[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 111 (Thursday, August 11, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: August 11, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is the first committee 
amendment.


                           Amendment No. 2534

    (Purpose: To limit the use of funds for a joint program for the 
     development of an advanced threat radar jammer with a foreign 
 government, other than a major ally of the United States, or with an 
  entity controlled by a foreign government, other than such an ally)

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask that the amendment be set aside, and 
I ask that amendment No. 2534, an amendment by Senator Feinstein, be 
considered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mrs. Feinstein, 
     for herself, Mr. Sasser, Mr. Bingaman, and Mr. Roth, proposes 
     an amendment numbered 2534.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 142, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:
       Sec.   . (a) None of the funds available to the Department 
     of Defense during fiscal year 1995 may be used for 
     negotiating or entering into any agreement with, nor for 
     accepting funds from, a foreign government or an entity 
     controlled by a foreign government for a joint program for 
     the development of an advanced threat radar jammer for combat 
     helicopters until 30 days after the Secretary of Defense, in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
     the Army, and the Director of the Defense Security Assistance 
     Agency, conducts a comprehensive review of the program and 
     submits a report on the results of that review to the 
     congressional defense committees.
       (b) This section does not apply with respect to a major 
     ally of the United States.
       (c) In this section:
       (1) The term ``entity controlled by a foreign government'' 
     includes--
       (A) any domestic or foreign organization or corporation 
     that is effectively owned or controlled by a foreign 
     government; and
       (B) any individual acting on behalf of a foreign 
     government, as determined by the Secretary of Defense. Such 
     term does not include an organization or corporation that is 
     owned, but is not controlled, either directly or indirectly, 
     by a foreign government if the ownership of that organization 
     or corporation by that foreign government was effective 
     before October 23, 1992.
       (2) The term ``major ally of the United States'' has the 
     meaning given such term in section 2350a(i)(2) of title 10, 
     United States Code.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the managers find this amendment to be 
acceptable.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today to support my amendment 
that would require the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on a 
very important issue that involves not only congressional oversight of 
a defense program, but also proliferation concerns and stability in the 
Middle East: a Department of Defense proposal to codevelop the Advanced 
Threat Radar Jammer [ATRJ] with the United Arab Emirates [UAE].
  I understand that the U.S. Army and Defense Security Assistance 
Agency [DSAA] are prepared to offer the UAE a proposal to codevelop the 
ATRJ--the Army's next generation radar receiver and jamming system. 
Under this proposal, the UAE would provide funding for research and 
development of the ATRJ and then be allowed to purchase the 
sophisticated systems for installation on recently acquired AH-64 
Apache helicopters.
  I and many of my colleagues are concerned about this proposal for 
several reasons. First, this agreement would establish an arrangement 
wherein a foreign nation would fund a U.S. defense program in an 
apparent circumvention of the normal authorization and appropriations 
process, and beyond the effective oversight of Congress. The Congress 
has repeatedly voiced its objections to executive branch efforts to 
solicit funds in support of U.S. foreign policy or defense initiatives 
that were not first made subject to the scrutiny of the legislative 
branch.
  Second, I believe this agreement would undermine the President's own 
efforts to constrain weapons proliferation. It provides the UAE with a 
quantum improvement in its war fighting capability which could provoke 
other hostile nations to seek advanced systems to counter the new 
perceived UAE threat.
  Third, this arrangement would violate a departmental policy, recently 
reaffirmed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on March 15, 1994, which 
states that:

       The Department of Defense remains committed to the policy 
     of no foreign military sales or commitments for foreign sales 
     of defense systems prior to the successful completion of OT&E 
     [operational test and evaluation], and the specific approval 
     of the Under Secretary of Defense. This policy remains in 
     effect today.

  Finally, I am deeply concerned that if this new weapons system were 
introduced into a volatile region and ever fell into the hands of a 
U.S. adversary, its state-of-the-art jamming capability could pose a 
serious threat to U.S. forces. When fully operational, this system will 
be capable of friend or foe identification, pulsed radar jamming, 
extreme radio frequency sensitivity and processing capability, as well 
as multiband situational awareness.

  I see little justification for proceeding with an arrangement that is 
fraught with so many questionable funding practices and policy 
implications. While I and many of my colleagues believe that the United 
States shares an interest in the security of the UAE, the ATRJ would 
provide a level of jamming capability significantly greater than that 
possessed by many of our close NATO and major non-NATO allies. The 
possible threats to the UAE are no greater than those faced by other 
nations in the region, none of which have been asked to participate in 
the ATRJ program.
  I have already contacted the Defense Department on this issue, 
expressing my concern over the codevelopment of the ATRJ with the UAE. 
Unfortunately, I found the response to my concerns to be inadequate.
  Therefore, I have offered this amendment that directs the Department 
of Defense not proceed to with the codevelopment of the ATRJ with any 
foreign entity until the Department has fully consulted with Congress, 
and evaluated both legal and policy implications. The amendment exempts 
our NATO and major non-NATO allies.
  Specifically, the report to be submitted by the Secretary of Defense 
should include the following:
  First, the legal basis for seeking for the program funds that are 
neither authorized to be appropriated nor appropriated.
  Second, the consistency of the program with the Department of Defense 
policy that no foreign military sale of a defense system, and no 
commitment to foreign military sale of a defense system, be made before 
operational test and evaluation of the system is successfully completed 
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology has 
specifically approved the system for sale to a foreign government.
  Third, the mission requirement for an advanced threat radar jammer 
for combat helicopters.
  Fourth, an assessment of each threat for which an advanced threat 
radar jammer would be developed, particularly with regard to each 
threat to a foreign country with which the United States would jointly 
develop an advanced threat radar jammer.
  Fifth, the potential for sensitive electronic warfare technology to 
be made available to potential adversaries of the United States as a 
result of U.S. participation in the program.
  Sixth, the availability of other nondevelopmental items and less 
sophisticated technologies for countering the emerging radar detection 
threats to U.S. combat helicopters and combat helicopters of U.S. 
allies.
  Seventh, a capability assessment of similar technologies available 
from other foreign countries and the consequences of proliferation of 
such technology.
  I urge my colleagues to support this commonsense amendment and I urge 
its adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from California.
  The amendment (No. 2534) was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2539

(Purpose: Limitations on military assistance for the Sandinista Popular 
                           Army of Nicaragua)

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask that the pending amendment be set 
aside, and I ask for the immediate consideration of amendment No. 2539, 
an amendment by Senator Helms.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Helms, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2539.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the Committee amendment, insert 
     the following:

     SEC.  . LIMITATION ON THE USE OF FUNDS FOR THE SANDINISTA 
                   POPULAR ARMY AND SECURITY FORCES OF NICARAGUA.

       (a) In General.--None of the funds appropriated under this 
     Act may be obligated or expended for the armed forces or 
     security forces of Nicaragua, and none of the funds 
     appropriated by this Act may be obligated or expanded to pay 
     the salaries of United States military personnel to provide 
     assistance for the armed forces or security forces of 
     Nicaragua, until the President determines and certifies to 
     the Congress that--
       (1) Nicaraguan military officers implicated for committing 
     human rights violations, including those involved in the 
     murders of Enrique Bermudez, Arges Sequeira, and Jean Paul 
     Genie, have been removed or suspended from the military and 
     judicial proceedings have commenced;
       (2) officers of the Nicaraguan armed forces or security 
     forces are not involved in the illicit trafficking of 
     military equipment, including those seized by Colombian 
     authorities on the San Andres Islands on July 24, 1994;
       (3) civilian control over the military and security forces, 
     including control over the budget and expenditures of such 
     forces, has been clearly established; and
       (4) there has been a full and independent investigation 
     conducted relating to issues raised by the May 23, 1993 
     discovery of the Santa Rosa arms cache of the existence of a 
     terrorist/kidnapping ring and any individuals identified by 
     the investigation as being part of such ring are being 
     prosecuted.

             no military aid to the sandinista popular army

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, one would assume that the dismal record of 
the Sandinista Popular Army would preclude the United States from 
providing them with military aid--at least until serious and genuine 
reform has occurred. I have learned, however, that there are some in 
the administration who advocate U.S. cooperation with the Sandinista 
Popular Army some time in the future, the theory being that the U.S. 
military can somehow reform the Sandinista Popular Army, which of 
course is the militia of the Sandinista Communist Party.
  That mistake must not be allowed to happen and that's why the pending 
amendment is important.
  This amendment prohibits assistance from Department of Defense funds 
to the Nicaraguan Armed Forces or security forces--unless certain 
conditions are met, relating to: First, human rights; second, illicit 
trafficking of weapons; third, civilian control over the military; and 
fourth, an investigation into allegations of a terrorist-kidnaping 
network operating in Nicaragua with the knowledge and approval of the 
Sandinista Popular Army.
  Mr. President, the so-called Sandinista Popular Army, and those 
associated with it, have compiled a record of assassinations that 
should provoke cries of death squads. Take the case of Frank Ibarra, a 
former Sandinista army officer. He publicly claimed credit for the 
assassination of property rights advocate and leading Sandinista critic 
Agres Sequeira. And the Sandinista Popular Army still shelters Frank 
Ibarra.
  Then there is the tragic case of Jean Paul Genie, a 16-year-old who 
was killed by Gen. Humberto Ortega's bodyguards. The Sandinista 
military court, beholden to General Ortega, absolved his bodyguards of 
guilt. So, there's still no justice for Jean Paul Genie and his family.
  Last year, I reported to the Senate that nearly 300 demobilized and 
disarmed former resistance members had been murdered by the Sandinistas 
since Mrs. Chamorro's election. At the time, only two civilians were in 
jail. And since then, more former resistance members have been 
murdered. Just 2 weeks ago, I met with our Ambassador to Nicaragua, 
John Maisto, and he told me that the Sandinista Popular Army and the 
Nicaraguan police continue to resist any accountability for their 
crimes.
  Mr. President, there are other important issues in addition to human 
rights that this amendment addresses. For example, there has been no 
thorough and impartial investigation into terrorist activities in 
Nicaragua, as required by section 562 of the fiscal year 1994 Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Act. The Sandinista-controlled National 
Police have been conducting the so-called investigation, so Mrs. 
Chamorro has put the fox in charge of the henhouse. The investigation 
is so blatantly a farce that even the State Department isn't fooled. 
U.S. officials have admitted to me that no progress had been made on 
the investigation.
  I have serious concerns about continuing Sandinista support for the 
few remaining Communist guerrilla movements. As recently as July 24 in 
the San Andres Islands, Colombian authorities seized weapons shipped 
from Nicaragua that were bound for the guerrillas in Colombia. There 
are indications that the Sandinista Popular Army was involved in this 
illicit arms transfer. On July 29, I asked Secretary Christopher to 
look into this situation, and I look forward to hearing what he finds. 
But, Congress should make it clear that the U.S. Government will not 
aid the Sandinista military as long as it supplies weapons to 
terrorists.
  Mr. President, there is no civilian control over the military. 
General Ortega--the Al Capone of Nicaragua--is still head of the 
Sandinista Popular Army. Nothing has been done to put the National 
Police--still staffed with Sandinista personnel--under effective 
civilian control.
  The United States should not even consider establishing official 
relations with, or providing military aid to the Sandinista Popular 
Army, until it accepts genuine civilian control, adjudicates those 
implicated in human rights abuses, and stops supporting terrorist and 
Communist guerrilla movements. And that is all that the pending 
amendment requires. Let us not legitimize Gen. Humberto Ortega and the 
Sandinista Popular Army.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the managers find this amendment to be 
acceptable.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from North Carolina.
  The amendment (No. 2539) was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2508

     (Purpose: To require congressional notification prior to the 
          expenditure of certain Department of Defense funds)

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask that the pending amendment be set 
aside, and that we consider amendment 2508, introduced by Senator 
Helms.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Helms, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2508.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the committee amendment, insert 
     the following:
       Sec.   . None of the funds appropriated to the Department 
     of Defense may be used to enter into any agreement or to pay 
     any logistical or support costs, including air 
     transportation, for foreign military participation in any 
     multilateral military activity or in any United Nations 
     sanctioned multilateral force unless the President provides 
     notification 5 days in advance to the appropriate Committees 
     of Congress.

  Mr. INOUYE. The managers have considered the amendment.
  May we withdraw it?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
amendment is withdrawn.
  The amendment (No. 2508) was withdrawn.


                           Amendment No. 2540

 (Purpose: To prohibit U.S. military participation in any multilateral 
 military force which includes Nicaraguan military or security forces)

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I call up amendment No. 2540, and ask that 
the pending amendment be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], for Mr. Helms, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2540.

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the committee amendment, insert 
     the following:

     SEC.   . PROHIBITION ON U.S. MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN ANY 
                   MULTILATERAL MILITARY FORCE WHICH INCLUDES 
                   NICARAGUA ARMED FORCES.

       None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available 
     by this Act may be provided for any U.S. military 
     participation in any multilateral operation which also 
     involves elements of the military or security forces of 
     Nicaragua unless the President certifies and reports in 
     writing to the Congress that--
       (1) Nicaraguan military officers implicated in human rights 
     abuses by the Tripartite Commission, the Inter-American 
     Commission on Human Rights, the Nicaraguan Association for 
     Human Rights, the Permanent Commission for Human Rights, or 
     the judiciary in Nicaragua, have been removed or suspended 
     from military service, as the case may be, and judicial/legal 
     proceedings have commenced;
       (2) officers of the Nicaraguan armed forces or security 
     forces are not involved in the illicit sale, transport, or 
     trafficking of weapons and military equipment, including 
     those seized by Colombian authorities on the San Andres 
     Islands on July 24, 1994;
       (3) civilian control over the military and security forces 
     by the democratically-elected President and Congress of 
     Nicaragua, including control over the budget and expenditures 
     of the military and security forces, has been clearly 
     established and evidence that such control is respected by 
     such forces; and
       (4) fair and impartial civilian judicial proceedings have 
     been completed against those involved in the murders of 
     Enrique Bermudez, Arges Sequeira, and Jean Paul Genie.

  Mr. INOUYE. In behalf of Senator Helms, I withdraw his amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
  The amendment (No. 2540) was withdrawn.


                      Amendment Nos. 2518 and 2524

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I believe the Senator from Connecticut 
wishes to be recognized. Mr. President, I believe that this is part of 
the unanimous-consent agreement that was reached last evening. We are 
now taking up amendment 2518 on Bosnia and 2524 also on Bosnia.
  Mr. President, am I correct that the time on these two amendments 
will run concurrently for 2 hours?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I have been advised that the Dole 
amendment on Bosnia is designated as amendment No. 2479.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair. I thank my distinguished colleague 
from Hawaii.
  Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes from the time allocated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the two amendments will be 
pending simultaneously under the order.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, once again we gather in this Chamber to debate the 
question of lifting the arms embargo against the Government of Bosnia.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Debra Shelton of my staff 
be granted floor privileges for the duration of debate on this 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, once again I am privileged to join with 
the Senate Republican leader in a remarkably diverse, encouragingly 
diverse, group of colleagues who support the ultimate unilateral 
lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia. Those colleagues include 
Senators McCain, Moynihan, Wellstone, Exon, Feingold, Hatch, DeConcini, 
Lugar, and Helms.
  Mr. President, this is not the first time we have debated this 
matter. It seems that in the previous debates in which we have come 
very close--in fact on the last occasion a tie vote--to lifting the 
arms embargo, a clear majority of Members of this Chamber has expressed 
the desire to lift what I consider to be the immoral, ineffective, 
insensible arms embargo against the people of Bosnia. But on each 
occasion there seems to be some reason, some excuse given for not doing 
it quite this time. I am encouraged, although I will not be confident 
until the vote is cast, that we are approaching that moment when the 
Senate of the United States will express its opposition to the arms 
embargo against Bosnia.
  Mr. President, this embargo was imposed in 1991 by the Government of 
the United States against the former country of Yugoslavia as an 
attempt to keep arms out of that smoldering region--at that time it was 
smoldering, but it has since caught fire--as a way to avoid the 
conflict that we feared would result. The fact is, as we know, there 
was then aggression by Serbia against its neighbors, most viciously 
against the people of Bosnia, and specifically against the Moslem 
population of Bosnia. People were harmed not for military purposes but 
simply because of their identity, because of their status, because they 
were Moslems, pushing them out of their homes, putting them into 
concentration camps, subjecting them to murder, to systematic, systemic 
use of rape as an instrument of war. These were horrible acts of 
violence against a people.
  The original hope and premise behind the arms embargo was not 
realized. War broke out. But we continued to maintain the arms embargo 
with its effect falling almost totally on the people of Bosnia, while 
the Bosnian-Serb soldiers have been supplied by the munitions factories 
in Serbia. They have been very well armed, and they have acted as the 
rest of the world has allowed them to act--without fear--because they 
had nothing to fear, over and over again, taking aggressive action, 
moving with tanks into a city only to meet opposition from light arms, 
light gunfire.

  On each occasion when Senator Dole and I and others have brought this 
amendment to the floor, there has always been some reason of 
statecraft, some reason of diplomacy that took us away from our moral 
and strategic responsibilities--which I think a majority of the Members 
of this Chamber feels--against the embargo to the tepid and 
inconclusive language of diplomacy.
  Well, now in the most recent chapter, the so-called ``contact group'' 
comes up with a peace plan that, in fact, validates, acknowledges, and 
accepts the taking of land from the Bosnian Moslems by force, contrary 
to all the principles of international law and the premises of the 
United Nations; and the Bosnian Moslems have accepted the contact 
group's peace plan. But the Bosnian Serbs, as Members of this Chamber 
know well, consistently refuse to accept the plan and have found 
various excuses to put it off. They have thumbed their noses at the 
international community.
  Mr. President, I fear that we are moving again toward a wider war in 
the Balkans. In this instance, as we ask the Senate once again to lift 
the arms embargo--unilaterally, if necessary--against the Bosnian 
Moslems, we are saying that it would not only not be in our strategic 
interest, but also in our interest in security in Europe, our interest 
in deterring those who would in the future seek to take land by force, 
and our interest in the moral principle of not standing by while 
genocide occurs. It is in those interests that we come, once again, to 
say that it is time for the United States to set down its marker--a 
strategic and moral marker--and say: If the nations of the world do not 
multilaterally lift this arms embargo, we will do so unilaterally, 
because as this wider war begins, which I fear will break out in the 
Balkans, do we really want to be following a policy that effectively 
denies the victims of aggression and genocide the arms to defend 
themselves and their families and their country? I say, in all that is 
good about America, the answer to that is, no, we do not want to be 
part of imposing that policy.
  Mr. President, this amendment to unilaterally lift the arms embargo 
is an expression of the policy the Clinton administration outlined more 
than a year ago of lifting the embargo and striking from the air. It 
was not implemented. The European allies expressed their opposition.
  There are two amendments before this Chamber: The one Senator Dole 
and the bipartisan group and I have introduced, and another introduced 
by Senators Nunn, Warner, and others. The other amendment expresses the 
language of the conference report on the DOD authorization bill. I am, 
frankly, disappointed with that language, resulting, as it does, from a 
process in which this Chamber tied, 50-50, on the question of an early 
lifting of the arms embargo unilaterally--and the House actually 
adopted a directive that this administration lift the arms embargo 
unilaterally by a margin of 66 votes.
  As disappointed as I am, though, I must say that the language in the 
Nunn-Mitchell-Warner amendment, which expresses the DOD conference 
report language, at least moves toward lifting the embargo. It directs 
the President, and he acknowledges in a letter to Senator Nunn that he 
will go to the United Nations to seek a multilateral lifting of the 
embargo if the contact group's plan is not accepted by the Bosnian 
Serbs by the middle of October. And if that plan is not accepted, the 
Nunn-Mitchell-Warner amendment at least removes the hands of the United 
States from enforcing this embargo.
  The embargo is not just a policy statement that bounces around the 
State Department or the United Nations. The arms embargo is an actual 
policy which military personnel of the United States are enforcing on 
ships in the Adriatic and on the access points on the ground into 
Bosnia. We are enforcing an ineffective, immoral policy. At least the 
Nunn-Mitchell-Warner amendment moves in that direction, but it does not 
go far enough.
  This process has to end with a clear statement to the world of where 
America is, a clear statement of American leadership, and a clear 
statement to the Serbian aggressors that they are now on a limited 
string, and if they do not accept the peace plan of the contact group, 
and the arms embargo is not lifted by the United Nations, then the arms 
embargo will be unilaterally lifted by the United States of America on 
November 15 of this year.
  So while I say that the Nunn-Mitchell-Warner amendment is a step 
forward from where we have been, it goes from a sense of the Senate in 
the previous Nunn-Mitchell-Warner amendment to a directive that clearly 
does not go far enough. I see the amendment, No. 2479, that I am 
privileged to cosponsor, as consistent with the other amendment. But 
more than consistent, it gives it the ultimate teeth, it puts in the 
moral content, it draws a final line in the Balkans for the Serbian 
aggressors.
  A final point: We have been concerned about our allies--the British 
and French particularly--who are on the ground as part of United 
Nations forces in Bosnia. Secretary Boutros-Ghali has recently said he 
thinks the U.N. forces probably should be removed, that it is a mission 
to be undertaken by the forces of the contact group. We have been told 
by Ambassador Redman, and others, that the allied forces need 60 to 90 
days to get out. What is going to happen to the Bosnian Moslems during 
that period? When the U.N. forces pull out, the Bosnian Serbs have full 
access to weapons of aggression, and the Bosnian Moslems do not have 
the arms with which to defend themselves. This policy has to end 
somewhere. I hope it ends and that the beginning of the end is today.
  Again, every time we have spoken to the leaders of Bosnia, they have 
said to us, ``We are not asking for your American soldiers on the 
ground.'' This amendment not only does not call for American soldiers 
on the ground, it says specifically that nothing in it shall be 
interpreted as authorization for deployment of U.S. forces in the 
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina for any purpose, including 
training, support, or delivery of military equipment.
  No, the Bosnians do not want our soldiers there. They know this is 
their fight. They are spirited and courageous, and they want to defend 
their families and their land. But they do not have the weapons to do 
so.
  This amendment will give them the wherewithal to fight the fight that 
I fear they will have to fight, and it will do so in a way that puts 
America, once again, clearly on the right side.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dorgan). The Senator from Kansas is 
recognized.
  Mr. DOLE. I thank the distinguished Senator from Connecticut. We have 
had this debate a number of times, and I hope this may be the last 
time, but it may not be.
  Today the Sarajevo airlift is again suspended, after two planes 
delivering humanitarian aid were hit by small-arms fire. There had been 
no flights into Sarajevo for 18 days prior to Tuesday's resumption of 
the airlift, and relief officials say that the city's food stocks are 
dangerously low--at only 30 percent of the city's food needs for the 
next two weeks.
  This rapid deterioration of conditions in Sarajevo and throughout 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is the reality and the context in which we need 
to consider the amendments before us today.
  That is what is happening today. The airlift has been suspended. They 
are short of food. So that is where we are today. It is not as if we 
are talking about something that may happen 6 months or 1 or 2 years 
from now--it is today.
  Almost everyone in this body would say that they support lifting the 
arms embargo in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not just the supporters of this 
amendment but the supporters of the Nunn-Mitchell amendment as well.
  Those who oppose our amendment, the amendment of myself, the Senator 
from Connecticut, and the Senator from Minnesota, we are pleased to 
say, and others who joined with us that support the Nunn-Mitchell 
amendment will probably say, the difference is on how the embargo is 
lifted. The difference is more likely to be whether it is lifted, not 
how, but whether it is going to be lifted.
  We believe our amendment is fairly simple. We listened to some 
critics and tried to move in that direction, and maybe the criticism 
was valid. I am not suggesting it was not.
  So the amendment is very simple. It sets a firm and definite deadline 
for terminating the U.S. embargo on Bosnia. The Government of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina will no longer be denied its inherent right to self-
defense as of November 15, 1994--no ifs, ands, or buts. That is all the 
amendment says. The reason we chose the mid-November date is that some 
of our allies with troops in Bosnia have told United States officials 
they need up to 90 days to redeploy or withdraw. Plus, we heard that 
from our colleagues on both sides of the aisle in previous debates that 
we were not giving enough time. Plus, this gives the administration a 
lot of time to try to figure out some multilateral lifting of the arms 
embargo. But aside from the date, there are no conditions. The 
objective, like the language of our amendment, is straightforward: To 
allow the Bosnians to defend themselves against aggression come 
November 15, at the latest. That is it.
  It does not seem like it is too much to ask to allow someone to 
defend themselves, particularly in light of what is happening there 
today.
  Mr. President, the message this amendment sends to Bosnian Serbs is 
that time is running out. This message is not being sent by the United 
States and the so-called contact group. The message being sent to 
Bosnian Serbs by the contact group is: Take more time to accept our 
July 6 proposal because we are not ready to do anything more than talk.
  It seems to me that the administration claims there is a lot of 
pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. Maybe I am missing something, but I do 
not see a lot of pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. I do not see the tough 
action that the contact group promised in its meeting 2 weeks ago.
  At the same time, I want to commend the distinguished chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, for recognizing the weaknesses 
of the administration's approach and for his efforts to move the 
administration toward setting a timeline for real action.
  But I do not think the amendment goes far enough, and I have had a 
discussion personally with Senator Nunn, and I think he pretty much 
agrees with us, and I think at the same time he feels a certain 
obligation to the administration. I do not quarrel with that. It is not 
an effort to embarrass the administration. But, although it urges the 
President to go to the U.N. Security Council to lift the arms embargo, 
which I support, there are no guarantees that it is going to be lifted.
  Again, I refer to the letter received by the chairman from the 
President, dated August 10, which talks about a reasonable time. I do 
not know how long the U.N. action takes. It seems to me it does not set 
any mandatory deadline.
  According to the Nunn-Mitchell-Warner amendment, if the Bosnian Serbs 
do not accept the contact group proposal by October 15, the President 
should, and the President said he will. In fairness to the President, 
he says in this letter he will go to the U.N. Security Council to seek 
termination of the arms embargo on Bosnia. So that letter has been 
received, and the President states that it is his intention to propose 
a resolution in the U.N. Security Council by the end of October if the 
Bosnian Serbs have not accepted the July 6 peace plan.
  Mr. President, we should ask ourselves why give the Bosnian Serbs 2 
more months? They have already rejected the contact group proposal four 
times. They have ambushed and stopped U.N. convoys. They continue 
violating NATO exclusion zones, and they continue the reprehensible 
practice of ethnic cleansing. Why does not President Clinton go to the 
U.N. Security Council right now? In fact, we have urged that in the 
last two times we had this vote. That has been one of the provisions, 
that the President be urged to go to the U.N. Security Council in an 
effort to have a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo.
  Now, according to the Nunn-Mitchell-Warner amendment, if such a 
Security Council resolution fails, or no later than November 15, a 
prohibition on Department of Defense funding for enforcing the U.N. 
arms embargo will go into effect, not the lifting, *but we just want to 
enforce the embargo. It is limited to the Department of Defense. It 
does not include Customs personnel overseas or cover intelligence that 
is outside the Defense Department.
  The Nunn-Mitchell amendment also includes a Presidential waiver for 
United States personnel serving in NATO headquarters.
  At present, the U.N. embargo is being enforced by NATO forces, not by 
the United States independently. Therefore, if the waiver is invoked, 
it could undermine the intended effect of this provision, which is 
already weakened as a result of the funding restriction being limited 
to the Pentagon. Let me give you an example. Theoretically, if the CIA 
picks up some intelligence on an arms shipment to the Bosnians, it 
could share it with NATO, and other NATO allies, such as the British 
and French who support the U.N. arms embargo on Bosnia--who could then 
respond by enforcing the embargo--without violating this provision. In 
short, this provision looks far more significant on paper than it would 
likely be in practice and thus is no substitute for lifting the arms 
embargo on the Bosnians.
  The Nunn-Mitchell-Warner amendment also requires, in the event a 
United States resolution to lift the arms embargo fails in the U.N. 
Security Council, that the President submit a plan to Congress and 
consult with Congress on providing training to the Bosnians and lifting 
the embargo unilaterally.
  The fact is that by the time October 15 rolls around, we are not 
going to be here. Congress will probably be in recess by then. There 
will be a lot of Members of the Senate and House running for 
reelection, the election in November. We do not think we are going to 
just stay here for that purpose, which means we will be waiting, if we 
do not come back until January--unless there is a special session, it 
means we can wait a full 2 years after President Clinton was sworn into 
office, and he came into office saying lift the arms embargo, have air 
strikes, a lot of things which I supported which are no longer probably 
viable, and we still would not have lifted the embargo.
  It just seems to me we do not need any more plans, we do not need any 
more consultation. We need to do something. We are not talking about 
American troops; we are not talking about air strikes; we are not 
talking about endangering any NATO forces. We are talking about doing 
something, and that is lifting the arms embargo.
  In January of this year--it is now mid-August--in January of this 
year Congress passed a nonbinding amendment urging the President to 
lift the arms embargo unilaterally. In May, the Senate passed S. 2042, 
which terminated the embargo. In June, the House passed the McCloskey-
Gilman amendment to the defense authorization bill which would have 
immediately ended the U.S. arms embargo. And although the Dole-
Lieberman amendment failed in July, it was on a tie vote.
  So we have this debate time after time--January, May, June--and 
nobody has responded in the administration. So it seems to me that it 
is time to do what we should have done some time ago. I think the 
bottom line is the majority of Congress, Democrats and Republicans, 
support ending this illegal and unjust arms embargo on the Bosnians.
  So it seems to me we prefer to listen to the French and British and 
the Russians. Certainly they are allies; we should listen to them. But 
in this case it seems to me that we ought to take the moral high 
ground, and we ought to be providing the leadership, and we still have 
one more opportunity to do it.
  I think setting the definite date is very, very important. So, I 
think if we make the decision, if we stand up and provide the 
leadership, I think it adds a very positive impact on what might happen 
in NATO. Historically our leadership has been the source of NATO's 
strength. It is the lack of this leadership and willingness by this 
administration to go long with failed policies that damaged NATO's 
credibility.
  I say there have been some improvements in the conference report. I 
know the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Virginia were well-
intentioned, but it seems to me that it is not going to happen. So the 
President's request for multilateral lifting of the arms embargo does 
not happen. Then the President consults with Congress, it is October, 
Congress is not in session, probably will not be in session until 
sometime around January 20, 1995. I do not know what happens in the 
meantime. So I guess the President could do it on his own, or he may 
consult with the leaders in the Congress even though we are not in 
session.
  But I want to just make one final point. A vote in support of the 
pending amendment means that the U.S. arms embargo in Bosnia will end 
by mid-November. August, September, October, November.
  It means that the President has plenty of time to go to the United 
Nations, but finally it means that we are committed to doing what is 
morally and legally right.
  And there is a real chance, if our amendment is not adopted and the 
other amendment is adopted, we will be here next year debating this 
amendment. The only difference is, we will be in the third year of 
debate and thousands more Bosnians will have been driven from their 
homes and killed and our credibility and global leadership will be 
further eroded.
  This is a bipartisan effort. It has been from the start. There is no 
effort--and I say this in all sincerity --to in any way embarrass the 
administration.
  It just seems to me, notwithstanding the good efforts made by some in 
the Armed Services Committee, that they are not good enough and we 
should recognize once and for all what our obligations are.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
at this point an editorial which appeared in this morning's Washington 
edition of the Los Angeles Times, dated August 10, 1994, which is 
entitled, ``Why U.S. Should Lift Bosnian Embargo.'' And they have been 
slow in coming to this position, I might add.
  There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows: Q02

               [From the Los Angeles Times, August 1994]

                  Why U.S. Should Lift Bosnian Embargo

       The time has come for a unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms 
     embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Clinton Administration has 
     preserved the Serbs' arms advantage for two years, deferring 
     to the wishes of the British and French and ignoring the 
     stated preference of Congress. The result has been a sorry 
     disappointment.
       When the Bosnian Serbs defied a July 20 ultimatum for the 
     acceptance of a peace plan, the five powers that had issued 
     the ultimatum responded with only a minor tightening of 
     economic sanctions on Serbia proper. Several other threats 
     the five had made turned out to be empty.
       Even leaky sanctions (Russia has ignored them) hurt in the 
     long run, however, and Serbia has sought an end to the 
     sanctions by suddenly stopping traffic with Serbian Bosnia 
     and denouncing its recalcitrance. But in the Stalinist manner 
     of old, President Slobodan Milosevic controls both policy and 
     media. Yesterday's dogma is today's heresy and may be dogma 
     again tomorrow.
       The Serbian action that matters is the action being taken 
     in Bosnia. Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the Bosnian Serb 
     assembly, has declared that the Serbs will not settle for 
     less than 64% of Bosnian territory--as against the 49% 
     assigned them in the five-power plan. Consistent with this 
     view, the Bosnian Serbs are continuing their notorious ethnic 
     cleansing. Within the past few days, according to reports 
     confirmed by the Red Cross, the Serbs have sent 100 Muslim 
     men to a labor camp in the Bosnian northeast and expelled 
     more than 300 Muslim women and children from a town in the 
     area.
       In the NATO heavy-weapons exclusion zones around Sarajevo 
     and Corazde, the Serbs, undeterred by a pinprick NATO air 
     attack, have escalated their attacks with virtual impunity. 
     The U.N. commander, British Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose, 
     declined to call for NATO retaliation in Gorazde on Monday 
     even after Serb forces fired anti-aircraft rounds in the 
     exclusion zone and repeatedly attacked his forces there.
       Sarajevo is the soul and the symbol of ethnically mixed 
     Bosnia. The lifting of the arms embargo should not mean an 
     end to the NATO exclusion zone there. That zone should be 
     enforced by vigorous retaliation against, among other 
     targets, the Bosnian Serb capital, Pale. But given Rose's 
     refusal to enforce the zone, his call for a broader 
     demilitarization of Sarajevo rings hollow.
       Elsewhere in the country, in any event, only the Bosnians 
     themselves can deter further aggression; and they can only do 
     so if they bring their forces into parity with those of the 
     Serbs. The lifting of the arms embargo will take months to 
     have any effect and can be reimposed if needed, but the 
     moment for the change is now. Given the isolation of the 
     Bosnian Serbs, the risk to the U.N. troops will never be 
     smaller. And even that risk cannot be overwhelming in view of 
     the reluctance of the United Nations to avail itself even of 
     the NATO protection already available.

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, it says:

       The time has come for a unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms 
     embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Clinton Administration 
     has preserved the Serbs' arms advantage for 2 years, 
     deferring to the wishes of the British and the French and 
     ignoring the stated preference of Congress. The result has 
     been a sorry disappointment.

  I will not read the entire editorial, but I think it makes a point 
that this is an opportunity for us to end this disadvantage the Serbs 
have had and it gives the Bosnians a chance to defend themselves. They 
are an independent nation. They are a member of United Nations. Under 
article 51 of the U.N. Charter, they have that right.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. DOLE. I yield to the Senator from Minnesota as much time as he 
may consume.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Wellstone is recognized for as much 
time as he may consume.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Republican leader. I will be relatively 
brief.
  Mr. President, I want to say first that I am pleased and proud to be 
an original cosponsor of this amendment. But I must say, I am sad that 
it has come to this point, Mr. President.
  I also believe--and I said this to Senator Nunn a few minutes ago--
that the Nunn-Warner-Mitchell amendment goes in the same policy 
direction as the Dole-Lieberman amendment, and I intend to support that 
initiative, as well. I believe that, when taken as a whole, they are 
complementary, not contradictory. Approving both today would provide an 
opportunity for the administration and our allies including U.N. forces 
in the region, to prepare for the unavoidable lifting of the embargo 
while setting a firm deadline for this action.
  Mr. President, I want to talk a little bit about my own journey on 
this, because back on July 1, we had a very close vote on this issue--
in fact a tie vote that was broken by Vice President Gore. And I want 
to give the Republican leader a tremendous amount of credit for his 
conviction and consistency on this issue.
  Rarely have I agonized more over a vote than I have over this one. I 
had briefings from all sorts of different people in the U.S. Government 
who work in the region, including our Ambassador in Croatia, Peter 
Galbraith, for whom I have a tremendous amount of respect. I talked to 
the President, the Vice President, others in the State Department, I 
had as many briefings as I could about the situation--what kind of arms 
did the Muslims have now, what was the situation on the ground, what 
were the prospects for the contact group discussions, and the like.
  Ultimately, I decided then the timing was such that the contact 
group's proposal should be given a chance. I believed that we ought not 
to make important and far-reaching policy decisions based on anything 
but the situation on the ground and our interests in peacefully 
resolving the conflict, and not simply on the fact that the defense 
bill happened to be on the Senate floor.
  I was not optimistic, but I was hoping and praying--as I think many 
Americans and others were--that that proposal would be accepted by the 
Bosnian Serbs. But it is quite clear that that is not going to be the 
case.
  But even in early July, Mr. President, I did not decide until the 
very end, when I received a letter from Strobe Talbott with a 
commitment from the administration that if the contact group's peace 
proposal was rejected, they would go to the United Nations and that if 
our allies balked and we could not get Security Council approval, then 
the administration would come and consult with the Congress on lifting 
the embargo unilaterally. Even back then, I felt that commitment from 
the administration was necessary to me in terms of securing my vote.
  But now the Serbs have turned down the contact group plan, and we are 
seeing increased sniping in Sarajevo, and unprovoked attacks on U.N. 
forces in the region.
  It just seems to me, Mr. President, that it is time for the U.S. 
Senate to convey a very strong message to the Bosnian Serbs.
  For my own part, I support a clear deadline of November 15, 1994. I 
think it is the right thing to do. I also believe that we should step 
up our efforts to enforce safe havens. If necessary, we should take 
additional military action from the air against targets, in retaliation 
for any further provocations.
  I do not want to see our troops directly involved on the ground. But, 
Mr. President, I think most of us are agreed, one way or another, the 
Muslims have a right to defend themselves.
  I want to conclude with two points. The first is that: I hope and I 
pray that the Bosnian Serbs will accept the contact group's peace 
proposal, and if they do, lifting the embargo may not be necessary. 
There is nothing that I want to see happen more than Serb acceptance of 
this plan, followed by tough, strict enforcement of the agreement by 
NATO and the United Nations.
  Mr. President, I think that if they do not, and if what we end up 
doing--and I believe we will, because I think we must--is to 
unilaterally or multilaterally end this arms embargo, I think may 
expand to an even more uncontrolled war and many more men, women, and 
children could die. In that case, the prospects for a peaceful short-
term settlement are almost nil. I recognize that, but, Mr. President, 
this is what it has gotten down to for me. I am lucky to have a 
tremendous staff person in Colin McGinnis, with whom I work on these 
issues. We were talking before I came down here, discussing the options 
facing the parties right now. As we were talking to one another, and as 
I was analyzing it, I was thinking to myself, it might very well be 
that if the embargo is ended--and it should and it must be if there is 
no acceptance of the peace proposal by the Serbs--there may be more 
men, women and children in the long run that die that way than if it 
was not ended and we continue to have instead a kind of gradual 
slaughter, gradual genocide, because I fear that is the direction that 
we would be heading in. So you see, there are no good options in this 
situation.
  But, Mr. President, I think the people in Bosnia, the Muslims 
themselves, have the right to decide. At this point, it seems to me 
that virtually all efforts have been made toward some kind of 
successful resolution; all efforts have been made toward getting the 
Serbs to accept the peace proposal. It does not look like the contact 
group's proposal is going to be accepted, even with the pressure from 
Milosevic, and the Russians. And I think if we are not going to 
intervene militarily--and I do not believe we should --on the ground, 
then the Muslims have the right to defend themselves.
  So I am an original cosponsor now of the amendment similar to one 
that I have voted against before, because I think now the time has come 
for us to move in this direction. And because this Dole-Lieberman 
amendment gives our allies time to redeploy their forces before the 
embargo is unilaterally lifted.
  I do believe that the Nunn-Warner-Mitchell amendment takes us in the 
same direction with the intermediary step of trying to get the United 
Nations to support us in lifting the embargo. If we can do it 
multilaterally, Mr. President, that is always my preference. But if we 
cannot--and I think November 15 gives this process plenty of time--then 
I think we must unilaterally end this embargo. In the interim, our 
allies will have time to redeploy their troops in order to protect 
them, and the package of consequences--tightening of sanctions, tougher 
enforcement of the safe havens, providing aid to regional powers to 
help them mitigate the effects of enforcing the sanctions--will have 
time to work, increasing pressure on the Serbs.
  I pray that it will not be necessary, because I think it could have 
grave implications. But I am also clear-eyed about the abysmal Serb 
record on such agreements, and I am not very hopeful. I fear it will be 
necessary. I think we in the U.S. Senate have to be clear that we will 
support such a step.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, we basically have a choice here between 
two amendments. The fundamental difference between the two is that the 
Dole amendment will force the President to assume leadership in the 
Security Council that he has so far avoided. He will be forced to 
either gain the approval of the United Nations by November 15 or lift 
the embargo unilaterally. And this also gives our European allies 
plenty of time to withdraw their forces if they are concerned for their 
safety.
  The Mitchell amendment encourages the President to seek a 
multilateral lifting of the embargo. If the President fails to gain 
Security Council approval, the Mitchell amendment would end U.S. 
participation in enforcing the embargo.
  Mr. President, let me just say at the outset that there has been 
fighting going on in this very unhappy country, with a few pauses, for 
well over 500 years. I greatly fear that despite what we may or may not 
do, there will be a certain level of fighting that will continue for a 
long, long time.
  Can the United States beneficially affect that situation? Of course 
we can. There is a fundamental right at issue here and it is whether a 
nation has the right to defend itself. We have been over a lot of this 
before, and we have gone in the debate in this body from a choice 
between lifting the embargo and doing nothing, which was the view of 
many, to when we are going to lift the embargo on people who in my view 
have the fundamental right to defend themselves.
  It is not only my view that nations have the right to defend 
themselves, but that of the United Nations Charter which states 
unequivocally in article 51 that ``nothing in the present Charter shall 
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures to maintain international peace 
and security,'' and article 2 of the United Nations Charter which says, 
``the inherent right to self-defense is a preeminent right of 
international law and may not be abridged by actions of the Security 
Council.''
  As I have stated before, the United Nations is in violation of its 
own charter. By imposing this punishment on Bosnia--which was never a 
country, by the way, when the arms embargo was put into being. The 
embargo was placed against then-Yugoslavia. This nation has committed 
no aggression against its neighbors. There is no comparison between 
this nation and Iraq and Libya, who are now under embargoes enacted by 
the United Nations Security Council.
  What we have done to this tragic and unhappy country is to allow--in 
fact, we are now implicated in causing--an unequal battlefield scenario 
and equation to the point where 200,000 citizens of that country have 
been killed and more than 2 million displaced.
  It is unfair. We should have lifted this embargo a long time ago. We 
listened to the siren song of a peaceful settlement now for 28 months. 
We have listened to this siren song and many have believed it when the 
fact is time after time after time the hopes for a peaceful settlement 
have been dashed.
  I hope and pray that tomorrow there will be a peaceful settlement. 
But history tells us that the way, sometimes, peace is achieved is when 
there is a balance on the battlefield that makes it in the interests of 
neither warring party to continue the conflict further--or victory is 
gained by one party or another.
  I just received information from the Action Council for Peace in the 
Balkans, of which Marshall Harris is the executive director. Let me 
just give a recent rundown of what has been going on in the last few 
days.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this entire chronicle of 
Serbian attacks be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       On July 30 in Geneva, Secretary Christopher and his 
     ``contact group'' counterparts agreed to tighten economic 
     sanctions against Serbia in the face of Bosnian Serb 
     rejection of the group's plan.
       Since then, the sanctions have not been tightened. In fact, 
     this week, Secretary Christopher spoke of actually easing 
     sanctions if Serbian President Milosevic actually cuts off 
     his proxies in Bosnia.
       Also since the Geneva meeting, the Bosnian Serbs have 
     rejected the contact group's plan a third and a fourth time. 
     This week they announced that they wanted 64% of Bosnian 
     territory--not 49% as offered by the Contact Group. So much 
     for the take-it-or-leave-it plan.
       [Meanwhile,] on the ground, the Bosnian Serbs have: 
     launched artillery attacks on Visoko and Breza from inside 
     the Sarajevo weapons exclusion zone; resumed constant sniping 
     at civilians in Sarajevo; resumed the shelling of Tuzla; and 
     fired more than 300 shells into Olovo and Vares (in central 
     Bosnia) in one day.
       In addition, beyond the weapons thefts that prompted NATO's 
     mini-strike against a World War II-vintage gun inside the 
     Sarajevo exclusion zone, Bosnian Serb forces have committed 
     the following atrocities or violations. This is only a 
     partial list of violations of which we are aware:
       August 1:
       Serbian forces moved tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft guns, 
     and mortars inside the Sarajevo exclusion zone.
       Serbian snipers wounded two civilians riding in a tram.
       Serbian troops launched attacks in Gorazde, Olovo, and 
     Kalesija.
       They launched tank attacks on Zavidovici and Maglaj.
       They wounded five civilians in rifle grenade attacks in 
     Dobrinja on the outskirts of Sarajevo.
       They expelled more than 300 refugees from Banja Luka, 
     Sanski Most, and other regions in northwest Bosnia. The 
     refugees, mostly women, children, and elderly men, arrived in 
     Travnik.
       August 3:
       Serbian forces renewed sniper attacks on three cities 
     (Marindvor, Nedzarici, and Stup).
       They killed one civilian and wounded three others in 
     Tesanj.
       They regrouped soldiers and supplies in Maglaj in central 
     Bosnia.
       They launched grenade, mortar, and howitzer attacks on 
     Visoko.
       They launched howitzer attacks on Breza and Kladanj.
       They hit Zivinice with tank and mortar fire.
       They hit Kalesija with artillery fire.
       They launched infantry attacks on Gorazde.
       August 4:
       Serbian forces fired twelve artillery shells into Tuzla.
       They fired 238 shells into Dastanko in central Bosnia. The 
     Bosnian Army responded with 132 shells, according to the U.N.
       They hit Gradacac in northern Bosnia with 532 shells.
       August 5:
       Serbian forces lobbed two 82 mm shells into Sarajevo.
       August 6:
       Serbian forces forced more than 300 Muslims from their 
     homes in Bijeljina. The refugees have been arriving in Tuzla. 
     According to the U.N., only 7,000-8,000 of Bijeljina's pre-
     war Muslim population remains.
       August 9:
       Serbian forces used howitzers and mortars inside the 
     Sarajevo exclusion zone to attack Visoko and Breza.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, while I am at it, I ask unanimous consent 
Senator Jeffords be added as a cosponsor to the Dole-Lieberman 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the plan is unjust and it is unworkable. 
It is unjust because it cedes 49 percent of Bosnian territory to the 
aggressors, thereby validating the aggression of the Bosnian Serbs. It 
is unworkable because it is unjust. Not one of our allies in Europe--
not one--would agree to a settlement that required handing over half of 
its national territory. That Serb forces have seized 70 percent of the 
nation is a gross injustice. That negotiators have attempted to 
legitimize the bulk of those gains is a travesty. And despite the 
unjust nature of the peace proposal, the Bosnians accepted it. And 
guess who rejected it? The Serb forces who have now even been deserted 
by some of their greatest sponsors, including apparently President 
Milosevic. In the meantime Serb forces, as I mentioned, have renewed 
the siege of Sarajevo, ambushed a U.N. convoy and other acts which I 
have chronicled for the record.
  The Bosnians have identified an end to the arms embargo as their 
highest priority. Many military experts say that will cause them to 
suffer more losses. I would think the Bosnians are in a better position 
to make that judgment than some military experts. The Bosnians state in 
very simple terms, ``We are dying. At least let us die fighting.''
  The Bosnians only want defensive weapons and, clearly, unless they 
are allowed the ability to defend themselves, there will be a continued 
gradual bloodletting to the point where that nation, tiny now--a much 
smaller nation--disappears. I believe after 28 months of diplomacy, 
after 200,000 dead and 2 million refugees, the time has come to embark 
on a new course of action, and that is lifting the arms embargo.
  Let me make it clear. The Dole amendment clearly prefers--clearly 
prefers--a lifting on the part of the United Nations of the embargo. We 
strongly prefer that to be done multilaterally. What the Dole amendment 
says is if we do not do it multilaterally, then unilaterally we must do 
so. I think we should wonder, Mr. President, what would have happened 
if in our struggle for independence the European nations had imposed an 
arms embargo on the then-revolutionaries, the United States? We were 
not even recognized as a country yet we received important, and in the 
view of many historians, vital assistance in our struggle for 
independence.
  This is an independent and recognized nation and we should cease 
punishing them and allow them to defend themselves.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Chair recognizes the 
majority leader, Senator Mitchell.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe the time is controlled by myself 
and the majority leader. Of those two, the majority leader will decide 
how much time he requires.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, the Senate is again debating whether to 
terminate the arms embargo that was imposed upon Bosnia and Herzegovina 
at the beginning of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
  Every member of the Senate is deeply concerned with the tragic events 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. All would like to see a peaceful settlement 
and an end to the fighting which has left thousands dead and millions 
of people displaced from their homes.
  There is no disagreement about the goal of a peaceful resolution of 
the conflict. The disagreement is over the best way to achieve that 
goal, consistent with the national interests of the United States.
  The question again before the Senate is whether the United States 
should now, on its own, simply terminate the arms embargo on Bosnia, as 
Senator Dole and his colleagues propose, or whether the United States 
should first act in concert with our allies in NATO and the United 
Nations to seek a decision in the Security Council to end the arms 
embargo on Bosnia.
  I do not believe this to be the time for the United States to act 
unilaterally, without regard to the views of our allies or the safety 
of their citizens and troops.
  At this time there are several multilateral actions in which the 
United States is a participant with other nations to impose sanctions 
or take other collective actions, in many parts of the world.
  There is an ongoing collective action to impose sanctions on Haiti. 
There continues to be the likelihood of collective action to impose 
sanctions on North Korea. Sanctions on Iraq continue. These are actions 
which are important to the United States as well as to other nations.
  If the United States is now to unilaterally drop out of collective 
action whenever it chooses, then what is to prevent every other country 
from doing the same thing on collective actions in which we want them 
to participate but they do not agree with?
  We must understand we cannot have it both ways. We cannot say there 
must be collective action when it suits us, but when we want to drop 
out at any time we can, because to do that will give other governments 
the incentive and the legitimacy to drop out of any actions which are 
disadvantageous to them. And that will be true of the sanctions on 
Haiti; that will be true of the sanctions on Iraq; it will be true of 
the sanctions on Serbia.
  We have been told repeatedly by the governments of those nations, 
which are close to those situations in Iraq and Serbia, that they are 
hurting economically because of the sanctions which we insist be 
imposed. If we now unilaterally, without regard to anything our allies 
think or do or say, pull out of this, then we invite others to do the 
same on other sanctions.
  The effective end of collective action through the use of sanctions 
is a consequence that I think should be avoided. And I urge those who 
are considering the Dole amendment to ponder very carefully the 
implications it has for future policy all around the world.
  The end of the cold war and the resurgence of ethnic conflict and 
nationalism has created turmoil in many parts of the world. The United 
States is going to be asked over and over again to send American troops 
to solve problems in every part of the world. The United States is the 
world leader, but it cannot by itself solve every problem in the world. 
We are going to have to ask others to join with us in dealing with 
problems, especially those distant from our shores.
  If we now say that we want to go it alone whenever we choose, what 
claim do we have on the cooperation of others when we do not want to go 
it alone? We can lead, and as a dominant military and economic power in 
the world, we must lead. We all know and recognize that there are going 
to be occasions when we will want and need help and support from other 
countries. If we are not going to get much help, if we say now that in 
this case we do not agree with collective action and so without any 
regard to the views of our allies we are just going to drop out, 
unilaterally end this collective embargo, never mind what the British 
think, never mind what the French think, never mind what our other 
allies who also have troops in Bosnia think--we do not like it so we 
are going to drop out, regardless of whether such action endangers the 
lives of thousands of our allies' troops and humanitarian workers who 
are there trying to enforce peace, trying to help the thousands of 
people who have been displaced by the war.
  Mr. President, let us remember, over the course of this conflict, the 
British have had several thousand of their troops in Bosnia on the 
ground. The French have had even more thousands. So have many of our 
other allies. Dozens have been killed, hundreds have been wounded, all 
are in danger. The United States has had virtually no one there. The 
British and the French and our other allies have been willing to do 
what we have been unwilling to do; and that is to place their young men 
and women in the line of fire to take risks that have resulted in 
dozens of deaths and hundreds of casualties.
  And yet here we are in this extraordinary circumstance telling them 
that we do not care what they think, we do not care what risk we impose 
upon their troops and their humanitarian workers--sent there when we 
would not--we are going to go ahead and do this alone.
  I think it is a very unwise course, even as I understand and 
sympathize with the motives of those who have offered this amendment. 
They are horrified and frustrated by the events in Bosnia. They want 
action. I also am horrified. I also am frustrated. I also want action. 
But let us take action which is consistent with our national interests. 
Let us take action which will help us deal with similar situations in 
the future.
  We should take action to cause the Bosnian Serbs to accept the most 
recent proposal for peace, and we should do so in concert with our 
allies. That is what the amendment does that has been offered by 
Senator Nunn in which I join and which I support.
  Senator Nunn will describe it in more detail. Let me touch just 
briefly on the principal points of that amendment.
  It states that the Congress supports the efforts of the contact group 
to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina based upon their proposal of July 6, 1994, which has been 
agreed to by the Government's of Bosnia and Herzegovina and rejected by 
the Bosnian Serbs. It establishes a process to end the arms embargo if 
the Bosnian Serbs continue to reject the July 6 proposal.
  The amendment specifies simultaneous complementary action on two 
tracks:
  First, an international track which provides that if the Bosnian 
Serbs have not accepted the July 6 proposal within 10 days of the 
enactment of this act, or by October 15, 1994, the President, or his 
representative, should within 14 days formally introduce a resolution 
in the U.N. Security Council to terminate the arms embargo on Bosnia no 
later than December 1, 1994.
  And second, a unilateral track which specifies that if the U.N. 
Security Council has not voted to lift the international arms embargo 
within 15 days after the President, or his representative, has 
introduced the above resolution or not later than November 15 of this 
year, and if by that date the Bosnian Serbs have not accepted the 
contact group's July 6 proposal, then no funds may be used for the arms 
embargo. And the President shall submit a plan to, and consult with, 
the Congress regarding unilaterally lifting the arms embargo and how 
the United States would provide training to the Bosnian armed forces 
outside the territory of that country.
  Additionally, the amendment would provide that if the Bosnian Serbs 
attack U.N. declared safe areas, the President and his representative 
shall promptly introduce a resolution in the U.N. Security Council that 
authorizes a selective lifting of the arms embargo on the Government of 
Bosnia to provide defensive weapons to enable the Bosnian armed forces 
to defend the safe areas.
  This amendment reflects the recent consensus reached by the House and 
Senate conferees on the Department of Defense authorization bill. The 
House bill included language similar to the Dole amendment authorizing 
unilateral U.S. termination of the arms embargo. The Senate bill 
included language authorizing the U.S. to seek multilateral termination 
of the arms embargo.
  These different points of view were reconciled and agreed to by the 
conferees, and the essential change of that agreement is contained in 
the amendment being offered today by Senator Nunn, which I support.
  The President has expressed his support and willingness to implement 
the provisions of this amendment. Thus, the language of the amendment 
reflects an agreement of the authorizing congressional conference 
committee and the administration on a proper course of action to follow 
in seeking a peaceful resolution to the fighting in Bosnia.
  I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting this carefully worked 
out alternative amendment. It is consistent with the best interests of 
the United States. It will be most helpful to an ultimate peaceful 
resolution of the conflict that has raged for too long in that tragic 
country.
  Mr. President, I also want to say that this constructive alternative, 
this reconciliation of the divergent views previously expressed by the 
House and Senate, is possible only because of the leadership and 
determination of Senator Nunn. He has clearly understood the important 
issues at stake, not just in Bosnia but for the United States and the 
rest of the world, and has fashioned a policy which I think makes sense 
for the United States and provides a specific and firm deadline for 
action with respect to the arms embargo. I think it makes a great deal 
of sense. I commend Senator Nunn for his leadership and his diligence 
in this area, and I urge my colleagues to support the Nunn amendment.

  Mr. President, I thank my colleague for his courtesy and I yield the 
floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, how much time does our side have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia controls 47\1/2\ 
minutes.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair, and I thank the majority leader for his 
kind comments and for his support of this amendment that we will be 
voting on, I understand, first. This amendment is being offered, Mr. 
President, on behalf of myself, the majority leader, Mr.Mitchell, the 
Senator from Virginia, Mr. Warner, the Senator from Kansas, Mrs. 
Kassebaum, and the Senator from Florida, Mr. Graham.
  Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may require.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, first, I would like to thank Senator 
Lieberman and Senator Dole for their positive comments about the 
conference report. We did the best we could. We had a very difficult 
job. The Senate had a multilateral position. There were a lot of people 
who were involved in working out this conference report, the essence of 
which we will be voting on as the first amendment, 
the Nunn-Mitchell-Warner-Kassebaum-Graham amendment.
  I would also like to thank Senator Lieberman, in addition to his 
comments, for his work on this conference report. I know that he 
prefers a unilateral lifting, and that is what is reflected in the 
Dole-Lieberman amendment. I know that the view of Senator Dole and 
Senator Lieberman is absolutely sincere and they are working on it 
because they believe in it, and I respect that very much.
  I differ with them, but I have great respect for their views. I think 
all of us, virtually all of us, would like to lift the embargo. The 
difference--an important difference--is whether we do it unilaterally 
or multilaterally.
  In addition, on the conference report, Senator Graham headed up the 
general provisions. This appropriation came under that. Senator Graham 
from Florida did an enormous amount of work here. It could not have 
been done without him and without Senators Lieberman, Warner, Thurmond, 
and others.
  On the House side, Congressman McCloskey, Congressman Dellums, the 
chairman of the committee, Congressman Hoyer, who was not on the 
conference committee, and Congressman Hamilton were all very involved 
in the deliberations.
  Mr. President, I would like to review the action recently taken by 
the House-Senate conference on the fiscal 1995 defense bill regarding 
the arms embargo on Bosnia.
  For those who may be interested in this debate, we in the Senate have 
a dual process. First, we have to pass an authorization bill on 
defense. Then we have to pass an appropriations bill. The authorization 
bill passed several weeks ago. We have been in conference. That 
conference report is completed. We announced the results today. That 
conference report, as soon as all the technical details are drawn up, 
will go to the President. Hopefully, he will sign that conference 
report.
  In that conference report, which will soon go to the President, 
hopefully for his signature, we have the provision that we will be 
voting on today. In other words, that is being agreed to by the House 
conferees and the Senate conferees. And of course, the conference 
report has to be agreed to by the Senate and then by the House and then 
go to the President.
  The bill we are on now, managed by the Senator from Hawaii and the 
Senator from Alaska, is an appropriations bill on defense. This bill 
has not yet been conferenced. Of course when it passes--and I know my 
colleagues hope it will pass this evening--this will go to conference. 
In all likelihood--I cannot speak for them; they would know better than 
I--in all likelihood this conference would be completed sometime in 
September.
  So we are going to have in law the authorization bill several weeks, 
in all likelihood, before this appropriations bill could possibly go 
into law, and that is assuming the President signs it. I think, of 
course, that depends on what we do on this and other areas as I view 
it. I am not sure what he will do if the Dole-Lieberman amendment goes 
to him in the appropriations bill coming out of conference.
  Mr. President, the issue before the conference was not whether the 
United States should lift the embargo but, rather, whether it should be 
done unilaterally or whether it should be done multilaterally.
  I think most of us on the conference agree that the embargo that was 
imposed upon the former Yugoslavia 3 years ago, supported both by the 
Bush administration and the United Nations and by the Clinton 
administration since then in their votes--our Government has voted for 
that embargo over and over again, and I think it is important for us to 
understand that. It is widely agreed among the conferees that the 
overwhelming source of aggression in Bosnia has been the Bosnian Serbs 
and their sponsors in Belgrade, and the principal victims of that 
aggression have been the Bosnian Moslems. Of course, there are acts of 
violence on both sides, tragedy on both sides, but that is our 
perception of the overwhelming source of aggression.
  It is also widely agreed that the arms embargo has provided an 
enormous military advantage to the perpetrators of the principal 
aggression, that is the Bosnian Serbs, and denied the victims of 
aggression, the principal victims, the Bosnian Government and the 
Moslem group, the means of effective self-defense.
  There is further general agreement that the embargo on the Government 
of Bosnia should be lifted, preferably on a multilateral basis.
  Finally, there seems to be a consensus here in the Congress, 
certainly in the Senate, among the conferees of the House and Senate 
against the deployment of United States ground forces to Bosnia for any 
purpose other than monitoring a peace agreement acceptable to all 
parties concerned. And even this kind of deployment, which, of course, 
will not occur unless there is a peace agreement, does not enjoy wide 
support in the Congress. The President has already said many times he 
will come to the Congress before he seeks any such deployment. That 
would be a matter of considerable debate here in Congress.
  The primary area of disagreement in the conference was reflected in 
the House desire to lift the arms embargo quickly and unilaterally, 
whereas the Senate wished to pursue remaining possibilities for 
achieving a multilateral lifting before considering unilateral action 
as a last resort.
  The resolution of this issue must take recent developments into 
consideration, among them the acceptance of the contact group's 
proposed peace settlement by the Government of Bosnia; its effective 
rejection by the Bosnian Serbs; and the contact group's failure so far 
to take effective action in the wake of the Bosnian Serbs' continued 
defiance.
  The track the contact group is pursuing logically involves, first, an 
attempt to obtain Bosnian Serb acceptance of the group's peace plan.
  Failing that, second, preparing for the United Nations forces orderly 
withdrawal from Bosnia, and also the humanitarian forces being able to 
get out of harm's way.
  And finally, once that withdrawal is completed, obtaining a 
multilateral lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia.
  That is what the contact group has said they are embarked upon. To 
lift the embargo multilaterally or unilaterally before the United 
Nations forces are withdrawn or before the humanitarian workers have 
been able to be secured or that there are other means to protect them, 
could subject these forces as well as these brave humanitarian workers 
to Bosnian attacks and hostage taking.
  Potentially, the most profound recent development, however, has been 
an apparent parting of company between Belgrade and its Bosnian Serb 
proxies. During the past 2 weeks, Serbian President Milosevic has 
publicly denounced the Bosnian Serb rejection of the contact group's 
peace proposal. He called Bosnian Serb leaders, quoting him, ``war 
profiteers,'' and he called upon Bosnian Serbs to dump them. Belgrade 
subsequently announced it was suspending all political and military 
ties with Serbs and was closing Serbia's border with Bosnia to all but 
the movement of food, medicine and clothes.
  Mr. President, as recently as this morning, there are strong 
indications from our independent sources that that is indeed being 
done.
  Now, I would have to add to that very hastily, skeptics are right, I 
think, based on history to be very wary of any pronouncement coming out 
of Mr. Milosevic's Belgrade government. On the other hand, the history 
of international relations is littered with the bodies of proxies 
abandoned by patrons. History tells us that.
  We know the Russians have exerted great pressure on Milosevic to 
disown his Bosnian Serb proteges. It is also clear that Milosevic 
desperately wants a termination of the present economic embargo of 
Serbia, and he wishes to certainly avoid further tightening of that 
embargo which could well be in store.
  Mr. President, this development is a potential watershed in the 
Bosnian crisis, and I think we have not discussed it nearly enough here 
in the Senate. Since the war erupted in the former Yugoslavia back in 
1982, we have operated on two assumptions: First, that the war-fighting 
capability and capacity of the Bosnian Serb forces is critically 
dependent on the delivery of military supplies from Serbia and, second, 
that Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs share an identity of interests in 
Bosnia.
  The first assumption is almost certainly valid but now could work in 
favor of intense pressure on Belgrade to disown its clients in Bosnia. 
But if Belgrade does so, then the second assumption may be invalid. Is 
Serbia indeed, if only for tactical reasons, in the process of 
politically abandoning its brethren in Bosnia? Is it prepared to shut 
off military assistance and control the energy supplies to Bosnian Serb 
forces in a manner subject to verification? My suggestion is that the 
United Nations take the Serbian President Milosevic up on his offer in 
terms of cutting off arms, and say to him, ``Yes. You are doing that. 
We want to verify it. We want U.N. forces on the border at each 
entrance point from Serbia to Bosnia, and we want to make sure that you 
are indeed doing what you say.''
  That is what I believe we should do.
  (Mr. PRYOR assumed the chair.)
  Mr. NUNN. If this indeed is happening, and if it continues to happen 
in a military position, those Bosnian forces are likely to deteriorate 
with or without a lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia. This in turn 
places a premium on avoidance by the United States and our NATO allies 
and the United Nations of actions that would drive Belgrade and the 
Bosnian Serbs back into each other's arms. In a situation in which the 
Bosnian Serbs have provoked even Belgrade to ostensibly at least 
abandon them, we should reexamine the policy of punishing Belgrade for 
the transgressions of the Bosnian Serbs but only if--this is a big 
``if''--Belgrade does in fact cut off the Bosnian Serbs and if they 
also permit verification of that cutoff by international inspectors at 
border crossings. That is the course that we should be pursuing 
diligently now.
  Mr. President, I believe we are obligated to weigh carefully the 
likely consequences of moving straight to unilateral lifting of the 
arms embargo. The process by which we lift the embargo is just as 
important as the act itself. In fact, with our broad position around 
the world and for our relationship with our allies, it is even more 
important.
  Those who today seek to set a firm date in all sincerity--I want to 
credit them for that--for lifting the arms embargo unilaterally should 
think very carefully about the implications of imposing this change in 
law and its effect on the Serbian Government.
  Would a precipitous unilateral termination of the embargo widen the 
war? Would it drive the UNPROFOR forces out of Bosnia? Would it place 
its security at risk? Would it place our humanitarian workers in 
security risk? Would it place Bosnia's fate--and especially the fate of 
those besieged Moslem communities which the United Nations has declared 
to be safe areas--in greater jeopardy than they are today? Would it 
draw the United States into the Bosnian and Balkan quagmire? Would our 
allies withdraw and say to us, ``OK. United States, you insisted on 
moving alone. Now we are getting out of here, and it is up to you not 
only to train and supply arms but to defend the Bosnians while they are 
getting heavy arms, and while they are being trained.'' Do we really 
want to take this on unilaterally?
  Could the United States, if it abruptly terminated the embargo, avoid 
both the moral and material responsibility for the defense of the 
Bosnian Government and its supporters? Would it not be the height of 
cynicism simply to declare the embargo lifted, force the U.N. forces 
out, whose presence at the very least has been enabling humanitarian 
aid to reach tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of them who 
otherwise probably would not live--and then walk away from those 
seeking to defend themselves against aggression and genocide?
  In other words, if we lift this embargo and there is a very strong I 
am sure case for that--I am in favor of doing it multilaterally. But if 
we do it unilaterally, there are some people who would like to say that 
is all we are going to do, that now we are through with it. Mr. 
President, that cannot happen. That is the worst course of all.
  If we are going to lift the embargo, we have to follow through. 
Otherwise, we are inviting disaster. We have to follow through by 
training. We have to follow through by arming, hopefully with defensive 
weapons that would not spread the war. If we do not, we are going to 
leave a vacuum there that would not only lead to tragedy for those we 
are presumably trying to help, but it would also invite other forces to 
come into that area with weapons that could greatly broaden the 
conflict. I will not name those other forces. But you can leave it to 
your imagination. It would be a very grave development.
  Mr. President, I have looked very carefully at the Dole-Lieberman 
amendment. Along that line, the way I read the amendment, the entire 
amendment is on one page. So it is not very hard to read. It says:

       The President shall terminate the United States arms 
     embargo on the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina no later 
     than November 15, 1994 so that Government may exercise its 
     right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations 
     Charter.

  It goes on to say what it actually does. The operative phrase of this 
is it basically repeals a July 15 policy published in the Federal 
Register of July 19 under the heading ``Suspension of munitions export 
licenses to Yugoslavia, and any similar policy adopted and implied by 
the United States as of the date of receipt of request of paragraph 
1,'' and so forth.
  That is what this does. If you look at what it does here, what it 
actually repeals, it repeals this Federal Register that says:

       Summary notice is hereby given that all licenses and 
     approvals to export or otherwise transfer defense articles 
     and defense services to Yugoslavia pursuant to Section 38 of 
     the Arms Export Control Act are suspended.

  So what we would be doing is saying arms can be exported to Bosnia. 
That means our defense contractors could sell, or, if the money is not 
available and they are charitable, they could give arms to Bosnia. It 
says nothing about how they are going to get them there. How are they 
going to get them there if the British and French decide to continue to 
enforce the embargo? Are we going to let Lockheed, General Dynamics, 
Hughes, and others fly through the French and British embargo and 
deliver arms to Bosnia? It says nothing whatsoever about that.
  There is no provision in here to deliver arms. There is no provision 
in here to deliver arms. There is no provision for training. There is 
not even a provision in here that says that we no longer would enforce 
the embargo. There are some people who would read that as meaning that 
there is nothing to prohibit the President in here from continuing to 
enforce the embargo with our military forces. In my own view, that 
would not be a very sensible reading of the intent behind this because 
certainly the intent is clear, and we would not participate in the 
embargo.
  But, Mr. President, I would say that the worst case we can get into 
from an international point of view, and from our own security point of 
view, is to lift an embargo, and then say nothing and provide nothing 
about training or about overall arms being delivered.
  The Yugoslavian army has not entered in this conflict in a direct 
way. We know they are supplying weapons. We know probably there are 
some of them participating. But they have a lot that they could do that 
they have not yet done. So we do not certainly want to trigger that.
  Mr. President, I think at a minimum we would be obliged to provide 
the Bosnian Government forces substantial quantities of weapons as well 
as the training necessary for their effective employment. Unless we 
want to lift the embargo and invite the Iranians into Europe, or unless 
we want Turkey to take over that obligation, unless we want to inflame 
the basic passions that already exist there, then we have an obligation 
to go much further than the Dole-Lieberman amendment goes. Maybe the 
authors of this amendment intend to do that. We have an appropriations 
bill that is about to pass. And it does provide $50 million. But it is 
in anticipation of either a unilateral or multilateral lifting; $50 
million in arms. But it requires that the President--I believe this is 
the foreign appropriations act. It provides that the President certify 
before permitting this aid, No. 1, the transfer of such articles that 
would assist that nation in self-defense and thereby promote the 
security and stability of the region; two, that the U.S. allies are 
prepared to join in such a military effort.

  So the only appropriations bill I know about that has any money in 
it, if we pass this unilateral lifting, requires that kind of 
certification. The President cannot certify that the United States 
allies are prepared to join in a military assistance effort; just to 
the contrary, they oppose the lifting of the embargo.
  So, Mr. President, this amendment is symbolism, and it is important 
symbolism. It is psychology, and it is important. It is going to send--
if we pass this--some messages around. But the problem is that there is 
nothing to carry out the policy, unless you assume that our private 
defense contractors are going to sell arms to Bosnia, and unless you 
assume that those arms are going to be delivered by somebody through an 
embargo that is continuing to be enforced by NATO and by the United 
Nations.
  Mr. President, for the United States, the Balkans are important, but 
they are not vital to our national security. But what is central to our 
security, and to Europe's security, is preventing the spread of this 
conflict. Of course, we as Americans are sympathetic to the 
humanitarian needs of the Bosnian people and the terrible atrocities 
and tragedies that have occurred there, and we are seeking--and should 
seek, and even intensify--to meet the needs where we can. But there is 
a vast difference between dropping relief supplies to civilians and 
taking on the conflict as our own. There is a vast difference in those 
two.
  Another issue posed by an abrupt unilateral termination of the 
embargo is a likely reaction of the Bosnian Serbs. It will take time, 
at least several weeks, if not months, to deliver significant 
quantities of weapons to the Bosnian Government, and to train 
government forces in their proper employment. The government's lack of 
access to the sea means that deliveries would have to be made via 
interdictable roads, initially through Croatia, and by air to airfields 
within the range of Serbian artillery.
  Who is going to deliver these weapons through a continued embargo by 
the United Nations and by our allies? Who is going to deliver the 
weapons? Where are they going to get the weapons? Are we going to have 
our defense contractors come in and say: ``Boy, I am sure glad that 
embargo is over. We are now going to find ways to deliver weapons in 
the middle of that conflict''?
  I doubt it. I doubt it very seriously. I think those who are going to 
vote for this unilateral move have the obligation to think through 
these questions. They may have thought of them, and there may be 
answers, but they are not apparent on the face of the amendment.
  Mr. President, are we going to assume that Bosnian Serb forces will 
remain idle while we go about arming and training Bosnian Government 
forces? Would a lifting of the embargo provoke a Bosnian Serb aim at 
preempting the Bosnian Government's military rearmament? The worst case 
is to have the Bosnian Serbs believe weapons are about to go in there 
because we voted in the U.S. Senate on lifting the embargo, and then 
have no weapons in there and have no training and have no way to get 
them in there, and not have any plan to get them in there. We would 
leave the people we are trying to help in worse shape than they are in 
now. We do that. We better think about it. This is not a sense-of-the-
Senate resolution. If this comes up and we pass it, and it goes into 
conference and comes out, it could become law.
  Would the Bosnian Serbs attack not only government forces but also 
the roads and airfields that are critical to the delivery of arms to 
government forces? Would they also attack the Moslem-safe areas which, 
with the departure of U.N. forces--and our allies told us if this 
happens, they are going to pull out--they would also pull out 
presumably the forward air controllers.
  What are we going to do about targeting if we have to go in and bomb, 
if we do not have air controllers on the ground? How are we going to do 
that? Will our air power be effective without any forward air controls? 
Even with the assistance of forward air controls, the Bosnian Serb 
targets around those safe havens are very elusive, and we have done 
what I call a pin-prick attacking; we have not really done much damage 
in that. Those attacks are very difficult because it is so easy to put 
the weapons in the civilian populations, and then we have to decide 
whether we are going to go in there and knock out a church or a school 
that has mortars in it. What are we going to do about this? There is an 
obligation to think through these questions, a real obligation.
  Mr. President, we would also have to be prepared for some of these 
same consequences if we multilaterally lift the arms embargo. But there 
is a huge difference. We and our allies will be acting in concert in 
taking collective steps preparing for withdrawing forces, deterring and 
reacting to any Bosnian Serb aggression. There is a huge difference 
between doing this unilaterally or multilaterally. We can do it 
unilaterally and we can take care of these questions, but only if we 
are willing to make a very large commitment of military forces and of 
training, and only if we are willing to follow the consequences of our 
action to their logical conclusion--and that means bombing. That means 
when you give out targets in Bosnia, you take it to Serbia. That is the 
logical consequence here, and people had better think through it.
  In sum, Mr. President, a hasty unilateral lifting of the arms embargo 
on Bosnia will no doubt offer, for maybe a week or two, emotional 
satisfaction, produce a number of editorials that are favorable; but it 
could precipitate and intensify a conflict for which the Bosnian 
Government forces could find themselves militarily much worse off than 
today. It could also provoke a major crisis with at least two of our 
major European allies, as well as encourage other members of the United 
Nations to unilaterally themselves either ignore or violate current and 
prospective embargoes that we are in favor of and have pushed through 
the United Nations, and that we want to continue, like Libya, like 
Iraq, like Haiti, and like North Korea.
  Mr. President, it is nice to be able to view through a telescope one 
small foreign policy question, even one that is as tragic as Bosnia. 
But it cannot be done with a country like America. We have to look at 
the whole scope and take into account other actions.
  How many members of the Security Council, if we have to use an 
embargo on North Korea, are going to bring up what we do in terms of 
this embargo that we voted for over and over again? After much 
deliberation, the House-Senate conferees on the fiscal year 1995 
defense authorization bill have determined what I believe to be a 
viable alternative to the original position of the two Chambers; I 
submit it is a viable alternative to the unilateral lift. Assuming a 
continued refusal of the Bosnian Serbs to accept the contact group's 
peace plan, I believe this alternative permits the Congress to support 
the contact group while at the same time pressuring our allies and the 
administration to lift the embargo multilaterally, rather than 
unilaterally.
  This alternative rests on two tracks. The first, international; the 
second, unilateral. This is the amendment we will be voting on first. 
The international track calls for Congress to call on the President to 
seek, by the end of October, a U.N. Security Council termination of the 
arms embargo on the Bosnian Government. For over a year and a half, the 
administration has declared repeatedly it believes the arms embargo on 
Bosnia should be lifted multilaterally if possible. But while it has 
really talked to our allies individually on the matter, it has made no 
concerted effort within the Security Council to obtain a multilateral 
termination of this arms embargo on Bosnia.
  President Clinton and his team have been kept informed of our 
deliberations on this issue, and the President indicated his 
willingness to take this effort to the U.N. Security Council by 
November 1, unless the Bosnian Serbs have come up with signature and 
agreement of the contact group's July 6 decision.
  In a letter delivered yesterday, the President reaffirmed his 
commitment--he made it in writing--seeking a repeal of the embargo by 
the U.N. Security Council.
  Mr. President, there is another track, in addition to the 
multilateral track, because we all know that the President, when he 
goes to the Security Council, around October 15 or November 1, he may 
get there and the Security Council may turn him down.
  They may say we do not want anymore multilateral arms. What do we do 
then? We go much further in this resolution than we have gone before. 
If the U.N. Security Council refuses to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia 
and the Bosnian Serbs continue to reject the contact group peace 
proposal, funding for the participation in the United States forces in 
the arms embargo on Bosnia will be terminated no later than November 
15.
  Mr. President, the Senator from Kansas said we will be gone in 
October. Well, this is law. This will be law if it goes into effect, 
and this will be automatic on November 15 if these two conditions have 
not occurred.
  What does that mean? It means our military forces no longer will be 
part of enforcing the embargo. We will no longer have Navy ships out 
enforcing the arms embargo. That is a very important step.
  It is a unilateral step, but it is in no way in contravention of our 
national duties.
  When we vote for an embargo at the U.N. Security Council, we do not 
sign up as the policemen. There are other members around the world of 
the Security Council and of the General Assembly who are honoring the 
embargo, but they are not enforcing it. As far as I know, the Russians 
are not enforcing the embargo. It is mainly the United States and our 
allies in NATO.
  It is one thing to unilaterally violate an embargo and quite another 
thing to participate in its enforcement.
  I personally, and I believe our conference agreed, find it 
unacceptable that American sailors and airmen are being deployed and 
engaged on behalf of an embargo that makes no moral or other 
distinction between the perpetrators and the victims of aggression and 
genocide.
  Some believe we are legally obligated to observe the embargo as long 
as it remains in effect, although this view is debatable. But 
certainly, however, we are not obligated to provide ships and aircraft 
to enforce the embargo. There is a great difference between being a 
law-abiding citizen and joining the police force. We have joined the 
police force on this embargo that we have decried for the last 2 years 
both in Congress and from the White House.
  What this amendment does it does not say we are going to unilaterally 
breach the embargo. There is a clear line. Here it says we are not 
longer going to enforce it. We do not know the effect of that. Our 
allies, the British and French, the NATO allies, can continue if they 
choose to enforce it without U.S. military forces.
  I am not standing here saying it will end the embargo. It could, 
because it could have a very significant psychological effect. It could 
push the parties toward moving together before November 15 in some 
cohesive fashion. There is no guarantee of that, and we have to be 
prepared for that.
  Mr. President, the Congress would also direct the President to submit 
to the Congress within a specified period of time a plan to train the 
Bosnian Government forces for the purpose of enabling them to defend 
themselves and the Bosnian safe areas from Serbian attack. It is 
important to recognize that any Bosnian political entity, including the 
one proposed by the contact group, would have to be able to defend 
itself. But if the peace agreement goes into effect, if everybody signs 
up, that country, if it is ever going to be secure, it also has to have 
the right to defend itself.
  If we are really concerned about what has occurred there, and I 
really and truly believe everybody in this body is, if we are really 
concerned about the victims, then we have to start planning how they 
are going to be trained and how they are going to be armed with or 
without a peace agreement and, of course, without one it is much more 
urgent.
  Mr. President, a defenseless Bosnian entity would be a standing 
invitation to further bloodshed in former Yugoslavia. Only a Bosnian 
Government capable of defending itself can escape the lurches of those 
who seek a greater Serbia. I think our allies have to start 
understanding this. I believe it is essential that they start grasping 
this essential fact.
  Mr. President, if Bosnia continues to be without defenses, without 
adequate defenses, and if we decide to unilaterally lift the embargo 
because of that and if we go no further on training, if we do not get 
any kind of agreement on what we are going to do to train them, it is 
an invitation to outside forces to come into that area of the world and 
make the situation much worse than it is now. This is a situation, 
tragic enough. The spread of this Bosnian war would move on the scale 
from humanitarian and important concerns to the scale of vital concerns 
at which point there could be a point we would have no choice but to 
commit military forces, which no one wants to do.
  Mr. President, sooner or later we and the other countries will be 
called upon to help train and arm the Bosnian Government forces, even 
if there is a peace agreement. The issue is not whether but when and in 
what context, unilaterally or multilaterally, before a peace agreement 
or after.
  The international community, the same international community that is 
supporting the contact group effort to achieve a workable peace in 
Bosnia is obligated to assure Bosnia's military viability after a peace 
agreement is reached.
  It is my view that we should keep the international community 
involved. If we have to go the unilateral route, we are basically and 
in my opinion morally volunteering to take it on ourselves, not simply 
a declaration that lifts the embargo, but training an army because that 
is what they need. Lifting the embargo will have no meaning unless they 
are trained and have arms and can defend themselves. It will have no 
meaning.
  Mr. President, in fact I would amend that by saying it could have 
just a reverse meaning. It could alarm the Bosnian Serbs. It could 
cause attack, and when the attack comes the Bosnia Government will look 
around and say, what did this lifting of the embargo mean? We do not 
have training. We do not have antitank weapons. We do not have mortars. 
Where is it going to come from? It is not going to continue outside of 
the amendment we are voting on here today. Where is it going to come 
from?
  Finally, we would require the President to submit a plan and consult 
with the Congress regarding a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. 
If this amendment passes, it is a difference in planning and executing 
than it is implementing. This does not unilaterally lift the arms 
embargo, this amendment by myself and the Senator Maine and others.
  What the House-Senate conferees are proposing that is in our defense 
authorization bill is one last stab at obtaining a multilateral lifting 
of the arms embargo, and failing that, placing complete responsibility 
on the international community for its continued enforcement. This 
amendment says, we want to try to work with you, but if we cannot work 
with you, then it is up to you to enforce it. The other amendment says 
we are basically going to unilaterally declare where we are going, and 
then I assume we would have the courage of our convictions and 
hopefully in some other measure follow through with what is essential, 
which will be training and which will be military weapons.
  This proposal, the Nunn-Mitchell proposal, would do this in a 
nonprecipitous manner. It would ratchet up the pressure on both the 
U.N. Security Council and the Bosnian Serbs. If, in the interim, 
Bosnian Serb forces attack safe areas that have been declared safe 
areas, the administration is urged in this amendment to go to the U.N. 
Security Council and seek authorization immediately for a selective 
lifting of the arms embargo to enable the Bosnian Government to defend 
these safe areas.
  Mr. President, I think that should have already been done. Why should 
we limit ourselves only to bombing? Why not multilaterally, not 
unilaterally, given people are under attack in Sarajevo, a chance to 
defend themselves with defensive weapons, carefully selected and 
prepared for? That is what we ought to do multilaterally. At least it 
would present more options than simply trying to bomb difficult targets 
in populated areas.
  Mr. President, I fully understand the frustration of those who seek 
to lift the embargo now and who are prepared to act alone. But I urge 
each of the Senators who will vote for the Dole-Lieberman amendment to 
think through the consequences and to ask yourself are you ready to 
follow the line of and the concept that is required here, if you are 
going to think through this proposition properly, because simply 
lifting the embargo without providing arms, without providing training, 
you are doing virtually nothing but saying that American defense 
contractors can now export to Bosnia. You provide no money to pay for 
it, provide no training. I think we have to go much farther, if we are 
going to embark on this course, and I think this course is not wise. 
But if Congress is determined to take such an action, it should only do 
so after a multilateral lifting of the embargo is clearly impossible. 
We have not yet been to the Security Council and asked them to lift the 
embargo. There have been private conversations but we have not put that 
proposition down. The President is now saying he is willing to do it, 
no later than November 1.
  Mr. President, I also want to stress again that we have to provide 
sufficient time for U.N. forces and humanitarian workers to debark and 
the Bosnian Government forces to arm and train, and we have to do that 
whether we lift the embargo unilaterally or multilaterally.
  Those who favor a unilateral lifting now have an obligation to 
recognize the corresponding obligation to prepare both the Bosnians and 
our allies for the consequences of this unilateral action. They also 
have an obligation to carefully review the effect a unilateral lifting 
will have on continued and prospective allied participation in 
sanctions on Libya, Iraq, Haiti, and North Korea.
  If we break ranks with our allies on an embargo that we voted for 
under two administrations, Bush and Clinton, however unwisely, then 
other nations will forever cite our action as a precedent should they 
decide in the future that it is in their narrow interest to break ranks 
with us. The consequences of this will flow with our foreign policy for 
a long time.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to take up to 
10 minutes of Senator Dole's time. It is my understanding that Senator 
McCain wanted 2 minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Of my own time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Reserving the right to object.
  Mr. McCAIN. Never mind, Mr. President.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I do not intend to object to the 
unanimous consent request, but I would like to ask that I could follow 
the Senator from Texas after her 10 minutes and the Senator from 
Arizona after his 2 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The Senator from Texas is recognized.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
McCain be allowed to speak for 2 minutes, after which I would like to 
speak for up to 10 minutes from Senator Dole's time.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, if it is all right with the Senator from 
Texas, I yield that 2 minutes to the senior Senator from Texas, and I 
will take no more of my time. In fact, I will yield back the remainder 
of my time.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, may I ask for clarification, if the 
unanimous consent has been approved?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair believes that the Senator from 
Arizona is yielding 2 minutes of his time to the Senator from Texas 
[Mr. Gramm]. The junior Senator from Texas is to be recognized for a 
period of not to exceed 10 minutes on Senator Dole's time. And then the 
senior Senator from Arizona would be recognized.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. For 8 minutes on Senator Dole's time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Nunn's time remaining is 7 minutes 53 
seconds.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I am sorry. I confused this and I did 
not mean to.
  It is from Senator Dole's time, up to 8 minutes.
  I ask unanimous consent that that be included in the unanimous 
consent agreement.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I would be glad to yield time to the 
Senator from Arizona. I believe I have 20 minutes. I would be glad to 
yield 8 minutes to the senior Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. There is no objection. I thank my colleague.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Texas is recognized for 2 minutes.

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