[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 111 (Thursday, August 11, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: August 11, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT

  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask for the regular order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H. R. 4650) making appropriations for the 
     Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending Sepember 30, 
     1995, and for other purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.

       Pending:
       Dole Amendment No. 2479, to provide for the termination of 
     the United States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina no later than November 15, 1994.

  Mr. MITCHELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I had hoped that we could return to the 
Department of Defense authorization bill by 1:30. We are obviously not 
on that schedule. But we are back on it now, and will continue.
  It is my intention that the Senate complete action on that bill 
today, and if possible take up other measures and then turn to the 
health care legislation tomorrow at a time and under circumstances 
which I will, of course, discuss further with the Republican leader as 
is my practice before making a final decision.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor. I believe the managers are ready to 
proceed with the Department of Defense appropriations bill.
  Mr. GRASSLEY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.


                           Amendment No. 2510

    (Purpose: To require the strengthening of Department of Defense 
    procedures for matching disbursements to particular obligations)

  Mr. GRASSLEY. My amendment is at the desk. I would ask to call up 
2510. It deals with the subject of matching disbursements. I will 
probably only speak about 5 minutes. I ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Iowa [Mr. Grassley] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2510.

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 142, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:
       Sec.   . (a)(1) The Secretary of Defense shall develop a 
     plan for establishing and implementing a requirement for 
     disbursing officials of the Department of Defense to match 
     disbursements to particular obligations before making the 
     disbursements. The Secretary shall transmit the plan to 
     Congress not later than March 1, 1995.
       (2) The Inspector General of the Department of Defense 
     shall review the plan and submit the Inspector General's 
     independent assessment of the plan to the congressional 
     defense committees.
       (b)(1) Not later than July 1, 1995, the Secretary of 
     Defense shall require that each disbursement by the 
     Department of Defense in an amount in excess of $5,000,000 be 
     matched to a particular obligation before the disbursement is 
     made.
       (2) Not later than October 1, 1995, the Secretary of 
     Defense shall require that each disbursement by the 
     Department of Defense in an amount in excess of $1,000,000 be 
     matched to a particular obligation before the disbursement is 
     made.
       (c) The Secretary shall ensure that a disbursement in 
     excess of the threshold amount applicable under subsection 
     (b) is not divided into multiple disbursements of less than 
     that amount for the purpose of avoiding the applicability of 
     such subsection to that disbursement.
       (d) The Secretary of Defense may waive a requirement for 
     advance matching of a disbursement of the Department of 
     Defense with a particular obligation in the case of (1) a 
     disbursement involving deployed forces, (2) a disbursement 
     for an operation in a war declared by Congress or a national 
     emergency declared by the President or Congress, or (3) a 
     disbursement under any other circumstances for which the 
     waiver is necessary in the national security interests of the 
     United States, as determined by the Secretary and certified 
     by the Secretary to the congressional defense committees.
       (3) This section shall not be construed to limit the 
     authority of the Secretary of Defense to require that a 
     disbursement not in excess of the amount applicable under 
     subsection (b) be matched to a particular obligation before 
     the disbursement is made.

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, this amendment addresses the continuing 
financial mismanagement at the Department of Defense. This is something 
that I have spoken about on this floor many times in the last year and 
a half. My colleague from Hawaii has been very cooperative in the past, 
and he is likewise cooperative this time. I thank him for that.
  This amendment is going to restore some accountability over the 
Department of Defense appropriations. It follows up on an initiative 
launched last year with the help of my good friend from Hawaii. It is 
the direct result of one particularly troublesome incident, but this 
incident is just an example of a greater problem. That was the 
disappearance, Mr. President, mind you, of $649.1 million. I spoke on 
this issue on several occasions last year.
  The Defense Department inspector general discovered that the Air 
Force accounting records maintained by the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service--I am going to refer to that as DFAS--were out of 
whack by $649.1 million. They were out of whack because DFAS's 
bookkeeping operations are in shambles. Instead of recording 
obligations and expenditures in a ledger as they occur--and that is 
commonsense bookkeeping or accounting, or whatever you want to call 
it--DFAS and the Air Force were using algorithms--mathematical 
equations--to estimate the missing accounts.
  Well, Mr. President, any first year accounting student knows that is 
no way to do accounting.
  When I brought this problem up to the attention of my colleagues, 
about 1 year ago now, my friend from Hawaii, the distinguished chairman 
of this subcommittee, agreed to ask the Department of Defense IG to 
review base-level records--that is, at the grassroots--to pinpoint this 
problem.
  Well, the IG has just completed the review ordered by Senator Inouye 
and, quite frankly, after 1 year of review, it is the very same story.
  This IG report is entitled--I give you these titles and references 
because I want people to read them, as we do--``Air Force Merged 
Account Obligations,'' No. 94-139, dated June 17, 1994. The report 
tells us that we can expect more of the same in the future. The 
systemic problems that produced the $649.1 million fiasco are still 
working full bore. The IG auditors discovered that DFAS accountants are 
still using mathematical equations to generate phony bookkeeping 
entries.
  I refer here to page 13 of the report under the heading ``Contractor 
Billing and DFAS Paying Practices.'' I will summarize the information 
and place it into the Record. This particular problem arose at the DFAS 
Center in Columbus, OH.
  When accounting clerks--get this, this is how IG lays it out, not how 
I as a political leader describe it--receive an invoice that does not 
identify the account or contract to be charged, they do not even bother 
to do the leg work necessary to get the right information. They simply 
use a formula to spread the payments across any appropriation, if that 
appropriation still has positive balances. There is no attempt to post 
payments to the correct account. In fact, they deliberately force 
payments onto the wrong accounts. This is a random allocation process. 
It is completely inconsistent with the laws governing the use of 
appropriations.
  This is the very same kind of procedure that led to the $649.1 
million mismatch--just a $649.1 million mismatch.
  It is the kind of flawed procedure that gave the Department of 
Defense a whole great big $41 billion headache, by what they term 
``unmatched disbursements.'' So the $649.1 million is just a small part 
of a $41 billion big problem entitled ``unhatched disbursements.''
  Matching disbursements with obligations is a very fundamental tool 
for internal financial management. If you do not match disbursements 
with obligations, your accounts are vulnerable to theft and abuse. I 
have spoken about millions being stolen by fake organizations like the 
one operated by Mr. McGill in Norfolk, VA.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record that section of 
the IG report.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       Contractor Billing and DFAS Paying Practices. We discussed 
     billing and paying problems with accounting officials at the 
     DFAS-Columbus Center. They stated that when contractors did 
     not include the ACRN and CLIN on bills submitted to the DFAS, 
     accounting clerks had to make a decision as to which 
     appropriation's unliquidated obligations the disbursement 
     should be recorded against. The accounting clerks also stated 
     that if they could not specifically identify the ACRN and 
     CLIN that should be paid on a particular invoice, the 
     Mechanization of Contract Administrative Services system used 
     a formula to charge disbursement to all appropriations with 
     unliquidated obligations for the contract at the time of the 
     disbursement and not to the specific appropriation that was 
     obligated.
       However, even when the ACRN and CLIN were shown on the 
     invoice, the payment was not always charged to the correct 
     account. For example, we found one contract for which $11.2 
     million was disbursed and charged to the ``M'' account that 
     should have been charged to the FY 1988 3010 (Aircraft 
     Procurement) account.
       The DFAS accounting clerks were concerned with paying the 
     invoices promptly to avoid interest penalties and lost 
     discounts; therefore, they used whatever funds were readily 
     available when no specific funds were specified through use 
     of the appropriate ACRN and CLIN. Accordingly, as time passed 
     and more and more progress payments were made, visibility 
     over appropriation accounting decreased, and reconciliation 
     required more time to complete.

  Mr. GRASSLEY. I compliment the new Department of Defense Comptroller, 
John Hamre. He is struggling with the problem. He has succeeded in 
reducing the number of unmatched disbursements.
  But there is another problem. No one really knows for sure how big 
the problem really is. We think it is $41 billion, but is it bigger? It 
is just a guess. But the best available guess says that that number 
now, because of Mr. Hamre's work, may be down from $41 billion to $34 
billion. I suppose in this town that is progress.
  But Mr. Hamre is still wrestling with a $21 billion problem in 
disbursements that cannot be matched at all. They may never be matched.
  The Deputy DOD IG, Mr. Derek Vander Schaaf, has suggested that the 
problem of this $21 billion may be so bad and the documentation so poor 
that it may be necessary just simply to ``write off'' those unmatched 
disbursements. This kind of thing must come to a screeching halt.
  If DOD asks Congress for authority to ``write off'' $10 billion to 
$20 billion in unmatched disbursements, then I think heads should roll.
  As legislators, we have a responsibility to correct the problem. We 
were assured that DFAS would fix the problem, but it has not been 
fixed. It must be fixed.
  Mr. President, I look to my friend from Hawaii for leadership and 
advice on how to proceed, and he has been very helpful in that area.
  I had another amendment, other than the one before us, that would 
have imposed very stringent measures immediately. And I would hold DFAS 
Director Springett accountable for continuing financial mismanagement 
by cutting off his salary, effective December 31, 1994. I suppose that 
sounds like a bill of attainder, but something has to be done.
  The chairman of the subcommittee now has developed what we have 
before us. We worked together on this to develop a more orderly 
approach for phasing in new procedures for matching disbursements with 
obligations. His solution is very acceptable to me, Mr. President. It 
is a good compromise. It will keep the pressure on. I think it sends a 
right signal to the Department of Defense managers.
  The chairman's compromise would provide the following: By March 1, 
1995, DOD would have to submit a plan to Congress requiring that 
disbursing officers match disbursements; the IG would provide an 
independent assessment of the plan; by July 1, next year, all 
disbursements over $5 million would have to be matched; by October 1, 
1995, all disbursements over $1 million would have to be matched; DOD 
would be prohibited from breaking down disbursements to evade 
thresholds; requirements could be waived in a national emergency; and 
DOD would have authority to lower thresholds. In other words, as you 
have just heard, rather than taking a one-step, drastic approach, as I 
suggested in my original amendment, our distinguished chairman has 
helped us work out a very phased approach to getting all of these 
unmatched disbursements accounted for. Next year, after we have had an 
opportunity to assess the plan, then we should be in a better position 
to refine the procedures and lower the threshold, if that is necessary.
  I think this is an excellent beginning, and I thank the chairman, and 
particularly his staff assistant, David Morrison, for his help and 
cooperation in this effort.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, as manager of the bill, I wish to commend 
my good friend, Senator Grassley, for his diligent leadership in this 
very important area of military financing. His intent is a very simple 
one: to do business in a businesslike manner.
  I believe that this step, this proposal will eventually lead the 
Department of Defense to that goal.
  So if I may in behalf of the managers of the bill we are prepared to 
accept the amendment.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I am ready for a vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  If not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2510) was agreed to.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2519

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I call up Amendment No. 2519, an amendment 
by Senator Cohen.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Cohen 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2519.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     section:

     SEC.   . SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT TO CHANGES IN OBLIGATIONS 
                   UNDER THE CFE TREATY.

       (a) Findings.--
       (1) On November 25, 1991, the Senate gave its advice and 
     consent to ratification of the CFE Treaty.
       (2) The President would need to seek the Senate's advice 
     and consent to any change in obligation of the states parties 
     under the CFE Treaty, unless such change were a minor matter 
     of an administrative or technical nature.
       (3) A change in the allowed holdings of treaty limited 
     equipment in the area of application or any geographic sub-
     zone of the area of application would constitute a change in 
     obligation for which the Senate's advice and consent would be 
     required.
       (b) Reaffirmation of Senate's Treaty-Making Powers.--The 
     President shall submit for the Senate's advice and consent 
     any change in the obligations of any state party under the 
     CFE Treaty, unless such change is a minor matter of an 
     administrative or technical nature.
       (c) CFE Treaty Defined.--For the purpose of this section, 
     the CFE Treaty means the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces 
     in Europe, signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, and 
     associated protocols.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Cohen I withdraw the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn.
  So the amendment (No. 2519) was withdrawn.


                           Amendment No. 2523

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I call up Amendment No. 2523 proposed by 
Senator McConnell.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye] for Mr. McConnell, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2523.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill insert the following:
       Sec.   .
       (a.) Within 60 days of enactment of this Act, the 
     President, in consultation with NATO, shall submit a report 
     to the Committee on Appropriations defining specific 
     military, economic, and political standards required to gain 
     admission to NATO; Provided further, that such report shall 
     not be limited to the principles enunciated in the 
     Partnership for Peace; Provided further, such report shall 
     include an assessment of measures which would be necessary to 
     guarantee the armed services of Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
     Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are capable 
     of military cooperation and interoperability with NATO and 
     fulfilling other member responsibilities.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator McConnell, I withdraw 
the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn.
  So the amendment (No. 2523) was withdrawn.


                           Amendment No. 2529

(Purpose: To authorize assistance to promote the peaceful resolution of 
                          conflicts in Africa)

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I call up Amendment No. 2529 proposed by 
Senator Simon.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye] for Mr. Simon, for 
     himself, Mr. Jeffords, and Mr. Helms, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2529.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the end of the bill, add the following new title:
                   TITLE--AFRICAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

     SEC. 01. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``African Conflict Resolution 
     Act''.

     SEC. 02. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) It is in the national interest of the United States to 
     help build African capability in conflict resolution. A 
     relatively small investment of assistance in promoting 
     African conflict resolution--
       (A) would reduce the enormous human suffering which is 
     caused by wars in Africa;
       (B) would help the United States avoid huge future 
     expenditures necessitated by Somalia-like humanitarian 
     disasters; and
       (C) would reduce the need for United Nations intervention 
     as African institutions develop the ability to resolve 
     African conflicts.
       (2) Africa, to a greater extent than any other continent, 
     is afflicted by war. Africa has been marred by more than 20 
     major civil wars since 1960. Rwanda, Somalia, Angola, Sudan, 
     Liberia, and Burundi are among those countries that have 
     recently suffered serious armed conflict.
       (3) In the last decade alone, between 2,000,000 and 
     4,000,000 Africans have died because of war. There were 
     5,200,000 refugees and 13,100,000 displaced people in Africa 
     in 1993. In Angola, relief organizations estimated that 1,000 
     people were dying each day at the end of 1993. In Rwanda, 
     more than 200,000 people died in less than 5 weeks of 
     fighting during 1994, while 300,000 people fled to other 
     countries to escape war.
       (4) Millions more Africans are currently at risk of war-
     related death. Looming or ongoing conflicts in Zaire, Angola, 
     Sudan, Rwanda, and other countries threaten Africa's future.
       (5) War has caused untold economic and social damage to the 
     countries of Africa. Food production is impossible in 
     conflict areas, and famine often results. Widespread conflict 
     has condemned many of Africa's children to lives of misery 
     and, in certain cases, has threatened the existence of 
     traditional African cultures.
       (6) Conflict and instability in Africa, particularly in 
     large, potentially rich countries such as Angola, Sudan, and 
     Zaire, deprive the global economy of resources and 
     opportunities for trade and investment. Peace in these 
     countries could make a significant contribution to global 
     economic growth, while creating new opportunities for United 
     States businesses.
       (7) Many African armies are far too large, threatening 
     political and economic stability while diverting scarce 
     resources from development needs. Military expenditures in 
     Africa average over twice the level in Latin America. 
     Demobilization and other measures to reduce military 
     expenditures are thus a critical need for many African 
     countries.
       (8) Conflict prevention, mediation, and demobilization are 
     prerequisites to the success of development assistance 
     programs. Nutrition and education programs, for example, 
     cannot succeed in a nation at war. Billions of dollars of 
     development assistance have been virtually wasted in war-
     ravaged countries such as Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan.
       (9) Africans have a long tradition of informal mediation. 
     This tradition should be built upon to create effective 
     institutions through which Africans can resolve African 
     conflicts.
       (10) The Organization of African Unity, under the 
     leadership of Secretary General Salim Salim, has established 
     a conflict resolution mechanism and has been active in 
     mediation and conflict resolution in several African 
     countries. Various subregional organizations have also become 
     active in conflict resolution efforts. These are encouraging 
     developments.
       (b) United States Policy.--The Congress declares, 
     therefore, that a key goal for United States foreign policy 
     should be to help institutionalize conflict resolution 
     capability in Africa.

     SEC. 03. IMPROVING THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION CAPABILITIES OF 
                   THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.

       (a) Authorization of Assistance.--The President is 
     authorized to provide assistance to strengthen the conflict 
     resolution capability of the Organization of African Unity, 
     as follows:
       (1) Funds may be provided to the Organization of African 
     Unity for use in supporting its conflict resolution 
     capability.
       (2) Funds may be used for expenses of sending individuals 
     with expertise in conflict resolution to work with the 
     Organization of African Unity.
       (b) Funding.--Of the foreign assistance funds that are 
     allocated for sub-Saharan Africa, significant sums for each 
     of the fiscal years 1995 through 1998 should be used to carry 
     out subsection (a).

     SEC. 04. IMPROVING CONFLICT RESOLUTION CAPABILITIES OF 
                   MULTILATERAL SUBREGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN 
                   AFRICA.

       (a) Authorization of Assistance.--The President is 
     authorized to provide assistance to strengthen the conflict 
     resolution capabilities of subregional organizations 
     established by countries in sub-Saharan Africa, as follows:
       (1) Funds may be provided to such an organization for use 
     in supporting its conflict resolution capability.
       (2) Funds may be used for the expenses of sending 
     individuals with expertise in conflict resolution to work 
     with such an organization.
       (b) Funding.--Of the foreign assistance funds that are 
     allocated for sub-Saharan Africa, up to $1,500,000 for each 
     of the fiscal years 1995 through 1998 may be used to carry 
     out subsection (a).

     SEC. 05. AFRICAN DEMOBILIZATION AND RETRAINING PROGRAM.

       (a) Authorization of Assistance.--In order to facilitate 
     reductions in the size of the armed forces of countries of 
     sub-Saharan Africa, the President is authorized to provide 
     assistance for--
       (1) encampment and related activities associated with 
     demobilization of such forces, and
       (2) the retraining for civilian occupations of military 
     personnel who have been demobilized.
       (b) Funding.--Of the foreign assistance funds that are 
     allocated for sub-Saharan Africa, up to $25,000,000 for each 
     of the fiscal years 1995 and 1996 should be used for the 
     assistance described in subsection (a), if conditions permit.

     SEC. 06. TRAINING FOR AFRICANS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND 
                   PEACEKEEPING.

       (a) Authorization of Assistance.--The President is 
     authorized to establish a program to provide education and 
     training in conflict resolution and peacekeeping for civilian 
     and military personnel of countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
       (b) Funding.--Funds made available for military education 
     and training activities under chapter 5 of part II of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 may be used to carry out the 
     program provided for in subsection (a).

     SEC. 07. BUILDING MEDIATION CAPABILITY IN AFRICA.

       (a) Authorization of Assistance.--The President is 
     authorized to provide assistance to nongovernmental 
     organizations that are engaged in mediation and 
     reconciliation efforts in Africa.
       (b) Funding.--Of the foreign assistance funds that are 
     allocated for sub-Saharan Africa, funds for each of the 
     fiscal years 1995 and 1996 should be used to carry out 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 08. DEFINITION.

       As used in this title, the term ``foreign assistance 
     funds'' means funds made available--
       (1) under chapters 1 and 10 of part I of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to development assistance 
     and the Development Fund for Africa),
       (2) under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961 (relating to the economic support fund), and
       (3) under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act 
     (relating to foreign military financing),
     and includes unobligated funds in such accounts which remain 
     available from previous fiscal years.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Simon, I wish to 
withdraw the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn.
  So the amendment (No. 2529) was withdrawn.


                           Amendment No. 2548

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I call up Amendment No. 2548, an amendment 
proposed by Senator Cohen.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Cohen, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2548.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At an appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     section:

     SEC.   . SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT TO CHANGES IN OBLIGATIONS 
                   UNDER THE CFE TREATY.

       (a) Findings.--
       (1) On November 25, 1991, the Senate gave its advice and 
     consent to ratification of the CFE Treaty.
       (2) The President would need to seek the Senate's advice 
     and consent to any change in obligation of the states parties 
     under the CFE Treaty, unless such change were a minor matter 
     of an administrative or technical nature.
       (3) A change in the allowed holdings of treaty limited 
     equipment in the area of application or any geographic sub-
     zone of the area of application would constitute a change in 
     obligation for which the Senate's advice and consent would be 
     required.
       (b) Reaffirmation of Senate's Treaty-Making Powers.--The 
     President shall submit for the Senate's advice and consent 
     any change in the obligations of any state party under the 
     CFE Treaty, unless such change is a minor matter of an 
     administrative or technical nature.
       (c) CFE Treaty Defined.--For the purpose of this section, 
     the CFE Treaty means the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces 
     in Europe, signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, and 
     associated protocols.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask that the amendment be withdrawn.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn.
  So the amendment (No. 2548) was withdrawn.


                           Amendment No. 2516

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 2516 on behalf of 
Senator Cohen.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Cohen, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2516.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At an appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     section:

     SEC.   . SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT TO CHANGES IN OBLIGATIONS 
                   UNDER THE CFE TREATY.

       (A) Findings.--
       (1) On November 25, 1991, the Senate gave its advice and 
     consent to ratification of the CFE Treaty.
       (2) The President would need to seek the Senate's advice 
     and consent to any change in obligation of the states parties 
     under the CFE Treaty, unless such change were a minor matter 
     of an administrative or technical nature.
       (3) A change in the allowed holdings of treaty limited 
     equipment in the area of application or any geographic sub-
     zone of the area of application would constitute a change in 
     obligation for which the Senate's advice and consent would be 
     required.
       (b) Reaffirmation of Senate's Treaty-making Powers.--The 
     President shall submit for the Senate's advice and consent 
     any change in the obligations of any state party under the 
     CFE Treaty, unless such change is a minor matter of an 
     administrative or technical nature.
       (c) CFE Treaty Defined.--For the purpose of this section, 
     the CFE Treaty means the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces 
     in Europe, signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, and 
     associated protocols.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, this matter has been studied by both 
managers and we find the amendment acceptable.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2516) was agreed to.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and I move 
to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2525



(Purpose: To state the sense of Congress on negotiation of limitations 
                      on nuclear weapons testing)

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask that we take up for immediate 
consideration Amendment No. 2525.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Harkin, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2525.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 142, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:

     SEC. 8121. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATION OF LIMITATIONS ON 
                   NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) On January 25, 1994, the United States joined with 37 
     other nations to begin negotiations for a comprehensive 
     treaty to ban permanently all nuclear weapons testing.
       (2) On March 14, 1994, the President decided to extend the 
     current United States nuclear testing moratorium at least 
     through September 1995.
       (3) Germany and the Group of 21 Non-Aligned States have 
     publicly stated their support for the completion of a 
     comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by 1995.
       (4) On June 6, 1994, the People's Republic of China 
     conducted its second nuclear weapons test explosion since the 
     United States, Russia, and France initiated their current 
     nuclear test moratoria.
       (5) On September 7, 1994, the third and final test ban 
     negotiating session of the year will end.
       (6) While some progress toward a comprehensive nuclear test 
     ban treaty has been achieved, there is little chance that an 
     agreement will be reached before April 1995 at the current 
     rate of negotiation.
       (7) The United States is seeking to extend indefinitely the 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty at the April 1995 Extension 
     Conference.
       (8) Conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty 
     could contribute toward successful negotiations to extend the 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty.
       (9) Agreements to eliminate nuclear testing and control the 
     spread of nuclear weapons could contribute to national 
     security of the United States, its allies, and other nations 
     around the world.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--The Congress--
       (1) applauds the President for maintaining the United 
     States nuclear testing moratorium and for supporting the 
     negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty;
       (2) encourages the People's Republic of China and all other 
     nuclear powers to refrain from conducting nuclear explosions 
     prior to conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban 
     treaty; and
       (3) urges the President and the other nuclear powers to 
     take measures necessary to achieve a multilateral 
     comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty before the Non-
     Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference.
       (c) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``Non-
     Proliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
     and Moscow on July 1, 1968 (21 U.S.T. 483).

  Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, negotiations are currently underway to 
draft a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT] and I commend the Senator 
from Iowa [Mr. Harkin] for bringing this resolution before the Senate. 
I ask that he include me as a cosponsor of his resolution.
  Two years ago, the Congress ended underground nuclear testing. That 
action paved the way for the negotiations which are being held in 
Geneva today. Strong interest by Members of the Senate, the House and 
by the President are vital to the effort to swiftly agree on a treaty. 
Several Senators, including myself, have tracked these negotiations 
closely and I hope that the message we send today will redouble the 
resolve of the U.S. negotiators and send a strong signal to other, 
participating nations that the United States wants a CTBT as soon as 
possible.
  I would ask that included in my remarks be printed a copy of a speech 
delivered by the U.S. Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, John Holum. As he says in his speech before the Conference on 
Disarmament, which is sponsoring the negotiations, ``A Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty is an opportunity whose time has arrived.'' By 
approving this resolution today, the Senate is sending that very same 
message.
  There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

 Statement by the Honorable John D. Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control 
                         and Disarmament Agency

       Thank you, Mr. President, I am pleased to have this 
     opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament again 
     during its session this year. First, Mr. President, may I 
     congratulate you on the skillful way in which you have 
     conducted the business of the CD during your presidency; I 
     know that the U.S. Delegation has provided you with its 
     fullest cooperation. I would also like to extend once again 
     my greetings to Mr. Petrovsky, the CD Secretary General, and 
     to his Deputy, Mr. Bensmail. We appreciate the efforts you 
     are making on behalf of all of us in facilitating our 
     negotiations.
       Mr. President, the Conference on Disarmament has 
     accomplished a great deal in recent years--and much since the 
     opening of the January session.
       In one sense our progress in the CD is more than any of us 
     had a right to expect--a testament to the abilities of this 
     body.
       But in another sense our recent efforts are not enough. The 
     United States is more committed than ever to concluding a 
     comprehensive test ban treaty at the earliest possible time. 
     None of us can rest--none can be satisfied by our noteworthy 
     progress to date--until the world's nations have agreed once 
     and for all to stop testing nuclear weapons.
       So I am here neither to criticize the CD nor praise it 
     unconditionally--but rather to exhort it.
       Last January I was privileged to report to you President 
     Clinton's commitment to achievement of a comprehensive test 
     ban ``at the earliest possible time.'' Six months later, he 
     has asked me to return here to tell you that these 
     instructions remain fully in effect--and that ``earliest 
     possible time'' means just what it says. It most assuredly is 
     not diplomatic code for a ``relaxed pace.'' It does not mean 
     take all the time allowed by U.S. law. It means take only the 
     time necessary, negotiating diligently and in good faith, to 
     write a sound treaty.
       President Clinton's commitment to the test ban is 
     authenticated by another decision--our continued moratorium 
     on nuclear testing. Despite China's tests, President Clinton 
     has extended our moratorium for a third year, through 
     September of 1995.
       I ask you to consider carefully what this means.
       The President's decision to extend the testing moratorium 
     balanced the potential value of additional tests against (1) 
     restraint by others, (2) the impact on our nonproliferation 
     goals, and (3) progress in the test ban negotiations here.
       In practical effect, this means that where the United 
     States is concerned, the central and profound policy decision 
     that many seek has already been made. If things here and 
     elsewhere go as we hope, the testing moratorium the United 
     States adopted in 1992 will last forever.
       This practical reality is underscored by the President's 
     definitive declaration to the UNGA last September, when he 
     said, ``In the face of disturbing signs, I renew my call on 
     the nuclear states to abide by that moratorium as we 
     negotiate to stop nuclear testing for all time.''
       Simply put, we are prepared for the conclusion that the 
     United States has already conducted its last nuclear test--
     that we will never test again.
       As we contemplate that reality, these negotiations--and 
     other developments, including preparations for the NPT 
     Conference next year--should be given even greater energy and 
     purpose.
       The United States seeks a CTBT that will bring an end to 
     all nuclear explosions--period. No thresholds. No exceptions. 
     And by that I mean not just all explosions, but all states. 
     Success demands in particular the full support and 
     participation of all five nuclear-weapon states. And we seek 
     universal adherence.
       Of course the United States and the other nuclear-weapon 
     states bear a special responsibility in this negotiation, and 
     of course we also have special experience and knowledge that 
     can aid it considerably. So we will continue to seek closely 
     with the other nuclear-weapon states to propel this effort 
     toward fruition.
       I wish to commend Ambassador Marin Bosch, Chairman of the 
     NTB Ad Hoc Committee, as he accelerates the Committee's work. 
     The United States supports his efforts to develop a complete 
     text from contributions developed in the Working Groups on 
     Verification and on Legal and Institutional Issues under the 
     leadership, respectively, of Ambassadors Hoffman and 
     Dembinski. Nevertheless, much time has passed and much work 
     remains to be done. We need a document that will both focus 
     and energize our work. And we look to the committee Chairman 
     for his leadership to bring this about.
       Now when I last spoke to you I said the United States would 
     be out front pulling in these negotiations, rather than in 
     the back dragging its heels. We plan to persist in--and 
     indeed, to intensify--our efforts to fulfill our President's 
     instructions.
       So I urge the Conference to make use of all time possible 
     available to it, even outside the normal term of the CD, to 
     move these negotiations forward. The U.S. delegation is 
     prepared to work continuously in the NTS Committee and its 
     working groups in the period after the September 7 end of 
     session and the opening of the 1995 session so as to make all 
     possible progress this year and prior to the start of the NPT 
     Extension Conference in April 1995.
       A kind of linkage has grown in the minds of some between 
     the NPT Extension Conference and progress in other areas. All 
     parts of the international arms control, nonproliferation, 
     and disarmament architecture are, of course, interrelated. 
     But it is a disservice to major regimes or initiatives to 
     posit any kind of rigid ``quid-pro-quo'' relationship between 
     them.
       The NPT should be extended because of its own intense 
     merits to world peace. A comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
     Treaty is an opportunity whose time has arrived. We should 
     seize it not because it goes well with NPT extension, but 
     because it deserves to be done.
       Mr. President, President John Kennedy was fond of saying 
     that from those to whom much has been given, much is 
     expected.
       The CD's remarkable success with the CWC and its notable 
     progress on the CTBT prove it is a body of great ability. And 
     so the world expects much of it--of you.
       One of the encouraging trends of these times has been an 
     ability of the international community to clear away much of 
     the divisive ideological and political underbrush that 
     occupied so much time, to so little effect, during the era of 
     maximum East-West and North-South confrontation. Of course 
     those habits have not entirely disappeared. My appeal to you 
     is that to the extent such inclinations persist, this is the 
     last place they should be exercised. For the CD is not a 
     place for scoring political points, but for doing serious 
     work--and producing tangible results.
       Indeed, in a world where even bilateral arms control has 
     become multilateral, this institution, the able statesmen and 
     experts who labor here, and the extraordinary and intricate 
     methods of diplomacy you have mastered here, have become the 
     wave of the future--and the embodiment of our hopes for a 
     safer world.
       With the end of the Cold War, nuclear proliferation 
     pressures may be more substantial than ever. Such pressures, 
     as you know, can be vertical as well as horizontal. So this 
     is at once the best time to buttress international security--
     and the most essential. Now especially--with the largest 
     nuclear-weapon powers finally able to deemphasize nuclear 
     weapons in their defense planning--this is no time to revert 
     to old habits.
       We have now had five decades of nuclear testing--and are in 
     the fifth decade of calls to stop it. By any fair 
     description, the world's pursuit of a CTBT has been a long-
     distance race.
       But such races are not won by limping across the finish 
     line, or even by being satisfied with moderate progress. They 
     are won with concluding surges of energy and commitment.
       We are in the final stages of our race. The finish line is 
     within our view. We must pick up the pace. We must agree to 
     cease nuclear explosive testing, without exceptions, without 
     artificial linkages, without delay--to conclude a CTBT before 
     the chance of our lifetime has passed.
       Mr. President, it is an intriguing historical coincidence 
     that the fiftieth anniversary of the first nuclear explosion 
     and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of 
     the NPT fall in the same year--1995. I hope our efforts can 
     make this coincidence into an important signpost of progress.
       From the very first atomic blast at Alamagordo, mankind has 
     been struggling to free itself from the ferocious beast 
     unleashed there. Since then, thousands of women and men of 
     good will and intellect have pursued--passionately, 
     painstakingly--the compelling mission of our age. Working 
     together, let us rededicate ourselves to that mission: to 
     shepherd this beast back into its cage--to bring what was 
     unleashed in a blinding blast of heat in the New Mexico 
     desert to a fitting end in the cool atmosphere of reason in 
     Geneva--to ensure that our first half-century of nuclear 
     explosions is our last.
  Mr. INOUYE. This amendment has been studied by both managers and we 
find it acceptable.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2525) was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2526

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I call up Amendment No. 2526, an amendment 
by Senator Lieberman.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Lieberman, 
     for himself, and Mr. Hatch, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2526.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 39, after the words ``such section'' on line 2, 
     insert: ``: Provided further, That of the funds appropriated 
     in this paragraph, not less than $2,000,000 shall be made 
     available for International Cooperative projects to be funded 
     under the Counterterror Technical Support program element.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the managers of the bill have discussed 
this matter and studied it. We find it acceptable.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There being no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2526) was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2527

(Purpose: To set aside operation and maintenance funds of the Air Force 
       for the Core Automated Maintenance System/Reliability and 
            Maintainability Information System (CAMS/ REMIS)

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask that the Senate take up Amendment 
No. 2527, an amendment by Senator Shelby.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Shelby, for 
     himself, Mr. Cochran, and Mr. Lott, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2527.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 10, line 17, before the period insert the 
     following: ``Provided, That, of the amount appropriated under 
     this paragraph, not less than $8,000,000 shall be available 
     only for the upgrading of the Air Force's Core Automated 
     Maintenance System/Reliability and Maintainability 
     Information system (CAMS/REMIS)''

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the managers have studied this amendment, 
and we find it acceptable.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2527) was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2533

   (Purpose: To add $1.296 million to the Air Force F-111 squadrons 
                            program element)

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask that we take up amendment No. 2533.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Bingaman, for 
     himself and Mr. Domenici, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2533.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 37, line 21 of the committee reported bill, before 
     the period insert the following: ``: Provided further, That 
     of the funds appropriated in this paragraph, $2,800,000 shall 
     be made available only for the F-111 Squadrons program 
     element''.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the managers have studied the amendment, 
and we find it acceptable.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2533) was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2543

(Purpose: To authorize that Secretaries of the military departments to 
contract for commercial or proprietary credit card services for use by 
 nonappropriated fund instrumentalities of the United States that are 
              under the jurisdiction of such Secretaries)

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask that we consider Amendment No. 2543, 
an amendment by Senator Johnston.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Johnston, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2543.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 142, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:
       Sec.   . (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     the Secretary of a military department may enter into a 
     contract for use of commercial or proprietary credit card 
     services for augmenting or replacing any in-house account 
     receivable system in use by a nonappropriated fund 
     instrumentality under the jurisdiction of that Secretary if 
     the Secretary determines that such contract is in the best 
     interest of that department.
       (b) No official of the Department of Defense outside a 
     military department may, by regulation or otherwise, limit or 
     control the exercise of authority under this section by the 
     Secretary of that military department.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the managers have studied this amendment, 
and we find it acceptable.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2543) was agreed to.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, may I ask that the Senator from Alaska be 
recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I thank the floor leader for allowing 
me to offer my amendment at this time, the distinguished senior Senator 
from Hawaii.


                           Amendment No. 2511

  (Purpose: To prohibit the availability of any funds for North Korea 
                   unless certain conditions are met)

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I call up an amendment numbered 2511.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Murkowski], for himself and 
     Mr. Dole, proposes an amendment numbered 2511.

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC.   . PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE FOR NORTH KOREA.

       (a) Prohibition.--No funds appropriated under this Act or 
     any other Act may be made available to the Democratic 
     People's Republic of Korea until the President certifies and 
     reports to Congress that the Democratic People's Republic of 
     Korea--
       (1) does not possess nuclear weapons;
       (2) has halted its nuclear weapons program; and
       (3) is not exporting weapons-grade plutonium.
       (b) National Security Waiver.--The President may waive the 
     prohibition in this section if he determines and certifies in 
     writing to the Congress that to do is vital to the national 
     security interest of the United States, and notifies the 
     appropriate Committee of Congress 15 days in advance in 
     accordance with the regular notification procedures of such 
     Committees. Such notification shall include the nature, 
     purpose and amount of the proposed assistance.


                    amendment no. 2511, as modified

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to send a 
modification to the desk at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Without objection, the amendment is modified.
  So the amendment (No. 2511) was modified, as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     new section:
       (a) Prohibition.--No funds appropriated under this Act may 
     be made available to the Democratic People's Republic of 
     Korea until the President certifies and reports to Congress 
     that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea--
       (1) does not possess nuclear weapons;
       (2) has halted its nuclear weapons program; and
       (3) is not exporting weapons-grade plutonium.
       (b) National Security Waiver.--The President may waive the 
     prohibition in this section if he determines and certifies in 
     writing to the Congress that to do is vital to the national 
     security interest of the United States, and notifies the 
     appropriate Committee of Congress 15 days in advance in 
     accordance with the regular notification procedures of such 
     Committees. Such notification shall include the nature, 
     purpose and amount of the proposed assistance.

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President. On July 15, this body unanimously approved an 
amendment I offered on behalf of myself and the distinguished minority 
leader, Senator Dole, to the foreign operations appropriations bill. 
The amendment barred United States aid to North Korea until President 
Clinton certified to Congress that certain conditions about North 
Korea's nuclear weapons program were met.
  The amendment was adopted 95-0 on a rollcall vote, representing, I 
think, the widespread feeling in this body that United States taxpayer 
dollars should not be used to subsidize this rogue regime until the 
President can certify that North Korea is no longer a nuclear threat. 
Not one person spoke against my amendment.
  I was dismayed, therefore, to learn that the final conference report 
did not contain the North Korea language. I am told that the House 
conferees, under pressure from the Clinton administration, objected to 
including the North Korea amendment in the final package.
  I am here today to offer this amendment again, with slight 
modifications, and to ask the managers to fight for this bill at 
conference.
  The amendment, offered on behalf of Senator Dole and myself, says 
that this body will not provide any aid to North Korea until the 
President certifies that three conditions have been met:
  First, that North Korea does not possess nuclear weapons. If North 
Korea possesses a nuclear weapon already, the weapons must be 
destroyed.
  Second, that North Korea has halted its nuclear weapons program. This 
includes full compliance with the terms of the Nuclear Proliferation 
Treaty and the January 30, 1992, full scope safeguards agreement 
between the IAEA and North Korea.
  Third, that North Korea is not exporting weapons-grade plutonium to 
other countries on missiles or otherwise.
  The amendment also contains a provision allowing the President to 
waive the provisions of the amendment if he finds that is vital to the 
national security interest of the United States, and notifies Congress 
accordingly.
  I remind my colleagues of the history of this regime in contemplating 
whether such assurances are necessary before giving the North Koreans 
aid.
  This was the regime which launched the invasion of South Korea in 
1950 resulting in the deaths of 3 million of their countrymen and more 
than 33,000 American troops; a regime whose agents detonated a bomb in 
Rangoon killing 16 South Korean officials; a regime which sanctioned 
the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight killing 115 passengers and 
crew; and a regime whose military hacked American personnel to death in 
the DMZ.

  Kim Il-song leaves a very unpredictable legacy, and he leaves it to a 
very unpredictable son. I have not met with anyone in the U.S. 
intelligence community who has first-hand information about Kim Chong-
Il. There are reports that it was Kim Chong-Il who actually 
orchestrated the Korean Airlines bombing.
  I would also like to remind my colleagues of the ominous announcement 
in Seoul by Kang Myong Do, a defector identified as the son-in-law of 
North Korea's Prime Minister. Kang indicated first, that Pyongyang has 
developed five nuclear warheads and second, that North Korea is 
purposely delaying international inspection of its nuclear sites by 
stalling talks with the United States and South Korea. The accuracy of 
the defector's claims are disputed by the State Department, but the 
mere fact that our intelligence cannot readily confirm nor dispute his 
allegations illustrate how dangerous the North Korean nuclear situation 
has become.
  Now, more than ever, the United States must demand that North Korea 
come clean on past nuclear activities and follow through on past 
commitments to allow IAEA inspectors complete access to nuclear 
facilities, both suspected and declared.
  As this amendment makes clear, it is up to the Administration, as the 
party directly negotiating with the North Koreans, to send a clear and 
strong message that the United States is prepared to offer incentives 
for North Korea, but on our terms.
  Unfortunately, up to now, our strategy with North Korea has been less 
than consistent. Everyone who has negotiated deals in the Asia Pacific 
understand a key point that I think the U.S. negotiators have missed--
Asians understand strength and consistency. Our policy has lacked both.
  For more than 2 years Kim Il-song has dictated and our negotiators 
have conceded.
  North Korea extracted concessions from the United States:
  United Stated agreed to high-level talks; United States suspended 
joint military exercises team spirit; United States delayed sending 
Patriot missiles requested by General; The North Koreans got another 
year to work on their nuclear capability; and the North Koreans moved 
fuel rods into the cooling pond without IAEA monitoring procedures in 
place.
  What did the United States get, nothing. The IAEA is still unable to 
verify whether nuclear activity is taking place. Two suspected nuclear 
sites remain off limits. And North Korea is a month or so away from 
being able to reprocess the spent fuel rods into weapons grade 
plutonium for perhaps four to six more bombs.
  It is more than 2 years since North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty Safeguards agreement that requires regular 
inspections of its nuclear facilities.
  It is more than 1 year since North Korea threatened to pull out of 
the NPT because IAEA was demanding access to the two undeclared nuclear 
sites and we are no further along in halting their nuclear weapons 
program.
  Mr. President, I have charts, but in view of the fact both sides have 
looked at the merits of the amendment, I will defer from going through 
the charts.
  However, I think it is important to recognize that since North Korea 
threatened to pull out of the IAEA in June, five significant events 
have occurred:
  First, the United States declared it would seek U.N. sanctions 
against North Korea;
  Second, Jimmy Carter visited Kim Il-song,
  Third, United States agreed to resume high-level negotiations with 
North Korea on July 8, but then postponed the talks because of the 
death of Kim Il-song;
  Fourth North and South agreed to hold a summit scheduled for July 25 
to 27, but now postponed; and
  Fifth, the United States and North Korea resumed high-level 
negotiations in Geneva on August 8 which are ongoing.
  Mr. President, Dr. Davis, the assistant secretary for political/
military affairs at the state Department testified before the Foreign 
Relations Committee in March of this year that she was not concerned 
about this loss of time because North Koreans told us their program was 
frozen, Mr. President, I am concerned.
  By allowing North Korea to continue their drive toward nuclear 
capability we face a more ominous enemy than we did just last year.
  If the new North Korea regime is ready to put aside its drive for 
nuclear arms and to move toward the family of nations, then I believe 
the United States should rightfully welcome such a move and offer 
rewards. However, I strongly believe that North Korea must offer the 
concessions, and not the other way around.
  For too long, we let Kim Il-song dictate the terms of the 
negotiations, while he gained valuable time to push the suspected 
nuclear program ahead. From the track record, it was hard to tell which 
country was a tiny, isolated, terrorist regime violating international 
agreements and which country was a superpower that was pulling the 
weight for the international community. This must change.
  This amendment sets goalposts for the new leadership in North Korea 
and signals the United States Administration that this body is ready to 
provide carrots to North Korea only after explicit guarantees about 
their nuclear weapons program are met.
  Why did the administration oppose the amendment? Is the United States 
prepared to offer North Korea economic assistance at the high-level 
negotiations ongoing in Geneva without ensuring that North Korea will 
abandon its nuclear intentions? Comments made by North Korean and 
American officials indicate that economic concessions are on the table.
  What types of concessions might the administration be considering? It 
has been widely reported that North Korea is demanding light-water-
based nuclear reactors [LWR's] to replace the outmoded graphite-
moderated reactors that they currently possess. I do not doubt that the 
United States negotiators view this technology upgrade as a significant 
carrot to offer North Korea.
  My concern is that the United States will give this carrot away 
without gaining tangible concessions from North Korea on its nuclear 
program. I am also concerned that the long-term nature of this project 
has not been sufficiently thought through by our negotiators. I refer 
my colleagues to a Washington Post op ed by Victor Gilinsky, a former 
member of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, entitled ``No Quick Fix on 
Korea'', which I included in the Record on August 8. I believe that Mr. 
Gilinsky exposes some of the fallacies in believing that LWRs will 
solve the nuclear issue. As Mr. Gilinsky observes:

       In the end, what is wrong with the LWR proposal is that it 
     presumes a level of goodwill on North Korea's part that, were 
     it present, would obviate the need for the proposal. If the 
     North Koreans are interested in electricity, there are much 
     cheaper, better and safer ways to provide it. If they insist 
     on a prestige nuclear project, we can be sure the deal is, in 
     fact, too good to be true. There are no neat technological 
     fixes to the present impasse. What is needed is change in 
     North Korea.

  The administration's written position paper on the Murkowski-Dole 
amendment listed six examples of possible assistance to North Korea 
that would be precluded by the language of the amendment. I would 
remind the administration that this amendment would not preclude any of 
these examples of assistance, if North Korea lived up to the conditions 
on nuclear concessions.
  It is appropriate to note that on November 7, 1993, President Clinton 
stated: ``North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon.''
  I agree. And this is exactly what this amendment is about. The 
President must certify that North Korea does not possess a 
nuclear weapon at such time as we consider giving them any type of U.S. 
aid or assistance.

  After watching the administration negotiate with the North Koreans 
over the last year, I continue to believe that economic concessions for 
anything short of nuclear concessions would be a mistake. Rewarding 
North Korea for empty words and promises brings us no closer to a 
resolution of the nuclear issue. For example, the United States agreed 
to resume high-level negotiations with North Korea after former leader 
Kim Il-song promised former President Carter that the spent fuel rods 
at its Yongbyon reactor would not be reprocessed.
  But this promise was merely empty words. The fuel rods cannot not be 
reprocessed for 2 months whether we negotiate or not because the rods 
are too ``hot'' with radioactive material. The promise that meant 
something was the promise the North Koreans did not keep, the promise 
to not move the fuel rods into the pond in the first place.
  Allowing IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspectors full 
and unhindered access to the two suspected and seven declared nuclear 
sites would distinguish this regime from the rogue tactics of the last. 
This come clean approach was taken in 1991 by South Africa's former 
President F.W. de Klerk when his country opened up its program to 
reveal past nuclear activities. We should expect no less from North 
Korea.
  And what should the American people and Congress expect from the 
Clinton administration during these negotiations? We should expect that 
the administration will use its leverage as the sole superpower to 
refrain from rewarding North Korea with taxpayer dollars until the 
President can certify that the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula 
is eliminated. Economic concessions should be made only for good deeds, 
not just good words.
  Unfortunately, the administration's opposition to my amendment leads 
me to believe that the administration is betting, once again, that 
rewards given now will lead to good behavior in the future. Every other 
time the administration has made such a bet, it has lost. This time, 
North Korean concessions should come first.
  I think Congress would be irresponsible to write the President a 
blank check for any other approach.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article appearing in 
today's issue of the Washington Times, entitled, ``Don't Bribe North 
Korea,'' be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Times, Aug. 11, 1994]

                        Don't Bribe North Korea

                        (By Frank H. Murkowski)

       The United States late last week resumed high-level 
     negotiations with North Korea, seeking to encourage the North 
     to abandon its nuclear intentions. While I support the 
     administration's decision to talk, I'm afraid that I may not 
     agree with part of what the administration may be saying.
       Comments by North Korean and American officials indicate 
     that the United States may be moving to offer economic 
     concessions to push the North to abandon its nuclear 
     intentions. I believe that economic concessions for anything 
     short of true nuclear concessions would be a mistake, but 
     unfortunately, some in Congress apparently favor writing the 
     president a blank check for this approach.
       In response to administration pressure, House and Senate 
     conferees for the Foreign Operations Appropriation bill 
     dropped my amendment, which had been unanimously approved 
     (95-0) by the Senate on July 15. The amendment stated that 
     North Korea would receive no United States foreign assistance 
     until the president certified to Congress that the following 
     three conditions had been met:
       North Korea does not possess nuclear weapons. If North 
     Korea possesses a nuclear weapon already, then the weapon 
     must be destroyed.
       North Korea has halted its nuclear weapons program. The 
     program must be halted, not frozen. This means full 
     compliance with the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty and the Jan. 30, 1992, full-scope safeguards agreement 
     between the International Atomic Energy Agency and North 
     Korea.
       North Korea has not exported weapons-grade plutonium to 
     other countries on missiles or by other methods.
       The administration's opposition to my amendment can only 
     fuel speculation by critics of the president's foreign policy 
     that U.S. officials are prepared to reward North Korea with 
     economic concessions for something far short of the 
     conditions outlined by my amendment. This would be a mistake.
       The United States must present North Korea with clear 
     alternatives: Either drop its nuclear intentions and gain the 
     economic and diplomatic benefits of membership in the 
     community of nations, or continue down its current perceived 
     nuclear path and face the consequences of heightened economic 
     and diplomatic isolation.
       Rewarding North Korea for empty words and promises brings 
     us no closer to a resolution of the nuclear issue. For 
     example, the United States agreed to resume high-level 
     negotiations with North Korea after former leader Kim Il-sung 
     ``promised'' not to reprocess the spent fuel rods at its 
     Yongbyon reactor during these talks. But this was an empty 
     promise--the North Koreans could not move these rods for two 
     months in any event because they are ``hot'' with radioactive 
     material.
       Now, administration officials indicate that negotiators are 
     considering North Korea's request for lightwater nuclear 
     reactors. This project would involve a significant commitment 
     of U.S. technology, financial assistance and time. Such a 
     perk might be appropriate at some stage in the negotiations, 
     but I would caution that North Korea should first make 
     tangible concessions. Granting a technological perk to a 
     country that is in violation of international nuclear 
     standards tells the other rulebreakers (Iran, Iraq, Libya) 
     that the rulemakers are prepared to reward intransigence.
       The world wants the nuclear impasse created by North 
     Korea's refusal to abide by the terms and conditions of the 
     Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to end. But it should end on 
     our terms.
       Kim Jong-il has a historic opportunity to end the impasse 
     and to begin a new era for his people. He can start by 
     announcing that North Korea is prepared to come clean on its 
     past and present nuclear activities. While Kim Il-sung may 
     have felt that he would lose face by revealing hidden 
     activities, the new leader need not be bound by the deeds of 
     his father.
       Allowing International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors full 
     and unhindered access to suspected and declared nuclear sites 
     would distinguish this regime from the rogue tactics of the 
     past. This approach was taken in 1991 by South Africa's 
     former president, F.W. DeKlerk, when his country opened up 
     its program to reveal past nuclear transgressions. The United 
     States should expect no less from North Korea.
       And what should the American people and the U.S. Congress 
     expect from the Clinton administration during this new round 
     of negotiations? We should expect the administration to use 
     its leverage as the sole superpower to refrain from 
     ``rewarding'' North Korea with taxpayer dollars until the 
     president can certify to the American people and Congress 
     that the nuclear threat is eliminated.

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I would be happy to respond to any 
questions by the floor leaders on the merits of my amendment.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I wish to commend my friend from Alaska 
for his diligence and leadership in this area. With the modification, 
we are able to send a strong and clear message to the dictatorial 
regime on the Korean peninsula.
  On behalf of the managers, I am pleased to accept the amendment. And 
may I, with the acceptance, assure my friend from Alaska that we will 
do our best to see that it remains in the bill during conference.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I am most appreciative. I thank my good friend from 
Hawaii. I do look forward to his assurance that he will do the very 
best he can in conference on this matter.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If 
not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2511), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2509

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask that the pending amendment be set 
aside and wish to call up amendment No. 2509, an amendment by Senator 
Chafee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report the amendment.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Chafee, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2509.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       From the Defense Environmental Restoration Account, $1 
     million for environmental restoration of the Derecktor 
     Shipyard, Newport, Rhode Island, owned by the U.S. Department 
     of the Navy.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I send to the desk a modification of the 
amendment on behalf of Senator Chafee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so 
modified.
  The amendment (No. 2509), as modified, is as follows:

       On page 9, line 13, before the period, insert: ``: Provided 
     further, That of the funds appropriated under this heading, 
     not less than $1,000,000 shall be made available only for 
     environmental hazard response and remediation activities at 
     facilities owned by the Department of the Navy at the 
     Derecktor Shipyard, Newport, Rhode Island''.

  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, the managers of the bill have informed me 
that they are both supportive of my amendment.
  The amendment I offer today in the Senate would make $1 million in 
funding available for cleanup of environmental contamination at the 
Derecktor Shipyard in Newport, RI. The Derecktor site is seriously 
contaminated with PCB's and other hazardous substances. The Navy has 
indicated to me that it will not fund cleanup of the site until an 
administrative process to include the shipyard within an existing 
Superfund site is complete. Well, Mr. President, in my view, the 
cleanup cannot wait until the shipyard is put on the proper list. The 
time for cleanup is now, and I am pleased to be able to help start the 
process.
  I thank the managers of the bill for working with me to develop this 
worthwhile amendment.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, with the modification, the managers are 
pleased to accept the modified amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, 
as modified.
  The amendment (No. 2509), as modified, was agreed.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2512

             (Purpose: Regarding Aviation Continuation Pay)

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask that the pending amendment be set 
aside and I call up amendment No. 2512, an amendment by Senator Hatch.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Hatch, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2512.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place in the bill, add the following new 
     section:
       ``Sec.   . Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
     Department of Defense shall pay the appropriate amount of 
     Aviation Continuation Pay authorized by 37 U.S.C. Sec. 301(b) 
     to the survivors of persons who have signed reenlistment 
     contracts but whose service connected death predates the 
     effective date of such reenlistment contract by less than 14 
     days.''

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I send a modification to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so 
modified.
  The amendment (No. 2512), as modified, is as follows:

       Sec.   . Notwithstanding any other provision of law, within 
     the funds made available by the Act, the Department of 
     Defense shall pay the appropriate amount of Aviation 
     Continuation Pay authorized by 37 U.S.C. Sec. 301(b) to the 
     survivors of persons who have signed reenlistment contracts 
     on or after January 1, 1994, but whose service connected 
     death predates the effective date of such reenlistment 
     contract by less than 14 days.

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I am deeply moved on this day to pay 
tribute to Capt. John R. Kindred, a U.S. Air Force pilot, who died in 
the line of duty in a midair collision on May 6, 1994, over the Yellow 
Sea, west of South Korea. Captain Kindred, of course, is only one of 
our brave military men and women who have given their lives in service 
to our country.
  However, my amendment was prompted by an unusual circumstance in the 
case of Captain Kindred. Captain Kindred had just reenlisted in the 
U.S. Air Force to serve another 7 years when his untimely death 
occurred. Although he had signed an agreement to serve under the 
Aviation Continuation Pay Program, he was not protected by this 
contract when he died 13 days short of the effective date of his 
contract. He was in an interim status of completing his old enlistment 
and beginning his new enlistment period when the collision occurred. 
Had he not chosen to reenlist, he would have been grounded and would 
not have been flying in preparation for possible conflict with North 
Korea on the tragic day of his death.
  I have, therefore, offered an amendment to H.R. 4650, the Department 
of Defense appropriations bill, which will pay the appropriate amount 
of aviation continuation pay authorized by 37 United States Code 
section 301(b) to the surviving members of his immediate family, his 
wife, Lori K. Kindred, and their 2-year-old daughter, Bryndel Kindred.
  I thank Senator Inouye and Senator Stevens for their support of this 
amendment.
  Mr. INOUYE. With the modification, Mr. President, the managers find 
the modified amendment to be acceptable.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, 
as modified.
  The amendment (No. 2512), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to, and I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2530

  (Purpose: To include the military services more actively in defense 
                   technology reinvestment programs)

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask the pending amendment be set aside, 
and I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Bingaman, for 
     himself, and Mr. Pryor, proposes an amendment numbered 2530.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       Strike section 8096 and insert in lieu thereof:
       Amendment No.   : None of the funds appropriated or 
     otherwise made available by this Act may be used for a 
     defense technology reinvestment project that is not selected 
     pursuant to the applicable competitive selection and other 
     procedures set forth in chapter 148 of title 10, United 
     States Code: Provided, That notwithstanding any other 
     provision of law, funds appropriated for defense reinvestment 
     programs under the heading ``Research, Development, Test and 
     Evaluation, Defense-Wide'' shall not be obligated until the 
     Secretary of Defense has ensured that the Assistant 
     Secretaries for Research, Development, and Acquisition of the 
     separate Military Departments are full members of the Defense 
     Technology Conversion Council: Provided further, That 
     notwithstanding any other provision of law, of the funds 
     appropriated for defense reinvestment programs under the 
     heading ``Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, 
     Defense-Wide'', $150,000,000 may only be obligated for 
     projects selected as a result of a focused competition held 
     in subject areas selected by the Assistant Secretaries for 
     Research, Development, and Acquisition of the separate 
     Military Departments in coordination with the Director of the 
     Advanced Research Projects Agency: Provided further, That in 
     addition to the restriction contained in the preceding 
     provisos, the focused competitions shall be conducted in 
     accordance with other unaffected statutory provisions of the 
     Defense Conversion, Reinvestment, and Transition Assistance 
     Amendments of 1993.


                    amendment no. 2530, as modified

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I send to the desk a modification in 
behalf of Senator Bingaman.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection the amendment will be 
modified.
  The amendment (No. 2530), as modified, is as follows:

       In Sec. 8096, on page 113, line 4, strike ``: Provided,'' 
     and all the text that follows through ``Amendments of 1993'', 
     on line 2, page 114, and insert in lieu thereof: ``: 
     Provided, That notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     funds appropriated for the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
     defense reinvestment program element under the heading 
     ``Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide'' 
     shall not be obligated until the Secretary of Defense has 
     ensured that the Assistant Secretaries for Research, 
     Development, and Acquisition of the separate Military 
     Department are full members of the Defense Technology 
     Conversion Council and are fully integrated into the process 
     of selecting dual-use technology focus areas for such 
     programs and evaluating proposals for such projects: Provided 
     further, That notwithstanding any other provision of law, of 
     the funds appropriated for defense reinvestment programs 
     under the heading ``Research, Development, Test and 
     Evaluation, Defense-Wide'', $150,000,000 may only be 
     obligated for projects selected as a result of a competition 
     held by the Advanced Research Projects Agency in focus areas 
     selected exclusively by the Assistant Secretaries for 
     Research, Development, and Acquisition of the separate 
     Military Departments: Provided further, That in addition to 
     the restriction contained in the preceding provisos, the 
     competition in focus areas shall be conducted in accordance 
     with other unaffected statutory provisions of the Defense 
     Conversion, Reinvestment, and Transition Assistance 
     Amendments of 1993.''

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Pryor and myself, I 
am offering an amendment to clarify provisions in the bill with regard 
to involving the military departments more in the technology 
reinvestment program run by ARPA.
  I first want to note that I agree with the thrust of the provision in 
the bill. It is vital that the dual-use approach to technology 
development be inculcated more deeply into the service acquisition 
systems. We will soon conclude a conference on S. 1587, the most far 
reaching acquisition reform bill in at least 20 years, and the heart of 
that bill is the commercial-military integration paradigm espoused by 
Secretary Perry at least since he was a member of the Packard 
Commission. DOD should move away from military specifications and 
toward greater use of commercial products wherever possible, 
particularly at the subtier industries such as electronics, materials, 
machine tools, manufacturing technology, communications, and computers. 
Secretary Perry has spoken eloquently about the opposition this 
paradigm shift is likely to face from those comfortable with the 
defense-unique or autarkic strategy DOD has followed too often in the 
past at great expense in its acquisition system.
  So I commend the Senator from Hawaii for the strong support he has 
shown for the ARPA technology reinvestment program in this bill and for 
his support for better integrating the services into this program, 
which is really the flagship of Secretary Perry's and Deputy Secretary 
Deutch's new dual-use model.
  Over the past few days our staffs have had very productive 
discussions as to how best to achieve the Senator from Hawaii's and our 
mutual goal in this area. The amendment before us would make the 
Service acquisition executives full members of the Defense Technology 
Conversion Council, along with the Director of ARPA and representatives 
of DOE, the Commerce Department, NASA and the National Science 
Foundation, and fully integrate them into the technology reinvestment 
program, including selecting focus areas for competitions and 
evaluating the proposals that come in as a result of those 
competitions. We feel that this will better achieve our goal than 
having an additional step at the end of the selection process involving 
the service acquisition executives as had been proposed.
  The amendment also clarifies that while the service acquisition 
executives will select the focus areas for $150,000,000 of the funds in 
the technology reinvestment program element, ARPA will hold the 
competition for these focus areas and remain the leader of the overall 
effort.
  I believe that this amendment is a step in the right direction 
compared to the provision currently in the bill. It will both better 
propagate this new way of doing business into the services and better 
protect the program from the sort of criticism it received in last 
night's debate that the program is insufficiently attentive to defense 
needs, criticism which I believe is wrong. If we have all three service 
acquisition executives fully involved as stakeholders in this program, 
as our amendment would do, it will be a better and stronger program.
  I understand the amendment is acceptable to the Senator from Hawaii 
and urge its adoption.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, with the modification the managers find 
the amendment to be acceptable.
  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment with 
Senator Bingaman that would include the military services more actively 
in our Federal Government's defense technology reinvestment programs.
  This amendment would replace language previously included in this 
bill that would have required the military services to certify that 
each technology reinvestment program addresses a bona fide defense 
need. The language offered by Senator Bingaman and myself would remove 
this certification and replace it with language that places a 
representative from each military department on the Defense Technology 
Conversion Council--the guiding body of the Clinton administration's 
technology reinvestment project that, among other things, selects focus 
areas, evaluates proposals, and ensures that each program addresses a 
bona fide defense need.
  Although I personally feel that the military departments are 
currently well represented in the Technology Reinvestment Program 
[TRP], I acknowledge that the distinguished chairman, Senator Inouye, 
and others in Congress wish to see a greater participation of the 
military departments in this important dual use initiative, to help 
ensure that each project addresses a true military need.
  I would like to express my extreme displeasure with one portion of 
this bill, relative to the technology reinvestment project. The 
appropriators have included language that would allow the military 
departments to select focus areas for $150 million of the $625 million 
technology reinvestment project. Mr. President, this is a direct 
violation of the intent and spirit of the TRP. TRP encourages 
partnerships in a bold effort to integrate military and commercical 
technology initiatives. To set an example for these partnerships, the 
Federal Government has assembled five agencies, each working together 
to foster dual-use technologies and competitiveness. This bill requires 
the military departments to select focus areas on 40 percent of the TRP 
without any input or consultation from the other agencies involved in 
this important initiative. I strongly oppose this shortsighted 
proposal.
  Mr. President, aside from my opposition to this provision, I feel 
compelled to acknowledge that, for the first time, all four 
congressional defense committees have provided funds for the Clinton 
administration's technology reinvestment project. I applaud Senator 
Inouye for his leadership in appropriating $625 million for TRP in the 
Senate version of the fiscal year 1995 Defense Appropriations bill. I 
also applaud Senator Inouye for upholding the integrity of our 
technology reinvestment programs by discouraging the deplorable 
practice of earmarking specific projects with funds that are designed 
to be awarded via a merit-based process. Finally, I thank the 
distinguished Senator for accepting our amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2530), as modified, was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2532

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask the pending amendment be set aside. 
I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Wellstone, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2532.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:
       Sec.   . The Senate finds:
       a. In 1953, the U.S. Army conducted chemical and biological 
     warfare tests in Minneapolis, MN, involving the spraying of 
     zinc cadmium sulfide particles.
       b. Members of the Senate have requested the Department of 
     Defense to provide full disclosure of all documents 
     pertaining to this and similar tests conducted nationwide.
       c. The Department of Defense has thus far failed to provide 
     even a time certain at which such documents will be made 
     available.
       Sec.   . It is the sense of the Senate that the Department 
     of Defense shall immediately provide, in writing, a schedule 
     of production for the requested documents.


                    amendment no. 2532, as modified

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I send to the desk a modification in 
behalf of Senator Wellstone.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection the amendment is modified.
  The amendment (No. 2532), as modified, is as follows:

       Sec.   . It is the sense of the Senate that not later than 
     90 days after the enactment of this Act, the Department of 
     Defense shall submit all documents pertaining to any and all 
     Department of Defense chemical and biological warfare tests 
     involving the use of zinc cadmium sulfide conducted anywhere 
     in the United States.

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, in 1953 the U.S. Army conducted 
chemical and biological warfare experiments in Minneapolis that 
involved the spraying of a potentially dangerous compound called zinc 
cadmium sulfide over the city. On June 10, 1994, I sent a letter to 
Defense Secretary Perry asking for all documents relating to these 
experiments, and since then, I have learned that similar tests were 
carried out using different materials in various locations throughout 
Minnesota and most of the United States.
  I offer this amendment not to make any judgments about the 
appropriateness of the experiments. I offer this amendment to ensure 
that the American people get the full disclosure they deserve. When the 
Army conducted its testing in Minneapolis and other cities, they made 
up a cover story so that the citizens wouldn't know what the tests 
really were. That was a long time ago and most of the people who 
directed those tests are probably no longer with the Department, but 
the American people still deserve to know what happened during the cold 
war. That is why I have requested documents and made those documents 
available to the public as I have received them.
  As I have said, my first request for disclosure was a letter to 
Defense Secretary Perry dated June 10, 1994. The letter asked for all 
documents relating to zinc cadmium sulfide spraying in Minneapolis and 
throughout the United States.
  On June 14, when I received a briefing from Army officials, I made it 
clear that I wanted full disclosure by the DOD of all documents 
involving zinc cadmium sulfide spraying in the United States, as well 
as involving any other chemical and biological warfare testing that 
occurred in Minnesota, even if zinc cadmium sulfide was not involved. 
The officials promised full disclosure and presented me with some very 
general documents, previously released in 1977. They also agreed to 
provide a timeline for the production of the rest of the documents.
  Over the next month, DOD provided my office with a number of very 
specific documents, detailing spraying experiments in Minneapolis, St. 
Louis, and Winnipeg in 1953.
  At a briefing July 15, DOD officials provided a health effects 
assessment of the Minneapolis spraying and promised to provide all 
documentation relevant to experiments in Minnesota and zinc cadmium 
sulfide spraying in the rest of the United States by August 15.
  In a July 28 telephone discussion, we were informed that DOD would 
not be able to provide anything but the Minnesota-related documentation 
by the August 15 deadline, and that the U.S.-wide documentation would 
not be available until some unspecified time in the future. DOD was 
requested to write a letter explaining their failure to meet the 
deadline. The letter was to be provided by August 9. No such letter has 
been received.
  DOD apparently still plans to provide the Minnesota-related documents 
by August 15, but I have no idea when I will see the rest of them, 
including those involving tests conducted in the rest of the country.
  This is an issue of public accountability. For some reason the 
Department seems incapable or unwilling to give me a time certain for 
delivery of these documents. They made a commitment, and then failed to 
keep it, without even providing a reason.
  This amendment assumes that the Department will keep its earlier 
commitment to make all Minnesota-specific documents available on August 
15, 1994. The amendment sets a 90-day deadline for DOD to provide the 
rest.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, as modified the managers find the 
amendment to be acceptable.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2532), as modified, was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2544

 (Purpose: To limit funds to ensure the operation of Fort Chaffee, AR, 
in accordance with the report of the 1991 Base Realignment and Closure 
                              Commission)

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask the pending amendment be set aside 
to consider amendment No. 2544, an amendment by Senator Bumpers. I send 
the amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Bumpers, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2544.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place in the bill, and the following:
       ``Sec.   . None of the funds made available under this Act 
     may be obligated or expended for the relocation or reduction 
     of the functions specified in the 1991 Report to the 
     President of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
     Commission to be maintained at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, 
     including ndall civilian management, support personnel and 
     operations associated with these functions that are in 
     existence as of September 30, 1994.''


                    amendment no. 2544, as modified

  Mr. INOUYE. I send to the desk a modification to this amendment in 
Senator Bumpers' behalf.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is modified.
  The amendment No. 2544, as modified, is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, and the following:
       ``Sec.   . None of the funds made available under this Act 
     may be obligated or expended for the relocation or reduction 
     of the functions specified in the 1991 and 1993 Reports to 
     the President of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
     Commission to be maintained at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, 
     including all civilian management, support personnel and 
     operations associated with these functions that are in 
     existence as of September 30, 1994.''

  Mr. INOUYE. With such modification the managers find the amendment to 
be acceptable.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2544), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2506

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask the pending amendment be set aside 
and we consider amendment No. 2506, an amendment submitted by Senator 
Domenici. I send the amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Domenici, for 
     himself and Mr. Bingaman, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2506.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert:
       Sec.   . No funds appropriated by this Act may be obligated 
     or expended during fiscal year 1995 for retiring, or 
     preparing to retire, any B-52H, B-1B, or F-111 bomber 
     aircraft.

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, this amendment would prohibit the 
expenditure of Department of Defense funds to retire, or prepare to 
retire, B-52H, B-1B, or F-111 bomber aircraft in fiscal year 1995. The 
language in this bill can also be found in this year's Defense 
authorization bill.
  The F-111 fighter bomber played a critical role in the Persian Gulf 
war in delivering precision-guided munitions deep behind enemy lines 
against high value targets. The F-111s at Cannon Air Force Base 
continue to demonstrate their prowess in exercises. Should they be 
called upon again to support our forces anywhere in the world they 
would be ready and they would make a tremendous contribution.
  The August 8 edition of Defense News contains an article dealing with 
F-111 force structure. It begins with the statement, ``Senior uniformed 
U.S. Air Force officials are opposing a plan to retire the F-111 long-
range strike aircraft by 1996, citing a gap in combat capability.''
  Mr. President, the Air Force officers referenced in the Defense News 
article are right. Their comments echo the Bottom-Up Review which says 
that the F-111 is necessary to carry out the missions of the Department 
of Defense through fiscal year 1999. This amendment is a step in the 
right direction. I thank the managers for the consideration of this 
amendment.
  Mr. INOUYE. This amendment has been authorized and accordingly the 
managers have no objection to its acceptance.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2506) was agreed to.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask the pending matter be temporarily 
set aside and that the Chair recognize the Senator from Ohio [Mr. 
Metzenbaum].
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. METZENBAUM addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized.


                      Unanimous Consent Agreement

  Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
Senator from Ohio and the Senator from Utah be permitted to offer a 
bill at this time, which I send to the desk and ask that the bill be 
placed on the calendar.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. METZENBAUM. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. METZENBAUM and Mr. HATCH pertaining to the 
introduction of S. 2380 are located in today's Record under 
``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')

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