[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 101 (Thursday, July 28, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 28, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
EXPRESSING EXTREME CONCERN OVER RUMORS OF AN AMERICAN INVASION OF HAITI

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. WELDON. Mr. Speaker, I rise this evening again as a member of the 
Committee on Armed Services to express my extreme concern over the 
rumors that are circulating rampantly inside the beltway about the 
possibility of an American invasion of Haiti within the next several 
weeks. Much of this speculation is fueled by internal memos that have 
been obtained from officials of the United Nations in a recent briefing 
that was held in Congressman Jack Fields' office. Jack is the ranking 
member on the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, which 
oversees the Coast Guard.
  A group of us asked the Coast Guard a number of questions about their 
operation in support of the current efforts around Haiti, and a 
representative of the National Security Council was also in attendance 
at that meeting. I asked him very specifically what the White House 
response was to the Dante Caputo memo, and Dante Caputo is the U.N. 
special envoy to Haiti; Members of this body obtained a copy of an 
internal memo that he circulated to the Secretary General of the United 
Nations.
  The response of the National Security Council is that the White House 
has no comment on the U.N. internal document, and the reports of 
meetings that have occurred with the Secretary General.
  This evening I asked unanimous consent to enter into the Record the 
entire memo, the transcripts of the meeting, and the internal working 
documents of the U.N. officials which describe in great detail what the 
United Nations thinks is going to be the United States response in 
terms of Haiti. I asked unanimous consent for that, Mr. Speaker, 
because it is time the American people listen not to the rehetoric of 
either political party nor to gross exaggerations, but look at what the 
U.N. special envoy is saying to his boss in terms of what our 
objectives are and what our real thrust is in terms of Haiti.
  It scares me, as a Member of Congress, sitting on the Committee on 
Armed Services. On page 5 of the internal memo, as Dante Caputo is 
describing what the opinion of the United States advisers is in terms 
of Haiti, it says that the United States advisers are of the opinion 
that the option of the military strategy is not just the lesser evil 
but it is politically desirable, politically desirable. It goes on to 
say that the Americans see in this type of action a chance to show, 
after the strong media criticism of the administration, the President's 
decisionmaking capability and the firmness of leadership in 
international political matters.
  Mr. Speaker, this is not what our military is about, sending our 
troops into harm's way to make political statements. And yet that is 
what this memo, in fact, states.
  It goes on to document meetings that say that America cannot wait 
until beyond the month of August to take action because of the 
criticism of their foreign policy on the domestic front, and I quote, 
``They want to do something. They are going to try to intervene 
militarily, and they are going to do it before the end of August.'' He 
goes on to talk about what would happen if this operation took place, 
but then what is most troubling to me is on page 2 of an internal 
document, or an internal meeting, where the Secretary General was 
questioning Mr. Caputo in response to a question about the existence of 
other alternatives other than a military intervention.
  Dante Caputo replies, and I quote, ``that the United States acted as 
a brake to a diplomatic solution, creating a situation where the 
intervention became nearly inevitable.'' So here we have the U.N. 
special envoy to Haiti telling the U.N. Secretary General that we, this 
country, headed by our President, actually put a brake on a diplomatic 
solution in Haiti, because we want to create a situation where we have 
to intervene militarily.
  Mr. Speaker, that is outrageous, and to all the moms and dads and 
uncles and aunts that have kids in our military, I say to them that 
this is not the way we should be conducting foreign policy. This is not 
the way that we should be attempting to exert our influence around the 
world.
  I would urge all of my colleagues and every American citizen 
concerned about Haiti to read the Congressional Record tomorrow, 
because the entire document that I have referred to will be printed in 
its entirety for all of America to see.


                              confidential

     Attention: The Secretary General.
     From: Dante Caputo, RSSC.
       Over the past fifteen days, I had the pleasure of meeting 
     several times with U.S. Talbott and other officials of the 
     American State Department. I also had some meetings in Paris 
     with M. Alain Juppe, Minister of Foreign Affairs and in 
     Ottawa with Mr. Andre Quellert, Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
     Moreover, I was able to have some informal conversations with 
     other areas of American political life.
       The conclusions that I am drawing today are as follows:
       1. The U.S. administration considers that an invasion of 
     Haiti is its best option.
       2. The principal objection to this type of action comes 
     from the fact that ``if it is easy to initiate this type of 
     action, it is more difficult to exit from it''.
       3. In order to resolve this dilemma, the U.S. 
     administration will seek to act in the following manner:
       a) set up a unilateral action, a surgical action, with the 
     eventual participation of several countries in the region so 
     as to give it a certain legitimacy;
       b) put President Aristide back in power
       c) it will seek a quick replacement of the armed 
     intervention forces by the [illegible] whose mandate and 
     structure will have been redefined beforehand.
       4. This strategy would allow it to capitalize on the 
     experience with such an operation, transferring the political 
     cost on the UN.
       5. In the same fashion, the President of the United 
     States's main advisers, are of the opinion that not only does 
     this option constitute the lesser evil, but that is 
     politically desirable. Thus we think that the current 
     opposition of public opinion to an armed intervention will 
     change radically, once it will have taken place. The 
     Americans see in this type of action a chance to show, after 
     the strong media criticism of the administration, the 
     President's decision making capability and the firmness of 
     leadership in international political matters.
       6. The position of the friendly countries vis a vis this 
     strategy is the following:
       France:
       France is opposed to the use of force be it multilateral or 
     unilateral. It is ready to participate in a MINUAH under the 
     terms foreseen in July, 1993, that is to say, technical 
     assistance and participation in forming a police force. In an 
     explicit manner, France is opposed to participating in 
     whatever activity that would imply direct police action.
       France considers that it is urgent that a meeting of the 
     Four friends take place at the department head or under 
     secretary level, preferably in New York.
       France insists as well on Argentina's participation as a 
     fifth friendly country given that it is a member of the 
     Security Council.
       Canada:
       Canada does not wish to participate in a multilateral armed 
     intervention force. Canada thinks that in the present 
     situation, there is probably no other alternative to that 
     which the U.S. administration will adopt. In this 
     perspective, according to Minister Ouellet, our problem will 
     consist of knowing how to ``manage'' this new reality. Canada 
     seems equally disposed to participate in a MINUAH whose 
     mandate will have been redefined. Canada also considers it 
     urgent to call a meeting of the Four Friends.
       7. The permanent U.S. Mission has undertaken the necessary 
     steps so that the Security Council comes to a decision very 
     soon on the MINUAH's mandate and structure.
                                                     May 23, 1994.

     From: SG.
     oc: OCA Central?
       Report of a discussion of the Secretary General with his 
     Special Representative for Haiti at the United Nations 
     Headquarters, Tuesday, May 24, 1994 at 6:30 p.m.
       Present: The Secretary General; Mr. Gharekhan; Mr. de Soto, 
     advisor; Mrs. Green; Mrs. Seguin-Horton.
     Subject: The situation in Haiti. Possibilities for a military 
         intervention by the United States.
       The Secretary General says to Mr. Caputo that he is well 
     aware of his last summary report.
       Mr. Caputo explains that he did not dare present any 
     options and policies to the Secretary General in this report. 
     The fact is that he had lately a large number of informal 
     consultations that are all going in the same direction: The 
     Americans will not be able to stand for much longer, until 
     August at the latest, the criticism of their foreign policy 
     on the domestic front. They want to do something: they are 
     going to try to intervene militarily.
       The Secretary General wonders if President Aristide could 
     invoke Article 51 of the Charter in order to call for a 
     military intervention.
       Mr. De Soto says that the constitution prevents him from 
     doing so.
       Mr. Caputo thinks that after having asked for the 
     intervention, Mr. Aristide will condemn it. Moreover, the 
     United States, that wants to obtain the Security Council's 
     blessing, is now actively studying the means to accord a 
     legal protection to this affair.
       Mr. de Soto recalls that this idea recently provoked a 
     general protest among the OSA.
       What can the United Nations Secretariat do, either to avoid 
     or to encourage this intervention?, asks the Secretary 
     General.
       Mr. Caputo predicts a disaster. The United States will make 
     the UN bear the responsibility to manage the occupation of 
     Haiti. ``With Aristide as President during two or three 
     years, it will be Hell!'' It is not so much the armed 
     intervention itself that we have to avoid. What we do not 
     want, is to inherit a ``baby''. For the Americans' are fixing 
     to leave quickly. They would not intervene if they had to 
     remain.
       Mr. Gharekhan asks Mr. Caputo what he understands by 
     leaving ``quickly''. One month, replies Mr. Caputo. Who is 
     going to replace the Americans?, asks the Secretary General.
       ``Us'', replies Mr. de Soto. The Americans will be 
     applauded and the dirty work will come back to the UN. The 
     only thing that could discourage the United States would be 
     to not obtain any contributing countries for mounting a 
     multinational operation.
       France, according to Mr. Juppe, is opposed to it, confirms 
     Mr. Caputo. As for Canada, it is committed to strictly 
     limiting its contribution to the formation of a new Haitian 
     police.
       The Secretary believes that in making an effort, the United 
     States will be able to manage to obtain 2,000 French-African 
     troops and a few troops from the Caribbean.
       Mr. Caputo says that the United Nations would have to work 
     with a complex force and that it would be difficult for it to 
     mount an operation in a one-month period. The Latin American 
     countries are not ready to contribute. Mr. Caputo knows that 
     Argentina, for example, is not very favorable to this idea. 
     He also doubts that Mexico, Brazil or Venezuela would be 
     tempted.
       This scenario would be fraught with consequences for the 
     United Nations as well as for this region of the world. Dante 
     Caputo emphasizes that it is harmful that at the conclusion 
     of the cold war, no other answer can be found for such a 
     crisis.
       In answer to the Minister's question about the consequences 
     of the American intervention in Panama, Dante Caputo replies 
     that it concerned a different time where the cold war was 
     still taking place. Today, we are right in expecting that 
     other types of means be activated. The United Nations will be 
     perceived as being impotent before the region's problems. 
     They will have to face up to a particular difficult post-
     intervention situation.
       To the Minister's question about the existence of another 
     alternative, Dante Caputo replies that the United States 
     acted as a brake to a diplomatic solution, creating a 
     situation where the intervention became nearly inevitable.
       The Minister remarks that actually, despite the goodwill of 
     the United Nations, it's credibility is jeopardized and the 
     [Haitian] military leaders are ``laughing at us''. The 
     Minister stresses the difficulties of a strict and effective 
     implementation of planned sanctions and expresses its doubt 
     over the possibility of a complete closing of the border.
       The Minister shares Dante Caputo's appreciation of the need 
     to make some arrangements in the event of a unilateral 
     intervention. However, the Minister continues to affirm that 
     Canada will not commit itself to hostile activities in Haiti. 
     Canada is ready to favorably consider a United Nations 
     request favoring a peace keeping operation with the view of 
     consolidating a democratic regime, aid programs, and 
     participation in a better equipped MUNUHA. Basically, the 
     Minister concedes that only the United States can wrestle 
     with the [Haitian] military leaders.
       To improve our image relative to President Aristide, the 
     Minister believes that the President should participate in 
     the next meeting of the Four Friends. Regarding this meeting, 
     Dante Caputo maintains that it would be preferable if it be 
     held first of all without the President, and that he not 
     participate except after the meeting. In the perspective of 
     managing the post intervention situation, Dante Caputo thinks 
     that it is important that President Aristide can consider 
     himself to be an integral part of the Four Friends' action.
       According to the Minister, President Aristide's credibility 
     risks to be stained, if he is restored after the U.S. 
     intervention.
       The Minsiter questions himself over the composition, nature 
     and on the willingness of the countries that would be ready 
     to participate in the MINUHA.
       Dante Caputo emphasizes that France expressed the wish to 
     participate in the formation of a police force in Haiti and 
     is reticent to do ``monitoring''. Ambassador Prechette then 
     recalls the difficulties encountered at the moment of 
     recruiting the components of the operation's police force in 
     1993. Dante Caputo remarks that the question of this police 
     force's role and mandate should be determined as a function 
     of the whole and notes that the countries interested in 
     taking part remain few, in addition to Canada, the United 
     States, Argentina, and France.
       The fundamental question remains the post-intervention 
     role, multilateral action being put aside, indicates Dante 
     Caputo. Ambassador Prechetto replies that in effect, the 
     United Nations will not vote for this type of action, but 
     could be in favor of a ``green light'' for a coalition of 
     States that would invite countries interested in toppling the 
     [Haitian] military leaders if a very serious incident 
     unfolded. Dante Caputo adds that this American initiative 
     could be blocked by an internal decision process.
       The Minister concludes the meeting by recalling that this 
     is an emergency, that Canada wants to play a role, and that 
     he will be guided by the advice and suggestions of Dante 
     Caputo. In the probable case where sanctions would have no 
     immediate effect and would act in the military leaders' 
     favor, the Minister remarks that it would then be necessary 
     to explain why sanctions are being maintained against Haiti.
                                                    Juliette Remy,
                                                     May 23, 1994.

       The Secretary General recalls that in the past, the United 
     States was able to show that it could mount a multinational 
     force, if only in appearance. ``Must we say that we think 
     that a military intervention in Haiti would be negative?''
       Mr. de Soto thinks that insinuating the possibility of an 
     armed intervention is working to produce a certain effect in 
     Haiti. The [Haitian] military leaders are nervous. * * *It 
     would thus be politically dangerous to publicly discourage 
     this menace.
       According to Mr. Caputo, it must first be proposed that the 
     President of the Security Council ask for a closing of the 
     border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This measure 
     will have a certain economic and psychological impact.
       The Secretary General wonders how it is possible to really 
     close this border. A very clear commitment on the part of the 
     Dominican authorities must be required, replies Mr. Caputo. 
     The Secretary General thinks that the Dominican government 
     does not have the means to prevent infiltration.
       Mr. Caputo considers that the land or sea routes can be 
     controlled if the authorities accept to play the game. In 
     this regard, Mr. Caputo informs the Secretary General that 
     the Americans have proposed to him to accompany them tomorrow 
     to meet President Balaguer in Santo Domingo. Mr. Caputo has 
     not yet replied, but he thinks that he must accept this offer 
     in order to show that he is being active on the diplomatic 
     front.
       Replying to a question from the Secretary General, Mr. 
     Gharckhan makes the point that the Security Council 
     specifically mentioned the border in his presidential 
     declaration.
       Mr. de Soto thinks that the other friends of Haiti must be 
     made to participate at this meeting, if only through their 
     ambassadors in Santo Domingo.
       Moreover, Mr. Caputo pointed out that the Republicans have 
     the tendency to keep their distance vis a vis the idea of 
     intervening, thinking that President Clinton would be 
     committing a monumental error there.
       Nobody can tell if such an operation will succeed or fail, 
     notes the Secretary General. In addition to closing the 
     border, continues Mr. Caputo, we will have to keep the same 
     political framework set up two months ago if the United 
     States requests.
       The Secretary General asks Mr. Caputo if he still believes 
     that after 17 months spent in his position, if the United 
     States can conduct diplomacy. The Americans are still deeply 
     divided on the Haitian question; there are supporters and 
     detractors of President Aristide.
       Mr. Caputo thinks that it is now or never to show the 
     Americans that there is a political alternative to American 
     intervention.
       Mr. de Soto wonders if in fact Mr. Caputo should not go to 
     Port au Prince to challenge the military leaders and try to 
     convince Mr. Cedras, who pretends to be a ``negotiator''.
       Mr. Caputo affirms that he is ready to go to Haiti. The 
     problem is that if his visit fails, and that if it is 
     accompanied by demonstrations by the BRAPH and by a definite 
     ``no'' from Mr. Cedras,we risk provoking an armed 
     intervention.
       Mr. Gharckahan thinks that, in effect, the Americans could 
     feel justified to intervene.
       According to Mr. de Soto, this would be the case if it were 
     already August, but if we try now, we still have time, he 
     says.
       Mr. Caputo declares that he likes this idea because the 
     United Nations seems to be making every possible effort on 
     the diplomatic front on the condition, of course, of 
     obtaining a meeting with Mr. Cedras. In reply to a question 
     from the Secretary General, he has the means to contact him.
       Moreover, Mr. Caputo points out that the French insist a 
     lot on including Argentina in the Group of the Secretary 
     General's Friends. Argentina, who was rather tepid two or 
     three months ago, now seems interested in the question.
       The French find in effect that the Argentina's presence 
     would allow a better balance * * * Security Council, among 
     the Group of Friends. Venezuela would not be excluded for as 
     much.
       Aware of the risk of displeasing Brazil who is also a 
     member of the Security Council, the Secretary General 
     proposes to use the criteria of Argentina's active 
     participation in the search of a solution to the Haitian 
     problem. Isn't Argentina a frigate that sails in the region 
     to check on the embargo's enforcement?
       Mr. Gharakhan believes that he remembers that Mr. Goulding 
     was totally opposed to this idea.
       In answer to the Secretary General's question, Mr. de Soto 
     says that Mr. Goulding thinks that including Argentina would 
     bother Brazil.
       Mr. Caputo suggests consulting Brazil.
       Mr. de Soto points out that Mr. Luis de Silva, Brazil's 
     presidential candidate, has come out in favor of intervention 
     * * *.
       Summarizing the situation the Secretary General proposes to 
     act in the following manner: 1) Mr. Caputo reports tomorrow 
     at Santo Domingo to discuss the border: 2) He makes contact 
     with Mr. Cedras to set up an appointment with him; 3) He goes 
     to Haiti to strengthen his credibility: 4) The Secretariat 
     contacts Brazil to announce the decision to invite Argentina 
     to be part of the Group of Friends, 5) The Secretariat? 
     invites Argentina.
       Evoking the role of the United Nations' mission in Haiti 
     (MINUAH), Mr. Caputo recalls that the American plan is to 
     intervene, leave quickly and pass the torch to the U.N. But, 
     if they saw how difficult it is to mount a U.N. operation on 
     the spot, they would perhaps reflect some more before 
     intervening.
       Mr. de Soto emphasizes that the MINUAH mandate exits. The 
     United States has met with officers from the [illegible] 
     Department for Peace Keeping to study means of renewing, 
     redefining, and strengthening the Mission. Replying to the 
     Secretary General, Mr. de Soto indicates that the initial 
     mandate foresees 700 to 800 men. The United States is in the 
     process of broadening the scope of MINUAH to a mission, not 
     only of technical assistance, but also one peace keeping. 
     This would thus be a way to discourage the United States to 
     intervene in showing them how difficult it is to set up the 
     Mission that it would like to see following its intervention.
       Mr. Gharakhan thinks that the Secretariat cannot highlight 
     this difficulty since the United States has the means to 
     obtain the necessary troops.
       The Secretary General fears that the United States will 
     take a unilateral decision and that it will repeat the 
     Somalian experience. The main question remains knowing what 
     to do to avoid this unpleasant role for the United Nations.
       According to Mr. de Soto, the Security Council's backing 
     can be politically costly to the United States in so far as 
     it will cause the United States to make concessions.
       The Secretary General points out that the United States can 
     even choose to leave forces behind.
       Mr. de Soto says that the closest analogy is the one of 
     Panama. The United States knows that the Latin American 
     countries will protest out of principle while at the same 
     time they will be relieved to get rid of Mr. Cedras.
       Suggesting to proceed by stages, the Secretary General 
     concludes that they agree on the five points mentioned above. 
     These points already will allow for movement. Mrs. Green, 
     having asked if Mr. Aristide was going to be contacted, the 
     Secretary General replies in the affirmative. He agrees to 
     telephone Mr. Aristide. He suggests to put off until later 
     the more substantial reflections on the question, but keeps 
     in mind the fact that there is a risk of escalation. It 
     should not be forgotten that the Haitian people suffer 
     because of those sanctions.
                                           Fabienno Seguin-Horton,
                                                     May 25, 1994.

                              Confidential


                           Note for the file

       Meeting between Mr. Dante Caputo, SREG for Haiti with Mr. 
     Andre Ouellet, Foreign Affairs Minister of Canada, Ottawa, 
     May 19, 1994.
       Present: Mr. Stanley E. Gooch, Assistant Vice Minister; 
     Latin American and Caribbean Desk; Mrs. Louise Prechette, 
     Permanent Canadian Representative at the United Nations.
       After being warmly welcomed by the Minister, Dante Caputo 
     stresses, first of all, the different options for a solution 
     and relates, for the Minister's benefit, the reactions 
     observed in Paris and Washington. The first option consists 
     of waiting for sanctions put in place to produce the desired 
     effect: the military leaders' departure. In this regard, 
     France and the United States have the same worry of seeing 
     that the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti be 
     hermetically sealed.
       However, stresses Dante Caputo, the United States would not 
     be ready to wait several months for this to produce the 
     desired effect. The second option, consists of using the 
     sanctions as an instrument to support a political strategy. 
     France is in favor of such a scenario and, in this regard, 
     supports the idea of a high level meeting of the Secretary 
     General's Four Friends Countries. The third option consists 
     of using unilateral force, multilateral force, or a 
     combination of the two. France is opposed to this. Concerning 
     the United States position, such as laid out by Strobe 
     Talbot, Dante Caputo thinks that time is short, and that the 
     situation today cannot last beyond July. Dante Caputo 
     emphasizes that Haiti represents a test case for which the 
     United States has to have found a solution before November. 
     The United States supports the return of a reinforced MINUAH 
     (self defense, protecting sites) without specifying the 
     probable means for the [Haitian] military leaders' departure.
       Dante Caputo gives his personal impression of the strategy 
     that the United States would get ready to implement. 
     According to him, the United States cannot wait any longer to 
     obtain the benefits of an action in favor of Haiti for a just 
     cause; it would intervene punctually in order to then cede 
     its place to the MINUAH.

     

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