[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 106 (Thursday, August 4, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: August 4, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                                 HAITI

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, in this morning's New York Times, there is 
an article which I ask unanimous consent to be printed in the Record at 
this time.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         Top U.S. Officials Divided in Debate on Invading Haiti


   goal is to remove junta--military and diplomats weigh threat vs. 
                 bribe--clinton says force is an option

                          (By Elaine Sciolino)

       Washington, August 3.--Despite winning approval of the 
     United Nations Security Council for an invasion of Haiti, the 
     Administration is split over whether to set a deadline for 
     carrying it out, senior Administration officials said today.
       This division became evident, officials said, at a meeting 
     of Mr. Clinton's top national security advisers on Tuesday at 
     the White House. The meeting had been called to draw up 
     recommendations for the President.
       Defense Secretary William J. Perry opposed a recommendation 
     that would set a deadline for an invasion if the Haitian 
     military leaders do not leave, the officials said, Mr. Perry 
     and much of the United States military want to avoid an 
     invasion and are willing to explore ways to induce Haiti's 
     leaders to leave for a comfortable life in exile.
       But Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, who has 
     emerged as the State Department's chief policy maker on 
     Haiti, argued that offering incentives to the leaders was 
     morally repugnant, senior officials said, Mr. Talbott was 
     said to favor an early invasion.
       In a sharp exchange, Mr. Perry countered instead that Mr. 
     Talbott represented a strange morality. He argued that it 
     would be immoral for the United States not to do whatever it 
     could to avoid the loss of lives of American soldiers and the 
     expenditure of taxpayers' money, officials said.
       At a news conference tonight, President Clinton laid out 
     the ``fundamental interests'' that he said would justify an 
     invasion, saying he was keeping his options open.
       ``We have kept force on the table,'' he said. ``We have 
     continued to move it up as an option as the dictators there 
     have been more obstinate. But it is permature in my judgment 
     to go beyond that now.''
       He also said that while he welcomed Congressional support 
     for a decision to invade, lack of it would not prevent him 
     from acting. The Senate today passed a non-binding resolution 
     requiring Congressional approval before an invasion.
       ``I would welcome the support of the Congress and I hope 
     that I will have that,'' Mr. Clinton said. ``But like my 
     predecessors in both parties, I have not agreed that I was 
     constitutionally mandated to get it.
       A number of participants at the meeting on Tuesday agreed 
     with Mr. Perry's analysis, senior officials said.
       The views of the two officials reflect the extremes of the 
     Administration's thinking on how best to restore Haiti's 
     exiled president, the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
       Mr. Talbott is said by his colleagues to favor an invasion 
     soon, within the next several weeks; Mr. Perry, while not 
     opposed totally to the use of force, wants to exhaust all 
     other steps first, even if that means promising Haiti's top 
     three military officials that they will not be punished for 
     their repression.


                        reluctance may run deep

       There is little consensus within the Administration on 
     whether Haiti's leaders will accept any offer to depart. Many 
     senior State Department and intelligence officials, as well 
     as William Swing, the United States Ambassador to Port-au-
     Prince, do not believe the men will leave, but add that the 
     Administration must exhaust every possibility before an 
     invasion.
       Mr. Perry declined to comment on Tuesday's meeting, saying 
     through a spokesman, Dennis Boxx, ``We're not going to get 
     into a discussion of the conversations at principals 
     meetings.''
       In a brief telephone conversation, Mr. Talbott also 
     declined comment.
       In Tuesday's meeting, Mr. Perry argued most strongly 
     against a deadline for invasion, saying that would 
     artificially constrain the Administration's room for 
     maneuver. ``Perry felt that it put the United States into a 
     box,'' said one senior Administration official. ``And the 
     Pentagon doesn't like boxes.''
       But even Gen. John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff, was said by Pentagon officials to be 
     resigned to the fact that an invasion was becoming more 
     likely.
       Secretary of State Warren Christopher also attended 
     Tuesday's meeting, but he allowed Mr. Talbott to take the 
     lead for the State Department in the discussions, a senior 
     official said.


                           first, try threats

       Although the officials were unable to come up with a plan, 
     analysts are refining different possible tactics. One is to 
     induce the peaceful departure of the military leaders--Lieut. 
     Gen. Raoul Cedras, the leader of the ruling junta; Col. 
     Michel Joseph Francois, the police commander, and Gen. 
     Philippe Biamby, the army chief of staff.
       According to one idea, the Administration would send an 
     envoy to warn the three men that if they did not leave 
     voluntarily within a specified time, an American-led 
     coalition would remove them, senior officials said.
       Under that plan, the men would be told that Washington 
     would arrange their departure, providing transportation, 
     visas, safe havens in third countries and assistance in 
     withdrawing their assets from frozen bank accounts. The men 
     and their families would be given guarantees that they would 
     not be prosecuted either in Haiti or in the country that 
     agreed to take them.


                         then, try more threats

       According to a second plan, the United States envoy would 
     simply inform the three officials that they had to leave or 
     risk an invasion. If the officials agreed but asked for help, 
     a meeting would be arranged to discuss arrangements for their 
     departure.
       One senior official said the Administration planners had 
     not ruled out a pay-off to get the men to leave, but other 
     senior officials insisted that the Administration has 
     rejected any such bribe. If the Administration decides to use 
     secret United States funds to induce the men to leave, it 
     would require a formal Presidential ``finding'' in advance.
       Such a finding, a formal statement of the national security 
     justification for a covert activity, is required before the 
     Central Intelligence Agency can pay for it. The 
     Administration is also required by law to inform Congress of 
     any such finding.
       One official said that the Administration could not even 
     open discussions about financial inducements without a 
     finding.


                         looking for a mediator

       A third plan would encourage the United Nations or another 
     country or countries to take the lead in easing the 
     departures of the three men, senior officials said.
       Venezuela and some other Latin countries, uncomfortable 
     with the idea of a United States invasion of Haiti, are 
     discussing sending a mission to Haiti to urge the military 
     leaders to leave.
       A complication may have arisen in the case of the Dominican 
     Republic. Although President Joaquin Balaguer opposed the 
     return of Father Aristide to Haiti, he was pressed by the 
     Administration to close his border with Haiti and accept 
     military help in monitoring the border to prevent shipments 
     of gasoline and other embargoed products.
       Mr. Balaguer was re-elected in May, but the results were 
     disputed. On Tuesday, Dominican election officials finally 
     declared him the winner, but Washington has charged that the 
     election was tainted by fraud and has called for new 
     elections.
       A State Department spokesman, Michael McCurry, today 
     predicted a deterioration in relations with the Dominican 
     Republic. ``Those who are calling for new elections seem to 
     us to have a very good and strong argument,'' he said, adding 
     that the decision to certify the election would be a 
     ``detrimental factor'' in ties between the two countries.
       But Mr. McCurry said the Administration did not link the 
     election dispute to Dominicans' cooperation in sealing the 
     border, and other officials said the Dominican Republic could 
     provide a safe haven for one or more of the Haitian leaders.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the article in the New York Times 
describes a dispute in the highest councils of this Government between 
the Secretary of Defense and the No. 2 person at the State Department, 
Mr. Strobe Talbott. I have no reason to believe that this account is 
inaccurate.
  Mr. President, the dispute is described as Secretary of Defense Perry 
having strong misgivings about setting a date for an invasion of Haiti. 
He reflects not only his own views but that of the military 
establishment whose task it will be to carry out this onerous mission.
  Mr. President, according to this news report, Mr. Talbott said that 
it was morally repugnant to talk with the Haitian dictators, that it 
was wrong to attempt to persuade them to leave, and that we should go 
ahead and set a date for an invasion and indeed invade Haiti.
  Mr. President, I am deeply disturbed. I am terribly alarmed that at 
the one of the highest positions of our Government an individual who 
chose not to serve himself in another unpopular war has decided that we 
will not exhaust every avenue before risking the lives of young 
Americans in conflict in Haiti.
  Mr. President, I opposed Mr. Talbott's nomination the first time. I 
got 9 votes. The next time I got 31 votes. I believe the next time Mr. 
Talbott's name comes before the body there will be a sufficient number 
to reject whatever position that he is nominated for.
  Mr. President, we should exhaust every possible avenue before we send 
our young men and women into conflict where they may die or suffer 
injury. Mr. Talbott's disregard for exploring every option indicates a 
fundamental misunderstanding of what is at risk when people go into 
combat.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator yields the floor.

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