[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 109 (Tuesday, August 9, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: August 9, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
     PRESIDENT CLINTON DESERVES CREDIT FOR RUSSIAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL

  Mr. PELL. Madam President, recently I made a statement on the Senate 
floor welcoming the Russian announcement that all troops would indeed 
be out of the Baltics by August 31. This is indeed good news.
  I noted in my statement that the Clinton administration deserves a 
great deal of credit for its quiet, yet effective diplomatic role in 
facilitating the Russian-Estonian agreement. I mentioned that most 
people do not realize the amount of energy President Clinton has 
personally expended on this issue. Accordingly, I was very pleased to 
read a piece by William Safire in Monday's New York Times on this very 
subject. Mr. Safire not only recognizes, but commends President Clinton 
for the key role that he played in the diplomatic effort to secure an 
agreement on troop withdrawal.
  I commend the piece to my colleagues, and ask that it be printed in 
the Record at this point.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                          Clinton's Good Deed

                          (By William Safire)

       Washington.--Five years ago, an inflammatory piece titled 
     ``Free the Baltics'' appeared in this space. Its theme was 
     that ``a great struggle has begun'' to dismember the Soviet 
     empire, and I went to the Baltics a few months later to be 
     able to put the message in a dateline redolent with pro-
     independence propaganda: ``Riga, Soviet-occupied Latvia.''
       The three tiny Baltic republics--Latvia, Estonia, 
     Lithuania--were the keys to the kingdom. The West had never 
     recognized Stalin's deal with Hitler to swallow up the three 
     states; for a half-century, U.S. Presidents of both parties 
     kept the diplomatic faith with the peoples of these ``captive 
     nations'' (a phrase derided by anti-anti-Communists here.)
       By emboldening independence movements in these disputed 
     Soviet annexations, we subtly encouraged nationalists in 
     Ukraine and in other republics where Kremlin sovereignty was 
     recognized. Sure enough, as the Russian economy collapsed, 
     Balts asserted their freedom, Ukrainians followed suit, and 
     the Soviet Union came apart.
       But there was a blot on the sovereignty of the Baltics: the 
     ominous, continued presence of Russian troops.
       Moscow gave such excuses as the protection of the human 
     rights of Russians sent by Stalin to colonize the states, and 
     the need to maintain an early-warning radar station. The 
     practical reason was that no decent housing existed in Russia 
     for the returning officers. The political reason was the 
     rising resentment within Russia of the loss of superpower and 
     the ensuing neo-imperialist pressure to dominate the ``near 
     abroad.''
       On Aug. 31, despite these pressures and to the surprise of 
     many Russian, American and Baltic diplomats, all remaining 
     Russian troops will be pulled out of the Baltics. Much of the 
     credit for this unremarked foreign-policy stunner should go 
     to the perseverance and persuasiveness of President Bill 
     Clinton.
       From the first summit with Boris Yeltsin in Vancouver to 
     the recent meeting in Naples, Clinton pressed for the Baltic 
     pullout. Yeltsin had criticized Gorbachev on this, but once 
     in power was faced with the military's demands to stay. Aided 
     by Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, Clinton began chipping 
     away at the reasons for delay, by phone and letter, making 
     plain a personal interest.
       The U.S. successfully medicated a radar phase-out that met 
     Moscow's defense concerns. We made available $160 million for 
     resettling Russian military, including $25,000 vouchers for 
     officers to build new housing back home, more generous than 
     our own old G.I. bill.
       But Yeltsin balked at the impending deadline for 
     withdrawal. Getting political heat from nationalists and 
     resentment from his army, he complained of ``brutal'' 
     repression of the Russian minority in Latvia and Estonia. 
     Asked last month if the would meet the deadline, he publicly 
     answered ``nyet.''
       On July 6, Clinton was the first U.S. President to visit 
     Latvia, affirming its Western ties, raising hard-liner hopes 
     that he will abandon ``partnership for peace'' bomfog and 
     expand NATO membership eastward while opportunity exits. But 
     he quieted a cheering throng in Riga with a message many non-
     Russians did not want to hear: ``to never deny others the 
     justice and equality you fought for . . . for freedom without 
     tolerance is freedom unfulfilled.''
       Nine days later, he wrote Yeltsin a private letter to 
     assure him that the rights of Russians in the Baltics ``is an 
     issue of principle with me'' but ``we do not see in these 
     countries a pattern of abuses . . .'' He added ``Boris, it 
     remains my firm view that we must not miss the chance to put 
     Russian-Estonian relations on a new path by achieving 
     agreement with President [Lennart] Meri. You should make 
     every effort to withdraw your remaining troops from Estonia 
     by August 31.''
       Russian diplomat Vitaly Churkin treated Meri rudely, 
     expecting his Moscow meeting with Yeltsin to fail; Nick 
     Burns, the Clinton national security aide highly regarded by 
     the Balts, was pessimistic. But Bill's penpal Boris, 
     repeatedly made aware of linkage, thundered ``solve it!'' to 
     aides and ordered his troops out--on the same day the last 
     Russian soldiers are to leave Berlin.
       Thus, Russian imperial interest seems directed more 
     southward than westward, partly by virtue of Clinton 
     diplomacy. That shows what can happen in the rare case when 
     this President makes a clear-cut strategic decision, takes a 
     personal interest in its success and quietly follows through.

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