[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 104 (Tuesday, August 2, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: August 2, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
              CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON HAITI NEEDED NOW

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
February 11, 1994, and June 10, 1994, the gentleman from New Jersey 
[Mr. Smith] is recognized during morning business for 4 minutes.
  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, of all the issues deserving the 
attention of the 103d Congress today, not one is more important than 
whether soldiers and sailors and airmen are sent into battle in Haiti. 
So I would ask the House's undivided attention to two specific 
questions that we are obliged to ask the President of the United 
States. One, if the United Nations Security Council gets to vote on 
committing troops in Haiti, why can we not, the Congress, the elected 
body of the people of the United States? And what are the costs of 
committing troops there, not only in terms of the very precious lives 
of our military men and women but to the military's overall mission and 
our readiness to respond to priority hotspots around the globe?
  Put very plainly, what will it cost and where will these resources 
come from?
  Mr. Speaker, more than 100 Members of the House have written 
President Clinton asking that he seek specific congressional 
authorization of any military action in Haiti. Notwithstanding his 
prerogatives as Commander in Chief and absent a genuine emergency that 
threatens the safety of American citizens, the President should first 
make the case for invasion and then let the Congress become part of 
that process.
  Members of Congress who hold very different views on United States 
policy in Haiti agree that the President should follow the course of 
consulting the elected Representatives of the American people. I would 
submit that, in any case, if he cannot convince a majority of the 
House, that will put his policy in peril to obtain a sustainable 
majority in both the House and the Senate.
  Mr. Speaker, again the President has sought and he has obtained U.N. 
approval for the use of force. Is the Congress to be denied that same 
opportunity?
  Some other questions that the American people need to know: What 
national interests are at stake that justify the use of armed force in 
a foreign land? How much, plus what we are already spending patrolling 
Haitian waters and the Dominican border, will such a Haiti mission 
cost? Are other programs and readiness suffering as a result? What are 
the objectives; specifically, what are the objectives of an invasion? 
Will we stay until President Aristide in restored or remain until he 
and the duly elected parliament are cooperating to govern Haiti? What 
steps have we taken to prevent the infamous mission creep or nation-
building that spawned disaster in Somalia? Who will share the risk and 
the cost? When we leave, who will step in?
  Above all, and I repeat myself on this, what are the risks to U.S. 
servicemen and servicewomen?
  These are just a few of the questions that must be asked and answered 
in this Chamber before we can truly say that we as elected 
Representatives have done our job. President Clinton should consider 
military force only when he has run out of options, not just when he 
has run out of ideas.
  Mr. Speaker, I have introduced a resolution, a bipartisan resolution 
which seeks to form a bipartisan commission to look at, explore, study 
and, hopefully, go to Haiti to find what are the facts and then to make 
some policy options, suggestions to the Administration. The objective 
is not to tie the President's hands but to lend a hand in devising a 
workable, sustainable strategy and, hopefully, a lasting solution to 
the nightmare of Haiti. I believe that this is just one idea that makes 
more sense rather than rushing into battle.
  Mr. Speaker, there are a number of people across the spectrum, both 
in Haiti, those who are concerned about Haiti, and policymakers of the 
previous administration and many others who have looked at this and 
said invasion is not the way.
  Let me be clear that no one wants to give any solace to General 
Cedras and other leaders in the dictatorship who might look at this as 
a delaying tactic. It is not. We are hoping to devise a bipartisan 
strategy that continues the pressure on the military dictatorship, the 
de facto government that has no place being in Haiti, while we look for 
the restoration of democracy.
  It seems to me until these vital questions are answered, we should 
not, I repeat, we should not invade Haiti.

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