains, regrettably--between our analysis of the 
facts and the executive branch analysis of the facts. Nevertheless, we 
are where we are today.
  The bottom line is as follows. I think this committee quite properly 
has addressed this project in the context that we did not have the 
information that the Senate required.
  Second, this is a valuable project and it will be completed along the 
exterior lines as envisioned. And it will be utilized in an efficient 
and cost-effective manner by the Federal Government. We, as Senators, 
have to provide for the construction for public employees and we do so 
in a manner to try to bring about a certain quality of the working 
spaces and working conditions, but not to give preferential treatment 
to some employees.
  Again drawing on my experience in the Department of Defense, when I, 
as Secretary of the Navy, had cognizance over the naval portion of the 
NRO--and the naval portions and other portions have now been 
consolidated--I remember it to be a comparatively small group, in terms 
of number of people and in terms of budget. True, it has grown through 
the years. My first reaction is this was more than was necessary--and 
that has now been confirmed in the testimony--the new headquarters 
larger than necessary to house the NRO.
  A certain colocation of contractors--that, too, is important. But 
again, this is a project that our committee, as correctly stated by 
Chairman DeConcini--our committee did not possess the full details 
necessary to keep not only ourselves informed but to fulfill our 
responsibility to other Senators.
  So we now have quick reaction by the executive branch, under the 
leadership of the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary, to put 
together an executive branch team to analyze the facts. I urge all to 
withhold judgment on this--withhold judgment until that report is 
completed. And I anticipate that report will corroborate many of the 
assertions made by myself and the distinguished chairman of this 
committee, as to the failure to have adequate communications between 
various segments of the intelligence community and this committee 
regarding the relevant facts.
  Mr. President, the House yesterday had a hearing. It has been 
contrasted in some ways to the hearing that we held. Certain assertions 
were made about their level of knowledge. I join with the chairman. I 
do not presume to have knowledge about what the House knows, but I do 
point out to the chairman that we had no conference item in the last 
several years on this subject with the House, at which time we would 
have had an exchange of views if our views were different. This is the 
first time that the matter has come up. The House is free to assert its 
views; we assert ours.

  Also, Mr. President, I think that this amendment should in no way be 
interpreted as an attempt to delay completion of the envisioned 
project. To the contrary. It is solely for completing the project in a 
cost-effective, efficient manner, and to assure the American taxpayers 
that should the NRO, as they have now testified, not require all this 
space, the balance of the space will be occupied by individuals 
performing necessary contractor support and/or by other defense-related 
or intelligence-related entities, so that the project one day will be 
complete.
  I want to assure the local community, I am proud of the fact that it 
is in the State of Virginia. I knew it was there. I worked on the 
colocation of all of these entities in our State and, indeed, on this 
site. I have not been told the specifics. Again, I did not have 
knowledge of the full cost. I had been relying on the 1992 figures of 
less than $200 million in terms of the whole project.
  Nevertheless, this amendment is a constructive effort to make sure 
that it is cost-effective, that it is utilized fully by the Government 
in a proper manner and also that those persons enjoying this very 
attractive site will do so in a manner commensurate with other 
Government employees, wherever they are throughout the Federal 
Government.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, how much time does the Senator from 
Arizona have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has 4 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. And on the bill, how much time does the Senator have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 14 minutes on the bill.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes from the Senator's 
time on the bill to the Senator from Montana [Mr. Baucus].
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona very much 
for his generosity.
  I support the amendment being offered by the committee chairman and 
vice chairman. On Wednesday of this week, the committee held what I 
regard to be a very revealing hearing. At that hearing, the public was 
presented with a very sorry picture of the intelligence community 
hiding from the Congress the costs of a huge construction project. I 
believe this amendment ensures that the cost of the project will not 
grow any larger than it now already has.
  In 1989, the National Reconnaissance Office started a very worthwhile 
project. They decided to bring together many of their activities which 
were spread throughout the United States and consolidate them in the 
Washington, DC area. The intent was clear and the goal was wise: 
Consolidation would eliminate waste and streamline many of the 
operations. Unfortunately, the intent and the goal became lost in the 
desire to build a huge modern, spacious, and extremely well-equipped 
headquarters complex.
  This complex, as has already been stated, is located in the 
Westfields area, along Route 28, in Northern Virginia. In order to get 
an idea of the size and the impact of this new headquarters, you do not 
need to have a security clearance. You only have to stand outside of 
the security fence and see that the National Reconnaissance Office will 
be working in an office complex that will be unrivaled throughout the 
entire Federal Government.
  Mr. President, not only does it have a great deal of space for every 
worker, it originally had a sauna and it originally had a fountain. 
Thankfully, these at least have been dropped from the project. This 
office complex is large, it is modern, and it is costly.
  In my opinion, excessive secrecy has led to the costliness of this 
project. As the Director of Central Intelligence admitted to me in the 
hearing on Wednesday, the intelligence community still--to this day--
has not specifically identified to the Congress in any of its budget 
requests the total cost or budget for this project. Since 1989, during 
briefings or in letters they have mentioned many different numbers--
some as high as $195 million, but only as a result of our committee's 
special audit did we find out that the National Reconnaissance Office 
has budgeted $350 million for this 1 million square feet of office 
space.
  Let me give you some perspective on this. The vice chairman reminded 
everyone on Wednesday that the Pentagon has 5 million square feet. The 
NRO's office complex, on the other hand, is 1 million square feet. How 
many people work in the Pentagon? Twenty-eight thousand. But how many 
will work in the NRO's new headquarters? 3,000. This gives you some 
idea of how large and spacious a complex is being built by the 
taxpayers for a cost of $350 million.
  I fully support the chairman's and vice chairman's amendment. It very 
simply says, enough is enough. It says quite simply that $310 million 
may be spent on the total project. This is only $40 million less than 
the NRO has budgeted. It requires that, if for some reason $310 million 
is not enough to build an office for 3,000 people, the intelligence 
community must come to the Congress and ask and justify its needs quite 
specifically.
  I commend the chairman and I commend the vice chairman for the speed 
with which they have responded to the information that has come to 
their attention and the actions they are taking to bring this costly 
project under control.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I want to thank the Senator from 
Montana for his participation in the hearings the other day and also 
for his interest in joining as a member of the committee to get some 
kind of handle on the cost of intelligence projects.
  The Senator from Montana makes an extremely good point about the 
square footage of offices. Our review shows that almost 50 percent of 
the offices are going to be single-occupied with the most common office 
size at 165 square feet--165 square feet--per office. The General 
Services Administration's recommended square foot per person for 
Federal Government employees is 125 square feet per person.
  Mr. Marsh, the NRO Project Director, said it may be a little bit off 
and they will supply us with more information if necessary.
  The Senator from Montana points out very astutely how many people are 
going to be here versus how many are in the Pentagon. I do not know if 
the Senator realized that 1,000 of the 2,900 people moving into the new 
facility are contractors, not employees of the NRO. So they are 
building space out here for other people to come in and use.
  What right does any agency have to step forward and spend money, 
build an excess building for a thousand contractors without coming to 
the Congress, making justification for the expenditure, and seeking our 
authority? Maybe we would have approved it. The Senator from Montana 
pointed the other way. It has been his experience in dealing with 
buildings in the 15 years he has been here that if you come to the 
committee and make a good case, the committee is pretty receptive.
  Mr. BAUCUS. If the chairman will yield, what struck me--and I would 
like the chairman's reaction to this--was the most common office size 
for over 40 percent of the building occupants is about 165 square feet 
per person.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. That is right.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I ask the chairman, do we have any sense 
of what, say, 20 percent or 30 percent of the personnel will have as 
office space? If 165 square feet is the most common office size, I have 
to think that there are an awful lot of offices there that are 
spacious, luxurious beyond any comprehension. I wonder if we have a 
sense yet about that.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. If the Senator will yield, we do not, we do not have 
the total picture, but we do know there are some offices that are going 
to have 500 square feet--the office for directors, for example. That is 
a lot of space. That is more than the Senator has in his office or I 
have in my office.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Much more.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Our audit team is still going through that 
information. When we get it, we will put it in the Record.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Why does a person need 500 square feet in their office?
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I think that is a question we should present to the 
NRO when they come back with the explanation of just how this office 
space is broken down. We asked them, as the Senator may recall if he 
was there, how many other facilities do they have, how many are going 
to be put in here, and what amount do they project will be saved by 
this consolidation, collocation, that the Congress asked them to do. I 
am not sure they ever even determined it. And they are going to come 
and tell us, but they say it may be classified.
  Mr. BAUCUS. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. CONRAD. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I will be glad to yield to the Senator from North 
Dakota.
  Mr. CONRAD. The Senator made mention of the fact that of the 2,900 
employees that were going to be in this facility, 1,000 would be 
contractors; that is, I assume he meant by that people who are working 
on NRO business but that are operating as private contractors.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. The Senator is correct. That is my understanding.
  Mr. CONRAD. What would be the justification for out of 2,900 
employees, 1,000 would be private contractors? Why are they not 
employees of NRO? What is the purpose for that? And what is the cost, 
if the Senator might know it, of those people operating as private 
contractors?
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Well, the Senator raises a question that I cannot 
answer because the NRO has not answered what the cost is. Their answer 
is that if they contract for some specialty service that the NRO cannot 
do inhouse--and they do have that legitimate requirement--then, when 
they contract, those people rent space if they come back here to do the 
work, and they charge a commission that may be as much as 20 to 25 
percent on top of whatever the rent is. So their justification is, put 
them in here, and then we do not charge them rent, but we do not pay 
the commission.
  But my question is, I would like to know a better argument, and I 
would like to know, as the Senator from North Dakota just asked, how 
much is that costing us? They are spending money out there, more than 
$175 a square foot, to build that building, probably more now than $310 
million, for which, believe me, I think you could rent space and even 
pay a 25 percent premium for a lot less than paying $175 per square 
foot for office space for contractors.
  Mr. CONRAD. If I might just further inquire, it strikes me that we 
have something here that really begs for further investigation. Why 
would there be 1,000 contractors out of 2,900 employees? What is the 
tax effect? Are those people getting favored tax treatment because they 
are being treated as contractors? Are those people working full-time 
for the NRO? If so, why are they not on the permanent payroll of NRO? 
Is this being used as a way to get around certain restrictions with 
respect to the number of personnel? Is it being used to get around 
certain restrictions with respect to Federal employees? Is it being 
used to give them tax-favored treatment?
  All of those questions present themselves. I must say when I hear we 
are building public space for 2,900 people and 1,000 of them are 
private contractors, that sets off a lot of alarm bells in this 
Senator's head.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I thank the Senator for his questions, and I am going 
to take them out of the Record and send them to the special task force 
headed by Deputy Secretary Deutch and ask that they be included in its 
review of this project. I think the Senator raises profoundly important 
questions that need to be answered. We need to know that. Maybe there 
is a justifiable reason. But I am like the Senator; the alarms go off.
  Mr. CONRAD. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair does indicate to the Senator from 
Arizona that the time on the amendment has expired.
  The Senator from Arizona has 7 minutes 40 seconds remaining on the 
bill.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, is there any time remaining to the 
Senator from Virginia?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has 6 minutes 35 
seconds.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. How much?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Six minutes.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I will suggest the absence of a quorum, 
and as soon as the Senator comes back, I am prepared to yield back the 
time.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. In the meantime, the time will be charged 
equally against each side.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would like to pose a couple of questions. 
I had reserved a couple of amendments on this bill under a time 
agreement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Arizona yield time?
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I yield whatever time I have left. I yield 4 minutes 
off the bill, from the time reserved for the manager of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have met with the Senator from Arizona and 
the Senator from Virginia, Senator Warner, about my concerns on this 
bill as it was originally drafted. I had reserved a couple of spaces 
for amendments, but our staffs have been working out the matters I was 
interested in. It is my understanding that each of the matters that I 
was concerned about has been dealt with in the managers' amendment that 
has been adopted. But I would like to make sure that is the case. I 
would like to therefore pose two or three questions to the Senator from 
Arizona and the Senator from Virginia.
  I have a section, insert section, 3(c) here which deals with the 
coordination of counterintelligence matters in the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. And it says:

       Except as provided in paragraph 3 below, the head of each 
     department or agency within the executive branch shall ensure 
     that--

  And this is the key paragraph.

     the Federal Bureau of Investigation is advised immediately of 
     any information, regardless of its source, which indicates 
     that classified information is being, or may have been, 
     deliberately disclosed in an unauthorized manner to a foreign 
     power or an agent of a foreign power.

  I believe the word ``deliberately'' was added after our meeting. I 
believe that achieves my major concern so that there is a certain 
threshold here of intent so that we do not have simply piles of 
complaints going over to the FBI on any matters that would not raise 
concern by any reasonable person.
  I believe that has been taken care.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. If the Senator will yield, I can confirm that is 
exactly what was suggested by the Senator and his staff. And the word 
``deliberately'' was included in the managers' amendment that we 
submitted and have agreed to here so as to do away with too much paper, 
to raise the threshold, as the Senator from Georgia pointed out.
  I think the Senator from Virginia has something to say on this as 
well.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, before the distinguished Senator from 
Georgia came in to consult with the chairman and me, I had discussed 
this with the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He, 
likewise, felt two things should be achieved in this paragraph. One is 
an affirmative duty on both the FBI and the CIA; that those affirmative 
duties be parallel in nature; and that there be some limitation of the 
materials sent back and forth, not in the sense to hide anything, but 
just to eliminate a lot of the material which might have been caught by 
more general phraseology, to that material which was essential in the 
promulgation of their respective responsibilities in 
counterintelligence and that drafting was incorporated at his 
recommendation as well as that of the Senator from Georgia.

  Mr. NUNN. I thank my friends from Arizona and Virginia.
  A couple more questions. The other concern I had--referring to the 
bill language here--I had a concern that the FBI was going to be 
consulted by the CIA in the event there was any kind of deliberate 
informational breach of classified information, but that this was not a 
two-way street. In other words, once the FBI started the investigation, 
there was not a corresponding duty of the FBI to keep the appropriate 
officials of the CIA informed of their activities. It seems to me there 
has to be a two-way street in terms of coordination.
  I believe that the Senators have addressed that concern in this 
managers' amendment, also; have they not?
  Mr. DeCONCINI. If the Senator will yield, the Senator from Georgia 
raised that issue, as did the national security advisers that we met 
with, and that is section 2, below the (c) on the page the Senator has 
before him. I believe it does exactly what the Senator suggested we do 
and what the national security advisers also requested.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator from Arizona.
  The third concern, I believe, has also been dealt with. That is, 
making sure that if there were extraordinary circumstances that perhaps 
none of us can foresee here on the floor of the Senate, but they 
nevertheless could occur, when the President of the United States 
believes that there could be an endangered national security interest, 
vital national security interests, if this information is immediately 
turned over to the FBI, and it could be a matter of life or death, or 
could be a matter of war or peace, for some reason we may not foresee, 
I was hoping the President would get some waiver authority here for 
these extraordinary circumstances.
  I believe that has also been provided for.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. It is indicated in paragraph 3, and it gives the 
President authority to waive on a case-by-case basis. He must only 
advise the committee that he has exercised that authority--but not the 
particular matters, until later when he feels he can do so.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senators. I think all of the concerns that I 
had raised with the two Senators and their staffs have been taken care 
of. I will have no amendment. I am not sure if I have one or two 
amendments on the list. But I will not be intending to bring those up.
  I thank the Senators for their help and leadership.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I thank the Senator from Georgia for his constructive 
discussion here. It has been a great pleasure to work with him as 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, which is part of this whole 
important procession. I appreciate immensely his participation and 
willingness to work to get this legislation, and the Senator from 
Virginia and I feel it really is necessary that we do some legislation 
in this area.
  Mr. WARNER. I join the distinguished chairman, and I thank Senator 
Nunn in his capacity as chairman of the Armed Services Committee. There 
is a sequential referring of the entire budget that comes up--that is, 
most of it--and, as such, I have seen, through the years, in working 
with him, that he exercises his responsibilities. It is not a simple 
pass-through. It is reviewed by the chairman and members of the Armed 
Services Committee with care.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend that our committee reviews their work 
carefully on everything--except building and construction.
  Mr. WARNER. The Senator's point is not well conceded.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Nevada, 
Senator Bryan, be included as an original sponsor of the pending 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I am prepared to yield back any 
remaining time this Senator has.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I likewise yield back whatever time the 
Senator from Virginia has remaining.
  I ask unanimous consent that Senator Specter be added as a cosponsor 
to the amendment of the Senator from Virginia on the Commission.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, on Wednesday evening I expressed my 
displeasure on this floor over the way the Intelligence Committee has 
handled the publicity over the headquarters building that is being 
constructed for the National Reconnaissance Office. I said then, and I 
repeat now, that if the committee or individual Senators seek only to 
assign blame rather than looking at how the committee and the Congress 
may share that blame we are sure to perpetuate rather than solve 
existing oversight problems.
  The committee has been aware of this construction project since its 
inception, indeed it was largely responsible for the consolidation of 
the NRO which made this project necessary. At any time over the last 
several years, the committee could have examined this project in 
detail. Only recently did the committee bother to take such a look. And 
when it discovered apparent problems it immediately transformed them 
into a major public issue. I believe that this approach was highly 
irresponsible and counterproductive.
  Mr. President, as I stated the other night, this will come back to 
bite the committee. Well, today's Washington Times provides just such a 
bite. I ask unanimous consent that this editorial be included in the 
Record at the conclusion of my statement.
  Mr. President, I do not say that the NRO is without blame or that the 
committee is not justified in its concern over this issue. But the way 
it has been handled is nothing short of irresponsible. If the committee 
seeks only to assign blame, it will surely never correct its own 
oversight shortcomings.
  There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Times, Aug. 12, 1994]

                  The Case of the Purloined Spy Agency

       Even in a city that thrives on hues and cries, it sure was 
     a mighty one that was raised by President Clinton's 
     revelation on Monday that an innocent looking office complex 
     in Westfields, Va., is really going to house a super-secret 
     spy agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, which is in 
     charge of our spy satellite operations.
       In fact, so secret is the NRO that even its name was hush-
     hush until two years ago, when the agency's existence was 
     first officially acknowledged. Not since the Department of 
     Energy revealed that Americans have been unknowingly zapped 
     by government scientists with atomic radiation for 50 years 
     have we seen such an uproar over Cold Warriors conniving and 
     conspiring to hoodwink the American people. Why, this project 
     was so secret that even the president of the United States 
     didn't know about it. How `bout that?
       At Senate Intelligence Committee hearings on the $310 
     million construction project on Wednesday, members could 
     barely contain their outrage. Sputtered Sen. Richard Byran: 
     ``I don't think it can be underestimated the extent or 
     magnitude of the damage done to the intelligence community in 
     terms of its credibility with the Congress and the American 
     people.'' Chairman Dennis DeConcini intimated that the CIA 
     had been employing the purloined letter technique, hiding the 
     massive complex in plain view (just like the CIA, isn't?). 
     And the always charming Sen. Howard Metzenbaum snarled that 
     perhaps CIA Director James Woolsey's successor would be more 
     forthcoming with information. ``Where were you?'' he demanded 
     of Mr. Woolsey.
       Well, where was the Senate Intelligence Committee, you 
     might ask? Where was Mr. DeConcini? Where was Sen. John 
     Warner, ranking minority member of the committee, in whose 
     state the complex is being built? Where was former committee 
     chairman David Boren, who has released a statement saying 
     that he was ``never made personally aware that a construction 
     project of this magnitude was being contemplated.'' Indeed 
     where was George Tenet, staff director for the Intelligence 
     Committee under Mr. Boren and now in charge of intelligence 
     for the National Security Council staff--the man who ought to 
     have been able to spare Mr. Clinton this enormous surprise? 
     Why didn't any of these people know?
       The truth, of course, is that they did know. They know very 
     well that the intelligence services are being reorganized and 
     some of their functions consolidated. The NRO complex in 
     Westfields is a part of that process. But no one saw this as 
     an issue until the president decided to declare it a scandal.
       Just how much they knew is evident from the ample 
     documentation that Mr. Woolsey and NRO Director Jeffrey 
     Harris brought with them to the hearing.
       A few samples:
       Back in 1989, a Senate Supplemental to Report No. 101-78 
     stated that the reorganization plan, combining a number of 
     functions of the CIA, the Air Force, and the NRO in a 
     northern Virginia facility was ``feasible'' and ``should be 
     pursued'' and authorized $30 million in fiscal 1990 and $27 
     million in fiscal 1991 for this purpose.
       On Feb. 26, 1990, William Webster, Director of Central 
     Intelligence, and Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, wrote to 
     Mr. Boren regarding the NRO headquarters collocation, 
     describing ``a phased, incremental facility strategy,'' and 
     outlined the funding needed for a partial collocation, a 
     total cost of $195.4 million.
       On Sept. 17, 1990, then-director of the NRO, Martin Faga, 
     wrote to Mr. Boren giving him ``formal notification of the 
     National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) intent to purchase a 
     parcel of land in support of the permanent facility 
     collocation activities of the NRO restructure efforts.'' The 
     letter describes ``a parcel of land approximately 68 acres'' 
     and a ``current master plan [providing] for the development 
     of approximately 1.3 million square feet on the site. . . . 
     Phase one provides for the construction of approximately 
     500,000 square feet. . . . Phase two would add an additional 
     400,000 square feet. Phase three would provide an additional 
     400,000 square feet. Flexibility is inherent in the master 
     plan to allow phase two and three to be sized differently as 
     the need arises.''
       In 1992, the FY 1993 Congressional Budget Justification 
     Book, submitted to all appropriate authorization and 
     appropriation subcommittees, stated that ``in FY 1991, the 
     NRO acquired a parcel of land sufficient to protect for the 
     option of full collocation. The final NRO facility 
     headquarters will be located in western Fairfax. Virginia on 
     approximately 70 acres. The facility master plan allows for a 
     six-building complex, structured parking, emergency generator 
     building, warehouse, conference facility, and cafeteria. The 
     current construction plan and budget provide for three 
     buildings. . . . occupancy in late 1995. The total 
     construction is approximately 800,000 square feet.''
       On Nov. 10, 1992, the staff of the Senate Intelligence 
     Staff was briefed on the details of the project. The plan had 
     grown from three to four buildings, a total of 1 million 
     square feet, (with an option to build two more should the 
     need arise).
       On Nov. 13, 1992, Mr. Faga wrote to David Boren and Frank 
     Murkowski, committee vice chairman, requesting permission to 
     reallocate $22 million to accelerate the NRO's consolidation 
     plan. He was told, ``The Committee does not object to the 
     expenditure of funds for the purpose specified.''
       In addition, there is report upon report of estimated costs 
     for the three- and four-building options five years' worth of 
     intelligence authorization bills, appropriations bills, 
     conference reports and on an on, in which the project has 
     been specifically mentioned, and, of course, funded.
       It's a pity, Mr. Woolsey only has the truth on his side. 
     Apparently, that doesn't count for much when there's 
     posturing and intelligence-bashing to be done.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today as a cosponsor of the 
DeConcini-Warner amendment concerning the construction of a National 
Reconnaissance Office [NRO] headquarters building.
  Frankly, I was extremely troubled to learn that more then $300 
million is being spent to secretly construct an NRO facility in 
northern Virginia to consolidate personnel located in California and 
throughout the country.
  Apparently, construction of the NRO facility was begun in 1990 and 
undertaken without the full knowledge and approval of Congress. This 
raises serious concerns about congressional oversight of this project 
and the entire NRO Organization. In my opinion, the credibility of the 
NRO has been damaged, and Congress will be forced to more closely 
scrutinize its budget and activities.
  I am trying to get answers about this project and consolidation, but 
am concerned about the level of cooperation the NRO is giving my office
  Last week, my staff contacted Pentagon officials to inquire about 
speculation that NRO personnel were moving from offices at Los Angeles 
Air Force Base [AFB] in California to a new NRO headquarters building 
near Dulles International Airport. The Air Force denied all knowledge 
of such a proposed consolidation, and inquiries to the NRO went 
unanswered. The way these inquiries were handled leads me to believe 
that the intelligence community was trying to deceive Congress or, at a 
minimum, me. This is simply unacceptable.
  Still today, after Pentagon officials testified before the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, the NRO has not provided me or my office any 
information, expect a joint statement that was released to the press.
  Apparently, construction of the NRO facility was originally planned 
for a partial consolidation of headquarters personnel that are 
scattered throughout the Washington area. This would have allowed for 
construction of a building with two office towers at substantially less 
cost than current estimates.
  However, sometime in 1992, after the fall of the Soviet Union--the 
primary target of NRO activities--the intelligence community decided to 
proceed with a full consolidation of NRO personnel nationwide. This 
decision caused the estimated cost for the new facility to near $350 
million as two additional office towers were added, for a total of four 
huge towers. This new structure will be far larger than necessary to 
house NRO and support personnel. I am unclear why additional funds were 
allocated for this new structure at a time when defense and 
intelligence budgets were declining.

  My staff still has not been able to determine exactly what type of 
consolidation is being proposed or the details of the approval process. 
Specifically:
  When and how was the decision made to shift from only partial 
consolidation to full consolidation?
  How many military, civilian, and contractor personnel are being 
affected, and what type of work are they performing?
  Where are these personnel currently located?
  When is the proposed consolidation occurring?
  What implications does the proposed consolidation have on the base 
realignment and closure [BRAC] process?
  Because NRO is partly a Defense Department agency, is it subject to 
the BRAC process?
  Was a true cost-benefit analysis completed to determine whether the 
associated cost of the NRO facility and full consolidation justified 
any national security or fiscal gain?
  I have already written to Defense Secretary Perry expressing my 
concern over this matter and submitted some of these questions to him. 
I expect answers to these questions as soon as possible. I also expect 
the review currently being undertaken by the Director of the CIA and 
Deputy Secretary of Defense to address these and other issues.
  In addition to my concerns regarding general congressional oversight 
of the project, I am particularly troubled that, though the 
consolidation was approved years ago and the Intelligence Committee was 
notified, I was never made aware that jobs would be moved out of 
California. Also, I am concerned that the consolidation of personnel 
from Los Angeles AFB may have an adverse impact--direct or indirect--on 
the upcoming 1995 base closure process, especially considering that 
this is just one of a number of planned consolidations out of Los 
Angeles AFB.
  As many of my colleagues know, the Space and Missile Systems Center 
at Los Angeles AFB is a center of excellence for the design and 
acquisition of satellites and other space systems. It would seem 
reasonable and practical that those working on satellites, such as the 
NRO, would want to be located at or near Los Angeles AFB. This is where 
the program offices are, this is where the acquisition personnel are, 
this is where the Aerospace Corporation, a support FFRDC is, and this 
is where the contractors are.

  But, the NRO apparently decided to move its personnel from this 
center of excellence to a headquarters building near Washington, DC. I 
believe the decision making process for proceeding to a full 
consolidation also needs to be examined closely.
  Mr. President, this matter needs to be thoroughly looked into and I 
hope that much of the information surrounding the project can be 
declassified so the public and taxpayers will have full knowledge of 
what is being built near Dulles International Airport.
  I fully support this amendment and urge its adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question occurs on amendment No. 2557, 
offered by the Senator from Arizona.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] 
is necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] would vote ``yea.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 99, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 283 Leg.]

                                YEAS--99

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boren
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Danforth
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mathews
     McCain
     McConnell
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Wallop
     Warner
     Wofford

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Wellstone
       
  So the amendment (No. 2557) was agreed to.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                       vote on amendment no. 2556

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question now 
occurs on agreeing to amendment No. 2556, offered by the Senator from 
Virginia [Mr. Warner].
  The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] 
is necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] would vote ``yea.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 99, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 284 Leg.]

                                YEAS--99

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boren
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Danforth
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mathews
     McCain
     McConnell
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Wallop
     Warner
     Wofford

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Wellstone
       
  So the amendment (No. 2556) was agreed to.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Boren be added as a cosponsor to the DeConcini-Warner amendment, and 
that Senator Leahy be added as a cosponsor to the Warner-DeConcini 
amendment that has already been adopted.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading and was read 
the third time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
proceed to the immediate consideration of H.R. 4299, which the clerk 
will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 4299) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 1995 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government, the Community 
     Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, all after the 
enacting clause of H.R. 4299 is stricken, the text of S. 2082, as 
amended, is inserted in lieu thereof, and the bill is considered read 
for a third time.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this vote 
be restricted to 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The question is, Shall the bill, as amended, pass? The yeas and nays 
have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] 
is necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] would vote ``yea.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 97, nays 2, as follows:

                      {Rollcall Vote No. 285 Leg.

                                YEAS--97

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boren
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Danforth
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mathews
     McCain
     McConnell
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Wallop
     Warner
     Wofford

                                NAYS--2

     Hatfield
     Riegle
       

                             NOT VOTING--1

     Wellstone
       
       
  So the bill (H.R. 4299), as amended, was passed.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate insists 
on its amendments and requests a conference with the House of 
Representatives thereon, and the Chair appoints conferees on the part 
of the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham) appointed Mr. DeConcini, Mr. 
Metzenbaum, Mr. Glenn, Mr. Kerrey of Nebraska, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Graham, 
Mr. Kerry of Massachussetts, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Johnston, Mr. Warner, Mr. 
D'Amato, Mr. Danforth, Mr. Gorton, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Lugar, 
and Mr. Wallop; and, from the Committee on Armed Services, Mr. Nunn and 
Mr. Thurmond.

                          ____________________