[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 102 (Friday, July 29, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 29, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                   SR-71 BLACKBIRD SUMMARY STATEMENT

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senate Armed Services Committee and the 
Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee included funds to establish 
a modest, 3-plane contingent of SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance 
aircraft. When it was retired in 1989, the SR-71 was the only 
survivable, penetrating, manned reconnaissance system in the U.S. 
inventory providing photographic and radar imagery and electronic 
intercept. It remains to this day the only survivable, penetrating, 
manned reconnaissance aircraft. The other aircraft systems operated by 
the United States, the U-2 and the RC-135, do not have the speed and 
altitude to overfly a potentially hostile opponent. Expensive efforts 
to develop unmanned aerial vehicles are still in development and will 
not be fielded for years.
  This capability is still needed. We needed it in the Persian Gulf 
war, when battlefield commanders could not get enough imagery from 
satellites to answer all of their intelligence questions. The United 
Sstates had to use lower-quality civilian Landsat and SPOT satellite 
imagery to produce the special maps that were needed to prosecute the 
war against Iraq. As capable as our satellite systems are, in a crisis 
the additional capability provided by the SR-71 could prove invaluable.
  I have been assured that for $100 million from within the budget 
request, three of these aircraft could be brought back into service 
within a year with their existing photographic and electronic sensors. 
A vital, new radar imaging system would also be included within that 
amount. This would include a 30-day deployment with approximately 10 
operational missions. We believe that this austere capability could be 
maintained for approximately $50 million per year, and surged if 
required to support a conflict. In my opinion, this is a very efficient 
stop gap measure, complementing existing satellite and aircraft 
systems, to assure that U.S. troops have the capability they need in a 
conflict.
  Some critics of the SR-71 question whether the United States has the 
``political will'' to use the SR-71 against another country, since a 
decision was made not to overfly Iraq in 1991. I reject the notion that 
we have learned nothing from that conflict. Far better for the 
political authorities to have an instrument in hand to use if necessary 
than to deny them the opportunity to use it by assuming that the 
nation's leadership will never have the political will to overfly a 
nation if our intelligence needs, and our combat forces at risk, demand 
it. Reestablishing a limited contingent of SR-71 Blackbird 
reconnaissance aircraft is a prudent move, and one that I fully 
support.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following my statement 
additional material referred to in the statement be printed in the 
Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)


                            sr-71 blackbird

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, in the last few years, the world has been 
beset by troubles. One of these troubles has already required the 
deployment of U.S. military forces in a war against Iraq. Another 
troubling situation is still bubbling away on the Korean peninsula, 
sometimes at a low simmer, sometimes looking like it is coming up to a 
boil. One of the critical lessons we learned from the Persian Gulf war 
is that, in a threatening situation or during the conduct of a war, a 
military commander cannot have too much information, too many maps, or 
too many ``looks over the hill'' to see what the enemy is doing. The 
Department of Defense's ``Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of 
the Persian Gulf War'' in 1992 noted that ``Imagery was vital to 
Coalition operations, especially to support targeting development for 
precision guided munitions and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile attacks, 
and for BDA [bomb damage assessment]. Operations Desert Shield and 
Desert Storm placed great demands on national, theater, and tactical 
imagery reconnaissance systems. The insatiable appetite for imagery and 
imagery-derived products could not be met.'' The U.S. Defense Mapping 
Agency had to use Landsat and SPOT data to create maps for the U.S.-led 
coalition's use in that war.
  Mr. President, our national ability to meet that ``insatiable 
appetite'' has not improved in the intervening years. The ``Final 
Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War'' went on to 
note that ``The SR-71 could have been useful during Operation Desert 
Shield if overflight of Iraq had been permitted. In that case, the 
system would have provided broad area coverage of a large number of 
Iraqi units * * * During Operation Desert Storm air operations, the SR-
71 would have been of value for BDA [bomb damage assessment] and 
determining Iraqi force dispositions.'' It is for this reason that I 
have again, as I had in a letter to the Secretary of Defense before the 
war with Iraq, broached the subject of bringing the SR-71 Blackbird 
reconnaissance aircraft out of forced retirement.
  In 1991, my suggestion to then Secretary of Defense Cheney was not 
adopted. The SR-71 program had been terminated as a full-fledged 
operational activity involving 12 aircraft in 1990 on the grounds of 
cost, lack of need due to the end of the cold war, and the promise of 
follow-on systems then in development. The follow-on to the SR-71 has 
since then also been canceled. The SR-71 Blackbird remains our sole 
manned, survivable, penetrating reconnaissance aircraft. The Congress, 
however, specifically directed that this capability be preserved. In 
June, 1990, the Secretary of the Air Force directed the Air Force to 
``place three SR-71A aircraft and six associated reconnaissance sensors 
and electronic countermeasure suites into long term storage, rather 
than a ``flight ready'' status, as a hedge against a protracted 
conflict some time in the future.'' This was a far-sighted move. I 
believed in 1991 that we should have taken advantage of that foresight, 
and I continue to believe that we should take advantage of this 
fortuitous circumstance and create a contingency capability for the SR-
71 in the face of the potential for conflict that continues to exist on 
the Korean peninsula. Our military forces deserve access to every tool 
that we can provide, particularly tools of such demonstrated capability 
and need.

  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, or UAV's, have been touted as a penetrating 
and survivable follow-on to the SR-71 and, indeed, in a few years they 
may be developed to that point. Very high expenditures are under 
consideration for a family of various UAV's, amounting to $2.2 billion 
over the next five years. The funds for UAV development have come in 
part at the expense of upgrades and overhaul to other existing airborne 
reconnaissance platforms like the U-2 and RC-135, which unlike the SR-
71 are not survivable over hostile territory. While potentially useful, 
the current program of UAV development is extremely ambitious and may 
not be fully attainable in the current constrained budget environment. 
The SR-71 is a cost effective stop gap that makes use of existing, but 
still state of the art, equipment to fill an inarguable gap in 
battlefield intelligence. I do not view it as a competitor of UAV's--I 
support funding for an effective tactical UAV program.
  The SR-71 as an aerial surveillance system complements other 
``national technical means,'' as satellite systems are euphemistically 
termed. A 1991 report by the Office of Technology Assessment, 
``Verification Technologies: Cooperative Aerial Surveillance,'' cites a 
1990 report to the Department of Defense that states ``the existence 
and utility of reconnaissance satellites is accepted . . . Satellite 
orbits are highly predictable. It is taken as a given by each side that 
the other will refrain from some activities, which would otherwise by 
observable, during a satellite pass--once or a few times a day, say for 
a total of 20 minutes. The long advance predictability of 
reconnaissance coverage makes it possible to hide, by careful advance 
scheduling, even very large and elaborate activities. Each side might 
worry, in the extreme case, that preparations for war or treaty 
breakout could thus be hidden.'' The scheduling and route flexibility 
provided by aircraft platforms such as the SR-71 make it very nearly 
impossible to avoid detection. Properly employed, there should be no 
advance warning of when or where an SR-71 might fly. Given the repute 
of the North Koreans in concealing their facilities and installations 
even in peacetime, this flexibility might be essential should tensions 
escalate or hostilities erupt on the peninsula.
  ``National technical means'' of intelligence collection will remain 
essential, but have some limitations, as I have just illustrated. 
Another weakness of current satellite intelligence systems, but a 
strength of the SR-71, is the ability to provide synoptic broad area 
coverage of large swaths of ground, needed for monitoring overall enemy 
force dispositions and for specialized and updated mapping. Prior to 
the Persian Gulf War, the United States acquired Landsat and SPOT 
satellite images from which to build maps, because U.S. intelligence 
systems were swamped trying to monitor Iraqi military activities. 
Buying Landsat and SPOT imagery for these needs was a stopgap measure. 
We might not be so fortunate the next time a crisis arises. Nor may we 
benefit from six months to prepare for a conflict, as we did during the 
Persian Gulf conflict. Military reconnaissance missions' requirements 
for timeliness often exceed the current capabilities of civilian 
satellite systems. According to a 1993 Office of Technology Assessment 
report, ``The Future of Remote Sensing From Space: Civilian Satellite 
Systems and Applications,'' Landsat satellites pass over any given 
place along the equator once every 16 days, while SPOT passes over once 
every 26 days. Each system may require weeks to process orders. The 
report goes on to state that ``existing civilian satellite data are not 
adequate to create maps with the coverage or precision desired for 
military use.''

  The same report also notes that because other nations control some of 
the most capable civilian satellite imaging systems, they could in the 
future deny the United States access to their systems. Additionally, 
since all countries generally follow a nondiscriminatory data policy, 
any purchaser can buy imagery at the same price and on the same 
delivery schedule. This means that in the future, Iraq or other some 
other belligerent could purchase Landsat, SPOT, and other civilian 
satellite imagery to prepare their own battle maps for their troops or 
for their own future cruise missile systems. During the Persian Gulf 
conflict, both the SPOT and Landsat organizations cut off Iraq's access 
to satellite imagery, but such cooperation is not assured in the future 
as more and more companies and countries attempt to enter the satellite 
imaging business.
  The SR-71, on the other hand, could have provided photographic 
coverage of Iraq in under three hours of flying time. It could have 
covered the country at regular intervals--daily or every several days, 
if necessary--to help update battle maps showing the widely dispersed 
Iraqi troop positions. Such missions might also have helped to reveal 
other Iraqi activities involving their nuclear, biological or chemical 
weapons industries that were uncovered only with great effort after the 
war. With electronic intercept sensors available for the SR-71, Iraqi 
air defense equipment could have been pinpointed prior to bombing 
raids. And with a different camera, the SR-71 could have followed 
bombing missions in to provide post-bombing damage assessments. An 
existing radar suite allows the SR-71 to support U.S. forces even in 
bad weather or at night, helping to keep in unblinking eye on every 
movement of enemy forces.
  In any future conflict, the capabilities of the SR-71 would augment 
support to U.S. combat forces. A limited contingency capability 
involving three aircraft can be reconstituted for as little as $100 
million, and maintained in standby status for under $50 million per 
year, according to estimates provided by the Defense Airborne 
Reconnaissance Office and by the contractor. The contractor is 
confident enough in these estimates to willingly accept a cap on the 
amount provided for the reconstitution of this capability. Over $700 
million worth of spare parts remain in storage, ranging from spare 
engines to spare tires. By basing the contingency aircraft with the 
NASA-operated SR-71 fleet that is used for scientific studies, 
additional savings are possible from sharing support equipment. In this 
scenario, twelve months of operations would include one 30-day 
deployment in which 10 overflights would be conducted. If or when 
military tensions escalate, the operating tempo could be readily 
increased to meet the needs of the local commanders.

  More creative use of the SR-71 is possible even while the aircraft 
remain in contingency status. In March, 1993, for instance, the United 
States used Landsat and SPOT data to create maps of the former 
Yugoslavia in order to support airdrops of food and medical supplies to 
towns and cities under siege in eastern Bosnia. With the greater 
resolution and finer detail achievable with SR-71 imagery, greater 
precision in airdrops would have been possible. Similarly creative use 
of the system is possible in support of humanitarian efforts now 
underway in Rwanda and Zaire, without drawing national collection 
systems away from other areas of interest.
  Finally, I would note that an overflight by an SR-71 can be a potent 
signal to a potential adversary of the seriousness of U.S. intentions. 
Even moving an SR-71 into a region underscores U.S. intentions to 
support possible military actions by every means possible. It is a 
mechanism that the President can use selectively to demonstrate 
national will as a political instrument. Imagine the message received 
by an adversary when an unarmed, non-hostile SR-71 aircraft sweeps 
across their country at high speed--a portent of future waves of 
bombers that could follow. It is a message that no satellite blinking 
across the night sky can send.
  During the period leading up the Persian Gulf war, a political 
decision was made not to overfly Iraq, despite the potential 
intelligence that might be garnered for the United States and the 
coalition forces. But to conclude from that decision as some have that 
no American political authorities will ever have the ``political will'' 
to overfly another country, even when the vital interests of the United 
States demand it, denies the idea that any lessons were learned from 
the Persian Gulf war experience. A New York Times article from July 4, 
1994, says that ``senior officers questioned whether the United States 
had the political will to use the aircraft against North Korea, its 
likeliest target.'' I reject the assumption that we are incapable of 
learning from the past. It is not the job of military officers or 
professional intelligence officials to second guess the political 
``will'' of our elected national leaders. Far better for the political 
authorities to have an instrument in hand to use if necessary, than to 
deny them the opportunity to use it by assuming that the nation's 
leadership will never have the political will to overfly a nation if 
our intelligence needs, and our combat forces at risk, demand it. 
Reestablishing a limited contingent of SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance 
aircraft is a prudent move, and one that I firmly believe that we 
should make.

                               Exhibit 1

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                                  Committee on Appropriations,

                                 Washington, DC, January 24, 1991.
     Hon. Richard Cheney,
     Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Secretary: The need for intense and accurate 
     coverage of the Iraq-Kuwait theater of operations through 
     advanced reconnaissance methods is obviously an important 
     ingredient in our successful limitation of casualties and an 
     early end to the conflict with Iraq. I have been concerned 
     that the decision taken last year to terminate the SR-71 
     ``Blackbird'' reconnaissance aircraft has denied the nation 
     an asset which leaves us with a gap in intelligence-gathering 
     that could have been avoided, and might well still be 
     repaired.
       I understand that the capabilities of the SR-71 aircraft, 
     in terms of invulnerability to enemy fire, all-weather 
     intelligence gathering, flexibility and speed argue for an 
     immediate review of reinstating several aircraft for use in 
     Desert Storm. In addition, I understand that the cost of 
     reassembling the system, amounting to several aircraft could 
     be held to roughly $100 million, and that at least one 
     operational aircraft could be flying missions in a short 
     time. I certainly feel that such cost would be worth the 
     effort to reinstate a limited system for use in Desert Storm, 
     and would enthusiastically support your efforts to return the 
     SR-71 to service.
       I request that you reopen the question of putting a small 
     SR-71 group (1-3 aircraft) back into service at this time, 
     and explore how that might be done expeditiously and with 
     minimal risk. In addition, I request that you examine the 
     possibilities of stationing the group in the Middle East 
     theater in order to reduce costs and increase mission 
     flexibility.
       Thank you for your willingness to review this matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Robert C. Byrd.
                                  ____



                                           Headquarters, USAF,

                                                   31 August 1990.
     Subject: SR-71 Storage:
       1. Although SR-71 program termination was directed by 
     Congress in Nov 89, subsequent congressional language 
     requested the Secretary of Defense preserve the option of 
     restoring limited SR-71 operations, should the need arise. In 
     Jun 90, the SECDEF directed the Air Force to ``Place three 
     SR-71 aircraft and six associated reconnaissance sensors and 
     electronic countermeasure suits into long term storage, 
     rather than a ``flight ready'' status, as a hedge against a 
     protracted conflict some time in the future. The Air Staff 
     has since reviewed the available options for storage of SR-71 
     aircraft and associated sensors and defensive systems. To 
     comply with SECDEF guidance, while minimizing initial and 
     recurring costs, AF/CC approved the following game plan.
       2. Aircraft and associated systems storage will be 
     accomplished as follows:
       a. Provide indoor storage of three aircraft at Palmdale 
     Calif facilities. Provide limited contractor inspection 
     maintenance services to ensure physical integrity of 
     aircraft.
       b. Store six of each type complete sensor systems at 
     contractor facility or other suitable location.
       c. Continue the Memorandum of Agreement with the 3246 Test 
     Wing, Eglin AFB FL, allowing storage and use of DEF Systems 
     for test purposes, subject to recall for SR-71 use.
       3. All remaining SR-71 unique spare parts, oil, hydraulic 
     fluid and support equipment will be retained to support 
     NASA's proposed 500 hour flight test program. In accordance 
     with the transfer loan agreement, these assets will remain 
     subject to recall by the Air Force should a decision be made 
     to reconstitute a limited SR-71 capability. The twenty two 
     remaining spare engines will continue to be stored at 
     Palmdale.
       4. Sufficient JF-7 fuel to support the NASA operation will 
     be retained by the Air Force. A minimum of six months lead 
     time would be required to provide JP-7 manufacture, should a 
     limited operational capability be restored.
       5. On behalf of the entire Air Staff, we commend all 
     agencies and personnel involved in the worldwide effort to 
     wind down this program and retire a superb aircraft that has 
     served the nation well for many years. It was a tremendous 
     task, carried out in a very timely and efficient manner by 
     all concerned. The final actions outlined above will preserve 
     these primary physical assets without which reconstitution 
     would be impossible.
                                  ____


   [From Conduct of the Persian Gulf war: Final Report to Congress, 
     Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental 
    Authorization and Personnel benefits Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-25), 
                 Appendix C. Intelligence, April 1992]

                                 JSTARS

       The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) 
     provided useful information concerning Iraqi forces during 
     the 29 January Iraqi attack on Al-Khafji. Iraqi follow-on 
     forces were tracked by JSTARS and destroyed by Coalition air 
     power--north of the Saudi border. Information such as this 
     was provided to ground and air commanders in near-real-time 
     via the Army's JSTARS Interim Ground Station Modules (IGSMs). 
     IGSMs were deployed with Army Component, Central Command 
     (ARCENT) headquarters, ARCENT Forward Command Post, ARCENT 
     Main Command Post, 1 Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters, 
     VII Corps, XVIII Airborne Corps, and the Air Force Component, 
     Central Command Tactical Air Control Center.
       Just before the Offensive Ground Campaign began, JSTARS 
     confirmed that Iraqi forces remained in their defensive 
     positions against which the attack had been planned. During 
     the attack itself, JSTARS detected the positioning of Iraqi 
     operational reserve heavy divisions into blocking positions 
     in response to the VII Corps advance.
       Imagery was vital to Coalition operations, especially to 
     support targeting development for precision guided munitions 
     and Tomahawk Land Attack Missile attacks, and for BDA. 
     Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm placed great 
     demands on national, theater and tactical imagery 
     reconnaissance systems. The insatiable appetite for imagery 
     and imagery-derived products could not be met.
       The SR-71, phased out in 1989, was evaluated for possible 
     reactivation to alleviate the imagery shortfall. The SR-71 
     could have been useful during Operation Desert Shield if 
     overflight of Iraq had been permitted. In that case, the 
     system would have provided broad area coverage of a large 
     number of Iraqi units. however, since overflight of Iraq was 
     not allowed, it would have provided no more coverage than 
     available platforms. During Operation Desert Storm air 
     operations, the SR-71 would have been of value for BDA and 
     determining Iraqi force dispositions. During Operation Desert 
     Storm ground operations, the SR-71 would not have made 
     greater contributions than other platforms, given the speed 
     of the advance. unique aircraft requirements also would have 
     limited potential SR-71 operating locations.
                                  ____


         [From the Office of Technology Assessment, July 1991]

     Verification Technologies--Cooperative Aerial Surveillance in 
                   International Agreements (Excerpt)


                                 cuing

       As with collateral intelligence gathering, the potential 
     role for aerial surveillance in cuing or targeting is 
     controversial. It is arguable that using overflights to 
     direct other systems may go against the spirit of an accord; 
     but some types of cuing can reinforce the main goals of an 
     agreement. This is the case when overflights uncover 
     ambiguous activities or objects that are beyond the airborne 
     sensors' ability to resolve. If the inspecting country did 
     not have any other way of determining the legitimacy of its 
     discovery, the result might be unfounded recriminations or an 
     unanswered threat, thus raising tensions or danger. However, 
     if the location of the discovery could be passed on to human 
     inspectors or NTM, the ambiguity might be easily resolved.
       But cuing can also be used in a way that is obviously 
     antithetical to the spirit of most agreements: the same 
     information that can localize an ambiguity for further 
     observation may also be used to target the items being 
     observed (or others not related to an accord) for military 
     attack or covert operations. Target information can be 
     specific, e.g., coordinates of a fixed site; or it can be 
     general, e.g., the operational behavior of mobile systems or 
     groups of forces. Aerial surveillance could also be used to 
     provide accurate tactical maps for military or other 
     purposes. These are further examples of how transparency may 
     not be a wholly beneficial objective.


           aerial surveillance and other means of observation

       The utility of aerial surveillance to gather information in 
     support of an agreement is not unique. Many of its features 
     are shared with NTM and OSI. The selection of which 
     monitoring systems to use, and in what combinations, will be 
     determined by the negotiating parties based on the ability of 
     each measure to detect the desired signatures, the 
     synergistic effects of different sensors, the degree of 
     cooperation possible between parties, the capabilities and 
     capacity of NTM, the political advantages of open 
     cooperation, the intrusiveness of the measure, and financial 
     costs.


                      aerial surveillance and ntm

       There is considerable overlap in the potential roles of 
     aerial surveillance and NTM. Both kinds of systems can take 
     imagery from overhead and over wide areas. However, while 
     aerial surveillance as described here is cooperative, NTM is 
     generally unilateral or alliance-based. Cooperative measures 
     can be (and have been) negotiated to enhance NTM 
     capabilities, but the sensors and platforms themselves can 
     operate independently of any agreement.
       Among the potential advantages that aerial surveillance 
     holds over at least some NTM assets are greater flexibility, 
     possible real-time physical access to the sensors, direct 
     cooperation between parties,\31\ and relative political and 
     technological insensitivity.
       An aerial surveillance regime could be negotiated to be 
     more flexible than some NTM, varying flight profiles by 
     timing, ground track, and altitude. As a recent report to the 
     U.S. Defense Department stated.
       ``The existence and utility of reconnaissance satellites is 
     accepted by both sides. Satellite orbits are highly 
     predictable. It is taken as a given by each side that the 
     other will refrain from some activities, which would 
     otherwise be observable, during a satellite pass--once or a 
     few times per day, say for a total of 20 minutes. The long 
     advance predictability of reconnaissance coverage makes it 
     possible to hide, by careful advance scheduling, even very 
     large and elaborate activities. Each side might worry, in the 
     extreme case, that preparations for war or treaty breakout 
     could be thus hidden.''
       With a sufficiently narrow preflight notification period 
     making it impossible to conceal a violation of an agreement 
     before a plane might arrive, aerial surveillance might be 
     able to plug gaps in NTM coverage. Airborne platforms might 
     have the flexibility to adjust their flight profiles to 
     optimize sun and sensor look angles, and to change altitude 
     to maximize a sensor's resolution or field of view. Aircraft 
     might also be permitted to fly under cloud cover or loiter 
     over areas of interest.
       In addition, overflights could have the advantage, if 
     negotiated, of real-time interaction between the sensors and 
     the inspectors. An inspector manning a sensing device on a 
     plane could maintain, fine-tune, retarget, or change the 
     focal length of the instrument if something interesting 
     caught his or her attention. The inspector could also-mark 
     and annotate important sightings to facilitate postflight 
     analysis.
       And as mentioned above, because observers are in constant 
     contact with host country escorts, a cooperative atmosphere 
     can be nurtured that is wholly missing from NTM. The 
     confidence that arises from this may lay the foundation for 
     more significant accords. And denial of requested flights 
     could signal a less cooperative relationship, heightening 
     vigilance by other means.
       Lastly and perhaps most importantly, information collected 
     by an overt airborne sensor--particularly if parties inspect 
     or share sensors--could more easily be released publicly to 
     confirm compliance, build general confidence, or support 
     charges of noncompliance. Direct release of NTM data is 
     contrary to government policy and is done so only in the most 
     extreme cases. Even in these cases, the evidence of violation 
     displayed is likely to be degraded to avoid giving away 
     information about which system uncovered the violation and 
     how advanced the NTM sensors really are.
       The primary advantage of NTM assets is that they are 
     largely independent of political events and negotiations. If 
     an important agreement is abrogated or if surveillance 
     flights are refused, aerial surveillance could leave a 
     country blind to critical developments. NTM would remain 
     unaffected, because it does not usually depend on the 
     cooperation of the country under observation. NTM employment 
     is also not constrained by sensor-limiting compromises, 
     formal notifications, or flight plans. A second advantage of 
     NTM assets is that they can monitor more than one agreement 
     at a time.
       Of course, the choice for the United States and the Soviet 
     Union probably will not be between aerial observation and 
     NTM. The questions are more likely to be: what can aerial 
     observation add to current NTM and how can they interact 
     effectively? According to the NATO Open Skies proposal, 
     aerial surveillance is supposed to ``complement'' NTM.
       Besides filling gaps in NTM coverage and capabilities, 
     overflights might be used to cue NTM to particularly 
     interesting sites and to clarify ambiguous NTM information. 
     Overflights or their notification might also be designed to 
     trigger activity that would be detectable by NTM. For 
     example, NTM might be able to spot a large mobile TLI during 
     its transit from an area to be overflown to shelter 
     elsewhere. In some areas, aerial surveillance might even by 
     used to free up NTM assets for other targets.


                      aerial surveillance and OSI

       Unlike NTM or aerial surveillance, an OSI is an inherently 
     close-up, but local, affair. OSIs, like aerial survelliance, 
     are also cooperative measures, requiring the consent of the 
     inspected state. On-site inspectors can go places and do 
     things that would be impossible for other monitoring systems. 
     For example only an OSI can take radiation measurement of a 
     warhead from close enough to negate concerns over shielding; 
     only an OSI can examine the interior of a closed-out 
     production facility. Yet on-site inspectors are limited in 
     the territory they can cover during a given inspection. A 
     similarity between aerial surveillance and OSI, not shared 
     with NTM, is that they both take place inside the earth's 
     atmosphere and thus can both take part in air sampling. All 
     forms of monitoring, with the right technology, could take 
     pictures and read identifying tags on TLSs.
       It is in the areas where aerial survelliance and OSI are 
     dissimilar that they may work best interactively. At a 
     minimum, OSI can cover the declared inspection sites, while 
     aerial survelliance flights (and NTM) survey the potentially 
     vast territory not subject to inspection. If ambiguous or 
     suspicious activities or objects are detected during these 
     flights, an inspection team might be sent to visit the site, 
     perhaps while the aircraft loiters overhead.\42\ A broad 
     aerial search could trigger a more time-consuming, but more 
     precise, inspection. Conversely, overflights might be used to 
     examine several inspectable sites at a time.


         aerial surveillance for countries without advanced ntm

       Until fairly recently, countries with little or no NTM have 
     had to rely on the generosity of the superpowers for a 
     detailed view of the world, including information about the 
     compliance of their neighbors with international agreements. 
     The superpowers' monopoly on advanced NTM limited the 
     quality, quantity, and timeliness of NTM information 
     available to third parties. Yet increasingly, countries have 
     other options: participation in consortia to develop 
     independent NTM or the purchase of commercial imagery from 
     other countries. France, Italy, and Spain are investing in 
     the Helios military reconnaissance satellite system to be 
     operational in early 1994. The United States, France, and the 
     Soviet Union sell relatively low-grade satellite imagery. In 
     the future, international organizations might pool national 
     resources to deploy reconnaissance satellites to monitor 
     agreements or increase global transparency.
       Cooperative aerial surveillance might also be used to 
     fulfill the informational need of some countries. With the 
     negotiation of mutual overflights, these countries would at 
     last obtain an independent source of compliance observation 
     and confidence building. If the cost of an aerial 
     surveillance regime remained beyond their reach, they might 
     spread the cost among like-minded countries by maintaining a 
     fleet of common aircraft or by promoting aerial surveillance 
     by international organizations. If they are willing to 
     negotiate the use of an advanced airborne sensor suite, they 
     might even eventually narrow the current informational gap 
     between themselves and the superpowers. This capability will 
     still be limited to overflights of participating states, so 
     participants would still lack the NTM owners' ability to 
     monitor the territory of potential adversaries without their 
     consent.
       Granting foreign countries the right to overfly U.S. 
     territory has important implications for the U.S. Government. 
     Such overflights will, to a certain extent, level the 
     informational balance between these countries and the United 
     States, ending an American advantage over all countries 
     except the Soviet Union. How important this leveling is must 
     be determined by U.S. policymakers. It may be the necessary 
     price to get other countries to sign on to important treaties 
     that had traditionally been left to the superpowers to 
     verify. It may also be the price of a more open world. (See 
     table 4-2 in chapter 4 for a listing of the asymmetric 
     advantages and disadvantages of countries negotiating Open 
     Skies.)
                                  ____


         [From the Office of Technology Assessment, July 1993]

The Future of Remote Sensing From Space: Civilian Satellite Systems and 
                              Applications


             Military Uses of Civilian Remotely Sensed Data

       Data from civilian satellites systems such as Landsat, but 
     more notably SPOT and the Russian Almaz,\1\ have considerable 
     military utility. They can be used to support:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Footnotes at end of article.
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       Military operations--For example, the use of Landsat and 
     SPOT data gave the United States and its U.N. allies a marked 
     advantage over Iraq in the Persian Gulf Conflict. The U.S. 
     Defense Mapping Agency used these data to create a variety of 
     maps for the U.S.-led battle against Iraqi forces. More 
     recently, in March 1993, the United States has used Landsat 
     and SPOT data to create maps of the former Yugoslavia in 
     support of air delivery of food and medical supplies to 
     besieged towns of Eastern Bosnia.
       Reconnaissance--The recent use of data from civilian 
     satellites for military reconnaissance demonstrates that 
     post-processing, skilled interpretation, and the use of 
     collateral information can make these data highly 
     informative. For this reason, the civilian satellites' 
     utility in reconnaissance exceeds that which might be 
     expected on the basis of ground resolution.\2\ The highly 
     conservative rules of thumb normally used to relate ground 
     resolution to suitability for particular reconnaissance tasks 
     underestimate the utility of moderate resolution 
     multispectral imagery.
       However, reconnaissance missions' requirements for 
     timeliness often exceed the current capabilities of civilian 
     satellite systems. Landsat satellites pass over any given 
     place along the equator once every 16 days; SPOT passes over 
     once every 26 days. In addition, both systems may take weeks 
     to process orders and military data users generally require 
     much shorter response times. Because civilian mission 
     generally have less stringent requirements than military 
     ones, civilian satellite systems will continue to fall short 
     in this regard unless they begin to cater expressly to the 
     military market or improve revisit time for other reasons, 
     such as crop monitoring or disaster tracking. As noted in 
     chapter 4, one way to increase timeliness without adding 
     additional satellites is to provide sensors with the 
     capability of pointing to the side. SPOT has the capacity for 
     cross-track imaging, and can reimage targets of interest in 1 
     to 4 days.
       Arms Control--Civilian satellite data have limited, but 
     important utility for supporting arms control agreements. 
     Although some facilities have been imaged by civilian 
     satellites, many other arms-control tasks are beyond the 
     capabilities (particularly resolution) of civilian 
     satellites. Their greatest weakness in most military 
     applications--lack of timely response--is of less concern in 
     the arms control arena, where events are typically paced by 
     diplomatic, not military, maneuvers.
       Mapping--Mapping including precise measurement of the 
     geoid\3\ itself, is a civilian mission with important 
     military applications. These include simulation, training, 
     and the guidance of automated weapons. Existing civilian 
     satellite data are not adequate to create maps with the 
     coverage or precision desired for military use. The military 
     use of data from civilian land remote sensing satellites 
     would be greatly enhanced by improved resolution, true stereo 
     capabilities, and improved orbital location and attitude of 
     the satellite. Military map makers and planners would also 
     find use for data acquired with a civilian synthetic aperture 
     radar system, which can sense Earth's surface through layers 
     of clouds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \3\  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Because other nations control some of the most capable 
     civilian remote-imaging satellites, they could deny the 
     United States access to some imagery for political reasons, 
     or operate their systems in ways inimical to U.S. interests. 
     Investment in improving U.S. technical strength in civilian 
     remote-imaging could allay these fears. However, attempting 
     to stay far ahead of all other countries in every remote 
     sensing technology could be extremely expensive, and would 
     therefore be difficult to sustain in an environment of highly 
     constrained budgets for space activities. From the national 
     security perspective, staying ahead in technologies of most 
     importance to national security interests may be enough.
       Because all countries now generally follow a 
     nondiscriminatory data policy,\4\ in which data are offered 
     to all purchasers at the same price and delivery schedule, 
     foreign belligerents can buy Landsat data to further their 
     wars against each other. These data, coupled with information 
     from the Global Positioning System (GPS), might even be used 
     to prepare for a war (or terrorism) against the United States 
     or its allies. As technical progress continues to improve 
     spatial and spectral resolution, the military utility of 
     successive generations of civilian remote sensing satellites 
     will also improve. Although such uses of satellite data may 
     pose some risk to the United States or its allies, the 
     economics and political benefits of open availability of data 
     generally outweigh the risks.
       The wide availability of satellite imagery of moderate 
     resolution, and inexpensive computer tools to analyze these 
     images, broadens the number and types of institutions and 
     individuals with access to information about secret sites and 
     facilities. Such information contributes to a widening of the 
     terms of the political debate over future military policies 
     in the United States and elsewhere.
       Because the military value of remotely sensed data lies in 
     timely delivery, the United States could cut off access to 
     data as soon as the countries' belligerent status is made 
     clear, as in the Persian Gulf Conflict where both SPOT Image, 
     S.A., a French firm, and EOSAT, Inc., cut off data to Iraq. 
     In that case, the French were part of the allied team 
     opposing Iraq. However, the United States and France (or 
     another country that operates a remote sensing system capable 
     of being used for military purposes) might be on opposing 
     sides of a future dispute.


            the broadening of access to military information

       The commercial availability of militarily useful remotely 
     sensed imagery has sparked the interest of many interested in 
     military affairs. Landsat and SPOT images have appeared in 
     the media, and have been used to support news stories about 
     military action or potentially threatening behavior.\5\
       Individuals who have used these images to make significant 
     deductions regarding military activity include Johnny Skorve, 
     whose photographic explorations of the Kola Peninsula using 
     SPOT and Landsat images fill two volumes; Bhupendra Jasani, 
     who has used SPOT data of the territory of the former Soviet 
     Union to investigate military questions including INF Treaty 
     compliance and reporters for several news organizations. 
     These efforts have shown that the resolution provided by SPOT 
     and Landsat, while poor compared to the rule-of-thumb 
     requirements often stated for some military tasks, is more 
     than sufficient to provide useful and even intriguing 
     military information.
       Civilians have also explored the military use (as distinct 
     from utility) of civilian satellites by studying the records 
     of SPOT image, S.A. The corporation does not identify its 
     customers, but its catalogue does list pictures already taken 
     by latitude, longitude, and date. Peter Zimmerman makes a 
     convincing case, on this basis, that SPOT has been used for 
     military purposes.
       These investigations of military matters share at least one 
     trait in common: they do not require especially timely data. 
     As described in appendix C, it is lack of timeliness, not of 
     resolving power, that most limits the military use of 
     civilian satellites.


                               footnotes

     \1\In October 1992, Almaz, which had been transmitting data 
     from its synthetic aperture radar, fell back into the 
     atmosphere and burned up.
     \2\Ground resolution is a useful but simplistic measure of 
     the capability to identify objects from high altitude.
     \3\The figure of the solid Earth.
     \4\This principle was originated by the United States when it 
     decided to sell Landsat data on this basis. See U.S. 
     Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Remote Sensing and 
     the Private Sector, OTA-ISC-TM-239 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
     Government Printing Office, April 1984) for a discussion of 
     the relationship of the U.S. nondiscriminatory data policy to 
     the ``Open Skies'' principle.
     \5\See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
     Commercial Newsgathering from Space, OTA-ISC-TM-40 
     (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1987).
                                  ____


                [From the New York Times, July 4, 1994]

  Spy Plane That Came in From Cold Just Will Not Go Away in the Senate

                            (By Tim Weiner)

       Washington, July 1--The sleek black supersonic spy plane 
     called the SR-71 Blackbird is a museum piece, a mighty relic 
     of the cold war gathering dust. So what is $100 million to 
     resurrect the plane doing in the Senate's bill authorizing 
     $263.3 billion in military spending for the coming year?
       The bill contains hundreds of millions of dollars for other 
     weapons and programs the Pentagon says it does not want, like 
     money to keep building the $2.2 billion a copy B-2 bomber. 
     The money keeps flowing for many reasons: Keeping a military 
     contractor solvent or defense workers on the job in a 
     powerful politician's home district, for example.
       But the renaissance of the Blackbird is a special case, 
     less about pork than about power and prerogative. The will of 
     one man made it happen: Robert C. Byrd, the West Virginia 
     Democrat who heads the Senate Appropriations Committee.
       In reviving the Blackbird, Mr. Byrd appears to have adopted 
     some of the Pentagon's stealthier and more secretive 
     techniques.


                         surprise for pentagon

       Prominent members of the Senate's Armed Services and 
     Intelligence Committees, along with top Pentagon officials, 
     were taken unawares by Mr. Byrd's move, the Senator's aides 
     acknowledge. Vice President Al Gore; the national security 
     adviser, Anthony Lake, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
     of Staff, Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, knew nothing about the 
     plan when they were visited last month by the senior members 
     of the Congressional Intelligence Committees, according to 
     several Congressional staff members.
       Neither Mr. Gore nor Mr. Lake nor General Shalikashvili 
     voiced any enthusiasm for Senator Byrd's plan to take the 
     plane out of mothballs and send it flying over North Korea's 
     suspected nuclear sites. The Pentagon believes that its 
     existing satellites and spy planes can do the job.
       Senior intelligence officers working for the Joint Chiefs 
     of Staff said that it would take at least a year to refurbish 
     the aircraft and retrain their crews, that the cost would be 
     far greater than $100 million and that no one in the Pentagon 
     wanted the Blackbirds, other intelligence officials said. The 
     senior officers questioned whether the United States had the 
     political will to use the aircraft against North Korea, its 
     likeliest target, they said.
       But the combination of Senator Byrd's prestige, the current 
     worries raised by targeting North Korea and the failure of 
     the Pentagon to produce a secret aircraft to replace the 
     Blackbird have won the battle thus far.


                        Fight began 4 years ago

       The Blackbird is not built in West Virginia nor do Senator 
     Byrd's constituents depend on Lockheed, the plane's 
     manufacturer, for jobs. But the plane was killed by the 
     Defense Department over Senator Byrd's objections and its 
     resurrection, if approved by Congress, would be a small 
     personal triumph for the Senator.
       The story begins four years ago, when Mr. Byrd fought the 
     Pentagon's forced retirement of the Blackbird, a unique 
     aircraft that flew faster than 2,500 miles an hour and used 
     sophisticated cameras to snap pictures of foreign targets. 
     That fight was one of several battles begun in the late 
     1980's over secret spending for classified programs like the 
     Blackbird's flights over North Korea, China and other lands 
     targeted by United States intelligence.
       Mr. Byrd, a Senator since 1959, president pro tempore of 
     the Senate since 1989 and a zealous defender of Congressional 
     prerogatives, joined the battle as a matter of principle.
       He contended that the Defense Department, aided by the 
     secrecy that shields classified projects, was refusing to 
     spend huge sums appropriated by Congress for certain programs 
     and flouting Congressional instructions to stop spending 
     money on others. The Bush and Reagan Administrations 
     routinely ignored classified Congressional directives on 
     secret spending, he said in 1990.
       When the Pentagon canceled the Blackbird in 1990, citing 
     the huge cost of operating and maintaining the fleet, it 
     assured Senator Byrd and a handful of his senior colleagues 
     on the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees that it was 
     working on a very fast, very expensive, very secret 
     reconnaissance plane to be a successor to the Blackbird.


                           Missed in Gulf War

       But that program collapsed after consuming several hundred 
     million dollars, according to members of Congress and their 
     aides. And despite rumors that another successor is secretly 
     in the works, they said, nothing of the sort is on the 
     horizon at the secret Air Force base in Nevada where 
     classified prototypes of state-of-the-art aircraft are flown.
       Though no supersonic secret reconnaissance aircraft remain 
     in the nation's arsenal, and by many accounts the Blackbird's 
     ability to target specific sites quickly was sorely missed 
     during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the Central Intelligence 
     Agency and the Pentagon have several other ways of taking 
     pictures of foreign soil from the sky, including a variety of 
     classified intelligence satellites and the well-known U-2 spy 
     plane. A multibillion-dollar investment in a new series of 
     hugely expensive spy satellites is under way.
       So Pentagon officials were chagrined last week when they 
     read the following language in the Senate's defense 
     authorization bill: ``The committee sees no reason, in 
     principle, why the Department of Defense could not also 
     operate the SR-71 in an austere manner.'' The committee 
     recommended $100 million to revive three Blackbirds, the bill 
     said. The money was inserted by the subcommittees of the 
     Appropriations Committee Mr. Byrd heads. Senator Sam Nunn, 
     the Georgia Democrat who heads the Armed Services Committee, 
     was also instrumental in moving the idea forward.
       The provision now goes to a conference with the House, 
     whose bill does not include the item. Its prospects are 
     uncertain.


                        is $100 million enough?

       Even those who support reviving the Blackbird predict it 
     may be a far more expensive proposition than a mere $100 
     million.
       ``It's going to be pretty difficult to do that kind of 
     mission with that kind of money,'' said Tom Alison, a retired 
     SR-71 Blackbird pilot who works as a curator at the National 
     Air and Space Museum, which owns one of the planes. ``If they 
     didn't feel they could afford it five years ago, then I don't 
     understand why they think they can afford it now.''
       But Richard D'Amato the counsel for national security 
     policy at the Senate Appropriations Committee, said the idea 
     was ``generated by Senator Byrd because there is a gap in our 
     abilities the unique capability that the Blackbird 
     provides.''
       ``The idea wasn't generated only by Korea but in like 
     situations, in the Middle East.'' he said.
       While acknowledging that senior Pentagon officials and many 
     of Senator Byrd's colleagues were ``blindsided'' by the 
     move--and that many of them maintain that the plane is ``an 
     antique, a museum piece''--he said three of the planes could 
     be ready to serve the nation by next summer for $100 million 
     or less.
       And $100 million is, as everybody in Congress knows, a mere 
     drop in the world's biggest single pool of public capital, 
     the Pentagon's budget.

                          ____________________