[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 96 (Thursday, July 21, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 21, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
        ON THE REPORTED SERB REJECTION OF THE BOSNIAN PEACE PLAN

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I rise to express my bitter 
disappointment and frustration with the Bosnian Serbs' apparent 
rejection of the peace plan put forward by the U.N.-sponsored contact 
group.
  This plan had been accepted unconditionally by the Croats and 
Moslems, despite some real concessions that they were required to make. 
Even the brutal Serb leader Milosevic had urged the Bosnian Serbs to 
accept the plan. This was in spite of the take it or leave it message 
from the contact group when they presented this plan to the parties.
  Mr. President, several weeks ago, I voted against the amendment 
requiring the President to immediately and unilaterally lift the arms 
embargo against the Bosnian Moslems. It was an extremely difficult 
vote. The reason I voted against it--even though for several years I 
have said that there needs to be a stronger international effort to 
stop the genocidal violence there--is that I thought the vote several 
weeks ago was based more upon the schedule of the Senate than upon what 
was happening on the ground in Bosnia. I thought it was important to at 
least give the contact group the opportunity to present this proposal 
to the warring parties, and I hoped and I prayed that the Serbs would 
accept it.
  Before casting my vote, which may have been the decisive vote, I did 
ask the majority leader to include in the alternative Nunn-Warner 
amendment some language which made it clear that the President should 
promptly propose a resolution to the Security Council if this peace 
plan was rejected to end the arms embargo, and that if that effort 
failed should immediately consult with the Congress about lifting the 
embargo unilaterally.
  In addition, I asked for a letter from the administration, signed by 
Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, clarifying the 
administration's intention regarding the arms embargo, and committing 
itself to consulting with Congress about unilaterally lifting the 
embargo. I ask unanimous consent that that letter be printed in the 
Record following my statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1).
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, a key commitment made in this letter, 
from my perspective, was the unprecedented agreement to consult with 
the Congress immediately regarding the unilateral termination of the 
embargo should the peace negotiations collapse due to continuing Serb 
resistance, and should the administration's effort to end the embargo 
in the Security Council again fail. If the administration pursued that 
course, and failed to achieve passage of a new resolution at the 
Security Council to lift the embargo, then the administration would 
consult with the Congress about lifting the embargo unilaterally.
  It was with that assurance that I cast my vote last time against 
requiring the President to immediately and unilaterally lift the 
embargo, and in favor of the Nunn-Warner amendment. Though I had some 
real reservations and doubts that this peace process would work, I 
wanted to give it a chance.
  Mr. President, the Serbs have apparently rejected the plan. It is not 
yet completely clear what conditions they may have imposed in their 
response, territorial or constitutional or otherwise, but it appears to 
be a rejection. If so, and if the international community is unwilling 
to lift the embargo and is unwilling to intervene more forcefully, then 
it seems to me we have to act alone to lift the embargo. We have to at 
least provide the Bosnian Moslems an opportunity to defend themselves.
  So, Mr. President, I just want to make it crystal clear that several 
weeks ago I agonized over that vote. I cast the vote that I believed 
in. I wanted to see whether or not there was a chance that this peace 
process would work.
  It seems, based upon the reports we have read, that it could very 
well be collapsing, and if the Serbs have in fact rejected this plan, 
then I certainly would call upon the administration, as essentially was 
said to me in the letter from Strobe Talbott, to move promptly to 
develop a forceful response, including lifting the embargo. I think 
this can be done with the foreign ministers meeting in Geneva scheduled 
for next week. I believe the administration should respond to a clear 
Serb rejection of the plan as they have said they would--by seeking a 
resolution in the U.N. Security Council to end the embargo. If that 
effort fails, then the administration should immediately come to 
Congress to consult about unilaterally ending that embargo, and we 
should act to do so.
  And the next time this issue comes to the Senate floor, if the 
Security Council continues to refuse to lift the embargo, I intend to 
vote accordingly.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1


                                          Department of State,

                                     Washington, DC, July 1, 1994.
     Hon. George J. Mitchell,
     U.S. Senate.
       Dear Senator Mitchell: I am writing to reaffirm the 
     Administration's support for lifting the international arms 
     embargo on the former Yugoslavia imposed by United Nations 
     Security Council Resolution 713 of September 25, 1991. It has 
     been our long-held view that the arms embargo has unfairly 
     and unintentionally penalized the victim in this conflict and 
     that the Security Council should act to remedy this 
     injustice. At the same time, as you know, there has been no 
     international consensus to take this step and acting 
     unilaterally to lift the embargo would have grave policy 
     implications that we would all have to be prepared to live 
     with, were we to take this course.
       That said, in recent days the efforts of the Contact Group 
     have helped to move us significantly closer to an 
     international consensus for lifting the embargo in the event 
     the Bosnian Serbs remain the obstacle to a peace settlement. 
     While there are still some very minor refinements to be made, 
     they will be ironed out early next week, and the peace 
     proposal will be reviewed by foreign ministers in Geneva on 
     July 5 and presented to the parties very shortly afterward as 
     a reasonable basis for a peaceful settlement. Along with this 
     proposal, it is expected that the parties will be presented 
     with a package of incentives and disincentives designed to 
     maximize the chances of their accepting the proposed 
     compromise.
       This package embodies a phased approach that seeks to 
     steadily escalate pressure on the Serbs to agree to the major 
     territorial concessions required by the Contact Group 
     proposal. Due to our very strong insistence, this package 
     includes lifting the arms embargo as one of the possible 
     consequences of a Bosnian Serb rejection of the territorial 
     proposal. In this regard, if we determine after consulting 
     with our Allies and Russia that the Contact Group 
     negotiations have not produced the results we seek, you can 
     be sure that we will take the lead in pressing for 
     implementation of this part of the incentives package. To 
     this end, we would take immediate steps to propose or support 
     a resolution at the United Nations Security Council to 
     terminate the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
     Further, if the Security Council for some reason fails to 
     pass such a resolution, the Administration would consult with 
     Congress immediately thereafter regarding possible further 
     action, including unilateral termination of the arms embargo 
     as called for in the Mitchell amendment to S. 2042 of May 12, 
     1994.
       I hope this clarification of the Administration's 
     intentions regarding the arms embargo on the former 
     Yugoslavia is helpful to you as the Senate considers the 
     implications of unilateral action on the Bosnian arms 
     embargo. The Administration strongly prefers the alternative 
     you have introduced with Senators Nunn, Warner, Kassebaum and 
     Robb to that introduced by Senator Dole and others.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Strobe Talbott,
     Acting Secretary.

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