[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 110 (Wednesday, August 10, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: August 10, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                Amendment No. 2528, As Further Modified

  Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, I suggested an addition to the 
Senator's amendment if he would consider it. I do believe there is 
another area that should be mentioned in this amendment and there are 
buildings that are specifically authorized and for which money has been 
appropriated that could be commenced. Would the Senator consider my 
suggested modification to his amendment?
  Mr. BOREN. I will be happy to consider that modification. Could the 
Senator tell me what the language would be? I see, ``unless 
specifically identified as a separate item in the President's annual 
fiscal year appropriation budget request or otherwise specifically 
authorized and appropriated.''
  Mr. STEVENS. Right.
  Mr. BOREN. I ask unanimous consent to modify the amendment further by 
adding after the word ``request,'' the words, ``or otherwise 
specifically authorized and appropriated.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Will the Senator please send a copy of that to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator please send a copy of that to 
the desk?
  Mr. BOREN. I send a copy to the desk.
  The amendment, with its modification, is as follows:

       On page 142, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following 
     new section:
       Sec.   . (a) No project for the construction of any 
     facility, or improvement to any facility, having an estimated 
     Federal cost in excess of $300,000, may be undertaken in any 
     fiscal year unless specifically identified as a separate item 
     in the President's annual fiscal year budget request or 
     otherwise specifically authorized and appropriated, if such 
     facility or improvement would be used primarily by personnel 
     of the intelligence community.
       (b) As used in this section, the term ``intelligence 
     community'' has the same meaning given that term in section 
     3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     401a(4)).

  Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I now urge the adoption of the amendment, 
as further modified.
  Mr. WALLOP addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. WALLOP. Madam President, I have no intention of mounting a 
ferocious opposition to this. But I will say to my friend who was the 
chairman and to the existing chairman and to the committee that this is 
as much the committee's fault as it is the fault of the National 
Reconnaissance Organization.
  To begin with, it was the committee that told the National 
Reconnaissance Organization to consolidate its budget. But most 
important, Madam President, there was a time on those committees when 
subcommittees were responsible for the oversight of specific elements. 
That now no longer exists. The chairman and vice chairman have held 
unto themselves the whole budget process, and now we go in and listen 
to budget presentations and none of us have the information--none of us 
have the information--upon which to make a judgment.
  So the change in the committee from the time when all of us had a 
little area of responsibility and, in fact, could have been asked why 
we allowed this to take place--this no longer exists.
  I have tried this year on the Intelligence Committee to get them to 
understand--our leadership on both sides; it is not a partisan issue--
that it is really important that we reestablish some element of 
accountability amongst the members of that committee. As it has 
evolved, it is a catastrophe, one of which has resulted in the way we 
now do it.
  In the old days, in the original time of the Intelligence Committee, 
we sat and we had areas of specific responsibility through 
subcommittees, and we had staff that could oversee and overlook these 
things.
  What has happened now is a harvest that was planted and sown when out 
of whatever reason, the past committee chairman--and I do not even know 
when it started, subsequent to the time I left there. And I am not 
blaming anybody. I am just telling the Senate that until we go back to 
the time when the rest of the committee is involved in the decisions of 
the Intelligence Oversight Committee, we are going to have more of 
these, not fewer.
  Mr. BOREN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I cannot comment on what the practice was 
of the past or the practice is now on the Intelligence Committee. I do 
not believe the Senator from Wyoming was serving on the Intelligence 
Committee during that period of time that I was chairman.
  But I say to my good friend from Wyoming, during the time that I was 
chairman, I felt there had been very insufficient budgetary oversight 
and, therefore, the full committee met en banc hour after hour. Let me 
say, we had extraordinary attendance in which we started looking at the 
budgets of all the various elements of the intelligence community. That 
was the number one item on our agenda for the full committee. We went 
over every one of them. We did not just look at the baseline from prior 
years. We made them start with their justifications from the beginning. 
And we divided up our staffs into separate sections that would look at 
the budgets for particular agencies.
  We then went further on construction projects, and I suppose the 
Senator from Wyoming might call this a subcommittee, but we set up a 
special task force of members at that time--I do not know if that 
practice is continuing--to particularly oversee construction projects 
and facilities decisions.
  Every single facilities decision, except this one, and the progress 
on those construction projects, except this one, as far as I know, was 
brought before that task force which was composed of some of the 
members of the Intelligence Committee. They looked at cost by square 
footage; they looked at the prevailing commercial costs of similar 
facilities. And in all of these cases--and I can remember CIA 
facilities; I can remember DIA facilities, NSA facilities--the agencies 
in question, Madam President, submitted specific requests for these 
facilities, accompanied by specific budgets, and year by year, asked by 
item for an amount of money to be appropriated for that project.
  We then, in addition, established during the time that I was chairman 
an independent audit unit for the first time so that we were simply not 
at the mercy of the Central Intelligence Agency or of the intelligence 
community to know if the money was being spent for the purpose for 
which we appropriated it.
  That special audit unit that was approved in legislation and signed 
into law by then President Bush was given the authority to move 
anywhere in the world to examine intelligence accounts and to oversee 
the spending of those funds.
  I might say, it was that independent audit unit that finally 
uncovered the full scope of what appeared to me to be significant cost 
overruns in this particular construction project. That was discovered 
only this year.
  But I say to my friend from Wyoming, I feel that the National 
Reconnaissance office, in this case, bears a very heavy responsibility 
for what has happened because, unlike all of the others--and I must say 
that I as chairman assumed that if they were expending significant 
sums, they would request line items of appropriations for these sums. 
They did not do so.
  I believe and, in fact, the very first briefing of any scale to the 
committee staff, interestingly, occurred in the period of time after 
the November 1992 elections when I was leaving the chairmanship, our 
staff members were leaving, our staff director, in fact, was working on 
a transition team, and the new staff of the new chairman was just not 
yet in place.
  So we have a very significant project in which year by year the 
agency in question did not identify any line item in its budget and the 
amount of money it was requesting for this construction project.
  So I think there was a significant lapse. That is the reason I am 
saying this, and I am not entering into what should now be the 
structure of the Intelligence Committee. I think that is appropriate 
for the current members.
  Mr. WALLOP. If the Senator will yield, I am not, either. But I am 
here to say that this is not entirely and exclusively the fault of the 
National Reconnaissance Organization. There is at least some level of 
blame to be placed within the committee and its lack of oversight.
  I say to the Senator, and I am not going to go on and debate the 
structure of it, but those budget hearings in which I participated this 
year were designed more to titillate than to inform, to show us the 
most amazing of the most amazing, and they were too short and they 
simply did not inform us.
  I am just saying that the Senate should, as it goes into its next 
year's oversight responsibility, take a look at what it was that was 
its part of the fault that allowed this to happen. There is no 
exclusive blame, and I am certainly not trying to assign any to any one 
person, the chairman or anyone else. But the structure now does not 
lend itself to finding out items of this kind.
  Mr. BOREN. Madam President, I will simply say to my good friend, at 
least during the period of time I was chairman, I would say the most 
significant part of my time, which averaged 4 to 5 hours a day, was 
spent trying to oversee the budget of the intelligence community and to 
make sure all the members of the committee had that information.
  I also have to tell the Senator that I feel, in this case, I was 
misled, and I think artfully misled, by the National Reconnaissance 
agency, and I think the members of the committee at that time were 
misled, because we were given only a very generalized idea, in spite of 
specific report language by our committee stating that that agency 
should come to the relevant committees and seek prior specific approval 
for their construction programs. They never came, and I think we had 
the right to assume they would come.
  Mr. WALLOP. I am not arguing the amendment, and I am certainly not 
trying to assign or lay blame. But this is not an exclusive problem.
  Mr. BOREN. I say to my good friend, I believe it is an exclusive 
problem in this particular individual case because I think when an 
agency does not come forward and specify where it is spending its money 
in construction programs, that that is a responsibility that they have. 
Now, it is certainly the responsibility of the committee then--and as I 
say, we had a task force that looked at construction of capital 
projects. I think it is appropriate. I think there should be a task 
force to look at it, composed of members, as well as having staff look 
at it.
  But I do think the National Reconnaissance office, just as the CIA, 
just as the NSA, just as the DIA, just as every other single 
intelligence organization itemizes construction requests down to the 
level of $300,000 or greater, the same standard followed in military 
construction projects. They should not be exempted from that 
requirement.
  Mr. WALLOP. Madam President, if the Senator will yield one more time, 
I am not quarreling with the conclusion or the solution that he 
presents. I just do believe that we in the Senate, if we seek only to 
assign blame and never to accept, will probably not get to the point 
where all things are fixed.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, will the Senator yield to the Senator 
from Virginia?
  Mr. BOREN. I would be happy to yield.
  Mr. WARNER. The committee today held a hearing, somewhat in excess of 
3 hours, on this precise issue. As the Senator from Wyoming stated--and 
I think quite correctly--I acknowledged in my opening statement and in 
the course of my questioning that there were options that our 
committee, possibly under the Senator's jurisdiction as chairman, 
possibly under the period that I have shared the responsibility with 
Senator DeConcini, could have taken to force the National 
Reconnaissance Office to be more forthcoming. An example was the 
specific language contained in the intelligence authorization bill in 
1992. When the answers were not forthcoming, we could have simply said, 
``Not one dollar more until you do this.'' But for certain reasons, we 
did not do that.
  So I think the Senator from Wyoming is correct in his observation. 
However, in the course of the hearing, I think in a spirit of fairness, 
both the Department of Defense through the Deputy Secretary, Mr. 
Deutch, and to some degree the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and later the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Harris, 
and others, acknowledged that perhaps there was not that degree of 
communication that is essential to enable the legislative branch, which 
has a small staff, to evaluate this project. Madam President, in this 
instance we had one staff person, Art Grant, a very fine individual, 
versus, as elicited from the NRO, 25 persons they have dealing with the 
budget.
  So there is some limitation imposed by virtue of the size of the 
staff of the Senate Committee on Intelligence as to its ability to get 
into the details if the information is not forthcoming on a voluntary 
basis from the NRO.
  So somewhere between these two poles lies the true story, and as yet, 
we are still trying to ascertain the full range of facts. And I would 
hope that all interested would reserve final judgment until such time 
as all those facts are before this body.
  Madam President, if I might just say, I will have further comment--
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma has the floor.
  Mr. BOREN. I will yield further to the Senator.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I was simply going to add I will ask 
unanimous consent to include a statement, and that I should like to 
have my statement appear with that given by the Senator from Nevada as 
it relates to his amendment, which I support as a cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. BOREN. Madam President, again I do not want to quarrel or prolong 
this discussion, but let me say the Senator from Virginia has just made 
the point, that the staff, even though we established a new independent 
audit unit during the time the Senator from Virginia was a member of 
the committee, a very important addition, because it left us some 
device of our own to be able to check to see how the agencies were 
spending the funds that were appropriated, an ability we never had 
before, we had a limited staff.
  That independent audit unit has two people to try to go out and spot-
check the entire intelligence budget to see if there was compliance on 
an independent basis on the part of the committee. In this case, one 
person on the staff was trying to oversee a functional area that 
included the National Reconnaissance Office. Let me say that we had 2 
years in a row--and I quote this language--2 years in a row at least 
during the time I was there, and I do not know if this language was 
repeated later after I left the chairmanship, but the last 2 years I 
was chairman and this matter began to move, we had the language:
  Facility acquisition will remain subject to the prior approval of the 
appropriate Congressional committees.
  Now, there was never a line item or a specific request made by this 
organization for facility acquisition or improvement and therefore none 
was ever submitted to us to give prior approval.
  Now, we worked very hard during the time that I was chairman, and 
other members worked very diligently with me, to establish a bipartisan 
atmosphere in that committee, and an atmosphere of mutual trust between 
the intelligence community and the committee which was charged with 
oversight so that we would never be in a position again in which we had 
to ask exactly the right question and we had to know a lot of 
information in advance, some information we could not possibly have 
known, to have asked exactly the right question to have found out the 
information.
  I think in this case this is clearly an example in which the 
community put us in the position of having to know a lot of information 
to ask exactly the right question in order to elicit the required 
information, and when we had report language directing them to come 
back to us and make specific requests for facilities improvements and 
acquisitions, I think that clearly the NRO was derelict in not meeting 
those requests of the committee.
  And as one who has tried year in and year out to support the 
legitimate requests of the intelligence community, let me say that I 
think this was a total lapse on their part, and I do not think it was a 
course of action aimed at allowing the Congress to play its appropriate 
role in the oversight or in the appropriation of funds.
  So, Madam President, I would urge the adoption of the amendment. We 
can argue about the past. We can argue about affixing blame in the 
past. I think the important thing is that we assure that the NRO, like 
every other intelligence agency, will have to submit requests on 
construction projects in the future whenever they are undertaking 
projects in excess of $300,000, a standard now being followed by all of 
the other intelligence agencies which worked very well. We were able to 
give complete oversight over the others because they made such 
requests.
  I think it needs to be put in place as a matter to prevent this kind 
of thing from happening in the future.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further discussion?
  The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2528), as further modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. INOUYE. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2545

  (Purpose: To provide additional funds for certain Ballistic Missile 
                          Defense activities)

  Mr. WALLOP addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming is recognized.
  Mr. WALLOP. Madam President, I call up my amendment numbered 2545.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Wyoming [Mr. Wallop] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2545.

  Mr. WALLOP. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 39, line 2, strike out the period at the end and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``: Provided further, That not less 
     than $120,000,000 shall be available for Sea-Based Wide Area 
     Defense System (Navy Upper Tier): Provided further, That not 
     more than $522,725,000 shall be available for Defense 
     Reinvestment Programs.''.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, will the Senator from Wyoming yield?
  Mr. WALLOP. I would be happy to yield to the chairman.
  Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 40 
minutes on the amendment, 20 minutes to each side, 20 minutes to be 
under the control of the Senator from Wyoming, and 20 minutes under the 
control of the Senator from Hawaii or his designee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.
  Mr. WALLOP. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. WALLOP. Madam President, I yield myself 12 minutes of the time 
allotted.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator is recognized 
for 12 minutes.
  Mr. WALLOP. Madam President, I offer an amendment to increase funding 
for a critical theater missile defense program: the Sea-Based Wide Area 
Defense Program, also known as Navy upper tier. The budget request for 
this program is $17.7 million. At that level of funding this highly 
promising program is essentially standing still. This was not a serious 
budget request, and if we fund the program at this level we will send 
the message that we too are not serious about this program.
  My amendment would increase funding for Navy upper tier by $102 
million, for a total of $120 million in fiscal year 1995. This is the 
exact level provided by the House Appropriations Committee--and it is 
the amount needed if this program is to become a coherent and high-
priority part of our theater missile defense efforts.
  To offset this funding increase, my amendment would reduce by the 
same amount funds available for defense reinvestment programs--the so-
called Defense Conversion Program. Even after this cut, this 
appropriations bill would still provide over $520 million for defense 
conversion. By any honest measure, this is plenty, even excessive, 
given the likely benefits of the conversion program and the many other 
defense requirements that remain underfunded.
  Let me briefly describe why the Navy Upper Tier Program needs more 
money and why it makes sense to take these funds from the Defense 
Conversion Program.
  First of all, let us be clear that the administration's budget 
request for Navy Upper Tier in no way represents a serious effort to 
proceed with the program. At this level of funding, the most we can 
accomplish is a series of modest tests and studies. Recognizing this, 
and wanting Navy Upper Tier to become a genuine Theater Missile Defense 
Development and Acquisition Program, three of the four committees with 
oversight responsibility made additional funds available for this 
program.
  The Senate Appropriations Committee did not provide additional funds 
for this program largely due to a concern that such a plus-up was 
premature. I have examined one program closely and consulted with the 
Navy, and I am here to tell the Senate that additional funds are not 
premature; in fact they are badly needed if we want to get moving any 
time soon.
  The Navy, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and several 
major aerospace contractors have already produced detailed studies of 
what it would take to modify the existing Aegis Air Defense System into 
a wide-area theater missile defense system. It is important to 
emphasize that we are not talking about reinventing the wheel. One of 
the great advantages of a sea-based theater missile defense is that it 
relies on an existing system and infrastructure. The Navy's Aegis Air 
Defense System is already developed, deployed and proven. With minor 
modification--mostly in software--this system can become a highly 
effective wide-area theater missile defense system.
  The Navy Upper Tier Program also builds on progress already made in 
the Navy's lower tier effort and BMDO's Lightweight Exoatmospheric 
Projectile [LEAP] Program. Later this year, the Navy will conduct two 
LEAP tests using a terrier missile booster. None of these efforts are 
fundamentally new--all are well underway and well understood.
  If we keep Navy upper tier funding at $17.7 million, as requested, 
the Navy will be able to do little more than concept exploration. With 
$120 million, on the other hand, the Navy could take the following 
important steps during fiscal year 1995:
  Conduct one additional Terrier/LEAP test--which would reduce the 
technical risk of developing a tactically capable LEAP kill vehicle and 
would improve lethality and guidance accuracy.
  Initiate aegis combat system engineering development for theaterwide 
capability.
  Initiate integration of the standard missile-2--(SM-2)--block IV and 
LEAP to allow earlier fielding of capability.
  Provide an option for a deployable prototype system--known as UOES--
by 1998.
  Provide an option to deploy an operational system by the year 2000.
  Provide an integrated, two-tier sea-based theater missile defense 
system by the turn of the century.
  As you can see, Madam President, we can get a tremendous theater 
missile defense capability with a relatively modest investment, and we 
can have it relatively soon if only we start now. This is not to say 
that the Navy Upper Tier Program faces no challenges or that we will be 
able to have a deployed system overnight. It is to say, however, that 
we are in no way prevented by technology from moving forward now, only 
by money and level of commitment.
  Why do we need such a capability? The answer should be obvious to 
anyone who takes a serious look at the expanding threat posed by 
theater ballistic missiles. The trend is toward longer range missiles 
with more and more countries in possession of such a capability. We now 
know that North Korea is developing three new ballistic missiles--the 
No Dong, which can reach much of Japan, and two longer range systems 
that may cover much of the Pacific--potentially even threatening United 
States territory there. Many other potentially hostile countries are 
also developing or otherwise acquiring such ballistic missiles.
  Madam President, the Navy Upper Tier Program promises to be both a 
highly affordable and capable theater missile defense system that could 
be developed before the turn of the century. Operating in conjunction 
with the Army's THAAD and advanced Patriot systems, the Navy upper tier 
system would give the United States a genuinely effective capability to 
defend against ballistic missiles.
  A Navy missile defense system could be forward deployed and would not 
depend on any special basing rights. Moreover, it would not occupy 
scarce air- and sea-lift resources that would be much in demand at the 
beginning of any future conflict. For these and many other operational 
reasons--to say nothing of the modest cost--we would be irresponsible 
for not aggressively pursuing this option.
  But of course funds are limited, as the distinguished chairman of the 
subcommittee has reminded us. My amendment, however, offers a means for 
paying for this important program. I propose to reduce funds for the 
Defense Conversion Program from $625 to $522 million in order to offset 
the increase in Navy upper tier.
  My personal belief is that the Defense Conversion Program is an 
unaffordable luxury that could be cut back even further. Although there 
may be some useful research conducted under this program, it is pretty 
clear that it benefits defense capability only marginally. I have been 
told by numerous people in industry--including some who have directly 
benefited by defense conversion contracts--that this money would be 
better spent on real defense development and acquisition programs.
  The Defense Conversion Program is intended in large part to be a 
means of preserving the defense industrial base. Instead, it has become 
a drain on limited resources. The Senator from Hawaii has correctly 
pointed out the inadequacy of the funds now available for defense 
procurement. I join him in expressing alarm over the erosion of the 
defense industrial base. Quite simply, we are eating our seed corn and 
hoping that we will not face another major threat in the future.
  At the same time, however, this bill proposes to spend $625 million 
on a whole range of interesting, but not particularly useful, hobby 
horses in the name of defense conversion. We simply cannot afford to 
spend this kind of money on projects that have little or no direct 
benefit to the national security of the United States. Projects that 
are truly meritorious should rise to the top and be selected for 
funding based on the normal DOD process. By making available a huge pot 
of money and simply saying come and get it, we are sure to waste much 
of it.
  Virtually every expert that I have consulted with regarding the 
defense industrial base has confirmed that the best way to preserve 
that base is to keep it busy working on real defense research, 
development; and acquisition efforts. To the extent that the Defense 
Conversion Program takes away money from these activities, it actually 
is detrimental to the defense industrial base and national security.
  My amendment proposes to take just over $100 million away from this 
fund and use it for something that will not only contribute to the 
defense industrial base but also will beef-up our inadequate efforts in 
the area of theater missile defense. To illustrate this point, let me 
just list the contractors that are already working on the Navy Upper 
Tier Program:
  Hughes Missile Systems Co.--Canoga Park, CA.
  Boeing Aircraft Co.--Seattle, WA.
  Rockwell International--Canoga Park, CA.
  Thiokol Corp.--Elkton, MD.
  Raytheon Corp.--Bedford, MA.
  Aerojet Corp.--Sacramento, CA.
  If the Navy upper tier program gets off the ground, this list is sure 
to grow, as contractors, subcontractors and vendors realize that this 
is a dedicated effort.
  I would be willing to bet that any one of these companies would 
rather be working on a contract to build real defenses against 
ballistic missiles than taking defense conversion contracts that don't 
create any defense capability at all. And I would also be willing to 
bet that each of these companies would confirm that money spent on a 
program such as Navy upper tier is more likely to preserve key elements 
of their productive base than anything that they could get from a 
defense conversion contract.
  In sum, Madam President, this amendment would transfer $102 million 
from a wasteful and overfunded program to one that is highly 
meritorious and woefully underfunded. The choice is clear: Dedicate 
these funds to a program that will defend Americans against a dangerous 
and growing threat--and at the same time help preserve the defense 
industrial base--or spend it on an ill-defined and bloated barrel of 
pork.
  (Mr. ROBB assumed the chair.)
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, interesting to note and very probably hard 
to see. But here is a map of what would take place if we had such a 
program. Here is what we can potentially do now. This is the Sea of 
Japan and the aegis cruiser, and we can barely touch a piece of the 
Japanese mainland against the North Korean threat. Were we to do this 
upper tier program, we would take all of the Japanese islands. Mr. 
President, the only way we can defend Hawaii, the only way we can 
defend Alaska, the only way we can defend either of our coasts, and 
many of our allies, is through this program.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER. I would like to ask for a minute or 2 in support of the 
Senator's amendment.
  Mr. WALLOP. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator from 
Wyoming. Perhaps no one in recent history of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, to my knowledge, has had a better grasp of the whole concept 
of strategic defenses, and particularly those involving theater nuclear 
defenses, than the distinguished Senator from Wyoming. As he departs 
the Senate this year, he will be sorely missed. Many of us are doing 
our very best to fill the void that he will leave.
  This is an amendment that the two of us have discussed. I strongly 
support it. I asked that I be made a cosponsor because it would be 
unconscionable for our Nation, given the experience we had in the gulf 
with those short-range Scud missiles, to ever again forward deploy men 
and women in the Armed Forces without adequate protection from theater 
ballistic systems. And this is precisely what this amendment does. It 
begins to bring back up that measure of funding that is essential to 
keep this program alive and at a level that will properly provide this 
Nation with that deterrent at sea that is needed.
  Mr. WALLOP. The Senator will agree with me that when three of the 
four committees of jurisdiction have said, A, that the request is 
underfunded and that, B, this is the only means by which we hope to 
achieve the goal and the deterrent that we have; this is the only way 
we are ever going to get it done.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I concur in that observation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Chair recognizes the Senator from Hawaii.


                      Unanimous Consent Agreement

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on 
or in relation to the Wallop amendment No. 2535 occur without any 
intervening action or debate immediately following the disposition of 
the McCain amendment No. 2501.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Wallop 
amendment be temporarily set aside for no more than 2 minutes to take 
up consideration of the Breaux amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment by the Senator from Wyoming is temporarily laid aside.
  The Chair recognizes the Senator from Louisiana, Senator Breaux.
  Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I first of all thank the distinguished 
chairman of the appropriations subcommittee for his consideration and 
also the Senator from Wyoming.


                           Amendment No. 2547

  Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk numbered 
2547 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Breaux] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2547.

  Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place, insert:
       Sec.   . Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
     Secretary of the Navy shall obligate, within thirty days of 
     this Act becoming law, not less than $29,750,000 from the 
     funds appropriated in this Act or previous Acts under the 
     heading ``Aircraft Procurement, Navy'', solely to procure, on 
     an urgent basis, AN/USH-42 mission recorders modified for use 
     in S-3B aircraft.

  Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I say to my colleagues briefly in fiscal 
year 1992 and fiscal year 1993 the Congress in the defense 
appropriations bill appropriated funds for the AN/USH-42 mission 
recorder program to be used within the A-6 aircraft program.
  In the 1994 appropriations bill, the Congress ordered the Navy to 
verify that that mission recorder is required in the future for Navy 
aircraft for peacetime training involving damage assessment in combat.
  The assessment by the Navy is completed, and the Navy said there is 
no particular requirement for the mission recorder based primarily on 
the decision to retire the A-6 aircraft. However, Mr. President, the 
Navy has conducted in their own words an independent review to examine 
other platforms for possible use of the AN/USH-42 and have determined 
that a modified AN/USH-42 could beat the S-3 attack aviation mission 
recorder requirements. In other words, the Navy is saying it cannot use 
it on the A-6 that is being phased out, but they can use it for their 
S-3 attack aviation operations.
  Mr. President, my amendment simply directs the Navy to, in fact, use 
these mission recorders on S-3B aircraft, as I have explained, and I 
will ask for approval of my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  Mr. INOUYE. We have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate? If not the question 
occurs on the amendment offered by the Senator from Louisiana.
  The amendment (No. 2547) was agreed to.
  Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. INOUYE. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WALLOP addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, the time situation being the Senator from 
Wyoming has used up something in the neighborhood of 12 or 13 minutes 
of his time, I would ask he be allowed to reserve his time if you want 
to go to another amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will remind the Senator he has 8 
minutes and 35 seconds under his control remaining.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, in view of the fact there no opposition 
time has been utilized, I would not like to share it equally. I do not 
think that is quite appropriate.
  I ask unanimous consent that until such time as someone is prepared 
to oppose it, unless the two leaders would like to drop the time 
agreement and vitiate the yeas and nays and they would accept it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous consent 
request propounded by the Senator from Wyoming to allocate time 
equally?
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the Senator from New Mexico should be 
coming shortly to discuss this matter in opposition. But in the 
meantime, I ask unanimous consent that the Wallop amendment be 
temporarily set aside to accommodate the Senator from Nevada for no 
more than 5 minutes.
  Mr. BRYAN. Six minutes at the outset.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I shall 
not object, I want the Chair to make clear my request was not to divide 
the time equally.
  Mr. INOUYE. Without the time running on either side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous consent 
request propounded by the Senator from Hawaii?
  If not, it is so ordered, and the Senator from Nevada, Senator Bryan, 
is recognized.
  Mr. BRYAN. I thank the Chair and I thank the floor manager.
  I might inquire of the Presiding Officer the amendment number of the 
Bryan amendment which was offered earlier this evening.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will inform the Senator that the 
number is 2502.
  Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
DeConcini and Senator Warner be added as original cosponsors to the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Arizona and Virginia are added as original 
cosponsors.


                     National Reconnaissance Office

  Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I earlier commented before the time 
pursuant to the unanimous consent had expired on another matter to 
begin explaining the nature of this amendment. It deals with the 
National Reconnaissance Office, which most of us were startled to learn 
yesterday morning, is now estimated to cost between $310 million and 
$350 million.
  The genesis of this building dates back to the early 1990's and late 
1980's in which the intelligence committees of the respective bodies 
were encouraging the colocation of some facilities that were scattered 
all over the country into a single facility.
  I was not a member of the committee at that time, having just joined 
last year.
  But earlier this afternoon, as part of a Senate Intelligence 
Committee hearing, I had occasion to review the record as I did 
yesterday with staff. Suffice it to say that the distinguished senior 
Senator from Virginia, the ranking member of the Intelligence 
Committee, who was a member of the committee during all of the times 
that are relevant to the construction of this National Reconnaissance 
Office made the assertion that at no time did the National 
Reconnaissance Office indicate to the Senate Intelligence Committee 
that it was preparing to build a building of a magnitude of a million 
square feet, the cost of which is about $175 per square foot, and that 
what really occurred is it was incrementally included in the baseline 
but never specifically authorized prior to its commencement.
  Mr. President, I say that my reading of the Record reaches the same 
conclusion as the distinguished Senator from Virginia.
  Now, in the hearing this afternoon we learned that the head of the 
CIA and the Under Secretary for the Department of Defense are 
conducting a review.
  The purpose of the amendment which I have offered is to seek to 
withhold any unobligated funds to be committed to the further 
expenditures in this building until such time as that review is 
completed and a report made back to the Intelligence Committees of the 
Senate and of the other body.
  Let me emphasize it is not my purpose to in any way interfere with 
any contractural relationship that currently exists, but we know that 
at least $50 million is unobligated for such items prospectively, 
furnishings and fixtures of these elaborate facilities.
  It is absolutely shocking, Mr. President, because four towers are 
under construction. The fourth tower, the most elaborate, the fanciest, 
which has huge office space and has very, very extravagant provisions 
in it, was authorized in 1992 by the National Reconnaissance Office. 
That is after the implosion of the former Soviet Union, after the 
Berlin Wall came down, after the Warsaw Pact had disintegrated.
  This is highly irresponsible conduct and, in my judgment, is an 
absolute outrage to the taxpayers.
  One of my colleagues during the course of this afternoon's hearing 
referred to it as a goldplated palace, and it is that.
  So the purpose of this amendment is simply to say that before you 
spend any more unallocated moneys for any aspect of this project, since 
it has never been before the Senate Intelligence Committee, for a 
preauthorization from start to finish, that the committee have an 
opportunity to look into it. We have an opportunity, Mr. President, to 
save tens of millions of taxpayers' dollars if we act promptly, and I 
am hoping that the distinguished floor managers can support this 
amendment.
  I emphasize we do not in any way impinge upon existing contractual 
rights, and this money would be subject to review after this executive 
agency review which I have described.
  I yield the floor and thank the floor managers for accommodating me 
and thank my colleagues who joined as sponsors.


                    Amendment No. 2502, as Modified

  Mr. INOUYE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Nevada yield?
  Mr. BRYAN. The Senator from Nevada would be happy to do so.
  Mr. INOUYE. May I suggest that the amendment be modified so that on 
page 2, on the last line, line 6, we add a comma after 
``Representatives'' and add the following: ``and the House and Senate 
Committees on Appropriations.''
  Mr. BRYAN. I am agreeable with such an amendment.
  Mr. INOUYE. With that modification, the managers will accept the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the modification.
  If not, the amendment is modified accordingly.
  The amendment (No. 2502), as modified, is as follows:
       On page 142, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following 
     new section:
       Sec.   . Of the funds made available by this Act for the 
     National Reconnaissance Office under the classified Schedule 
     of Appropriations accompanying this Act, funds allocated for 
     construction of the headquarters buildings of the National 
     Reconnaissance Office which were unobligated as of the date 
     of enactment of this Act may not be obligated or expended 
     until the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary 
     of Defense have completed a review of that construction 
     project and the results of such review have been disclosed to 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
     Senate and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I simply want to express my appreciation to 
the distinguished Senators from Hawaii and Alaska for accepting the 
amendment. I do think we have an opportunity to correct what is clearly 
an excessive expenditure.
  I thank them both for their responsible action.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  If not, the question is on agreeing to amendment No. 2502, as 
modified, offered by the Senator from Nevada.
  The amendment (No. 2502), as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. STEVENS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. INOUYE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii, Senator Inouye.


                           Amendment No. 2545

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I believe I should respond to the Senator 
from Wyoming to explain to the Senate the reasons for the action taken 
by the committee.
  The committee, in studying the request by the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization, provided the full budget request amount that the 
BMDO had suggested, $18 million, and we could not go beyond that.
  It is true that the House has added funds for this program and we 
felt that it could be considered in conference. It may interest my 
colleagues to know that in a memo dated July 11 of this year, the Chief 
of Naval Operations, Admiral Boorda, stated that the lower tier system 
was the Navy's first priority. The Department is just now beginning a 
cost and operational effectiveness analysis of this upper tier program.
  Therefore, adding funds or accelerating this program before this cost 
and operational effectiveness analysis is complete would be premature 
and prejudges the outcome of the DOD analysis, which itself will cost 
about $5 million to complete.
  So, all in all, because of the technical concerns and the ongoing 
analysis, the committee felt that any acceleration in the Navy upper 
tier missile program would be premature.
  Mr. WALLOP addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized accordingly.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I feel as though I am being done in; that 
the opposition to this amendment is reserving all of its time and sort 
of calling on me to waste mine.
  But let me just say, I realize the Navy requested only the $17.6 
million. But the problem is that the Navy was instructed to request--
and this would not be the first time in the experience of the Senator 
from Wyoming--that the Appropriations Committee, specifically the 
subcommittee headed by the distinguished chairman, ignore what the Navy 
requested or the Army and Air Force requested, and ignore, in fact, 
what the Senate Armed Services Committee did.
  We once had a rather gruesome little fight on the floor, which I will 
admit that I lost. One of the reasons I lost was because they 
appropriated things for which we had no authorizations. They 
appropriated things for which there were higher authorizations.
  The purpose of the amendment of the Senator from Wyoming is to do one 
thing: To take the money, the $100 million, out of defense conversion, 
which is nothing but a corporate entitlement program, and put it into 
something that buys some defense for Americans. And three of the four 
committees of oversight have recommended this.
  Mr. President, it is a question, when the administration and 
everybody says the only thing really threatening Americans and their 
allies now is missile proliferation, that we say we are going to spend 
a piddly little $17.6 million, which even the Navy now says is a waste 
of money and will get us nowhere nearer our goal. We will have some 
reports made and some lovely bound books printed, and other kinds of 
things, but we will not be able to defend ourselves from anything.
  What the Senator from Wyoming is trying to do is to take the money 
that has been said to be useful and to provide a defense. And, keep in 
mind, Mr. President, that the Army THAAD and other kinds of things have 
to be moved overseas or through the air; the Air Force's programs are 
not yet available to us; the Navy's can be deployed with all the kinds 
of confrontation that took us how many months to make a piddly decision 
to move an inadequate system to Korea called the Patriot.
  The Navy--again, let me show the map of what it can do. Here is what 
Aegis can now do. This is Korea and all of this under here is Japan. 
Look at what would happen if we had the Navy upper tier, the kidney-
shaped thing. You can take care of all of Japan, and most of the 
western Alaskan islands down through Korea and Taiwan. We will either 
be able to do something useful about defending Americans and American 
allies from missiles or we will waste money spending $17.6 million and 
$100 million buying no defense.
  Mr. President, almost two-thirds of $1 billion has gone into this 
corporate thing called defense conversion, which buys Americans 
nothing. And it is supposed to sustain the defense industrial base. How 
can you defend the defense industrial base by wasting money on things 
that do not result in weapons or security?
  This is a small little thing. In case the Senator from Wyoming is 
wrong, $100 million out of two-thirds of $1 billion going into 
something that all of us know is of use, can produce, and has the 
technology. We merely need to know how to integrate it.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
permitted to yield a minute to the Senator from Maine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Maine is recognized for up to 1 minute.


                           Amendment No. 2548

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, yesterday I advised Senator Inouye that I 
intended to offer an amendment to this appropriations bill dealing with 
the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.
  My understanding is that my staff submitted the language itself about 
a few minutes after 7 o'clock, and so it would not qualify under the 
unanimous consent agreement. So I now ask unanimous consent that this 
amendment be allowed to be considered during the debate before the 
conclusion of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous consent 
request propounded by the Senator from Maine to consider the amendment?
  If not, the amendment is in order.
  Mr. COHEN. I thank my friend from Hawaii.


                           Amendment No. 2545

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time.
  Mr. STEVENS. Does the Senator have any time left?
  Mr. WALLOP. Would the Chair state the time circumstance?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time remaining chargeable to the Senator 
from Wyoming is 4 minutes and 20 seconds. The time remaining to the 
Senator from Hawaii is 17 minutes and 4 seconds.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. INOUYE. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Alaska.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska, Senator Stevens, is 
recognized for up to 5 minutes.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the chairman of the subcommittee is 
generous, because I rise to support the amendment of the Senator from 
Wyoming, which I know that the Senator from Hawaii does not support.
  I believe that Senator Wallop has correctly noted the emergency 
situation in the ballistic missile threats that face us in the northern 
Asia area. I do believe that we have reviewed these intensively in the 
Intelligence and Appropriations Committees. The flexibility that would 
be afforded by a sea base system is essential. In my judgment, we 
should proceed now.
  While I have joined the chairman in supporting the defense 
reinvestment budget, I do believe that Senator Wallop's amendment 
addresses a much greater need. He addresses the acute shortfall in our 
missile defense effort. He addresses the acute shortfall in our missile 
defense effort. Development of Patriot, ERINT and THAD meet the land-
based requirements. The Senator correctly noted there is this emergency 
in the Asian area, and I believe his amendment should be adopted.

  I yield the remainder of the time that was yielded me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent Senator McCain be 
listed as a cosponsor and reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator withhold that? Would it be in order to 
set aside this amendment and turn to the amendment of the Senator from 
Idaho? Could we set aside the Wallop amendment? We are still waiting 
for one person to speak on that. I ask unanimous consent the pending 
amendment be set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The time 
allotted under the previous order is set aside, and the Senator from 
Idaho, Senator Kempthorne, is recognized for up to 5 minutes.


                           Amendment No. 2538

 (Purpose: To restrict funding for United States military personnel in 
                                Somalia)

  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and 
ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Idaho [Mr. Kempthorne], for himself, Mr. 
     Warner and Mr. Craig, proposes an amendment numbered 2538.

  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     new section:


   restriction on funding united states military personnel in somalia

       Sec.   . None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be 
     used for the continuous presence in Somalia of United States 
     military personnel after September 30, 1994.

  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Warner and Senator Craig be added as original cosponsors.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, in January of this year I visited 
Mogadishu. I was astounded at what I saw there in Somalia. An effort 
that had begun for relief purposes, for humanitarian purposes, to feed 
starving people at that point in time had become a situation where you 
were stepping into a war zone. It was absolutely apparent that it was a 
dangerous place to be.
  Of course, it is there we lost 18 very brave Rangers.
  Last year the Senator from West Virginia offered an amendment that 
was adopted by Congress. It said we prohibit the deployment of U.S. 
combat troops in Somalia after March 31, 1994. That was accomplished. 
But it did allow for a small contingent of U.S. military to remain 
there in order to provide protection for U.S. diplomats who would also 
remain there. We have 58 marines who are members of the fleet 
antiterrorist security team who are in place, and 20 diplomats. I have 
to say with regard to these Americans--the marines, the diplomats--it 
takes guts to be there. They have it. I also should note offshore we 
have an amphibious ready group, a Marine expeditionary unit. So we have 
about 4,000 U.S. military personnel off the coast of Somalia who are 
there in the event we need to go in for rapid extraction of U.S. 
personnel.
  We were assured that after June 30 of this year, all of the military 
personnel would be out of Somalia. It was by happenstance I learned 
that June 30 came and went and our military personnel were not out of 
Somalia. I discussed this with the Armed Services chairman, Senator 
Nunn, and with the ranking member, Senator Thurmond. We held a hearing 
on July 21, 1994. As a result of that hearing, where we were briefed by 
the Department of Defense and by the State Department, 16 of the 22 
members of the Armed Services Committee sent a letter immediately to 
the President of the United States urging him to withdraw all U.S. 
military personnel from Somalia by August 14.
  We can see that date is not going to be met. But let me just read the 
names of those Senators who signed this letter urging that withdrawal: 
Senators Nunn, Thurmond, Byrd, Warner, Shelby, Coats, Levin, Smith, 
Graham, Cohen, McCain, Lott, Lieberman, Faircloth, Hutchison and 
myself.
  So why do I raise this issue? When you have an embassy in a country, 
are you not normally going to have a Marine detachment that is there to 
protect your diplomats? The problem is there is no embassy. There is no 
embassy and there is no one to protect that because there is no 
government in Somalia.
  Normally, a host government provides protection in the streets 
surrounding the area where your personnel are located. This is what is 
in the streets of Somalia. This is a picture of one of the technicals. 
These are the vehicles that are roaming throughout Somalia with a 
concentration in Mogadishu. You can see here a 50-caliber machinegun. 
You can see this individual is holding a rocket-propelled grenade 
launcher. This is the same sort of equipment that was used to down the 
aircraft when the firefight erupted that caused the death of the 
Rangers. That is what is roaming the streets of Mogadishu.
  Is it just one faction? Absolutely not. You have Aideed and you have 
Ali Mhadi--two factions. And it is very clear that they are back at 
war. It is very clear, according to the State Department, that their 
attitude is winner take all, no reconciliation in sight.
  Where are our marines staying? Where are the diplomats? Here is a 
photograph of Mogadishu. The compound where they are located. This 
fence is what separates them. Repeatedly--repeatedly the U.S. 
Government has complained to the United Nations of the lack of security 
of the perimeter of this facility. It is not being addressed. So what 
is the assessment?
  The Honorable Chas Freeman, who is the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, has stated with regard to Somalia: ``The situation has 
continued to deteriorate. Prospects for national reconciliation are 
bleak. And U.S., UNISOM, and relief organization personnel are 
increasingly in danger.''
  Let me remind this body of what President Clinton stated with regard 
to our goals in Somalia. He said, ``It is not our job to rebuild 
Somalia's society or even to create a political process that can allow 
Somalia's clans to live and work in peace. The Somalis must do that for 
themselves.''
  So what is the assessment, then, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the 
Armed Services of the United States? They say that there is: A high 
threat of attacks, banditry, looting for all unsecured movements and 
facilities; No political settlement in sight; Large scale inter-clan 
fighting expected; High threat of spillover violence against U.S./U.N. 
personnel; The United Nation's are selectively targeted. The United 
States is also now being selectively targeted. Chance will attack when 
they perceive U.S. and U.N. interference.
  Mr. President, 58 marines are in that situation. They are the best 
fighting individuals of any armed service in the world. But 58 marines 
in that situation are a token force. And one of the lessons that we 
have learned is, you go in with an overwhelming force or you simply get 
yourself in a real dilemma; 58 marines in that environment is just 
enough to get in trouble.
  The amendment I offer would cut off funds for the continuous 
deployment of U.S. military personnel in Somalia after September 30, 
1994. The amendment would result in the withdrawal of U.S. military 
personnel from Somalia by October 1, 1994. But after consultation with 
various experts, it would not tie the President's hands regarding any 
future military deployments to Somalia.
  As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I remember the hearing 
we held where we listened to the fathers of the Rangers who were killed 
in Somalia. I remember every one of us was deeply moved by that. And I 
remember they raised the question as to whether or not their sons had 
died in vain. But they said they hoped we have learned something from 
that and, if we had learned something from that that might protect 
other personnel in Somalia, it would not be in vain.
  Mr. President, every assessment that you will look to from the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, from the Department of Defense, from the State 
Department say that there is no reconciliation in sight in Somalia. Why 
then are we continually leaving at risk U.S. personnel?
  It is absolutely time for them to be withdrawn from Somalia and for 
us to move that 4,000 amphibious-ready group from the coast of Somalia. 
That is what this amendment will accomplish, Mr. President.
  With that, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I yield whatever time is necessary to the 
Senator from New Mexico.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico is recognized for 
up to 15 minutes and 42 seconds.


                           Amendment No. 2545

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I very much appreciate the time. I will 
not use the full 15 minutes, but I would like to make a few statements, 
at least, in opposition to the amendment that the Senator from Wyoming 
has offered.
  As I understand his amendment, he is proposing to take, I believe it 
is, $102 million out of the technology reinvestment project and 
transfer that money to an activity designated the Navy Upper-Tier 
Ballistic Missile Defense Program.
  Let me start by giving some background about the technology 
reinvestment project. This is a subject that many of us in the Senate 
worked very hard on in the last few years. I think it has been a 
successful program.
  The TRP, or technology reinvestment project, is a program that was 
established to accomplish some of the defense conversion activity which 
we felt was important at this time after the end of the cold war. A 
specific amount of research and development funding has been set aside 
in the Department of Defense budget for initiatives that industry comes 
forward with that are defense related but that have a dual-use purpose.
  The idea was that industry would know better than the Government 
where the opportunities were to use defense-related technology in a 
dual-use capacity. So the technology reinvestment project was designed 
with that in mind, and it is important to note that the project is one 
that requires a cost share, a 50-percent cost share, by industry, and 
it also requires the industry initiative in order for a program to be 
funded under this TRP.
  It is administered by the Advance Research Projects Agency, ARPA, in 
the Department of Defense but in cooperation with the Department of 
Energy, with NASA, with the Department of Commerce, the Advance 
Technology Program people at NIST in the Department of Commerce. They 
all work together to administer this program, and it is a very 
successful program, Mr. President.
  This last year, the amount available was somewhere in the range of 
$500 million. There were 2,800 proposals last year from industry for 
that funding. When the analysis had been done of the various proposals, 
right at 5 percent of the proposals were actually able to be funded.
  So this is a program which is substantially oversubscribed by 
industry. There is a tremendous pent-up demand by industry that has 
been involved in the defense effort to pursue activities that can be 
funded through the technology reinvestment project--half funded through 
the technology reinvestment project, half funded by those industrial 
partners themselves.
  This technology reinvestment effort has the strong support of 
Secretary Perry and Deputy Secretary Deutch. It has the strong support 
of the President and the Vice President. It has continued to have 
overwhelming demand in various of the focus competition areas. There is 
clearly a need here, and that need is one that this committee is trying 
to meet in the bill that it has presented to the Senate for 
consideration.
  I commend the Senator from Hawaii and the Senator from Alaska for the 
funding that they have proposed for the technology reinvestment 
project. I think it is very consistent with what we have tried to do in 
the authorization bill. It is certainly consistent with the desires of 
the Department of Defense, and it is something we should not be 
reducing in order to fund the program which is specified by the Senator 
from Wyoming.
  Just to say a few words about the alternative use of this money that 
the Senator from Wyoming has come up with, my information on this is 
that the committee has provided the exact amount of funds that the Navy 
and the Department of Defense requested for this activity, this Navy 
upper-tier program. The House added funds for it, and clearly the 
matter will be open for consideration in conference. But our own 
committee in the Senate, the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, has 
funded it at the level that the administration asks.
  Clearly, the first priority, as I understand it, of the Navy in this 
area is the lower-tier system, not the upper-tier system. They have 
made that clear. Admiral Boorda, the Chief of Naval Operations, signed 
a memo on July 11 stating that the lower-tier system was the Navy's 
first priority.
  The Department of Defense is just now beginning a cost and operations 
effectiveness analysis on this Navy upper-tier program. And, 
accordingly, they did not think this kind of high-level funding that is 
being requested by the Senator from Wyoming was appropriate at this 
time.
  Adding funds or accelerating this program before this analysis is 
complete is premature and prejudges the outcome of the Department of 
Defense analysis which itself will cost about $5 million to complete. 
It is not a cursory analysis.
  The Department of Defense study may well recommend a naval version of 
the theater high-altitude area defense, or THAAD Interceptor. Thus, no 
well-defined program exists which would support the addition of these 
funds at the expense of other valid Department of Defense programs.
  I also point out that we watched the administration negotiate for 
months with Russia on changes in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and 
we know that the Russians oppose the Navy upper-tier system as it is 
presently proposed.
  The recent U.S. offer to the Russians under the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty negotiations could preclude deployment of this Navy 
upper-tier system for which the Senator from Wyoming wants to increase 
funding. These funds could be wasted if the United States negotiates 
ABM Treaty restrictions which prohibit this Navy upper-tier system from 
being deployed.
  The Navy upper-tier program is a very risky program relying on 
technologies which have not been proven or demonstrated. Significant 
questions exist about the lethality of the lightweight exo-atmospheric 
projectile and its ability to precisely impact a reentry vehicle.
  Nora Slatkin, who is the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
research, development and acquisition, testified that the Navy upper-
tier technology is not mature enough to be demonstrated for at least 
another 5 years. Technical concerns and the ongoing analysis I earlier 
referred to and the U.S. stance in the ABM Treaty negotiations--all of 
those factors argue strongly against any acceleration of this Navy 
upper-tier missile defense program.
  Mr. President, to summarize, the technology reinvestment project is 
an extremely important initiative that was started under the Bush 
administration. It is being carried on by the Clinton administration. 
It needs to be continued. It needs to be supported. We have a long way 
to go to make the conversion for our defense sector from the cold war 
era to the post-cold-war era. They are working hard at it. These funds, 
through the technology reinvestment project, are an extremely important 
part of them making that transition. We need to support that program. 
We should not be taking funds away from it and earmarking it for other 
activities. Particularly, we should not be earmarking these funds for 
this particular program that the Senator from Wyoming is championing 
here tonight.

  For the reasons I have stated, that program is not mature enough to 
justify the kind of funding he is requesting. I urge my colleagues in 
the Senate to resist his amendment.
  I appreciate the time that has been granted to me by the Chair, and I 
yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I am pleased to yield time to the 
Republican leader.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Republican leader, 
Senator Dole.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I did not have any comment on the amendment. 
Is the amendment going to be accepted? Why not go ahead and do that and 
then maybe I can be recognized.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Wofford be named as a cosponsor of amendment No. 2505.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Dole be permitted to submit an amendment at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection----
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I shall 
not object----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. WALLOP. I would like to have 2 minutes before the hour of 9 
o'clock comes along to answer some of the points that were raised by 
the Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, pursuant to the time agreements 
previously entered into, I send an amendment to the desk for the 
minority leader, Mr. Dole.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, what is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is the amendment 
submitted by the Senator from Wyoming. There is 4 minutes and 20 
seconds remaining. The Chair also observes that there are about 3 
minutes remaining until 9 o'clock, and under the previous order, all 
the time on that amendment would expire at that time.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I ask that I might regain the floor in 
behalf of my amendment.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, would it not be better order for us to 
let the Senator from Wyoming complete his time before we start the time 
at 9 o'clock?
  I ask unanimous consent we just extend this so he can finish his 4 
minutes, and then we have the votes.
  Mr. WALLOP. I am perfectly willing to complete at 9 o'clock, if I can 
just get on with it.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming is recognized for up 
to 3 minutes.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, the Senator from New Mexico was describing 
a pet project of his, TRP, or defense conversion. Let me just explain 
to Senators that it buys no defense. It really buys no technology. And 
it buys no hardware. It does buy some stockholder good will, and it 
does buy some corporate souls. It is, in effect, nothing more than a 
defense industry entitlement.
  Mr. President, the amendment that I have submitted takes $100 million 
out of a program that has two-thirds of $1 billion in it. It has more 
money than the entire money for the Marine Corps. It has as much money 
in it as all of the combat aircraft procurement. It has $200 million 
plus more than the entire national missile defense budget, and $150 
million more than THAAD.
  The argument is that we ought to go on something on which we are 
spending money that buys us nothing because the Russians oppose it.
  Now, Mr. President, the administration has said if we are serious 
about defense--and they say they are--the one thing that is threatening 
to America and her allies is missiles and missile proliferation.
  The Navy has said that we can have a prototype by the year 1998 and 
an operational system by 2000 if we fund it at this level. At least, 
for heaven's sake, Senators, if we are going to spend any money on 
defense and out of the defense budget, let us spend it on something 
that achieves a level of defense that Americans can have.
  The Senator from New Mexico said there are significant questions 
about the capability. Of course, there are. That is the purpose of my 
amendment, to resolve those questions and buy American defense.
  Mr. President, time is up. I yield back the remainder of whatever it 
may.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back. Under the previous 
order, the question is on agreeing to amendment No. 2501, offered by 
the Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. STEVENS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been suggested. 
The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Order of Procedure

  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, the managers have suggested that the 
Senate now complete debate on the Kempthorne amendment, and then have 
three votes in succession. I believe their suggestion is appropriate. 
It has been cleared on both sides.
  So I now ask unanimous consent that there be 10 minutes of debate on 
the Kempthorne amendment No. 2538, 5 minutes under the control of 
Senator Simon, 5 minutes under the control of Senator Kempthorne, and 
that the vote on the Kempthorne amendment occur following the two votes 
previously scheduled; and that for the three votes that would then be 
scheduled the first be for the regular time, 15 minutes, and the second 
and third votes be for 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, the vote on the Kempthorne amendment 
will be the last vote today. So there will be three votes beginning in 
approximately 10 minutes, the first 15 minutes, the second and third 10 
minutes, and those will be the only votes remaining this evening.
  I thank my colleagues. I thank the managers for their suggestion.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the 
Kempthorne amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. SIMON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Kempthorne 
amendment. It is well-intentioned. But I think it is unwise.
  We have roughly--I am not sure of the amount exactly--but roughly 300 
American personnel in Somalia. This amendment would say we have to pull 
all of these people out. The people who are there are protecting our 
liaison office, and some are providing some technical assistance on 
such things as pure water and that sort of thing. We have asked other 
nations to have troops there. And we have pulled out almost all of our 
troops.
  I was asked by a representative of the administration to talk to one 
of leaders of Africa who has troops there urging that he keep his 
troops there pointing out that we would keep a residue of troops there.
  I do not think we ought to be sending a signal to terrorists that, if 
you cause some problems, American troops will pull out. There are 
problems in Somalia. But let us leave it up to the administration, up 
to the Defense Department, when to pull those troops out.
  I would add we have to be willing to take some risks. I wish we lived 
in a risk-free society. But when people enlist in the Armed Forces, 
there are risks that have to be taken just as people who enlist in the 
Chicago police department know that there are certain risks that have 
to be taken.
  Somalia was not a disaster from the viewpoint of the United States. 
We saved who knows how many lives. Well over a million lives I believe 
were saved by our action there. It has not turned out the end product 
politically as well as we had hoped. But frankly, it was one of George 
Bush's finest hours when we used the U.S. military to see that 
desperate people in a land that was ungoverned got the food that was 
needed. Senator Metzenbaum and I were in Somalia. Before we entered we 
saw the devastation like devastation I have never seen before.
  Finally, I would add. Yes. There were casualties in Somalia. But 
there were fewer people, American service personnel, killed in Somalia 
than cab drivers killed in New York City last year. I do not want one 
additional person to be killed unnecessarily. But I think we have to 
recognize that when you enlist in the Armed Forces there are risks, and 
we should be a force for stability in that area of the world.
  I do not think we should micromanage this from the U.S. Senate. We 
ought to leave it up to the administration, up to the Defense 
Department, to make this decision.
  I hope the Kempthorne amendment will be defeated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Akaka). Who yields time?
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. I 
withhold my request. The Senator from Idaho I understand is now here 
and prepared to debate. I withhold my request.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, thank you very much.
  I would like to acknowledge the comments made by the senior Senator 
from Illinois. Much of what I was able to hear I have to say I fully 
respect, and acknowledge that when you deploy military personnel you 
know that there may be in fact casualties. When you do that, though, 
Mr. President, you need to know what the mission is. The mission in 
Somalia changed on us. It went from humanitarian relief to trying to 
apprehend Aideed. Then there is the statement that I read by the 
President of the United States who said that our goal is not to 
establish a new society in Somalia. We must leave that to the Somalis. 
Our job is done in Somalia.
  It has been stated, Mr. President, by the Department of Defense, by 
the State Department--if I had my papers here I would read to you--that 
the prospect of a peaceful settlement is zero, and that they are moving 
at a glacial pace to achieve this.
  Mr. SIMON. Will my colleague yield for a question?
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I am happy to.
  Mr. SIMON. My understanding is that we only have about 300 personnel 
there. They are there primarily to protect our diplomatic mission and 
to serve as technicians. Is that correct, first?
  Then my second question is: Does the Senator not think that we would 
be wise to leave this decision up to the administration and the Defense 
Department rather than making this decision on the floor of the U.S. 
Senate?
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, in response to that, there are 
currently 58 members of what is called the fleet antiterrorist security 
team, FAST marines. Normally, we have Marine detachments with 
embassies. There is no government to have an embassy for. I showed, 
moments ago, what is parading around through the streets of Mogadishu, 
the technicals with .50 caliber machine guns. They are beginning to 
target our U.S. military personnel. They are targets. For what? What 
are we trying to accomplish?
  There is no mission. There is no stated mission today of anything 
further that the United States can accomplish.
  Therefore, why do we not pull them out?
  I also acknowledge that these diplomats--I think they are just as 
brave as the marines, but I am not dictating that those people must be 
pulled out. They have said they would go to a contract security system 
if that was necessary. But this is a very different situation. Mission 
accomplished.
  If there is a lesson learned that we were supposed to learn from 
Vietnam, it was how do you exit. We do not know how to exit from 
Somalia. I also say to the distinguished Senator from Illinois that 
just offshore are 4,000 other U.S. military in an amphibious ready 
group, ready to go in and extract U.S. personnel if they get into a 
real problem. We are tying up a lot of assets, and there is no mission 
in Somalia.
  Mr. SIMON. If my colleague will yield again, I believe in every 
diplomatic situation I know of there are a few marines. They have used 
military personnel to protect diplomatic personnel. I do not know why 
Somalia should be an exception to that general rule.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. I say there is no government to provide further 
protection for the installation and for the diplomats. I would like to 
see all Americans out of Somalia.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have been ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2501

  Mr. STEVENS. We are now proceeding with the McCain amendment; is that 
correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. STEVENS. This is an amendment to refund the costs in connection 
with Olympic games to DOD, which I oppose.
  Atlanta is not the only one who could potentially make a profit from 
the games. But does this amendment ask anyone else to pay back the DOD 
for services which we should be glad to contribute?
  Should NBC, the network which won the bid to cover the 1996 Olympics, 
have to pay 25 percent of its profits back to DOD to pay for the 
benefits it receives from DOD? Should United Parcel Service have to pay 
back DOD for the profit it makes from being the ``official'' express-
delivery company of the games? Should the many other sponsors have to 
pay 25 percent of their profits back to DOD for the services DOD 
provides?
  It is an honor to win the privilege of hosting the games, and takes a 
lot of hard work by a city. The Federal Government should continue to 
fully support our cities when they are able to get these games. Atlanta 
already has committed much of the profits it receives--if there are 
any--in accordance with its host city contract.
  According to the host city contract, Atlanta already has to pay the 
International Olympic Committee [IOC] and United States Olympic 
Committee [USOC] 10 percent each of any surplus after the games. 
According to the Atlanta Journal and Constitution, the Atlanta 
Committee for the Olympic Games will have to split any remaining money 
with the IOC as well. So Atlanta already will only keep a small portion 
of the profits if there are any.
  The 1984 Los Angeles Games were a huge success story in terms of 
making profit; Los Angeles took that profit and created the $100 
million Amateur Athletic Foundation [AAF], a nonprofit organization 
which has already provided more than $50 million to create, sustain, 
and encourage sports programs in California. This program has already 
taught more than 100,000 children how to swim, and introduced thousands 
more inner-city kids to sports like cycling, volleyball, and other 
sports.
  Atlanta should have the same opportunity to create a legacy from any 
profits it makes for its children to remember the 1996 games by, and to 
be introduced to sports.


                       vote on amendment no. 2501

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the 
roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski], 
and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor] are necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 21, nays 77, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 276 Leg.]

                                YEAS--21

     Chafee
     Coats
     D'Amato
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Jeffords
     Kohl
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     Metzenbaum
     Nickles
     Pressler
     Reid
     Smith
     Specter
     Wallop

                                NAYS--77

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boren
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Danforth
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Mathews
     McConnell
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Mikulski
     Pryor
       
  So the amendment (No. 2501) was rejected.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was rejected.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                       vote on Amendment No. 2545

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
2545 of the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. Wallop].
  The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] 
and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor] are necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 38, nays 60, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 277 Leg.]

                                YEAS--38

     Bennett
     Bond
     Brown
     Burns
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Danforth
     Dole
     Faircloth
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Roth
     Simpson
     Smith
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Wallop
     Warner

                                NAYS--60

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boren
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Conrad
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Mathews
     Metzenbaum
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nunn
     Pell
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Specter
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Mikulski
     Pryor
       
  So the amendment (No. 2545) was rejected.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the amendment was rejected, and I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                       vote on amendment no. 2538

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Mr. President, the question now occurs on 
agreeing to the Kempthorne amendment No. 2538.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Maryland [Ms. Mikulski] 
and the Senator from Arizona [Mr. Pryor] are necessary absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Levin). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 54, nays 44, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 278 Leg.]

                                YEAS--54

     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Brown
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Dole
     Domenici
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Ford
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Kempthorne
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mathews
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Roth
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Wallop
     Warner

                                NAYS--44

     Akaka
     Bingaman
     Boren
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Conrad
     Danforth
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Feinstein
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Leahy
     McCain
     Metzenbaum
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Pell
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                             NOT VOTING--2

     Mikulski
     Pryor
      
  So the amendment (No. 2538) was agreed to.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. STEVENS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. I as unanimous consent that amendment No. 2500 
previously adopted today be modified, and I send to the desk a 
modification.
  I ask unanimous consent that Senator Chafee be added as an original 
cosponsor of this amendment.
  The effect of this amendment that I am sending to the desk will make 
that amendment which was previously adopted subject to modification.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The modification is as follows:

       On page 142, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:
       Sec.   . (a) The prohibition on concurrent award of 
     compensation and retirement pay (including naval pension) set 
     forth in section 5304(a)(1) of title 38, United States Code, 
     does not apply to a person who has a service-connected 
     disability if--
       (1) the person has completed at least 20 years of service 
     in the uniformed services that is creditable for purposes of 
     computing the amount of retirement pay to which the member is 
     entitled;
       (2) the disability was incurred or aggravated in the 
     performance of duty as a member of a uniformed service, as 
     determined by the Secretary concerned; and
       (3) the disability is a disability rated as total--
       (A) by the Secretary concerned as of the date on which the 
     person is retired from the uniformed services; or
       (B) by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs within four years 
     following the date on which the person is retired from the 
     uniformed services.
       (b) Notwithstanding section 1463(a) of title 10, United 
     States Code, the amount of retirement pay paid in accordance 
     with subsection (a) concurrently with the payment of 
     disability compensation to the recipients of such retirement 
     pay shall be paid out of funds appropriated by this Act.
       (c) Subsection (a) is not applicable to a person for any 
     period for which the disability of such person is not a 
     disability rated as total as described in paragraph (3) of 
     such subsection.
       (d) In this section:
       (1) The terms ``compensation'', ``service-connected'', and 
     ``Secretary concerned'' have the meanings given such terms in 
     section 101 of title 38, United States Code.
       (2) The term ``disability rated as total''--
       (A) means a disability that is rated as total under the 
     standard schedule of rating disabilities in use by the 
     Department of Veterans Affairs; and
       (B) does not include a disability for which the schedular 
     rating is less than total but for which a rating of total is 
     assigned by reason of inability of the disabled person 
     concerned to secure or follow a substantially gainful 
     occupation as a result of service-connected disabilities or 
     by reason of any other factor.
       (3) The term ``uniformed services'' has the meaning given 
     such term in section 101(a)(5) of title 10, United States 
     Code.
       (e) This section shall take effect on October 1, 1994, and 
     shall apply to months that begin on or after that date and 
     before October 1, 1995, upon authorization in an Act other 
     than this Act.

  Mr. McCain. Mr. President, with reference to amendment No. 2500, 
which was adopted a short time ago in the Senate, I want to bring to 
the attention of the Senate a correction to that amendment.
  The amendment I offered, and which was accepted, sought to 
appropriate funds for a program which is not authorized. As soon as I 
realized that the program was not authorized, I sought the assistance 
of the managers of the bill in correcting the amendment. I thank the 
managers for promptly offering a technical amendment to amendment No. 
2500 to make this program subject to authorization.
  As my colleagues know, I do not support the appropriation of funds 
for any unauthorized program, project, or activity. I apologize to my 
colleagues for my inadvertent violation of this important principle.
  I intend to ask the conferees on this bill to retain the language in 
amendment No. 2500, as corrected by the managers. In no case will I 
support expenditure of funds for this program in the absence of a 
specific authorization.
  I also intend to work in the Armed Services Committee and appropriate 
authorizing committees to seek authorization for this program, as is 
required under the Senate's procedures.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Joe Sanchez 
be allowed access to the Senate floor during the remainder of the 
debate on this appropriations bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee 
amendments be adopted en bloc.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. STEVENS. I reserve the right to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. STEVENS. Reserving the right to object, may I take the 
opportunity to check that?
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I withdraw my request.
  I ask unanimous consent to consider and adopt en bloc amendments 
numbered 2535, 2536, and 2542.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we add to 
that No. 2513 by Senator McConnell.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. INOUYE. And that upon the adoption of these amendments, amendment 
2517 be withdrawn.
  Mr. STEVENS. I ask unanimous consent that the Mitchell amendment 2542 
be cosponsored by Senator Cohen.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Hawaii accept the 
modification as proposed by the Senator from Alaska?
  Mr. INOUYE. I do.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  So the amendments (No. 2513, 2535, 2536, and 2542) were agreed to, as 
follows:

                           Amendment no. 2513

       At the appropriate place in the bill insert the following
       Sec.   . (a.) Within 60 days of enactment of this Act, the 
     President, in consultation with NATO, shall submit a report 
     to the Committee on Appropriations defining specific 
     military, economic, and political standards required to gain 
     admission to NATO: Provided further, that such report shall 
     not be limited to the principles enunciated in the 
     Partnership for Peace; Provided further, such report shall 
     include an assessment of measures which would be necessary to 
     guarantee the armed services of Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
     Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are capable 
     of military cooperation and interoperability with NATO and 
     fulfilling other member responsibilities.


                           amendment no. 2513

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, In 1949 a remarkable treaty was signed 
by 12 nations. The North Atlantic Treaty was a document of vision and 
flexibility--a collective covenant to safeguard freedom, democracy, 
individual liberty, and the rule of law--a pact to ``promote stability 
and well being in the North Atlantic area.''
  NATO joined in common cause nations of disparate economic resources 
and strength, differing governing institutions, diverse ideologies and 
dissimilar military capabilities. Yet, differences have not divided the 
organization nor compromised the unambiguous and united determination 
to defend against any attack.
  NATO has worked. It has been remarkably successful for more than four 
decades in preserving peace, security and stability.
  Given the track record, it is completely understandable that nations 
so recently liberated from Soviet aggression now seek the security of 
participating in NATO. I can think of no more clear or compelling U.S. 
interest than the expansion of NATO's stabilizing influence.
  Unfortunately, no nation seems to be able to crack the NATO admission 
code. They have been told that participation in the Partnership for 
Peace pact may lead to NATO admission, but there are no guarantees. 
They have been offered the cold comfort that if attacked, they have an 
``opportunity to consult with NATO'' with no follow on commitments.
  Why? because according to the administration these nations do not 
meet NATO's admission standards. When I pursued the question of just 
what the standards of eligibility were with Secretary Christopher in a 
hearing before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee, he told me they had 
to meet the standards in the NATO charter. Well, the only standard 
spelled out in the charter is a commitment to the alliance and 
collective defense.
  Mr. President, during consideration of the Foreign Operations bill I 
offered an amendment to clarify NATO eligibility standards. The 
amendment lost narrowly. During the debate there appeared to be two 
principal concerns which I believe I have addressed in this revised 
revision.

  This amendment will require a report from the President in 60 days 
defining specific military, political or economic standards required to 
gain admission to NATO. During the last debate Senator Levin pointed 
out since NATO was a collective body, decisions regarding admission 
standards should be collective--the President does not have the 
unilateral authority to grant admission. I agree and presumed such 
consultation would occur, but to satisfy Senator Levin and others I 
added language to the amendment clarifying the President should prepare 
the report ``in consultation with NATO leaders.''
  The amendment also requires an assessment of the capabilities of the 
Visegrad and Baltic nations to meet those admission standards and 
provides the President permissive authority to offer excess defense 
articles to assist these nations in achieving military cooperation and 
interoperability with NATO.
  My earlier amendment required the transfer of excess defense articles 
to these seven nations. I decided to delete this provision in response 
to some of my colleagues who argued the President could not 
unilaterally mandate NATO EDA recipients and, more importantly, such a 
directive many undermine the security requirements of other current 
beneficiaries.
  Mr. President, I believe the amendment before the Senate responds to 
the concerns raised by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee and 
others with a strong interest in NATO and European security policy. No 
doubt, Deputy Secretary Talbott will continue to object to the 
provision because it singles out several nations, thus ``drawing 
lines'' in Europe. Frankly, by default the administration has already 
drawn lines--NATO is on one side, Russia the other, and Central and 
Eastern Europe have been relegated to the gray ambiguous, no-man's land 
of Partnership of Peace.
  Unfortunately, the victims of the administration's ambiguity consider 
their circumstances as an open invitation to Russia. In 1823, the U.S. 
established the imperatives of the Monroe Doctrine, Now, the perception 
from Warsaw to Kiev, is the U.S. supports a new, variation on their 
historical theme--the Moscow mandate. Leaders throughout Central Europe 
have publicly and privately criticized the administrations's 
willingness to cede their economic sovereignty and political 
independence to the sphere of Russian influence.
  A July 24 column in the Washington Post by Lally Weymouth drew our 
attention to the profound concerns shared across Europe. Ms. Wymouth 
writes, ``Recently, the Russian Ambassador to the United Nations Yuli 
Vorontsov, asked the world to bless the Russian deployment of 
peacekeepers to Georgia. Vorontsov said without some sort of U.N. 
endorsement of Russian peacekeepers in Georgia, Moscow would veto a 
resolution authorizing the dispatch of troops to Haiti * * * as a 
consequence, the Clinton Administration entered into a cynical deal 
with Russia which at least one U.N. diplomat compares with the 
controversial 1945 ``spheres of influence Yalta pact * * *. What this 
means is that the United States has given Russia the right to reoccupy 
the Caucasus and other former Soviet Republics in return for Russian 
acquiescence in the U.N. Security Council Resolutions on Haiti.''
  Senior State Department officials have expressed concern about 
drawing lines dividing Europe--I think this is an artful dodge. In 
fact, avoiding drawing lines is avoiding making important decisions, 
avoiding the responsibilities of leadership, and avoiding the 
definition of American policy and interests in Europe. In effect, we 
concede to the Moscow mandate.
  During his recent visit to Poland, President Clinton addressed the 
Parliament. In discussing NATO membership, he said there is ``no longer 
a question of whether, but when and how.''
  This was a very encouraging statement which I hope to build on with 
the amendment I am offering today. The amendment before the Senate 
begins the process of defining ``when and how'' nations can join. It is 
a small first step in the direction of expanding stability and security 
in Europe, a goal so clearly and unambiguously in American interests.


                           amendment no. 2535

       On page 9, on line 13 of the Committee-reported bill, 
     insert before the period the following: ``: Provided further, 
     That of the funds appropriated under this heading, not less 
     than $39,674,000 shall be made available only for the Pacific 
     Missile Range Facility, Hawaii''.
                                  ____



                           amendment no. 2536

       On page 29, on line 15 of the Committee-reported bill, 
     insert before the period the following: ``: Provided, That of 
     the funds appropriated under this heading, not less than 
     $30,100,000 shall be made available only for the Pacific 
     Missile Range Facility, Hawaii''.
                                  ____



                           amendment no. 2542

       On page 53, line 13, after the period insert: ``Funds 
     appropriated in Title III of this Act may be used for 
     multiyear procurement contracts as follows: MK19-3 grenade 
     machine guns; M16A2 rifles; M249 squad automatic weapons; and 
     M4 carbine rifles for the Army.''

  So the amendment (No. 2517) was withdrawn.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the managers of the bill are ready to go 
to bed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2505

  Mr. WOFFORD. Mr. President, I am pleased to cosponsor this important 
amendment that will provided $5 million in fiscal year 1995 for the 
completion of phase I of the vectored thrust combat agility 
demonstrator [VTCAD].
  The VTCAD program is designed to assess the benefits of the ring tail 
vectored thrust dected propeller [VTDP] for existing and future combat 
helicopters. This research has the potential of increasing the speed, 
range, and endurance of conventional helicopters for more effective 
combat productivity.
  I appreciate the efforts of Senator Inouye and the members of the 
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee for their acceptance of this 
amendment. As a strong supporter of the VTCAD research, I am very glad 
that my colleagues have agreed with my request to provide $5 million in 
funding for the completion of phase I of this important effort in 
fiscal year 1995.


        harkin amendment no. 2525 on the comprehensive test ban

  Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to the amendment 
by the Senator from Iowa. This amendment, while only a sense of the 
Senate amendment, takes an irresponsible position in relation to our 
nuclear weapons stockpile, and our future need to maintain nuclear 
weapons that are safe and reliable.
  We cannot turn a blind eye to the reality that we have a nuclear 
stockpile of thousands of weapons. As the cold war has come to a close, 
we have made substantial progress in reducing the number of nuclear 
weapons. I support these efforts.
  What concerns me about the approach of this amendment and the ongoing 
Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations, is the lack of focus on the long-
term needs of our nuclear weapons scientists to monitor our stockpile. 
It is hard to imagine why we would want to maintain thousands of the 
most dangerous weapons known to mankind, but eliminate the ability to 
test them. In the past, we have been able to replace old nuclear 
warheads with newer and safer designs. We now have no new nuclear 
warheads under development, and so the task of our nuclear scientists 
is to ensure the stockpile remains safe and reliable as the various 
components age and deteriorate.
  Nuclear weapons are complex devices. The interaction that occurs in a 
warhead between the highly energetic explosive and the nuclear material 
will never be completely mimicked by testing simulation. As these 
devices age, we must have a complete understanding of their 
deterioration, and how this affects their safety and reliability.
  In fact, as our stockpile of nuclear weapons is reduced, the 
reliability of each nuclear weapon becomes even more critical to an 
effective deterrence. Only through testing at the Nevada test site can 
we have adequate assurance that our nuclear weapons will function as 
expected in a time of crisis. Stockpile surveillance, above ground 
experiments, and modeling often uncover flaws that cannot be resolved 
without the use of a nuclear test.
  The Washington Post ran a story in May 1990, which explained a 
disturbing incident occurring in 1988, only 6 years ago. The Department 
of Defense unexpectedly discovered a defect in a type of nuclear weapon 
after it had been deployed throughout Europe. Urgent orders were issued 
not to move the warheads, and repair teams had to hurry to the nuclear 
ammunition depots to disable the weapons so they could not accidently 
be detonated. Computer calculations and underground tests before the 
start of production had indicated no safety problems. Yet, a new safety 
analysis in 1988 raised concerns that were confirmed by actual 
underground nuclear tests.
  Again, it is plain reckless for our Nation to hold thousands of the 
most powerful and dangerous weapons known to mankind, and destroy the 
ability to monitor and test them.
  Mr. President, no one in this body can state with certainty that the 
nuclear weapons created by the United States have, suddenly, become 
completely safe and reliable for the foreseeable future. No one in this 
body can say with certainty that we will never again discover a 
dangerous flaw in a nuclear weapon, like that found less than 6 years 
ago.
  Without a doubt, the goal of nonproliferation is vitally important, 
particularly maintaining controls on nuclear materials. However, I have 
yet to see a compelling argument that the United States nuclear testing 
moratorium has furthered that goal. China continues to test and 
modernize its nuclear weapons at will. Renegade nations, such as Libya 
and N. Korea, could continue to develop nuclear weapons even if they 
signed and abided by the provisions of a comprehensive test ban.

  I also want to address the issue of the Comprehensive Test Ban and 
how it would affect the Nevada Test Site. The Nevada testing facility 
is a unique resource, and the Nation's investment in it must be 
protected.
  Some of America's greatest technological resources have been devoted 
to design, production, and testing of our nuclear weapons. Personnel at 
the Nevada test site are a small community of highly specialized 
workers, with expertise found nowhere else in the world.
  Mr. President, 2 years ago, a one kiloton conventional explosion 
occurred in the tunnels at the Nevada test site. The nonproliferation 
experiment was conducted in the general vicinity of previous low-yield 
nuclear tests, and provided vital data on the different seismic signals 
between a conventional explosion and a nuclear explosion. By furthering 
our ability to distinguish between conventional explosions and low-
yield nuclear explosions, we greatly expanded our ability to monitor 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This test has had far reaching 
consequences in the ability of the United States to prevent renegade 
nations from disguising low-yield nuclear tests.
  No other facility in the world has recorded data from low-yield 
nuclear explosions that made this test possible. No other facility in 
the world has the unique tunneling capability that enabled this 
conventional test to occur efficiently and without undue expense.
  Most Members recognize the unique assets and expertise of the 
personnel at the Nevada test site. What my colleagues may not realize 
is that a wide variety of activities, such as the nonproliferation 
experiment, are now occurring at the test site, and many more 
activities are being planned for the future.
  One of the most promising future uses for the Nevada test site is in 
the production of solar energy. Because of its size and location, the 
test site is ideally suited for research in solar energy development, 
which I believe should have a very high priority in supplying our 
future energy needs. Even a small portion of the test site, devoted to 
solar electric generation, could supply substantial energy resource.
  Mr. President, as long as dictatorships are striving to acquire 
weapons of mass destruction, we must be vigilant. Our nuclear 
deterrence, tested time and again in the Nevada desert, helped prevent 
the tensions between the Soviet Union and the West from ever resulting 
in a nuclear conflict. Testing was part of that success, and we must 
not lightly discard such a proven capability.
  Again, I urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment, and I 
yield the floor.


                      nuclear test ban resolution

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, the amendment at the desk is on behalf of 
myself, Senator Jeffords, Senator DeConcini and Senator Daschle. This 
is a sense of the Congress resolution, basically praising the President 
for extending the nuclear testing moratorium until September, 1995, and 
calling on the President and the other nuclear powers to complete 
negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear testing ban treaty before the 
extension conference for the Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] begins in 
April 1995.
  Some may say ``Why the rush?''
  Why not wait until 1996, which China and France seem to prefer?
  I would list two primary reasons for President Clinton to take a 
strong leadership position now to assure completion of the CTBT by 
1995: to complete the CTBT before the NPT extension conference begins 
in April, 1995 and to complete a CTBT before new presidents are elected 
in Russia, France and the United States.
  First, the Non-Proliferation Treaty is up for renewal in 1995. The 
conference to strengthen, expand and extend the NPT begins in April 
1995.
  Mr. President, the NPT is becoming ever more important in the post 
cold war era. In the past, our focus has been on the former Soviet 
Union, with their enormous nuclear arsenal of over 20,000 nuclear 
weapons, and their plans and missiles to deliver many of those weapons 
of mass destruction to the United States homeland with less than half 
an hour warning.
  But now we may have more to fear from one or two crude nuclear 
weapons in the hands of Saddam Hussein or Kim II Sung's son in North 
Korea than 20,000 much larger nuclear weapons in the Soviet arsenal.
  Paranoid leaders from rogue nations may be much more inclined to use 
nuclear weapons in a crisis. And paranoid leaders are not deterred by 
the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal.
  Hence the Non-Proliferation Treaty takes on much greater 
significance. Our national security interests are severely undermined 
by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. So much so that at least one 
active-duty military officer, General Horner, has even suggested that 
we seriously consider the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons.
  He reasoned that nuclear weapons are the ideal ``equalizers'' for 
weak third world nations. Only nuclear weapons could severely damage 
U.S. interests, given our current and projected overwhelming 
conventional military superiority.
  Under these circumstances, the extension and strengthening of the NAT 
should be a primary priority of U.S. defense policy.
  For better or worse, the comprehensive test ban has become almost a 
prerequisite for extension of the NPT in the eyes of most of the 
nuclear weapons have-not nations.
  They reason that stopping all nuclear testing is the least the 
nuclear weapons states can do to demonstrate our resolve not to 
continue the qualitative nuclear arms race. They reason that only if we 
agree to stop all testing will they, the nuclear have-nots, agree to 
forego development or acquisition of nuclear weapons.
  Hence, to maximize our chances of strengthening and extending the 
NPT, we should make every possible effort to complete the CTBT by 1995. 
It will take a major, concerted effort by the United States to achieve 
this objective. This amendment encourages the President to undertake 
such a dedicated effort to complete the CTBT before April, 1995.
  Second, the political landscape in several key nations may change 
significantly after 1995. Francois Mitterrand will be stepping down in 
May, 1995, and new presidential elections will be held in Russia and 
the United States in 1996.

  While President Mitterrand's successor may eventually support a CTBT, 
I fear that France may want to conduct a flurry of nuclear tests before 
agreeing to sign the CTBT. The two current French candidates are vying 
with each other to see who can be the most supportive of the French 
nuclear arsenal. So we cannot be assured that the next French 
Government will support the CTBT at all.
  In other words, we have three of the five nuclear powers supporting 
the completion of the CTBT now, but no assurance that any of the three 
will be as enthusiastic by 1996 or later. The CTBT now, but no 
assurance that any of the three will be as enthusiastic by 1996 or 
later. The CTBT and the NPT are too important to the national security 
of the United States to let this current opportunity pass by.
  While we would certainly like France and China to join the CTBT 
initially, this is not necessary. After all, both France and China were 
not party to the NPT initially, but are now supportive.
  At this moment, negotiations are continuing in Geneva on the CTBT. 
The current session began on July 25, and is scheduled to end on 
September 7. This is the last scheduled negotiating session. But a 
draft treaty has not even been tabled in Geneva.
  I therefore urge the President to encourage the session chairman to 
at least lay down a draft treaty, so that the negotiators can begin 
narrowing down differences. I urge the President to avoid last minute 
complications, such as submitting endless verification or other 
technical suggestions which slow down the process without yielding 
significant increased security assurances.
  I was pleased to learn that John Holum, the director of ACDA, stated 
on August 4 in Geneva at the U.N. Conference on Disarmament that the 
U.S. delegation will be willing to work after September 7, 
``continuously'' if necessary.
  This is a hopeful sign that the Clinton administration is willing to 
work with all diligence to complete the negotiations by April 1995.
  This resolution merely signifies to the administration that we in 
Congress consider rapid progress essential to our national security.
  I encourage my colleagues to support this resolution, urging the 
President and other nuclear powers to complete negotiations on the 
nuclear testing moratorium before the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
extension conference begins in April 1995.


                           amendment no. 2525

  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment offered by my 
colleague from Iowa, Senator Harkin.
  Once again, I see an effort to continue to undermine our nuclear 
deterrent and our nuclear stockpile while ignoring the real danger that 
faces our world today. That danger is the danger of the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and, in particular, the spread of 
nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology.
  Our national security will be served by negotiating an extension of 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but the amendment offered by my 
friend from Iowa focuses on the negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, which may or may not play a roll in gaining the extension of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty carries with it several clear risks 
to national security and worldwide security that have been recognized 
by the Senate, President Clinton, and past Presidents.
  The Senate in passing the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment recognized 
that the safety and security of our nuclear weapons and, presumably 
those of other countries, could be improved by a limited continuation 
of nuclear testing. The Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment permitted 
continued testing for safety and reliability until 1996 and longer if 
other nations continued to conduct nuclear tests.
  President Bush's national security advisors recommended a veto of the 
legislation containing the testing restrictions because of its serious 
consequences to national security. If the amendment had not been tied 
to a larger bill, it most likely would have been vetoed.
  President Clinton, in extending the moratorium, expressed his 
concerns about the risk that a moratorium posed to our stockpile, but 
accepted the risk as the apparent cost of establishing the right 
atmosphere to promote the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.
  The Chinese and the French have both stated the importance of a 
limited number of additional nuclear tests before a Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty would be in their national interests. A premature effort to 
push a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty before next April may cause the 
Chinese and the French to withhold their support.
  Do we want a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that the Chinese will not 
sign?
  I do not support a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty because I do not 
believe that it really contributes to making the world safer.
  If there is to be an amendment, it should encourage the President to 
continue his efforts to get an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. A Non-Proliferation Treaty without a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a significant step to a safer world. A 
comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without an extension of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty is a failure.
  The Chinese will likely continue testing beyond April 1995, the time 
when the Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference will be held. I 
suspect that the United States will, and should, push for an extension 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty whether or not China or anyone else is 
testing.
  Testing is not the issue. Limiting, or stopping proliferation of 
nuclear weapons is the issue.
  The extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty is in the 
interests of every nation, be they a nuclear power or a nonnuclear 
state. Most nations know this. No nation will gain from the termination 
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, although many may threaten not 
to sign to advance some separate agenda.
  I believe that the sense of the Senate resolution offered by my 
friend from Iowa is in fact an attempt to advance a separate agenda.
  That agenda is the delegimitization of nuclear weapons and, in 
particular, the U.S. nuclear arsenal as fast as possible.
  As the chairman of the Defense Appropriation Committee said so 
eloquently on the floor earlier in this debate, this is not time to let 
the euphoria of the end of the cold war lead us into thinking that we 
can abandon our Armed Forces, and in this case our nuclear forces.
  The world is still a dangerous place. The nuclear threat has changed, 
but it has not disappeared. We must maintain our nuclear stockpile, our 
nuclear deterrent capability, and our nuclear expertise. The capacity 
to resume testing is a critical element of that capability.
  I am very concerned about efforts like this amendment that undermine 
the support for our own national security without securing assurances 
that the external nuclear threats are being reduced.
  Look at Korea. The Non-Proliferation Treaty did not guarantee that 
they could not develop nuclear weapons. Our moratorium did not stop 
them from continuing their program. Our continuing efforts to promote a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a the extension of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty have not convinced them to reject a nuclear 
program.
  For another example of the continuing external threat, look at the 
recent discovery of weapons-grade plutonium being diverted from the 
former Soviet Union and offered for sale in Germany. The news media 
reports that the buyer for this material was to be Iraq. Does anyone 
here think that the extension of any treaty will end the threat from 
Iraq?
  An extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will help 
address these threats. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will not.
  Let us not forget the arguments that have been used to advance the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty argument. Originally, we needed to stop 
testing to stop the arms race. In fact, the arms race ended while we 
were testing. The end came because the Soviet Union collapsed.
  Another argument was that we need to stop testing to promote 
disarmament. The United States and Russia are both in the process of 
drastically reducing our nuclear arsenals. A testing program for 
reliability and safety does not preclude a weapons reduction.
  Now they are saying that we need to end testing to get an extension 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is highly unlikely. The vast 
majority of responsible nations realize the great progress that has 
been made by the United States and the former Soviet Union to reduce 
the nuclear tension and the nuclear stockpiles.
  These same nations realize that giving up the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty solely because there is no Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not 
in their national security interests.
  The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is, at best, a debatable element of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty extension.
  If we want to send our President a sense of the Senate, let's tell 
him that we support his efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. Let's not divert his attention to secondary issues 
that may or may not contribute to the ultimate goal.
  I ask my colleagues to oppose the Harkin amendment.


                           amendment no. 2526

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, at a time of heightened concerns about 
terrorist attacks such as the World Trade Center bombing and recent 
incidents in Argentina and London, the Senate has an important 
opportunity to increase efforts of the United States Government and our 
allies to help counter these threats.
  Several years ago, in response to the bombing of Pan Am 103, the 
Department of State and the Department of Defense established the 
Technical Support Working Group [TSWG], an interagency body that 
coordinates counterterrorism research and development efforts. Since 
its creation, the TSWG has made valuable contributions to enhancing the 
security of persons and property both inside the United States as well 
as beyond our borders by orchestrating and funding the development of 
innovative technology. For example, the TSWG has already improved the 
security of people flying on the world's airways by developing advanced 
methods for postblast detection and postblast containment of chemical 
explosives.
  In the aftermath of the attacks in Argentina and London, it is clear 
that the world continues to be a dangerous place where terrorism will 
be used to strike at the heart of civilized peoples everywhere. We 
should do more to bolster the promising start of the technologies and 
techniques already developed by the TSWG. As President Clinton recently 
stated, ``I think everyone in the United States would want us to do 
more against terrorism.''
  President Clinton requested $6.321 million as the Defense 
Department's contribution to the TSWG. This amount has been authorized 
by the Senate and House, appropriated by the House, and is in the 
Senate Defense appropriations bill we are currently discussing. 
Virtually all of this is required to continue projects identified in 
fiscal year 1993 and fiscal year 1994 and already underway. Thus, only 
about $2 million--the amount provided by the State Department in its 
funding share--is available for new projects, of which there are many 
which appear quite promising. Moreover, the $6.321 will limit the 
TSWG's ability to follow up the excellent start permitted by the fiscal 
year 1993 congressional initiative for an international program.
  In the Defense authorization bill passed by the Senate, an additional 
$3 million was authorized for TSWG to enable it to continue and expand 
its promising international cooperative efforts. The additional funding 
which we seek today in this Defense appropriations will go along with 
the additional amount authorized and will go a considerable distance in 
funding important new counterterrorist technologies. Three areas are 
particularly promising and important: nonlethal technologies; border 
security; and strategies against advanced shoulder-launched surface-to-
air missiles, radio-controlled explosive devices, and weapons of mass 
destruction. We will not solve the problems posed by these terrorist 
strategies with the funds we are adding today, but it is vital to keep 
up the momentum which has developed.
  All of us recognize the constrained resources era in which we are 
currently operating. The distinguished chairman and his staff have 
worked with us on this amendment and have agreed to accept an 
additional $2 million for this program. I appreciate the chairman's 
cooperation and believe that this $2 million investment is both 
worthwhile and timely. We cannot wait until the next terrorist strike 
takes innocent lives here or abroad. We should move forward now with 
efforts which will enable us to prevent these kinds of attacks in the 
future. We have a responsibility to do all we can. This $2 million is 
an excellent beginning.


                           amendment no. 2526

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise as a cosponsor of this amendment 
because of the importance in providing funds to fight terrorism. This 
earmark would further enable the Pentagon to contribute funds for the 
valuable work of the Technical Support Working Groups [TSWG], an 
interagency group that helps cover collaborative research projects 
designed to counter terrorist activity.
  Mr. President, we have signed a series of Memorandums of 
Understanding [MOU] with three countries for 15 different counter 
terrorism programs. These programs cover a range of projects, including 
improved explosive detection and better perimeter security at a variety 
of facilities. Unfortunately, the MOU's were signed after budget was 
submitted, and subsequently the costs of these international R&D 
programs are not covered in the current budget. While the DOD bill 
authorized $3 million for the international programs, there is the need 
for a specific appropriation to cover these international projects.
  There is not a single Member of this Chamber prepared to suggest that 
terrorism is not a serious challenge or threat to American interests or 
security. The recent bombing attacks in Buenos Aires, Panama, and two 
incidents in London only underscore the importance of developing the 
tools and resources to counter terrorism, and I am pleased to see that 
the TSWG is taking an important role in this process.
  If we believe that we need to confront the threat posed by terrorism, 
then we need to will the means to fight it. I urge my colleagues to 
support the adoption of the amendment.


                           amendment no. 2527

  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I am joined today by Senators Heflin and 
Glenn in offering an amendment to H.R. 4650, the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1995, that would provide $3 million 
in much needed additional funding to modernize Air Force management/
maintenance information systems. As our forces decline in numbers, it 
is incumbent on the Department of Defense to ensure that our Armed 
Forces are in a high state of readiness. In today's military, this 
often falls to the automated programs which keep maintenance 
information at technicians' fingertips.
  The CAMS/REMIS system is the major Air Force system which provides 
technicians with up-to-date information about the maintenance and 
supply status of missiles, aircraft, and other equipment. It is in use 
at virtually every Air Force base throughout the United States and 
abroad.
  The CAMS/REMIS system was created under a contract awarded in 1986. 
While funding has been available to create and operate CAMS/REMIS, and 
to consolidate other systems into this comprehensive system, funding 
constraints unfortunately have precluded upgrading the system to keep 
up with developments in this fast-growing field. I believe it is 
critically important to our readiness, and to the safety of our air men 
and women, that the Air Force provide a modern, fully capable 
maintenance management information system. A total of $8 million for 
these programs would permit the Air Force to upgrade the system 
adequately.
  Mr. President, I urge the adoption of this amendment.


                           amendment No. 2530

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and Senator Domenici 
I rise to offer an amendment which will ensure adequate funding for a 
critical safety modification of the F-111 aircraft. The amendment adds 
$1.296 million, for a total of $2.8 million, to the F-111 squadrons 
program element in the Air Force RDT&E budget.
  As the Senator from Hawaii and the Senator from Alaska know, these 
aircraft are stationed at Cannon Air Force Base in New Mexico and 
provide a critical capability to deliver precision munitions deep 
within an adversary's territory, a capability that was demonstrated 
repeatedly and was vitally needed during the Persian Gulf war. The 
amendment I am proposing is consistent with action taken in the 
conference committee on the defense authorization bill.
  During the authorization conference the Air Force told us that 
additional funds were needed in this program element to correct 
deficiencies found in operational testing of a modification to the 
digital flight control system of the F-111 and EF-111 aircraft. These 
problems include nuisance warnings, warning light anomalies, autopilot 
release level faults, and a terrain following radar/central air data 
computer interface fault. The program office at McClellan Air Force 
Base proposes to fix these problems through an engineering change 
proposal, the total cost of which is estimated to be $4.3 million. The 
Air Force informed us they had a requirement for $2.8 million in fiscal 
year 1995 for the overall program element, $2.5 million of which they 
intend to use for the digital flight control system upgrade. The 
remaining $1.8 million for the digital flight control system upgrade 
will be incorporated in the fiscal year 1996 request.
  In light of this information, I hope our amendment is acceptable to 
the managers and I urge its adoption. I would note before closing that 
the House version of the fiscal year 1995 Defense Appropriations' Act 
provides $11.019 million for the F-111 squadrons program element, $9.5 
million of which is to be used for safety modifications of the F-111 
and EF-111 aircraft if the Secretary of the Air Force submits a report 
that such modifications are needed. I am not aware of other 
modifications needed at this time, but if further requirements for 
modifications in the F-111 fleet are identified by the Air Force, I 
would urge my colleague from Hawaii and my colleague from Alaska to 
move toward the higher level in the conference.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I appreciate the information provided by 
the Senator from New Mexico. I support the amendment he is offering to 
insure the digital flight control system is fully funded in this bill. 
I know the Senator from New Mexico is a very vigorous proponent of the 
F-111 aircraft and the capabilities it brings to our forces and I know 
that he takes a personal interest in insuring that upgrades needed by 
the aircraft, such as the digital flight control system modification, 
stay on track and get deployed on the aircraft.
  With regard to the conference, I will be happy to consult with the 
Air Force to ascertain the actual funding needs with respect to 
maintaining the important capabilities of the F-111 fleet. As the 
Senator points out, there will be ample opportunity for us to bring 
this matter to the attention of the House conferees with the objective 
of satisfying the highest priority operational needs of the F-111. It 
is difficult at this time to predict what will be the amount acceptable 
to the House conferees for F-111 modifications, but we will do our 
utmost.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Hawaii for his 
support of my amendment and his promise to look into this matter 
further in the upcoming conference. I thank him also for his strong 
support for New Mexico's military installations and laboratories, ad 
the people who serve in them, support which is reflected in numerous 
provisions in this bill.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Madam President, I rise today to offer an amendment 
that would require the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on a 
very important issue that involves not only congressional oversight of 
a defense program, but also proliferation concerns and stability in the 
Middle East: A Department of Defense proposal to codevelop the Advanced 
Threat Radar Jammer [ATRJ] with the United Arab Emirates [UAE].
  I understand that the U.S. Army and Defense Security Assistance 
Agency [DSAA] are prepared to offer the UAE a proposal to codevelop the 
ATRJ--the Army's net generation radar receiver and jamming system. 
Under this proposal, the UAE would provide funding for research and 
development of the ATRJ and then be allowed to purchase the 
sophisticated systems for installation on recently acquired AH-64 
Apache helicopters.
  I and many of my colleagues are concerned about this proposal for 
several reasons. First, this agreement would establish an arrangement 
wherein a foreign nation would fund a U.S. defense program in an 
apparent circumvention of the normal authorization and appropriations 
process, and beyond the effective oversight of Congress. The Congress 
has repeatedly voiced its objections to executive branch efforts to 
solicit funds in support of U.S. foreign policy or defense initiatives 
that were not first made subject to the scrutiny of the legislative 
branch.
  Second, I believe this agreement would undermine the President's own 
efforts to constrain weapons proliferation. It provides the UAE with a 
quantum improvement in its war fighting capability which could provoke 
other hostile nations to seek advanced systems to counter the new 
perceived UAE threat.
  Third, this arrangement would violate a departmental policy, recently 
reaffirmed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on March 15, 1994, which 
states that ``the Department of Defense remains committed to the policy 
of no foreign military sales or commitments for foreign sales of 
defense systems prior to the successful completion of OT&E [operational 
test and evaluation], and the specific approval of the Under Secretary 
of Defense. This policy remains in effect today.''
  Finally, I am deeply concerned that if this new weapons system were 
introduced into a volatile region and ever fell into the hands of a 
U.S. adversary, its state-of-the-art jamming capability could pose a 
serious threat to U.S. forces. When fully operational, this system will 
be capable of friend or foe identification, pulsed radar jamming, 
extreme radio frequency sensitivity and processing capability, as well 
as multi-band situational awareness.
  I see little justification for proceeding with an arrangement that is 
fraught with so many questionable funding practices and policy 
implications. While I and many of my colleagues believe that the United 
States shares an interest in the security of the UAE, the ATRJ would 
provide a level of jamming capability significantly greater than that 
possessed by many of our close NATO and major non-NATO allies. The 
possible threats to the UAE are no greater than those faced by other 
nations in the region, none of which have been asked to participate in 
the ATRJ program.
  I have already contacted the Defense Department on this issue, 
expressing my concern over the codevelopment of the ATRJ with the UAE. 
Unfortunately, I found the response to my concerns to be inadequate.
  Therefore, I have offered this amendment that directs the Department 
of Defense not to proceed with the codevelopment of the ATRJ with any 
foreign entity until the Department has fully consulted with Congress, 
and evaluated both legal and policy implications. The amendment exempts 
our NATO and major non-NATO allies.
  Specifically, the report to be submitted by the Secretary of Defense 
should include the following:

       (1) The legal basis for seeking for the program funds that 
     are neither authorized to be appropriated nor appropriated.
       (2) The consistency of the program with the Department of 
     Defense policy that no foreign military sale of a defense 
     system, and no commitment to foreign military sale of a 
     defense system, be made before operational test and 
     evaluation of the system is successfully completed and the 
     Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition of Technology has 
     specifically approved the system for sale to a foreign 
     government.
       (3) The mission requirement for an advanced threat radar 
     jammer for combat helicopters.
       (4) An assessment of each threat for which an advanced 
     threat radar jammer would be developed, particularly with 
     regard to each threat to a foreign country with which the 
     United States would jointly develop an advanced threat radar 
     jammer.
       (5) The potential for sensitive electronic warfare 
     technology to be made available to potential adversaries of 
     the United States as a result of United States participation 
     in the program.
       (6) The availability of other nondevelopmental items and 
     less sophisticated technologies for countering the emerging 
     radar detection threats to United States combat helicopters 
     and combat helicopters of United States allies.
       (7) A capability assessment of similar technologies 
     available from other foreign countries and the consequences 
     of proliferation of such technology.

  I urge my colleagues to support this common sense amendment and I 
urge its adoption. I now ask unanimous consent that my previous 
correspondences with DOD be printed in the Record at this time.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                   Washington, DC, April 13, 1994.
     Lt. Gen. Thomas Rhame,
     Director, Security Assistance Agency,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear General Rhame: I am concerned that the Department of 
     Defense is considering a co-development program with the 
     United Arab Emirates (UAE) for the Army's Advanced Threat 
     Radar Jammer (ATRJ). This action follows the sale of AH-64 
     Apache helicopters to the UAE.
       Apparently, the UAE would provide funding for research and 
     development of the ATRJ and then be allowed to purchase the 
     sophisticated systems for installation on the recently 
     required Apache helicopters. Specifically, I am concerned 
     that the proposed program could have serious implications for 
     U.S. national security by providing the UAE with an ultra-
     sophisticated capability to detect enemy radar and equip UAE 
     helicopters with an advanced, high-powered radar jamming 
     system.
       This precedent may represent a major departure from U.S. 
     Middle East policy and our commitment to Israel's qualitative 
     edge in its national defense. To my knowledge, ATRJ 
     technology has not been offered to other U.S. allies and 
     would likely surpass similar technologies currently employed 
     by other countries. By allowing the UAE to assist with 
     research and development costs, the Defense Department may be 
     granting a foreign country access to the most advanced 
     version of a weapon system used by U.S. forces. In addition, 
     the ATRJ co-development program may cause a new round of high 
     technology proliferation in a very volatile region of the 
     world.
       I urge you to fully investigate the ATRJ co-development 
     program, and carefully consider the implications to U.S. 
     national security and U.S. Middle East policy. Thank you for 
     your attention to this matter and I look forward to your 
     reply.
           Sincerely yours,
                                                 Dianne Feinstein,
                                                     U.S. Senator.
                                  ____

                                                  Defense Security


                                            Assistance Agency,

                                     Washington, DC, May 10, 1994.
     Hon. Dianne Feinstein,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Feinstein: This responds to your April 13, 
     1994, letter concerning the electronic warfare (EW) suite for 
     the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) AH-64 Apache helicopter 
     program.
       The UAE has for some time been considering several United 
     States and foreign EW systems for its AH-64 Apache 
     helicopters. The Department of Defense and the UAE are 
     exploring a two-phased approach under which the UAE would 
     purchase a standard U.S. Army EW suite for its short-term 
     needs, with a possible cooperative development program 
     providing hardware for its long-term requirements. These 
     discussions are still at an early stage, and no final 
     decisions have been reached.
       It is premature to speculate about the configuration and 
     capabilities of any hardware that may result from a 
     cooperative program several years hence, though it assuredly 
     would not exceed the capabilities of equipment in use with 
     our own forces. Should the United States and the UAE agree on 
     such a program, you can be assured that all sensitive 
     technologies would be protected and precautions taken against 
     unauthorized disclosures.
       The central objectives of our security assistance programs 
     throughout the region are to enhance the self-defense 
     capabilities of our friends and allies and to build the 
     interoperability that will enable us to fight together should 
     it ever become necessary. If successfully implemented, this 
     program will fulfill both these objectives by providing UAE 
     aircrafts with a defensive system that will be interoperable 
     with U.S. systems and supportable through the U.S. logistics 
     system.
       I can assure you that our commitment to Israel's security 
     remains unshakable. We would not even be considering such a 
     program with the UAE if we believed that it would affect 
     Israel's qualitative edge, which we are committed to 
     maintaining. Please contact me if I can provide any 
     additional information.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Thomas G. Rhame.


                   center for manufacturing sciences

  Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. President, I am concerned that the Defense 
appropriations bill deletes funding for the National Center for 
Manufacturing Science [NCMS]. I would also not the committee report 
contains language questioning the appropriateness of continued DoD 
funding for NCMS. I recognize and support the need for close scrutiny 
of programs funded by the Department of Defense, especially in this 
time of constrained budgetary resources. However, this Senator believes 
that the best way to ensure effective use of DoD research and 
development funding is through the dual-use technology and 
manufacturing policy currently being followed by the Department. As 
Anita Jones, Director of DDR&E, stated in her testimony before the 
Senate Armed Service Committee, ``our vision for the 21st century 
manufacturing is for an integrated civil/ military industrial base that 
can provide a flexible response to our needs for a variety of product 
demands at varying rates, and can reduce the cost of defense products 
by getting components and subsystems from dual-use production lines.'' 
Mr. President, the NCMS is designed specifically to accomplish just 
such a dual-use objective, and therefore is highly appropriate for DoD 
funding.
  As to the concerns that have been raised as to the defense benefits 
of NCMS, it is my understanding that the Department and NCMS signed an 
agreement that provided that all funded projects must have a defense 
application and that DoD would receive royalty-free licenses to all 
technologies developed. It is also my understanding that more than 20 
weapon systems currently utilize NCMS developed technologies, including 
the V-22 Osprey and the C-17.
  Given the benefits accruing to DoD through NCMS' research projects, I 
hope that the Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee will reconsider this 
issue during Conference with the House.


                          intent of sec. 8096

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I would like to engage the distinguished Chairman of 
the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee in a colloquy to clarify 
Section 8096 of this bill regarding defense reinvestment programs. Is 
it the Chairman's intent that this section should in no way impact the 
small business defense conversion guaranteed loan program?
  Mr. INOUYE. The senior Senator from California is correct. Service 
8096 does not impact the small business defense conversion guaranteed 
loan program.


                 brain and spinal cord injury research

  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I would like to express my deep concern 
for those suffering from injuries to the brain and spinal cord. I have 
spoken with my distinguished colleague from Hawaii, Senator Inouye, who 
appreciates the seriousness of this medical problem. And I would like 
an opportunity to further express my thoughts on this issue.
  There are approximately 180,000 individuals in the United States who 
suffer from chronic spinal cord injury, with between 10 and 12 thousand 
new cases added each year. A substantial number of these individuals, 
approximately 45,600, are veterans--men and women who have served our 
Nation with honor and distinction. Sixty percent of these veterans 
receive treatment for these injuries exclusively from VA facilities, 
while another 23 percent use a secondary medical provider in addition 
to the VA.
  We know that combat service can be very hazardous, and that injuries 
to the brain and spinal cord can occur both during combat related 
operations and noncombat related activities. They can and do occur from 
shell blasts, armed combat, bullet wounds, and sometimes, common 
accidents. Very often such injuries are fatal. For those who survive, 
the injuries are usually seriously debilitating.
  Currently, our Nation spends approximately $1.4 billion per year for 
initial spinal cord injury medical treatment. And an additional $4 
billion is spent each year for subsequent spinal cord injury treatment.
  Our moral obligation to help our veterans, the need to help prevent 
deaths and aggravated injuries among active duty military personnel, as 
well as the costs associated with such injuries and treatment, are 
compelling reasons for us to invest in research efforts to develop 
effective treatment for those afflicted with such injuries.
  That is why I believe that it is important that the Departments of 
Defense and Veterans' Affairs work together on this medical problem to 
assist both members in uniform and our veterans in this regard.
  I am pleased that the Senate Armed Services Committee, on which I 
serve, recommended $20 million for a collaborative Department of 
Defense and Department of Veterans' Affairs research initiative for 
brain and spinal cord injury, with cost sharing as a prerequisite. I am 
confident that the authorization conference committee will support the 
Senate-passed provision.
  Knowing that we share a similar concern in this area, I would like to 
ask the chairman questions to clarify the intent of his subcommittee 
with respect to the Defense appropriations bill for fiscal year 1995.
  Mr. INOUYE. I would be happy to respond to the Senator from Florida.
  Mr. GRAHAM. I thank the Senator. It is my understanding that the 
chairman shares a similar concern regarding brain and spinal cord 
injury, and believes that such research should be considered a high 
priority for the two departments. Is that understanding correct?
  Mr. INOUYE. Yes it is. I am well aware of the problems the Senator 
spoke of, and would support the use of funds appropriated in the bill 
for this research.
  Mr. GRAHAM. I thank the Senator. Is the distinguished chairman aware 
of the cost-shared brain and spinal cord injury research program 
authorized in S. 2182, the Defense authorization bill; and if so, is 
this a program that the chairman would support?
  Mr. INOUYE. Yes, I am aware of the action taken by the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, on which the Senator from Florida serves, and I 
fully support their recommendations with regard to this brain and 
spinal cord injury initiative.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Again, I thank my colleague for those words of support. 
Given the clear intent of the authorizing committee in the Senate to 
provide full funding for this collaborative initiative between the 
Departments of Defense and Veterans' Affairs, is it the intent of the 
distinguished floor manager that full funding would be available in the 
defense appropriations bill to carry out this meritorious program?
  Mr. INOUYE. Yes, it is our intent and desire to provide the full 
amount authorized for the brain and spinal cord injury research 
initiative.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Finally, is it also the desire of the appropriators for 
the Departments of Defense and Veterans' Affairs to act promptly to 
ensure that authorized and appropriated monies are directed to brain 
and spinal cord injury research?
  Mr. INOUYE. Yes, it is.
  Mr. GRAHAM. I thank the distinguished Senator from Hawaii and look 
forward to working with him during further consideration of the Defense 
appropriations bill for fiscal year 1995.
  Mr. BOND. I would like to address the provision in the bill regarding 
the Air Force's 60K aircraft loader program.
  There has been a lot of talk in recent months about the concept of 
buying commercial-derivative aircraft either to replace or supplement 
military aircraft such as the C-17 and C-5B. Despite one's view's one 
that subject--and I am one who has strong views--it is clear that the 
Air Force needs a new aircraft loader to replace its current inventory 
of Vietnam-era loaders. This new loader--the 60K loader--will be used 
to load and unload all types of cargo aircraft, however, it will be 
absolutely essential for operating any commercial derivative aircraft 
we buy, as well as the Civil Reserve airfleet aircraft. The new system 
will allow the Air Force to load supplies rapidly on its aircraft for 
vital military missions and humanitarian relief missions. given the 
daily commitments we face in airlift needs, the 60K loader is a vital 
part of the airlift master plan.
  In its report, the committee has exercised its oversight 
responsibility and raised several valid concerns regarding the Air 
Force's progress on the 60K loader program. My office has been in 
contact with the Air Force on this matter, and they have said that any 
decrement in fiscal year 1995 funding could result in higher costs and 
possible delay for the program. In the Air Force appeal of our mark, 
they say our bill ``actually increases risk as well as cost'' of this 
program which the Air Mobility Command ranks second only to the C-17 in 
terms of requirements. I believe it is essential that we work with the 
Air Force to find a solution that meets the committee's concerns 
without causing harm or delay to the program. I hope the chairman will 
work with me and the Air Force to craft an equitable solution.
  Mr. INOUYE. I thank my colleague for his statement. I understand his 
concerns about this program. I too, believe the 60K loader is a vital 
part of this Nation's future airlift capability. The committee has, 
indeed, voiced concerns about the structuring of the program. However, 
I would be glad to work with my colleague from Missouri in the 
conference committee to ensure that this program stays on an 
appropriate track. I will also direct the committee staff to work with 
the Air Force to resolve committee concerns. I believe we can work 
together to help the Air Force make this vital program a success.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I would like to commend the chairman and 
ranking member for including in the committee report accompanying this 
bill an important provision directing a study of the Air Force's strike 
airpower requirements. I have been concerned for some time about the 
Air Force's plans regarding the future of our interdiction aircraft 
force. These aircraft--the F-117, F-111 and F-15E--played a key role in 
the Gulf War, and would certainly play a similar role in any future 
conflict.
  The aircraft that make up the long-range interdiction force are the 
primary ones that can deliver precision guided munitions. In the Gulf 
War, we used them for striking hardened targets, for Scud hunting, and 
other priority strikes. Unfortunately, the future of the interdiction 
force appears to be bleak.
  The Air Force reportedly has considered plans to retire the entire F-
111 strike force. Although there are currently two full wings of F-
15E's, normal attrition will take us below that amount in the near 
future. And there are only 56 F-117's remaining in the inventory at 
this time.
  The F-117 line has been shut down for years. The Air Force has no 
current plans to buy additional F-15E's. And, in a development that 
only increases my concern, the Air Force has said that they plan to 
fill the eventual gap left by the F-111 with the F-16--an aircraft that 
does not have the range required to perform the mission, the ability to 
carry a similar weapons load, nor the same ability to deliver precision 
guided munitions as the F-111. Moreover, the ability of long range 
bombers to deliver precision guided munitions will be limited until 
about the turn of the century when these weapons begin to become 
available in adequate numbers.
  It seems clear to me, that we face a major shortfall in interdiction 
aircraft as we enter the next century. The study ordered by the 
committee report on this bill will help us to focus on what that 
shortfall is, and how best to address it.
  In my view, I believe the study ought to focus in on several specific 
points including:
  First, the impact of the eventual retirement of F-111 aircraft on the 
Air Force's ability to conduct interdiction missions; second, the 
outlook for the interdiction force, assuming an eventual F-111 
retirement and the expected attrition of F-15E and F-117 aircraft, and 
the ability of that force to meet planned requirements; third, the 
ability of existing aircraft (F-117, F-15E, F-16) to perform the 
mission currently being performed by the F-111--that is, the delivery 
of precision-guided munitions in the long-range interdiction role; 
fourth, the costs and operational effectiveness of continuing to 
operate the F-111 aircraft for the long-range interdiction role through 
the end of their expected service life; and fifth, the possible need 
for additional aircraft to fulfill the interdiction role.
  I believe that a review of these issues will help both the Air Force 
and Congress to understand the challenge we face and begin to address 
it.
  Mr. INOUYE. I thank the Senator from Missouri for his comments. I 
believe he has focused on an important issue--one that we will have to 
face in future budgets. I agree that the specific questions he has 
outlined are ones that, among other important considerations, should be 
covered in the independent strike airpower study to be performed by the 
Institute for Defense Analysis. I will do my best in conference to see 
that these issues are to be addressed comprehensively in the required 
study. I also intend to seek approval by the conference committee of 
the requirement that the full results of this study shall be submitted, 
in both classified and unclassified versions, to the congressional 
defense committees no later than June 1, 1995.


   joint training, analysis and simulation center for u.s. atlantic 
                                command

  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, this amendment would provide up to $10.5 
million in fiscal year 1995 for the Navy to begin procurement of 
equipment to outfit the new Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation 
Center for U.S. Atlantic Command. The amendment does not add funds to 
the bill--it simply provides the authority for the Navy to use funds 
within the Other Procurement, Navy account to initiate this exciting 
new simulation Center.
  Earlier this year, the Subcommittee on Military Readiness and Defense 
Infrastructure which I chair visited the Norfolk Naval complex to 
discuss readiness concerns with front-line operating units. During our 
visit, we met with Adm. Paul David Miller, the Commander in Chief of 
U.S. Atlantic Command to discuss readiness within USACOM.
  During that discussion, Admiral Miller briefed the Subcommittee on 
the Command's plans for a Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation 
Center. The purpose of this Center will be to provide cost-effective 
joint training to support U.S. Atlantic Command's program for training 
joint task forces through simulation.
  Mr. President, in June the Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Readiness, chaired by former Army Chief of Staff General Shy Meyer, 
issued its final report on readiness in the Department of Defense. This 
Task Force found that the Defense Department did not have good systems 
for measuring joint readiness, and urged DOD to provide ``increased 
emphasis on Joint and Combined readiness and requirements, including 
development of joint mission essential task lists.''
  The Readiness Task Force also called for enhanced use of modeling and 
simulation. Their final report recommends that ``Modeling and 
simulation technology should be exploited to enhance joint and combined 
training and doctrine. It offers tremendous opportunity to leverage our 
existing training at all levels through enhancement or even replacement 
where appropriate after thorough review.''
  In my view, Mr. President, this new Joint Training, Analysis and 
Simulation Center is exactly the kind of effort that is called for by 
the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness. This Center will 
serve to improve and measure joint readiness, and provide a laboratory 
for the improvement of joint tactics, throughout U.S. Atlantic Command.
  This new facility will be located in the building which was 
constructed for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in Suffolk, VA. This 
building is under long-term lease to the Navy. Since the Naval Undersea 
Warfare Center is leaving this building as a result of the Base 
Realignment and Closure process, the use of the facility as the site 
for the Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center will make cost-
effective use of this facility.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter from Mr. Louis 
Finch, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness), to Senator 
Nunn describing the Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center be 
included in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Without objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                     Pentagon,

                                    Washington, DC, June 23, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your recent 
     inquiries regarding the Joint Training, Analysis and 
     Simulation Center (JTASC). The purpose of this Center is to 
     provide cost-effective joint training to support the United 
     States Atlantic Command's (USACOM) program for training joint 
     task forces via simulation. This program will serve to 
     improve and measure joint readiness, provide a laboratory for 
     the improvement of joint tactics, and establish a secure 
     CONUS joint environment for the demonstration of new 
     technologies. It will occupy and use as a hub for these 
     efforts the facility in Suffolk, Virginia, that is being 
     vacated by the Naval Undersea Warfare organization.
       To ensure there is no duplication of efforts, the JTASC 
     fully intends to coordinate its efforts with those of the 
     Services and other joint training efforts including those of 
     the Joint Warfighting Center and the Armed Forces Staff 
     College in Tidewater, Virginia, and those of the United 
     States Special Operations Command for Special Operations 
     Forces. It is my understanding that $10.548 million is 
     required to finance the initial phase of this effort which is 
     to procure command, control, communications and computer 
     equipment for the Center.
       Thank you for inquiry on this cost-effective program to 
     improve joint readiness and other defense matters.
           Sincerely,

                                               Louis C. Finch,

                                            Deputy Under Secretary
                                          of Defense, (Readiness).

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, since we have finished our work for this 
evening, and we will be returning at or about 1:30 tomorrow afternoon, 
may I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  Mr. FORD. Will the Senator withhold.
  Mr. INOUYE. Certainly.

                          ____________________