[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 107 (Friday, August 5, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: August 5, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
   NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN PAKISTAN: REAFFIRMING THE INTENT OF THE 
                           PRESSLER AMENDMENT

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, in 1990 President Bush no longer could 
certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon. As a 
consequence, U.S. assistance was cut off. Over the past year, the 
Clinton administration has attempted to waive current law to allow the 
shipment of at least 38 F-16's to Pakistan. The language in the Foreign 
Assistance Act which prevents the administration from sending the 
planes to Pakistan, as my colleagues know, is the ``Pressler 
amendment.''
  In 1985 when the Pressler amendment became law, I was gravely 
concerned about regional arms building. Those concerns remain today. I 
have opposed the President's desire to exempt the F-16's for Pakistan. 
When the Pressler amendment was triggered in 1990, U.S. assistance 
ended. I did not intend to allow exemptions then. I do not intend to 
allow exemptions now.
  Recently, I wrote a chapter for a book titled ``Future Imperiled.'' 
In the chapter, I detail the history and current interpretation of the 
Pressler amendment. As a way of reiterating the intent of the amendment 
and to remind the administration of the amendment's importance in 
thwarting a South Asian arms race, I ask unanimous consent to place a 
copy of this chapter in the Record at this time.

   The Restraint of Fury: US Non-Proliferation Policy and South Asia

                          (By Larry Pressler)

       While the end of the Cold War brings with it a waning 
     danger of super power nuclear confrontation, the world 
     remains troubled and unstable. A new security concern has 
     risen from the dust and shadows of the Cold War's rubble. 
     Regional nuclear weapons proliferation is replacing the 
     competition for global hegemony as the world's most pressing 
     security threat. Indeed, mounting evidence suggests that 
     regional nuclear proliferation has been a greater danger than 
     super power weapons-building all along--a danger that has 
     been tolerated, or even ignored, so long as it was creeping 
     rather than leaping, and discreet rather than blatant. This 
     threat is no longer creeping, and it certainly is no longer 
     discreet.
       Over the last several decades, the hostilities, suspicions, 
     and border disputes in South Asia have created a complex 
     amalgam of policies and perceptions. Conflicting interests in 
     this region of the world have heightened the concern that 
     rivalries between countries will spur nuclear proliferation 
     in the developing countries of the world. According to Peter 
     Herrly, a US Department of Defence official, `The growing 
     spread of chemical and advanced weapons to Third World combat 
     zones has undermined the restraints against escalation and 
     could bring to a shattering end, a half-century of non-use of 
     nuclear weapons.\1\
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     \1\Footnotes at end of article.
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       Traditional suspicions among South Asians have dampened 
     hopes of establishing long-term regional security agreements. 
     New worries and old rivalries fuel the desire for stronger, 
     more highly modernized, nuclear-oriented militaries. This 
     military blueprint led to a reality in which humanity's most 
     lethal form of fury--the nuclear bomb--is precariously held 
     in check. This fury must be restrained.
       Of the numerous security considerations in South Asia, 
     Pakistan's nuclear capability is a special concern. Anxiety 
     over Islamabad's nuclear weapons program has sparked much 
     controversy. Pakistan's aspirations for membership to the 
     nuclear club has raised significant US foreign policy 
     questions. The following narrative assesses Pakistan and 
     India's desire for nuclear military status. Further, it 
     details US reactions and initiatives to counter the threat of 
     nuclear weapons proliferation.


                        historical relationships

       To understand America's pressing need to develop a specific 
     non-proliferation policy regarding Pakistan better, one must 
     closely examine Pakistan's relationship with India. That 
     association is especially important to understanding both 
     Pakistan's perceived need for building up its military as 
     well as its actual ability to acquire nuclear weapons.
       Indo-Pakistani relations have evolved into an intricate and 
     tenuous configuration, heavily influenced by historical 
     antagonisms. The history of conflict between these two 
     nations, combined with each country's deep suspicions over 
     the other's nuclear intentions, has promoted additional 
     instability in an already unstable South Asia. In 1974, 
     demonstrating its ability to produce highly modernized 
     weaponry, India exploded a nuclear device. This `peaceful' 
     demonstration sent shock-waves around the globe, heralding 
     India's distinct nuclear technology and its more equivocal 
     nuclear ambitions.
       In an effort to counter India's aspiring nuclear programme, 
     Pakistan retaliated in kind with its own modernization plans. 
     Evidence suggests that Pakistan embarked on nuclear weapons 
     research projects shortly after the initial Indian nuclear 
     tests in 1974.\2\ According to a Carnegie Task Force report 
     on South Asian security, `Islambad's nuclear ambitions stem 
     principally from its efforts to meet the threat from India's 
     conventional military superiority and its nuclear potential, 
     as well as to counter more subtle forms of Indian dominance 
     in regional affairs.'\3\ More assertively, a once-
     classified State Department memorandum claims: `Pakistan's 
     long-term goal is to establish a nuclear deterrent to 
     aggression by India, which remains Pakistan's greatest 
     security concern.\4\
       And so began a South Asian chain reaction of attempted 
     nuclear bomb acquisition. India, fearing China, built a tomb. 
     Pakistan, partially because it considered India's nuclear 
     programme a threat to its own national security, developed 
     its own nuclear programme. While both India and Pakistan may 
     believe this tit for tat nuclear policy lowers the risk of 
     conflict, should a hot conflict erupt, the stakes would be 
     much higher with nuclear weapons figured into the 
     calculation. Therefore, `The Indian high command must not go 
     past a certain threshold that might provoke a nuclear 
     exchange. They cannot be sure what Pakistan thinks the 
     threshold is. One must go with impressions and guesses'\5\
       The mutual suspicion over the other's clandestine nuclear 
     arsenal and the ever-present, still unresolved disputes over 
     Kashmir have impeded Western attempts at persuading the two 
     nations to shrink their expanding nuclear programmes. Added 
     to frustrated US efforts, some Indian and Pakistani military 
     strategists enthusiastically espouse their beliefs in the 
     presumable benefits of nuclear weapons. `There are some 
     senior military strategists in both countries who apparently 
     believe that a nuclear war on the subcontinent would be 
     winnable in both tactical and strategic terms.\6\ As a result 
     of this distorted yet discernible military perspective, India 
     has maintained its nuclear threshold status.
       India's nuclear drive can be traced to a deep-rooted desire 
     for regional respect, command, and even economic self-
     sufficiency. To achieve this great, regional hegemonic 
     status, India believes a nuclear weapons capability is 
     essential. According to an Indian public opinion poll 
     conducted in the early 1980s, `more than 70 per cent of the 
     urban residents in 15 of India's leading cities wanted the 
     country to acquire nuclear weapons capability regardless of 
     what its neighbours were doing.'\7\ The Indian populace seems 
     to concur with what military strategists have believed all 
     along--calculated ambiguity keeps the region on its 
     collective toes! This policy, `has proven to be an extremely 
     useful policy to keep both hawks and doves hopeful, 
     contributes somewhat indirectly toward collective efforts of 
     total nuclear disarmament, provides a face-saving device and 
     can pay desired dividends in the national politics.'
       India and Pakistan can choose to aggravate or to prevent 
     the South Asian weapons competition. Unless India and 
     Pakistan constrain their nuclear weapons research and 
     development programmes, these technological programmes could 
     create the political momentum within each country to build 
     and test nuclear weapons. The main goal in the region should 
     centre on verifiable commitments not to build nuclear 
     weapons.
       While India maintains that its nuclear objectives are 
     peaceful, Pakistan remains suspicious. `Whether or not India 
     in fact possesses a number of nuclear weapons at this time, 
     it clearly has the capability to manufacture them quickly, 
     and Pakistani strategists have to assume that Pakistan would 
     confront a nuclear-armed adversary in any future 
     conflict.'\8\ Politically destabilizing events involving 
     India and Pakistan constantly offer the potential for an 
     explosion. Regional tensions and violent internal eruptions 
     in India or Pakistan threaten to provide just the catalyst 
     needed to trigger a nuclear reaction. For that reason, it is 
     necessary to counteract such risks before they escalate 
     beyond the region. This raises a substantial foreign policy 
     question for the United States: How can American influence 
     stop a nuclear arms race in South Asia?


                      us non-proliferation policy

       As one nation obtains the technology and the components 
     necessary to construct atomic weapons, it is politically 
     difficult for another country, that feels threatened by the 
     first, to withstand temptations to strengthen its own nuclear 
     programme. This competition substantially increases the 
     possibility that disputes between the two nations could end 
     in an atomic clash.
       International pleas urging India and Pakistan to halt their 
     nuclear programmes have met significant resistance. Attempts 
     to persuade the two nations to sign the Non-Proliferation 
     Treaty (NPT) have been fruitless in recent years. `India 
     considers the treaty discriminatory since it allows the 
     nuclear-weapon States to keep their nuclear arsenals while 
     denying nuclear weapons to other countries, and because the 
     treaty imposes inspections of civil nuclear facilities on 
     non-nuclear weapon States but not on nuclear-weapons States. 
     India has also said that it will not sign the NPT unless the 
     nuclear-weapons States disarm.'\9\
       Indian opposition to the NPT creates little reasonable 
     incentive for the Pakistani government to support accession 
     to the treaty. The Indian government appears willing to 
     support only a nuclear pact that includes the world-wide 
     elimination of all nuclear weapons. Pakistan has proposed 
     several initiatives designed to eliminate atomic weapons in 
     the region. The then Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, 
     advanced an agreement to control nuclear weapons in South 
     Asia in June 1991. This proposal, supported by the United 
     States, would allow India and Pakistan to negotiate weapons 
     reduction with mediation provided by China, the United 
     States, and Russia. India rejected this offer and refused to 
     sign the Sharif agreement, citing again its opposition to 
     regional settlements.\10\
       The United States, in November 1991, urged India to 
     reconsider its objections to signing a regional agreement 
     with the Pakistani government. The Indian government, to 
     date, has not accepted that request. While the two South 
     Asian adversaries have signed an agreement not to attack each 
     other's nuclear facilities--itself a positive move toward 
     non-proliferation--a nuclear-free compromise has not been 
     achieved in South Asia. Because of this continued inability 
     to obtain a regional arms agreement, other US foreign policy 
     action has been warranted.
       While the United States has pressured India moderately to 
     discontinue its nuclear programme, US policy has been aimed 
     more heavily at Pakistan. The rationale for the country-
     specific policy is based on several factors. At the time a US 
     policy response was being developed to address nuclear 
     proliferation in South Asia, India's programme was already in 
     place. Pakistan, however, had not yet acquired the 
     technology. In addition, because of its smaller industrial 
     base, Pakistan turned its attention to acquiring critical 
     technology and components from abroad--sometimes in violation 
     of US and other countries' export laws.
       Pakistani violations of US domestic laws governing the 
     export of sensitive materials and technology have been 
     particularly vexing. In June 1984, US Customs agents arrested 
     and charged three Pakistanis in Houston with violating US law 
     by attempting to export krytons, extremely high-speed 
     switches that can be used to detonate nuclear weapons. One of 
     the suspects eventually was convicted and deported to 
     Pakistan. In another case, Arshad Z. Pervez, a Canadian 
     national of Pakistani origin, was arraigned in the United 
     States in July 1987 on the charge that he attempted to bribe 
     US Customs agents to grant licenses required for the export 
     of maraging steel, very hard steel which can be used in 
     uranium enrichment centrifuges. Pervez was later convicted 
     of conspiracy to export beryllium illegally and making 
     false statements, but was acquitted on the grounds of 
     entrapment of attempted bribery and of illegally seeking 
     to export maraging steel.
       Yet another factor in US policy toward Pakistan was 
     American intelligence assessments during the late 1970s and 
     early 1980s that indicated India was not actually building 
     nuclear weapons. On the other hand, other intelligence did 
     indicate that Pakistan was pursuing an aggressive nuclear 
     weapons development programme. For these reasons, US policy-
     makers believed India was less vulnerable to US influence 
     than Pakistan. The United States and other industrialized 
     countries had more leverage to manipulate the Pakistani 
     nuclear agenda.
       United States policy-makers also believed Pakistan was 
     susceptible to a `carrot and stick' approach in terms of US 
     economic and military assistance because of the United 
     States' role as a major provider of aid to Pakistan. India, 
     on the other hand, was much more closely aligned with the 
     former Soviet Union and received comparatively little 
     assistance from the United States. The level of US assistance 
     to India was insufficient to serve as a bargaining tool in 
     obtaining US non-proliferation objectives in India.
       Another basis for focusing US initiatives on Pakistan was 
     US concern over potential Pakistani ties to Islamic 
     fundamentalism. Anti-Western factions have taken hold in 
     several Islamic countries in recent years, including Iran, 
     Libya and Syria. While certainly not governed by religious 
     fanatics, given its religious and cultural foundations, 
     Pakistan was viewed more likely than India to cooperate with 
     such governments. In this regard, US foreign policy was 
     designed to slow the possible proliferation of nuclear 
     weapons beyond south Asia to the Middle-East.
       In 1976, Congress adopted Section 669 as an amendment to 
     the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This provision of law was 
     modified in 1977 by Senator John Glenn, and it is now known 
     as the Symington-Glenn Amendment. That amendment was designed 
     to prohibit US assistance to any country that acquires 
     unsafeguarded uranium enrichment technology, unless the 
     country places all of its nuclear facilities under full-scope 
     safeguards; or unless the President certifies he has reliable 
     assurances that the country will neither acquire nuclear 
     weapons nor help other nations to do so.
       The Carter Administration in April 1979 invoked the 
     Symington-Glenn Amendment after it received intelligence 
     assessments confirming Pakistan was building a secret uranium 
     enrichment facility. Pakistan is the only country ever to be 
     designated as violating Section 669 and sanctioned under its 
     terms. In late 1981, Congress enacted section 620E of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act to allow the President, under certain 
     conditions, to waive Section 669 sanctions. This move allowed 
     the resumption of US assistance at a time when Pakistan ws 
     being threatened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
       In 1984, faced with mounting evidence that Pakistan wsa 
     intensively developing a nuclear weapons capability, Congress 
     began consideration of legislative proposals to strengthen 
     conditions on US assistance to Pakistan. In that year, the US 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered an amendment 
     offered by Senators Alan Cranston and John Glenn to cut off 
     US assistance to Pakistan unless the President, on a yearly 
     basis, was able to certify that Pakistan did not possess a 
     nuclear explosive device, was not developing such a device, 
     and was not acquiring technology, material, or equipment for 
     the purpose of either manufacturing or detonating a nuclear 
     weapon. The Cranston-Glenn Amendment was defeated in the face 
     of strong Administration opposition.


                         the pressler amendment

       In 1985, in an effort to curtail the fledgling nuclear 
     programme in Pakistan, I offered a non-proliferation 
     amendment to the US foreign aid authorization legislation. 
     The provision, commonly known as the `Pressler Amendment', 
     amended Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act to read as 
     follows:
       No assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no 
     military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred 
     to Pakistan, pursuant to the authorities contained in this 
     Act or any other Act, unless the President shall have 
     certified in writing to the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations of the Senate, during the fiscal year in which 
     assistance is to be furnished or military equipment or 
     technology is to be sold or transferred, that Pakistan 
     does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the 
     proposed United States assistance programme will reduce 
     significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a 
     nuclear explosive device.
       In 1985, the Reagan Administration welcomed the Pressler 
     Amendment, insisting that Pakistan not develop a nuclear 
     weapon. Because some members of the US Senate Foreign 
     Relations Committee wished to cut off all US assistance to 
     Pakistan in 1985, Congress, and indeed Pakistani leaders, 
     viewed the amendment as a viable compromise--aid to Pakistan 
     would continue, provided the President could certify that the 
     country did not possess a nuclear explosive device.
       In 1985, Pakistan faced 120,000 Soviet troops on its 
     border, repeated cross-border raids from Afghanistan, and 
     wanton acts of Soviet-inspired terrorism in the crowded 
     bazaars of Peshawar and Islamabad. A draconian cut in US 
     foreign assistance to Pakistan at that time would have 
     undermined the security interests of both Pakistan and the 
     United States. Nevertheless, I believed, as did the Reagan 
     Administration, that it was important to send a strong but 
     fair message to Pakistan. The Administration-supported 
     Pressler Amendment compromise established a clear policy on 
     US assistance to Pakistan. The standard merely required the 
     President to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear 
     weapon. If the President made the certification, generous 
     levels of economic and military assistance would be 
     available.
       From the time the Pressler Amendment was adopted until the 
     beginning of the US Government's 1991 fiscal year (1 October, 
     1990), the President was able to make the required 
     certification and the US Congress supported annually the 
     President's request for both security and economic assistance 
     to Pakistan. Pakistani officials were well aware of the 
     provisions of the Pressler Amendment. They were reminded of 
     it time and again by senior US officials. It offered no 
     surprises. So long as Pakistan did not cross the nuclear 
     line, it would continue to receive US assistance. Until 1990, 
     Pakistan was among the largest recipients of US foreign 
     assistance. In 1990, however, President George Bush was not 
     able to certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear 
     weapon. Consequently, All economic and military assistance to 
     Pakistan was cut off.
       In early spring 1991, President Bush proposed to strike the 
     Pressler Amendment. In a letter dated 12 April, 1991, Bush 
     indicated that this action was consistent with his approach 
     of removing country-specific provisions from the US Foreign 
     Assistance Act--not because he disagreed with the substance 
     of the law's provisions.
       The President indicated he would continue to hold Pakistan 
     to the same standard embodied in the Pressler Amendment even 
     if the amendment were struck. His letter stated:
       While the proposed elimination of the Pakistan-specific 
     certification requirement is intended to uphold the general 
     principle of Presidential authority, I will continue to 
     insist on unambiguous specific steps by Pakistan in meeting 
     non-proliferation standards, including those specifically 
     reflected in the omitted language known as the Pressler 
     Amendment. Satisfaction of the Pressler standard will remain 
     the essential basis for exercising the national interest 
     waiver that is in the Administration's proposal.
       The Administration's attempt to strike all provisions it 
     perceived to be Congressional micromanagement of foreign 
     policy, failed. During the US House of Representatives' 
     consideration of the Foreign Assistance Act, an amendment to 
     repeal the Pressler Amendment was offered. This effort failed 
     by the significant margin of 151-252 on 12 June, 1991.
       Despite the aid ban, the bonds of friendship continue to 
     exist between Pakistan and the United States. Pakistan 
     supported the Afghan freedom fighters during the brutal 
     Soviet invasion. During the recent Persian Gulf war, 
     Pakistan's Government, led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, 
     stood courageously with the United States--in spite of 
     contrary pressures from powerful elements in the Pakistan 
     military. Notwithstanding the mutual desire for continuation 
     of the historic friendship between the United States and 
     Pakistan, the US Congress should not retreat from its fair 
     and principled non-proliferation objectives in that region of 
     the world. Eliminating the Pressler Amendment in no way would 
     further US non-proliferation policy. The current non-
     proliferation policy in South Asia should continue with 
     regard to Pakistan. The solution is squarely in the hands of 
     Pakistani leaders. They can dismantle their nuclear 
     weapons and, by the terms of the Pressler Amendment, 
     Pakistan once again legally would be able to receive aid.
       Why does Pakistan need a nuclear programmeme? Pakistani 
     leaders have claimed that they must do whatever is necessary 
     to protect themselves against potential aggression from 
     India. Although India is known to have exploded a nuclear 
     device in 1974, there is no evidence that India has sought to 
     develop a nuclear arsenal. Is it really protection that 
     Pakistan seeks, or is it something else? As already 
     mentioned, anti-Western factions have taken hold in several 
     Islamic countries in recent years. Such forces are on the 
     verge of victory in Algeria and have enough power to threaten 
     the stability of Pakistan's government. The direction the now 
     independent Soviet Islamic republics will take is unclear. 
     Should control of these nations shift to religious fanatics, 
     these countries suddenly could find that they have much in 
     common, both ideologically and geographically.
       This could well be enough incentive for these countries to 
     form, at the very least, some kind of loose-knit 
     confederation. It is true that several of these countries 
     historically have had serious disputes. However, religious 
     fundamentalism may very well provide the tie that binds. Past 
     differences, at least on one level, could be put aside. The 
     result can be a new nuclear power in the world.
       Since the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, it has 
     been fashionable to talk about a `New World Order' in which 
     the United States has new leadership responsibilities. As the 
     world's sole remaining super power and faced with significant 
     domestic problems exacerbated by excessive federal budget 
     deficits, the United States must rethink its role in the 
     world.
       America no longer can conduct business as usual with any 
     developing nation that continues to squander resources on the 
     development of nuclear, chemical, or conventional weapons. 
     For instance, in July 1992, I visited nine of the countries 
     emerging from the former Soviet Union, as well as Latvia. 
     Just prior to that trip, the US Senate Foreign Relations 
     Committee considered the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
     (START) and the full Senate passed the `Freedom Support Act' 
     to provide aid to the former Soviet republics. Under the 
     terms of the Lisbon Protocol to the START Treaty, Belarus, 
     Kazakhstan and Ukraine each agreed to sign the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear States parties.
       Such assurances would be equally valuable from the other 
     nations emerging from the former Soviet Union, as well as 
     other developing countries around the world. The terms of the 
     Pressler Amendment should be applied to other developing 
     nations receiving aid from the United States. The United 
     States should use economic means to encourage countries to 
     remain non-nuclear. It should be made clear that, should they 
     decide to pursue a nuclear weapons programme, it will be 
     without the help of the United States.


                  interpreting the pressler amendment

       Andrew Hamilton once said: `Power may justly be compared to 
     a great river; while kept within its bounds it is both 
     beautiful and useful, but when it overflow its banks, it is 
     then too impetuous to be stemmed; it bears down all before 
     it, and brings destruction and desolation wherever it comes.' 
     The power of the Pakistani military machine, when kept within 
     proper bounds, serves to protect its nation and deter 
     potential adversaries. When, however, that military might 
     becomes too powerful, perhaps through the illegal acquisition 
     of U.S. technology and equipment transfers, that protection 
     becomes the very threat it was designed to defend against.
       In February 1992, reports emerged charging that U.S. 
     manufacturers had continued private military sales to 
     Pakistan despite the U.S. assistance embargo mandated by the 
     Pressler Amendment. `The Bush Administration has quietly 
     permitted the Pakistani armed forces to buy American-made 
     arms from commercial firms for the last year and a half; 
     according to classified documents and Administration 
     officials. Among the military items licensed for sale to 
     Pakistan are spare parts for American-made F-16 fighter 
     planes, which form the nucleus of Islamabad's Air Force. 
     Officials said the equipment is intended to help Pakistan 
     maintain its current arsenal.'\11\ Such sales can only be 
     made pursuant to licenses issued by the U.S. Government under 
     authorities contained in the Arms Export Control Act. But 
     U.S. Government-licensed commercial sales of arms and 
     military technology violate the U.S. non-proliferation policy 
     embodied in the Pressler Amendment.
       As a result, when the then Secretary of State, James Baker, 
     appeared before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
     February 1992, I questioned him as to how the 
     Administration could interpret the Pressler Amendment to 
     allow the licensing of commercial sales of military parts 
     and technology to Pakistan. In response, Secretary Baker 
     stated:
       ``We have indeed cut off all foreign assistance to Pakistan 
     because we were unable to certify within the parameters of 
     [the Pressler] amendment. We have legislative history, and as 
     a legal matter we do not believe it applies to commercial 
     sales or exports controlled by the Department of Commerce, so 
     we look at munitions and spare parts that are necessary to 
     maintain the Pakistani military at current levels on a case-
     by-case basis.''\12\
       I then asked for a copy of the documents used by the 
     Administration to reach this policy decision. I was provided 
     an unsigned paper consisting of an outline of the reasons why 
     a suspension of such licensing was not legally required by 
     the Pressler Amendment:
       It is not reasonable to interpret the language of the 
     Pressler Amendment as prohibiting Executive branch licensing 
     of arms exports pursuant to private sales.
       Licensing of arms exports pursuant to private sales have 
     consistently been treated as not covered by statutory 
     language comparable to that used in the Pressler Amendment.
       When Congress intends that provisions in foreign assistance 
     legislation apply to private arms transactions, it 
     consistently uses language making clear that intention.
       The legislative history of the Pressler Amendment confirms 
     that it was meant to apply to US Government sales and 
     assistance, but not to licensing of arms exports pursuant to 
     private sales.\13\
       In a series of letters between myself and Secretary Baker 
     from March through July 1992, I explained that the paper 
     failed to answer how the US State Department, as a matter of 
     law, could permit continuation of the licensing of private 
     sales of arms and military technology in light of 
     a straightforward statutory ban on the sale or transfer of 
     any military equipment or technology to Pakistan.
       Before being elected to Congress, I served as a lawyer at 
     the US State Department. During my tenure there, departmental 
     interpretations of legislation were based on memoranda of law 
     written in a specific legal format, and signed by the lawyer 
     responsible for providing the opinion--not unsigned papers 
     created in response to a Senator's question after a policy 
     decision was implemented.
       On 30 July, 1992 the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
     held a hearing on the Administration's interpretation of the 
     Pressler Amendment. During that hearing, the Committee 
     explored the process by which the Executive Branch of the 
     United States Federal Government exercises its responsibility 
     of interpreting and enforcing laws passed by the Legislative 
     Branch of Government. The hearing also considered what the 
     proper level of consultation should be between the Executive 
     and Legislative Branches, as the process of Interpreting and 
     implementing federal law unfolds. Finally, the hearing 
     considered U.S. policy toward Pakistan.
       During the hearing, State Department officials were 
     presented with a letter to Secretary Baker from myself and 
     Senators John Glenn and Alan Cranston, both of whom played an 
     active role in the development of the Pressler Amendment. Our 
     letter expressed our opposition to the Administration's 
     position. A reading of the Pressler Amendment that allows the 
     Federal Government to license the private sales of arms and 
     military technology is without foundation within the plain 
     language of the statute or its legislative history.
       While the policy conflict between the US Congress and the 
     Administration has yet to be resolved, the debate certainly 
     will continue. The global stakes are simply too high to allow 
     otherwise. The issue involves much more than simply US-
     Pakistani relations. It tests the United States' resolve to 
     develop a strong non-proliferation policy.


                               conclusion

       The expressive words of Russel Watson articulately describe 
     the consequences of modern military conflict:
       The history of war is an arms race. As men keep finding 
     more ingenious ways to kill each other, they become caught in 
     what the war-college gurus call an `offense-defense spiral.' 
     The lance overcomes the shield, the bullet pierces the armor. 
     Tanks crush men in their trenches, the missile destroys the 
     bunker.\14\
       Peace in South Asia is fragile--its delicate state 
     predicated upon the balancing actions of the industrialized 
     world. For the sake of future South Asian stability and to 
     deter nuclear confrontation in the region, the United States 
     unquestionably should maintain its nuclear non-proliferation 
     policy toward Pakistan.
       US export decisions that have steadily provided Pakistan 
     with the wherewithal to modernize its nuclear weapons 
     capabilities have created military and political consequences 
     for all of South Asia. As possibilities for regional conflict 
     multiply, so too does the potential arms market. 
     International nuclear arms traffic renews tensions recently 
     calmed by the demise of United States-Soviet Union rivalry. 
     The presence of nuclear devices in South Asia increases the 
     possibility that these weapons may be used.
       As the United States attempts to reorder priorities and 
     alliances in the aftermath of the Cold War, non-proliferation 
     matters must be high on the agenda. In the case of South 
     Asia, the Pressler Amendment directly confronts the issue of 
     nuclear weapons acquisitions in the developing world. The 
     amendment sends a strong message that the United States will 
     not reward a nation that covertly or overtly maintains a 
     nuclear weapons programme.
       The Pressler Amendment was not designed to punish Pakistan. 
     Rather, it reflects the commitment of the US Congress to 
     stopping nuclear weapons proliferation and ensuring that US 
     taxpayers are not forced to subsidize, however indirectly, 
     the building of nuclear weapons in another country. The 
     highly specialized technology, skill, and intelligence 
     necessary for the Pakistani military to modernize its nuclear 
     arsenal depends upon crucial US assistance. This assistance, 
     if renewed or illegally continued, would sent the wrong 
     signals to Pakistan and other nations. Arms shipments and 
     technology transfers to Pakistan will not encourage that 
     country to enter into an arms control regime.
       In the final analysis, the issues and debate surrounding 
     the Pressler Amendment pertain to more than Pakistan or even 
     South Asia. They involve global concerns. Unless the United 
     States acts decisively to stop nuclear proliferation among 
     the world's developing nations, it will not be able to 
     defend its non-proliferation policy. Other countries 
     seeking membership in the nuclear club surely will reach 
     their own conclusions from any failure on the part of 
     America to act with resolve. Russell Watson's vision of 
     the ``offense-defense spiral'' could take on a wholly new 
     and tragic dimension. Ironically, this could occur in a 
     world, which for the first time, is witnessing meaningful 
     progress toward nuclear disarmament by the major powers.


                                 notes

     \1\Peter Herrly, ``Middleweight Forces and the Army's 
     Deployability Dilemma'', in Parameters, September 1989, p. 
     47.
     \2\``Memorandum: The Pakistani Nuclear Program'', The US 
     State Department, 23 June 1983, p. 5.
     \3\Carnegie Task Force on Non-Proliferation and South Asian 
     Security, Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security, 
     Washington, D.C., 1988, p. 1.
     \4\``Memorandum: The Pakistani Nuclear Program'', p. 1.
     \5\Steve Coll, ``South Asia Retains Its Nuclear Option: India 
     and Pakistan Pose Dual Risk as Potential Flashpoints'', in 
     The Washington Post, 30 September, 1991, p. A01.
     \6\Ibid.
     \7\Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, ``Prospects for Nuclear Freeze in 
     South Asia'', in the Asian Defence Journal, December 1991, p. 
     23.
     \8\Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, Cambridge, 
     Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988, p. 106.
     \9\US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service 
     Issue Brief, ``India and Nuclear Weapons'', Washington, D.C., 
     1992, p. 4.
     \10\Steve Coll, ``Pakistan Seeks Talks on Nuclear Weapons: 
     Announcement Timed to Improve US Ties'', in The Washington 
     Post, 1 June, 1991, p. A20.
     \11\Murray Waas and Douglas Frantz, ``Despite Ban, US Arms 
     are Sold to Pakistan'', in The Los Angeles Times, 6 March, 
     1992, p. 1.
     \12\Testimony by Secretary of State James Baker before the 
     Senate Foreign
     Relations Committee. Hearing on Foreign Policy Overview, 5 
     February, 1992.
     \13\State Department Paper, reprinted in Congressional 
     Record, 19 March, 1992, p. S3950.
     \14\``Borders'', in Newsweek, 31 December, 1990, p. 31.

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