[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 104 (Tuesday, August 2, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: August 2, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                        NO NUKES FOR NORTH KOREA

                                 ______


                        HON. FORTNEY PETE STARK

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                        Tuesday, August 2, 1994

  Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, when the House further considers the Export 
Administration Act, I hope we will adopt a sense-of-the-Congress 
amendment I have proposed, against providing nuclear powerplants to 
North Korea.
  Following is an op ed from today's Washington Post that makes some of 
the arguments against the idea of sharing light-water reactors with 
North Korea.

                         No Quick Fix on Korea

                          (By Victor Gilinsky)

       The idea has gotten about that there is a neat technical 
     fix to the threat posed by North Korea's homemade nuclear 
     reactors. This involves replacing their reactors, which are 
     fueled with natural uranium and geared to producing 
     plutonium, with ones like ours, which are more 
     ``proliferation resistant.'' It was explained in the headline 
     of a recent Post story: ``U.S. to Dangle Prospect Reactor at 
     N. Korea; Deal Would Allow Nuclear Plant for Electricity'' 
     [front page, July 7]. Jimmy Carter is said to have supported 
     this idea in his talks with North Korea.
       It was actually the North Koreans who came up with the 
     offer to switch technologies. During U.S.-North Korean talks 
     a year ago, they said they would rather have U.S.-style power 
     reactors (called light-water reactors, or LWRs) than the 
     outmoded ones they possess. Because the two reactors they are 
     building would soon multiply their weapon potential many 
     times, this offer by the North Koreans seemed almost too good 
     to be true.
       In a joint communique of July 19, 1993, the United States 
     agreed that if the ``nuclear issue'' could be resolved 
     finally, then it was ``prepared to support the introduction 
     of LWRs and to explore with the [North Koreans] ways in which 
     LWRs could be obtained.'' A year later, the idea seems to be 
     very much alive. The Post story cited above quotes a 
     ``senior U.S. official'' as saying ``the attitude is, if 
     that's what they want, that's what we'll give them.''
       We had better stop and think.
       Sure, it would be great if we would switch their nuclear 
     plants into less threatening ones with a snap of our fingers. 
     But the reality of such an exchange is more tangled than it 
     might appear, and the attempt would likely do more harm than 
     good.
       To begin with, for the United States to provide technology 
     and assist with financing (North Korea is without funds or 
     credit), the president would have to override our strict 
     statutory standards for nuclear exports. He would have to 
     make favorable findings about North Korea that, in effect, 
     would make us accomplices to its violations of 
     Nonproliferation Treaty inspection rules.
       By thus buying off an international troublemaker, we would 
     be giving the wrong idea to others similarly inclined (as 
     well as to those who have played by the rules). The 
     undermining of international nuclear export rules would not 
     be lessened if we sent U.S. technology through another 
     country with weaker export rules (South Korea has been 
     mentioned), or (this is the latest proposal) if we paid the 
     Russians to export their version of LWRs to the North 
     Koreans.
       In an era when we are extolling the virtues of the 
     marketplace, it is also more than a little inconsistent to 
     indulge the technological vanities of dictators for 
     uneconomic prestige projects. A nuclear power plant of even 
     modest size needs an infrastructure of people and equipment 
     and a sizable and secure electrical grid that--from 
     everything one hears--is lacking in the North. To develop 
     these, to train large numbers of North Koreans and to build a 
     plant would take most of a decade. Do we really want to do 
     this?
       If North Korea is willing to trade its outmoded nuclear 
     plants for their modern electrical equivalent, then coal-
     fired plants make such more sense. And more than a new 
     generation of nuclear plants, the North Koreans need to 
     improve the efficiency of the way they transmit and use 
     electricity. Such changes would be relatively cheap and 
     would produce results much faster, perhaps within a year. 
     Whether North Korea seeks genuine improvements or prefers 
     an uneconomic prestige nuclear project is a test of its 
     goodwill and judgment.
       It will no doubt be argued that, given the nature of the 
     North Korean regime, a prestige project from the West is 
     exactly what is needed to get it off its dangerous course 
     toward nuclear weapons. Moreover, the multi-year duration of 
     the project--and its dependence on enriched uranium fuel, 
     which North Korea would have to import from one of the 
     advanced countries--would allow us to remain in control. The 
     same factors would seem to give the North Koreans the 
     incentive to hold up their end of the bargain.
       Let us not, however, deceive ourselves. Barring a 
     miraculous change in the regime (in which case the deal would 
     be unnecessary), the North Koreans are not likely to give up 
     their plutonium production potential during the 10-year 
     construction of replacement reactors. And they will likely 
     want a sufficient stockpile of enriched uranium fuel so they 
     will not be at our mercy when those reactors do operate.
       Instead of being under our control, the project is likely 
     to develop strong constituencies and to take on a life of its 
     own. We should not imagine that we would be able to turn it 
     off if the North Koreans did not keep their promises. If 
     history is any guide, we would be the hostages, not the North 
     Koreans.
       In the end, what is wrong with the LWR proposal is that it 
     presumes a level of goodwill on North Korea's part that, were 
     it present, would obviate the need for the proposal. If the 
     North Koreans are interested in electricity, there are much 
     cheaper, better and safer ways to provide it. If they insist 
     on a prestige nuclear project, we can be sure the deal is, in 
     fact, too good to be true. There are no neat technological 
     fixes to the present impasse. What is needed is change in 
     North Korea.

                          ____________________