[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 107 (Friday, August 5, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: August 5, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                     EXCEPTED COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee 
amendments be agreed to en bloc; that the bill, as thus amended, be 
regarded for the purposes of amendment as original text, provided that 
no point of order shall have been considered to have been waived by 
agreeing to this request; and that the following committee amendments 
be excepted from this en bloc request:
  Page 25, lines 8 through 13; page 50, line 17; page 78, line 16 
through page 81, line 8; page 63, line 5 through page 64, line 4; page 
68, line 18 through page 69, line 5; page 78, line 24 through page 79, 
line 15.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, we are ready to go to amendments at any 
point.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I believe it is in order that I request 
unanimous consent that the pending committee amendment be temporarily 
laid aside and that it be in order to consider the committee amendment 
beginning on page 25, line 8; is that correct?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator that that is the 
pending committee amendment; therefore, no unanimous consent request is 
required.


   Amendment No. 2460 to the Excepted Committee Amendment on Page 25, 
                           Lines 8 through 13

  (Purpose: To prohibit the use of the United States Armed Forces in 
                                 Haiti)

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Specter] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2460.

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 25, line 13, before the last period, insert the 
     following:

     SEC. 108. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED 
                   FORCES IN HAITI.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings--
       (1) Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution 
     provides that Congress shall have the sole power to declare 
     war; and
       (2) On July 31, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
     Resolution 940, which authorizes member states of the United 
     Nations to use all necessary means to facilitate the 
     departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent 
     with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the 
     legitimately elected President, and the restoration of the 
     legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti.
       (b) Prohibition of United States Armed Forces in Haiti.--
     The President is prohibited from using the United States 
     Armed Forces to facilitate the departure of the military 
     leadership and the restoration of the legitimately elected 
     government.
       (c) The prohibition in subsection (b) does not apply if--
       (1) the use of the United States Armed Forces in Haiti is 
     authorized in advance by Congress;
       (2) the temporary deployment of forces of the United States 
     Armed Forces into Haiti is necessary in order to protect or 
     evacuate United States citizens from a situation of imminent 
     danger and the President reports as soon as practicable to 
     Congress after the initiation of the temporary deployment, 
     but in no case later than 48 hours after the initiation of 
     the temporary deployment; or
       (3) the deployment of forces of the United States Armed 
     Forces into Haiti is vital to the national security interests 
     of the United States (including the protection of American 
     citizens of Haiti), there is not sufficient time to seek and 
     receive congressional authorization, and the President 
     reports as soon as practicable to Congress after the 
     initiation of the deployment, but in no case later than 48 
     hours after the initiation of the deployment.

  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I believe that once the amendment is 
proposed, the Senator loses the right to the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Once the amendment is offered, the floor is 
open for recognition, but the Chair recognized the Senator from 
Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair. I will be glad to yield to my 
colleague from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the only reason I sought recognition was 
to ask the Senator if he was prepared to enter into a time agreement on 
this particular amendment. That was the only reason.
  I yield back to the Senator.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the chairman. I am prepared to do that.
  Senator Harkin and I had discussed the time agreement and it is 
agreeable to have a 1-hour time agreement equally divided.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I will propound 
a unanimous consent request.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 11:30 
a.m., Senator McCain, or his designee, be recognized to move to table 
the Specter amendment No. 2460, with the time between now and then 
equally divided and controlled in the usual form, with no other 
amendments in order prior to the vote on the motion to table; that the 
time be controlled by Senator Specter, or his designee, and by Senator 
McCain, or his designee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized 
for 10 minutes.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the amendment proposes that there be a 
prohibition on the use of armed forces in Haiti unless there is 
specific authorization in advance by Congress or the temporary 
deployment of forces in Haiti is necessary in order to protect or 
evacuate United States citizens or the deployment of forces is vital to 
the national security interests of the United States and there is not 
sufficient time to seek and receive congressional authorization.
  We have debated the Haiti issue substantially on this floor, Mr. 
President, in the course of the past several weeks, and I believe that 
it is necessary to consider this amendment for a number of reasons.
  One reason is that notwithstanding the sense-of-the-Senate 
resolutions expressing the concern of the Senate and objecting to the 
deployment of military forces in Haiti, the President of the United 
States has continued to say that he does not have to get congressional 
authority to move ahead with an invasion in Haiti.
  It is my view that the President is incorrect and that as a matter of 
fundamental constitutional law, where the sole authority to declare war 
resides in the Congress, and the Congress has spoken, the Senate has 
spoken in opposition to an invasion in Haiti, the President may not 
proceed on the current record without a change in circumstances or 
cannot proceed when Congress is in session and there is an opportunity 
for the President to come to Congress to get congressional 
authorization as the Constitution requires.
  The President had a news conference on Wednesday night, August 2, the 
day before yesterday, and it was reported in the New York Times, August 
3, and I read a brief extract of the President's statement at that 
time. This is with respect to Haiti:

       I would welcome the support of the Congress, and I hope 
     that I will have that like my predecessors of both parties. I 
     have not agreed that I was constitutionally mandated to get 
     it, but at this moment I think we have done all we need to do 
     because I do not want to cross that bridge until we come to 
     it.

  The suggestion has been made, Mr. President, that this type of an 
amendment is premature, but it is my view that we do not know when the 
Congress will recess. We do not know when the President may proceed to 
use force in Haiti, and it is necessary that the Senate speak as 
clearly and as unequivocally as possible and the Senate speak promptly 
after the President's statement on Wednesday night.
  When the United Nations moved to authorize the use of force in Haiti 
at the request of the United States, it seems to me that the President, 
short of coming to Congress, had taken the last step to set the stage 
for the invasion of Haiti. On Monday of this week, the day following 
the United Nations action, I asked the majority leader if he had an 
intention of bringing to the floor a resolution authorizing the use of 
force as the Congress considered such a resolution before the war in 
Iraq, and the majority leader told me that he had not considered that 
but would do so. I talked with him again yesterday afternoon, and he 
advised me that he thought it was premature to undertake such a 
consideration of such a resolution. I respectfully disagree with the 
majority leader because I believe that it is necessary to consider that 
resolution at this time.
  The majority leader has considerably more power in the premises than 
does any other Senator because the majority leader establishes the 
schedule of the Senate as to when we will be here. I do not know how 
long the Senate will be in session during the month of August before 
the break if there is to be a break. I understand, too, that the 
majority leader cannot be sure, depending upon how long the debate 
takes on the crime bill and how long the debate takes on the 
legislation for reform of our health system.
  But the majority leader does have the authority to keep the Senate in 
for an extra day or two, and the majority leader does have the 
authority to set the agenda so that if he sets forth a resolution for 
the use of force in Haiti as he set forth a resolution for the use of 
force in Iraq back in 1991, he has that control which is obviously 
greater than the control which any other Senator has.
  The other consideration on what may or may not be premature is that 
it is impossible to make a determination as to what the President will 
do. He has not said that he is going to use force or established any 
timetable, and there is substantial speculation in the press about when 
it may or may not occur. But it is entirely possible that the President 
may decide to use force and to invade Haiti when the Senate goes out of 
session later in August or perhaps in early September. I believe it is 
vitally important that the Senate, as one of the two Houses of the 
Congress, speak as emphatically and as directly as we can on this 
subject.
  There have been a series of amendments and the sense-of-the-Senate 
resolutions passed by overwhelming numbers expressing our sense that 
there not be an invasion of Haiti. When the resolutions have taken a 
slightly different form, that is, to prohibit funding for an invasion, 
a different result occurred largely along party lines with the Senate 
being unwilling to cut off funding for an invasion in Haiti, and then 
after that, an additional amendment was offered again expressing the 
sense of the Senate that there not be an invasion and that resolution 
passed in large numbers. And then the distinguished Republican leader, 
Senator Dole, and Senator Gregg offered an amendment saying that the 
U.N. resolution on the use of force did not constitute authorization by 
the Congress, and that passed unanimously 100 to nothing.
  That was an important resolution because there is some legal theory 
that the United States is bound by treaties that become the supreme law 
of the land, and there might be a commitment by the United States to 
proceed to use force--notwithstanding the constitutional provision--
because of the authorization by the United Nations.
  One of the difficulties is that the sense-of-the-Senate resolutions 
are not binding. I considered what might be done procedurally to set 
forth a resolution authorizing the use of force and then arguing 
against it because I believe we should not invade Haiti, and I 
considered a sense-of-the-Senate resolution and decided that a more 
direct and a more binding way is to provide for a prohibition on the 
use of United States Armed Forces in Haiti. And that is what this 
amendment provides.
  There are two issues, Mr. President, involved here. One is the 
constitutional issue, and the second is the public policy as to whether 
Haiti ought to be invaded. I think that the constitutional issue is 
institutionally the more important by far.
  Taking up the question of an invasion of Haiti on the merits, there 
has been a virtual unanimity or overwhelming majorities in the Senate, 
98 to 2 and, I believe, 93 to 4, on the sense of the Senate that Haiti 
should not be invaded, that we do not have vital national interests at 
stake. When we went into Haiti in 1915, we were there some 19 years, 
and it was a mistake then, and it will be a mistake now.
  The President, in his press conference on Wednesday, uses another 
concept, a concept of fundamental interest as he articulates it. The 
word ``vital'' interests, I think, has some substantial meaning. I do 
believe that the Senate is virtually unanimous that there is not a 
vital national interest in invading Haiti, and the House of 
Representatives has spoken on the matter as well.
  And yet, in the face of that, the President persists in saying that 
``I have not agreed that I was constitutionally mandated to get it''--
``it'', obviously, referring to congressional approval.
  Mr. President, I believe that we have strayed a long way in the 
United States from the head-on recognition of Congress' sole authority 
to declare war and have moved a great deal where the powers of the 
President, as Commander in Chief, have been expanded.
  This is a subject that I have been concerned about long before coming 
to the Senate, and have expressed myself on it on many occasions in my 
14 years here in the Senate.
  Korea, by all accounts, was a war, but Congress never declared war 
there. Once the President initiates an action--as President Truman did 
on June 25, 1950--Congress could exercise power by limiting funds, but 
has never done that. It is, as a practical matter, not realistic to cut 
off funding once the President has dispatched troops to the field.
  I recall the day well, June 25. I started that day at Lowry Air Force 
Base in ROTC summer training between my third and fourth years at the 
University of Pennsylvania. When several thousand young men started 
that training, the thought in all of our minds was that we probably 
would not take the khaki off with the Korean war starting. We were not 
correct on that. I went back, as did the others, to finish my 4 years 
of college and then served as a lieutenant in the Office of Special 
Investigations in the Air Force stateside.
  But it seemed to me at that time the constitutional mandate was not 
observed. Then we became embroiled in the Vietnam war. There was never 
a declaration of war there, and we had the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I 
think Vietnam demonstrated that the United States could not fight a war 
without public support. The first line to get that public support is in 
the Congress. And I think that applies today to Haiti, as well.
  When we had issues on Lebanon, the matter was debated under the War 
Powers Act. I had a debate with Senator Percy about whether Korea was a 
war, about whether Vietnam was a war. Senator Percy then was chairman 
of the Foreign Relations Committee and the best person to talk to about 
that. He agreed that both of those events constituted war, and yet 
there had not been a declaration. I consulted with Senator Baker, then 
our majority leader, and went through the laborious task of drafting a 
complaint to try to get a Supreme Court determination of the relative 
authority of the President and the Congress under the constitutional 
provisions. I tried to get a submission to the Supreme Court with the 
agreement of the President, not that that necessarily would have 
prevailed, where the Court takes only cases in controversy, and the 
White House turned it down at that time.
  We have seen the matters evolve in many situations which I will not 
go into now. But I think it is safe to say, Mr. President, that there 
has never been a situation like Haiti, where the Congress has spoken 
repeatedly and definitely on our judgment that we should not invade 
Haiti and the President has come back and, on Wednesday night, says 
again that he does not consider it necessary to get congressional 
authorization.
  I was one who spoke out early on the Iraq situation after the United 
Nations authorized the use of force there, spoke out and said that the 
President, President Bush, a Republican President, did not have the 
authority to use force in Iraq unless there was congressional approval.
  There was a very complex series of events. Senator Harkin spoke up on 
January 3, 1991 on a procedural issue, which I think compelled bringing 
that matter to the Senate. There was a very extensive debate. The use 
of force was authorized and I supported it. But I thought it was 
important for the Congress institutionally to make that decision, and 
we did at that time.
  And, similarly, I think it is very important institutionally that the 
Congress make a decision if there is to be an invasion of Haiti.
  We talk about what constitutes a war, semantics as to whether the 
Korean conflict was a war. Certainly, it was. In my legal opinion, 
where there is an invasion of Haiti under these circumstances, it is a 
war; not a war that will necessarily be hard to win. But what do we do 
after we are there? And what does it do to the institutions of American 
Government where the constitution is explicit that only the Congress 
has the authority to declare war?
  Congress has spoken about its sense of the matter and we have a 
renewed statement by the President of the United States that he does 
not consider himself to be constitutionally obliged--``I have not 
agreed that I was constitutionally mandated to get it,'' referring to 
congressional authorization.
  So this is the articulation of this issue in the terms that most 
squarely presents the issue. That is why I have offered the amendment 
here. I do not wish to see this bill encumbered unnecessarily, but I 
think this is an important amendment. Since we have debated it in the 
past, I thought we could handle it in the course of an hour's debate. I 
am advised that the leadership does not want a vote before 11:30, so I 
do not think we are encumbering the process here and I do not believe 
that there are any other Senators who have any other amendments to 
offer.
  But I make no apologies for offering this amendment at this time. 
There is no other way to take it up. We are not likely to have the 
defense appropriations bill on the floor before the recess. And, who 
knows, this issue may have to be revisited when other legislation is on 
the floor between now and the time of recess, depending upon what 
events transpire.
  I inquire of the Chair, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania has 18 minutes 
and 20 seconds remaining. The Senator from Arizona has the full 35 
minutes.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. I yield myself 10 minutes.
  Mr. President, according to the unanimous-consent agreement, I will 
be offering a motion to table the Specter amendment at the expiration 
of the time.
  Mr. President, it is kind of an unusual situation, because in every 
way I am in agreement with Senator Specter and the majority of this 
body on this issue. To me, the Specter amendment--which has been 
addressed in various forms in the past, and I have spoken out on this 
constitutional issue on several occasions--is one of an interpretation 
of the Constitution of the United States.
  Before I go further and my friend from Pennsylvania departs, I would 
say that I believe that he is one of the foremost constitutional 
experts in this country. I believe that on many occasions he has 
illuminated this body on the Constitution of the United States. I 
appreciate the many contributions he has made.
  On this particular issue, we happen to disagree, although on a 
constitutional basis, not on whether we should invade Haiti. I 
appreciate the continued efforts of the Senator from Pennsylvania to 
alert the people of this country as to the consequences of an invasion 
and also an invasion without congressional approval, which the Senator 
from Pennsylvania correctly assumes is an extreme likelihood.
  In fact, this morning's Washington Post states:

       Senior officials said that at a meeting of Clinton's senior 
     foreign policy and security advisers on Tuesday, Joint Chiefs 
     of Staff Chairman Gen. John Shalikashvili laid out a 4-to-6 
     week period as ``optimal'' for assembling and training an 
     international coalition. September also would have the virtue 
     of coinciding with the end of the upcoming congressional 
     recess, should Clinton be disposed to consult.

  So, I do not think there is any doubt that the congressional recess 
has an impact on the decisionmaking process in the White House, which I 
find, frankly, very distasteful.
  Mr. President, it is well known, and I will not go into detail, all 
the reasons I am opposed to an invasion of Haiti. I do not think it is 
in our national security interest. I do not think it is worth the risk 
of American lives. Very importantly, I believe once we are there, 
without the ability to disengage, the ability to form some 
international force--which we are finding nearly impossible to get 
together--the chances of their succeeding are about the same as those 
of the multinational force that tried and failed in Somalia.

  I am also deeply concerned--and I have to mention this again --that 
in yesterday's New York Times and again in this morning's Washington 
Post, Mr. Strobe Talbott, the No. 2 person who is described as being 
the lead person on this issue, is in opposition to speaking with or 
negotiating with Mr. Cedras and those other thugs in Haiti. He said he 
found it, according to the New York Times, ``morally repugnant,'' 
although he did not in the past find it morally repugnant for the 
United States to talk with Mr. Brezhnev who invaded Afghanistan and 
slaughtered thousands of innocent people. But he finds it morally 
repugnant to talk to Cedras. Whereas Secretary of Defense Perry, as 
portrayed by the media, strongly feels we should try everything, every 
possible avenue before we put American lives at risk.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent this article from the 
Washington Post be printed in the Record at this time.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

           Best Time To Invade Haiti Is Weeks Away, Aides Say

                  (By Ann Devroy and Daniel Williams)

       President Clinton's top advisers have concluded they need 
     until at least mid-September to launch an invasion of Haiti 
     under ``optimal'' conditions, senior officials said 
     yesterday.
       That conclusion, reached following a series of high-level 
     meetings on Haiti this week, is based on what officials said 
     was the time required to enlist and train the international 
     component of an invasion force headed by the United States, 
     although so far no country has stepped forward to join such a 
     force. Argentina, the only country to have made a public 
     commitment, yesterday withdrew.
       Officials say they also want to plug the porous border with 
     the Dominican Republic, long a major hole in the economic 
     blockade of Haiti. About 30 percent of Haiti's energy needs 
     are met with gasoline and oil coming across the border.
       ``It will be a matter of some weeks'' before the United 
     States is prepared to invade, said one official, although 
     others noted that if American lives were threatened or Haiti 
     exploded in violence, military action could be undertaken 
     right away.
       Another high-ranking official said that President Clinton, 
     who was involved in some but not all of the meetings, has ``a 
     great number of individual decisions to make,'' including a 
     determination that economic sanctions will produce no further 
     progress and invasion is the only option to achieve his goal 
     of ousting Haiti's military rulers.
       Pending decisions include whether to issue a public 
     deadline for their departure from the country, whether to 
     send a high-profile envoy to Haiti to deliver an ultimatum to 
     the military, and whether to enlist support in Congress for 
     an invasion.
       The delay in reaching decisions has costs, for Haiti 
     suffering under sanctions and a repressive regime, but also 
     for Washington in its efforts to synchronize policy with 
     other countries.
       Even as efforts to collect invasion partners have been 
     unsuccessful so far, Venezuela and other 
     hemispheric governments that oppose invasion prepared a 
     separate diplomatic approach to Haiti. The Venezuelans 
     have proposed sending a delegation of foreign ministers to 
     Haiti to offer a secure and comfortable exile to Haiti's 
     military leaders, and amnesty for their subordinates left 
     behind.
       If Haitian military leaders Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras and 
     others refuse, the ministers would warn of invasion, 
     Venezuelan officials said. Yesterday Venezuela put the plan 
     on hold pending a clear sign from the United States that 
     invasion would follow an ultimatum. ``We don't want to go 
     with a weak hand,'' said Enrique Tejera Paris, Venezuela's 
     ambassador to the United Nations.
       U.S. officials expressed some dismay over the Venezuelan 
     proposal, however, saying it might cause greater delay if it 
     involves prolonged negotiation. The officials also said they 
     feared it would result in letting Cedras and the others off 
     the hook.
       Senior officials said that at a meeting of Clinton's senior 
     foreign policy and security advisers on Tuesday, Joint Chiefs 
     of Staff Chairman Gen. John Shalikashvili laid out a four-to-
     six week period as ``optimal'' for assembling and training an 
     international coalition. September also would have the virtue 
     of coinciding with the end of the upcoming congressional 
     recess, should Clinton be disposed to consult.
       The officials discussed but rejected setting an internal 
     deadline for the Haitian rulers to leave, fearing that it 
     would become public and tie the administration's hands. 
     Defense Secretary William J. Perry was particularly opposed, 
     senior officials said.
       Secretary of State Warren Christopher argued for no further 
     negotiations with the Haitian military, but he was opposed by 
     Perry who said that all options should be given a chance 
     because American lives would be at stake.
       Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Perry clashed 
     over whether financial inducements should be offered to 
     Cedras and others, with Talbott opposing, officials said.
       White House and other administration officials yesterday 
     attempted to portray the administration as united, with 
     everyone in agreement that the United States must lead an 
     invasion force as a ``last resort'' and that all other 
     options would be exhausted first. The rest was mere debate 
     over tactics, they said.
       Clinton has ``not even entered this discussion seriously,'' 
     a senior official added.
       Supporters and advisers of deposed President Jean-Bertrand 
     Aristide here suspect that delay is a maneuver by the Clinton 
     administration to prepare for compromise with anti-Aristide 
     political forces in Haiti. They say that Talbott and 
     Clinton's national security adviser Anthony Lake have talked 
     of a need for a political counterweight in the Haitian 
     government to Aristide, viewed as radical by many U.S. 
     officials.
       Meanwhile, White House press secretary Dee Dee Myers said 
     yesterday that the United States has asked Haitian 
     authorities for permission to send a charter plane to pick up 
     as many as 500 Haitians who have been approved to come to the 
     United States as refugees. She said no response has been 
     received.
       Haiti has been without international air service since 
     Sunday, when Air France, the last carrier operating out of 
     Port-au-Prince, suspended all flights. American and other 
     international carriers stopped serving Haiti weeks ago as 
     part of the international sanctions.
       Myers said that if the U.S. request to send a charter plane 
     is turned down, other means of evacuating the Haitians will 
     be explored, according to the Associated Press.
       In addition to the 500 who are ready to leave, another 
     1,000 or so Haitians also have been declared eligible for 
     refugee status but are not ready to travel because their 
     paperwork is not complete.
       Officials said they are pleased with current trends, noting 
     only one Haitian has been rescued at sea since Sunday. In 
     contrast, more than 3,200 were saved on July 4, the most 
     since Haitians began to flee after Aristide's ouster almost 
     three years ago.

  Mr. McCAIN. ``Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Perry 
clashed over whether financial inducements should be offered to Cedras 
and others, with Talbott opposing, officials said.''
  Then most alarming of all, Mr. President--in fact I find it 
unbelievable--the article says, ``Clinton''--obviously President 
Clinton--``Clinton has `not even entered this discussion seriously,' a 
senior official added.''
  Here we are making plans for an invasion of Haiti and the President 
of the United States has ``not even entered this discussion 
seriously.'' Give me a break. I think it is time that the President of 
the United States entered this discussion seriously.
  We have sent, in clear and unequivocal terms within the 
constitutional constraints of this body and the Congress of the United 
States, the views of the Senate of the United States against an 
invasion of Haiti. I believe the 100-to-0 vote that just occurred in 
this body within the last 48 hours on a resolution stating 
unequivocally that authorization by the United Nations does not 
constitute authorization by the Congress of the United States sends a 
clear message. Time after time both bodies in this Congress have sent 
sense-of-the-Congress resolutions saying we are opposed to an invasion 
of Haiti. The message is clear, and it reflects the overwhelming 
majority view of the American people.
  My problem with the Specter amendment is that it exceeds the 
authority of the Congress of the United States. The first military 
endeavor in the history of this country was a dispatch of naval forces 
to the Mediterranean to stop the Barbary pirates, as they were then 
known, from interfering with U.S. commerce in the Mediterranean. The 
great nations were not disturbed by these pirates. Those ships were 
sent. They engaged in combat--very successful combat I am happy to say. 
There was conflict, they took casualties, and the Congress of the 
United States never made a declaration of war or even a declaration of 
approval. That has been the case throughout.
  Senator Specter mentioned the case of Korea. I would say to Senator 
Specter, at any time if the Congress of the United States had shown the 
willingness to do so, they could have had a resolution on a declaration 
of war. They chose not to.
  There was a case, I inform my friend from Pennsylvania, in the case 
of Cambodia, where the Congress of the United States did cut off funds 
which prevented further aerial bombardment of Cambodia. I did not 
happen to agree with that decision of Congress, but there is historical 
precedent for congressional action, after the President of the United 
States acts.
  Why is that? Why did our Founding Fathers give this enormous 
authority to one person, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed 
Forces, the President of the United States? Because legislative bodies 
cannot anticipate events in the world. If we use the philosophy and the 
line of thinking of this amendment, we should be considering as 
amendments to this bill resolutions by the Senate prohibiting our 
engagement in Rwanda. Right now there is a possibility of our being 
involved militarily in Rwanda. Perhaps this body wants to speak on that 
issue.
  In Bosnia, clearly the Bosnian peace process is breaking down. Should 
we be considering legislation prohibiting the President of the United 
States from engaging militarily in Bosnia? I do not want the President 
of the United States to engage militarily in Bosnia, but I can draw a 
scenario where, if the Balkan conflict spreads throughout the region, 
then maybe, tragically the United States may have to be involved. But 
should we have passed an amendment, a binding amendment on the 
President of the United States that he not go into Bosnia?
  Mr. President, it is impossible for legislative bodies to anticipate 
world events. That is why our Founding Fathers put those 
responsibilities, enormous responsibilities--the lives of American 
service men and women--within the authority of the President of the 
United States of America.
  Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has 26 minutes 30 
seconds remaining.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, we put that enormous responsibility into 
the hands of the President of the United States because there is no way 
that a legislature can anticipate events in the world which would 
require U.S. reaction. And that is particularly true in the 20th 
century.
  But if the President of the United States embarks on a wrong or 
dangerous course--on a course which involves the needless and wasteful 
loss of American lives, then the Congress of the United States does 
have the clear responsibility--not just the privilege or right, but 
responsibility--to act. We have the power of the purse. If the 
President of the United States leads this country into some kind of 
military debacle, then we can cut off those funds. That is clear. That 
was exercised, as I mentioned, in the case of the bombing of Cambodia 
back in the year 1973, if I remember correctly.
  So the problem that I see here is that if we approve an amendment, no 
matter how well-meaning and no matter how much I share the goal of 
prohibiting the President of the United States from invading Haiti, 
there is no reason why we should not be able to prohibit the President 
of the United States from going anywhere in the world. And, 
unfortunately, this body, the Congress of the United States, does not 
have the clairvoyance and ability to predict events anywhere in the 
world.
  Two or three years ago, I do not believe there were many Americans 
who knew where Bosnia was. Unfortunately, today most Americans do not 
know where Macedonia is, where we happen to have a few hundred marines 
stationed. I do not believe the people of this country are 
appreciative--nor should they be--of the flash points of the world, nor 
of the fact that there are conflicts going on in 40 places in the 
world. It takes a wise and foresighted foreign policy in order to 
anticipate where the United States may have to be militarily involved, 
where our vital national security interests are threatened.
  I would say again to my friend from Pennsylvania, elections have 
consequences. Elections have consequences, as we all know. I supported 
and I believe that the foreign policy of the Reagan-Bush administration 
will go down in history as perhaps one of this Nation's finest hours in 
the conduct of foreign policy. I do not have to review for my 
colleagues the incredible events that took place between the years 1981 
and 1993 that literally changed the shape and complexion of this world. 
Our children can now go to sleep at night without fear of a nuclear 
exchange. But the fact is, at no time during those years would I have 
contemplated prohibiting the President of the United States from 
military actions any place in the world.
  In 1983, when we were considering a resolution about Beirut, I went 
to the floor of the House of Representatives where I was at the time 
and spoke as passionately as I could in opposition to sending our 
marines to Beirut. I wish they had listened to me because 241 young 
marines would be alive today. But I exhausted my responsibilities at 
that time as a Member of Congress, just as, when we pass resolutions as 
to what the sense of this body is, we exhaust our responsibilities, as 
tragic as it may be. And the fact is, the President of the United 
States, Bill Clinton--although I obviously wish it were not Bill 
Clinton because I am of the opposite party--has that responsibility. It 
was given to him by the American people. And as long as he is Commander 
in Chief I intend to help him carry out his responsibilities, although 
I will closely monitor them. And if he goes wrong, I will take every 
constitutional action to try to prohibit further mistakes and further 
loss of American life.
  Mr. President, I believe that there have been serious mistakes made. 
I have ventilated my views on this issue many times on this floor. But 
the fact is that the President of the United States is given the 
responsibility, the most grave responsibility of sending into harms way 
our greatest national treasure, our young men and women.
  So, Mr. President, with all due respect to Senator Specter, whose 
knowledge of the Constitution I am deeply appreciative of, and whose 
impassioned interest on this issue and many other foreign policy issues 
has been a great service to this body and this country, I will seek to 
table the amendment.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Arizona for 
those comments. I understand his background as a naval pilot, and I 
appreciate the comments he has made about the authority of the 
President. But where we join issue, and where I disagree with him 
categorically--if I might have the Senator's attention because I would 
like to discuss this one point--is the point about prohibiting him from 
acting, which does bind him.
  I agree with most of what Senator McCain had to say. When he talks 
about the Cambodian situation, Congress did withdraw funds, but that 
was on bombing, which is very different when you have forces on the 
ground. So I think it would be impossible for the Congress 
realistically to stop ground forces once they were in Haiti, just as I 
think it was impossible for the Congress to stop ground forces in 
Vietnam, although there was much sentiment in this body and in the 
House against the Vietnam war.
  When the Senator from Arizona says that the necessity exists for 
Executive action in cases of emergency if something unforeseen happens, 
I agree with him. I have tried to craft the exceptions very much as 
Senator Gregg did in an amendment which Senator McCain approved cutting 
off funds. I believe he voted for that amendment.
  Mr. McCAIN. I say to my friend I voted against that.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Senator for the correction. I had thought he 
was with us on that.
  But coming to the merits as to what he has argued, this prohibition 
would not apply under three specific circumstances. One of the 
circumstances is when the temporary deployment of forces of the United 
States into Haiti is necessary in order to protect or evacuate United 
States citizens from a situation of imminent danger. And a second 
exception would be when the deployment of forces into Haiti is vital to 
the national security interests of the United States and there is not 
sufficient time to seek and receive congressional authorization.
  So I believe that on the face of this amendment there would be 
sufficient latitude for the President to act if there were an 
emergency.
  The concern that I have is that if the President moves into Haiti 
after the House and the Senate have spoken, and there is no change in 
circumstance, there is really nothing left to the congressional 
authority to declare war and that when the Senator from Arizona says 
that legislative bodies cannot anticipate all the events in the world, 
I agree with him on that. But I think there is sufficient latitude 
here.
  So the question on which I take issue with the Senator from Arizona 
and would like a specific view, is that where you agree that the 
Constitution gives the authority to the Congress to declare war, and 
where you agree that there should not be an invasion of Haiti on the 
merits, if there is no change in circumstance, why should not the 
Congress enter a prohibition?
  Mr. McCAIN. I say to my friend from Pennsylvania, the Constitution 
gives the Congress the right to declare war. It does not give the 
Congress of the United States the right to declare peace. It does not 
give the Congress of the United States the right to declare, prior to 
the President acting, that we cannot engage militarily. The President 
of the United States, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, can 
send forces into hostilities any place in the world, with the proviso 
that sooner or later--hopefully sooner--he should seek congressional 
approval.
  That is my reading of the Constitution of the United States, as it 
was probably Thomas Jefferson's when he sent a naval task force to put 
down the Barbary pirates in 1801. Just as there were expeditions, in my 
view tragically, into Mexico on several occasions in pursuit of Pancho 
Villa. Just as there was another occupation of Haiti in the year 1915 
that was planned to last for a few months, but unfortunately and 
tragically for all concerned, lasted until 1934.
  There is a clear history, I will say to my friend from Pennsylvania, 
from the beginning of the origins of this country where military force 
has been used by the Commander in Chief of the United States without 
congressional approval. If Congress did not choose to exercise its 
constitutional responsibility, I cannot blame the President of the 
United States for that.
  Mr. SPECTER. I have a followup question. I would appreciate it if the 
Senator from Arizona would be willing to answer on his time because my 
time is whittling down, and he has a fair amount left.
  Where you say the Congress does not have the authority to declare 
peace, the thought crosses my mind that the Congress has the sole 
authority to declare war. And if the President gets us involved in a 
war in Haiti where Congress has had a chance to speak, authorize the 
use of force or to declare war and there is no change in circumstance, 
but the President does not consider it necessary to come to Congress to 
get authorization to invade and, therefore, to undertake a war, is not 
the President really usurping the sole congressional authority to 
declare war?
  Mr. McCAIN. I will say to my friend, if the President gets us into 
Haiti militarily--and if the Washington Post is to be believed and 
other information we have, it is increasingly likely --then the 
Congress of the United States has the right to act at that time, 
according to my reading of the Constitution of the United States.
  But the Congress of the United States, in my view, does not have the 
authority to act prospectively. Never in the history of the United 
States has the Congress prohibited the President from carrying out his 
responsibilities as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.
  The Senator from Pennsylvania talks about interpretations of the 
Constitution. I would tell him that the history of the United States 
indicates time after time, from our earliest history, that the 
President of the United States, as Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces, has engaged militarily. If Congress has not shown the guts, in 
the case of the Vietnam war--where at one point an overwhelming public 
opinion was for an immediate withdrawal--to force that withdrawal, 
which they had the power to do, I cannot blame the President of the 
United States.
  We cannot do anything but open a veritable Pandora's box if we 
somehow establish the precept and the concept that the Congress of the 
United States has a right to prohibit military action anyplace in the 
world. I think we would then see resolutions that the President cannot 
engage militarily in Africa, the President cannot engage in Bosnia.
  I would love to not see the United States of America involved in 
Bosnia. And if I were President of the United States, I absolutely 
would not go militarily into Bosnia, I promise you that. But I am not 
the President of the United States.
  Where the Senator and I disagree is where the American people and the 
Constitution of the United States has placed the responsibilities of 
the Commander in Chief of U.S. Armed Forces.
  Now, they have given the right and the authority of Congress to cut 
off funds--the powers of the purse--but if the Congress of the United 
States does not choose to use that, then that is not the President's 
responsibility. Mr. President, I would like to yield 4 minutes to 
Senator Pell, from Rhode Island, if that is all right.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, if I may----
  Mr. McCAIN. I am sorry, the Senator from Pennsylvania still has the 
floor.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, just in response to what the Senator from 
Arizona has said. My interpretation is, from the thrust of our debate, 
that what he cited are circumstances totally different from what we 
have today in Haiti where Congress has expressed its view on the merits 
and has ample time.
  The conclusion that I come to and submit to my colleagues is that if 
the conclusions of the Senator from Arizona are adopted and not mine, 
that there is nothing left of the congressional authority to declare 
war under the Constitution.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham). Who yields time?
  Mr. McCAIN. I yield myself 1 minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Let me say in response to the Senator from Pennsylvania, 
one, the Congress of the United States has the right to declare war. 
They can do that without any prompting from the President of the United 
States, although clearly that has not been the case at any time we have 
chosen to declare war in the past. I believe that the Senate of the 
United States has spoken as much and as strongly as it can given our 
constitutional responsibilities and that was the 100 to zero vote on 
the resolution by the Republican leader and Senator Gregg that the 
United Nations does not constitute Congressional authorization and 
other sense-of-the Congress resolutions that said we do not support an 
invasion of Haiti. And if the President invades Haiti and it turns out 
to be a debacle, I would be one of the first to come to the floor of 
this Senate, although I would not do so at the time when American lives 
are at risk, at least in the beginning, and seek a prohibition and a 
cutoff of funds for further military involvement in Haiti which I think 
is clearly within the responsibilities of the Congress.
  I would like to yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized 
for 4 minutes
  Mr. PELL. I thank my colleague.
  Mr. President, the gist of this amendment should be familiar to every 
Member of this body. The Senate has rejected similar amendments which 
would prohibit or restrict our Presidents' ability to deploy troops in 
Haiti three times. While I share the desire that the United States 
should not use force and have so advised our President, I do not 
believe we should be tying the hands of our President.
  I very much hope and it is very much in the interest of the United 
States and the people of Haiti that the ruling junta leave voluntarily 
so that democracy can be restored. If that is to happen, however, the 
possibility of the use of force to remove the junta cannot be taken off 
the table or called into question. It is ironic, but true, that if 
military action is to be avoided, the threat of it is essential.
  At this point, the President has decided that rather than using 
force, the United States should tighten sanctions and allow them time 
to work in the hope of avoiding military intervention. The United 
States and the United Nations are working to tighten the border along 
the Dominican and Haitian border. The United States is providing 
equipment and the United Nations will send observers to help the 
Dominican Government enforce the embargo. And, only a few days ago, the 
last commercial flight servicing Haiti left Port-au-Prince, heightening 
pressure on the coup leaders and their supporters.
  If the pending amendment were to be enacted it would seriously 
undermine the administration's diplomacy which focused on persuading 
the illegal government in Haiti that it must go voluntarily. If the 
amendment were to pass, it would send the very damaging message that 
General Cedras and his cohorts would have nothing to fear from refusing 
to give up power, because the Congress would see to it that the threat 
of force is an empty one. Indeed, the rascal leaders in Port au Prince 
have interpreted similar amendments considered by this body as a sign 
that some in the Senate do not support democracy or human rights, but 
instead are on the side of the thugs who continue to rule through 
terror.
  I am certain my colleagues would agree this not the message that we 
ought to send either to the junta or the Haitian people who have 
suffered so much--too much in fact.
  This is a very strong amendment, mandatory, and actually prohibits 
our President from taking the kinds of actions that Presidents have 
taken in the past.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.
  Mr. SPECTER. The question I have for the distinguished chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee is the essential question. It is true 
that the President of the United States has engaged as Commander in 
Chief in many military operations historically, but there has never 
been an occasion like the one present where both bodies of the Congress 
have spoken as a matter of the sense-of-the-Senate, the sense-of-the 
House, in opposing on the merits the invasion of Haiti. If there is no 
change of circumstance, and there is ample time for the President to 
come to the Congress and get our authorization for the use of force or 
a declaration of war, and the President says that he does not feel 
mandated to do it, and all of this time has elapsed where we have been 
considering this for many months, what then is left of the 
congressional sole authority under the Constitution to declare war?
  Mr. PELL. We have that right. As you know, we have not exercised it 
since 1941. And I think that we have that right, we can do that, but we 
see military actions taken without declaring war--Vietnam, Grenada, and 
so forth.
  Mr. SPECTER. Well, my followup question would be where the Congress 
has the opportunity to declare war or authorize the use of force and 
withholds from doing so, does the President then have the authority to 
declare and to make war?
  Mr. PELL. The President has the authority to make it de facto, not de 
jure, by his actions.
  Mr. SPECTER. Well, I thank the chairman for that. If the Senator says 
that the President has the power to make it de facto, not de jure, I 
think that----
  Mr. PELL. The Constitution gives it to the Congress de jure.
  Mr. SPECTER. Right. But does the Senator think the President has the 
right to declare or make war de facto?
  Mr. PELL. I do. He has waged war in the absence of a formal 
declaration several times.
  Mr. SPECTER. Well, I think that underscores the necessity for this 
amendment to reassert the sole authority of the Congress of the United 
States to declare war.
  I thank the Chair and yield. I thank my colleague from Rhode Island. 
I yield the floor.
  Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The time is under the control of the Senator from Arizona and the 
Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. DOLE. How much time does the Senator from Pennsylvania have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania has 10 minutes 6 
seconds.
  Mr. DOLE. I yield myself 5 minutes of his time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority, leader, the Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I first want to call attention to all my 
colleagues on both sides of this issue what I consider to be an 
excellent treatise by Louis Fisher, senior specialist in separation of 
powers, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress dated 
August 1, 1994. I am going to put the entire document in the Record. 
For anybody on either side of this issue, I would certainly say this is 
recommended reading.
  It will be presented to the American Political Science Association, 
New York Hilton, September 1 through 4, this coming month. Let me read 
just three short paragraphs.

          The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?

       In June 1950, President Harry Truman ordered U.S. troops to 
     Korea without first requesting congressional authority. For 
     legal footing he cited resolutions passed by the United 
     Nations Security Council, a beguiling but spurious source of 
     authority. In 1990 the Bush administration tried the same 
     tactic, relying on the Korean War as an acceptable precedent 
     for taking offensive action against Iraq, again without 
     seeking congressional approval. Like Truman, Bush claimed 
     that UN resolutions were a sufficient base of authority. In 
     Bosnia, President Clinton has relied on UN resolutions and 
     NATO agreements as sufficient authority to military force 
     without first seeking congressional approval.
       UN machinery is not a legal substitute for congressional 
     action. If that were possible, the President and the Senate, 
     through treaty action, would strip from the House of 
     Representative its constitutional role in deciding questions 
     of war. Following that same logic, the President and the 
     Senate, through the treaty process, could rely on the UN to 
     determine trade and tariff matters, again bypassing the 
     prerogatives of the House of Representatives. This history of 
     the United Nations makes it very clear that all parties in 
     the legislative and executive branches understood that the 
     decision to use military force through the UN required prior 
     approval from both Houses of Congress.


                         the league of nations

       The Versailles Treaty was defeated by the Senate in 1919 
     and again in 1920. The treaty failed in large part because a 
     number of Senators insisted that any commitments of U.S. 
     troops to a world body (the League of Nations) had to be 
     first approved by Congress. On that issue, and others, 
     President Wilson refused to yield.

  I ask unanimous consent this treatise by Louis Fisher be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                   Congressional Research Service,


                                      The Library of Congress,

                                   Washington, DC, August 1, 1994.
     Senator Robert Dole,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Dole: UN Security Council Resolution 940 of 
     July 31, 1994, authorizing military action against Haiti, 
     raises the same issue that this country faced in 1950 when 
     President Truman relied on a Security Council resolution to 
     take military action against North Korea. The fundamental 
     question: Is a Security Council resolution a legal substitute 
     for explicit congressional approval?
       In a paper to be presented next month at the American 
     Political Science Association annual meeting, I conclude that 
     Truman's action violated the Constitution and violated the UN 
     Participation Act, which calls for congressional approval by 
     bill or joint resolution. The UN Charter, entered into by a 
     President and the Senate, was never a means of eliminating 
     the constitutional role of the House of Representatives. In 
     short, UN resolutions are not an appropriate or legal 
     mechanism for circumventing Congress.
       If I can be of any further assistance, please contact me at 
     707-8676.
           Sincerely,

                                                 Louis Fisher,

                                              Senior Specialist in
                                              Separation of Powers
                                  ____


          The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?

           (By Louis Fisher, Congressional Research Service)

       In June 1950, President Harry Truman ordered U.S. troops to 
     Korea without first requesting congressional authority. For 
     legal footing he cited resolutions passed by the United 
     Nations Security Council, a beguiling but spurious source of 
     authority. In 1990 the Bush administration tried the same 
     tactic, relying on the Korean War as an acceptable precedent 
     for taking offensive action against Iraq, again without 
     seeking congressional approval. Like Truman, Bush claimed 
     that UN resolutions were a sufficient base of authority. In 
     Bosnia, President Clinton has relied on UN resolutions and 
     NATO agreements as sufficient authority to use military force 
     without first seeking congressional approval.
       UN machinery is not a legal substitute for congressional 
     action. If that were possible, the President and the Senate, 
     through treaty action, could strip from the House of 
     Representatives its constitutional role in deciding questions 
     of war. Following that same logic, the President and the 
     Senate, through the treaty process, could rely on the UN to 
     determine trade and tariff matters, again bypassing the 
     prerogatives of the House of Representatives. The history of 
     the United Nations makes it very clear that all parties in 
     the legislative and executive branches understand that the 
     decision to use military force through the UN required prior 
     approval from both Houses of Congress.


                         the league of nations

       The Versailles Treaty was defeated by the Senate in 1919 
     and again in 1920. The treaty failed in large part because a 
     number of Senators insisted that any commitments of U.S. 
     troops to a world body (the League of Nations) had to be 
     first approved by Congress. On that issue, and others, 
     President Wilson refused to yield.
       President Wilson submitted the treaty to the Senate on July 
     10, 1919, attaching to it the Covenant of the League of 
     Nations. The Covenant provided for an Assembly (giving each 
     member nation an equal voice) and a Council (consisting of 
     representatives from the United States, Great Britain, 
     France, Italy, Japan, and four other nations elected by the 
     Assembly). Members pledged to submit to the League all 
     disputes threatening war and to use military and economic 
     sanctions against nations that threatened war. In an 
     emotional address to the Senate, Wilson called the League of 
     Nations a ``practical necessity'' and ``indeed 
     indispensable.'' He said that statesmen saw it as ``the hope 
     of the world. . . . Shall we or any other free people 
     hesitate to accept this great duty? Dare we reject it and 
     break the heart of the world?''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Mass.) favored U.S. 
     participation in the League but proposed a number of 
     ``reservations'' to protect American interests. The second of 
     fourteen reservations concerned the congressional prerogative 
     to decide questions of war:
       ``The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the 
     territorial integrity or political independence of any other 
     country or to interfere in controversies between nations--
     whether members of the league or not--under the provisions of 
     article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the 
     United States under any article of the treaty for any 
     purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, 
     under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or 
     authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of 
     the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so 
     provide.''\2\
       Wilson opposed the Lodge reservations, claiming that they 
     ``cut out the heart of this Covenant'' and represented 
     ``nullification'' of the treaty.\3\ Wilson's theory of the 
     treaty process was a simple one: the President proposes, the 
     Senate acquiesces. There was no room in his philosophy of 
     government for independent Senate thinking or the offering of 
     legislative amendments and reservations.
       Wilson's attitude toward the Senate and presidential power 
     had been revealed crisply in two books. In Congressional 
     Government (1883), he advocated unilateral presidential 
     negotiation with complete exclusion of the Senate. These 
     executive initiatives would supposedly set to the country 
     ``into such scrapes, so pledged in the view of the world to 
     certain courses of action, that the Senate hesitates to bring 
     about the appearance of dishonor which would follow its 
     refusal to ratify the rash promises or to support the 
     indiscreet threats of the Department of State.''\4\ In 
     Constitutional Government in the United States (1908), he 
     reiterated the same line of argument:
       ``One of the greatest of the President's powers I have not 
     yet spoken of at all: his control, which is very absolute, of 
     the foreign relations of the nation. The initiative in 
     foreign affairs, which the President possesses without any 
     restriction whatever, is virtually the power to control them 
     absolutely. The President cannot conclude a treaty with a 
     foreign power without the consent of the Senate, but he may 
     guide every step of diplomacy, and to guide diplomacy is to 
     determine what treaties must be made, if the faith and 
     prestige of the government are to be maintained. He need 
     disclose no step of negotiation until it is complete, and 
     when in any critical matter it is completed the government 
     is virtually committed. Whatever its disinclination, the 
     Senate may feel itself committed also.''\5\
       This legislative strategy, fully articulated in Wilson's 
     writings, failed abysmally with the Treaty of Versailles. 
     After excluding the Senate from the negotiating sessions, he 
     tried to present Senators with a fait accompli. The result: a 
     resounding political defeat for Wilson. He had never 
     cultivated sufficient support among Senators to have his 
     handiwork approved. The treaty was rejected in November 1919 
     and again in March 1920. Wilson appealed to the public in an 
     exhausting campaign across the country, leading to his 
     physical and emotional collapse. The dismal experience of a 
     President's ``going it alone'' would remain seared in the 
     nation's memory, casting a shadow over future efforts to 
     create the United Nations.


                       creating the u.n. charter

       America's entry into a world organization was revived in 
     1943 through a series of methodical steps: the Ball 
     Resolution, the Connally and Fulbright Resolutions, and the 
     Moscow Declaration. Those actions were followed by meetings 
     at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 and in San Francisco in 1945. The 
     issue of which branch takes the nation to war--Congress or 
     the President--was ignored at some of these meetings and 
     addressed at others. The predominant view required prior 
     authorization by Congress (both Houses) of any commitment of 
     U.S. forces to the United Nations.
       On March 16, 1943, Senator Joseph Hurst Ball (R-Minn.) 
     introduced a resolution calling for the formation of the 
     United Nations. He was joined by Senators Lister Hill (D-
     Ala.), Harold Burton (R-Ohio), and Carl Hatch (D-N.M.). The 
     bipartisan nature of this resolution commanded respectful 
     attention. Senator Ball said that the ``whole world, and our 
     allies, know today that it is the United States Senate which 
     will finally decide what will be the foreign policy of our 
     country when the war ends.'' He noted that the Senate's 
     constitutional power in the past had been used 
     ``negatively,'' reminding listeners of the rejection of the 
     Treaty of Versailles. Senator Ball hoped that the decision on 
     the United Nations would not become embroiled in partisan 
     politics.\6\ Senate debate on the Ball Resolution said 
     nothing about which branch of government would commit U.S. 
     troops.
       On the day that Ball introduction his resolution, Walter 
     Lippman wrote an article on the Senate's role in giving 
     advice and consent to treaties. Lippman had long been 
     identified as a defender of foreign policy by elites and 
     executive officials. In an article published in the 
     Washington Post, he now urged that President Wilson's mistake 
     with the Treaty of Versailles not be repeated. Ways and means 
     had to be found of ``enabling the Senate to participate in 
     the negotiations.''\7\
       On September 20, the House debated a resolution introduced 
     by Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) to support the 
     concept of a United Nations. The language was exceedingly 
     brief:
       ``Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
     concurring), That the Congress hereby expresses itself as 
     favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery 
     with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and 
     lasting peace, among the nations of the world, and as 
     favoring the participation by the United States therein.''\8\
       Congressman Hamilton Fish, Jr. (R-N.Y.) proposed that 
     Fulbright's resolution end with the language ``favoring 
     participation by the United States therein through its 
     constitutional processes.''\9\ He explained that the 
     additional language meant that any commitment to join the 
     United Nations, made either by agreement or by treaty ``must 
     go through in a constitutional way, either by a two-thirds 
     vote of the Senate or by the approval of the entire 
     Congress.''\10\ He warned that a number of Members of 
     Congress were prepared to oppose the Fulbright Resolution 
     because they ``are afraid that some secret commitments will 
     be entered into and that the Congress will be by-passed, and 
     that the Constitution will be ignored.''\11\
       The House passed the Fulbright resolution, as introduced, 
     252 to 23.\12\ The following day it voted again, after adding 
     the language ``through its constitutional processes,'' and 
     this time the margin was 360 to 29.\13\ The House action 
     sharply challenged the Senate's presumed monopoly to define 
     foreign policy for the legislative branch. The debate pointed 
     out that both Houses acted on the declaration of war for 
     World War II, voted funds to sustain it, and conscripted 
     American soldiers to fight the battles.\14\ Recalling the 
     Senate's role in rejecting the Treaty of Versailles, 
     Congressman Mike Monroney (D-Okla.) said he was 
     ``unwilling to surrender to 33 Members of the Senate, one-
     third of that body, the life or death veto over the 
     security of future generations of Americans.''\15\
       The Senate ignored the Fulbright Resolution, which had been 
     introduced as a concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 25) and 
     therefore needed concurrence by the Senate. Instead,the 
     Senate considered a resolution (S. Res. 192) requiring only 
     its own action. Debate on this resolution, called the 
     Connally Resolution, stretched from October 25 through 
     November 5. Similar to the House, it included the phrase 
     ``through its constitutional processes'' to prevent the 
     President from joining the United Nations without explicit 
     congressional support.\16\ Congressional processes meant the 
     ``powers of Congress''--both Houses, not just the Senate.\17\ 
     A few Senators thought of congressional action solely through 
     the treaty process, excluding the House\18\ The majority 
     recognized that international commitments (in this case 
     joining the United Nations) could be made either by treaty or 
     by a majority of each House voting on a bill or joint 
     resolution.\19\
       The final version of the Connally Resolution, approved 85 
     to 5, provides that the United States, ``acting through its 
     constitutional processes,'' joins in the establishment of an 
     international authority with power to prevent aggression. The 
     final paragraph states that any treaty made to effect the 
     purposes of the resolution shall be made only with the 
     concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate.\20\ Senator Robert 
     Taft (R-Ohio) said that the requirement for Senate action was 
     added because of the fear that the President ``has shown some 
     indications of a desire to do by executive agreement things 
     which certainly in my opinion ought to be the subject of a 
     treaty.''\21\
       Little was said during this lengthy Senate debate about 
     congressional controls over the use of American troops in a 
     UN action. Senator Claude Pepper (D-Fla.) opposed any 
     delegation of Congress' war-declaring power to an 
     international body, but believed that it would be permissible 
     for American troops to be used, without prior congressional 
     approval, as a ``police force'' to combat aggression in small 
     wars.\22\ The notion of a ``police action'' would be later 
     used by President Truman as a legal pretext for going to war 
     in Korea without congressional approval. Truman was a member 
     of the Senate at the time Pepper made that remark.
       Senate action on the Connally Resolution occurred during a 
     four-nation conference that endorsed an international 
     peacekeeping organization. On October 30, 1943, the United 
     States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China 
     issued the Moscow Declaration, setting forth a number of 
     guiding principles. The declaration recognized ``the 
     necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a 
     general international organization . . . . for the 
     maintenance of international peace and security.''
       Those same nations met a year later at Dumbarton Oaks, in 
     Washington, D.C., to give further definition to the 
     international organization. Legal specialists who monitored 
     these meetings speculated on the procedures for going to war. 
     Edwin Borchard surmised: ``Constitutionally, the plan seems 
     to assume that the President, or his delegate, without 
     consulting Congress, the war-making and declaring authority, 
     can vote for the use of the American quota of armed forces, 
     if that can be limited when the `aggressor' resists.''\23\ 
     Two weeks after the end of the conference at Dumbarton Oaks, 
     President Roosevelt delivered an address in which he 
     indicated the need for advance congressional approval:
       ``The Council of the United Nations must have the power to 
     act quickly and decisively to keep the peace by force, if 
     necessary. A policeman would not be a very effective 
     policeman if, when he saw a felon break into a house, he had 
     to go to the town hall and call a town meeting to issue a 
     warrant before the felon could be arrested.
       ``It is clear that, if the world organization is to have 
     any reality at all, our representatives must be endowed in 
     advance by the people themselves, by constitutional means 
     through their representatives in the Congress, with authority 
     to act.''\24\
       After Roosevelt's death, Borchard learned that President 
     Truman had sent a cable from Potsdam stating that all 
     agreements involving U.S. troop commitments to the UN would 
     first have to be approved by both Houses of Congress.\25\ 
     Borchard believed that the Constitution required approval by 
     both Houses and not merely the Senate.\26\
       Another perspective appeared in a letter to The New York 
     Times. Six specialists of international law analyzed the 
     President's authority to contribute troops to the UN. They 
     recognized the risks for congressional prerogatives: ``It is 
     doubtless true that Congress feel a certain hesitancy in 
     permitting the President, acting through the Security 
     Council, to engage even a small policing force in 
     international action because it will fear that this might 
     commit the United States to further military action and thus 
     might impair the discretion of Congress in respect to 
     engagement in `war.''' Yet they suggested that Presidents in 
     the past had broad discretion in the use of military force, 
     frequently acting without explicit congressional authority. 
     The American constitutional system, they said, relied heavily 
     on good-faith actions and sensitive political judgment by the 
     President: ``Congress has always been dependent upon the good 
     faith of the President in calling upon it when the situation 
     was so serious that a large-scale use of force may be 
     necessary.''\27\
       The meetings at Dumbarton Oaks were followed by a 
     conference in San Francisco in 1945, attended by fifty 
     nations and lasting nine weeks. Unlike Wilson's futile 
     strategy for the Versailles Treaty, half of the eight members 
     of the U.S. delegation came from Congress: Senators Tom 
     Connally (D-Tex.) and Arthur H. Vandenberg (R-Mich.) and 
     Representatives Sol Bloom (D-N.Y.) and Charles A. Eaton (R-
     N.J.).\28\ John Foster Dulles, later to be Secretary of State 
     under President Eisenhower, told the Senate Foreign Relations 
     Committee in 1945 that, in the past, he had ``some doubts as 
     to the wisdom of Senators participating in the negotiation of 
     treaties.'' After his experience at the San Francisco 
     conference, he said those doubts ``were dispelled.''\29\
       Out of the San Francisco conference came the United Nations 
     Charter, which was submitted to the Senate for its approval. 
     The UN consisted of a General Assembly (representing all 
     member states), a Security Council (eleven members, including 
     China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the 
     United States as permanent members), a Secretariat, an 
     International Court of Justice, and specialized councils. 
     Chapter VII of the Charter dealt with UN responses to 
     threats of peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
     aggression. Procedures were established to permit the UN 
     to employ military force to deal with these threats. All 
     UN members would make available to the Security Council, 
     ``on its call and in accordance with a special agreement 
     or agreements,'' armed forces and other assistance for the 
     purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 
     The agreements were to be concluded between the Security 
     Council and members states and ``shall be subject to 
     ratification by the signatory states in accordance with 
     their respective constitutional processes.'' Thus, the 
     decision of who would grant that approval in the United 
     States--Congress, the President, or the two branches 
     acting jointly--was deliberately deferred. Each nation 
     would determine for itself the ``constitutional 
     processes'' to be followed.
       From July 9 to July 13, 1945, the Senate Foreign Relations 
     Committee held hearings on the Charter. Leo Pasvolsky, a 
     Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, was asked 
     whether Congress would have ultimate control over the special 
     agreements to use armed force. Pasvolsky replied: ``That is a 
     domestic question which I am afraid I cannot answer.''\30\ 
     Senator Vandenberg volunteered that, in his opinion, the 
     President would not need ``the consent of Congress to every 
     use of our armed forces.''\31\
       John Foster Dulles, an adviser to the U.S. delegation at 
     San Francisco, testified that the procedure for special 
     agreements would need the approval of the Senate and could 
     not be done unilaterally by the President.\32\ Dulles 
     elaborated: ``It is clearly my view, and it was the view of 
     the entire United States delegation, that the agreement which 
     will provide for the United States military contingent will 
     have to be negotiated and then submitted to the Senate for 
     ratification in the same way as a treaty.'' Senator Connally 
     agreed with that interpretation.\33\ When Senator Walter F. 
     George (D-Ga.) suggested that congressional approval could be 
     by statute, involving both Houses, Dulles disagreed: ``The 
     procedure will be by treaty--agreements submitted to the 
     Senate for ratification.''\34\ Senator Eugene Millikin (R-
     Colo.) tried to distinguish between ``policing powers'' (to 
     be exercised exclusively by the President) and ``real war 
     problems'' (reserved for congressional action).\35\ Dulles 
     agreed with that concept: ``If we are talking about a little 
     bit of force necessary to be used as a police demonstration, 
     that is the sort of thing that the President of the United 
     States has done without concurrence by Congress since this 
     Nation was founded.''\36\
       During floor debate, Senator Scott Lucus (D-Ill.) took 
     sharp exception to Dulles' contention that special agreements 
     would come back to Congress as treaties to be disposed of 
     solely by the Senate. Such agreements, Lucas said, required 
     action by both Houses. He cited constitutional passages 
     giving to the entire Congress powers to raise and support 
     armies and to make rules for the government and regulation of 
     the land and naval forces.\37\ Of course action by both 
     Houses is required to declare war and to appropriate funds 
     for the military. A number of Senators agreed with Lucas in 
     rejecting the proposition advanced by Dulles.\38\
       As the debate continued, Senator Vandenberg called Dulles 
     to clarify his position. Dulles explained that when the issue 
     came up in the hearings, he thought the question was between 
     unilateral action by the President (through executive 
     agreements) or retaining congressional control (which Dulles 
     took to mean action on treaties). The central point he tried 
     to make, Dulles said, was that ``the use of force cannot be 
     made by exclusive Presidential authority through an executive 
     agreement.'' He was positive about that. On the other issue--
     whether Congress should act by treaty or by joint 
     resolution--he was less certain.\39\
       At other points in the debate, Senator Harlan Bushfield (R-
     S.D.) said he had objected ``and I still object, to a 
     delegation of power to one man or to the Security Council, 
     composed of 10 foreigners and 1 American, to declare war and 
     to take American boys into war.'' Such a proposal ``is in 
     direct violation of the Constitution.'' Congress did not have 
     the power, Bushfield said, ``to make such a delegation even 
     if we desired to do so.''\40\ Senator Burton Wheeler (D-
     Mont.) was also emphatic on that point:
       ``If it is to be contended that if we enter into this 
     treaty we take the power away from the Congress, and the 
     President can send troops all over the world to fight battles 
     anywhere, if it is to be said that that is to be the policy 
     of this country, I say that the American people will 
     never support any Senator or any Representative who 
     advocates such a policy; and make no mistake about 
     it.''\41\
       President Truman, aware of the Senate debate on which 
     branch controlled the sending of armed forces to the UN, 
     wired a note to Senator McKellar on July 27, 1945, from 
     Potsdam. Truman pledged: ``When any such agreement or 
     agreements are negotiated it will be my purpose to ask the 
     Congress for appropriate legislation to approve them.''\42\ 
     In asking ``Congress'' for legislation, Senators understood 
     that Congress ``consists not alone of the Senate but of the 
     two Houses.''\43\ With that understanding, the Senate 
     approved the UN Charter by a vote of 89 to 2.\44\
       Having approved the Charter, Congress now had to pass 
     additional legislation to implement it and to determine the 
     precise mechanisms for the use of force. The specific 
     procedures, brought into conformity with ``constitutional 
     processes,'' are included in the UN Participation Act of 
     1945.


                        the un participation act

       Nothing in the passage of the Fulbright and Connally 
     Resolutions or the history of the UN Charter supports the 
     notion that Congress, by endorsing the structure of the 
     United Nations as an international peacekeeping body, altered 
     the Constitution by reading itself out of the war-making 
     power. Congress did not--it could not--do that. That 
     conclusion is driven home even more sharply by the 
     legislative history of the UN Participation Act.
       Under the provisions of the UN Charter, in the event of any 
     threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
     aggression, the UN Security Council may decide under Article 
     41 of the UN Charter to recommend ``measures not involving 
     the use of armed force,'' If those measures prove inadequate, 
     Article 43 provides that all UN members shall make available 
     to the Security Council--in accordance with special 
     agreements--armed forces and other assistance. These 
     agreements would spell out the numbers and types of forces, 
     their degree of readiness and general location, and the 
     nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. It 
     was anticipated that each nation would ratify these 
     agreements ``in accordance with their respective 
     constitutional processes.''
       The meaning of constitutional processes is defined by 
     Section 6 of the UN Participation Act of 1945. Without the 
     slightest ambiguity, this statute requires that the 
     agreements ``shall be subject to the approval of the 
     Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution.'' 
     Statutory language could not be more clear. The President 
     must seek congressional approval in advance. Two 
     qualifications are included in Section 6:
       The President shall not be deemed to require the 
     authorization of the Congress to make available to the 
     Security Council on its call in order to take action under 
     Article 42 of said Charter and pursuant to such special 
     agreement or agreements the armed forces, facilities, or 
     assistance provided therein: Provided, That nothing herein 
     contained shall be construed as an authorization to the 
     President by the Congress to make available to the Security 
     Council for such purpose armed forces, facilities, or 
     assistance in addition to the forces, facilities, and 
     assistance provided for in such special agreements or 
     agreements.''\45\
       The first qualification states that once the President 
     receives the approval of Congress for a special agreement, he 
     does not need subsequent approval from Congress to provide 
     military assistance under Article 42 (under which the 
     Security Council determines that peaceful means are 
     inadequate and military action is necessary). Congressional 
     approval is needed for the special agreement, not subsequent 
     implementations of that agreement. The second qualification 
     clarifies that nothing in the UN Participation Act is to be 
     construed as congressional approval of other agreements 
     entered into by the President.
       Thus, the qualifications do not eliminate the need for 
     congressional approval. Presidents could commit armed forces 
     to the UN only after Congress gave its explicit consent. That 
     point is crucial. The League of Nations Covenant foundered 
     precisely on the issue of needing congressional approval 
     before using armed force. The framers of the UN Charter knew 
     of that history and very consciously included protections for 
     congressional prerogatives.\46\
       The legislative history of the UN Participation Act 
     reinforces the need for advance congressional approval. IN 
     his appearance before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
     Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained that only 
     after the President receives the approval of Congress is he 
     ``bound to furnish that contingent of troops to the Security 
     Council; and the President is not authorized to furnish any 
     more than you have approved of in that agreement.''\47\ When 
     Congresswoman Edith Rogers remarked that Congress ``can 
     easily control the [Security] Council,'' Acheson agreed 
     unequivocally: ``It is entirely within the wisdom of 
     Congress to approve or disapprove whatever special 
     agreement the President negotiates.''\48\ Congressman John 
     Kee wondered whether the qualifications in Section 6 of 
     the UN Participation Act permitted the President to 
     provide military assistance to the Security Council 
     without consulting or submitting the matter to Congress. 
     Acheson firmly rejected that possibility. No special 
     agreement, Acheson said, could have any ``force or 
     effect'' until Congress approved:
       ``This is an important question of Judge Kee, and may I 
     state his question and my answer so that it will be quite 
     clear here: The judge asks whether the language beginning on 
     line 19 of page 5, which says the President shall not be 
     deemed to require the authorization of Congress to make 
     available to the Security Council on its call in order to 
     take action under article 42 of the Charter, means that the 
     President may provide these forces prior to the time when any 
     special agreement has been approved by Congress.
       ``The answer to that question is ``No,'' that the President 
     may not do that, that such special agreements refer to the 
     special agreement which shall be subject to the approval of 
     the Congress, so that until the special agreement has been 
     negotiated and approved by the Congress, it has no force and 
     effect.''\49\
       Other parts of the legislative history support this 
     understanding. In reporting the UN Participation Act, the 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee anticipated a shared, 
     coequal relationship between the President and Congress:
       ``Although the ratification of the Charter resulted in the 
     vesting in the executive branch of the power and obligation 
     to fulfill the commitments assumed by the United States 
     thereunder, the Congress must be taken into close partnership 
     and must be fully advised of all phases of our participation 
     in this enterprise. The Congress will be asked annually to 
     appropriate funds to support the United Nations budget and 
     for the expenses of our representation. It will be called 
     upon to approve arrangements for the supply of armed forces 
     to the Security Council and thereafter to make 
     appropriations for the maintenance of such forces.''\50\
       The Senate Foreign Relations Committee further noted that 
     ``all were agreed on the basic proposition that the military 
     agreements could not be entered into solely by executive 
     action.''\51\ Nevertheless, during floor debate, Senators 
     Connally and Taft agreed that in ``certain emergencies'' the 
     President and the Security Council might to able to act 
     without first obtaining authority from Congress.\52\ These 
     comments are interesting, but they do not change the 
     statutory requirement that special agreements be approved in 
     advance by ``appropriate Act or joint resolution.'' Moreover, 
     Connally and Taft seemed to be laboring under concepts left 
     over from the San Francisco conference and the Senate debate 
     over the UN Charter. They were endorsing the President's 
     ability to become engaged in ``police actions'' without any 
     congressional involvement.
       Connally's confusion is evident a few pages later where he 
     agrees with Senator Kenneth Wherry (R-Neb.) that special 
     agreements could be made by treaty.\53\ That 
     misinterpretation, originally pushed by John Foster Dulles 
     and others, was explicitly corrected by the language in 
     Section 6 of the UN Participation Act. Later, an amendment 
     was offered in the Senate to authorize the President to 
     negotiate a special agreement with the Security Council 
     solely with the support of two-thirds of the Senate.\54\ 
     Senator Vandenberg opposed the amendment on these grounds:
       ``If we go to war, a majority of the House and Senate puts 
     us into war. . . . The House has equal responsibility with 
     the Senate in respect of raising armies and supporting and 
     sustaining them. The House has primary jurisdiction over the 
     taxation necessities involved in supporting and sustaining 
     armies and navies, and in maintaining national defense.
       ``. . . [The Senate Foreign Relations Committee] chose to 
     place the ratification of that contract in the hands of both 
     Houses of Congress, inasmuch as the total Congress of the 
     United States must deal with all the consequences which 
     are involved either if we have a war or if we succeeded in 
     preventing one. . . .''\55\
       Vandenberg's reasoning prevailed. The great majority of 
     Senators recognized that the decision to go to war must be 
     made by both Houses of Congress. The amendment was defeated 
     decisively, 57 to 14.\56\
       The House of Representatives also designed the UN 
     Participation Act to protect congressional prerogatives over 
     war and peace. In reporting the bill, the House Foreign 
     Affairs Committee drew attention to the vote in the Senate 
     rejecting the idea that special agreements could be handled 
     solely by the Senate through the treaty process. The 
     Committee ``believes that it is eminently appropriate that 
     the Congress as a whole pass upon these agreements under the 
     constitutional powers of the Congress.''\57\ During floor 
     debate, Congressman Sol Bloom, one of the delegates at the 
     San Francisco conference, underscored that point:
       ``The position of the Congress is fully protected by the 
     requirement that the military agreement to preserve the peace 
     must be passed upon by Congress before it becomes effective. 
     Also, the obligation of the United States to make forces 
     available to the Security Council does not become effective 
     until the special agreement has been passed upon by 
     Congress.''\58\
       The restrictions on the President's power under Section 6 
     to use armed force were clarified by amendments adopted in 
     1949, allowing the President on his own initiative to provide 
     military forces to the United Nations for ``cooperative 
     action.'' However, presidential discretion to deploy these 
     forces are subject to stringent conditions: they could serve 
     only as observers and guards, could perform only in a 
     noncombatant capacity, and could not exceed one thousand.\59\ 
     Moreover, in providing these troops in the UN the President 
     shall assure that they not involve ``the employment of armed 
     forces contemplated by chapter VII of the United Nations 
     Charter.''\60\ Clearly, there was no opportunity in the UN 
     Participation Act or its amendments for unilateral military 
     action by the President.


                             the korean war

       With these safeguards supposedly in place to protect 
     congressional prerogatives, on June 26, 1950, President 
     Truman announced to the American public that he had conferred 
     with the Secretaries of State and Defense, their senior 
     advisers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ``about the situation 
     in the Far East created by unprovoked aggression against the 
     Republic of Korea.''\61\ He said that the UN Security Council 
     had acted to order a withdrawal of the invading forces to 
     positions north of the 38th parallel, and that, ``[i]n 
     accordance with the resolution of the Security Council, the 
     United States will vigorously support the effort of the 
     Council to terminate this serious breach of the peace.''\62\ 
     At that point, he made no commitment of U.S. military forces.
       On the next day, however, President Truman announced that 
     North Korea had failed to cease hostilities and to withdraw 
     to the 38th parallel. He summarized the UN action in this 
     manner:
       ``The Security Council called upon all members of the 
     United Nations to render every assistance to the United 
     Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these 
     circumstance I have ordered United States air and sea forces 
     to give the [South] Korean Government troops cover and 
     support.''\63\
       In addition to this argument, Truman said that ``the 
     occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct 
     threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United 
     States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions 
     in that area.''\64\ Finally, he advised that all members of 
     the United Nations ``will consider carefully'' the 
     consequences of Korea's aggression ``in defiance of the 
     Charter of the United Nations'' and that a ``return to the 
     rule of force in international affairs'' would have far-
     reaching effects. The United States, he said, ``will continue 
     to uphold the rule of law.''\65\
       In fact, Truman violated the unambiguous statutory language 
     and legislative history of the UN Participation Act. How 
     could he pretend to act militarily in Korea under the UN 
     umbrella without any congressional approval? The short answer 
     is that he ignored the special agreements that were the 
     vehicle for assuring congressional approval in advance of any 
     military action by the President. With the Soviet Union 
     absent, the Security Council voted 9 to 0 to call upon North 
     Korea to cease hostilities and to withdraw their forces. 
     Two days later the Council requested military assistance 
     from UN members to repel the attack, but by that time 
     Truman had already ordered U.S. air and sea forces to 
     assist South Korea.
       Truman's legal authority was non-existent for two reasons. 
     First, it cannot be argued that the President's 
     constitutional powers vary with the presence or absence of 
     Soviet delegates to the Security Council. As Robert Bork 
     noted in 1971, ``the approval of the United Nations was 
     obtained only because the Soviet Union happened to be 
     boycotting the Security Council at the time, and the 
     President's Constitutional powers can hardly be said to ebb 
     and flow with the veto of the Soviet Union in the Security 
     Council.''\66\
       Second, the Truman administration did not act pursuant to 
     UN authority, even though it strained to make that case. On 
     June 29, 1950, Secretary of State Acheson claimed that all 
     U.S. actions taken in Korea ``have been under the aegis of 
     the United Nations.''\67\ Aegis is a fudge word, meaning 
     shield or protection. Acheson was using it to suggest that 
     the United States was acting under the legal banner of the 
     United Nations, which of course was not the case.
       Acheson falsely claimed that Truman had done his ``utmost 
     to uphold the sanctity of the Charter of the United Nations 
     and the rule of law,'' and that the administration was in 
     ``conformity with the resolutions of the Security Council of 
     June 25 and 27 giving air and sea support to the troops of 
     the Korean government.''\68\ Yet Truman committed U.S. forces 
     before the Council called for military action. General 
     MacArthur was immediately authorized to send supplies of 
     ammunition to the South Korean defenders. On June 26, Truman 
     ordered U.S. air and sea forces to give South Koreans cover 
     and support.\69\ After Acheson summarized the military 
     situation for some members of Congress at noon on June 27, 
     President Truman exclaimed: ``But Dean, you didn't even 
     mention the U.N.!''\70\ Later that evening the Security 
     Council passed the second resolution. In his memoirs, Acheson 
     admitted that ``some American action, said to be in support 
     of the resolution of June 27, was in fact ordered, and 
     possibly taken, prior to the resolution.''\71\ After he left 
     the presidency, Truman was asked whether he was prepared to 
     use military force in Korea without UN backing. He 
     replied, with customary bluntness: ``No question about 
     it.''\72\
       On June 29, at a news conference, Truman was asked whether 
     the United States was at war. His response: ``We are not at 
     war.''\73\ He was asked whether it would be more correct to 
     call the conflict ``a police action under the United 
     Nations.'' He agreed with that language: ``That is exactly 
     what it amounts to.''\74\ The UN exercised no real authority 
     over the conduct of the war. Other than token support from a 
     few nations, it was an American war. The Security Council 
     requested the United States to designate the commander of the 
     forces and authorized the ``unified command at its discretion 
     to use the United Nations flag.''\75\ Truman designated Gen. 
     Douglas MacArthur to serve as commander of this so-called 
     unified command.\76\ Measured by troops, money, casualties, 
     and deaths, it remained an American war.
       As to the distinction between police actions and wars, 
     federal courts had no difficulty in defining the hostilities 
     in Korea as war. A federal district court noted in 1953: ``We 
     doubt very much if there is any question in the minds of the 
     majority of the people of this country that the conflict now 
     raging in Korea can be anything but war.''\77\ During Senate 
     hearings in June 1951, Secretary of State Acheson conceded 
     the obvious by admitting ``in the usual sense of the word 
     there is a war.''\78\
       Truman violated constitutional and statutory requirements 
     in part because of his mistaken reading of history. In 
     deciding whether North Korean aggression could go unanswered, 
     he looked, in his own lifetime, to Japan's invasion of 
     Manchuria and Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland. He did 
     not consider other historical parallels where force is used, 
     such as the American Civil War or with nineteenth-century 
     efforts in Germany for unification. It did not occur to him 
     that the situation in Korea resembled the latter more than 
     it did Manchuria and the Rhineland.\79\
       Even if a case could be made that the emergency facing 
     Truman in June 1950 required him to act promptly without 
     first seeking and obtaining legislative authority, nothing 
     prevented him from returning to Congress and asking for a 
     supporting statute or retroactive authority. John Norton 
     Moore has made this point: ``As to the suddenness of Korea, 
     and conflicts like Korea, I would argue that the President 
     should have the authority to meet the attack as necessary but 
     should immediately seek congressional authorization.''\80\ I 
     would put it a little differently. In a genuine emergency a 
     President may act without congressional authority (and 
     without express legal or constitutional authority), trusting 
     that the circumstances are so urgent and compelling that 
     Congress will endorse his actions and confer a legitimacy 
     that only Congress, as the people's representatives, can 
     provide.


                        political repercussions

       Congress was largely passive to Truman's usurpation of the 
     war power. Some members offered the weak justification that 
     ``history will show that on more than 100 occasions in the 
     life of this Republic the President as Commander in Chief has 
     ordered the fleet or the troops to do certain things which 
     involved the risk of war [without seeking congressional 
     consent].''\81\ This list of alleged precedents for 
     unilateral presidential action contains not a single military 
     adventure that even comes close to the magnitude of the 
     Korean War. As Edward S. Corwin noted, the list consists 
     largely of ``fights with pirates, landings of small naval 
     contingents on barbarous or semi-barbarous coasts, the 
     dispatch of small bodies of troops to chase bandits or cattle 
     rustlers across the Mexican border, and the life.''\82\
       A few legislators insisted that Truman should have gone to 
     Congress for authority first.\83\ Congressman Vito 
     Marcantonio (ALP-N.Y.) delivered this indictment: ``when we 
     agreed to the United Nations Charter we never agreed to 
     supplant our Constitution with the United Nations Charter. 
     The power to declare and make war is vested in the 
     representatives of the people, in the Congress of the 
     United States.''\84\
       Senator Taft warned that if the President could intervene 
     in Korea ``without congressional approval, he can go to war 
     in Malaya or Indonesia or Iran or South America.'' Taft 
     conceded that U.S. entry into the United Nations created a 
     new framework, ``but I do not think it justifies the 
     President's present action without approval by Congress.'' 
     Taft referred to Section 6 of the UN Participation Act, 
     noting that no special agreement had ever been negotiated by 
     the Truman administration and submitted to Congress for its 
     approval.\35\
       Almost a year after the war began, a number of Senators 
     participated in a lengthy debate that thoroughly shredded the 
     administration's legal pretenses. Truman's commitment of 
     troops to Korea violated the UN Charter, the UN Participation 
     Act, and repeated assurances given to Congress by Acheson and 
     other executive officials. Truman used military force before 
     the second Security Council resolution. It was a war, not a 
     police action. It was an American, not a UN, operation. On 
     all those points the record is abundantly clear.\36\
       Just as the Vietnam War spelled defeat for the Democrats in 
     1968, so did the Korean War help put an end to twenty years 
     of Democratic control of the White House. ``Korea, not crooks 
     or Communists, was the major concern of the voters,'' writes 
     Stephen Ambrose.\87\ The high point of the 1952 campaign came 
     on October 24, less than two weeks before the election, when 
     Dwight D. Eisenhower announced that he would ``go to Korea'' 
     to end the war.\88\ Two authors of a study on Eisenhower 
     described the crucial influence of the Korean War: 
     ``Dissatisfaction with the war destroyed Truman's popularity 
     and had much to do with Eisenhower's emphatic victory in the 
     election of 1952.''\89\
       Some leading academics, after rushing to Truman's support, 
     later regretted their failure to give proper attention to 
     constitutional principles. Henry Steele Commager, a prominent 
     historian, was quick to defend Truman. Writing for The New 
     York Times on January 14, 1951, Commager blithely remarked 
     that the objections to Truman's unilateral actions ``have no 
     support in law or in history.''\90\ His own research into law 
     and history, on this point, was superficial and 
     misinformed. Consider this reasoning by Commager:
       ``. . . it is an elementary fact that must never be lost 
     sight of that treaties are laws and carry with them the same 
     obligation as laws. When the Congress passed the United 
     Nations Participation Act it made the obligations of the 
     Charter of the United Nations law, binding on the President. 
     When the Senate ratified the North Atlantic Treaty it made 
     the obligations of that treaty law, binding on the President.
       ``Both of these famous documents require action by the 
     United States which must, in the nature of the case, be left 
     to a large extent to the discretion of the Executive. . . 
     .\91\''
       Commager not only overstated the President's power under 
     mutual defense treaties but ignored, totally, the statutory 
     text and legislative history of the UN Participation Act.
       Arthur S. Schlesinger, Jr. was also an early defender of 
     Truman's action in Korea. In a letter to The New York Times 
     on January 9, 1951, he disputed the statement by Senator Taft 
     that President Truman ``had no authority whatever to commit 
     American troops to Korea without consulting Congress and 
     without Congressional approval'' and that by sending troops 
     to Korea he ``simply usurped authority, in violation of the 
     laws and the Constitution.'' Schlesinger said that Taft's 
     statements ``are demonstrably irresponsible.'' Harkening back 
     to Jefferson's use of ships to repel the Barbary pirates, 
     Schlesinger claimed that American Presidents ``have 
     repeatedly committed American armed forces abroad without 
     prior Congressional consultation or approval.''\92\
       Schlesinger neglected to point out that Jefferson told 
     Congress he was ``[u]nauthorized by the Constitution, without 
     the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense.'' 
     It was the prerogative of Congress to authorize ``measures of 
     offense also.''\93\ Schlesinger did not cite, nor could he, a 
     presidential initiative of the magnitude of the Korean War. 
     Years later he expressed regret that, in calling Taft's 
     statement ``demonstrably irresponsible,'' he had responded 
     with ``a flourish of historical documentation and, alas, 
     hyperbole.''\94\
       Edward S. Corwin took Commager and Schlesinger to task by 
     labeling them the ``high-flying prerogative men.''\95\ 
     However, Corwin himself had been careless in earlier 
     publications in describing the scope of presidential war 
     power. Writing in 1949, he said that the original grant of 
     authority to the President to ``repel sudden attacks'' had 
     developed into an ``undefined power--almost unchallenged from 
     the first and occasionally sanctified judicially--to employ 
     without Congressional authorization the armed forces in the 
     protection of American rights and interests abroad whenever 
     necessary.''\96\ He did note the significance of the UN 
     Participation Act, which is said was based on the theory that 
     American participation in the United Nations ``is a matter 
     for Congressional collaboration.''\97\
       By the late 1960s, with the nation mired in a bitter war in 
     Vietnam, Commager and Schlesinger publicly apologized for 
     their earlier unreserved endorsements of presidential war 
     power. By 1966 Schlesinger was counseling that ``something 
     must be done to assure the Congress a more authoritative and 
     continuing voice in fundamental decisions in foreign 
     policy.''\98\ In 1973 Schlesinger stated that the ``idea of 
     prerogative was not part of presidential powers as defined by 
     the Constitution,'' although it ``remained in the back of 
     [the framers'] mind.''\99\ Commager told the Senate in 1967 
     that there should be a reconsideration of executive-
     legislative relations in the conduct of foreign 
     relations.\100\ Testifying in 1971, Commager appealed for 
     stronger legislative checks on presidential war powers.\101\


                              conclusions

       President Truman's unilateral use of armed force in Korea 
     violated the U.S. Constitution and the UN Participation Act 
     of 1945. It is not a valid precedent for what President Bush 
     planned to do in 1990-91, against Iraq, nor is it a valid 
     precedent for any military operations that President Clinton 
     would want to launch in Bosnia or other UN ``peacekeeping'' 
     operations. The decision to place U.S. troops in combat and 
     to take the nation from a condition of peace to a state of 
     war requires approval by Congress in advance. That was the 
     constitutional principle in 1787. It has not changed today.
       Presidents and their advisers point to more than 200 
     incidents in which Presidents have used force abroad without 
     first obtaining congressional approval. Most of those actions 
     were minor adventures done in the name of protecting American 
     lives or property, taken at a time when U.S. intervention in 
     neighboring countries was considered routine and proper. Is 
     the bombardment of Greytown, Nicaragua, in 1854 an acceptable 
     ``precedent'' for the current use of American military power? 
     Are we comfortable with citing America's occupation of Haiti 
     from 1915 to 1934 or the repeated interventions in Nicaragua 
     from 1909 to 1933? Today, such invasions would violate 
     international law and regional treaties. We should not speak 
     nonchalantly about ``more than 200 precedents,'' assuming 
     that such numbers, by themselves, justify unilateral military 
     action by the President. We need to examine the specific 
     incidents. Are they attractive precedents for the use of 
     force today? None of the two hundred incidents come close to 
     justifying military actions of the magnitude and risk of 
     Korea in 1950, Panama in 1989, Iraq in 1990, or Bosnia in 
     1994.
       The Korean War stands as the most dangerous precedent 
     because of its scope and the acquiescence of Congress. In 
     recognizing the importance of the Korean War and its threat 
     to constitutional democracy, we should not attempt to confer 
     legitimacy to an illegitimate act. Illegal and 
     unconstitutional actions, no matter how often repeated, do 
     not build a lawful foundation. If Presidents withdrew funds 
     from the Treasury without an appropriation from Congress, 
     those actions would have no constitutional legitimacy, 
     regardless of the number of infractions. As Gerhard Casper 
     has remarked: ``unconstitutional practices cannot become 
     legitimate by the mere lapse of time.''\102\ Justice 
     Frankfurter noted: ``Illegality cannot attain legitimacy 
     through practice.''\103\ Presidential acts of war, including 
     Truman's initiative in Korea, can never be accepted as 
     constitutional or as a legal substitute for congressional 
     approval.


                               FOOTNOTES

     \1\17 Richardson 8735.
     \2\58 Cong. Rec. 8777 (1919).
     \3\63 The Papers of Woodrow Wilson 451 (Arthur S. Link ed. 
     1990); 64 The Papers of Woodrow Wilson 47, 51 (Link ed. 
     1991).
     \4\Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government 233-234 (1885).
     \5\Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United 
     States 77-78 (1908).
     \6\89 Cong. Rec. 2031 (1943).
     \7\Id. at 2032.
     \8\Id. at 7623.
     \9\Id. at 7646-47.
     \10\Id. at 7647.
     \11\Id.
     \12\Id. at 7655.
     \13\Id. at 7728-29.
     \14\Id. at 7705 (Congressman Richards).
     \15\Id. at 7706.
     \16\Id. at 9187 (Senator Willis, first column).
     \17\Id. at 8662 (reading by the legislative clerk).
     \18\Id. at 9187 (Senator Willis, first column); id. at 9189 
     (Senator Brooks); id. at 9205 (Senator Wherry).
     \19\Id. at 9207 (Senator Hayden).
     \20\Id. at 9222.
     \21\Id. at 9101.
     \22\Id. at 8742-43.
     \23\Edwin Borchard, ``The Dumbarton Oaks Conference,'' 39 Am. 
     J. Int'l L. 97, 101 (1945).
     \24\11 Dep't of State Bull. 447, 448 (1945).
     \25\Edwin Borchard, ``The Charter and the Constitution,'' 39 
     Am. J. Int'l L. 767, 767-768 (1945).
     \26\Id. at 770-771.
     \27\The New York Times, November 5, 1994, at 8E. Signers of 
     the letter: John W. Davis, W.W. Grant, Philip C. Jessup, 
     George Rublee, James T. Shotwell, and Quincy Wright.
     \28\``The Charter of the United Nations,'' hearings before 
     the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st 
     Sess. 197 (1945).
     \29\Id. at 644.
     \30\``The Charter of the United Nations,'' hearings before 
     the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st 
     Sess. 298 (1945).
     \31\Id. at 299.
     \32\Id. at 645-646.
     \33\Id. at 646.
     \34\Id. at 652.
     \35\Id. at 654.
     \36\Id. at 655.
     \37\91 Cong. Rec. 8021 (1945).
     \38\Id. at 8021-8024 (Senators McClellan, Hatch, Fulbright, 
     Maybank, Overton, Hill, Ellender, and George).
     \39\Id. at 8027-28.
     \40\Id. at 7156.
     \41\I. at 7988.
     \42\Id. at 8185.
     \43\Id. (Senator Donnell).
     \44\Id. at 8190.
     \45\59 Stat. 621, Sec. 6 (1945).
     \46\Michael J. Glennon, ``The Constitution and Chapter VII of 
     the United States Charter,'' 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 74, 75-77 
     (1991).
     \47\``Participation by the United States in the United 
     Nations Organization,'' hearings before the House Committee 
     on Foreign Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1945).
     \48\Id.
     \49\Id. at 25-26.
     \50\S. Rept. No. 717, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1945).
     \51\Id. at 8.
     \52\91 Cong. Rec. 10965-66 (1945).
     \53\Id. at 10974
     \54\Id. at 11296.
     \55\Id. at 11301.
     \56\Id. at 11303.
     \57\H. Rept. No. 1383, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1945).
     \58\91 Cong. Rec. 12267 (1945).
     \59\63 Stat. 735-736, Sec. 5(1949).
     \60\Id.
     \61\Public Papers of the Presidents, 1950, at 491.
     \62\Id.
     \63\Id. at 492.
     \64\Id.
     \65\Id.
     \66\Robert H. Bork, ``Comments on the Articles on the 
     Legality of the United States Action in Cambodia,'' 65 Am. J. 
     Int'l L. 79, 81 (1971).
     \67\23 Dept. of State Bull. 43 (1950).
     \68\Id. at 46.
     \69\Public Papers of the Presidents, 1950, at 529.
     \70\Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision 188 (1968).
     \71\Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation 408 (1969). See 
     also Edwin C. Hoyt, ``The United States Reaction to the 
     Korean Attack: A Study of the Principles of the United 
     Nations Charter as a Factor in American Policy-Making,'' 55 
     Am. J. Int'l L. 45, 53 (1961).
     \72\Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry 
     S. Truman 276n (1973).
     \73\Public Papers of the Presidents, 1951, at 503.
     \74\Id. at 504. On July 13, at a news conference, he again 
     called the Korean war a police action.'' Id. at 522.
     \75\Id. at 520.
     \76\Id.
     \77\Weissman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 112 F.Supp. 420, 
     425 (S.D. Cal. 1953). See also Gagliormella v. Metropolitan 
     Life Ins. Co., 122 F.Supp. 246 (D. Mass. 1954); Carius v. New 
     York Life Insurance Co., 124 F.Supp. 388 (D. Ill. 1954); and 
     A. Kenneth Pye, ``The Legal Status of the Korean 
     Hostilities,'' 45 Geo. L. J. 45 (1956).
     \78\``Military Situation in the Far East'' (Part 3), hearings 
     before the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign 
     Relations, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2014 (1951).
     \79\Richard S. Kirkendall, Harry S Truman and the Imperial 
     Presidency 11, 16 (1975).
     \80\John N. Moore, ``The National Executive and the Use of 
     the Armed Forces Abroad,'' 21 Naval War College Rev. 28, 32 
     (1969).
     \81\96 Cong. Rec. 9229 (1950). Statement of Senator Scott 
     Lucas (D-Ill.)
     \82\Edward S. Corwin, ``The President's Power,'' The New 
     Republic, January 29, 1951, at 16.
     \83\96 Cong. Rec. 9233 (1950). Statement of Senator Arthur V. 
     Watkins (R-Utah). See also Arthur V. Watkins, ``War by 
     Executive Order,'' 4 West. Pol. Q. 539 (1951).
     \84\96 Cong. Rec. 9268 (1951).
     \85\Id. at 9323.
     \86\97 Cong. Rec. 5078-5103 (1951).
     \87\1 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the 
     Army, President-Elect 569 (1983).
     \88\Id.
     \89\Chester J. Pach, Jr. and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency 
     of Dwight D. Eisenhower 46 (1991).
     \90\Henry Steele Commager, ``Presidential Power: The Issue 
     Analyzed,'' The New York Times, January 14, 1951, p. 11.
     \91\Id. at 24.
     \92\Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., ``Presidential Powers: Taft 
     Statement on Troops Opposed, Actions of Past Presidents 
     Cited,'' The New York Times, January 9, 1951, p. 28.
     \93\1 Richardson 315.
     \94\Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency 139 
     (1973).
     \95\Edward S. Corwin, ``The President's Power,'' The New 
     Republic, January 29, 1951, at 15.
     \96\Edward S. Corwin, ``Who Has the Power to Make War?'' The 
     New York Times Magazine, July 31, 1949, at 14.
     \97\Id.
     \98\Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Alfred de Grazia, Congress 
     and the Presidency 27-28 (1967).
     \99\Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, at 9. Emphasis in 
     original.
     \100\``Changing American Attitudes towards Foreign Policy,'' 
     hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
     90th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1967).
     \101\``War Powers Legislation,'' hearings before the Senate 
     Committee on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-74 
     (1971).
     \102\Gerhard Casper, ``Constitutional Constraints on the 
     Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model,'' 
     43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 463, 479 (1976).
     \103\Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517, 524 
     (1940).

  Mr. DOLE. The treaty was never ratified.
  Mr. President, having said that, this is essentially the same 
amendment that was defeated in the Senate by a vote of 65 to 34 on June 
29, 1994. I am not certain that bringing up the issue again with the 
same outcome likely sends the right signal to the White House because 
we read in this morning's paper--at least it hints--that the President 
will wait until we are in recess before there is any action. We read 
that he may not have seriously engaged the question and has not really 
focused on it himself.
  The President has indicated he does not want, nor needs, 
congressional authorization. He said that in his press conference the 
other night. I happen to believe that is a mistake. If President 
Clinton made his case for the use of force, and if Congress authorized 
the use of force, I believe President Clinton's hand would be 
strengthened just as President Bush's hand was strengthened when he in 
effect rolled the dice and came to Congress and asked for our support 
for offensive military action in Iraq.
  The best way for the administration to show the United States is 
serious would be the affirmative Congress authorizing the use of force 
in Haiti. The Congress should have a role to play.
  It is a little odd that the administration goes to the United Nations 
and ignores the Congress. There is the argument made the other day that 
the Senator from Arizona has already referred to in this amendment. It 
passed by a vote of 100 to 0. We indicated at that time, every Senator, 
that U.N. authorization certainly is not authorization by Congress or 
the American people.
  It is a little odd that Argentina has decided not to participate in 
the invasion precisely because of opposition from the Argentine 
Congress. Their Congress said no. They are pulling out.
  So apparently they are going to bypass our Congress. That seems the 
President's attitude at the White House.
  There should be no mistake at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue if 
this amendment is defeated. It does not mean the Congress does not have 
a role to play, and Congress should play a role. There is no emergency 
in Haiti.
  The President has plenty of time to come up here right now and say, 
``OK. I want to get authorization from Congress.'' But he has to make 
his case to the American people first. If he cannot make it to the 
American people, he certainly is not going to make it effectively to 
the Congress of the United States So the President ought to come up 
here and try to make his case.
  I think Roll Call, a little newspaper here on Capitol Hill, had a 
good editorial on August 4, which I also want to include in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                             Haiti Vote Now

       White House officials tell us that President Clinton is 
     undergoing an ``excruciating'' process of deciding whether to 
     seek Congressional authorization for an invasion of Haiti. 
     His aides are divided, the officials say, with some fearing 
     Congress will deny permission and undercut Clinton's effort 
     to scare the illegitimate military government into 
     abdicating, others arguing that putting the issue to Congress 
     will create a bad precedent narrowing the powers of the 
     Commander-in-Chief, and still others (apparently a minority) 
     advising that a Congressional vote is the right thing to do, 
     politically and constitutionally.
       We strongly urge the President to listen to this last 
     group, and we strongly urge Congressional leaders to insist 
     that Clinton seek proper authorization if he decides on an 
     invasion. We render no opinion on the invasion idea itself, 
     but we think it's vital that Congress be restored to its 
     proper constitutional role in deciding whether the United 
     States goes to war.
       During the Cold War era, it came to be accepted practice 
     that presidents would commit US troops abroad without a 
     declaration of war or other formal authorization. In some 
     cases where quick action is necessary, this will continue to 
     be the case--as it was prior to the Cold War. But a Haiti 
     invasion, if it occurs, will take place in the new post-Cold 
     War era, and now is the right time to make certain that in 
     this new world, Congress is no longer left out of the 
     process.
       The basic principle is simple: If the president decides 
     that military action is required to secure some desired 
     foreign policy purpose, and time is not of the essence, he 
     ought to have to secure Congress' permission for it. This is 
     what President Bush did with the Persian Gulf war, and it's 
     generally agreed that the debate preceding the authorization 
     vote was one of the US government's finest hours in recent 
     history.
       If President Clinton is worried that Congress will deny him 
     authorization for an invasion of Haiti, this is all the more 
     reason he needs to seek it. Congress usually supports a 
     president when he takes decisive action overseas, so doubt 
     about Congress's will in this case is strong evidence that 
     the President has failed to make his case for an invasion. He 
     needs to do that to win public support as well as 
     Congressional support. Going to war without such approval 
     leaves a president ``on his own''--without a safety net if 
     anything goes wrong.
       Independent of the Haiti case, it's time for Congress to 
     fulfill its oft-made--and oft-broken--resolve to rewrite the 
     1973 War Powers Resolution, which neither Congress nor the 
     President finds workable. It permits a president to put 
     troops in combat for up to 90 days, but then demands their 
     removal if Congress has not approved their dispatch.
       In the case of Haiti, President Clinton has sought and 
     obtained the blessing of the United Nations Security Council 
     for an invasion. If he plans to use US troops, however, he 
     needs to secure the authorization of the US Congress. He is 
     rumored to be thinking of mounting an invasion when Congress 
     is in recess later this month, but that would be a mistake. 
     Clinton needs to face, not duck, opponents of his Haiti 
     policy. If he wins a vote in Congress, that might really 
     induce the Haitian military to flee to France.

  Mr. DOLE. It says, ``Haiti Vote Now,'' and it points out a number of 
reasons why I think the President should come to Congress.
  Let me just reiterate what my colleague has said.
  Mr. President, I am not certain what rationale the administration may 
have in mind, if in fact there is intervention in Haiti. Certainly, if 
it is because the people are impoverished or the people are suffering, 
if that were a rationale that you could use, that might be enough. But 
that is not. There are not any Americans being threatened. There is no 
real American interests being threatened. There are a lot of poor 
people there. They deserve our help. But that is not enough to justify 
intervention, shedding Haitian blood, and perhaps American blood. And 
who knows how long the occupation would last thereafter? We all know 
the last one lasted about 19 years.
  So it seems to me that the President of the United States has some 
obligation to come to Congress and make his case. In my view, if the 
President can persuade the Congress that he is right, we ought to do 
what he asked us to do, what he asked the American people to do, or 
asked the American soldier to do. Then I think his case will be 
strengthened with the American people.
  I recall that after President Bush came to Congress, not one single 
member of the Democratic leadership, not a single Member in the House 
or the Senate of the Democratic leadership, supported President Bush's 
efforts to get Congress to authorize the use of offensive forces in 
Iraq. But there were 11 Democrats and a number of Republicans, and 
President Bush rolled the dice and prevailed.
  As I recall it--I will go back to check to be certain--but once the 
Congress put its stamp of approval on what President Bush asked, then 
support for that operation climbed steadily. I think the same would be 
true, whether it is Haiti or anywhere else.
  I do not see any reason for an intervention in Haiti. Others do. The 
Presiding Officer feels just as strongly the other way, and maybe for 
good reason. But I think we all should make the case that the President 
has an obligation to come to us, to come to Congress, to make his case. 
First, he has to make it to the American people.
  It appears that the only country that is going to help us is now 
saying we cannot do it because our Congress objects. What about our 
Congress? If there are going to be American soldiers, why not Argentine 
soldiers? In our Congress, we reflect the views of the American people. 
We ought to be prepared to have some role.
  So I support the amendment of the Senator from Pennsylvania because 
it is much like the Gregg-Dole amendment which was defeated. And I hope 
that maybe today Senator Specter may prevail. But if not, the White 
House should not misunderstand the vote, or misconstrue the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from 
Virginia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I thank you. I thank my colleague from 
Arizona.
  Mr. President, on this particular question, I join with the Senator 
from Arizona and others who are concerned about the possible 
ramifications of potential action that we would be taking if we were to 
approve the amendment by our colleague from Pennsylvania.
  I understand the intent of his amendment at this particular point. I 
do not agree, however, with the operative effect of it. I think that 
this would be a very serious and, indeed, dangerous precedent for the 
Congress of the United States to engage in.
  I happen to be one, with all deference to the Republican leader, who 
was, at least temporarily, as the occupant of the chair is now, in the 
leadership 3 years ago, whatever the date was, when we were asked to 
consider the question of force authorization. I, as the occupant of the 
chair, supported force authorization with respect to the invasion of 
Kuwait by Iraq. But in this particular case, I differ with my friend 
from Arizona with respect to the advisability of some action and 
certainly with respect to the question of whether or not the President 
is engaged--I know for a fact that he is engaged and is considering 
this question very, very seriously.
  But putting that aside for a moment, the far more serious question is 
whether or not we should attempt, given the responsibility under the 
Constitution to declare war, whether we should attempt to usurp the 
authority of the President of the United States under section 2, 
article II, in his role as Commander in Chief.
  In this particular case, an attempt to engage in prior restraint 
would not only send the very difficult and mixed signal that has 
already been alluded to in some of the debate, it would set a precedent 
for future U.S. actions that would be, in my judgment, fundamentally 
wrong. Again, there is a wide difference within this body as to whether 
or not the President ought to engage in certain actions.
  I supported the unanimous consent resolution recently because it was 
a sense-of-the-Senate resolution regarding whether or not U.N. Security 
Resolution 940, I think was the number, actually authorized the use of 
U.S. forces. Clearly on its face, it did not and could not.
  This is a different question, however. I think it is very important 
that our colleagues understand the potential ramifications and the 
precedents that this would set, and I think as far as I am concerned 
certainly would be entirely a wrong precedent.
  So with all deference to my friend from Pennsylvania, whose expertise 
in terms of the Constitution of the United States is not questioned or 
challenged by any Member of this body, and indeed there are very wide 
differences on this particular point, I nonetheless must respectfully 
urge my colleagues to vote against the Specter amendment.
  With that, Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  I thank my colleague from Arizona for yielding the time.
  Mr. SPECTER. Will the Senator from Virginia yield for a question?
  Mr. ROBB. The Senator would be delighted to yield for a question.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Four minutes and thirty-nine seconds.
  Mr. SPECTER. My question to the Senator from Virginia is that the 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee stated earlier in response 
to a question that the Congress has the de jure authority to declare 
war but the de facto authority to declare war has been overtaken by the 
President. Would you agree with that?
  Mr. ROBB. Let me say, Mr. President, to the Senator from Pennsylvania 
that I am not as quick to defend constitutional role in war-making as 
some of my friends. I accept that. I accept the War Powers Resolution. 
I think it is important, however, to recognize that as Commander in 
Chief we expect certain responsibility to be vested in the President of 
the United States. I think that we severely inhibit his or potentially 
her ability to carry out that function if we engage in additional 
restraint, and particularly if the attempt is to engage in specific 
prior restraint with respect to activities that may or may not be 
undertaken or authorization that may or may not be requested.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank my colleague. I take that as a qualified yes.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. McCAIN. Let me try to make myself clear on this issue. The 
question before this body is not whether we think that the President of 
the United States should invade Haiti. The Senate has spoken very 
clearly on that issue. In October 1993, on the Defense appropriations 
bill, there was a vote by the U.S. Senate to express the sense of the 
Senate. Just a few days ago, a short time ago, there was a 100-to-0 
vote which was correctly interpreted as a message to the President that 
he must come to the Congress before initiating a military action in 
Haiti. And if there was a simple, again, sense-of-the-Senate resolution 
here as to whether we should invade Haiti, I do not have any doubt that 
the vote would be overwhelming in opposition to invasion.
  But this is not about whether we should invade Haiti. I believe with 
every bone in my body that the President should consult with Congress, 
should come to Congress for authorization, and should receive approval 
of any military action in Haiti. According to the Washington Post this 
morning, ``September also would have the virtue of coinciding with the 
end of the upcoming congressional recess, should Clinton be disposed to 
consult.''
  I say to my friend from Virginia, if he believes the President is 
fully engaged, I hope he will ask that ``senior administration 
official,'' whoever it was, to correct his statement that the President 
has ``not even entered this discussion seriously.'' Maybe a retraction 
could be issued by that senior administration official.
  Mr. President, is the answer to the problem of a failure of the 
President to consult with Congress and receive authorization from 
Congress a prohibition, a prospective proscription of actions on the 
part of the President? I would say the answer is no. I believe that if 
any military action is initiated by the President, without 
congressional approval, it will fail. The Vietnam war, Somalia, and 
Beirut prove that you have to have support of the American people and 
the support of the Congress; otherwise, military actions are doomed to 
failure.
  I believe that this President is very smart, and I believe that this 
President is going to realize that he has to come to the Congress and 
the American people--not necessarily in that order--if he is going to 
invade Haiti. For us to say we are so afraid that he will not that we 
have to prohibit him from becoming militarily involved in Haiti, I 
believe, creates an enormous constitutional crisis.
  I will add one other thing from the Members' perspective on my side 
of the aisle; that is, I do not expect the other party to control the 
White House forever. I believe fervently, hopefully, prayerfully, that 
somebody from my party will be President of the United States. If that 
happens, I would hate for us to have set a precedence where we are 
prohibiting the President of the United States from carrying out his 
responsibilities as Commander in Chief. The fact is that at any time 
the President of the United States is engaged militarily, the Congress 
can debate a declaration of war and declare war or not. If the Congress 
chooses not to exercise their constitutional rights to do that, then 
that responsibility lies on the Congress, not on the President.
  I repeat, Mr. President, I want the President of the United States to 
come and consult. I want him to get approval and authorization before 
we engage ourselves militarily in Haiti. I am afraid he may not. But 
for us to prohibit the President of the United States from taking 
actions, which I believe are clearly within his constitutional 
authority, I think is the wrong solution. How much time do I have 
remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator controls 5 minutes 18 seconds.
  Mr. McCAIN. I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I thank my colleague 
from Arizona.
  I suppose I can say ``amen'' here to what he just said. This is not a 
debate about whether or not we ought to commit United States Forces to 
Haiti. That debate, hopefully, will never come and we will not have to 
engage in that question, and the issue will be resolved without ever 
getting to that point. But if it does, there will clearly be--if it 
comes to the Congress--a significant debate and discussion.
  Ideally--the Senator from Arizona is absolutely correct--the proper 
way to proceed is that Presidents come to the Congress and ask for that 
kind of authority before engaging. As my colleague has pointed out--and 
I was not here for all of this debate--I count 14 or 15 occasions since 
1903 when Presidents of all political persuasions have injected U.S. 
Forces into hostile environments without prior authority from the 
Congress. It began in Panama in 1903. Coincidentally, the last one also 
happens to be Panama. Many would have argued--and I think did--that 
they wish the President had come to this Congress beforehand.
  But the point I think the Senator from Arizona is making, and the one 
I think we need to emphasize, is that under our Constitution, the 
Constitution divides war powers, in effect, between Congress and the 
Executive. That is why we have these debates, because it clearly is the 
power of the President to be Commander in Chief. It is also very clear 
that the power to declare war is vested in the Congress. So you have 
these two branches of Government, separate but equal, that are charged 
in the same Constitution with responsibilities in the conduct of war. 
And so we find ourselves in this situation. So I say to my friend from 
Pennsylvania, while I certainly respect his knowledge and ability and 
awareness in constitutional areas, I do not think at this juncture you 
want to be precommitting without the initiation being taken by the 
Executive.
  President Bush, to his credit, came to this institution prior to the 
conflict in the Persian Gulf. He asked this body, and the other, to 
express its view on whether or not forces should be committed to 
hostilities in the Middle East. I point out that--I do not know the 
exact number; my colleague could probably tell me--there was a 
significant number of forces we sent over to the Middle East prior to 
the debate in this body. But President Bush deserves a great deal of 
credit for what he did then, the least of which was to come here and 
ask our view.
  I generally say that this President should do the same, if he can, if 
he is confronted with that choice. There may be circumstances, as we 
have seen in other examples where that will not or cannot be the case. 
I do not want to tie the hands of a President when he feels as though 
he should take some action. He can inform and consult with the 
Congress, but not necessarily be able to come and seek that authority.
  So I do not know what the proper motion is here, but whatever it is, 
I urge that this amendment be defeated. Again, we have had 5 amendments 
now, as I count them, in the last 2 weeks on Haiti. We have had a 
pretty good discussion around here about what the circumstances are 
and, I think, what we all hope happens. I think this is a premature 
debate. Hopefully, it is a debate that will never have to occur because 
we will not have to commit those United States Forces to Haiti. I join 
with my colleague from Arizona and the distinguished chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee in support of the proposition that this 
amendment be rejected.
  I thank my colleague from Arizona, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania controls 3 
minutes 20 seconds; the Senator from Arizona 1 minute 6 seconds.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, the key point was made by the 
distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee when he said, 
in response to my question, that de jure the Congress has the authority 
to declare war and de facto the President has the power to declare war. 
I think that is correct.
  I think that is the way it has worked out, and it is high time, under 
circumstances as clear as those present now, that the Congress reassert 
its de jure and de facto authority to declare war. ``De jure'' means 
out of law; ``de facto'' means out of fact.
  The fact is that he who asserts the fact of the matter controls what 
practically happens, and where you have a situation where the Senate of 
the United States has said, ``Do not invade Haiti,'' and the House has 
said, ``Do not invade Haiti,'' and the President says, ``I am not 
mandated to get the authority of the Congress,'' that is a flat 
violation of the constitutional requirement that only the Congress has 
the power to declare war. There may well be a constitutional crisis if 
the President moves ahead to declare war and make war in violation of 
the Constitution.
  Mr. President, this amendment is carefully crafted to leave the 
President his authority as Commander in Chief to have temporary 
deployment of U.S. Forces to protect U.S. citizens or to have the 
deployment of U.S. forces to protect vital U.S. national security 
interests where there is not time to come to the Congress. So his power 
as Commander in Chief is respected and protected.
  What this amendment does is seek to reassert the de facto authority 
of the Congress as the sole authority to declare war.
  It is ironic, Mr. President, that we articulate a desire to promote 
democracy in Haiti while we are ignoring democracy and the United 
States Constitution at home.
  Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania controls 40 
seconds.
  Mr. SPECTER. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania yields the 
floor.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield myself the remaining time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 1 minute 1 second.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, one of the great embarrassments to me as a 
Senator is the failure to abide by our own law, which is the War Powers 
Act.
  I urge the participation of Senator Specter and others in this body 
to review this law and revise it in a fashion that we can obey. We 
should abide by the laws that we pass as we expect the people of the 
rest of the country to abide the laws we pass.
  This amendment is not about whether we should invade Haiti. That 
issue has been ventilated and will be ventilated again many times on 
the floor. This amendment is not about whether the President should 
come to the Congress of the United States and consult and receive prior 
authorization before he invades Haiti, if he contemplates such action.
  This amendment is about the Constitution of the United States and 
Senator Specter's view of it and mine.
  I believe that history shows that the President of the United States 
should be clear to exercise his powers as Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces. I believe the Constitution of the United States does 
provides him with this authority. For us to prospectively prohibit that 
action, I think would set a very dangerous precedent for the future.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this amendment is about a de facto 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States. It was succinctly 
and accurately expressed by the chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee that the President takes on the de facto authority to declare 
war, and if, in the circumstances here where there has been ample time 
for the President to come to the Congress and he does not, the Congress 
says, ``Do not make war in Haiti,'' and the President responds, ``I am 
not mandated to come back to the Congress,'' if we allow that to stand 
and if we allow the President to assert and usurp the authority to make 
war, we are having a de facto amendment of the Constitution.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.


                         wrong signal on haiti

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I oppose the amendment offered by the 
Senator from Pennsylvania on Haiti. The adoption of this amendment 
today would send the wrong message to the military leadership in Haiti. 
We should not take action today that gives the de facto Haitian 
Government any sense of security or complacency, and which might impede 
other diplomatic efforts to ensure their speedy departure.
  I agree with the Senator from Pennsylvania in that I believe that the 
President should seek prior congressional approval for any military 
action in Haiti that does not stem from the urgent need to protect 
Americans living in Haiti or from some other immediate national 
security concern. Under the Constitution, the President has the freedom 
of action to respond to those emergency situations. Military actions to 
remove the military leadership of Haiti and return the legitimately 
elected civil authorities are actions for which he should want and 
should seek the approval and support of the Congress. I believe that 
the President understands that actions such as are contemplated for 
Haiti, involving risk for United States military personnel, are actions 
for which he would want and would seek congressional support and 
approval. That way, should any eventual military action result in 
casualties, that burden would not be borne by the President alone.
  A prohibition on the use of military force in Haiti except in cases 
where the President already has the clear constitutional authority to 
act, is unwise at this time. It gives support for the military 
leadership in Haiti. The President needs flexibility to exercise his 
responsibilities as Commander in Chief and he should also have the good 
judgment to build a solid consensus in Congress and the American public 
for military action. The President, I believe, has that good judgment 
and I do not think we should be presuming that he does not. Therefore, 
I urge my colleagues to table this amendment.

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I do not support an invasion of Haiti 
at this time, but I will oppose the Specter amendment which appears to 
prohibit it.
  As Senator McCain, and others who oppose both an invasion and the 
amendment have argued, the Specter language would do nothing but 
undercut the ability of this or any future President to use the threat 
of force as a negotiating tool.
  I want the President to seek congressional authorization prior to any 
action. I believe that President Bush's decision to seek such an 
authorization prior to the conflict with Iraq was extremely helpful. If 
President Clinton believes that an invasion of Haiti is necessary, he 
should explain that to the Congress and the country. He should explain 
the need for action and the strategy which will guide that action. 
While I am not now persuaded that an invasion is the best course to 
take, I intend to listen carefully to the President's arguments and 
explanations.
  Mr. President, the Specter amendment involves issues of process and 
politics rather than policy. Defeat of this amendment does not mean 
that the Congress supports or wants an invasion of Haiti; adoption of 
this amendment would not prohibit an invasion since it spells out, as 
does existing law, situations in which the President may act 
unilaterally.
  The Senate has cast a series of votes on Haiti over the past few 
weeks. My votes on those amendments make it clear that I want the 
President to consult with the Congress and that I am not persuaded that 
an invasion is justified or wise at this time. It was unfortunate, in 
my view, that this amendment was offered as the debate has made clear, 
Senators do not see this as a debate about policy. It is a debate about 
process and no one--in Haiti or in America--should read anything more 
than that into this vote. To interpret this as a vote for or against a 
given policy in Haiti would be a serious mistake and could lead to 
serious miscalculations.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I rise today to join Senator McCain in 
opposing the amendment of the senior Senator from Pennsylvania.
  I have consistently voted against legislation, such as the amendment 
offered by Senator Specter, which would prohibit the president from 
exercising his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. I last 
spoke to this issue on June 29, during consideration of a similar 
amendment offered by Senator Gregg.
  I agree with the arguments of Senator McCain that the Constitution 
grants the President, as Commander in Chief, the authority to deploy 
U.S. military forces abroad as he deems appropriate. I would hope that 
Presidents, absent situations where timing is so critical that 
consultations cannot precede execution of a military operation, would 
either consult with Congress or seek prior congressional authorization 
regarding the use of force. But I do not find constitutional authority 
to require such congressional involvement as a condition precedent.
  Having said that, my vote against the specter amendment should not be 
broadly interpreted as an endorsement of a United States invasion of 
Haiti, given the facts existing today, August 5, 1994. I have serious 
misgivings about the policy being pursued by the administration 
regarding Haiti. I remain firm in my belief that the administration has 
not made a convincing case to justify the use of United States troops 
in Haiti.
  We are all moved by the tragedies in Haiti--the human rights 
violations, the thousands of desperate refugees, the military leaders 
prospering while the poor are suffering. But our compassion alone is 
not sufficient reason for endangering the lives of the men and women of 
the U.S. Armed Forces, should they be ordered to invade. Compassion 
will not offset the injury to other nations in this hemisphere who 
constantly remind us of Yankee imperialism in years past.
  The main question that I believe the administration has failed to 
answer is--what is the United States national interest in Haiti that 
would justify the use of United States military power? It appears at 
this point that there remains disagreement at the highest levels of the 
administration regarding this question. I refer my colleagues to 
Senator McCain's floor statement of yesterday addressing the New York 
Times article of August 4 entitled, ``Top U.S. Officials Divided in 
Debate on Invading Haiti.''
  During briefings to the Congress, administration officials have said 
that the United States has an interest in restoring democracy to Haiti. 
This is not, as some officials claim, a justification for the use of 
force. While we would like to see democracy restored in Haiti, we 
should not shed American blood to achieve that goal.
  The administration has also stated that we have an interest in 
stability in the Caribbean. I agree. But I fail to see how the 
situation in Haiti is contributing to uncontrolled instability in the 
region. Several months ago, on May 16, the nation which adjoins Haiti, 
the Dominican Republic, held a Presidential election. The unrest in 
Haiti--just miles away--did not de-stabilize that free election.
  We should not forget the history of United States military 
involvement in Haiti as we contemplate a possible invasion. The last 
time the United States intervened in Haiti it restored order, in 1915, 
we remained for 19 years. History has a way of repeating itself.
  Mr. President, it is unfortunately true that the world today is a 
more dangerous and violent place than it was just 10 years ago. There 
are currently 64 areas of conflict in the world. The United States 
cannot be expected to solve all of the problems in the world today. We 
are not the world's policeman. We must be selective in the use of U.S. 
military power. Unless vital U.S. national interests are at stake, U.S. 
troops should not be sent into harm's way. At this point, Haiti does 
not meet that standard. A U.S. military solution to the problems in 
that country should be avoided.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Pursuant to the previous order, the Senator 
from Arizona is recognized upon the expiration of time.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I move to table the amendment and ask for 
the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of 
the Senator from Arizona to lay on the table the amendment of the 
Senator from Pennsylvania. On this question, the yeas and nays have 
been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, on this vote I have a pair with the 
distinguished Senator from Vermont [Mr. Jeffords]. Senator Jeffords is 
unavoidably absent. If he were present and voting, he would vote 
``yea,'' for the McCain motion to table. If I were at liberty to vote, 
I would vote ``nay.'' And, therefore, I withhold my vote.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Breaux], 
the Senator from Arizona [Mr. DeConcini], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. 
Heflin], and the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Mathews] are necessarily 
absent.
  Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Jeffords] 
is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 63, nays 31, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 263 Leg.]

                                YEAS--63

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boren
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Harkin
     Hatfield
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Mack
     McCain
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nunn
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Stevens
     Warner
     Wofford

                                NAYS--31

     Bennett
     Brown
     Burns
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Danforth
     Dole
     Domenici
     Durenberger
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Kempthorne
     Lott
     Lugar
     McConnell
     Nickles
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Roth
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Thurmond
     Wellstone

       PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR, AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED--1

                            Wallop, against

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Breaux
     DeConcini
     Heflin
     Jeffords
     Mathews
  So the motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 2460) was agreed 
to.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I just wanted the Record to reflect that 
Senator Jeffords is regrettably absent today due to a family medical 
emergency.


  Vote On Excepted Committee Amendment beginning on page 25, line 8, 
                            through line 13

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on the underlying 
committee amendment on page 25, line 8.
  If there be no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the 
amendment.
  So the excepted committee amendment beginning on page 25, line 8, 
through line 13, was agreed to.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and I move 
to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. HARKIN. I move to reconsider also the vote on the Specter 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a motion to reconsider the vote to 
table the Specter amendment. Is there a motion to lay that upon the 
table?
  Mr. SPECTER. So moved.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that pursuant to 
the previous agreement, the list of excepted amendments be modified to 
read as follows:
  Page 25, lines 8 through 13;
  Page 51, line 16, through page 52, line 17;
  Page 78, line 16 through line 23;
  Page 78, line 24, through page 79, line 15;
  Page 80, line 1 through line 5;
  Page 80, line 6, through page 81, line 8;
  Page 63, line 5, through page 64, line 4.
  Page 68, line 18, through page 69, line 5.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dorgan). Will the Senator modify his 
request to delete the committee amendment on page 25, lines 8 through 
13?
  Mr. HARKIN. That was the one just adopted. I delete the one excepted 
amendment on page 25, lines 8 through 13.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, now we are ready to move to an amendment 
that will be offered by the Senator from Arizona regarding the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting. As soon as he is recognized to 
offer that, then perhaps we can enter into some time agreement on it.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, before I send an amendment to the desk, I 
would like to tell the distinguished managers that the Republican 
leader has asked for 10 minutes to speak on this amendment. So I only 
need 5 or 10 minutes. I will need a maximum of 20 minutes on this side 
on the issue. I will be glad to enter into a unanimous-consent 
agreement for a time limit.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I ask unanimous 
consent that on the McCain amendment dealing with the Corporation for 
Public Broadcasting there be 40 minutes equally divided, 20 minutes 
controlled by the Senator from Arizona, or his designee, and 20 minutes 
controlled by Senator Inouye, or his designee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. SPECTER. I want to be sure, reserving the right to object, that 
Senator Stevens has 10 minutes in that time.
  Mr. BROWN. Reserving the right to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. BROWN. Is the distinguished chairman willing to include my Taiwan 
amendment in that unanimous-consent request? I will be happy to limit 
that to 10 minutes.
  Mr. HARKIN. We have not cleared that.
  Mr. BROWN. It has not been cleared. I thought it would be appropriate 
to do it in terms of a time limitation.
  Mr. HARKIN. We will seek to get that agreement as soon as we finish 
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. I think we will be OK on it.
  Mr. BROWN. I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent 
request propounded by the Senator from Iowa? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  The Senator from Arizona.


Amendment No. 2461 to Excepted Committee Amendment on Page 68, Line 18, 
                        through Page 69, Line 5

            (Purpose: To increase funding for AIDS programs)

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
committee amendment be laid aside and that the committee amendment 
beginning on page 68, line 18, through page 69, line 5, be the pending 
business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send a second-degree amendment to the 
pending committee amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2461.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of the committee amendment on page 69, at the 
     end of line 5, insert the following: Provided further, That 
     $37,360,000 shall be transferred to Department of Health and 
     Human Services to be used solely for AIDS research and 
     prevention programs in Fiscal Year 1997.''

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment mandates that of the $330 
million appropriated in the bill for the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting, $37,360,000 should be transferred to the Department of 
Health and Human Services to be used for AIDS research and prevention 
programs.
  The bill before the Senate appropriates $330 million to the CPB for 
fiscal year 1997. This amendment lowers that amount to $292,640,000000, 
the amount that was requested by the President and mandates the 
difference be used for AIDS research.
  Mr. President, this is simply a matter of priorities. Each day 
Americans in every Member's State, in every congressional district will 
die from AIDS. According to the Centers for Disease Control, as of 
March 1994, 382,173 Americans were diagnosed as having AIDS and another 
1 million were infected with the HIV virus.
  Based on current information, those numbers will undoubtedly 
increase. The facts surrounding this killer are well known, and there 
is no need to repeat them all. But there exists no cure for AIDS, and 
we are in desperate need to do all we can to fund AIDS research and 
prevention programs.
  At the same time, we are increasing the funding for the Corporation 
for Public Broadcasting. The President requested the Corporation for 
Public Broadcasting be funded at $292 million for 1997. I do not always 
agree with the President, but when I do--and when I recognize a 
concerted effort on his part to control spending--then we have an 
obligation, in my view, to support him.
  Mr. President, I repeat, this is an issue of priorities. Do we 
increase funding for the CPB in excess of the President's request, or 
do we use the money for AIDS research?
  Let me point out, this bill funds the CPB $37 million more than the 
President's request. It funds the Ryan White AIDS Program at $8 million 
below the President's request. The Ryan White AIDS Program, which funds 
AIDS early intervention programs, is funded at $14,400,000 below the 
President's request. And, Mr. President, title IV of the Ryan White 
program, which funds pediatric AIDS programs, is funded $1 million less 
than the administration's request.
  Let me repeat, pediatrics AIDS programs in this bill are funded at a 
level $1 million less than requested, yet we are funding the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting above requested levels.
  The supporters of the CPB constantly state how important the CPB is 
for our Nation's young people. Let me emphasize, this is obviously very 
important to young people, but those young people have to be alive. The 
House has realized that we must make priorities, and the House Members 
and the Labor/HHS Appropriations Subcommittee cut the fiscal year 1995 
budget by $20 million. The report that accompanies the House bill 
states:

       The committee's action to rescind a portion of the advanced 
     appropriation for 1995 is consistent with funding 
     recommendations for many other programs in the bill which are 
     slightly reduced below the 1994 funding level due to the 
     committee's tight budget allocation and the need to shift 
     resources to the President's investment priorities in 
     education, job training, health prevention and biomedical 
     research.

  The CPB may have served a need when it was created in 1969. It served 
many individuals who were not able to receive quality programming and 
does still in some areas. But times have changed, needs have changed, 
and our priorities must change with them.
  Cable is now available to 97 percent of American homes and 63 percent 
of all households subscribe to cable television and subscription rates 
are rising. Additionally, direct broadcast service television, known as 
DBS, has begun direct satellite-to-home broadcast television. The 
popularity of that service is expected to skyrocket.
  What kind of programming can someone watch on these venues? Stations 
such as Arts and Entertain, BRAVO, CNN, Nickelodeon, C-SPAN and 
Discovery--many stations that air programs as good as, if not better, 
than those which exist on PBS. Yet we continue to raise the spending 
levels for the CPB.
  I am keenly aware that the Senator from Alaska and the Senator from 
Hawaii will point out the far-reaching areas of their States where 
cable is not available and public broadcasting is necessary. I would 
state to my colleagues, first, DBS will soon solve that problem; 
second, if my amendment is adopted, we in Congress can mandate during 
consideration of the reauthorization bill, which is currently pending 
in the Commerce Committee, that CPB use its funding to ensure that 
rural Alaska and rural Hawaii is not abandoned; and, third, we will 
still be funding the CPB at substantial levels.
  I acknowledge that there is a need for public broadcasting stations 
to remote sections of our Nation. However, in areas such as metro 
Washington, DC, where three public broadcasting stations are available 
over the airwaves, at the very least, continued increases in Federal 
funding must be called into question.
  I repeat, it is a matter of priorities.
  Cutting the money from the CPB budget will not cause public 
broadcasting to cease. Public broadcasting can and will continue to 
exist, but the fact remains, using this $37 million to fund AIDS 
research may save lives. It may bring us one day closer to a cure for 
this deadly disease. And that, Mr. President, I believe is worth a 
small reduction in the CPB budget.
  I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. INOUYE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Hawaii.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I rise in support of the funding level for 
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting which is included in this bill, 
$330 million for fiscal year 1997.
  Mr. President, this amount is well below the proposed authorized 
level of $425 million provided for in S. 2120, the Public Broadcasting 
Act of 1994.
  The funding contained in this appropriations bill would allow public 
broadcasting stations to simply maintain the present level of high 
quality programming. I think all of us have seen firsthand how public 
broadcasting has helped this country. Public broadcasting's effort in 
education, advanced technology, and program development continues to 
set the standard for commercial broadcasting.
  For example, nationwide, public television is the largest contributor 
of video and televised instructional material for schools, for 
colleges, and home viewers in the country. Public TV reaches over 29 
million students in nearly 70,000 schools from kindergarten to grade 
12. Close to 2 million teachers use public educational services 
provided by public TV and nearly 2 million adults have earned college 
credit because of public broadcasting.
  Last month, public television launched a new school readiness service 
designed to help children to start school ready to learn. The ready to 
learn service is being tested in 11 sites across the country, and this 
service will offer quality children's programming, community outreach, 
and increased support services for children.
  Yesterday, public broadcasting announced that it will launch another 
new education initiative called Ready to Earn. This service is designed 
to enhance career and economic opportunity for millions of Americans. 
``Going the Distance,'' the first of the ready to earn programs, will 
allow students to earn associate of arts degrees in over 60 community 
colleges in PBS telecourses. The program will enable students who need 
to work, parents who need to take care of their children, and citizens 
who do not live near a college campus to earn a college degree.
  Many of us do not realize this, but public television provides closed 
captioning for the hearing impaired, a descriptive video service which 
has an optional audio narration track for the sight impaired, and 
Spanish language tracks for Spanish-speaking students.
  Innovative services like these are important as our society becomes 
more diverse.
  Public broadcasting also allocates a large percentage of its funds to 
enhance programming by and for minorities in traditionally unserved 
areas. And through the Independent Television Service and five minority 
consortia, public broadcasting has enabled Americans to explore 
important social issues and experience a wide variety of opinions and 
ideas.
  CPB coordinates statewide planning and conducts research to help 
public broadcasting systems keep up with the new technologies and 
fluctuating financial conditions. For instance, many public radio and 
television stations are exploring new ways to manage the administrative 
and technical processes to achieve greater efficiency, and I applaud 
the efforts of these stations to become more efficient and eliminate 
duplicate program coverage.
  When one considers, Mr. President, that public broadcasting receives 
only $1 a year per person from the Federal Government, one can only 
conclude that public broadcasting is one of the wisest investments that 
Congress can make. The Communications Subcommittee of the Commerce 
Committee is committed to passing reauthorization legislation this year 
so that we can ensure a healthy public broadcasting system in this 
country. The subcommittee held a hearing just 2 months ago on 
legislation to reauthorize the CPB, and I expect the bill to be marked 
up before the next recess.
  The House is also expected to introduce a similar measure and to hold 
hearings rather soon. And I believe any issues with regard to CPB 
programs and policies should more properly be considered in the context 
of an authorization bill.
  Finally, Mr. President, I support the funding level contained in this 
bill and must commend Senator Harkin and the Appropriations Committee 
for demonstrating such fiscal responsibility. The funding provided in 
the appropriations bill is a good investment in our country's future.
  Mr. President, it is time once again for Congress to reaffirm its 
commitment to the public broadcasting system and to provide the 
financial stability and means needed for CPB to realize its full 
potential.
  How much time do we have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii has 14 minutes and 10 
seconds remaining. The Senator from Arizona has 14 minutes and 26 
seconds remaining.
  Mr. INOUYE. I suggest the absence of a quorum with no time taken off 
from either side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum is noted, with no time 
taken off the time agreement. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HARKIN. How much time is remaining on both sides, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 14 minutes remaining to the Senator 
from Iowa and 14 minutes and 26 seconds remaining to the Senator from 
Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. HARKIN. Will the Senator from Hawaii yield to me a couple minutes 
on the subject?
  Mr. INOUYE. I would be happy to. I promised 10 minutes to the Senator 
from Alaska.
  Mr. HARKIN. How much time does the Senator from Hawaii have?
  Mr. INOUYE. Fourteen minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Just under 14 minutes.
  Mr. HARKIN. I ask the Senator to yield 2 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized for 2 
minutes.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I urge Senators to vote against the McCain 
amendment. Few of the programs funded in this bill touch as many lives 
as public broadcasting does; 90 million people watch public television, 
more than half of American households in any given week. Many of them 
are children. For them, public television makes essential learning 
opportunities available regardless of their parents' education, income, 
or occupation. It exposes children to information about world politics, 
economic events, and career opportunities that will affect their lives.
  Commercial broadcasting's primary goal is to deliver an audience to 
advertisers. Public broadcasting's primary goal is to produce quality 
programs that do not necessarily make money, and this difference makes 
public broadcasting unique. There is nothing like All Things Considered 
or Morning Edition anywhere on commercial radio. There is nothing like 
MacNeil/Lehrer or Sesame Street anywhere on commercial television.
  Of the $330 million provided in the Senate bill for CPB, $218 million 
goes directly to the Nation's 700 radio stations and 350 public 
television stations in the form of community service grants. Stations 
use these grants to acquire or produce programming that serves the 
needs of their local communities. In spite of overall increases in CPB 
funding, many stations have had their grants cut in real and relative 
terms. Between 1989 and 1994, at least 15 new public television 
stations and 90 new public radio stations have become eligible for 
these grants. Grants to these new stations, although helping the system 
bring public broadcasting services to areas and audiences not 
previously served, have offset significantly the growth in Federal 
support for existing stations. Small rural stations are most reliant on 
these funds and would be most affected by cuts. For rural audiences, 
the money we appropriate is vital. Because television stations in rural 
areas do not have great fundraising capabilities, smaller rural 
stations will likely be forced to cut service to their communities. 
Public broadcasting works because it is a partnership between business, 
Government and the American people. If you weaken one leg, the whole 
enterprise is affected.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has consumed 2 minutes.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum without 
taking time off either side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum is noted without the 
time being taken from either side. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I want to use about 2 minutes of my time. 
Then I would like to go ahead and move to lay the pending amendment 
aside so that Senator Brown, the Senator from Colorado, can pose his 
amendment. I believe the Senator from Iowa is working on a time certain 
for this vote and also for the next vote.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, today as we consider the level of funding to 
be provided for the Corporation of Public Broadcasting, I believe it is 
important to reflect on the accomplishments and potential for public 
broadcasting.
  During the last 27 years, public broadcasting has enabled Americans 
to take countless journeys, explore the heavens and Earth, participate 
in great events and arouse more dreams and address more issues of 
social importance.
  Public broadcasting is no longer just ``MacNeil/Lehrer,'' ``All 
Things Considered,'' or Big Bird. Today it is public telecommunications 
encompassing all forms of technology from videodisc to interactive 
computers and high-definition television to other means of 
communication that will continue to allow us to dream, take journeys, 
experience great drama and music, and explore the heavens and beyond.
  Today, communications technologies offer exciting opportunities to 
improve the quality and quantity of educational programming on 
television and radio. Education is the key to the future of our 
country. If we fail to provide quality education, we risk not only the 
minds of our children but also our Nation's place in an increasingly 
competitive world. But how do we, in times of budget deficits, make the 
most of our limited resources to ensure that Americans are able to 
function in the workplace? One way is to empower citizens and 
communities to work together to find solutions. And in order to do so, 
it is Congress' role to provide citizens and communities the means to 
work together.
  One of the best means available to Congress to achieve this goal is 
public telecommunications. CPB is embarking on several new journeys 
which ensure its place in our changing world. It is exploring new ways 
to improve school readiness for very young children using the powerful 
medium of television as a positive influence rather than a harmful one. 
It is developing community-wide education and information services that 
will provide local capacity to utilize the national information 
infrastructure. And it is seeking ways to use its access into every 
community and every home to address such difficult problems as youth 
violence.
  Preschool children have been exposed since the late 1960s to the 
early childhood educational values of ``Sesame Street'' and ``Mr. 
Rogers' Neighborhood.'' Classroom television from kindergarten through 
high school reaches 29 million students across the country with 
science, math, and reading instruction. After school, public television 
programs like ``Reading Rainbow'', ``Where in the World is Carmen 
SanDiego?'', and the upcoming ``Magic Schoolbus'' series, encourage 
youngsters to pursue subjects such as reading, geography, and science.
  College courses are available through the Annenberg/CPB Project, a 
1981 initiative to promote adult education which has been a pioneer in 
interactive computer systems to improve teaching and learning. Nearly 
1.5 million students used the audio and video material in their college 
classes in 1989. Approximately 150,000 students have completed Project 
courses for college credit, and an additional 7.5 million general 
interest viewers tune in to courses every week.
  For these reasons, I fully support the Appropriations Committee 
recommendation to provide $330 million to the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting for fiscal year 1997 and I oppose the McCain amendment to 
cut CPB funds.
  Mr. President, I also ask your permission to submit for the record an 
article from yesterday's Washington Post which describes a new Public 
Broadcasting Service initiative, ``Going the Distance.'' The program is 
a cooperative effort with 60 community colleges across the country, 
including Northern Virginia Community College, that will enable 
students for the first time to earn degrees entirely through PBS 
telecourses. I believe this is a sterling example of public TV's 
commitment to meet the lifelong educational needs of all Americans and 
to be a significant provider of quality programming for the so-called 
information superhighway.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.

                [From the Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1994]

     PBS Launches Couch College--Students Can Earn Associate Degree

                           (By Ellen Edwards)

       Public television has forged a partnership with 60 
     community colleges around the country that will enable 
     students to earn degrees for the first time entirely through 
     PBS ``telecourses.''
       ``It will bind PBS as never before to its original 
     education mission,'' said PBS President Ervin Duggan. 
     ``Educational TV has come a long way since a single camera 
     was trained on Mrs. Gundy holding a pointer at the 
     blackboard.
       ``In a 500-channel universe we have to have a unique and 
     differentiated mission. This is the first big strategic thing 
     we are doing.''
       The program, called Going the Distance and scheduled to 
     begin this fall, is to be announced at a news conference 
     today. It will permit students who need to work, who take 
     care of their children at home or who live too far from a 
     campus to earn an associate of arts degree from any of the 
     colleges paired with 20 PBS stations.
       In the Washington area, only Maryland Public Television is 
     participating in the program's initial phase, in conjunction 
     with Prince Georges Community College in Largo, Catonsville 
     Community College in Baltimore, Howard Community College in 
     Columbia and Northern Virginia Community College in 
     Annandale.
       PBS has offered courses for credit since 1981--with nearly 
     350,000 enrolled last year--but students have never before 
     been able to earn a degree with only those programs. The 
     program comes under the umbrella of PBS's new ``Ready to 
     Earn'' initiative, which is a parallel program with the 
     network's elaborate preschool initiative called ``Ready to 
     Learn.''
       Reich said the increasing ``structural unemployment'' 
     brought about by technology and downsizing is forcing more 
     people to develop new job skills. ``Our message loud and 
     clear is that the future requires you to upgrade your skills 
     and get ahead.''
       In addition, it is a way for community colleges to increase 
     their own enrollment.
       PBS estimates that 90 percent of the students participating 
     in ``distance learning'' are employed; 68 percent are women; 
     and 70 percent are between the ages of 23 and 49.
       Wanda Cromer, 29, is typical. She is married, lives in 
     Prince George's County, works full time as an administrator 
     for a computer company in College Park and is raising two 
     children, ages 4 and 6. She now tapes her telecourses off the 
     Prince George's cable channel, she said, and watches them 
     when she can. She wants to get an associate degree in 
     business management, which she estimates will take her about 
     four years, and then transfer to the University of Maryland 
     to complete requirements for a bachelor's degree. Right now 
     she has had to go to the Prince George's campus to meet 
     course requirements. The new program will give her increased 
     flexibility in where and how she completes the courses.
       PBS's Adult Learning Service has been self-supporting, 
     according to Jinny Goldstein, who is in charge of educational 
     project development, and Going the Distance should also pay 
     for itself. PBS receives a $15 fee from the colleges for each 
     student who takes the class as well as a license fee of 
     between $400 and $500 from the college to air each course.
       Some of the course materials come from programs that 
     originally aired on PBS, such as ``Eyes on the Prize,'' about 
     the civil rights struggle in America, and ``Art of the 
     Western World.'' Other courses are created by outside 
     educational producers specifically for the program. For the 
     fall, about 60 courses will be offered.
       Students must register and pay tuition at a participating 
     community college, and then they receive the video portion of 
     the course in a variety of ways--either through over-the-air 
     broadcasts on the station, on videocassettes or on 
     educational cable channels.
       Each participating school sets its own requirements for 
     successful completion of the course.
       In each case the effort will be to reach students who could 
     not otherwise attend college and work toward a degree.
       ``The information highway,'' said Reich, ``is irrelevant if 
     you don't know how to drive on it.''
       Because of its focus on job training and retraining, Labor 
     Secretary Robert Reich is to join Duggan in announcing the 
     program this morning. ``This effort directly affects the work 
     force of the future,'' Reich said yesterday. ``Earnings are 
     directly correlated to knowledge. Those who have some 
     training beyond high school earn about 10 percent more than 
     those with only a high school degree.''

  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I rise in support of the funding level for 
the Corporation For Public Broadcasting [CPB] included in the Labor, 
HHS and Education Appropriations bill. The Appropriations Committee 
approved $330 million for the CPB for fiscal year 1997. This amount is 
well below the proposed authorized level of $425 million provided for 
in S. 2120, the Public Broadcasting Act of 1994.
  The funding contained in this appropriations bill would allow public 
broadcasting stations to simply maintain the level of high-quality 
programming they provide today while properly balancing the need of 
Congress to show fiscal responsibility.
  We have all seen first hand how public broadcasting has helped our 
Nation. Public broadcasting's efforts in education, advanced 
technology, and program development continue to set the standard for 
commercial broadcasting. For instance, in the area of education, Public 
television has shown itself to be one of the most economical and 
efficient mechanisms for distributing educational information to our 
homes and schools. Public television stations are providing their local 
schools and State educational institutions with technical expertise and 
quality programs to supplement classroom instruction.
  Nationwide, public television is the largest contributor of video and 
televised instructional materials for schools, colleges and home 
viewers in the country. Public TV reaches over 29 million students in 
nearly 70,000 schools, grades K through 12. Close to 2 million teachers 
use public educational services provided by Public TV and nearly 2 
million adults have earned college credit because of public 
broadcasting.
  Last month public television launched a new school readiness service 
designed to help children start school ready to learn. The ready-to-
learn service is being tested in 11 sites across the country. The new 
service will offer quality children's programming, community outreach 
and increased support services for children, families, and child care 
providers.
  Today, the Public Broadcasting Service announced that it will launch 
yet another new education initiation called ``ready-to-earn.'' The 
ready-to-earn service is designed to enhance career and economic 
opportunities for millions of Americans. ``Going the distance,'' the 
first of the ready-to-earn programs will allow students to obtain an 
associates arts degree from over 60 community colleges through PBS 
telecourses. The program will enable students who need to work, parents 
who need to take care of their children and citizens who do not live 
near a college campus to earn a college degree. Mr. President, 
continued Federal funding will enable public broadcasting to offer more 
programs like these--programs that will help millions of American 
citizens.
  We should not forget how public broadcasting has helped broaden the 
reach of television to many of our Nation's citizens. Public television 
provides closed-captioning for the hearing- impaired, Descriptive Video 
Services [DVS]--an optional audio narration track for the sight-
impaired, and Spanish language tracks for Spanish-speaking citizens. 
Innovative services like these are important as our society becomes 
more diverse.

  The CPB also allocates a large percentage of its funds to enhance 
programming by and for minorities and traditionally unserved areas. 
Through the Independent Television Service [ITVS] and the five minority 
consortia, public broadcasting has enabled Americans to explore 
important social issues and experience a wide variety of opinions and 
ideas.
  The CPB coordinates systemwide planning and conducts research to help 
the Public Broadcasting System keep up with new technologies and 
fluctuating financial conditions. For instance, many public radio and 
television stations are exploring new ways to manage their 
administrative and technical processes to achieve greater efficiencies. 
Some are discussing ways to consolidate their stations and share 
resources. I applaud the efforts of these stations to become more 
efficient and eliminate duplicate program coverage.
  When one considers that public broadcasting receives only $1 a year 
per person from the Federal Government, one can only conclude that 
public broadcasting is one of the wisest investments that Congress can 
make.
  Mr. President, the Communications Subcommittee of the Commerce 
Committee is committed to passing reauthorization legislation this year 
so that we can ensure a healthy public broadcasting system in this 
country. The subcommittee held a hearing just 2 months ago on 
legislation to reauthorize the CPB. I expect the bill to be marked up 
before the next recess. The House is also expected to introduce a 
similar measure and to hold a hearing relatively soon. I believe any 
issues with regard to CPB programs and policies should more properly be 
considered in the context of an authorization bill.
  Finally, Mr. President, I support the funding level contained in this 
appropriations bill and must commend Senator Harkin and the 
Appropriations Committee for demonstrating such fiscal responsibility. 
The funding provided in the appropriations bill is a good investment in 
our country's future.
  It is time once again for Congress to reaffirm its commitment to the 
Public Broadcasting System and to provide the financial stability and 
means needed for the CPB to realize its full potential.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I urge the Senate to support the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and the funding levels provided by 
the committee for its important programs.
  The Corporation for Public Broadcasting [CPB] has done an excellent 
job creating many worthwhile educational programs for young people, and 
a wide range of documentary and cultural programming for older viewers.
  At a time when commercial programming is often saturated with 
violence, public broadcasting offers a realistic alternative for young 
viewers and families. Programs such as ``Sesame Street'' and ``Shining 
Time Station'' are widely watched, and they deserve our support.
  The Federal investment in public broadcasting is approximately $1 per 
person. That investment must be matched by $2.50 in non-Federal 
support. More than twice that amount in matching funds is actually 
attained each year, demonstrating the enthusiasm and broad support that 
CPB has earned through its record of quality programming and community 
outreach.
  In Massachusetts, WGBH and WGBY have been extraordinary leaders in 
their communities. I commend WGBH for its instrumental role in 
supporting the Ready to Learn Program. School readiness is the first of 
the Nation's education goals. Ready to Learn is using television and 
video broadcasting to develop important programming for preschool 
children to help them enter school ready to learn.
  The Ready to Learn activities are under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Education, to insure that educational priorities are 
included in the programming. Public broadcasting has been an early 
advocate and innovator in this effort, and I am pleased that the 
Department of Education will be working closely with CPB in this effort 
to improve readiness skills for the Nation's preschoolers.
  Some critics claim that because so many alternatives now exist, 
public broadcasting is no longer needed. It is true that some cable 
signals provide similar educational programming. But nationally, only a 
little over half of all households subscribe to cable. By contrast, 
public broadcasting is available in any home with a television set, and 
we ought to take advantage of this access.
  No other alternative can match the commitment of public broadcasting 
to educational, informative, and cultural programming. Our national 
system of community-based and viewer-supported public broadcasting is 
an extraordinary achievement.
  Support for public broadcasting is good public policy and a sound 
Federal investment. I urge the Senate not to undermine it.

                          ____________________