[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 100 (Wednesday, July 27, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 27, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mrs. BOXER (for herself and Mrs. Feinstein):
  S. 2326. A bill to require the Secretary of Agriculture to issue 
regulations concerning use of the term ``fresh'' in the labeling of 
poultry, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry.


                   the truth in poultry labeling act

 Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce today the 
Truth in Poultry Labeling Act of 1994. This legislation directs the 
Secretary of Agriculture to restrict the use of the term ``fresh'' to 
poultry that has never been kept frozen.
  The bill would close a loophole in Federal law that allows frozen 
chickens and turkeys to be labeled and sold as fresh.
  A few weeks ago fresh poultry producers held an event outside the 
Rayburn House Office Building featuring frozen chicken bowling. Members 
of the House actually bowled frozen chickens, clearly labeled as fresh. 
Even in the heat of a Washington summer the hard-as-rock chickens 
skated along the floor and knocked down pins as effectively as bowling 
balls.
  Mr. President, this situation is not only absurd, it is grossly 
unfair to consumers and to the producers of genuinely fresh poultry. 
Consumers have no way of knowing whether the chickens and turkeys they 
buy for dinner are really fresh or whether they have been kept frozen 
for months and thawed out for sale.
  And what's the difference? Consumers and some of our best chefs have 
testified that, in terms of taste and texture, fresh poultry is 
superior to poultry that has been kept frozen. Because of that, 
consumers are willing to pay a premium price for fresh poultry. 
Unfortunately, because of misleading labels, consumers are not always 
getting what they're paying for.
  In addition, producers of genuinely fresh poultry in States like 
California are at a significant disadvantage as big out-of-State 
producers of frozen poultry benefit from lower feed costs, lower labor 
costs, and less stringent health, safety and environmental standards. 
This puts 25,000 jobs at risk in California alone.
  We must put an end to the deception allowed by current law. Poultry 
that has been frozen and then thawed should be accurately labeled. This 
bill would in no way prohibit poultry producers from selling their 
frozen products in California or anywhere else. It would simply 
restrict their right to use the term ``fresh'' to products that are in 
fact fresh.
  The Truth in Poultry Labeling Act of 1994 is supported by Consumers 
Union, the National Consumers League, Public Voice, the California 
Poultry Industry Federation, the Consumer Federation of America, and 
the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union.
  I urge my colleagues to support this sensible legislation.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2326

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Truth in Poultry Labeling 
     Act of 1994''.

     SEC. 2. REGULATIONS ON LABELING OF POULTRY.

       Not later than 120 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the Secretary of Agriculture shall issue final 
     regulations under the Poultry Product Inspection Act (21 
     U.S.C. 451 et seq.) that prohibit the use of the term 
     ``fresh'' on labeling of any poultry or poultry part, or of 
     any edible portion of the poultry or part, that has been 
     frozen or previously frozen to below 26 degrees 
     Fahrenheit.
                                 ______

      By Mr. DANFORTH:
  S. 2327. A bill to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to encourage 
mediation of charges filed under title VII of such act and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, to amend the Revised Statutes 
to encourage mediation of complaints filed under section 1977 of the 
Revised Statutes, and to decrease resort to the courts; to the 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources.


               employment dispute resolution act of 1994

 Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, I introduce the Employment 
Dispute Resolution Act of 1994. A companion bill, H.R. 2016 has been 
introduced in the House by Representative Steve Gunderson.
  This legislation is designed to provide an alternative to litigating 
employment discrimination claims. When I first introduced this measure 
in 1992, it was needed to ease the burden on the already swamped and 
overloaded court system and EEOC. Since that time, the plight of the 
courts and the EEOC has become steadily worse, and the need for this 
measure has become even more desperate.
  According to EEOC Chairman Tony Gallegos, the agency received almost 
88,000 new charges of discrimination in the year ending September 30, 
1993. This is almost 22 percent more than the previous year and 38 
percent more than 1991. This dramatic increase is the anticipated 
result of the protections legislated by Congress in the Americans With 
Disabilities Act [ADA] and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 [CRA].
  Of course the effects of this deluge of claims are felt throughout 
the system. In September 1992, then-Chairman Evan Kemp reported that 
``EEOC investigators are already stretched to the limit. They will 
break under these conditions.'' Since then, matters have become even 
more drastic. The Americans With Disabilities Act and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 have both created protections which have generated 
significant numbers of claims. At the same time, claims of sexual 
harassment have doubled. As a result, the average time for processing a 
claim has more than doubled. And this hurts the claimants whose civil 
rights Congress wants to protect.
  As Chairman Kemp said in 1992:

       Those who turn to the EEOC for relief will be forced to 
     wait nearly three years before the agency can resolve their 
     charges. A woman who files a charge of pregnancy 
     discrimination, for example, will not see the case resolved 
     until her child is in pre-school.
       The practical implications of such a delay are horrendous. 
     They are horrendous not only for the charging party who feels 
     his or her rights have been violated, but for the business 
     charged with the alleged violation. An employer would be 
     faced with the administrative nightmare of producing 
     information to justify actions of three or four years 
     earlier.

  Chairman Kemp's analysis was corroborated by a recent GAO report 
which reviews the EEOC's methods for investigating and litigating 
discrimination charges. As reported by the GAO, by fiscal year 1996, 
the processing time for a discrimination claim could more than double. 
The GAO concluded that this delay can seriously injure complaining 
parties:

       The longer it takes to investigate a charge, the greater 
     potential for difficulty in (1) locating witnesses, (2) 
     obtaining from witnesses credible accounts of the actions 
     alleged to be discriminatory, and (3) securing settlements--
     because the larger liability involved after a long time could 
     make some employers less willing to settle. * * *
       The extensive processing times * * * that charging parties 
     can expect to face in EEOC appear incompatible with the 
     mission of the Commission ``to ensure equality of opportunity 
     by vigorously enforcing federal legislation prohibiting 
     discrimination in employment * * *.

  It is only getting worse. As of yesterday, July 26, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act has expanded to cover businesses with 15 or more 
employees; until now, it has only covered those with 25 or more. The 
EEOC simply cannot handle this explosion.
  The situation in the courts is also disaster. The Civil Rights Act of 
1991 added jury trials for compensatory and punitive damages to both 
title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act. These valuable 
antidiscrimination measures are naturally strong incentives to 
litigate. Even before the enactment of these amendments, the number of 
private employment discrimination suits skyrocketed over 2,000 percent 
between 1970 and 1990.
  Increasingly, therefore, the courts are not viable as a responsible 
enforcement mechanism. Finally, even if there were no problems of 
overcrowded court dockets and delays that are matters of years, the 
adversarial nature of a prolonged legal battle is so hostile, that it 
overcomes most prospects of resuming a productive work relationship 
after resolution of the charge.
  There should be a better way and there is. It is called mediation. In 
the winter 1991-92 issue of The Journal of Intergroup Relations, a 
publication of the National Association of Human Rights Workers, there 
is an article called ``Mediation of Civil Rights Complaints: Win/Win.'' 
The author, Clark Field, is a human relations specialist in Evansville, 
IN. He explains, simply, accurately and compellingly, why mediation is 
a superior method for resolving employment discrimination claims. I 
agree.
  But I would like to share with my colleagues some of the arguments he 
makes in the article. Mr. Field's experience has led him to corroborate 
that which is intuitively true. That the adversarial process of 
litigation is itself destructive and a barrier to resuming a continuing 
employment relationship. That, even when a complainant wins the battle, 
he or she loses the war.
  ``Is there a better way?'' asks the article. ``A win/win method of 
dealing with discrimination charges, where the relationship of employer 
and employee may be maintained? Maybe so. With mediation, everyone 
wins.''
  The Employment Dispute Resolution Act is not just expedient, although 
it is that. It is not just speedier, although it is that. It is not 
just cost-effective, although it is that. This act is important because 
it is fair and good. It recognizes the plight of complainants who are 
intimidated by the prospect of hiring lawyers to embark on a prolonged, 
hostile and confusing battle that may take years to resolve. It 
provides neutrality and confidentiality to reassure employers that they 
should try to mend the situation rather than use their muscle to get 
their way in court.
  In conversations my office has had with Mr. Field he has told us that 
he can mediate a case in 2 hours that normally would take 6 to 12 
months or more to investigate. But, he says that ``the most beautiful 
thing is to see people walk out smiling, shake hands and go away 
friends.''
  The concept of mediation as a win/win approach is being asserted by 
more and more experts in the field of employment disputes. In the June 
1994 Labor Law Journal, an article entitled ``Mediation of Employment 
Discrimination Claims: The Win/Win ADA Option'' describes how well 
suited mediation is to resolving employment disputes. I recommend this 
article to my colleagues who are interested in doing something 
practical to help employees protect their rights in a timely and 
reasonable way. As that article concludes, mediation ``is an especially 
appropriate vehicle for resolving employment discrimination claims, 
because mediation makes possible creative outcomes that serve the 
respective interests of the parties in ways that litigation or 
arbitration cannot.''
  And when these experts call mediation a win/win proposition, they are 
right on target. According to the GAO, ``[m]ediation was the ADR 
approach discussed most often'' in the interviews they conducted with 
EEOC commissioners, three former EEOC chairpersons, headquarters and 
field staff, Fair Employment Practice Agency staff, lawyers for 
charging parties and respondents and representatives of interest 
groups.
  This has been my experience as well, when I have discussed my own 
mediation proposal. All sides recognize they have something to gain. 
Mr. Field reports that employers are sometimes reluctant to mediate out 
of fear that they may be surrendering some of their power. 
Increasingly, however, employers are recognizing that such fears are 
unfounded. That is the subject of a recently published monograph called 
``Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques: Options and Guidelines To 
Meet Your Company's Needs.'' In that book, Douglas McDowell, the 
general counsel to the Equal Employment Advisory Council sets out the 
advantages which accrue to employers if they agree to mediate 
discrimination claims.
  In April, Mr. McDowell testified before the Commission on the Future 
of Worker-Management Relations. The Commission, formed by Secretaries 
Reich and Brown, is headed by former Labor Secretary John Dunlop. Mr. 
McDowell recommended that the Commission closely examine the Employment 
Dispute Resolution Act and suggested that the approach taken by my bill 
could have a positive effect on resolving employment disputes before 
they reach the courts.
  Mr. President, it is rare that labor and management find mutual 
advantage from the same reform. The Employment Dispute Resolution Act 
is one such rarity. I hold no illusions that mediation will be 
successful in every case. But under this act, there really is no 
downside. This legislation does not compel parties to mediate in all 
circumstances. However, where either of the parties feels that a 
settlement can be achieved in mediation, then the parties cannot 
proceed to litigate in the courts without first trying to work out 
their differences in mediation.
  Let us act now to make available the civil rights protections we 
struggled so hard to win. Let us ease the massive burden of the EEOC 
and the courts. Let us establish procedures that are quicker, cheaper, 
and friendlier.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that excerpts of Mr. Field's 
article be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

       [From the Journal of Intergroup Relations, Winter 1991-92]

             Mediation of Civil Rights Complaints: Win/Win

                          (By Clark G. Field)


                              introduction

       If you are not familiar with Mediation, let me first define 
     it and describe it as a process. Mediation is the coming 
     together of disputants with an unbiased facilitator (``third 
     party neutral''), who will assist both parties--although 
     there can be more than two disputants--in reaching an 
     agreement. The mediator absolutely makes no decisions, but 
     only facilitates consensus decision-making.
       Mediation is not: compromise, negotiation arbitration, 
     conciliation, nor striking a deal.
       Mediation is: voluntary, immediate, future oriented, 
     confidential, hard on facts but soft on persons; conducted by 
     an unbiased, trained mediator; and respectful of disputants.
       In a few months, I will have been writing ``VS'' on my 
     letters, question-naires, fact-finding conference notes, and 
     investigative summaries for eight years. I am a Human 
     Relations Specialist/Investigator for the City of Evansville 
     and Vanderburgh County, Indiana, and I have written that 
     abbreviation ``VS'' thousands of times. Versus means 
     ``against''; it means ``doing battle,'' ``overcoming''--
     ``VS'' means ``win/lose.'' Our society instinctively thinks 
     of suing, forcing, litigating, winning when it comes to 
     disputes.
       When a person comes into our Human Relations office to file 
     a discrimination charge (ninety-five times out of one-
     hundred, it will be in the area of employment), the common 
     procedure is adversarial--only lately am I explaining the 
     mediation option. If both parties should be amenable, we work 
     out an informal resolution and, if the Complainant is found 
     to have made a good case for him/herself (received a 
     ``Probable Cause'' ruling), there is a time set (maybe twenty 
     days) for reconciliation--these efforts I term ``hit and 
     miss'' affairs.
       There is an inherent flaw in our system, in our adversarial 
     approach, and it is this. Typically, when the Complainant 
     ``wins'' his/her case--proves discrimination because of race, 
     sex, color, religion, national origin, age, or handicap--she/
     he will choose not to return to work for the same employer 
     (Respondent). The feeling is that things will not be the 
     same, that he/she will be picked on, or treated worse. Both 
     Respondent and Complainant are reminded that retaliation is 
     illegal, but Complainant still will be afraid to return to 
     the old position. Therefore, we can say that Complainant 
     ``wins the battle, but loses the war.''
       It is my experience that more anger and ill will are 
     generated by race discrimination charges than by any other 
     kind. When the Respondent receives the official charge, e.g., 
     ``John Jones VS. John Doe Corp,'' a combination of feelings 
     erupt in many employers, such as: anger, hostility, fear, 
     hurt, bellicosity, indignation, frustration, embarrassment, 
     defensiveness, vindictiveness, and maybe self-righteousness. 
     More than anything else, whites do not like for blacks to 
     point fingers at them and label them as discriminators and 
     racists. Maybe, back in the recesses of our genetic history, 
     guilt and fear linger as a remnant of slavery.
       Is there a better way? Another route, other than ``VS''? A 
     win/win method of dealing with discrimination charges, where 
     the relationship of employer and employee may be maintained? 
     Maybe so. With Mediation, everyone wins.


                           PROBLEMATIC AREAS

                      1. The Motivation to Mediate

       My experience has been that Complainant will usually 
     consent to Mediation, while Respondent is much more hesitant. 
     The reasons are pretty obvious, namely: Complainant has a lot 
     to gain, such as an immediate resolution of the complaint and 
     the repairing of the employer/employee relationship, while 
     the Respondent must deal with a number of obstacles, 
     including: fear of the unknown; fear of giving up power; fear 
     of compromising their position; and the traditional 
     dependence on legal counsel in such matters.
       One of the challenges facing the mediator is that of 
     balancing the power. In a Title VII (employment) charge, the 
     power imbalance can be more pronounced than in any other 
     setting--a large corporation facing an unemployed, and 
     sometimes uneducated, ex-employee. But the more employers 
     realize that not only valuable time, energy, and expense can 
     be saved, but also valuable, trained employees can be ``kept 
     on board,'' the more they may choose the Mediation option.
       In some Mediations, both parties, after they are familiar 
     with the ``Rules and Regulations of Mediation,'' are required 
     to sign an agreement ``to begin Mediation.'' This can be an 
     important tool for successful Mediation.

                    2. That Impartiality Be Ensured

       The most important attribute of any mediator is 
     impartiality. If the investigator also serves as the 
     mediator, there may be a conflict of interest should no 
     agreement be mediated. For instance, if one of the 
     participants proves to be very difficult, later this may bias 
     the mediator/investigator.
       In one of my mediations, I realized that Complainant, a 
     white woman, was prejudiced against her black co-workers. She 
     also appeared to have an emotional problem. As the Mediation 
     progressed she backed off, and no agreement was reached. 
     Because of this experience, I felt that she had no legitimate 
     discrimination charge--she was claiming handicap 
     discrimination. As it happened, we went to Mediation before 
     she filed a discrimination charge. Had she later returned to 
     file such a charge, I would have had to refer her to another 
     investigator.
       Generally, the mediator and the investigator should be 
     different persons. In small offices, where there is only one 
     investigator, something would have to be worked out. Where 
     there is only an executive director and a secretary and where 
     the Human Relations Commission does not have the force of 
     law, as is the case in some rural Kentucky offices, Mediation 
     could be extremely expedient, if properly promoted.

                             3. Timeliness

       There is always a time limit, usually well defined, for 
     filing discrimination charges. In Indiana, it is ninety days 
     from the last date of harm for local and state commissions, 
     and usually one hundred and eighty days for the Equal 
     Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Since Mediation is 
     voluntary and unofficial, it is better for Complainant's 
     charge to be filed initially, in order to preserve the 
     timeliness. Then, when Mediation results in an agreement, 
     Complainant can withdraw his/her charge. Otherwise, 
     Complainant's timely filing could be compromised.


                               CONCLUSION

       At a time in the United States when cities and states are 
     experiencing a financial crunch and as we move into 1992, 
     when the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) will ``kick 
     in'' for handicapped persons--thus presenting enforcement 
     agencies with perhaps 30 percent more complaints--Mediation 
     can be a very ``timely'' process. With Mediation, the 
     possibilities are almost limitless. It empowers both employer 
     and employee to sit down together and solve their problems--
     this way, both win.
       While we have been focusing on discrimination in employment 
     in this paper. Mediation will serve a similar purpose in 
     other discrimination charges--housing, education, finance, 
     and public accommodations. In housing especially, 
     Complainants need immediate action, and the survey showed 
     that some offices use Mediation exclusively for housing 
     discrimination charges.
                                 ______

      By Mr. SIMON (by request):
  S. 2328. A bill to revise and simplify certain labor laws applicable 
to Federal contracts, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Labor 
and Human Resources.


         Federal Acquisition Labor Law Improvement Act of 1994

 Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce today the 
Federal Acquisition Labor Law Improvement Act of 1994. I am introducing 
the legislation on behalf of the Clinton administration. The Federal 
Acquisition Labor Law Improvement Act of 1994 is the product of work 
initiated by the National Performance Review as part of their efforts 
to streamline the Federal procurement process. The bill proposes 
reforms to the Davis-Bacon Act and other labor laws applicable to 
Federal contracts. The reforms are designed to clarify the law and to 
reduce administrative burdens.
  The administration remains strongly committed to the protections that 
the Davis-Bacon Act and other laws provide to workers. These reforms 
are designed to balance the objectives of these laws with the 
administration's goal to streamline the Federal procurement process. 
The key components of the Davis-Bacon Act reform in the proposal are: a 
threshold increase, simplified reporting requirements, a clarification 
of coverage, and a private right of action.
  Mr. President, I look forward to working with the administration as 
the Federal Acquisition Labor Law Improvement Act of 1994 moves through 
the legislative process. I ask unanimous consent that the bill, and 
other material be included in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 2328

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Federal Acquisition Labor 
     Law Improvement Act of 1994''.

     SEC. 2 AMENDMENTS TO THE DAVIS-BACON ACT.

       The Act of March 3, 1931, 46 Stat. 1494, as amended, 
     commonly referred to as the ``Davis-Bacon Act'', 40 U.S.C. 
     276a et seq., is amended--
       (1) by retitling section 1 (40 U.S.C. 276a) to read 
     ``CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS'' and amending subsection (a) to read 
     as follows:
       ``(a) Required Provisions.--(1) In general.--A contract 
     described in subsection (b) which requires or involves the 
     employment of mechanics and/or laborers shall contain a 
     provision:
       ``(A) stating the minimum wages to be paid various classes 
     of laborers and mechanics which shall be based upon the wages 
     that will be determined by the Secretary of Labor to be 
     prevailing for the corresponding classes of laborers and 
     mechanics employed on projects of a character similar to the 
     contract work in the locality where the work is to be 
     performed;
       ``(B) which stipulates that the contractor or subcontractor 
     under the contract shall pay all laborers and mechanics under 
     the contract--
       ``(i) unconditionally,
       ``(ii) not less often than once a week; and
       ``(iii) without subsequent deduction or rebate on any 
     account, unless otherwise authorized in writing by such 
     laborer or mechanic in accordance with section 186(c)(4) of 
     title 29, United States Code or by regulations issued by the 
     Secretary of Labor, the full amounts accrued at the time of 
     payment, computed at wage rates not less than those stated in 
     the advertised specifications, regardless of any contractual 
     relationship which may be alleged to exist between the 
     contractor or subcontractor and such laborers and mechanics;
       ``(C) which stipulates that the requirements of paragraph 
     (A) shall apply to laborers and mechanics employed by the 
     contractor or subcontractor to work directly upon the site of 
     the work, including work at fabrication plants, batch plants, 
     tool yards or similar facilities (other than previously 
     established facilities of a contractor or subcontractor whose 
     location and continuance in operation are determined wholly 
     without regard to the contract work) which are not located on 
     the project site but are dedicated exclusively, or nearly so, 
     to construction of the project; and to laborers and 
     mechanics, including truckdrivers, employed by the contractor 
     or subcontractor to transport materials, supplies, and 
     equipment to and/or from the site of the work (other than the 
     hauling of materials or supplies to the site of the work from 
     a permanent previously established facility by truckdrivers 
     employed by a bona-fide independent trucking company or bona-
     fide material supplier), including between the actual 
     construction location and other covered facilities; and
       ``(D) which stipulates that there may be withheld from the 
     contractor under the contract or any contract between the 
     same contractor and Federal Government or the District of 
     Columbia or under any Federally assisted contract subject to 
     Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirements so much of accrued 
     payments as may be considered necessary by the contracting 
     officer or by the Secretary of Labor to pay to laborers and 
     mechanics employed by the contractor or any subcontractor on 
     the work the difference between the rates of wages required 
     by the contract to be paid laborers and mechanics on the work 
     and the rates of wages received by such laborers and 
     mechanics and not refunded to the contractor, subcontractors 
     or their agents, and, if the violations are willful, to pay 
     an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Funds 
     withheld under this section shall be placed in an interest 
     bearing account until the disposition of the funds is 
     administratively and/or judicially resolved.
       ``(2) Posting.--A contractor or subcontractor under a 
     contract described in subsection (b) shall post the scale of 
     wages required to be paid under such contract in a prominent 
     and early accessible place at the site of the contract 
     work.''
       ``(2) by redesignating subsection (b) as (c), inserting 
     ``Wages.--(1) Definition.--'' after ``(c)'', redesignating 
     ``(1)'' and ``(2)'' as ``(A)'' and ``(B)'', redesignating 
     ``(A)'' and ``(B)'' as ``(i)'' and ``(ii)'', changing all 
     references to ``subparagraph (2)(A)'' to ``subparagraph 
     (B)(i)'', changing all references to ``subparagraph (2)'' to 
     ``subparagraph (B)(ii)'', changing all references to 
     ``paragraph (1)'' to ``subparagraph (A)'', change all 
     references to ``paragraph (2)'' to ``subparagraph (B)'', and 
     by inserting ``(2) Overtime.--'' at the beginning of the last 
     paragraph of the subsection.
       ``(3) by inserting the following as new subsection (b) of 
     section 1 (40 U.S.C. 276a) to read as follows:
       ``(b) Covered Contracts. (1) In general.--The requirements 
     of this section shall apply to any contract to which the 
     United States or the District of Columbia is a party:
       ``(A) for the new construction, complete rehabilitation or 
     reconstruction, including painting and decorating, of public 
     buildings or public works of the United States or the 
     District of Columbia within the geographical limits of the 
     States of the Union or the District of Columbia in excess of 
     $100,000;
       ``(B) for the repair and/or alteration, including painting 
     and decorating, of public buildings or public works of the 
     United States or the District of Columbia within the 
     geographical limits of the States of the Union or the 
     District of Columbia in excess of $50,000.
       ``(2) Leases of real property.--The requirements of this 
     section shall apply to any contract to which the United 
     States or the District of Columbia is a party for the new 
     construction, complete rehabilitation or reconstruction, 
     including painting and decorating, of any building or work 
     which is so constructed, rehabilitated or reconstructed for 
     lease to, and in preparation for occupancy and use by, the 
     United States or the District of Columbia where such lease 
     provides for an average annual rental in excess of $100,000, 
     provided, that any use of the building or work other than by 
     the United States or the District of Columbia will be 
     functionally or quantitatively incidental to the use and 
     occupancy by the United States or the District of Columbia.
       ``(3) Federally assisted.--(A) The requirements of this Act 
     apply as provided in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph to 
     any project for the construction, rehabilitation, 
     reconstruction, alteration or repair, including painting and 
     decorating, of buildings or works which are financed in whole 
     or in part by loans, grants, revolving funds, loan 
     guarantees, or other assistance from the United States 
     pursuant to a statute which (i) is enacted after the 
     effective date of this Act unless exempted or otherwise 
     limited by Federal law, or (ii) contains a 
     provision requiring the payment of prevailing wages as 
     determined by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to this Act.
       ``(B) The provisions of this Act shall apply to Federally 
     assisted projects if the amount of Federal financial 
     assistance provided for the project exceeds the applicable 
     thresholds set forth in this subsection for contracts to 
     which the United States or the District of Columbia is a 
     party. In the case of loan guarantees or other assistance for 
     which the instrument of Federal financing or assistance does 
     not have an aggregate dollar amount or cannot be determined, 
     this Act shall apply when the value of the assisted project 
     exceeds the applicable threshold set forth in this subsection 
     for projects to which the United States or the District of 
     Columbia is a party.
       ``(4) Adjustments for changes in dollar values.--The 
     amounts of the thresholds set forth in paragraph (1) shall be 
     adjusted by the Secretary of Labor each year that is 
     divisible by 5 to the amount that is equal to the fiscal year 
     1994 constant dollar value of the amount set forth. Any 
     amount, as so adjusted, shall be rounded to the nearest 
     $1,000. The adjusted threshold shall be effective upon 
     publication in the Federal Register to contracts for which 
     bids are solicited or negotiations concluded after such 
     publication.
       ``(5) Prohibition on splitting contracts.--No project that 
     would, if procured under a single contract, be subject to the 
     requirements of this Act may be divided into multiple 
     contracts of lesser value to avoid the application of this 
     Act.
       ``(6) Preemption.--Neither the requirements of subsection 
     (a) nor the provisions of any other Federal law or regulation 
     related to prevailing wages shall, solely by reason of such 
     prevailing wage provisions preempt the application of 
     requirements for the payment of wages or fringe benefits or 
     both adopted by State, local or tribal governments otherwise 
     applicable to contracts for the construction, rehabilitation 
     or reconstruction, repair or alteration, including painting 
     and decorating, of buildings and works financed in whole or 
     in part by loans, grants, revolving funds, loan guarantees, 
     or other assistance from the United States, unless compliance 
     with such requirement would make it impossible to comply with 
     the requirements of subsection (a).''
       (4) by retitling section 3 (40 U.S.C. 276a-2(a)) to read 
     ``ENFORCEMENT'' and amending subsection (a) to read as 
     follows:
       ``(a) Administrative Procedures.--(1) Payments.--The 
     Secretary of Labor is hereby authorized and directed to pay 
     directly to laborers and mechanics from any accrued payments 
     withheld under the contract or any contract between the same 
     contractor and the Federal Government or District of Columbia 
     or under any Federally assisted contract subject to Davis-
     Bacon prevailing wage requirements any wages found to be due 
     laborers and mechanics pursuant to this Act, and if the 
     violations were willful, for payment of an additional equal 
     amount as liquidated damages. Any sum not paid to an employee 
     because of inability to do so within 3 years shall be 
     deposited into the miscellaneous receipts of the United 
     States Treasury. If the accrued payments withheld are 
     insufficient to reimburse all the laborers and mechanics with 
     respect to whom there has been a failure to pay the wages 
     required by this Act, the Secretary or any laborer or 
     mechanic or any organization authorized to represent such 
     laborer or mechanic may, within one year of the conclusion of 
     all administrative proceedings, bring an action against the 
     contractor and the contractor's sureties or other responsible 
     parties for the payment of wages and liquidated damages found 
     due by the Secretary. In such an action it shall be no 
     defense that such laborers and mechanics accepted or agreed 
     to accept less than the required rate of wages or voluntarily 
     made refunds. Every suit instituted under this subparagraph 
     shall be brought in the United States district court for the 
     district in which the contract was performed, where the 
     contractor or subcontractor is currently doing business, or 
     where the contractor or subcontractor maintains its payroll 
     records, irrespective of the amount in controversy in such 
     suit. In such suits, the parties must conform to Chapter 7 of 
     Title 5 of the United States Code.
       ``(2) Deparment.--The Secretary of Labor is further 
     authorized and directed to provide the names of persons or 
     firms whom the Secretary has found to have disregarded their 
     obligations to employees and subcontractors to the General 
     Services Administration for inclusion on the governmentwide 
     List of Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement and 
     Nonprocurement Programs. No contract shall be awarded to the 
     person or firm appearing on this list or to any firm, 
     corporation, partnership, or association in which such person 
     or firm has an interest until three years have elapsed from 
     the date the persons' or firms' name is entered on the 
     electronic version of the list.
       ``(3) Authority.--The Secretary of Labor shall prescribe 
     appropriate standards, regulations and procedures in order to 
     assure coordination of administration and consistency of 
     enforcement of this Act which shall be observed by the 
     Federal agencies responsible for administration of contracts 
     described in subsection (b) of section 1 of this Act. The 
     Secretary of Labor and the Federal agencies awarding 
     contracts or providing financial assistance to projects are 
     authorized to investigate compliance by any contractor or 
     subcontractor with the requirements of the Act, and may take 
     such action to secure compliance with such requirements as 
     may be appropriate. The Secretary shall have the power to 
     issue orders requiring the attendance and testimony of 
     witnesses and the production of evidence under oath. 
     Witnesses shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are 
     paid witnesses in the courts of the United States. In the 
     case of contumacy, failure, or refusal of any person to obey 
     such order, any district court of the United States or of any 
     territory or possession, within the jurisdiction of which the 
     inquiry is carried on, or within the jurisdiction of which 
     said person who is guilty of contumacy, failure, or refusal 
     is found, or resides or transacts business, upon application 
     by the petitioner, shall have jurisdiction to issue to such 
     person an order requiring such person to appear before the 
     Secretary or a representative designated by the Secretary, to 
     produce evidence if, as, and when so ordered, and to give 
     testimony relating to the matter under investigation or in 
     question, and any failure to obey such order of the court may 
     be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.''
       (5) by amending subsection (b) of section 3 (40 U.S.C. 
     276a-2(b)) to read as follows:
       ``(b) Review Procedures.--(1) Action by the Secretary.--The 
     Secretary of Labor shall issue regulations providing 
     procedures for making determinations regarding the 
     application of this Act to given contracts.
       ``(2) Coverage Review.--(i) Any interested person, as 
     defined in regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor, 
     shall have the right to request the Secretary of Labor to 
     make a determination regarding the applicability of the Act 
     to a contract. Such determination shall be binding upon the 
     Federal agencies awarding contracts or providing financial 
     assistance and any recipient of financial assistance. If the 
     Secretary notifies the contracting agency that the contract 
     is subject to the Act, the contracting authority shall 
     include in the contract the provisions required by section 1, 
     including any applicable wage determination issued by the 
     Secretary or his authorized representative, through the 
     exercise of any and all authority that may be needed 
     (including, where necessary, its authority to negotiate or 
     amend, its authority to pay any necessary additional costs, 
     and its authority under any contract provision authorizing 
     changes, cancellation, and termination).
       ``(ii) Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by a 
     determination by the Secretary of Labor made on a petition 
     filed pursuant to paragraph (i), may obtain review of such 
     determination in any United States court of appeals for the 
     circuit in which such person is located, or in the United 
     States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by 
     filing in such court within 60 days following issuance of 
     such determination, a written petition praying that such 
     determination be modified or set aside. A copy of such 
     petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the 
     court in which it is filed to the Secretary and to other 
     interested persons. Review shall conform to Chapter 7 of 
     Title 5 of the United States Code.''
       (6) by amending section 3 (40 U.S.C. 276a-2) to add a new 
     subsection (c) to read as follows:
       ``(c) Right of Action.--(1) In general.--A laborer or 
     mechanic employed pursuant to a contract, subcontract, loan, 
     grant or other agreement which incorporates the provision 
     required by section 1, or an organization authorized by such 
     laborer or mechanic to represent the laborer or mechanic, who 
     has not been paid in full therefor shall have the right to 
     sue the contractor and/or subcontractor and the contractors' 
     sureties for the amount, or balance thereof, unpaid and, if 
     the violations were willful, for an additional equal amount 
     as liquidated damages, and to prosecute said action to final 
     execution and judgment for the sum or sums justly due the 
     laborer or mechanic. A copy of the complaint shall be served 
     on the Secretary of Labor. Such an action shall be commenced 
     not later than 180 days after the day on which the last labor 
     was performed under the contract with respect to which the 
     action is brought, except that such time allowed for 
     commencement shall be tolled if the contract is under 
     investigation or review, including review of the 
     applicability of the Act to the contract, by the Secretary of 
     Labor pursuant to section 2(b) of this Act. In such an action 
     it shall be no defense that such laborers and mechanics 
     accepted or agreed to accept less than the required rate of 
     wages or voluntarily made refunds. Any action that 
     requires a determination of the applicability of the Act 
     shall first be referred by the Court to the Secretary of 
     Labor for the opportunity to make a decision pursuant to 
     paragraph (b)(2) of this section. No action may be brought 
     or maintained under this paragraph by a laborer or 
     mechanic with respect to the laborers' or mechanics' wages 
     if an administrative proceeding or judicial action has 
     been brought by the Secretary for the payment of wages 
     alleged due such laborers or mechanics.
       ``(2) Action.--Every suit instituted under paragraph (c)(1) 
     shall be brought in the United States District Court for the 
     district in which the contract was performed, where the 
     contractor or subcontractor is currently doing business, or 
     where the contractor or subcontractor maintains its payroll 
     records, irrespective of the amount in controversy in such 
     suit.
       ``(3) Attorney's Fee.--The Court in any action brought 
     under paragraph (c)(1) shall, in addition to any judgment 
     awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable 
     attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant and the cost of 
     the action.''

     SEC. 3. AMENDMENTS TO THE COPELAND ACT.

       Section 2 of the Act of June 13, 1934, 48 Stat. 948, as 
     amended, commonly referred to as the ``Copeland Act'', 40 
     U.S.C. 276c, is amended to read a follows:
       ``(a) The Secretary of Labor shall make reasonable 
     regulations for contractors and subcontractors engaged in the 
     construction, prosecution, completion or repair and/or 
     alteration of buildings or works subject to the Davis-Bacon 
     Act, as amended (40 U.S.C. 276a et seq.), or to the 
     requirement of payment of wages determined in accordance with 
     the Davis-Bacon Act. The regulations shall include 
     provisions: (1) requiring contractors and subcontractors to 
     submit along with each payment request under the contract a 
     signed statement certifying that all persons employed in the 
     performance of work under the contract have been paid the 
     full amount of wages earned without deductions, except as 
     permitted by regulations under this act, during the period 
     covered by the payment request and certifying that all 
     payroll records maintained and/or submitted by the contractor 
     or subcontractor under subsections (b) and (c) of this 
     section are correct and accurate, and (2) requiring lessors 
     to submit monthly during the period of construction subject 
     to prevailing wage provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act a signed 
     statement certifying that all persons employed in performance 
     of work under the contract have been paid the full amount of 
     wages earned without deductions, except as permitted by 
     regulations under this Act, during the period covered by the 
     payment request and certifying that all payroll records 
     maintained and/or submitted by the contractor or 
     subcontractor under subsections (b) and (c) of this section 
     are correct and accurate. Section 1001 of title 18 of the 
     United States Code (Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure) 
     shall apply to such statements.
       ``(b) Such regulations shall provide, among other things,
       ``(1) in the case of contracts which exceed $100,000 (as 
     adjusted under section (b)(3) of 40 U.S.C. 276a), that all 
     contractors and subcontractors, unless waived by the 
     Secretary of Labor, shall furnish with respect to persons 
     employed in such work not later than the 10th day of each 
     month a payroll statement which sets forth at least the 
     following information for each person for each payroll period 
     ending during the preceding calendar month: the name, 
     address, social security number, employment classification, 
     number of hours worked daily and during the payroll period, 
     hourly rates of wages paid (including rates of contributions 
     or costs anticipated for bona fide fringe benefits), all 
     deductions made, and actual wages paid, and
       ``(2) procedures for waiving the requirement for submission 
     of monthly payroll statements based on criteria established 
     by the Secretary of Labor. Such criteria shall include, but 
     are not limited to, the contractor or subcontractor (A) has 
     never been debarred for disregarding its obligations to 
     employees under the Act of March 3, 1931, 46 Stat. 1494, as 
     amended, commonly referred to as the ``Davis-Bacon Act'' or 
     any other labor standards statute, (B) has demonstrated a 
     thorough knowledge of the requirements of the Davis-Bacon Act 
     through a history of compliance with the requirements of the 
     Davis-Bacon Act over a substantial period of time, and (C) 
     has otherwise demonstrated through performance that it is a 
     responsible contractor.
       ``(c)(1) Each contractor and subcontractor shall maintain 
     payroll and other basic records relating to payroll as 
     required by regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and 
     shall preserve such records for a period of three years after 
     completion of the contract work.
       ``(2) The contractor or subcontractor shall submit payroll 
     and related records to the contracting officer or the 
     authorized representatives of the Secretary of Labor upon 
     request, and make payroll and related records available 
     for inspection upon request. If a contractor or 
     subcontractor fails to make records available in a timely 
     manner as required herein, the Secretary of Labor or 
     authorized representatives or the contracting officer may 
     suspend all payments to the contractor or subcontractor. 
     Any statement provided under this section, excepting 
     social security numbers, may be obtained by any person 
     from any department, agency, or contracting authority 
     which is required by law, regulation, or the terms of a 
     contract, grant, or other agreement, to maintain a record 
     of such statement without regard to the provisions of 
     section 552 of title 5, United States Code.
       ``(3) The Secretary of Labor may require by subpoena 
     testimony and the production of payroll and related record 
     access to which is provided by this section. Any such 
     subpoena in the case of contumacy or refusal to obey, shall 
     be enforceable by order of an appropriate United States 
     district court.
       ``(4) The Secretary of Labor may debar contractors, 
     subcontractors or other persons pursuant to section 3(a)(2) 
     of the Davis-Bacon Act who fail to submit payroll records 
     when requested to do so or who fail or refuse to make payroll 
     records available for inspection, including contractors and 
     subcontractors who fail to retain required records, or who 
     maintain or provide false payroll records.
       ``(5) Any contractor, subcontractor or other person whose 
     duty it shall be to employ, direct, or control any laborer or 
     mechanic employed in the performance of any contract to which 
     this Act applies who other than inadvertently provides false 
     payroll records to the Government under any mechanism 
     provided for in this section, shall be subject to a fine of 
     not to exceed $25,000, or by imprisonment for not more than 
     one year, or both, in the discretion of the court having 
     jurisdiction thereof.
       ``(d) This section shall not apply to any contract or 
     project that is exempted by its size from the application of 
     the Act of March 3, 1931, 46 Stat. 1494, as amended, commonly 
     referred to as the ``Davis-Bacon Act'', 40 U.S.C. 276a et 
     seq.''

     SEC. 4. CONTRACT WORK HOURS AND SAFETY STANDARDS ACT.

       The Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act, as 
     amended (40 U.S.C. 327-333) is amended--
       (1) by striking, in subsection 330(a), ``Comptroller 
     General of the United States'' and substituting ``Secretary 
     of Labor'';
       (2) by striking, in subsection 333(d)(1), ``Comptroller 
     General'' and substituting ``General Services 
     Administration''; and
       (3) by amending subsection 333(d)(2) to read as follows:
       ``(2) The General Services Administration shall include 
     each name so transmitted on the governmentwide List of 
     Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement or Nonprocurement 
     Programs. No contract shall be awarded to the person or firm 
     appearing on the list or to any firm, corporation, 
     partnership, or association in which such person or firm has 
     a substantial interest until three years have elapsed from 
     the date the persons' or firms' name is entered on the 
     electronic version of the list.''

     SEC. 5. SERVICE CONTRACT ACT.

       The Service Contract Act, Pub. L. 89-286, as amended (41 
     U.S.C. 351(a)), is amended--
       (1) by striking, in subsection 4(d), ``, if authorized by 
     the Secretary,'' and ``not exceeding five,'';
       (2) by amending subsection (a) of section 5 to read as 
     follows:
       ``(a) The Secretary is directed to provide the names of 
     persons or firms that the Secretary has found to have 
     violated this Act to the General Services Administration for 
     inclusion on the governmentwide List of Parties Excluded from 
     Federal Procurement or Nonprocurement Programs. Unless the 
     Secretary determines otherwise because of unusual 
     circumstances, no contract of the United States shall be 
     awarded to the person or firm appearing on this list or to 
     any firm, corporation, partnership, or association in which 
     such person or firm has a substantial interest until three 
     years have elapsed from the date the persons' or firms' name 
     is entered on the electronic version of the list.''
       (3) by striking paragraph (2) of section 7 and 
     redesignating paragraphs (3) through (7) as (2) through (6).

     SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       This Act shall apply to all contracts entered into pursuant 
     to negotiations concluded or invitations for bid issued on or 
     after 180 days from the date of enactment of this Act.
                                  ____


   Federal Acquisition Labor Law Improvement Act of 1994--Section-by-
                            Section Analysis


                         section 1--short title

       Section 1 provides that the proposed Act may be cited as 
     the ``Federal Acquisition Labor Law Improvement Act of 
     1994.''


              section 2--amendments to the davis-bacon act

       Section 2 amends provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act to 
     address the following issues:

                        Designation of locality

       Subsection (a)(1)(A) of Section 1 of the Act (40 U.S.C. 
     276a) as amended deletes all reference to ``city, town, 
     village, or other political subdivision of the State'' and 
     substitutes in its place ``in the locality where the work is 
     performed''. This change conforms the language of the Davis-
     Bacon Act and the Service Contract Act and gives the 
     Department of Labor greater flexibility for establishing wage 
     determinations.

                    Authorized deductions from wages

       Subsection (a)(1)(B)(iii) of Section 1 of the Act (40 
     U.S.C. 276a) as amended requires contractors and 
     subcontractors to pay laborers and mechanics unconditionally 
     at least weekly and without subsequent deduction or rebate. A 
     new exception from the broader language prohibiting 
     subsequent deductions or rebates on any account has been made 
     for deductions authorized by section 186(c)(4) of title 29 
     U.S.C. to accommodate union job targeting programs. Section 
     186(c)(4) allows employers to deduct union initiation fees, 
     dues and assessments from the wages of employees and remit 
     such amounts to a labor organization, provided that the 
     employer has received a written authorization for each 
     employee on whose account deductions are made. However, this 
     new exception in no way otherwise limits the Secretary of 
     Labor's authority to permit reasonable deductions pursuant to 
     regulations issued under section 2 of the Copeland Act (40 
     U.S.C. 276c).

                       Definition of site of work

       Subsection (a)(1)(C) of Section 1 of the Act (40 U.S.C. 
     276a) as amended applies the Act's requirements to laborers 
     and mechanics employed by the contractor or subcontractor to 
     work directly upon the site of the work, including work at 
     fabrication plants, batch plants, tool yards and other 
     similar facilities that are dedicated exclusively, or nearly 
     so, to the performance of the contract work. This language 
     essentially codifies the Department of Labor's ``site of the 
     work'' regulations for activities performed by employees 
     of a contractor or subcontractor at facilities dedicated 
     exclusively, or nearly so, to the contract work but which 
     are not located on the project site. The language change 
     does not, however, extend the Act's coverage provisions to 
     previously established fabrication plants, batch plants, 
     tool yards and similar facilities of a contractor, 
     subcontractor or material supplier whose location and 
     continuance in operation are determined wholly without 
     regard to the contract work, even where the operations for 
     a period of time may be dedicated exclusively, or nearly 
     so, to the performance of the contract. These changes 
     nullify the effects of the Court of Appeals decision in 
     Ball, Ball and Brosamer, Inc. No. 92-5366, June 10, 1994.
       The Act will also apply to laborers and mechanics, 
     including truckdrivers, employed by the contractor or a 
     subcontractor to transport materials, supplies, and equipment 
     to and/or from the site of the work including between the 
     actual construction location and fabrication plants, batch 
     plants, tool yards or similar facilities that are dedicated 
     exclusively, or nearly so, to construction of the project. 
     This language essentially reinstates the Department of 
     Labor's long-standing rule covering truck drivers employed by 
     contractors and subcontractors who haul materials and 
     supplies to or from a Davis-Bacon covered site. The language 
     change does not, however, extend the Act's provisions to 
     truckdrivers employed by a bona-fide material supplier or 
     bona-fide independent trucking company, when hired by 
     contractors or subcontractors, if the truck drivers are 
     transporting materials or supplies to the site of the work 
     from a previously established permanent facility. These 
     changes nullify the effects of the Court of Appeals decision 
     in Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO v. 
     United States Department of Labor, 932 F. 2d 985 (D.C. Cir. 
     1991) but not the Court of Claims decision in H. B. Zachry 
     Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 115, 344 F. 2d 352 (1965).

                           Covered contracts

       Subsection (b)(1) of section 1 of the Act (40 U.S.C. 276a) 
     as amended replaces the current single coverage threshold of 
     $2,000 with a threshold of $100,000 for contracts for new 
     construction, complete rehabilitation or reconstruction 
     (including painting and decorating) of public buildings and 
     public works, and a $50,000 threshold for contracts for 
     repairs and/or alterations (including painting and 
     decorating) of public buildings and works.
       The thresholds are established solely for purposes of 
     determining whether the statute applies to projects and are 
     not determinative of the nature of projects for wage 
     determination purposes. Thus, separate wage schedules need 
     not be developed or issued for new construction, 
     rehabilitation or reconstruction versus repair and 
     alteration.
       In defining the terms the Secretary shall consider the term 
     ``new construction'' to mean the initial construction of any 
     building or work or the initial construction of an addition 
     or extension to an existing building or work (e.g., adding a 
     new wing or additional floors to an existing building). The 
     term ``complete rehabilitation or reconstruction'' shall be 
     defined to mean the complete renovation, rehabilitation or 
     reconstruction of an existing building or work.
       Subsection (b)(2) of section 1 of the Act (40 U.S.C. 276a) 
     as amended applies to contracts to which the United States or 
     District of Columbia is a party for the new construction, 
     complete rehabilitation or reconstruction of any building or 
     work which is so constructed, rehabilitated or reconstructed 
     for lease to, and in preparation for occupancy and use by, 
     the United States or the District of Columbia where such 
     contract provides for an average annual rental in excess of 
     $100,000, provided, that any use of the building or work 
     other than by the United States or the District of Columbia 
     will be functionally or quantitatively incidental to the 
     Government's use and occupancy. Where the building to be 
     constructed will be occupied by tenants other than the 
     Government, the construction of the building would be covered 
     only if the use by the other tenants would be functionally or 
     quantitatively incidental to the Government's use. In other 
     words, the tenants' use would be functionally incidental if 
     it served the Government or its employees--e.g., physical 
     fitness or other athletic facilities, child care centers, 
     credit unions, retail space such as cafeterias, restaurants 
     or dry cleaners. The other tenants' use would be incidental 
     in a quantitative sense if it were a relatively small 
     proportion of the usable space, in relation to the space 
     leased to the Government. It is anticipated that regulations 
     of the Secretary will set clearer parameters for these 
     criteria.
       The Act will not apply to repairs or alterations, including 
     painting and decorating, of any leased buildings or works 
     performed by the lessor within the general scope and under 
     the terms and conditions of the lease. Repairs and 
     alterations performed by the lessor which are within the 
     general scope of the lease are those which should be regarded 
     as fairly and reasonably within the contemplation of the 
     parties when the lease was entered into. Construction or 
     repairs and alterations, including painting and decorating, 
     that fall outside the general scope of the lease, even if 
     they are performed by the lessor under a supplemental 
     agreement to the lease, would be treated as a new procurement 
     subject to the Act if the criteria in subsection (b)(1) of 
     the Act are met. The principles of Federal procurement law 
     will apply in determining whether work is outside the general 
     scope of the lease contract.
       Subsection (b)(3) of section 1 of the Act (40 U.S.C. 276a) 
     as amended applies prospectively to new enacted statutes that 
     provide Federal assistance unless exempted or otherwise 
     limited by Federal law if the amount of Federal assistance 
     provided for the project exceeded $100,000 for new 
     construction or $50,000 for repairs and alterations.
       Subsection (b)(4) of section 1 of the Act (40 U.S.C. 276a), 
     as amended, provides a mechanism for periodic (every 5 years) 
     adjustments of the threshold based on inflation.
       Subsection (b)(5) of section 1 of the Act (40 U.S.C. 276a) 
     as amended prohibits splitting contracts to avoid the 
     threshold.
       Subsection (b)(6) of section 1 of the Act (40 U.S.C. 276a) 
     as amended deals with preemption and makes it clear that 
     application of the Act would not preempt requirements of 
     State or local laws related to the payment of wages. 
     Contractors would have to comply with Davis-Bacon and State 
     or local laws unless compliance with State or local law would 
     make it impossible to comply with Federal law in which case 
     the Contractor would comply with Federal law.

                              Enforcement

       Section 3 of the Act (40 U.S.C. 276a-2(a)) is retitled and 
     revised to enhance the enforcement provisions by: (1) 
     establishing provisions for the Secretary of Labor to review 
     an agency determination regarding the applicability of the 
     Act to particular contracts; (2) providing for liquidated 
     damages in an amount equal to the amount of unpaid wages for 
     willful violations; (3) specifically authorizing the 
     Secretary of Labor to bring action against the contractor, 
     the contractor's sureties or other responsible parties for 
     payment of wages; (4) providing for funds withheld to be 
     placed in an interest bearing account until disposition of 
     the funds is administratively or judicially resolved; (5) 
     authorizing the Secretary of Labor to pay laborers and 
     mechanics directly from funds withheld under contracts; (6) 
     authorizing the Secretary of Labor instead of the Comptroller 
     General to debar contractors for violations of the Act; (7) 
     providing for listing of debarred parties on the 
     Governmentwide list maintained by the General Services 
     Administration; and (8) providing laborers and mechanics a 
     private right of action. Such actions will be filed in United 
     States District Court. The private right of action provision 
     allows for the Court to provide for payment of reasonable 
     attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant and the cost of 
     the action.


               section 3--amendments to the copeland act

       Section 3 amends the Copeland Act to eliminate the current 
     requirement for submission of weekly payroll data on all 
     covered contracts of $100,000 or less (repair and alteration 
     contracts over $50,000). For contract in excess of $100,000 
     (to be adjusted every 5 years to reflect inflation) the 
     frequently for submission of weekly payroll data is changed 
     from weekly to monthly. In addition, the Act is amended to 
     provide for the Secretary of Labor to issue regulations which 
     will provide procedures for waiving the requirement for 
     monthly payroll data submission for contractors or 
     subcontractors with a demonstrated history of compliance. 
     These changes will significantly benefit the procurement 
     community by reducing the flow of paper to the contracting 
     agencies and reduce the paperwork burden on contractors and 
     subcontractors. Contractors will, however, be required to 
     certify with each payment request submitted to the 
     contracting agency that employees have been properly 
     compensated and that their payrolls, either maintained or 
     submitted, are correct.
       Section 3 also amends the Copeland Act to enhance the 
     enforcement mechanisms by (1) requiring the contractor to 
     maintain records for a period of 3 years after completion of 
     the contract, (2) providing for suspension of all payments 
     under the contract for failure to submit payroll and related 
     records upon request by the contracting officer or a 
     representative of the Secretary of Labor, (3) providing 
     the Secretary of Labor authority to subpoena testimony and 
     the production of payroll records, and (4) establishing a 
     penalty of not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment for not 
     more than one year, or both for submission of false 
     payroll records.
       In addition, the Copeland Act is amended to provide for 
     release of monthly payroll statements, excepting social 
     security information, by any department, agency, or 
     contracting authority which is required by law, regulations 
     or terms of a contract or grant to maintain a record of such 
     statement.


 section 4--amendment to the contract work hours and safety standards 
                                  act

       Section 4 amends the Contract Work Hours and Safety 
     Standards Act to provide for the Secretary of Labor rather 
     than the Comptroller General to initiate debarment action for 
     violations of the Act and for the submission of information 
     on debarments to the General Services Administration (GSA) 
     for inclusion on the Governmentwide List of Parties Excluded 
     from Federal Procurement or Nonprocurement Programs. This 
     change will provide for uniformity with other labor laws with 
     respect to the process for withholding and disbursing funds 
     to employees, for debarring violators, and for disseminating 
     information on debarment actions. It will reduce costs by 
     cutting out the Comptroller General. Uniformity in procedures 
     under the various labor laws simplifies matters for 
     contractors, procuring agencies and the Department of Labor. 
     It also resolves possible constitutional issues regarding the 
     role of the Comptroller General.


                    section 5--service contract act

       Section 5 amends the Service Contract Act by eliminating 
     the current 5 year limitation on the period of a contract 
     while retaining the provision for incorporating updated wage 
     determinations in multiyear contracts at least every two 
     years. It also amends the Act to provide for the Secretary of 
     Labor to debar contractors for violations and for use of the 
     Governmentwide list maintained by GSA to disseminate 
     information on debarment actions.


                       section 6--effective date

       Section 6 establishes the effective date of the amendments 
     to the various labor laws.
                                  ____

                                              Office of Management


                                                   and Budget,

                                    Washington, DC, July 26, 1994.
     Hon. Al Gore,
     President of the Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: Enclosed for the consideration of the 
     Congress is a legislative proposal entitled the ``Federal 
     Acquisition Labor Law Improvement Act of 1994.'' A sectional 
     analysis is also enclosed.
       The Administration continues to support the basic 
     protections provided by the Davis-Bacon Act. At the same 
     time, the National Performance Review (NPR) highlighted the 
     need to streamline Davis-Bacon requirements as they apply to 
     Federal procurement. For example, the NPR recommended 
     reducing burdensome reporting requirements and increasing the 
     onerous low threshold for the Act's coverage, which has 
     remained unchanged since 1935. Davis-Bacon streamlining will 
     produce administrative savings and reduce burdens on small 
     construction contractors doing business with the Government.
       The Administration has developed a balanced package of 
     Davis-Bacon reforms, which would achieve streamlining without 
     undercutting the wages of construction workers. The enclosed 
     legislative proposal:
       Raises the threshold for coverage from $2,000 to $100,000 
     for new construction and from $2,000 to $50,000 for repairs 
     and alterations.
       Eliminates more than three quarters of contractors' 
     reporting requirements.
       Prospectively applies Davis-Bacon to federally assisted 
     construction (unless Congress votes otherwise) and introduces 
     an automatic inflation adjustment to the coverage threshold.
       To keep the package balanced, (1) restores traditional 
     Department of Labor policies (recently overturned in court) 
     regarding the definition of the worksite for the purposes of 
     coverage, and (2) establishes a worker-initiated remedy for 
     Davis-Bacon enforcement.
       Provides a statutory standard for the coverage of Davis-
     Bacon in cases of leased construction. The need for such a 
     standard has become more urgent given the recent ruling of 
     the Department of Justice that Davis-Bacon can cover leased 
     buildings.
       This legislative proposal provides a significant 
     opportunity for the first reform of the Davis-Bacon Act in 
     many decades. I urge its prompt and favorable consideration 
     by the Congress.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Alice M. Rivlin,
                                          Acting Director.
                                 ______

      By Mr. DODD (for himself and Mr. Lieberman):
  S. 2329. A bill to settle certain Indian land claims within the State 
of Connecticut, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Indian 
Affairs.


  the mohegan nation of connecticut land claims settlement act of 1994

 Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I introduce the Mohegan Nation of 
Connecticut Land Claims Settlement Act of 1994. I am joined in this 
effort by my good friend and colleague, Senator Joseph Lieberman.
  This legislation can be described as the final leg of a journey that 
began in Colonial times. It was then that white settlers in the Colony 
of Connecticut first encountered and befriended the Mohegan Tribe, a 
band of Indians that dwelled primarily in what is now New London County 
along the banks of the Thames River. Regrettably, in a scenario that 
has become all too familiar in the annals of the history of United 
States-Native American relations, the Mohegans ultimately paid a severe 
price for their willingness to cooperate with the Europeans. They were 
eventually forced onto a reservation, only to find the boundaries of 
that land shrink steadily over time.
  Three hundred years later, descendants of the Mohegans still reside 
in eastern Connecticut, living and working side-by-side with 
descendants of the original Europeans.
  And after a lengthy and complicated process, the modern-day Mohegan 
Tribe has succeeded in documenting their historical and genealogical 
linkages with the original tribe and have satisfied the requirements 
necessary to achieve Federal recognition. I commend the tribe for 
persevering on the administrative recognition process. Challenging 
though it may be, the Mohegan experience illustrates that the 
administrative process does work, and ought to be followed.
  It remains for the Congress, however, to enact legislation to 
extinguish any pending Mohegan land claims. Though most of these claims 
were filed prior to the establishment of the Federal recognition 
process, they continue to cloud land titles in Connecticut to this day.
  The legislation I am about to introduce extinguishes those pending 
land claims. This is an important step--not just for the tribe, but for 
the citizens of Montville as well. Homeowners, many of whom have been 
living with clouded titles for a dozen years or more, will finally have 
peace of mind when they go to sell or refinance their property.
  In addition to the extinguishment provisions, the bill authorizes the 
Secretary of the Interior to accept lands to be taken into trust by the 
United States for the Mohegan Tribe, so that they may establish a 
reservation. Finally, the legislation paves the way for implementation 
of a pair of underlying agreements that the Mohegan Tribe has 
negotiated with the State of Connecticut and the town of Montville, CT, 
respectively.
  With regard to those agreements, I am pleased that the tribe has made 
the effort to sit down with their non-Indian neighbors and work out 
agreements that address the legitimate concerns of those citizens. 
These groups have been and will continue to be neighbors for a very 
long time, and it is in everyone's interest to start off on the right 
foot. To be sure, the future endeavors of the Mohegan Tribe will have 
an impact on the other residents of the town of Montville, and by 
establishing a cooperative relationship at this juncture, the prospect 
for continued mutual respect and collaboration is greatly enhanced.
  These agreements would not have come about without the concerted 
efforts of Mohegan Chief Ralph Sturges and Mayor Wayne Scott of 
Montville. I commend them both for sitting down and forging a positive 
relationship.
  I also want to acknowledge the efforts of my colleague in the House 
of Representatives, Congressman Sam Gejdenson, who introduced this 
measure in the House. I look forward to working with him and my 
colleagues in the Senate to enact this legislation.
                                 ______

      By Mr. ROCKEFELLER (for himself, Mr. Murkowski, Mr. DeConcini, 
        Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Graham, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Daschle, Mr. Campbell, 
        Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Specter, and Mr. Jeffords):
  S. 2330. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to provide 
that undiagnosed illnesses constitute diseases for purposes of 
entitlement of veterans to disability compensation for service-
connected diseases, and for other purposes; to the Committee on 
Veterans' Affairs.


               va compensation for undiagnosed illnesses

 Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, as the chairman of the 
Committee on Veterans' Affairs, I am introducing today S. 2330, a bill 
to amend title 38, United States Code, to clarify that undiagnosed 
illnesses constitute diseases for purposes of entitlement of veterans 
to service-connected disability compensation from the Department of 
Veterans Affairs. I am enormously pleased that all members of the 
Committee on Veterans' Affairs have joined me as original cosponsors of 
this important measure. They are ranking minority member Murkowski and 
Senators DeConcini, Mitchell, Graham, Akaka, Daschle, Campbell, 
Thurmond, Simpson, Specter, and Jeffords.
   Mr. President, this bill would clarify the authority of the 
Department of Veterans Affairs to pay service-connected disability 
compensation to veterans who are clearly disabled as the result of 
illnesses that cannot be diagnosed. The necessity for this measure has 
arisen with respect to compensation for Persian Gulf war veterans.
   Mr. President, I first express my deep concern about the 
Department's failure thus far to compensate certain Persian Gulf war 
veterans who should already be compensated. This problem is the direct 
result of VA's refusal to grant service connection to those veterans 
with clearly disabling conditions who do not have a diagnosable illness 
which VA will recognize as meeting the definition of ``disease.''

  Mr. President, since their service in the Persian Gulf theater of 
operations, many members of the U.S. Armed Forces have experienced 
serious, unexplained health problems that many suspect are related to 
their in-theater service before, during, or after the war. A small 
number also have experienced specific health problems that clearly are 
related to this service, such as leishmaniasis, which results from 
infection by a known tropical parasite.
  In the past year or so, there has been a great deal of attention paid 
to the mysterious illnesses experienced by Persian Gulf veterans. 
Veterans and active-duty servicemembers have reported chronic symptoms 
such as joint pain, debilitating fatigue, hair loss, impaired memory, 
and skin rashes. Often, these afflictions are broadly referred to as 
``Persian Gulf Syndrome'' or ``Gulf War Syndrome.'' Whatever their 
source or cause, these symptoms have led to varying degrees of 
disability for numerous veterans.
  At first, much of the focus was on the effects of the burning oil 
from wells in Kuwait set afire by Iraqi troops. More recently, the 
focus has expanded to include the potential health effects of other 
chemical exposures during military operations in the Persian Gulf, as 
well as the experimental drugs and vaccines that were administered to 
hundreds of thousands of servicemembers.
  Congress, VA, and the Department of Defense have taken a number of 
actions to address the problems facing Persian Gulf veterans. 
Legislation has required VA and DOD to conduct health examinations and 
establish registries of Persian Gulf war veterans, in an effort to 
record and track any health problems. The registries are meant to 
preserve information about these troops that could prove vital in 
assessing the health impact of the various exposures in the Gulf. The 
examinations and registries are intended to give the Federal Government 
an opportunity to observe and monitor the health of these veterans, in 
an effort to allow for valid, long-term, scientific study of these 
reported medical problems--without immediately reaching any conclusions 
about specific conditions or mandating any particular studies.
  Congress also required VA and DOD to seek to enter into a contract 
with the National Academy of Sciences' Medical Follow-Up Agency [MFUA] 
to review the existing scientific, medical, and other information on 
the health consequences of military service in the Persian Gulf theater 
of operations. Under this provision, MFUA also would assess the 
effectiveness of efforts by VA and DOD to collect and maintain 
information potentially useful for assessing these health consequences. 
Finally, MFUA would evaluate and recommend whether there is a 
scientific basis for VA and DOD to undertake an epidemiological study 
or studies, and, if so, what types of studies would be appropriate.

  In April 1994, the National Institutes of Health held a workshop on 
the health effects of service in the Persian Gulf. This workshop was 
cosponsored by VA, DOD, and other Federal agencies. Unfortunately, the 
experts on the panel did not have sufficient information to draw 
conclusions about the causes of the symptoms being experienced by 
Persian Gulf war veterans.
  Mr. President, while all of these actions are being taken, there are 
many veterans who continue to suffer from disabilities resulting from 
their Persian Gulf service, yet nevertheless remain uncompensated.
  VA maintains that current law does not authorize the Department to 
compensate any veterans who do not have diagnosable illnesses--even if 
symptoms first showed up during service. VA will not award compensation 
because there is no diagnosis of a defined disease on the veteran's 
medical examination report.
  Mr. President, sections 1110 and 1131 of title 38, United States 
Code, state that the Federal Government will pay compensation for a 
disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease 
contracted in line of duty * * *. Nothing in the law requires that a 
disability must consist of a specific diagnosed condition in order to 
be awarded service connection and subsequently rated for purposes of 
determining the amount of the compensation payment. The requirement of 
a diagnosed condition is one imposed by VA for purposes of adjudicating 
claims for service-connected disability compensation. This may be 
convenient for VA, but it is not a requirement of the law.
  I simply cannot understand why VA takes the position it does 
concerning compensation for Persian Gulf veterans, particularly in 
light of the Department's duty, under section 1154 of title 38, to 
resolve every reasonable doubt in favor of combat veterans and 
generally to apply the ``reasonable doubt doctrine'' in every case, 
under section 3.102 of title 38, Code of Federal Regulations.
  Mr. President, I remain firm in the belief that the Department has 
sufficient legal authority under existing law to fully remedy this 
situation. The full membership of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs 
shares this view, as reflected in a June 9, 1994, letter from all 
members of the Committee to Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Jesse Brown, 
in which we urged him to take action to compensate Persian Gulf 
veterans without delay. Nevertheless, correspondence and discussions 
over the past few weeks between the Committee and VA have indicated 
that the Department remains unconvinced of this authority. Therefore, 
legislation is required.

  Mr. President, this bill is intended to solve this stalemate by 
affirming VA's authority to pay compensation for a disability that 
happens to result from an illness that has no defined diagnosis. This 
bill would afford a broad approach to addressing the problem of 
compensation for Persian Gulf veterans. Because it would affirm VA's 
general authority related to service connection for disabilities, it 
would apply to all veterans with chronic, undiagnosed illnesses, not 
only to Persian Gulf veterans.
  Mr. President, this bill would amend sections 1110 and 1131 of title 
38 to clarify that the term ``disease'' for purposes of eligibility for 
disability compensation includes undiagnosed illnesses. The bill also 
would amend section 1154 of title 38 to require that VA regulations 
governing the determination of service connection include consideration 
of any military experiences or medical symptoms that a veteran may have 
in common with other veterans whose service was similar to the 
veteran's. For example, in the case of Persian Gulf veterans, VA would 
be required to take into consideration the similarity of the 
constellation of medical symptoms suffered by so many Persian Gulf 
veterans. Such similarities, while not explained, must be attributed to 
more than mere coincidence and these veterans must be given the benefit 
of the doubt.
  Mr. President, section 1101 of title 38 sets out a list of specific 
chronic diseases that may be service-connected on a presumptive basis 
under section 1112(a) if they show up within a year after the veteran 
leaves service. Section 1101 also gives the Secretary authority to 
establish presumptive service connection for such other chronic 
diseases as the Secretary may add to this list. The clarification of 
current law contained in the measure introduced today, along with the 
provision in section 1101 that allows the Secretary to add chronic 
diseases to the list, would provide the Secretary with all the tools 
needed to compensate Persian Gulf veterans for undiagnosed illnesses.
  Mr. President, I regret that this situation requires a legislative 
remedy. However, I strongly believe this measure is the appropriate 
action to take if the Department will not correct this problem on its 
own. This bill would provide clarification of VA's existing authority 
to award service connection for disabilities resulting from undiagnosed 
conditions, without expanding or changing that authority. Of the 
various legislative options available, I believe this is the preferable 
approach because it avoids micromanagement of the Department by 
Congress, and validates VA's authority to make decisions concerning 
service connection for specific conditions.

  Congress should not be in the business of legislating service 
connection for every new disease that results from service in 
particular wars or military conflicts. This measure leaves the 
discretion for such decisions to VA, where it rightfully belongs. Only 
when VA fails to act properly in carrying out its obligations with 
respect to compensating veterans for service-related disabilities 
should Congress step in and take some corrective action.
  This measure will not resolve all of the problems faced by Persian 
Gulf veterans. There are still many unanswered questions concerning the 
health effects of the chemical exposures in the Persian Gulf and 
whether conditions that take a longer time to show up can be connected 
to Persian Gulf service. However, as it has been noted previously in 
this debate, we will have to wait for the scientific and medical 
evidence to provide us with answers. In the meantime, VA can and should 
be acting with respect to at least some of the affected veterans. This 
bill will ensure that VA is able to do just that.
  Mr. President, my hope is that we can enact this measure quickly, so 
that VA can begin to compensate all veterans who are suffering from 
undiagnosed, service-connected conditions that have left them severely 
disabled. These deserving veterans should not be penalized simply 
because their diseases have no name. They are sick because of their 
military service, and therefore should receive compensation from the 
government they served so bravely.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2330

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of 
     Representatives of the United States of America in 
     Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. CLARIFICATION OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNDIAGNOSED 
                   ILLNESS AND DISEASE FOR PURPOSES OF ENTITLEMENT 
                   TO DISABILITY COMPENSATION.

       (a) Wartime Disability Compensation.--Section 1110 of title 
     38, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(a)'' before ``For disability''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(b) For the purposes of this section, the term `disease', 
     in the case of an individual, means any deviation from or 
     interruption of the normal structure or function of any part, 
     organ, or system of the body of the individual that is 
     manifested by a symptom or sign (or symptoms or signs) the 
     etiology, pathology, and prognosis for which is known or 
     unknown.''.
       (b) Peacetime Disability Compensation.--Section 1131 of 
     such title is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(a)'' before ``For disability''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(b) For the purposes of this section, the term `disease', 
     in the case of an individual, means any deviation from or 
     interruption of the normal structure or function of any part, 
     organ, or system of the body of the individual that is 
     manifested by a symptom or sign (or symptoms or signs) the 
     etiology, pathology, and prognosis for which is known or 
     unknown.''.
       (c) Consideration of Circumstances of Service.--Subsection 
     (a) of section 1154 of such title is amended to read as 
     follows:
       ``(a) The Secretary shall include in the regulations 
     pertaining to service-connection of disabilities the 
     following provisions:
       ``(1) Additional provisions requiring that due 
     consideration be given in each case where a veteran is 
     seeking service-connection for a disability and where such 
     consideration might materially assist the veteran in 
     establishing such service-connection to--
       ``(A) the places, types, and circumstances of such 
     veteran's service as shown by such veteran's service record, 
     the official history of each organization in which the 
     veteran served, such veteran's medical records, and all 
     pertinent medical and lay evidence; and
       ``(B) the common or shared experiences, medical symptoms or 
     signs, or both, of other veterans (including groups of 
     veterans) who--
       ``(i) were engaged in service similar to the service of 
     such veteran; and
       ``(ii) exhibit, or have exhibited since such service, 
     medical symptoms or signs similar to the medical symptoms or 
     signs of such veteran.
       ``(2) The provisions required by section 5 of the Veterans' 
     Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act (38 
     U.S.C. 1154 note).''.
 Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, as Senator Rockefeller has 
outlined in his statement, the legislation being introduced today 
reaffirms the authority of the Department of Veterans Affairs [VA] to 
compensate Persian Gulf veterans who suffer illnesses which physicians 
and scientists do not yet fully understand. As the ranking minority 
member of the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee, I speak on this 
legislation with mixed feelings.
  Certainly, I am committed to the principle that Persian Gulf veterans 
who suffer mysterious maladies must receive the compensation to which 
they are entitled. Equally, I am committed to the principle that 
Persian Gulf veterans who are ill must receive compensation now--even 
though medical professionals, scientists, and VA officials have not yet 
been able to agree on the ``diagnostic codes'' into which they might 
cubby hole the very real maladies which, all now seem to agree, some 
Persian Gulf veterans are suffering.
  In light of my commitment to Persian Gulf veterans, I am pleased to 
join Senator Rockefeller in cosponsoring this legislation. I am 
pleased, as well, to be able to say that all of the Republican members 
of the committee have joined in co-sponsoring this bill.
  As I have stated however, I do have mixed feelings about this 
legislation because I think it is unnecessary, and I think VA delay 
while waiting for unnecessary legislation is unconscionable. The 
members of the Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee are of the unanimous 
view, as expressed in a letter to VA dated June 6, 1994, that the VA 
already has authority to compensate Persian Gulf veterans. Senator 
Rockefeller and I reaffirmed our view, in a letter published in the 
July 13, 1994 edition of the Washington Post, that the existence of 
Persian Gulf ailments--not their cause, diagnosis or scientific name--
is what matters when it comes to the issue of whether Persian Gulf 
veterans should be compensated. In that letter, Senator Rockefeller and 
I said that ``it doesn't matter if the cause of the [Persian Gulf] 
health problem is a toxin, a virus, a psychosomatic reaction to the 
stress of deployment or of combat or forever unknown. If a veteran went 
over healthy and came back sick, the VA's mandate is, to paraphrase 
Abraham Lincoln, to care for those who have borne the battle.''
  In my view, Mr. President, VA has lost sight of this fundamental 
tenet. The fact that VA may not yet fully understand gulf war illnesses 
is not a good reason for denying compensation. Nor should the fact that 
medical science has not yet developed ``diagnostic codes'' by which it 
might label Persian Gulf illnesses. ``Diagnostic codes,'' to my way of 
thinking, are mere administrative conveniences under which doctors can 
classify sick persons. The existence of ``diagnostic codes'' is not a 
necessary prerequisite to a medical finding those persons are, in fact, 
sick. The fact that a Persian Gulf veteran came back from the gulf 
sick--not the label we attach to that sickness--is what matters. No 
amount of legal hair splitting ought to distract us, or the VA, from 
that fundamental fact.
  Unfortunately, Mr. President, the committee has not succeeded in 
persuading VA that the scope of its current legal authority allows it 
to proceed. No practical purpose would be served in further arguing the 
point with VA, since VA lawyers have apparently convinced the Secretary 
of Veterans Affairs that he cannot take decisive action without 
legislation. Thus, Senator Rockefeller and I--supported by a bipartisan 
coalition of Veterans' Affairs committee members--offer this 
legislation today. We request the support of our colleagues, noting 
that the bill will grant to VA clear and unmistakable--and generic--
authority to determine in the future which diseases and conditions 
ought to give rise to compensation. It will thereby get Congress out of 
the business of making such determinations on a disease by disease 
basis.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the texts of the two 
letters I have mentioned in this statement--a letter to the Secretary 
of Veterans Affairs, dated June 6, 1994, and a letter to the Washington 
Post, dated June 29, 1994, be printed in the Record at this point.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                                      U.S. Senate,


                               Committee on Veterans' Affairs,

                                     Washington, DC, June 9, 1994.
     Hon. Jesse Brown,
     Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
       Dear Jesse: We are deeply concerned about the Department's 
     failure to adequately meet the needs of Persian Gulf War 
     veterans, a goal we know you share. This problem is the 
     direct result of VA's refusal to grant service connection to 
     those veterans with clearly disabling conditions but for whom 
     VA has not made, or recognized, a diagnosis which VA 
     considers adequate to meet the regulatory definition of 
     disability or disease.
       We strongly believe that the Department has sufficient 
     legal authority under existing law to fully remedy this 
     shortcoming, and urge you to do so without delay.
       We have received information indicating there are a 
     significant number of Persian Gulf veterans who allege 
     service connection based on exposure to environmental hazards 
     in the Persian Gulf, and there is no question that the 
     veteran is disabled. However, VA will not award compensation 
     because it lacks a diagnostic code to place on the medical 
     examination report. There simply is no excuse for this.
       We applaud your support for legislation that would require 
     VA to pay compensation to Persian Gulf veterans who suffer 
     from a chronic disability resulting from an undiagnosed 
     illness if the disability manifested itself to a degree of at 
     least 10 percent within 2 years after the veteran left 
     Southwest Asia. However, we nevertheless maintain that you do 
     not need additional legislative authority to provide 
     compensation to those veterans who are clearly disabled.
       Section 1110 of title 38, United States Code, states that 
     the federal government will pay compensation for a 
     ``disability resulting from personal injury suffered or 
     disease contracted in line of duty, . . .'' Nothing in the 
     law requires that a ``disability'' must consist of a 
     diagnosed condition in order to be awarded service connection 
     and subsequently rated for purposes of determining the amount 
     of the compensation payment. The regulatory requirement of a 
     diagnosed condition is one imposed by VA for purposes of 
     adjudicating claims for service-connected disability 
     compensation. While it may be a matter of convenience to VA, 
     it is not a requirement of the law.
       We are at a loss to understand why VA would take the 
     position it does with respect to these claims, in light of 
     VA's obligation under section 1154 of title 38, to resolve 
     every reasonable doubt in favor of combat veterans and 
     generally to apply the ``reasonable doubt doctrine'' in every 
     case under section 3.102 of title 38, Code of Federal 
     Regulations.
       Whether VA takes action to provide compensation to Persian 
     Gulf War veterans on an administrative basis or under new 
     legislative authority, there will be cost implications. We 
     are interested in your views on how VA proposes to achieve 
     the necessary savings to offset the cost of an approach such 
     as in H.R. 4386, which we understand VA estimates will be $15 
     million per year.
       Mr. Secretary, we know that you are thoroughly committed to 
     providing every possible assistance to the veterans of this 
     most recent war. The issue we have raised certainly provides 
     an opportunity to show this generation of American veterans 
     that the government that sent them to the Persian Gulf stands 
     ready and willing to make sure they get the benefits they 
     have earned through their service. We urge you to look into 
     this issue personally and get back to us as soon as possible.
           Sincerely,
         Jay Rockefeller,
         Ben Nighthorse Campbell,
         Daniel K. Akaka,
         Frank H. Murkowski,
         George Mitchell,
         Al Simpson,
         Bob Graham,
         Dennis DeConini,
         Tom Daschle,
         Jim Jeffords,
         Arlen Specter.
                                  ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                               Committee on Veterans' Affairs,

                                    Washington, DC, June 29, 1994.
     The Editor,
     The Washington Post, Washington, DC.
       Dear Editor: Jim Schnabel, in his column headlined ``Band-
     wagon Syndrome'', missed the point on disability compensation 
     for veterans.
       By law, VA is mandated to compensate for diseases or 
     injuries which are either incurred or aggravated during 
     active duty. The cause of the illness is irrelevant. In the 
     case of ``Persian Gulf Syndrome'', it doesn't matter if the 
     cause of the health problem is a toxin, a virus, a 
     psychosomatic reaction to the stress of deployment or combat, 
     or forever unknown. If a veteran went over healthy and came 
     back sick, VA's mandate is, to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, to 
     care for those who have borne the battle.
       That is why we are astonished at VA's refusal to compensate 
     disabled Persian Gulf veterans unless forced to do so by the 
     Congress.
           Sincerely,
     John D. Rockefeller IV,
       Chairman.
                                               Frank H. Murkowski,
       Ranking Minority Member.

                          ____________________