[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 94 (Tuesday, July 19, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 19, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

  Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I 
call up House Resolution 468 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 468

       Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
     resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule 
     XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
     Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of 
     the bill (H.R. 4299) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 1995 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States Government, the Community 
     Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The 
     first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. General 
     debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one 
     hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and 
     ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence. After general debate the bill shall be 
     considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall 
     be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose 
     of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the 
     nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The 
     committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be 
     considered by title rather than by section. Each title shall 
     be considered as read. Points of order against the committee 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute for failure to comply 
     with clause 7 of rule XVI or clause 5(a) of rule XXI are 
     waived. No amendment to the committee amendment in the nature 
     of a substitute shall be in order unless printed in the 
     portion of the Congressional Record designated for that 
     purpose in clause 6 of rule XXIII before its consideration. 
     At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment 
     the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House 
     with such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may 
     demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted 
     in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous 
     question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and 
     amendments thereto to final passage without intervening 
     motion except one motion to recommit with or without 
     instructions.

                              {time}  1510

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Serrano). The gentleman from California 
[Mr. Beilenson] is recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield 
the customary one-half hour to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] 
pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During 
consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose 
of debate only.
  Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 468 is the rule providing for the 
consideration of H.R. 4299, the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 1995.
  Mr. Speaker, this is an open rule providing 1 hour of general debate, 
equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority 
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  For the purpose of amendment, the rule makes in order the 
Intelligence Committee amendment in the nature of a substitute now 
printed in the bill as an original bill.
  Under the rule, the bill shall be considered by title, with each 
title considered as read.
  Clause 5(a) of rule XXI, prohibiting appropriations in a legislative 
bill, is waived against the committee substitute. The chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee requested this waiver for sections 601 (a) and 
(b) and 806(a), which give authority for the use of appropriated funds 
for purposes different than those for which they were appropriated and 
therefore may constitute a technical violation of the rule mentioned 
above.
  In addition, the rule waives clause 7 of rule XVI, which prohibits 
nongermane amendments, against the committee substitute. The chairman 
of the committee requested this waiver of a point of order that might 
arise because the bill as introduced was narrow in focus and the 
amendment in the nature of a substitute is broader.
  Mr. Speaker, the rule makes in order only those amendments printed in 
the Congressional Record prior to the consideration of the bill. The 
chairman of the Intelligence Committee based his request for this 
notification requirement on the need to recognize the sensitivity 
surrounding the components of the intelligence budget.
  He testified that advance notification of amendments would give the 
committee a chance to help protect the security of sensitive 
information that could be affected by amendments modifying the 
authorization levels in the bill.
  He asked also that the debate on such amendments be carefully 
structured to minimize the risk that classified information will be 
inadvertently disclosed, and testified that directing the debate away 
from classified matters can best be accomplished by an advance 
notification requirement.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, the rule provides one motion to recommit with 
or without instructions.
  Mr. Speaker, H.R. 4299, the bill for which this rule provides 
reconsideration, authorizes funds for all the intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States for the coming 
fiscal year. It also provides legislative authorities for the conduct 
of U.S. intelligence activities which are regularly found in an 
intelligence authorization bill.
  The authorization levels in the bill are classified, but are 
available for review by Members. The amount authorized is 2.2 percent 
less than the President's budget request, but approximately 2.6 percent 
more than last year's appropriated level.
  The bill contains several important provisions, some of which are in 
response to the Ames espionage case which caused so much concern to all 
of us who are interested in the successful operation of the CIA.
  The bill also recognizes the necessity for the entire intelligence 
community to adjust to the post-cold war era. It is obvious that the 
intelligence agencies need to reexamine their overall roles and 
missions in that world and the committee has given the agencies 
guidance in this respect.
  Mr. Speaker, the 1980's were a period of substantial growth in the 
budgets and personnel rolls of U.S. intelligence agencies. That growth 
was felt to be necessary to counter the national security threat posed 
by the Soviet Union.
  With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, 
the primary focus of intelligence activities and the principal 
justification for the intelligence resource levels of the 1980's was 
eliminated. The intelligence community has been struggling since that 
time to define its mission and to properly size itself for the future.
  In the last three authorization bills, the Intelligence Committee has 
attempted to make the intelligence budget reflect the reality of a 
world significantly changed from a national security standpoint, while 
ensuring that the United States maintains its ability to provide timely 
and reliable intelligence to its policymakers and military commanders. 
That approach is continued in this year's bill.
  The committee is bringing the intelligence budget down, but in a 
measured way which preserves essential capabilities and encourages 
investment in the collection and processing systems which will be 
needed in the future. Personnel rolls are being trimmed as well and, as 
a result of actions mandated by Congress 2 years ago, by the end of 
fiscal year 1997, employment levels will be at least 17.5 percent less 
than they were in fiscal year 1992.
  Despite the demise of the Soviet Union, the world clearly remains an 
unpredictable and dangerous place. There is need for effective 
intelligence, especially in light of the world-wide reduction of U.S. 
military personnel. That need, however, does not have to be met by an 
intelligence community of the size and orientation of its cold war 
predecessor.
  The committee's bill continues to provide encouragement for 
intelligence agencies to review their operations, discarding those 
which are no longer necessary, while retaining those which remain 
important. Intelligence support to the military commander is 
emphasized. Special attention is placed as well on providing sufficient 
resources to respond to intelligence challenges on issues such as 
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  Spending throughout the national security establishment has been 
reduced in recent years, and intelligence has been no exception. This 
was inevitable given the significant changes which have occurred in the 
world. It is the Intelligence Committee's judgment that neither the 
reductions made in past years, nor those contained in this year's bill, 
will hinder the ability of the intelligence agencies to respond to 
essential intelligence requirements.
  Mr. Speaker, the Committee on Rules believes this is a good, a fair 
rule, and I urge my colleagues to approve it so that we may proceed 
with consideration of this important bill today.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, it is remarkable, I think, having listened 
closely to my colleague from California, how much in agreement we are 
on this subject. I think that is a very encouraging sign. I think many 
of the remarks that I am about to make are going to seem very similar 
to the remarks the gentleman from California has made, and that pleases 
me because I think we are facing a challenge here.
  Obviously, I am pleased to be able to support an open rule. I have no 
objection to the reasonable requirement included in this rule that 
amendments offered on the intelligence authorization be preprinted in 
the Record. I do not feel that way about preprinting for other bills, 
but intelligence is a little special because of its sensitivity and 
confidentiality and the need to not have surprises here on the floor. I 
think that is an entirely reasonable request and a legitimate one, 
given the importance of protecting classified information.
  I very much doubt if any Member is going to mind the extra review of 
amendments to insure that national security is not compromised in the 
process of this bill. I think we all understand that the national 
security is very significant for us and, unfortunately, we have had 
incidents where it has been compromised in the past.
  The rule also waives certain points of order against the committee 
substitute, supported by the chairman, Mr. Glickman, and our ranking 
member, Mr. Combest.
  Given the complexity of the subject in front of us, I have no 
objection to the technical waivers that have been made. I certainly 
commend the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] and the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Combest] for their work and their interest in having as open 
a debate as possible without jeopardizing national security. And again, 
I think the comments by my colleague from California underscore that we 
have had a good discussion in the Committee on Rules and we have come 
forward with a good product today to deal with this matter.
  I am, however, deeply troubled by the trend that the bill itself 
perpetuates. For the past several years, resources devoted to 
intelligence gathering have been cut repeatedly.

                              {time}  1520

  The authorization levels in this bill are 16 percent below what they 
were in 1992, and total intelligence spending has declined by 20 
percent since 1990. Looking against the national performance review 
standards, I understand the cuts are about double what the target was, 
done on a percentage basis, and the actual dollar amount is a 
significantly greater cut than was actually necessary or called for.
  So, some real sacrifice has been made here, and I am wondering if 
maybe we have not gone too far. Some people might believe that we no 
longer have use for intelligence because the Soviet Union is not there 
anymore as a monolith and because the sweeping changes that have 
transformed Europe are all good. But, as we know, that simply is not 
the case. We have in some ways more challenges for good intelligence 
and for good information for our decisionmakers than we have ever had 
before. The recent crises in North Korea, Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti, and 
Somalia probably all underscore the dangers of attempting to navigate 
the volatile and uncertain waters of global politics without the best 
possible compass and the most accurate and up-to-date charts. I do not 
think we should be fooled by those who say the storm is past and it is 
all smooth sailing ahead. I do not think anybody really believes that. 
We have seen what happens when decisionmakers operate without good 
information delivered in a timely and useful way.

  In fact, Mr. Speaker, it was not that long ago that this Nation 
watched in some puzzlement and embarrassment as the U.S.S. Harlan 
County, loaded with American service people, retreated in haste from 
the docks of Haiti because a band of thugs were menacing them from the 
port. Where was the intelligence? Why did we not have better 
information available to our decisionmakers at the State Department and 
the Pentagon to make a better policy statement and figure that one out 
a little bit better?
  And what about the potentially deadly game of hide and seek we are 
still playing with North Korea over the issue of nuclear weapons? Do we 
really have the necessary resources in place to develop good 
information about the capabilities and the motivation, the motivation 
of the North Koreans? Does anybody really understand Kim Jong-Il, what 
he stands for, and where he is going?
  What about Africa? Recently we read two articles in the newspaper, 
the first outlining how the CIA is planning to scale back its 
operations there by closing 15 stations as a way to absorb budget cuts. 
Five days later another news article quotes President Clinton decrying 
the ``pretty low'' level of understanding Americans have about Africa. 
So, here we have the left hand reducing our ability to get good human 
intelligence, good human information in Africa, while the right hand is 
seeking to improve our understanding of that region. It seems a little 
curious. No wonder people are confused.
  There are some in this Chamber who see no practical use for 
intelligence at all. Perhaps they have watched too many old cloak and 
dagger movies; I do not know. Perhaps they do not understand world 
affairs. But despite the undercurrent of animosity for covert 
operations and classified information, Mr. Speaker, America should be 
reminded that we have for decades been the beneficiaries of constant, 
consistent, accurate information that has made good intelligence. 
Picture a hidden hand guiding decisionmakers through crucial policy 
options and helping to avoid potentially deadly and costly mistakes. Of 
course things do not always go smoothly, and we always read about the 
problems every time there is a high profile policy mistake or a 
security breach. Just about everybody hears about it, just as we have 
all heard about Aldrich Ames and should have heard about Aldrich Ames. 
There are those clamoring to excoriate our intelligence services as a 
result, but we must not give in to that temptation in my view.

  Mr. Speaker, we hear about the mistakes and problems. We rarely hear 
about the averted crises and the success stories for obvious reasons. 
That is the nature of the intelligence business. Those of us who are 
charged with oversight responsibility must remember to make a fair 
judgment about how well the intelligence community is doing, realizing 
that we are never going to be able to have an even playing field to 
talk about the successes.
  Of course, as one who worked in the intelligence community, I agree 
wholeheartedly that management reforms are needed. I will say that 
again. I do believe we need to get at this issue of reform, and I am 
glad for the resolve of the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] in 
ensuring these matters are addressed, which was supported by the 
ranking member, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest]. In that process 
I hope we will also make some necessary changes in the classification 
and declassification process to ensure that the guise of, quote, 
national security, unquote, is not used in vain, while guaranteeing 
truly sensitive material is, in fact, not compromised. This is a very 
difficult balancing act, but it is crucial to ensuring accurate 
information and the protection of the human component of intelligence 
gathering. The people who risk their lives to provide this service do 
not want to risk their lives in vain, and we owe them protection of 
that information.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, I once again call on my colleagues in the House 
to take the important step of requiring a secrecy oath for Members of 
Congress. Members are granted extraordinary access to classified 
material, very sensitive material I would add, and mountains of it. I 
hope it is understood that we have a responsibility to protect that 
information. Repeated, if isolated, leaks of substance from classified 
briefings to the front pages of morning newspapers suggest, perhaps, 
that some Members still do not understand our important responsibility 
in this area. So I will, once again, join the gentleman from Illinois 
[Mr. Hyde], my friend, in offering an amendment to this bill to require 
that Members and staff seeking access to classified information sign a 
pledge that they will, not willfully disclose such material. I know 
that this will be seen as symbolic by some, but sometimes it is the 
symbolism that gets the point across, attracts people's attention, and 
ensures that they do the right thing.

                                  OPEN VERSUS RESTRICTIVE RULES 95TH-103D CONG.                                 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                              Open rules       Restrictive rules
                      Congress (years)                       Total rules ---------------------------------------
                                                              granted\1\  Number  Percent\2\  Number  Percent\3\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
95th (1977-78).............................................          211     179         85       32         15 
96th (1979-80).............................................          214     161         75       53         25 
97th (1981-82).............................................          120      90         75       30         25 
98th (1983-84).............................................          155     105         68       50         32 
99th (1985-86).............................................          115      65         57       50         43 
100th (1987-88)............................................          123      66         54       57         46 
101st (1989-90)............................................          104      47         45       57         55 
102d (1991-92).............................................          109      37         34       72         66 
103d (1993-94).............................................           75      17         23       58         77 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Total rules counted are all order of business resolutions reported from the Rules Committee which provide for
  the initial consideration of legislation, except rules on appropriations bills which only waive points of     
  order. Original jurisdiction measures reported as privileged are also not counted.                            
\2\Open rules are those which permit any Member to offer any germane amendment to a measure so long as it is    
  otherwise in compliance with the rules of the House. The parenthetical percentages are open rules as a percent
  of total rules granted.                                                                                       
\3\Restrictive rules are those which limit the number of amendments which can be offered, and include so-called 
  modified open and modified closed rules, as well as completely closed rule, and rules providing for           
  consideration in the House as opposed to the Committee of the Whole. The parenthetical percentages are        
  restrictive rules as a percent of total rules granted.                                                        
                                                                                                                
Sources: ``Rules Committee Calendars & Surveys of Activities,'' 95th-102d Cong.; ``Notices of Action Taken,''   
  Committee on Rules, 103d Cong., through July 12, 1994.                                                        


                                                        OPEN VERSUS RESTRICTIVE RULES: 103D CONG.                                                       
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Rule                                      Amendments                                                                  
   Rule number date reported      type       Bill number and subject         submitted         Amendments allowed         Disposition of rule and date  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. Res. 58, Feb. 2, 1993......  MC        H.R. 1: Family and medical     30 (D-5; R-25)..  3 (D-0; R-3)..............  PQ: 246-176. A: 259-164. (Feb. 3,
                                           leave.                                                                       1993).                          
H. Res. 59, Feb. 3, 1993......  MC        H.R. 2: National Voter         19 (D-1; R-18)..  1 (D-0; R-1)..............  PQ: 248-171. A: 249-170. (Feb. 4,
                                           Registration Act.                                                            1993).                          
H. Res. 103, Feb. 23, 1993....  C         H.R. 920: Unemployment         7 (D-2; R-5)....  0 (D-0; R-0)..............  PQ: 243-172. A: 237-178. (Feb.   
                                           compensation.                                                                24, 1993).                      
H. Res. 106, Mar. 2, 1993.....  MC        H.R. 20: Hatch Act amendments  9 (D-1; R-8)....  3 (D-0; R-3)..............  PQ: 248-166. A: 249-163. (Mar. 3,
                                                                                                                        1993).                          
H. Res. 119, Mar. 9, 1993.....  MC        H.R. 4: NIH Revitalization     13 (d-4; R-9)...  8 (D-3; R-5)..............  PQ: 247-170. A: 248-170. (Mar.   
                                           Act of 1993.                                                                 10, 1993).                      
H. Res. 132, Mar. 17, 1993....  MC        H.R. 1335: Emergency           37 (D-8; R-29)..  1(not submitted) (D-1; R-   A: 240-185. (Mar. 18, 1993).     
                                           supplemental Appropriations.                     0).                                                         
H. Res. 133, Mar. 17, 1993....  MC        H. Con. Res. 64: Budget        14 (D-2; R-12)..  4 (1-D not submitted) (D-   PQ: 250-172. A: 251-172. (Mar.   
                                           resolution.                                      2; R-2).                    18, 1993).                      
H. Res. 138, Mar. 23, 1993....  MC        H.R. 670: Family planning      20 (D-8; R-12)..  9 (D-4; R-5)..............  PQ: 252-164. A: 247-169. (Mar.   
                                           amendments.                                                                  24, 1993).                      
H. Res. 147, Mar. 31, 1993....  C         H.R. 1430: Increase Public     6 (D-1; R-5)....  0 (D-0; R-0)..............  PQ: 244-168. A: 242-170. (Apr. 1,
                                           debt limit.                                                                  1993).                          
H. Res. 149 Apr. 1, 1993......  MC        H.R. 1578: Expedited           8 (D-1; R-7)....  3 (D-1; R-2)..............  A: 212-208. (Apr. 28, 1993).     
                                           Rescission Act of 1993.                                                                                      
H. Res. 164, May 4, 1993......  O         H.R. 820: Nate                 NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (May 5, 1993).    
                                           Competitiveness Act.                                                                                         
H. Res. 171, May 18, 1993.....  O         H.R. 873: Gallatin Range Act   NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (May 20, 1993).   
                                           of 1993.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 172, May 18, 1993.....  O         H.R. 1159: Passenger Vessel    NA..............  NA........................  A: 308-0 (May 24, 1993).         
                                           Safety Act.                                                                                                  
H. Res. 173 May 18, 1993......  MC        S.J. Res. 45: United States    6 (D-1; R-5)....  6 (D-1; R-5)..............  A: Voice Vote (May 20, 1993)     
                                           forces in Somalia.                                                                                           
H. Res. 183, May 25, 1993.....  O         H.R. 2244: 2d supplemental     NA..............  NA........................  A: 251-174. (May 26, 1993).      
                                           appropriations.                                                                                              
H. Res. 186, May 27, 1993.....  MC        H.R. 2264: Omnibus budget      51 (D-19; R-32).  8 (D-7; R-1)..............  PQ: 252-178. A: 236-194 (May 27, 
                                           reconciliation.                                                              1993).                          
H. Res. 192, June 9, 1993.....  MC        H.R. 2348: Legislative branch  50 (D-6; R-44)..  6 (D-3; R-3)..............  PQ: 240-177. A: 226-185. (June   
                                           appropriations.                                                              10, 1993).                      
H. Res. 193, June 10, 1993....  O         H.R. 2200: NASA authorization  NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (June 14, 1993).  
H. Res. 195, June 14, 1993....  MC        H.R. 5: Striker replacement..  7 (D-4; R-3)....  2 (D-1; R-1)..............  A: 244-176.. (June 15, 1993).    
H. Res. 197, June 15, 1993....  MO        H.R. 2333: State Department.   53 (D-20; R-33).  27 (D-12; R-15)...........  A: 294-129. (June 16, 1993).     
                                           H.R. 2404: Foreign aid.                                                                                      
H. Res. 199, June 16, 1993....  C         H.R. 1876: Ext. of ``Fast      NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (June 22, 1993).  
                                           Track''.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 200, June 16, 1993....  MC        H.R. 2295: Foreign operations  33 (D-11; R-22).  5 (D-1; R-4)..............  A: 263-160. (June 17, 1993).     
                                           appropriations.                                                                                              
H. Res. 201, June 17, 1993....  O         H.R. 2403: Treasury-postal     NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (June 17, 1993).  
                                           appropriations.                                                                                              
H. Res. 203, June 22, 1993....  MO        H.R. 2445: Energy and Water    NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (June 23, 1993).  
                                           appropriations.                                                                                              
H. Res. 206, June 23, 1993....  O         H.R. 2150: Coast Guard         NA..............  NA........................  A: 401-0. (July 30, 1993).       
                                           authorization.                                                                                               
H. Res. 217, July 14, 1993....  MO        H.R. 2010: National Service    NA..............  NA........................  A: 261-164. (July 21, 1993).     
                                           Trust Act.                                                                                                   
H. Res. 220, July 21, 1993....  MC        H.R. 2667: Disaster            14 (D-8; R-6)...  2 (D-2; R-0)..............  PQ: 245-178. F: 205-216. (July   
                                           assistance supplemental.                                                     22, 1993).                      
H. Res. 226, July 23, 1993....  MC        H.R. 2667: Disaster            15 (D-8; R-7)...  2 (D-2; R-0)..............  A: 224-205. (July 27, 1993).     
                                           assistance supplemental.                                                                                     
H. Res. 229, July 28, 1993....  MO        H.R. 2330: Intelligence        NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (Aug. 3, 1993).   
                                           Authority Act, fiscal year                                                                                   
                                           1994.                                                                                                        
H. Res. 230, July 28, 1993....  O         H.R. 1964: Maritime            NA..............  NA........................  A: Voice Vote. (July 29, 1993).  
                                           Administration authority.                                                                                    
H. Res. 246, Aug. 6, 1993.....  MO        H.R. 2401: National Defense    149 (D-109; R-    ..........................  A: 246-172. (Sept. 8, 1993).     
                                           authority.                     40).                                                                          
H. Res. 248, Sept. 9, 1993....  MO        H.R. 2401: National defense    ................  ..........................  PQ: 237-169. A: 234-169. (Sept.  
                                           authorization.                                                               13, 1993).                      
H. Res. 250, Sept. 13, 1993...  MC        H.R. 1340: RTC Completion Act  12 (D-3; R-9)...  1 (D-1; R-0)..............  A: 213-191-1. (Sept. 14, 1993).  
H. Res. 254, Sept. 22, 1993...  MO        H.R. 2401: National Defense    ................  91 (D-67; R-24)...........  A: 241-182. (Sept. 28, 1993).    
                                           authorization.                                                                                               
H. Res. 262, Sept. 28, 1993...  O         H.R. 1845: National            NA..............  NA........................  A: 238-188 (10/06/93).           
                                           Biological Survey Act.                                                                                       
H. Res. 264, Sept. 28, 1993...  MC        H.R. 2351: Arts, humanities,   7 (D-0; R-7)....  3 (D-0; R-3)..............  PQ: 240-185. A: 225-195. (Oct.   
                                           museums.                                                                     14, 1993).                      
H. Res. 265, Sept. 29, 1993...  MC        H.R. 3167: Unemployment        3 (D-1; R-2)....  2 (D-1; R-1)..............  A: 239-150. (Oct. 15, 1993).     
                                           compensation amendments.                                                                                     
H. Res. 269, Oct. 6, 1993.....  MO        H.R. 2739: Aviation            N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 7, 1993).   
                                           infrastructure investment.                                                                                   
H. Res. 273, Oct. 12, 1993....  MC        H.R. 3167: Unemployment        3 (D-1; R-2)....  2 (D-1; R-1)..............  PQ: 235-187. F: 149-254. (Oct.   
                                           compensation amendments.                                                     14, 1993).                      
H. Res. 274, Oct. 12, 1993....  MC        H.R. 1804: Goals 2000 Educate  15 (D-7; R-7; I-  10 (D-7; R-3).............  A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 13, 1993).  
                                           America Act.                   1).                                                                           
H. Res. 282, Oct. 20, 1993....  C         H.J. Res. 281: Continuing      N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 21, 1993).  
                                           appropriations through Oct.                                                                                  
                                           28, 1993.                                                                                                    
H. Res. 286, Oct. 27, 1993....  O         H.R. 334: Lumbee Recognition   N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote. (Oct. 28, 1993).  
                                           Act.                                                                                                         
H. Res. 287, Oct. 27, 1993....  C         H.J. Res. 283: Continuing      1 (D-0; R-0)....  0.........................  A: 252-170. (Oct. 28, 1993).     
                                           appropriations resolution.                                                                                   
H. Res. 289, Oct. 28, 1993....  O         H.R. 2151: Maritime Security   N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote. (Nov. 3, 1993).   
                                           Act of 1993.                                                                                                 
H. Res. 293, Nov. 4, 1993.....  MC        H. Con. Res. 170: Troop        N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: 390-8. (Nov. 8, 1993).        
                                           withdrawal Somalia.                                                                                          
H. Res. 299, Nov. 8, 1993.....  MO        H.R. 1036: Employee            2 (D-1; R-1)....  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote. (Nov. 9, 1993).   
                                           Retirement Act-1993.                                                                                         
H. Res. 302, Nov. 9, 1993.....  MC        H.R. 1025: Brady handgun bill  17 (D-6; R-11)..  4 (D-1; R-3)..............  A: 238-182. (Nov. 10, 1993).     
H. Res. 303, Nov. 9, 1993.....  O         H.R. 322: Mineral exploration  N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote. (Nov. 16, 1993).  
H. Res. 304, Nov. 9, 1993.....  C         H.J. Res. 288: Further CR, FY  N/A.............  N/A.......................  .................................
                                           1994.                                                                                                        
H. Res. 312, Nov. 17, 1993....  MC        H.R. 3425: EPA Cabinet Status  27 (D-8; R-19)..  9 (D-1; R-8)..............  F: 191-227. (Feb. 2, 1994).      
H. Res. 313, Nov. 17, 1993....  MC        H.R. 796: Freedom Access to    15 (D-9; R-6)...  4 (D-1; R-3)..............  A: 233-192. (Nov. 18, 1993).     
                                           Clinics.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 314, Nov. 17, 1993....  MC        H.R. 3351: Alt Methods Young   21 (D-7; R-14)..  6 (D-3; R-3)..............  A: 238-179. (Nov. 19, 1993).     
                                           Offenders.                                                                                                   
H. Res. 316, Nov. 19, 1993....  C         H.R. 51: D.C. statehood bill.  1 (D-1; R-0)....  N/A.......................  A: 252-172. (Nov. 20, 1993).     
H. Res. 319, Nov. 20, 1993....  MC        H.R. 3: Campaign Finance       35 (D-6; R-29)..  1 (D-0; R-1)..............  A: 220-207. (Nov. 21, 1993).     
                                           Reform.                                                                                                      
H. Res. 320, Nov. 20, 1993....  MC        H.R. 3400: Reinventing         34 (D-15; R-19).  3 (D-3; R-0)..............  A: 247-183. (Nov. 22, 1993).     
                                           Government.                                                                                                  
H. Res. 336, Feb. 2, 1994.....  MC        H.R. 3759: Emergency           14 (D-8; R-5; I-  5 (D-3; R-2)..............  PQ: 244-168. A: 342-65. (Feb. 3, 
                                           Supplemental Appropriations.   1).                                           1994).                          
H. Res. 352, Feb. 8, 1994.....  MC        H.R. 811: Independent Counsel  27 (D-8; R-19)..  10 (D-4; R-6).............  PQ: 249-174. A: 242-174. (Feb. 9,
                                           Act.                                                                         1994).                          
H. Res. 357, Feb. 9, 1994.....  MC        H.R. 3345: Federal Workforce   3 (D-2; R-1)....  2 (D-2; R-0)..............  A: VV (Feb. 10, 1994).           
                                           Restructuring.                                                                                               
H. Res. 366, Feb. 23, 1994....  MO        H.R. 6: Improving America's    NA..............  NA........................  A: VV (Feb. 24, 1994).           
                                           Schools.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 384, Mar. 9, 1994.....  MC        H. Con. Res. 218: Budget       14 (D-5; R-9)...  5 (D-3; R-2)..............  A: 245-171 (Mar. 10, 1994).      
                                           Resolution FY 1995-99.                                                                                       
H. Res. 401, Apr. 12, 1994....  MO        H.R. 4092: Violent Crime       180 (D-98; R-82)  68 (D-47; R-21)...........  A: 244-176 (Apr. 13, 1994).      
                                           Control.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 410, Apr. 21, 1994....  MO        H.R. 3221: Iraqi Claims Act..  N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (Apr. 28, 1994).   
H. Res. 414, Apr. 28, 1994....  O         H.R. 3254: NSF Auth. Act.....  N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (May 3, 1994).     
H. Res. 416, May 4, 1994......  C         H.R. 4296: Assault Weapons     7 (D-5; R-2)....  0 (D-0; R-0)..............  A: 220-209 (May 5, 1994).        
                                           Ban Act.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 420, May 5, 1994......  O         H.R. 2442: EDA                 N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (May 10, 1994).    
                                           Reauthorization.                                                                                             
H. Res. 422, May 11, 1994.....  MO        H.R. 518: California Desert    N/A.............  N/A.......................  PQ: 245-172 A: 248-165 (May 17,  
                                           Protection.                                                                  1994).                          
H. Res. 423, May 11, 1994.....  O         H.R. 2473: Montana Wilderness  N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: Voice Vote (May 12, 1994).    
                                           Act.                                                                                                         
H. Res. 428, May 17, 1994.....  MO        H.R. 2108: Black Lung          4 (D-1; R-3)....  N/A.......................  A: VV (May 19, 1994).            
                                           Benefits Act.                                                                                                
H. Res. 429, May 17, 1994.....  MO        H.R. 4301: Defense Auth., FY   173 (D-115; R-    ..........................  A: 369-49 (May 18, 1994).        
                                           1995.                          58).                                                                          
H. Res. 431, May 20, 1994.....  MO        H.R. 4301: Defense Auth., FY   ................  100 (D-80; R-20)..........  A: Voice Vote (May 23, 1994).    
                                           1995.                                                                                                        
H. Res. 440, May 24, 1994.....  MC        H.R. 4385: Natl Hiway System   16 (D-10; R-6)..  5 (D-5; R-0)..............  A: Voice Vote (May 25, 1994).    
                                           Designation.                                                                                                 
H. Res. 443, May 25, 1994.....  MC        H.R. 4426: For. Ops. Approps,  39 (D-11; R-28).  8 (D-3; R-5)..............  PQ: 233-191 A: 244-181 (May 25,  
                                           FY 1995.                                                                     1994).                          
H. Res. 444, May 25, 1994.....  MC        H.R. 4454: Leg Branch Approp,  43 (D-10; R-33).  12 (D-8; R-4).............  A: 249-177 (May 26, 1994).       
                                           FY 1995.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 447, June 8, 1994.....  O         H.R. 4539: Treasury/Postal     N/A.............  N/A.......................  A: 236-177 (June 9, 1994).       
                                           Approps 1995.                                                                                                
H. Res. 467, June 28, 1994....  MC        H.R. 4600: Expedited           N/A.............  N/A.......................  .................................
                                           Rescissions Act.                                                                                             
H. Res. 468, June 28, 1994....  MO        H.R. 4299: Intelligence        N/A.............  N/A.......................  .................................
                                           Auth., FY 1995.                                                                                              
H. Res. 474, July 12, 1994....  MO        H.R. 3937: Export Admin. Act   N/A.............  ..........................  .................................
                                           of 1994.                                                                                                     
H. Res. 475, July 12, 1994....  O         H.R. 1188: Anti. Redlining in  N/A.............  ..........................  .................................
                                           Ins.                                                                                                         
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note.--Code: C-Closed; MC-Modified closed; MO-Modified open; O-Open; D-Democrat; R-Republican; PQ: Previous question; A-Adopted; F-Failed.              

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Utah [Mr. Hansen], a member of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence.
  Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule. I want to 
comment Chairman Glickman and my colleague, Mr. Combest, for their 
leadership. We worked well in this committee this year. When disputes 
arose, they were quickly settled with the result being a bipartisan 
bill that we can all support.
  As a member of both the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees, I 
have closely followed a number of controversial crossover issues, the 
most significant being intelligence support for Department of Defense 
drug interdiction operations. I remain very concerned that there is no 
one in charge of supply reduction efforts. The Defense Department has 
unilaterally picked a fight with the Governments of Peru and Colombia 
by ceasing to pass radar tracking data to these Governments that would 
facilitate the force-down of narcotics trafficker aircraft. At the same 
time that the Defense Department was driving a wedge between Peru and 
Colombia and our Government, it was requesting more money for radar 
programs in Latin America. This mismanagement has a direct impact on 
Americans at home because cocaine destined for the United States that 
would otherwise have been interdicted is now freely moving from Peru to 
Colombia. I have received assurances that the administration has 
focused on this problem and hopes to have it resolved soon. They should 
have thought about this before they reversed a long held policy on 
force-downs without prior consultation with other affected Federal 
agencies.
  The problem I have described with the drug war is symptomatic of a 
larger problem: Lack of policy direction that will permit the 
intelligence community to efficiently allocate scarce collection 
assets. This has been clear throughout the year as we looked to the 
administration for a clear statement of its global priorities, which 
can best be described as constantly in flux. Barring such a vision, we 
will be forced to continue to provide direction. This is both 
unfortunate and unnecessary. Eighteen months into the Clinton 
administration is far too long to wait for a clear sense of policy 
direction. Mr. Speaker, I hope they do better next year.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], the ranking member of 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from Florida 
[Mr. Goss] yielding this time to me. And to the gentleman from 
California and the gentleman from Florida I simply want to say I 
appreciate very much the cooperation of the Committee on Rules in 
granting this rule that allows a full and open debate, allows any 
amendments that wish to come up under the preprinted rule. And I 
strongly support it and would urge passage of the rule.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time and am 
prepared to yield back the balance of my time, if I can be assured by 
my colleague that he has no further requests.
  Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  In closing, Mr. Speaker, this is an open rule. The only way it could 
otherwise be characterized is because of the preprinting requirement, 
but because of the problems associated, or potential problems 
associated, with national security interests, that is, we believe it a 
reasonable requirement, one that was agreed to by the minority on the 
Committee on Rules.

                              {time}  1530

  The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence we believe has brought 
us a good bill which can be fully debated under this rule. I urge my 
colleagues to vote for this rule.
  Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, I yield back the 
balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The resolution was agreed to.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. (Mr. Serrano). Pursuant to House Resolution 
468 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of 
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the 
bill, H.R. 4299.
  The Chair designates the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. Slaughter] 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentlewoman 
from Hawaii [Mrs. Mink] to assume the chair temporarily.

                              {time}  1531


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 4299) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for 
intelligence, and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, with Mrs. Mink of Hawaii (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is 
considered as having been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] will be 
recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] 
will be recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman].
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Chairman, at the outset I want to compliment the committee's 
ranking Republican member, Larry Combest, for the leadership he 
provided in fashioning this legislation. We have not agreed on every 
issue, and I know he has reservations about the funding levels in the 
bill, but we worked together in a cooperative spirit to produce a 
measure which the committee could support.
  The bill before the House authorizes the funds for fiscal year 1995 
for all of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the 
U.S. Government. The intelligence budget is comprised chiefly of two 
parts, the National Foreign Intelligence Program [NFIP] and the 
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities [TIARA] Program. The NFIP 
includes those activities involved in the provision of intelligence to 
national policymakers and includes programs administered by agencies 
like the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and 
the Defense Intelligence Agency.
  Tactical intelligence programs reside solely within the Department of 
Defense and are primarily, although not exclusively, concerned with the 
provision of intelligence to military commanders. There is not always a 
clear distinction between national and tactical programs and the 
Intelligence Committee has jurisdiction over the budgets of both. In 
our review of the funding requests for intelligence activities of 
particular concern to the Armed Services Committee and I want to 
acknowledge the assistance provided to us by Chairman Dellums, the 
members of his committee, and the committee staff.
  Since so much of the Intelligence Committee's work deals with 
classified information, it is not possible to discuss the contents of 
the bill publicly except in broad terms. I am aware that this situation 
is frustrating to many Members and when we reach the amendments phase 
of these proceedings, Bob Torricelli and I will offer an amendment 
which would bring a degree of openness to the consideration of the 
intelligence budget. Our amendment will require that, beginning with 
the submission of the budget for fiscal year 1996, the aggregate amount 
of money spent on, and requested for, intelligence will have to be 
disclosed.

  Although their funding levels are not public, all of the programs and 
activities authorized by H.R. 4299 are, however, set forth in a 
classified schedule of authorizations which is incorporated into the 
bill by reference, and discussed in detail in a classified annex to the 
committee's report. These documents have been available for review by 
Members since June 10. I urge Members who have not yet done so to visit 
the committee's office, room H-405 in the Capitol, and familiarize 
themselves with these materials.
  This is the third consecutive year in which the committee has 
reported an authorization which is below both the President's request 
and the amount authorized the year before. The congressional 
intelligence committees, much more so than the agencies they oversee, 
have been the agents for change in the intelligence community. 
Responding to the end of the cold war, it was the committees that 
mandated a 17.5-percent reduction in personnel to be accomplished by 
fiscal year 1997, and cuts in spending which have amounted to 
approximately 7 percent in the aggregate over the last 3 years. We have 
taken these actions largely as a result of a conviction that with the 
changes in the world arising from the demise of the Soviet Union, some 
alteration in the size of the intelligence community, which after all 
had been created to respond to the national security threat posed by 
the Soviets, was required.
  The committee has been frustrated, however, by the inability of 
either this administration or its predecessor to articulate a clear 
vision of what the intelligence community should be doing in the post-
cold-war world. Without that vision, and a well-defined implementation 
plan, it is difficult for the committee to effectively assess resource 
needs. Budget reductions are a blunt instrument for producing change in 
either the direction or method of operation of any agency or department 
of Government. Budget cuts must be reacted to, but those reactions do 
not always produce the efficiencies which might have resulted if the 
savings had been the end result of change, and not its cause. Thus far, 
however, the intelligence community's response has been primarily to 
react to the budget initiatives of Congress rather than looking to the 
future, attempting to define its role in it and matching its budget 
needs to that future role.
  That is not to say that the maintenance of an effective intelligence 
capability will not continue to be necessary or that its maintenance 
will not be expensive. The world will remain an unpredictable place and 
intelligence will continue to be the insurance policy which will 
hopefully enable our leaders to deal with crises and conflicts in ways 
which reduce the risk to American interests and American lives. I 
believe, however, that the premium on that insurance should be going 
down because, as dangerous as the world may be, it is quite simply not 
as dangerous as it was when we had an enemy of the dimensions of the 
Soviet Union.
  The committee's actions to refocus intelligence spending and 
activities are of necessity ad hoc. They cannot be expected to 
substitute for strategic planning by the executive branch. We need a 
strategic plan for intelligence and it is my judgment that the 
individuals from outside of Government need to be involved in its 
formulation. The planning effort must be undertaken promptly and 
completed expeditiously. We cannot afford another budget cycle in which 
the committee trims the request because of a gut feeling that it is too 
high.
  The committee needs to be able to judge the budget by how well it 
allocates resources to priority intelligence activities. The 
identification of priorities has not been done clearly and the 
resulting impression is that the intelligence community is trying to do 
most of what it did during the cold war, in the same way as it did in 
the cold war, and that is difficult because there are fewer resources. 
In the committee's judgment, there are intelligence priorities. They 
include countering the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, international terrorists, and narcotics traffickers, 
and ensuring that our military commanders, no mater where they are 
deployed, have timely access to intelligence collected by national and 
tactical systems. These activities need to be emphasized and if that 
requires terminating some things which are no longer necessary because 
of changes in the world, that has to be done--and much more quickly 
than it has thus far. That is why a strategic plan is so important.

  The fiscal year 1995 budget submission requested an increase in the 
NFIP, a cut in TIARA, and marginal growth when the two were combined. 
The committee's recommendation cancels almost all of the requested 
increase in the national programs, deepens the reduction in the 
tactical programs, resulting in an authorization below the request and 
below the amount appropriated in fiscal year 1994. I recognize that it 
will be argued by some that we did not cut enough and by others that we 
cut too much. We are proceeding cautiously, for the reasons I have 
already stated. In reducing spending and personnel, our goal has been 
twofold. First, we have tried to keep the pressure on the intelligence 
community to reorient itself, a process which takes time especially 
when it involves systems which are complex and expensive. Second, we 
have sought to avoid creating gaps in intelligence coverage by a too 
rapid reduction in resources. We are walking a fine line in a difficult 
area and while I do not believe that the committee's recommendations 
will cause any diminishing of essential capabilities, I am concerned 
that substantial additional reductions would have that result. I urge 
the House to reject amendments which would require such reductions.
  In addition to the budget recommendations, the bill contains a number 
of legislative proposals which will be explained in detail by the 
chairman of our subcommittee on legislation, Mr. Coleman. Some of these 
proposals involve matters within the jurisdiction of other committees 
and I want to acknowledge the assistance we have received from those 
committees in moving this legislation forward. At this point in the 
Record, I would like to insert an exchange of letters between Chairman 
Ford of the Committee on Education and Labor and myself on one such 
proposal.
  Among the legislative recommendations in H.R. 4299 are several which 
comprise the committee's initial responses to the Ames espionage case. 
While these recommendations should be of help in deterring espionage, 
the Ames case was not caused by deficiencies in the law. The committee 
has an inquiry underway to help determine why a CIA employee could 
conduct espionage for 9 years, from different CIA posts in the United 
States and abroad, under the noses of his supervisors and coworkers, 
without detection. I am concerned that the Ames case reflected the 
continuation of a problem that the committee publicly identified in 
1986 and 1987--counterintelligence has not been a high enough priority 
of senior management at the CIA or elsewhere in the intelligence 
community. Until protecting our secrets becomes as important to 
management as acquiring the secrets of other countries, we will 
continue to court disaster. No amount of legislation will correct the 
problems which allowed Mr. Ames to operate successfully for so long. 
They will be remedied only by a heightened emphasis on 
counterintelligence by top management and closer coordination of 
counterintelligence activities between intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies.
  Madam Chairman, I urge the House to endorse the committee's judgments 
as reflected in H.R. 4299. Those judgments reflect a balancing of 
interests but I believe the bill makes progress in encouraging the 
community to invest in its future rather than cling to its past.

                                        Permanent Select Committee


                                              On Intelligence,

                                    Washington, DC, July 12, 1994.
     Hon. William D. Ford,
     Chairman, Committee on Education and Labor, Rayburn House 
         Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of July 12, 
     1994 concerning section 501 of H.R. 4299, the fiscal year 
     1995 intelligence authorization bill.
       As noted in your letter, section 501 amends a number of 
     statutes to enable the Secretary of Defense to manage the 
     civilian employees of the Central Imagery Office in the same 
     personnel system as exists for comparable employees of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency. One of these statutes, the 
     Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, is within the 
     jurisdiction of the Committee on Education and Labor pursuant 
     to Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
       The Intelligence Committee appreciates your willingness not 
     to seek the referral of H.R. 4299 to which your committee 
     would have been entitled on the basis of its jurisdiction 
     over section 501. Your decision has facilitated the floor 
     consideration of H.R. 4299.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Dan Glickman,
                                                         Chairman.
                                  ____



                             Committee on Education and Labor,

                                    Washington, DC, July 12, 1994.
     Chairman, Hon. Dan Glickman,
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: This week the House of Representatives 
     will consider H.R. 4299, the Intelligence Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1995. Section 501 of the proposed legislation 
     provides the Secretary of Defense with the statutory 
     authority to manage the civilian employees of the Central 
     Imagery Office in the same personnel system as the one which 
     exists for comparable employees of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency. This section modifies a whole range of statutes to 
     ensure that employees of the Central Imagery Office are 
     subject to the same statutory provisions as employees of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency.
       One provision of Section 501 amends the Employee Polygraph 
     Protection Act of 1988 to include employees of the Central 
     Imagery Office in the same stautory exemption as the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency.
       The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 is a statute 
     within the Rule X jurisdiction of this Committee. The 
     Committee does not oppose the amendment proposed in H.R. 4299 
     and sees no need to take action upon the bill. Our decision 
     to forego action, however, should not be construed as a 
     waiver of the Committee's Rule X jurisdiction. We would 
     appreciate it if this letter and your response could be 
     printed in the Congressional Record with the debate on H.R. 
     4299.
       With kind regards,
           Sincerely,
                                                  William D. Ford,
                                                         Chairman.

                              {time}  1540

  Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  (Mr. COMBEST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, as the ranking Republican member of the 
Intelligence Committee, let me first express my appreciation to my 
colleague from Kansas, Chairman Glickman, for his hard work in leading 
our committee through some extremely difficult deliberations. The 
pressure to continue cutting when common sense dictates it should cease 
has made preparation of the authorization bill for intelligence more 
difficult in each of my 6 years on this committee.
  H.R. 4299 is not the bill that I or my Republican colleagues would 
have written. I strongly urge anyone who is concerned with this 
country's security to read the minority views to the unclassified 
report, where we discuss at some length our philosophic and practical 
dissent from some key elements of the authorization report. 
Realistically, though, we stand united in supporting the bill as the 
best compromise we can reach at present. I say this in the full 
expectation that we will in conference, on a bipartisan basis, seek 
compromise positions which will lessen our concern that this bill 
endangers some critically important and fragile intelligence 
capabilities, such as in the area of human intelligence.
  The committee is responsible for examining, evaluating, and funding 
intelligence capabilities and activities, the specifics of which are 
largely and necessarily unknown to the public. When Congress makes an 
unwise cut to public works or education, the taxpayer sees the bridge 
left half built and the school left unfurnished. But, when we cut 
intelligence the taxpayer sees nothing. If we decide to gamble with 
public safety by cutting money for law enforcement, the public sees the 
results and can draw the right conclusions. But, when we gamble with 
national security by cutting intelligence programs the taxpayer is 
unaware how we may be risking his and his family's well-being. We 
cannot disclose publicly the extent and nature of those risks, because 
that would tip off those in our unsettled and dangerous world who wish 
us harm about where our intelligence capabilities are thinnest. In 
practice this often means that we will not face full public 
accountability until our gambles result in an open disaster.
  Frankly the short-term odds are with the Members of this House who 
press for such irresponsible continuing cuts. After all, those who 
opposed strong defenses in the years before World War II could claim to 
be demonstrably right year after year after year. In the gamble of 
national preparedness they rolled straight sevens and saved the 
taxpayers billions of dollars--right up until December 1941 and the 
debacle of Pearl Harbor. Some people refuse to learn from history, but 
what was true then is true now: Responsible leaders of this country 
must fight against the short-sighted tendency to think we can safely 
cut corners in intelligence and national security. Those savings will 
be lost inevitably many times over, and they will be paid back not only 
in dollars but in lives. With important national security interests at 
stake, we must be more cautious about these continuing cuts to 
intelligence. We cannot afford to search for some illusory right level 
of intelligence resources by making cuts we later find to our regret 
are too deep and then working backward to restore lost capabilities.
  Madam Chairman, I am not now talking about history, though. Neither 
am I talking about some sort of hypothetical point of decision off in 
the future. I am talking about this year, this budget, and what we do 
about it today. For, in the area of intelligence, push has come to 
shove. In all but one of my 6 years on this committee we have turned 
out an authorization bill showing cuts to intelligence in real terms. 
We have probed, examined, and x rayed the intelligence budget from 
every angle. We have torn it down and rebuilt it. We have cut and pared 
and sliced away at fat. We are now cutting away muscle and sinew. 
Savings can now be measured only in risks taken.

  There is no shortage of facts and figures I can cite to demonstrate 
the rather remarkable, indeed reckless, slope of decline on which we 
have put the intelligence community. Despite a consensus of informed 
opinion that intelligence cuts should be avoided or at least minimized 
in a period when we are cutting our defense capabilities, we are again 
this year cutting intelligence more than defense at large. It is 
downsizing at a rate twice that recommended by the President's National 
Performance Review for the Government. President Clinton made a 
campaign promise in 1992 to cut the Bush administration's proposed 
intelligence budget over a 5-year period by $7 billion. This was an 
incredibly ambitious--and many would say a foolhardy--goal. Yet, as 
Director Woolsey has stated publicly, this has been accomplished with 2 
years to spare, and it appears the cuts over the 5 years will likely be 
more than $14 billion. This irrational urge to keep cutting 
intelligence has taken on a life of its own and it will, unless 
stopped, inevitably lead to disaster.
  Madam Chairman, I have not talked today on the continuing need for 
intelligence. I did so last year at some length and, I imagine, several 
of our committee colleagues will discuss it some more. I will only 
observe that it takes an incredibly naive person to argue that the 
current world situation is such that our country does not have a 
pressing need to know the behind-the-scenes realities of: the 
capabilities and intentions of well-armed hostile states, terrorist 
organizations, weapons proliferators, and unfair trade competitors 
worldwide.
  In 1944 Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, in his political 
innocence, convinced President Roosevelt to have Gen. William Donovan 
of the CIA's predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, return to 
the Soviet Union a captured copy of a code book used by the Soviet 
intelligence services. He did, and the Soviets promptly changed their 
codes. A chance to follow Soviet intelligence activities in the United 
States and worldwide was thrown away. Fortunately, Donovan returned the 
code book only after making a copy--a copy which U.S. intelligence used 
a few years later, when political leadership was wiser to decrypt 
Soviet intercepts from before 1945. These messages allowed the United 
States to wrap up numerous Soviet agents who were still active in the 
United States. Those who now seek to limit intelligence capabilities 
are far more short-sighted, naive, and downright foolish than Secretary 
Stettinius. What Stettinius did was only to limit the benefit of good 
intelligence work. Those who cut crucial intelligence resources now 
are, effectively speaking, keeping the code books of today's enemies 
from ever reaching our hands in the first place.
  I urge the House to pass this authorization without further cuts and 
the even greater risks to our national security interests which further 
cuts would entail.
  I feel I should also take this occasion to comment on the Ames 
espionage case and the reforms that are under consideration in its 
wake.
  First of all, reform of intelligence and counter-intelligence should 
not be of the ready-fire-then-aim sort.
  While the Intelligence Committees have been considering various 
options for change, the DCI has refrained from making quick fixes and 
opted--I think wisely--to wait until he began getting in the results of 
several external and internal investigations and task forces to propose 
his remedies. He has taken very careful aim because he wants to fix 
what is broken without destroying an extraordinarily important and, 
despite Ames, a highly successful element of the intelligence 
community--the CIA's clandestine Operations Directorate.
  Last week the DCI gave us on the Intelligence Committee his initial 
read-out of what sorts of changes he envisions. An unclassified version 
of that talk was given yesterday to the Center for Strategic and 
International Security. In it he announced ``a comprehensive overhaul 
of a number of key structures, programs, and procedures.'' It was a 
speech which, in the words of the New York Times, was unprecedented: 
``no other sitting Director of Central Intelligence has offered a 
public critique quite as pointed as Mr. Woolsey's.'' And, as Mr. 
Woolsey told our committee, this is just the beginning.
  I am very much encouraged by the direction the DCI is moving. He has 
not been misled by the distracting hue-and-cry of those claiming the 
main scandal is in the longevity of Ame's treachery. Parenthetically, I 
would note that the two potentially most damaging cold war spy cases, 
the Whitworth/Walker case in the Navy and the Conrad case in the Army--
either one of which could have resulted in hundreds of thousands of 
U.S. dead if not outright U.S. military defeat in war--went on for 18 
and over 12 years, respectively. While identifying factors which 
hamstrung the CIA and FBI efforts over 8 years to identify the spy 
responsible for the 1985-86 intelligence compromises, the DCI has 
rightly focused in on the system which allowed Rick Ames access to so 
many of the CIA crown jewels to begin with. This is a much more 
difficult problem and he is to be lauded for attacking it head-on.
  Our committee, you can be sure, will be watching these developments 
closely. The DCI has promised he will consult with us at every step of 
the way. This is exactly as it should be. We are not content, however, 
to sit by and be consulted. We are ourselves delving into the details 
of Ames' espionage activities and all aspects of U.S. intelligence and 
counterintelligence relevant to it. It is in the interest of every 
member of our committee--indeed, of the American people--that we 
minimize the possibility of there being a repetition of Ames' treachery 
while maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. 
intelligence community.

                              {time}  1550

  Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield 9 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Coleman], chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Legislation of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  (Mr. COLEMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. COLEMAN. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 4299, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1995. As chairman of the 
Legislation Subcommittee, I feel we have produced a good bill that 
makes responsible reductions in the intelligence community's budget 
request while maintaining essential capabilities. In the budget area, 
we have continued to put pressure on the community to develop 
innovative, cost-effective solutions to meeting the challenges of the 
future. More needs to be done, but progress is being made.
  On the legislative side, H.R. 4299 contains a large number of 
substantive proposals, which I would like to summarize briefly:
  Section 401 deletes certain archaic provisions of the Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 to ensure CIA's alcohol rehabilitation 
program is not seen as inconsistent with the Agency's statutory 
authorities.
  Section 501 provides the Secretary of Defense the statutory 
authorities to manage civilian employees of the Central Imagery Office 
[CIO] in the same personnel system as exists for civilian employees of 
the Defense Intelligence Agency. Providing these authorities to the 
Secretary of Defense should ensure there is no separate administrative 
structure created for the smaller CIO.
  Section 502 clarifies that the notice requirements of the Privacy Act 
of 1974 do not apply to Department of Defense [DOD] intelligence 
officers conducting, outside the United States, an initial assessment 
contact of a U.S. person as a possible source of foreign intelligence. 
Section 502 is intended to permit a DOD intelligence officer one 
opportunity for a face-to-face meeting with the potential source 
without having to inform the U.S. person of the officer's affiliation 
with the U.S. Government.
  The committee was not convinced that the notice requirements of the 
Privacy Act were intended to apply to situations covered by the bill, 
but recognized that the Department of Defense had legitimate grounds 
for requesting an exemption, in light of the civil penalties that 
attach to violations. In addition, the committee was concerned about 
the safety overseas of U.S. intelligence officers and U.S. persons 
being assessed.
  The committee intends that the Privacy Act exemption contained in the 
bill be construed in such a way as to minimize intrusion on the privacy 
of the potential U.S. person. The committee believes that no personal 
information solicited from an individual during the initial assessment 
contact should be retained in a U.S. Government system of records if 
the individual is not informed of the intelligence officer's 
governmental affiliation. Furthermore, the committee expects that under 
no circumstances should a potential U.S. person be requested or 
utilized in any fashion to undertake any intelligence activity by 
defense intelligence officers unless the potential U.S. person is made 
witting that he or she is acting on behalf of the U.S. Government 
regardless of the status of the initial assessment contact.
  Section 601 of H.R. 4299 establishes independent statutory inspectors 
general [IG's] for the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National 
Security Agency. These IG's would be appointed by the directors of the 
respective agencies, and would not be subject to Senate confirmation. 
The bill spells out the authorities of the statutory DIA and NSA 
inspectors general, qualifications for the positions, and reporting 
requirements to the congressional intelligence committees.
  The committee has been concerned about the independence and 
effectiveness of the offices of the inspector general at DIA and NSA 
for a number of years. A statutory inspector general at each agency 
should ensure that important intelligence programs operated by the NSA 
and DIA have a high degree of specialized, professional, inspector-
general oversight. Section 601 will be the subject of an amendment from 
Mr. Conyers at a later point in the debate. I support the adoption of 
this amendment: it should bring greater clarity to the interpretation 
of the provisions establishing the NSA and DIA IG's in the law.
  Title VII of the bill includes two provisions intended to improve the 
management of classified information in the Federal Government. Section 
701 requires larger intelligence agencies to allocate at least 2 
percent of their appropriations for security, countermeasures, and 
related activities to certain declassification activities, including 
reducing classified archives. Section 702 requires the President to 
issue an Executive order on classification and declassification, not 
later than 90 days after enactment, and includes a sense of Congress on 
what the Executive order should provide.
  Title VIII of the bill contains several measures to improve U.S. 
counterespionage efforts. These measures should deter U.S. Government 
employees--including contractors, consultants, and legislative and 
judicial branch staff--from engaging in espionage, facilitate the 
detection of espionage, and provide additional authority to prosecute 
and redress espionage activities.
  The bill requires individuals with access to classified information 
to give consent to disclosure of records held by financial 
institutions, credit bureaus, and commercial travel entities, to 
authorized investigative agencies, or employing agencies, during 
background investigations, while granted access to classified 
information, and for 3 years thereafter.
  Section 801 sets forth the conditions under which an authorized 
investigative agency may request, obtain, and disseminate this 
information. While H.R. 4299 requires employees to waive a certain 
degree of privacy as a condition of access to classified information, 
the bill carefully places limitations on when an investigative agency 
may make a request for financial records and how the information 
contained in the record may be disseminated. This should be less 
burdensome to individuals than new reporting requirements, and less 
intrusive on their privacy.
  Title VIII also authorizes rewards for information leading to arrests 
or convictions for espionage; establishes venue for trials involving 
espionage committed outside the United States; requires post-conviction 
forfeiture of espionage proceeds; provides for the denial of retired 
pay to certain individuals convicted overseas of espionage; and 
authorizes provide post-employment assistance to certain Defense 
Department civilian employees to maintain their stability and judgment 
and avoid unlawful disclosure of classified information.

                              {time}  1600

  Mr. Speaker, I would only say in closing that all of the matters that 
I have listed that we dealt with legislatively on this particular 
subcommittee and we have included in the bill are the result of the 
work of a lot of the members of this committee in the area of 
classification and declassification of items. Of course, our colleague, 
the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs], will perhaps speak on that 
issue more later.
  I would say that were it not for the staff on both sides of the aisle 
of the committee, I do not believe we could have brought a bill to the 
floor that has garnered the support of Republicans as well as Democrats 
on this most important matter, not just for its budget matter but for 
its authorization and change in the legislative part of the bill.
  Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from 
Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter], a most valuable member of the committee.
  (Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BEREUTER. Madam Chairman, we have had typically the last 5 years 
I have been a member of the committee sweetness and light at this 
stage, and I think I will depart from that, unfortunately. This is a 
time to draw a line in the sand, because I am not happy at all with 
this budget.
  Madam Chairman, this Member would tell his colleagues he has severe 
reservations about the amount of cuts in the funding of the 
intelligence community recommended by this committee. Certainly I would 
strenuously oppose any further cuts from the floor or in conference.
  Both Republican and Democratic administrations now have sought to 
avoid cutting the intelligence budget as much as the cuts in the 
overall DOD budget within which intelligence funds are obscured. The 
theory has been that intelligence is a force multiplier and also 
exceedingly important in an increasingly confusing and unstable world. 
The Defense Department itself consistently has subscribed to this 
theory, even though more lenient treatment of the intelligence function 
in budget-cutting efforts meant that DOD's core military programs had 
to take deeper cuts to stay within the Department's budget ceiling. 
However, for several years in a row now, Congress has chosen to take 
misguidedly higher percentage cuts in the intelligence request than in 
the overall Defense request.
  The reasons for this tough budgetary treatment of the intelligence 
community budget are mostly political rather than substantive. This 
year our Democratic Party colleagues on the committee tell us that the 
committee must cut deeply because a majority of the Democratic caucus 
is critical of U.S. intelligence, and we might otherwise be unable to 
carry the bill without draconian cuts on the floor.
  Madam Chairman, this member believe, and some other members of the 
committee believe, especially this year, that real damage is being done 
by the budget cuts the committee is recommending and that some of these 
cuts are very unwise. In making such cuts, we do not even have the 
consolation of contributing to deficit reduction, since the Armed 
Services and Appropriations Committees, rather than reducing the 
Defense budget accordingly, routinely divert intelligence savings to 
other Defense programs, notably those that are not funded in the 
Defense request but are valued by some members for parochial or 
political reasons.
  Let us examine some of the problems.
  First, there is now a real question whether we will be able to 
support an adequate satellite infrastructure. Second, it seems like 
only yesterday that Congress itself was leading a highly publicized 
bandwagon of support for human intelligence collection--``HUMINT for 
the 90's,'' it was grandly called. But we are nothing if not fickle, 
and in the twinkling of an eye, the mood shifted 180 degrees. CIA's 
Directorate of Operations now is facing severe cuts that mandate 
worldwide retrenchment comparable to the worst day of the Carter 
administration, when disastrously, Adm. Stansfield Turner was Director 
of Central Intelligence. Intelligence collection for whole regions of 
the world must be virtually written off.
  Obviously, HUMINT cuts and the flagging support for satellite 
restructuring cripple another recent initiative to support military 
operations. The cry for intelligence support for military operations 
became as popular as HUMINT for the 90's, and gained steam after 
lessons learned in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, but that concern and 
effort now looks to be equally short-lived.
  With this Member's interests being heavily focused on arms control 
and verification, I have watched in dismay as we have dismantled many 
of our technical systems for collecting intelligence on Russian 
weapons, on the theory that they are no longer a threat, or that they 
will always comply with treaty provisions, or that we will always 
retain access by other means.
  So, Madam Chairman, I rise to tell Members of the House that in 
certain key areas these cuts have hurt, hurt grievously, and the damage 
cannot be reversed except at great expense and over long periods of 
time. That this pain has not even contributed to deficit reduction is 
insult added to the injury. That a Democratic Congress has called for 
such cuts even against the recommendations of a Democratic President 
seems especially unfathomable. That some outside the responsible 
committees have occasioned these defensive cuts by Democrat members of 
the committee by calling for percentage cuts, without knowledge of, or 
apparent concern about, the specific harm inflicted, and that the 
responsible committees have with good intentions and concern about 
floor cuts, succumbed to their cries of the anti-intelligence forces is 
very unfortunate; I believe it jeopardizes our national security.
  Therefore, it is with reluctance that I support this bill but only at 
this stage of debate. Portions of it are unacceptable, but many of us 
vote for it in order to avoid further cuts. The problem is that if 
those of us concerned about inadequate funding vote ``no'' and are 
joined by the shortsighted or ill-informed who are simply anti-
intelligence, the results could be disastrous. I vote for the bill with 
the hope that the Senate and the conference will restore some of the 
absolutely necessary funding for the intelligence community. If that is 
not the case I will strongly urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' later on 
the conference report.
  Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Young].
  Mr. YOUNG. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Madam Chairman, I want to compliment him and the chairman of the 
committee for the hard work that has been done to bring this bill to 
the floor today. I am going to vote for this bill, but in all honesty I 
have to say, as my colleague, the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. 
Bereuter], has just said, this bill is not adequate, it does not meet 
the requirements of 1994, 1995, or 1996 for intelligence and national 
security interests.
  We have to understand, intelligence is a vital part of our national 
security. I think of the words of General Schwarzkopf after the 
tremendously successful Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He made the 
point that he had about everything that a field commander could have to 
win that war and to win it decisively and to win it without a large 
loss of life. He also said that the intelligence that he had was better 
than any field commander had ever had before.

                              {time}  1610

  But he also said that he could have used more intelligence, more 
accurate intelligence and more and quicker intelligence.
  We cannot separate intelligence from the national security interests 
of our Nation. But we have different kinds of intelligence. We have the 
overhead intelligence, the highly technical, highly classified overhead 
types of intelligence that can do amazing things. But they are limited 
to the extent that they cannot get into the brain, or the mind or the 
thought process of a hostile leader.
  Obviously then, human intelligence is equally important. Human 
intelligence is essential to a comprehensive intelligence program. We 
have not done the job on human intelligence. Since Vietnam we have 
spent billions and billions of dollars on high-technology intelligence 
at the risk of losing our ability to conduct an effective human 
intelligence program. I am afraid the legislation presented today 
allows that direction to continue.
  A major concern that I have is that the intelligence our policymakers 
are getting, and I think it is important to make the point that 
the intelligence community, those who collect the intelligence, are not 
the policymakers but provide the information and the assessment and the 
analysis upon which the policymakers would make their decisions and 
make their determinations and establish a direction.

  It worries me when I believe that our top policymakers are not paying 
the attention to the intelligence information they are getting that 
they should. I do not think they are spending nearly enough time in 
considering, and I do not think that they are placing the importance 
that the members of this committee place on this intelligence 
information. I would venture to say that any member of this Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence probably spends more time every week 
reviewing intelligence information and intelligence matters than some 
of the highest policymakers in the executive branch of Government, and 
that is dangerous, that is dangerous. They need to pay more attention 
to what is happening in the real world.
  Madam Chairman, we need some definite direction. We need an 
intelligence program that meets the Nation's security requirements and 
not the political whims of a budget cutter. I am all for cutting most 
budgets. I look at the votes I have cast in this Congress and 
Congresses before to cut budgets and I am prepared to cut a lot more 
budget items but, I am not prepared to cut the budget when it threatens 
the security of this Nation, because without our national security we 
have very little else to offer the people of this great Nation of ours.
  Madam Chairman, I am going to vote for this bill. As I said earlier, 
I compliment the leaders of the committee and the leadership of the 
committee, but because of these budget restraints we are not doing the 
job that we need to be doing. The Berlin Wall may have come down, the 
Iron Curtain may have melted, but the former Soviet Union's nuclear 
missiles are still in existence. The KGB, while it has changed its 
name, it is no longer called the KGB, but it is still there, and they 
are still collecting, and as the Director of the CIA, Jim Woolsey said, 
when the big target of the KGB and the Soviet Union want away, there 
were a hundred new ones in its place.
  Madam Chairman, I will vote for this bill today, but we need to make 
some real serious changes in the future.
  In an era of downward spiraling budgetary outlays for intelligence, 
we must spend every dollar even more carefully so that the Nation 
receives the absolute maximum in benefits from every dollar spent. I 
have made clear to the administration, the foreign policymakers, and 
the Director of Central Intelligence, that we need a strategic plan 
that will lay out their spending priorities for the remainder of the 
decade.
  We cannot afford to make mistakes now. The world continues to be 
unstable and changing. The death of Kim Il-song last week highlights 
the need for continued vigilance on the Korean Peninsula. The unfolding 
tragedy in Haiti where thousands of Haitians are fleeing their country 
requires constant surveilliance. Bosnia remains unstable, and our 
tentative steps at forming a long-term settlement there are not 
guaranteed to work. Of course Russia remains unstable and armed with 
thousands of nuclear weapons and it continues development programs on 
strategic defense weapons. Although we must carefully monitor these 
developments, I do not see strong planning initiatives on behalf of the 
intelligence community and the administration. As we approach 
conference and the next year's budget submission, I pray that the 
intelligence community will perform better than it did this year. In 
particular, I would like to see a better synergy between the foreign 
policy community and the intelligence community to ensure that they are 
in lock step as they face the challenges that America faces.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I am delighted to yield 5 minutes to 
the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], a vigorous advocate for 
national defense, both in the State of Washington and throughout the 
United States, and chairman of the subcommittee of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence.
  (Mr. DICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, first I want to compliment the chairman 
and the ranking member of our committee and the staff of the committee 
for an excellent job in oversight and review of this year's 
intelligence authorization bill and budget. Yes, I agree with my 
friend, the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Investigations and 
Oversight, that the members of the Intelligence Committee I think, the 
ones the Speaker has appointed after a lot of deliberation, are really 
spending a great deal of time in the committee listening to the 
witnesses, attending the meetings and giving the kind of oversight that 
I think was anticipated when this committee was created.
  I will say to my colleagues on the Republican side, yes, we have made 
large cuts. But as someone who sits both on the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence and on the Defense Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Appropriations, I would remind all of my colleagues that 
if they look at what we have done in procurement in defense, take the 
numbers in this year's budget and translate them back to 1985, we have 
taken procurement down from $135 billion to $43 billion. We have made 
draconian cuts in defense, so large, in fact, that the President this 
year right in this Chamber said we were not going to cut defense any 
further.
  So I would urge Members in the context of this kind of draw down in 
force structure and in the procurement of new systems that what we have 
done here in the intelligence arena is acceptable, and I in my heart of 
hearts believe that we have given the intelligence community the money 
and the resources necessary to do an excellent job in gathering 
intelligence.
  The problem is not there. The problem is that we have too many 
agencies with too much redundancy, doing too much of the same thing.
  I want to commend the chairman. He basically said here today that we 
need not only the Intelligence Committee to be working on this problem, 
but I truly believe we need a group of outside experts, very senior 
people to look at the entire operation of the intelligence community 
and to make recommendations to the President and to the Congress about 
how we can restructure and simplify the intelligence community.
  The gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] got up and said we are not 
going to have as many places with CIA offices in Africa. The only thing 
I would say to that is we still have a State Department, and frankly, a 
lot of what we gather today, in my mind, can be gathered through open 
sources, through the State Department, through the Commerce Department 
who are out in these parts of the world. They are out there and they 
can make a contribution here, because what we are trying to do is get 
the best information we can to decision makers. It does not always have 
to come through clandestine activities.
  Madam Chairman, I would also say this Director, Mr. Woolsey, and this 
is to his credit, has called upon us to make investments in national 
technical collection means. This means some money up front. In this 
respect I do believe that the committee has stood behind him. We have 
said yes, we are going to give you the money now to make the investment 
in improving our national technical collection means. In my view, in 
the future, that will simplify the architecture and allow us to spend 
less money on intelligence gathering. So I think we should support him 
on that.
  The Ames case is a national scandal and disaster, there is no other 
way to put it. I believe the Director was a little slow at first in 
recognizing that the Congress and the American people want him to clean 
house.
  We have to have a better way of doing counter intelligence and the 
CIA and the F.B.I. are both, in my mind, responsible.
  I will give the Clinton administration a credit in this sense, that 
the National Security Counsel came into play and presented some very 
important reforms that have been adopted and put into place.
  I would like to say this: Yes, we tried to help the directorate of 
operations. But one cannot have read the article in U.S. News and World 
Report without having some skepticism and concern about how well the 
directorate of operations has been doing its job. We may have given 
them a lot of money, but I must ask where has been the performance? I 
intend as chairman of the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee to 
spend some time even in this remaining year looking at those problems, 
because it is clear that in Cuba, and Russia and other areas, in Iran 
we have some very serious problems.
  Madam Chairman, I want to say to the House I think we have done a 
responsible job. I think we should vote for this bill. I think we have 
cut as deeply as we should. I think the chairman is right. If we cut 
further, we would be in some serious trouble, and if we will work with 
our colleagues in the conference to try and improve the bill when we 
get there.

                              {time}  1620

  Mr. COMBEST. Madam chairman, I yield 4\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
  (Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GEKAS. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  I, too, want to extend my gratitude to the chairman of the full 
committee, the ranking member, the chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Legislation, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Coleman], and particularly 
to the staff on both sides for their consistent assistance to us. As a 
matter of fact, the staff, if they do nothing else, in unscrambling the 
acronyms for me, I will be eternally grateful to them. I am going to 
create one called SAM, which is ``Staff Assistance to Members,'' which 
I endorse right here and now. If I have to introduce legislation to 
that effect, I will do it. But anyway, SAM has been good to me.
  The message for this particular hour has been amply delivered by the 
presentations made by our colleagues on both sides of the aisle.
  Two gigantic truths emerge from everything that we say here and now. 
One is that there is a continuing absolute need for our country to 
engage in intelligence activities. If the only trouble spot in the 
world were North Korea, that in itself would justify our continuing 
state of alert in the intelligence community and in the Intelligence 
Committee in both Chambers for monitoring of that situation.
  But when you add to that the hundreds of little and bigger situations 
across the civilized and uncivilized world, then we say to the American 
people, and I reiterate this every chance I get in my home district, 
that notwithstanding the end of the cold war, there is this state of 
alertness that is absolutely necessary to our national security and 
that, therefore, we must continue to support an intelligence component 
of our national being.
  And the second truth, one that has been reiterated here, is the agony 
that we have suffered as members of the committee and as American 
citizens throughout the land on the disgraceful Ames case. I am one who 
firmly believes that we will have other cases in the future 
undoubtedly, other betrayals, other individuals who will for money or 
for other reasons betray our country, and in my mind the death penalty 
ought to be considered each and every time such an event occurs.
  Notwithstanding my support of the death penalty, however, it appears 
that some of the antipathy toward that kind of penalty is also apparent 
even in cases when the entire Nation is put at risk. I must tell you 
that it is not just wartime espionage and treason that should be 
punishable by death. Any kind of total sacrifice of the American 
prestige and the American being on the part of anybody who works for 
the CIA, but the Ames case definitely proves that an act of treason 
such as that puts at risk fellow Americans, risk of their lives 
wherever they may be serving across the world, and not only Americans 
but other nationals of other nations who work with us, who share our 
ideals, who share our hopes for the world, and so the death penalty is 
an appropriate measure for treason and espionage, and to the last day 
that I serve in this Congress, I will attempt to do everything I can to 
reinstate that penalty for betrayal of our country.
  Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Lewis].
  Mr. LEWIS of California. I appreciate my colleague yielding. I 
appreciate the work of not just my colleague but my chairman as well in 
a very difficult year in the Intelligence Committee.
  I am the new kid on the block in this committee, for I am just 
beginning my second year of service on the committee. Up until now, I 
have spent most of my time in the Congress on the Appropriations 
Committee, where I focused on the Housing and Independent Agencies 
Subcommittee for a few years, now, service on the Defense Subcommittee.
  I must say that I have been distressed over the last several years 
with the rather rapid reduction in national defense spending that was 
described by my colleague, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks]. 
Hand in hand with that, it seemed to me, as we were going about 
reducing money spent for national defense, it would be very appropriate 
to have access to the kinds of information that one has made available 
to them in the intelligence work, so assignment to that committee has 
been most timely from my perspective.
  As others have suggested, we spent hours and hours behind those 
walls, reading material and trying to get a handle on issues that are 
largely based upon information that is secret intelligence information, 
making certain our public-policy decisions reflect those very serious 
American as well as worldwide needs.
  I must say that I am not lightly disconcerted with the pattern of 
reduced spending in this subject area of recent years. During the 
decade of the 1990's, it would appear that we could be very well moving 
toward, adjusted for inflation, by the year 2000 spending 60 percent 
less on intelligence matters than we spent at the beginning of the 
decade.
  It was only 2 years ago that the former chairman, the gentleman from 
Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], came to the floor and urged us to cut no 
further a budget that then was 15 percent larger than we are curently 
spending in this subject area. And how can that be justified, this in 
view of the world we are living in, a world that is extremely 
dangerous? Indeed the East-West confrontation has largely been set 
aside, but to the rest of the world more complex and maybe even more 
dangerous.
  How do you develop the intelligence resources you need to effectively 
tap that new and complex world?
  Madam Chairman, it is very, very important the House recognize these 
needs, and I urge them to support this legislation.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague, the 
gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
  Mr. COMBEST. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. 
Skaggs].
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentlemen from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs] is recognized 
for 4 minutes.
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend Chairman Glickman 
and ranking minority member Combest for their hard and good work in 
bringing H.R. 4299 to the floor. This is thoughtful legislation that 
strikes a decent balance between the need for our Nation to engage in 
necessary intelligence activities with the need for fiscal restrant. 
This bill also continues the efforts of the Intelligence Committee to 
bring about reform of overall intelligence activities in a way that 
saves the taxpayers money and strengthens our democracy.
  One thing should be clear from today's bill: While the reform efforts 
of the Central Intelligence Agency and related offices have begun, they 
need to proceed with an even greater sense of urgency. The human 
intelligence program still needs a better strategic plan that defines 
essential roles and missions in a way that makes sense in the post-
cold-war world. The counterintelligence program needs special reform in 
light of the Aldrich Ames case. Continuing personnel reductions 
mandated by last year's bill also pose challenges for the intelligence 
community. Director Woolsey, I know, is committed to necessary changes 
in these areas, and we all should encourage and support his leadership.
  The funding level of the bill, which is less than requested, should 
be interpreted as an effort to deal with the budget environment we live 
in and as a message to the intelligence community to recoganize and 
reform itself as quickly as possible to meet today's new challenges.
  In trying to develop sound priorities, it's always helpful to know 
what is of value to people. Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess 
the real value of the products produced by the intelligence community. 
In economic parlance, intelligence products are called free goods, 
meaning they come with no cost to consumers such as the State 
Department or the Department of Defense. Because they are free goods, 
there is no way to determine their value to consumers analogous to the 
price mechanism of the marketplace. As a result, Congress and the 
community don't have the best kind of information we need to decide how 
to allocate intelligence resources according to the priorities of these 
consumers. To solve this problem, I have worked with Chairman Glickman 
to include report language requesting the Community Management Staff to 
develop proposals for pilot projects to test various means for 
measuring the value of and assigning cost to intelligence information. 
The committee report specifies that a pilot project should try to 
develop a market-type mechanism for guiding supply and demand, and as 
for valuing intelligence products. I believe this is the kind of 
innovative approach that will help us prioritize our intelligence 
efforts as intelligently as we can.
  The reform of procedures for classifying information has consumed 
much of my time and attention since becoming a member of the 
Intelligence Committee. Language I drafted for the report on last 
year's intelligence authorization bill directed the intelligence 
community to collect information regarding the annual costs in dollars 
and personnel associated with the classification of information. Two 
months ago the Office of Management and Budget released a report 
documenting that the Government will spend roughly $2.28 billion on 
classifying information this year and will assign classification duties 
to 32,400 Federal workers throughout the Government. The report 
estimated that another $13.8 billion will be spent to reimburse 
Defense, State, and intelligence contractors for compliance with 
security procedures. It was interesting to note that some of the 
agencies which classify information are those Americans would least 
suspect, such as the Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human 
Services, and Education. Unfortunately, the OMB report did not include 
data from the intelligence agencies themselves because they have thus 
far failed to comply. An amendment I'll offer in a few minutes will 
deal with this failure.

  In an effort to continue the declassification process, today's bill--
in language proposed by the chairman and me--requires the intelligence 
agencies to develop a phased plan to implement declassification 
guidelines, begin the process of declassification of archived 
classified documents, and submit reports to Congress on the 
declassification process. The President is also required to develop a 
plan to narrow the definition of information subject to classification, 
to reduce the time period of classification, and to provide for the 
automatic declassification of information when a document's period of 
classification expires. These measures will continue the reform process 
in a balanced and reasonable manner.
  I have two primary reasons for pursuing the reform of the 
classification process. My first reason is my strong philosophical 
belief that the American public and American democracy are best served 
by an open Government. It is clearly necessary to continue to classify 
certain types of information to protect our national security. But 
keeping information from Americans which poses no security risk is just 
as clearly contrary to democratic principles. For example, why should 
we continue to spend money to store classified material regarding troop 
movement during World War I? Why is the department of Education 
spending thousands of dollars to install secure telephone lines? We all 
recognize that a significant portion of what is classified is likely 
kept from the public more for political reasons, or to avoid 
embarrassment, or simply from inaction, rather than to serve any 
defined security need.
  The Founding Fathers believed an educated and informed public would 
serve as the best protector of our form of government and the best 
guarantor against tyranny. We can't expect the public to carry out its 
responsibilities if we allow the classification process to keep 
outdated information secret or to make secret information that should 
properly be available to the public. Reform of the classification 
process will place more information in the public domain and thereby 
strengthen our democracy.
  My second reason for pursuing classification reform involves saving 
money for taxpayers. The OMB report stated that we spend $16 billion 
annually on classifying material and then storing and maintaining it, 
even though much of it is outdated or shouldn't have been classified in 
the first place. The money spent on maintaining the cloak of secrecy 
over outdated information or information which never had significant 
national security content, is simply wasted. Given the huge sum of 
money involved here, if we save only a fraction of the total we spend 
each year, we can narrow the budget deficit substantially.
  In summary, H.R. 4299 is thoughtful legislation that authorizes funds 
for necessary intelligence activities and continues the reform of our 
intelligence apparatus in a way that saves money and strengthens our 
country. I ask all Members to give their full support to the bill.

                              {time}  1630

  Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield the balance of our time to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan].
  Mr. DORNAN. I thank the Republican leader and thank the chairman.
  Like my fellow Republican members on this committee, I also support 
the intelligence authorization bill.
  I, however, share with many of my colleagues on the other side of the 
aisle and all of my Republican colleagues a great concern on the degree 
to which intelligence has been cut over the recent years. In fact, over 
the past 3 years, while the overall defense budget has been slashed 
precipitously, it is a mystery to me that the intelligence budget has 
declined to an even greater degree. I would think any administration, 
any Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, would want all the 
information they could possibly accrue for the benefit of our leaders 
in a most dangerous world.
  Our current Secretary of Defense I think came up with the best 
metaphor I have heard to describe the situation in the world today. He 
said that we have slain the dragon--and by that he meant the massive 
evil force of communism, with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons 
pointed in our direction and we, likewise, we like to think in a 
defensive, deterrent mode, pointing them back at the other side.
  That dragon has been slain, although the poison lies all over the 
landscape, that is, those nuclear missiles, even the tactical ones, 
thousands of those have not yet been perfectly disposed of. We now talk 
of crime syndicates in Russia getting their hands on missiles. But the 
dragon itself is down. On Christmas Day, of all days, the Communist 
hammer and sickle came down and we saw the white, powder blue, and red 
flag of the old Russia go up. But to continue Mr. Perry, our Secretary 
of Defense's metaphor, we now have a garden of a thousand poisonous 
snakes replacing that dragon. The snake is not equal to a dragon, but 
when there are a thousand of them, you have your hands full. Hence the 
need for even greater intelligence.
  I believe I echo the belief of, I think, most of our colleagues in 
repeating that in these times of military downsizing intelligence 
capabilities are increasingly critical to the safety and effectiveness 
of our military and to the wise and effective use of those diminishing 
resources of the military.
  With the demise of the Soviet Union, few would argue these following 
facts, I believe: That is, intelligent men and women would not argue 
that robust intelligence capabilities, strategic and tactical, are 
increasingly critical in this unpredictable, dynamically unpredictable 
world in which we live.
  No longer does our planning focus chiefly on some large-scale 
engagement, Soviet tank divisions pouring through the gap, fighting it 
out in the plains of Europe; and to some this meant, ``Well, let's all 
but bring our military down to nothing,'' and as the prior speaker 
said, some few voices in this House wonder why we need intelligence 
information at all.
  Despite the funding reductions that have occurred since the demise of 
the Soviet Union, it has been said over and over on the House floor 
this afternoon that Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, possibly to a greater 
degree we need more intelligence over and throughout North Korea, where 
we have almost no human intelligence.
  I might add here that even in great humanitarian crises, like Rwanda, 
intelligence is the fastest way to find out how to save human lives by, 
in Rwanda's case, the tens of thousands. The French have already 
apparently changed sides from the Hutu to the Tutsi, and this puts them 
in great danger. When I took the well some months ago to point out a 
simple historical fact that is actually mind-numbing, that more people 
died in Rwanda in a 1-month period, the month of early April through 
early May, than died in all the German concentration camps, the six 
death camps designed just for death.
  In closing, Madam Chairman, I might point out that that figure is now 
double through a million deaths in Rwanda. We need all the intelligence 
we can get. Let us stop cutting our intelligence authorization.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Let me just say, Madam Chairman, that we have very constructive 
members of the committee on both sides. There is general unanimity on 
the issue, although some difference as to the amount to be spent on 
intelligence. I would just point out that in the 1970's and 1980's we 
had very radical, sharp increases in intelligence spending to deal with 
the Soviet threat, particularly the nuclear threat.
  While the numbers are not going up any longer, the numbers this year 
are essentially a freeze of last year, 2.1 percent below the 
President's request and 1.7 percent below last year's appropriation. So 
at a time when the Soviet threat is over, the numbers are not coming 
down in the same way that they went up in the face of the Soviet 
threat, because we acknowledge there remain very serious threats to 
this country, but they are different kinds of threats than we faced in 
the 1970's and 1980's.
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I rise to join Mr. Combest and the rest 
of the Republican members of the House Intelligence Committee in 
expressing deep concern over the latest round of intelligence budget 
cuts contained in H.R. 4299. As detailed in the minority views 
contained in the bill report, both the administration and Congress 
continue to reduce the intelligence budget based on the misguided 
notion that the end of the cold war dictates drastic cutbacks in our 
national intelligence capabilities. This policy flies in the face of 
the reality that, from an intelligence perspective, today's multipolar 
world is infinitely more complex and challenging than the bipolar world 
of yesterday.
  Further, as the technology of warfare continues to advance, today's 
battlefield has become increasingly dependent on timely, accurate and 
usable intelligence to guide precision weapon systems and make tactical 
judgments. This battlefield revolution dictates a need for national and 
tactical intelligence systems able to properly support our military 
forces of the future. I fear that the intelligence cuts embraced by 
this administration and made worse by this bill place this critical 
national security objective at serious risk.
  Beyond these broad concerns, Mr. Chairman, I want to express strong 
opposition to the amendment filed by Mr. Conyers dealing with the 
establishment of statutory inspector generals for the National Security 
Agency [NSA] and the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]. I similarly 
oppose the underlying provision already in section 601 of the bill.
  When the Armed Services Committee received H.R. 4299 under sequential 
referral, we looked closely at this issue and agreed with the 
Intelligence Committee that valid and legitimate issues exist with the 
adequacy of IG oversight coverage for DIA and NSA. However, we disagree 
with the prescribed solution.
  As component agencies of the Department of Defense, the DIA and NSA 
already have an IG--the DOD IG. The DOD inspector general is 
statutorily responsible for carrying out the IG function throughout the 
entirety of the Department, to include DIA and NSA. While many defense 
agencies, as well as the military services, have their own IG offices, 
the ultimate responsibility for this critical function remains with the 
DOD IG who has the necessary expertise, statutory independence, and 
investigative resources for the job.
  Section 601 of the bill and the Conyers amendment would directly 
undermine this arrangement by balkanizing the IG function within DOD 
into separate fiefdoms. This year its DIA and NSA, next year its CIO 
and NRO or somebody else. Once you breach the organizational logic 
behind making the DOD IG universally responsible for department-wide 
oversight, there is no real rational basis for stopping with just these 
two agencies.
  Mr. Chairman, I strongly oppose these provisions as they will 
inevitably lead to a decrease in the quality and effectiveness of IG 
oversight within the Department of Defense. Congress has a long 
historical interest in ensuring that adequate independent oversight of 
executive agencies is provided by IG's and I consider both of these 
provisions to be counterproductive.
  At the end of my statement I have attached a copy of a letter the 
Committee on Armed Services recently received from the Department of 
Defense inspector general detailing the many other substantive 
objections to these provisions. I have also attached a copy of the 
letter that Chairman Dellums and I wrote to the Speaker discharging the 
Armed Services Committee from further consideration of H.R. 4299 and 
describing our mutual concerns with the impact of section 601.
  I strongly oppose the Conyers amendment and I intend to work 
vigorously in the conference to modify this section of the bill to 
address the above-mentioned concerns.

                                                Inspector General,


                                        Department of Defense,

                                     Arlington, VA, July 15, 1994.
     Hon. Ronald V. Dellums,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
     House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to express my concern over 
     proposed legislation (H.R. 4299, Intelligence Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 1995) that appears to begin a process of 
     creating multiple statutory Inspectors General (IG) offices 
     with congressional reporting responsibilities within the same 
     Federal department or agency. Internal oversight type 
     activities are diffused throughout the DoD where they serve 
     as the ``eyes and ears'' of command. The proposal to create 
     statutory Inspectors General in subordinate combat support 
     agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and 
     the National Security Agency (NSA) would tend to undermine 
     the efficacy of this office. I also believe that creation of 
     such statutory IGs with reporting requirements to Congress 
     will reduce their effectiveness within their agency.
       I am opposed to any legislative proposal that would change 
     the status of the Inspectors General of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. Those 
     Agencies are integral parts of the Department of Defense 
     (DOD) and need not be treated any differently than the 
     Military Departments or the other Defense Agencies. Section 
     601 of H.R. 4299, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 1995, establishes independent statutory Inspectors 
     General for the DIA and the NSA similar to the Inspector 
     General for the Central Intelligence Agency. Additionally, 
     Chairman Conyers has proposed an amendment to H.R. 4299 that 
     would not only create statutory Inspectors General for the 
     DIA and the NSA but would also prohibit this office from 
     conducting any activity in any matter the Secretary of 
     Defense deems the sole responsibility of the DIA or the NSA. 
     The latter provision conflicts with the intent of Congress, 
     as expressed in the Inspector General Act, as amended, that 
     the Inspector General DoD Act, be the principal advisor to 
     the Secretary of Defense on the prevention and detection of 
     fraud, waste and abuse on all DoD programs, operations and 
     components.
       It is unnecessary to create a statutory Inspector General 
     at the DIA or the NSA to ensure a reasonable level of 
     oversight. We have nearly 50 auditors assigned to the 
     intelligence area. Our inspectors, investigators and other 
     specialists also routinely cover intelligence subjects. We 
     provided Congress with comprehensive reports of 
     organizational inspections of the NSA and the DIA in 1992 and 
     1991, respectively. Further, this office has never turned 
     down a congressional request for an audit at the DIA or the 
     NSA; indeed, we have received very few such requests over the 
     past several years. We have also offered to provide a 
     classified annex to our semiannual report to provide better 
     insight into those agencies and activities within the DoD 
     where the bulk of the work involves classified activities.
       Our relationship with the DIA and the NSA Inspectors 
     General is consistent with the other internal oversight 
     offices of other Defense Agencies. The relationship includes 
     ensuring that they follow prescribed standards and policies 
     on auditing, audit follow-up, investigations, hotline 
     management, etc. We also rely on them to be responsive and a 
     source of support for the senior managers of their Agencies, 
     just as the Military Department Inspectors General serve 
     their Chiefs of Staff and the Auditors General serve the 
     Service Secretaries. Like other Defense Agency Inspectors 
     General or internal review offices, they do not need or have 
     criminal investigations capability. We provide that support.
       The creation of a statutory IG for the DIA and the NSA 
     would dramatically change this relationship and have serious 
     adverse repercussions on our operations, especially if 
     Chairman Conyers' proposed amendment restricting our 
     authority were adopted. In practice that would probably 
     result in Directors of those Agencies seeking Secretary of 
     Defense determinations that all functions conducted by their 
     agencies-both programmatic and administrative-are their sole 
     responsibility, effectively eliminating any DoD IG coverage. 
     For example, we would be unable to conduct the comprehensive 
     review of equal employment opportunity and discrimination we 
     recently concluded at the NSA absent the consent of the 
     Director of the NSA. More importantly, under the proposed 
     amendment neither the IG, DOD, nor the new statutory 
     Inspectors General in the DIA and the NSA would have 
     sufficient access to look at intelligence matters on a DoD-
     wide basis.
       We have reviewed the IG organizations of the DIA and the 
     NSA in the past and continue to monitor them. Our 
     relationship with the Inspectors General of the DIA and the 
     NSA is effective and working well.
       I seriously hope that you will reconsider this legislation 
     in view of the precedent it would set. If I may be of further 
     assistance, please contact me.
           Sincerely,
                                           Derek J. Vander Schaaf,
                                         Deputy Inspector General.
                                  ____

                                    U.S. House of Representatives,


                                  Committee on Armed Services,

                                    Washington, DC, June 24, 1994.
     Hon. Thomas S. Foley,
     Speaker, the Capitol, U.S. House of Representatives, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Speaker: We write with respect to H.R. 4299, the 
     Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, which 
     was sequentially referred to the Committee on Armed Services 
     until June 24, 1994.
       The Committee on Armed Services will not mark-up and file a 
     report on this legislation. We will refrain from action on 
     the bill primarily because, although there are policies 
     reflected in the bill with which we disagree, we believe 
     those policies can be addressed adequately in conference. A 
     separate mark-up and report on the bill frankly would 
     unnecessarily complicate consideration of the measure in the 
     House, and we no need to do that.
       The one provision that does raise concern warranting 
     mention here is section 601 of the reported bill. This 
     section proposes to establish statutory charters for 
     Inspector General positions within two Department of Defense 
     agencies--the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the 
     National Security Agency (NSA).
       A careful reading of the Intelligence Committee's report 
     accompanying H.R. 4299 shows that issues exist in this area 
     that may require congressional action. However, we are not 
     convinced that statutory charters are the most effective or 
     appropriate solution to the identified problems. The 
     Department of Defense already has an Inspector General with 
     the statutory responsibility to perform this critical 
     function across the entirety of the department. Further, 
     section 601 appears to be patterned on legislation previously 
     used to establish an inspector general office within the 
     Central Intelligence Agency. Since DIA and NSA are agencies 
     of an executive department, we believe they require 
     significantly different treatment in statute than that 
     afforded to independent agencies.
       The Committee on Armed Services stands prepared to work 
     with the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in 
     properly addressing the issues by that committee's action on 
     H.R. 4299. We look forward to reaching an appropriate 
     solution to these issues during conference on the bill.
           Sincerely,
     Ronald V. Dellums,
                                                         Chairman.
     Floyd D. Spence,
                                               Ranking Republican.

  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute printed in the bill shall be considered by titles as an 
original bill for the purpose of amendment, and each title is 
considered read.
  No amendment to the substitute shall be in order except those 
amendments printed in that portion of the Congressional Record 
designated for that purpose in clause 6 of rule XXIII prior to 
consideration of the bill.
  The Clerk will designate section 1.
  The text of section 1 is as follows:

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 1995''.

  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
remainder of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute be 
printed in the Record, and open to amendment at any point.
  Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, reserving the right to object, if a 
Member is not here now, this would not preclude him from going back to 
title I?
  The CHAIRMAN. The whole bill would be open for amendment.
  Mr. COMBEST. I thank the Chair, and I withdraw my reservation of 
objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Kansas?
  There was no objection.
  The text of the remainder of the committee amendment in the nature of 
a substitute is as follows:
                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 1995 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:
       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (7) The Department of State.
       (8) The Department of the Treasury.
       (9) The Department of Energy.
       (10) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (11) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (12) The Central Imagery Office.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1995, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4299 of the One Hundred 
     Third Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of 
     the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1995 the 
     sum of $91,800,000. Within such amounts authorized, funds 
     identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and 
     Development Committee and the Environmental Task Force shall 
     remain available until September 30, 1996.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The Community Management 
     Account of the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized 
     209 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1995. Such 
     personnel of the Community Management Account may be 
     permanent employees of the Community Management Account or 
     personnel detailed from other elements of the United States 
     Government.
       (c) Reimbursement.--During fiscal year 1995, any officer or 
     employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces 
     who is detailed to the Community Management Staff from 
     another element of the United States Government shall be 
     detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such 
     officer, employee or member may be detailed on a 
     nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for 
     the performance of temporary functions as required by the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 1995 the sum of $198,000,000.
                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or laws of the United States.
                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. ILLNESS OR INJURY REQUIRING HOSPITALIZATION.

       Section 4(a)(5) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
     1949 (50 U.S.C. 403(e)(a)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (A)--
       (A) by striking ``, not the result of vicious habits, 
     intemperance, or misconduct on his part,'';
       (B) by striking ``he shall deem'' and inserting ``the 
     Director deems'';
       (C) by striking ``section 10 of the Act of March 3, 1933 
     (47 Stat. 1516; 5 U.S.C. 73b)'' and inserting ``section 5731 
     of title 5, United States Code'';
       (D) by striking ``his recovery'' and inserting ``the 
     recovery of such officer or employee''; and
       (E) by striking ``his return to his post'' and inserting 
     ``the return to the post of duty of such officer or 
     employee'';
       (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``his opinion'' both 
     places it appears and inserting ``the opinion of the 
     Director''; and
       (3) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``, not the result of 
     vicious habits, intemperance, or misconduct on his part,''.
         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 501. CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 
                   MANAGEMENT.

       (a) General Provisions.--Chapter 83 of title 10, United 
     States Code, is amended as follows:
       (1) By amending the heading of the chapter to read as 
     follows:

 ``CHAPTER 83--DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND CENTRAL IMAGERY OFFICE 
                         CIVILIAN PERSONNEL''.

       (2) In section 1601--
       (A) by inserting ``and the Central Imagery Office'' after 
     ``Defense Intelligence Agency'' in subsection (a);
       (B) by inserting ``or the Central Imagery Office'' after 
     ``outside the Defense Intelligence Agency'' and inserting ``, 
     the Central Imagery Office,'' after ``to the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency'' in subsection (d); and
       (C) by inserting ``and the Central Imagery Office'' after 
     ``Defense Intelligence Agency'' in subsection (e).
       (3) In section 1602, by inserting ``and Central Imagery 
     Office'' after ``Defense Intelligence Agency''.
       (4) In section 1604--
       (A) by inserting ``and the Central Imagery Office,'' after 
     ``Defense Intelligence Agency'' in subsection (a)(1);
       (B) by inserting ``or the Central Imagery Office'' after 
     ``Defense Intelligence Agency'' in both places it occurs in 
     the second sentence of subsection (b);
       (C) by inserting ``or the Central Imagery Office'' after 
     ``Defense Intelligence Agency'' in subsection (c);
       (D) by inserting ``and the Central Imagery Office'' after 
     ``Defense Intelligence Agency'' in subsection (d);
       (E) by inserting ``or the Central Imagery Office'' after 
     ``Defense Intelligence Agency'' in subsection (e)(1); and
       (F) in subsection (e)(3)--
       (i) by amending the first sentence to read as follows: 
     ``The Secretary of Defense may delegate authority under this 
     subsection only to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the 
     Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of 
     the Central Imagery Office, or all three.''; and
       (ii) by striking ``either'' and inserting ``any''.
       (b) Conforming Change to Title 10.--The items relating to 
     chapter 83 in the tables of chapters at the beginning of 
     subtitle A, and at the beginning of part II of subtitle A, of 
     title 10, United States Code, are amended to read as follows:

  ``83. Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Imagery Office Civilian 
    Personnel...................................................1601''.

       (c) Chapter 23 of Title 5.--Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) of 
     title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``the 
     Central Imagery Office,'' after ``Defense Intelligence 
     Agency,''.
       (d) Chapter 31 of Title 5.--Section 3132(a)(1)(B) of title 
     5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``the Central 
     Imagery Office,'' after ``Defense Intelligence Agency,''.
       (e) Chapter 43 of Title 5.--Section 4301(1)(B)(ii) of title 
     5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``the Central 
     Imagery Office,'' after ``Defense Intelligence Agency,''.
       (f) Chapter 47 of Title 5.--Section 4701(a)(1)(B) of title 
     5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``the Central 
     Imagery Office,'' after ``Defense Intelligence Agency,''.
       (g) Chapter 51 of Title 5.--Section 5102(a)(1) of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``or'' at the end of clause (ix);
       (2) by striking the period at the end of clause (x) and 
     inserting ``; or''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(xi) the Central Imagery Office, Department of 
     Defense.''.
       (h) Chapter 51 of Title 5.--Section 5342(a)(1) of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``or'' at the end of subparagraph (J);
       (2) by inserting ``or'' after the semicolon at the end of 
     subparagraph (K); and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(L) the Central Imagery Office, Department of Defense;''.
       (i) Additional Leave Transfer Programs.--(1) Section 
     6339(a)(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended--
       (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (D);
       (B) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (F); 
     and
       (C) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new 
     subparagraph (E):
       ``(E) the Central Imagery Office; and''.
       (2) Section 6339(a)(2) of such title is amended--
       (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (D);
       (B) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (F);
       (C) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the following new 
     subparagraph (E):
       ``(E) with respect to the Central Imagery Office, the 
     Director of the Central Imagery Office; and''; and
       (D) in subparagraph (F), as redesignated by subparagraph 
     (B) of this paragraph, by striking ``paragraph (1)(E)'' and 
     inserting ``paragraph (1)(F)'' both places it appears.
       (j) Chapter 71 of Title 5.--Section 7103(a)(3) of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``or'' at the end of subparagraph (F);
       (2) by inserting ``or'' at the end of subparagraph (G); and
       (3) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(H) the Central Imagery Office;''.
       (k) Chapter 73 of Title 5.--Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i) of 
     title 5, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``or'' at the end of subclause (XI); and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(XIII) the Central Imagery Office; or''.
       (l) Chapter 75 of Title 5.--Section 7511(b)(8) of title 5, 
     United States Code, is amended by inserting ``the Central 
     Imagery Office,'' after ``Defense Intelligence Agency,''.
       (m) Ethics in Government Act of 1978.--Section 105(a)(1) of 
     the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is 
     amended by inserting ``the Central Imagery Office,'' after 
     ``Defense Intelligence Agency,''.
       (n) Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988.--Section 
     7(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 
     1988 (29 U.S.C. 2006(b)(2)(A)(i)) is amended by inserting 
     ``the Central Imagery Office,'' after ``Defense Intelligence 
     Agency,''.

     SEC. 502. DISCLOSURE OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFILIATION BY 
                   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL 
                   OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES.

       (a) General Provisions.--Chapter 21 of title 10, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 426. Disclosure of governmental affiliation by 
       Department of Defense intelligence personnel outside the 
       United States

       ``Notwithstanding section 552a(e)(3) of title 5 or any 
     other provision of law, Department of Defense intelligence 
     personnel shall not be required, outside the United States, 
     to give notice of governmental affiliation to potential 
     United States person sources during the initial assessment 
     contact. For the purposes of this section, the term `United 
     States' includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the 
     Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any 
     territory or possession of the United States.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for 
     subchapter I of such chapter is amended by adding at the end 
     thereof the following new item:

``426. Disclosure of governmental affiliation by Department of Defense 
              intelligence personnel outside the United States.''.

                      TITLE VI--INSPECTORS GENERAL

     SEC. 601. INSPECTORS GENERAL FOR DIA, NSA, AND CIA.

       (a) DIA.--(1) Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, 
     is amended by inserting after section 426, as added by 
     section 502 of this Act, the following new section:

     ``Sec. 427. Inspector General

       ``(a) Purpose; Establishment.--In order to--
       ``(1) create an objective and effective office, 
     appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and 
     conduct independently inspections, investigations, and audits 
     relating to programs and operations of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency;
       ``(2) provide leadership and recommend policies designed to 
     promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the 
     administration of such programs and operations, and detect 
     fraud and abuse in such programs and operations;
       ``(3) provide a means for keeping the Director fully and 
     currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating 
     to the administration of such programs and operations, and 
     the necessity for and the progress of corrective actions; and
       ``(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that 
     the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (hereafter in this 
     section referred to collectively as the `intelligence 
     committees') are kept similarly informed of significant 
     problems and deficiencies as well as the necessity for and 
     the progress of corrective actions,
     there is hereby established in the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency an Office of Inspector General (hereafter in this 
     section referred to as the `Office').
       ``(b) Appointment; Supervision; Removal.--(1) There shall 
     be at the head of the Office an Inspector General who shall 
     be appointed by the Director of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency. This appointment shall be made without regard to 
     political affiliation and shall be solely on the basis of 
     integrity, compliance with the security standards of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency, and prior experience in the 
     field of foreign intelligence and in a Federal office of 
     Inspector General. Such appointment shall also be made on the 
     basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, financial 
     analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or 
     auditing.
       ``(2) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be 
     under the general supervision of the Director.
       ``(3) The Director may prohibit the Inspector General from 
     initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit, 
     inspection, or investigation if the Director determines that 
     such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national 
     security interests of the United States.
       ``(4) If the Director exercises any power under paragraph 
     (3), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified 
     statement of the reasons for the exercise of such power 
     within seven days to the intelligence committees. The 
     Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time such 
     report is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the 
     protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the 
     Inspector General with a copy of any such report. In such 
     cases, the Inspector General may submit such comments to the 
     intelligence committees that the Director considers 
     appropriate.
       ``(5) The Director shall report to the Inspector General of 
     the Department of Defense any information, allegation, or 
     complaint received from the Inspector General established 
     under this section, relating to violations of Federal 
     criminal law involving any officer or employee of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency, consistent with such guidelines as may 
     be issued by the Inspector General of the Department of 
     Defense. A copy of all such reports shall be furnished to the 
     Inspector General established under this section.
       ``(6) The Inspector General may be removed from office only 
     by the Director. The Director shall immediately communicate 
     in writing to the intelligence committees the reasons for any 
     such removal.
       ``(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty 
     and responsibility of the Inspector General appointed under 
     this section--
       ``(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, 
     conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the 
     inspections, investigations, and audits relating to the 
     programs and operations of the Defense Intelligence Agency to 
     ensure they are conducted efficiently and in accordance with 
     applicable law and regulations;
       ``(2) to keep the Director fully and currently informed 
     concerning violations of law and regulations, fraud and other 
     serious problems, abuses and deficiencies that may occur in 
     such programs and operations, and to report the progress made 
     in implementing corrective action;
       ``(3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence 
     sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued 
     by the Office, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose 
     and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be 
     appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence 
     sources and methods described in such reports; and
       ``(4) in the execution of the responsibilities of the 
     Inspector General, to comply with generally accepted 
     government auditing standards.
       ``(d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or 
     Flagrant Problems; Reports of Functional Problems.--(1) The 
     Inspector General shall, not later than January 31 and July 
     31 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director a 
     classified semiannual report summarizing the activities of 
     the Office during the immediately preceding six-month period 
     ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, 
     respectively. Within thirty days of receipt of such reports, 
     the Director shall transmit such reports to the intelligence 
     committees with any comments the Director may deem 
     appropriate. Such reports shall, at a minimum, include a list 
     of the title or subject of each inspection, investigation, or 
     audit conducted during the reporting period and--
       ``(A) a description of significant problems, abuses, and 
     deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and 
     operations of the Defense Intelligence Agency identified by 
     the Office during the reporting period;
       ``(B) a description of the recommendations for corrective 
     action made by the Office during the reporting period with 
     respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies 
     identified in subparagraph (A);
       ``(C) a statement of whether corrective action has been 
     completed on each significant recommendation described in 
     previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective 
     action has been completed, a description of such corrective 
     action;
       ``(D) a certification that the Inspector General has had 
     full and direct access to all information relevant to the 
     performance of the functions of the Inspector General;
       ``(E) a description of all cases occurring during the 
     reporting period where the Inspector General could not obtain 
     documentary evidence relevant to any inspection, audit, or 
     investigation due to the lack of authority to subpoena such 
     information; and
       ``(F) such recommendations as the Inspector General may 
     wish to make concerning legislation to promote economy and 
     efficiency in the administration of programs and operations 
     undertaken by the Defense Intelligence Agency, and to detect 
     and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and 
     operations.
       ``(2) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the 
     Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of 
     particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or 
     deficiencies relating to the administration of programs or 
     operations. The Director shall transmit such report to the 
     intelligence committees within seven calendar days, together 
     with any comments the Director considers appropriate.
       ``(3) In the event that--
       ``(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any 
     differences with the Director affecting the execution of the 
     Inspector General's duties or responsibilities; or
       ``(B) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible 
     alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary 
     information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or 
     audit,
     the Inspector General shall immediately report such matter to 
     the intelligence committees.
       ``(4) Pursuant to title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947, the Director shall submit to the intelligence 
     committees any report or findings and recommendations of an 
     inspection, investigation, or audit conducted by the Office 
     which has been requested by the Chairman or Ranking Minority 
     Member of either committee.
       ``(e) Authorities of the Inspector General.--(1) The 
     Inspector General shall have direct and prompt access to the 
     Director when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the 
     performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
       ``(2) The Inspector General shall have access to any 
     employee or any employee of a contractor of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency whose testimony is needed for the 
     performance of the duties of the Inspector General. In 
     addition, the Inspector General shall have direct access to 
     all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, 
     recommendations, or other material which relate to the 
     programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector 
     General has responsibilities under this section. Failure on 
     the part of any employee or contractor to cooperate with the 
     Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate 
     administrative actions by the Director, to include loss of 
     employment or the termination of an existing contractual 
     relationship.
       ``(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and 
     investigate complaints or information from any person 
     concerning the existence of an activity constituting a 
     violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, 
     gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial 
     and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once 
     such complaint or information has been received from an 
     employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency--
       ``(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity 
     of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless 
     the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is 
     unavoidable during the course of the investigation; and
       ``(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of 
     reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any 
     employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency in a position to 
     take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the 
     information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was 
     false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity.
       ``(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to 
     administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, 
     or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the 
     duties of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or 
     affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee 
     of the Office designated by the Inspector General shall have 
     the same force and effect as if administered or taken by or 
     before an officer having a seal.
       ``(5) The Inspector General shall be provided with 
     appropriate and adequate office space at central and field 
     office locations, together with such equipment, office 
     supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities 
     and services as may be necessary for the operation of such 
     offices.
       ``(6) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the 
     Director, the Inspector General shall select, appoint and 
     employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to 
     carry out the functions of the Inspector General. In making 
     such selections, the Inspector General shall ensure that such 
     officers and employees have the requisite training and 
     experience to enable the Inspector General to carry out the 
     duties of the Inspector General effectively. In this regard, 
     the Inspector General shall create within the organization of 
     the Inspector General a career cadre of sufficient size to 
     provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the 
     effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
       ``(7) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the 
     Inspector General may request such information or assistance 
     as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and 
     responsibilities of the Inspector General from any Federal 
     agency. Upon request of the Inspector General for such 
     information or assistance, the head of the Federal agency 
     involved shall, insofar as is practicable and not in 
     contravention of any existing statutory restriction or 
     regulation of the Federal agency concerned, furnish to the 
     Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such 
     information or assistance.
       ``(f) Relationship With Inspector General of the Department 
     of Defense.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
     affect the authorities and responsibilities of the Inspector 
     General of the Department of Defense.
       ``(g) Separate Budget Account.--Beginning with fiscal year 
     1996, there shall be included in the National Foreign 
     Intelligence Program budget a separate account for the Office 
     of Inspector General established pursuant to this section.
       ``(h) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office 
     the office of the Defense Intelligence Agency referred to as 
     the `Office of Inspector General'. The personnel, assets, 
     liabilities, contracts, property, records, and unexpended 
     balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and 
     other funds employed, held, used, arising from, or available 
     to such `Office of Inspector General' are hereby transferred 
     to the Office established pursuant to this section.''.
       (2) The table of sections of chapter 21 of title 10,

     United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 426, as added by section 502 of this Act, 
     the following:

``427. Inspector General.''.

       (b) NSA.--The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 
     U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following:

     ``SEC. 19. INSPECTOR GENERAL.

       ``(a) Purpose; Establishment.--In order to--
       ``(1) create an objective and effective office, 
     appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and 
     conduct independently inspections, investigations, and audits 
     relating to programs and operations of the National Security 
     Agency;
       ``(2) provide leadership and recommend policies designed to 
     promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the 
     administration of such programs and operations, and detect 
     fraud and abuse in such programs and operations;
       ``(3) provide a means for keeping the Director fully and 
     currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating 
     to the administration of such programs and operations, and 
     the necessity for and the progress of corrective actions; and
       ``(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that 
     the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (hereafter in this 
     section referred to collectively as the `intelligence 
     committees') are kept similarly informed of significant 
     problems and deficiencies as well as the necessity for and 
     the progress of corrective actions,
     there is hereby established in the National Security Agency 
     an Office of Inspector General (hereafter in this section 
     referred to as the `Office').
       ``(b) Appointment; Supervision; Removal.--(1) There shall 
     be at the head of the Office an Inspector General who shall 
     be appointed by the Director of the National Security Agency. 
     This appointment shall be made without regard to political 
     affiliation and shall be solely on the basis of integrity, 
     compliance with the security standards of the National 
     Security Agency, and prior experience in the field of foreign 
     intelligence and in a Federal office of Inspector General. 
     Such appointment shall also be made on the basis of 
     demonstrated ability in accounting, financial analysis, law, 
     management analysis, public administration, or auditing.
       ``(2) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be 
     under the general supervision of the Director.
       ``(3) The Director may prohibit the Inspector General from 
     initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit, 
     inspection, or investigation if the Director determines that 
     such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national 
     security interests of the United States.
       ``(4) If the Director exercises any power under paragraph 
     (3), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified 
     statement of the reasons for the exercise of such power 
     within seven days to the intelligence committees. The 
     Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time such 
     report is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the 
     protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the 
     Inspector General with a copy of any such report. In such 
     cases, the Inspector General may submit such comments to the 
     intelligence committees that the Director considers 
     appropriate.
       ``(5) The Director shall report to the Inspector General of 
     the Department of Defense any information, allegation, or 
     complaint received from the Inspector General established 
     under this section, relating to violations of Federal 
     criminal law involving any officer or employee of the 
     National Security Agency, consistent with such guidelines as 
     may be issued by the Inspector General of the Department of 
     Defense. A copy of all such reports shall be furnished to the 
     Inspector General established under this section.
       ``(6) The Inspector General may be removed from office only 
     by the Director. The Director shall immediately communicate 
     in writing to the intelligence committees the reasons for any 
     such removal.
       ``(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty 
     and responsibility of the Inspector General appointed under 
     this section--
       ``(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, 
     conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the 
     inspections, investigations, and audits relating to the 
     programs and operations of the National Security Agency to 
     ensure they are conducted efficiently and in accordance with 
     applicable law and regulations;
       ``(2) to keep the Director fully and currently informed 
     concerning violations of law and regulations, fraud and other 
     serious problems, abuses and deficiencies that may occur in 
     such programs and operations, and to report the progress made 
     in implementing corrective action;
       ``(3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence 
     sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued 
     by the Office, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose 
     and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be 
     appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence 
     sources and methods described in such reports; and
       ``(4) in the execution of the responsibilities of the 
     Inspector General, to comply with generally accepted 
     government auditing standards.
       ``(d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or 
     Flagrant Problems; Reports of Functional Problems.--(1) The 
     Inspector General shall, not later than January 31 and July 
     31 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director a 
     classified semiannual report summarizing the activities of 
     the Office during the immediately preceding six-month period 
     ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, 
     respectively. Within thirty days, the Director shall transmit 
     such reports to the intelligence committees with any comments 
     the Director may deem appropriate. Such reports shall, at a 
     minimum, include a list of the title or subject of each 
     inspection, investigation, or audit conducted during the 
     reporting period and--
       ``(A) a description of significant problems, abuses, and 
     deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and 
     operations of the National Security Agency identified by the 
     Office during the reporting period;
       ``(B) a description of the recommendations for corrective 
     action made by the Office during the reporting period with 
     respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies 
     identified in subparagraph (A);
       ``(C) a statement of whether corrective action has been 
     completed on each significant recommendation described in 
     previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective 
     action has been completed, a description of such corrective 
     action;
       ``(D) a certification that the Inspector General has had 
     full and direct access to all information relevant to the 
     performance of the functions of the Inspector General;
       ``(E) a description of all cases occurring during the 
     reporting period where the Inspector General could not obtain 
     documentary evidence relevant to any inspection, audit, or 
     investigation due to the lack of authority to subpoena such 
     information; and
       ``(F) such recommendations as the Inspector General may 
     wish to make concerning legislation to promote economy and 
     efficiency in the administration of programs and operations 
     undertaken by the National Security Agency, and to detect and 
     eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and operations.
       ``(2) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the 
     Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of 
     particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or 
     deficiencies relating to the administration of programs or 
     operations. The Director shall transmit such report to the 
     intelligence committees within seven calendar days, together 
     with any comments the Director considers appropriate.
       ``(3) In the event that--
       ``(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any 
     differences with the Director affecting the execution of the 
     Inspector General's duties or responsibilities; or
       ``(B) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible 
     alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary 
     information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or 
     audit,
     the Inspector General shall immediately report such matter to 
     the intelligence committees.
       ``(4) Pursuant to title V of the National Security Act of 
     1947, the Director shall submit to the intelligence 
     committees any report or findings and recommendations of an 
     inspection, investigation, or audit conducted by the Office 
     which has been requested by the Chairman or Ranking Minority 
     Member of either committee.
       ``(e) Authorities of the Inspector General.--(1) The 
     Inspector General shall have direct and prompt access to the 
     Director when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the 
     performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
       ``(2) The Inspector General shall have access to any 
     employee or any employee of a contractor of the National 
     Security Agency whose testimony is needed for the performance 
     of the duties of the Inspector General. In addition, the 
     Inspector General shall have direct access to all records, 
     reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, 
     or other material which relate to the programs and operations 
     with respect to which the Inspector General has 
     responsibilities under this section. Failure on the part of 
     any employee or contractor to cooperate with the Inspector 
     General shall be grounds for appropriate administrative 
     actions by the Director, to include loss of employment or the 
     termination of an existing contractual relationship.
       ``(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and 
     investigate complaints or information from any person 
     concerning the existence of an activity constituting a 
     violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, 
     gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial 
     and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once 
     such complaint or information has been received from an 
     employee of the National Security Agency--
       ``(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity 
     of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless 
     the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is 
     unavoidable during the course of the investigation; and
       ``(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of 
     reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any 
     employee of the National Security Agency in a position to 
     take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the 
     information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was 
     false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity.
       ``(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to 
     administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, 
     or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of duties 
     of the Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or 
     affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee 
     of the Office designated by the Inspector General shall have 
     the same force and effect as if administered or taken by or 
     before an officer having a seal.
       ``(5) The Inspector General shall be provided with 
     appropriate and adequate office space at central and field 
     office locations, together with such equipment, office 
     supplies, maintenance services, and communications facilities 
     and services as may be necessary for the operation of such 
     offices.
       ``(6) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the 
     Director, the Inspector General shall select, appoint and 
     employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to 
     carry out the functions of the Inspector General. In making 
     such selections, the Inspector General shall ensure that such 
     officers and employees have the requisite training and 
     experience to enable the Inspector General to carry out the 
     duties of the Inspector General effectively. In this regard, 
     the Inspector General shall create within the organization of 
     the Inspector General a career cadre of sufficient size to 
     provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the 
     effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
       ``(7) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the 
     Inspector General may request such information or assistance 
     as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and 
     responsibilities of the Inspector General from any Federal 
     agency. Upon request of the Inspector General for such 
     information or assistance, the head of the Federal agency 
     involved shall, insofar as is practicable and not in 
     contravention of any existing statutory restriction or 
     regulation of the Federal agency concerned, furnish to the 
     Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such 
     information or assistance.
       ``(f) Relationship With Inspector General of the Department 
     of Defense.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
     affect the authorities and responsibilities of the Inspector 
     General of the Department of Defense.
       ``(g) Separate Budget Account.--Beginning with fiscal year 
     1996, there shall be included in the National Foreign 
     Intelligence Program budget a separate account for the Office 
     of Inspector General established pursuant to this section.
       ``(h) Transfer.--There shall be transferred to the Office 
     the office of the National Security Agency referred to as the 
     `Office of Inspector General'. The personnel, assets, 
     liabilities, contracts, property, records, and unexpended 
     balances of appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and 
     other funds employed, held, used, arising from, or available 
     to such `Office of Inspector General' are hereby transferred 
     to the Office established pursuant to this section.''.
       (c) CIA.--Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act 
     of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)(1)--
       (A) by striking ``foreign intelligence.'' and inserting 
     ``foreign intelligence and in a Federal office of Inspector 
     General.'';
       (B) by striking ``or'' after ``analysis,''; and
       (C) by striking the period at the end thereof and inserting 
     ``, or auditing.'';
       (2) in subsection (c)(1), by striking ``to conduct'' and 
     inserting ``to plan, conduct'';
       (3) in subsection (d)(1)--
       (A) by striking ``June 30 and December 31'' and inserting 
     ``January 31 and July 31'';
       (B) by striking ``period.'' at the end of the first 
     sentence and inserting ``periods ending December 31 (of the 
     preceding year) and June 30, respectively.''; and
       (C) by inserting ``of receipt of such reports'' after 
     ``thirty days'';
       (4) in subsection (d)(3)(C), by inserting ``inspection, or 
     audit,'' after ``investigation,'';
       (5) in subsection (d)(4), by inserting ``or findings and 
     recommendations'' after ``report''; and
       (6) in subsection (e)(6)--
       (A) by striking ``it is the sense of Congress that''; and
       (B) by striking ``should'' and inserting ``shall''.
                  TITLE VII--CLASSIFICATION MANAGEMENT

     SEC. 701. DECLASSIFICATION PLAN.

       Each agency of the National Foreign Intelligence Program to 
     which is appropriated more than $1,000,000 in the security, 
     countermeasures, and related activities structural category 
     for fiscal year 1995 shall allocate at least two percent of 
     their total expenditure in this structural category for 
     fiscal year 1995 to the classification management 
     consolidated expenditure center, to be used for the following 
     activities:
       (1) Development of a phased plan to implement 
     declassification guidelines contained in the executive order 
     which replaces Executive Order 12356. Each such agency shall 
     provide the plan to Congress within 90 days after the 
     beginning of fiscal year 1995 or 90 days after the 
     publication of such replacement executive order, whichever is 
     later. This plan shall include an accounting of the amount of 
     archived material, levels of classification, types of storage 
     media and locations, review methods to be employed, and 
     estimated costs of the declassification activity itself; as 
     well as an assessment by the agency of the appropriate types 
     and amounts of information to be maintained in the future, 
     how it will be stored, safeguarded, and reviewed, and the 
     projected costs of these classification management activities 
     for the succeeding five years.
       (2) Commencement of the process of declassification and 
     reduction of the amount of archived classified documents 
     maintained by each agency.
       (3) Submission of a report to the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate within 90 
     days after the end of fiscal year 1995 on the progress made 
     in carrying out paragraph (2), with reference to the plan 
     required by paragraph (1).

     SEC. 702. CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION.

       (a) Plan.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the President shall develop a plan, 
     and issue an executive order for its implementation, which 
     provides for the classification and declassification of 
     information. It is the sense of Congress that the plan should 
     provide for the following:
       (1) A test for the classification of information which 
     balances the public's right to know against identifiable harm 
     to the national security which will result from public 
     disclosure.
       (2) A narrow definition of the categories of information 
     subject to classification to avoid excessive classification.
       (3) Classification periods of reasonably short duration, 
     and a determination of the date when or event upon which 
     declassification of such information shall occur, with a 
     recognition that extension of such period may be required in 
     certain circumstances.
       (4) Automatic declassification at the expiration of the 
     classification period.
       (b) Submission to Congress; Effective Date.--The plan and 
     executive order referred to in subsection (a) may not take 
     effect until after 30 days after the date on which such plan 
     and proposed regulation is submitted to the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Government 
     Operations of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Governmental 
     Affairs of the Senate.
                    TITLE VIII--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

     SEC. 801. ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

       (a) In General.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end thereof 
     the following new title:

             ``TITLE VIII--ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION


                         ``rule of application

       ``Sec. 801. The President and Vice President, Members of 
     the Congress (including any Resident Commissioner and 
     Delegate to the House of Representatives), Justices of the 
     Supreme Court, and Federal judges appointed by the President 
     shall, by virtue of their elected or appointed positions, be 
     entitled to access to classified information needed for the 
     performance of their governmental functions without regard to 
     the other provisions of this title.


                             ``regulations

       ``Sec. 802. (a) The President shall, within 180 days after 
     enactment of this title, direct the issuance of a regulation 
     to implement this title.
       ``(b) The regulation issued pursuant to subsection (a) may 
     not take effect until after 30 days after the date on which 
     the regulation is submitted to the Congress.


             ``consent for access to financial information

       ``Sec. 803. Except as may be provided for in the regulation 
     issued under section 802 of this title, after such regulation 
     takes effect, no person shall be given access to classified 
     information by any department, agency, or office of the 
     executive branch unless such person has provided consent in 
     accordance with this section. Such consent shall be provided 
     to the investigative agency responsible for conducting the 
     security investigation of such person, or in the case of a 
     person who is an employee of the legislative branch or the 
     judicial branch, to the employing office of such employee. 
     Such consent shall be provided during the initial background 
     investigation, for such times as access to such information 
     is maintained, and for three years thereafter. Such consent 
     shall permit access to--
       ``(1) financial records held by a financial agency or 
     financial institution;
       ``(2) consumer reports held by a consumer credit reporting 
     agency; and
       ``(3) records maintained by commercial entities within the 
     United States pertaining to any travel by the person outside 
     the United States.


            ``requests by authorized investigative agencies

       ``Sec. 804. (a)(1) Any authorized investigative agency may 
     request from any financial agency, financial institution, or 
     consumer credit reporting agency such financial records and 
     consumer reports as are necessary in order to conduct any 
     authorized law enforcement investigation, foreign 
     counterintelligence inquiry, or security determination. Any 
     authorized investigative agency may also request records 
     maintained by any commercial entity within the United States 
     pertaining to travel by a person outside the United States.
       ``(2) Requests may be made under this section where--
       ``(A) the records sought pertain to a person who is or was 
     an employee required, as a condition of access to classified 
     information, to provide consent, during a background 
     investigation, for such time as access to the information is 
     maintained, and for three years thereafter, permitting access 
     to financial records, other financial information, consumer 
     reports, and travel records; and
       ``(B) there are reasonable grounds to believe, based upon 
     specific and articulable facts available to it, that the 
     person is, or may be, disclosing classified information in an 
     unauthorized manner to a foreign power or agent of a foreign 
     power, or in the course of any background investigation or 
     reinvestigation, an issue of otherwise unexplained affluence 
     or excessive indebtedness arises.
       ``(3) Each such request shall--
       ``(A) be accompanied by a written certification signed by 
     the department or agency head or deputy department or agency 
     head concerned and shall certify that--
       ``(i) the person concerned is an employee within the 
     meaning of paragraph (2)(A);
       ``(ii) the request is being made pursuant to an authorized 
     inquiry or investigation and is authorized under this 
     section; and
       ``(iii) the records or information to be reviewed are 
     records or information which the employee has previously 
     agreed to make available to the authorized investigative 
     agency for review;
       ``(B) contain a copy of the agreement referred to in 
     subparagraph (A)(iii);
       ``(C) identify specifically or by category the records or 
     information to be reviewed; and
       ``(D) inform the recipient of the request of the 
     prohibition described in subsection (b).
       ``(4) The authorized investigative agency shall promptly 
     notify the person who is the subject of a request under this 
     section relating to a background investigation or 
     reinvestigation for records, reports, or other information.
       ``(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except 
     as provided in subsection (a)(4), no governmental or private 
     entity, or officer, employee, or agent of such entity, may 
     disclose to any person, other than those officers, employees, 
     or agents of such entity necessary to satisfy a request made 
     under this section, that such entity has received or 
     satisfied a request made by an authorized investigative 
     agency under this section.
       ``(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law except 
     section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, an entity 
     receiving a request for records or information under 
     subsection (a) shall, if the request satisfies the 
     requirements of this section, make available such records or 
     information within 30 days for inspection or copying, as may 
     be appropriate, by the agency requesting such records or 
     information.
       ``(2) Any entity (including any officer, employee or agent 
     thereof) that discloses records or information for inspection 
     or copying pursuant to this section in good faith reliance 
     upon the certifications made by an agency pursuant to this 
     section shall not be liable for any such disclosure to any 
     person under this title, the constitution of any State, or 
     any law or regulation of any State or any political 
     subdivision of any State.
       ``(d) Subject to the availability of appropriations 
     therefor, any agency requesting records or information under 
     this section may reimburse a private entity for any cost 
     reasonably incurred by such entity in responding to such 
     request, including the cost of identifying, reproducing, or 
     transporting records or other data.
       ``(e) An agency receiving records or information pursuant 
     to a request under this section may disseminate the records 
     or information obtained pursuant to such request outside the 
     agency only to the agency employing the employee who is the 
     subject of the records or information, to the Department of 
     Justice for law enforcement or foreign counterintelligence 
     purposes, or, with respect to dissemination to an agency of 
     the United States, only if such information is clearly 
     relevant to the authorized responsibilities of such agency 
     relating to security determinations, law enforcement, or 
     counterintelligence.
       ``(f) Any agency that discloses records or information 
     received pursuant to a request under this section in 
     violation of subsection (e) shall be liable to the person to 
     whom the records relate in an amount equal to the sum of--
       ``(1) $100, without regard to the volume of records 
     involved;
       ``(2) any actual damages sustained by the person as a 
     result of the disclosure;
       ``(3) if the violation is found to have been willful or 
     intentional, such punitive damages as the court may allow; 
     and
       ``(4) in the case of any successful action to enforce 
     liability, the costs of the action, together with reasonable 
     attorney fees, as determined by the court.
       ``(g) Nothing in this section shall affect the authority of 
     an investigative agency to obtain information pursuant to the 
     Right to Financial Privacy Act (12 U.S.C. 3401 et seq.) or 
     the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.).


                             ``definitions

       ``Sec. 805. For purposes of this title--
       ``(1) the term `agency of the legislative branch' means the 
     Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the Botanic Garden, 
     the General Accounting Office, the Government Printing 
     Office, the Library of Congress, the Office of Technology 
     Assessment, the Congressional Budget Office, and the 
     Copyright Royalty Tribunal;
       ``(2) the term `authorized investigative agency' means--
       ``(A) an agency authorized by law or regulation to conduct 
     foreign counterintelligence investigations or investigations 
     of persons who are proposed for access to classified 
     information to ascertain whether such persons satisfy the 
     criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such 
     information;
       ``(B) in the case of the House of Representatives, an 
     agency designated by the Speaker of the House;
       ``(C) in the case of the Senate, an agency designated by 
     the President pro tempore of the Senate;
       ``(D) in the case of an agency of the legislative branch, 
     an agency designated by the head of such agency; and
       ``(E) in the case of the judiciary, an agency designated by 
     the Director of the Administrative Office of the United 
     States Courts, under the direction of the Chief Justice of 
     the United States;
       ``(3) the term `classified information' means any 
     information that has been determined pursuant to Executive 
     Order No. 12356 of April 2, 1982, or successor orders, or the 
     Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to require protection against 
     unauthorized disclosure and that is so designated;
       ``(4) the term `consumer credit reporting agency' has the 
     meaning given such term in section 603 of the Consumer Credit 
     Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1681a));
       ``(5) the term `employee' includes any person who receives 
     a salary or compensation of any kind from the United States 
     Government, is a contractor of the United States Government 
     or an employee thereof, is an unpaid consultant of the United 
     States Government, or otherwise acts for or on behalf of the 
     United States Government;
       ``(6) the term `employee of the legislative branch' means 
     an individual (other than a Member of, and a Resident 
     Commissioner or Delegate to, the Congress) whose salary is 
     paid by--
       ``(A) the Director of Non-legislative and Financial 
     Services of the House of Representatives;
       ``(B) the Secretary of the Senate; or
       ``(C) an agency of the legislative branch;
       ``(7) the terms `financial agency' and `financial 
     institution' have the meaning given such terms in section 
     5312 of title 31, United States Code; and
       ``(8) the term `State' means any State of the United 
     States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 
     Rico, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and any 
     territory or possession of the United States.


                            ``effective date

       ``Sec. 806. This title shall take effect upon the issuance 
     of a final regulation pursuant to section 802.''.
       (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:

             ``Title VIII--Access to Classified Information

``Sec. 801. Rule of application.
``Sec. 802. Regulations.
``Sec. 803. Consent for access to financial information.
``Sec. 804. Requests by authorized investigative agencies.
``Sec. 805. Definitions.
``Sec. 806. Effective date.''.

     SEC. 802. REWARDS FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING ESPIONAGE.

       (a) Rewards.--Section 3071 of title 18, United States Code, 
     is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(a)'' before ``With respect to''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(b) With respect to acts of espionage involving or 
     directed at the United States, the Attorney General may 
     reward any individual who furnishes information--
       ``(1) leading to the arrest or conviction, in any country, 
     of any individual or individuals for commission of an act of 
     espionage against the United States;
       ``(2) leading to the arrest or conviction, in any country, 
     of any individual or individuals for conspiring or attempting 
     to commit an act of espionage against the United States; or
       ``(3) leading to the prevention or frustration of an act of 
     espionage against the United States.''.
       (b) Definitions.--Section 3077 of such title is amended--
       (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (6);
       (2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (7) and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(8) `act of espionage' means an activity that is a 
     violation of--
       ``(A) section 793, 794, or 798 of title 18, United States 
     Code; or
       ``(B) section 4 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 
     1950.''.
       (c) Clerical Amendments.--(1) The item relating to chapter 
     204 in the table of chapters for part II of such title is 
     amended to read as follows:

``204. Rewards for information concerning terrorist acts and3071''.age.

       (2) The heading for chapter 204 of such title is amended to 
     read as follows:

 ``CHAPTER 204--REWARDS FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING TERRORIST ACTS AND 
                              ESPIONAGE''.

     SEC. 803. ESPIONAGE NOT COMMITTED IN ANY DISTRICT.

       (a) In General.--Chapter 211 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by inserting after section 3238 the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 3239. Espionage and related offenses not committed in 
       any district

       ``The trial for any offense involving a violation of--
       ``(1) section 793, 794, 798, 952, or 1030(a)(1) of this 
     title;
       ``(2) section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947; or
       ``(3) subsection (b) or (c) of section 4 of the Subversive 
     Activities Control Act of 1950,

     begun or committed upon the high seas or elsewhere out of the 
     jurisdiction of any particular State or district, may be in 
     the District of Columbia or in any other district authorized 
     by law.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for chapter 
     211 of such title is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 3238 the following:

``3239. Espionage and related offenses not committed in any 
              district.''.

     SEC. 804. CRIMINAL FORFEITURE FOR VIOLATION OF CERTAIN 
                   ESPIONAGE LAWS.

       (a) In General.--Section 798 of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(d)(1) Any person convicted of a violation of this 
     section shall forfeit to the United States irrespective of 
     any provision of State law--
       ``(A) any property constituting, or derived from, any 
     proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the 
     result of such violation; and
       ``(B) any of the person's property used, or intended to be 
     used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the 
     commission of, such violation.
       ``(2) The court, in imposing sentence on a defendant for a 
     conviction of a violation of this section, shall order that 
     the defendant forfeit to the United States all property 
     described in paragraph (1).
       ``(3) Except as provided in paragraph (4), the provisions 
     of subsections (b), (c), and (e) through (p) of section 413 
     of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
     1970 (21 U.S.C. 853(b), (c), and (e)-(p)), shall apply to--
       ``(A) property subject to forfeiture under this subsection;
       ``(B) any seizure or disposition of such property; and
       ``(C) any administrative or judicial proceeding in relation 
     to such property,
     if not inconsistent with this subsection.
       ``(4) Notwithstanding section 524(c) of title 28, there 
     shall be deposited in the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury 
     all amounts from the forfeiture of property under this 
     subsection remaining after the payment of expenses for 
     forfeiture and sale authorized by law.
       ``(5) As used in this subsection, the term `State' means 
     any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the 
     Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Trust Territory of the 
     Pacific Islands, and any territory or possession of the 
     United States.''.
       (b) Amendments for Consistency in Application of Forfeiture 
     Under Title 18.--(1) Section 793(h)(3) of such title is 
     amended in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking 
     out ``(o)'' each place it appears and inserting in lieu 
     thereof ``(p)''.
       (2) Section 794(d)(3) of such title is amended in the 
     matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking out ``(o)'' 
     each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof ``(p)''.
       (c) Subversive Activities Control Act.--Section 4 of the 
     Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 783) is 
     amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(e)(1) Any person convicted of a violation of this 
     section shall forfeit to the United States irrespective of 
     any provision of State law--
       ``(A) any property constituting, or derived from, any 
     proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the 
     result of such violation; and
       ``(B) any of the person's property used, or intended to be 
     used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the 
     commission of, such violation.
       ``(2) The court, in imposing sentence on a defendant for a 
     conviction of a violation of this section, shall order that 
     the defendant forfeit to the United States all property 
     described in paragraph (1).
       ``(3) Except as provided in paragraph (4), the provisions 
     of subsections (b), (c), and (e) through (p) of section 413 
     of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
     1970 (21 U.S.C. 853(b), (c), and (e)-(p)) shall apply to--
       ``(A) property subject to forfeiture under this subsection;
       ``(B) any seizure or disposition of such property; and
       ``(C) any administrative or judicial proceeding in relation 
     to such property,
     if not inconsistent with this subsection.
       ``(4) Notwithstanding section 524(c) of title 28, there 
     shall be deposited in the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury 
     all amounts from the forfeiture of property under this 
     subsection remaining after the payment of expenses for 
     forfeiture and sale authorized by law.
       ``(5) As used in this subsection, the term `State' means 
     any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the 
     Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Trust Territory of the 
     Pacific Islands, and any territory or possession of the 
     United States.''.

     SEC. 805. DENIAL OF ANNUITIES OR RETIRED PAY TO PERSONS 
                   CONVICTED OF ESPIONAGE IN FOREIGN COURTS 
                   INVOLVING UNITED STATES INFORMATION.

       Section 8312 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
       ``(d)(1) For purposes of subsections (b)(1) and (c)(1), an 
     offense within the meaning of such subsections is established 
     if the Attorney General of the United States certifies to the 
     agency administering the annuity or retired pay concerned--
       ``(A) that an individual subject to this chapter has been 
     convicted by an impartial court of appropriate jurisdiction 
     within a foreign country in circumstances in which the 
     conduct violates the provisions of law enumerated in 
     subsections (b)(1) and (c)(1), or would violate such 
     provisions had such conduct taken place within the United 
     States, and that such conviction is not being appealed or 
     that final action has been taken on such appeal;
       ``(B) that such conviction was obtained in accordance with 
     procedures that provided the defendant due process rights 
     comparable to such rights provided by the United States 
     Constitution, and such conviction was based upon evidence 
     which would have been admissible in the courts of the United 
     States; and
       ``(C) that such conviction occurred after the date of 
     enactment of this subsection.
       ``(2) Any certification made pursuant to this subsection 
     shall be subject to review by the United States Court of 
     Claims based upon the application of the individual 
     concerned, or his or her attorney, alleging that any of the 
     conditions set forth in subparagraphs (A), (B), or (C) of 
     paragraph (1), as certified by the Attorney General, have not 
     been satisfied in his or her particular circumstances. Should 
     the court determine that any of these conditions has not been 
     satisfied in such case, the court shall order any annuity or 
     retirement benefit to which the person concerned is entitled 
     to be restored and shall order that any payments which may 
     have been previously denied or withheld to be paid by the 
     department or agency concerned.''.

     SEC. 806. POST EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL 
                   WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS OF THE 
                   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

       (a) Consolidation of Authority.--
       (1)  In general.--Chapter 81 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

     ``Sec. 1599. Post employment assistance regarding certain 
       civilian intelligence personnel

       ``(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
     Secretary of Defense may use appropriated funds to assist a 
     civilian employee who has been in a sensitive position in an 
     intelligence agency or component of the Department of Defense 
     and who is found to be ineligible for continued access to 
     Sensitive Compartmented Information and employment with the 
     intelligence agency or component, or whose employment with 
     the intelligence agency or component has been terminated--
       ``(1) in finding and qualifying for subsequent employment;
       ``(2) in receiving treatment of medical or psychological 
     disabilities; and
       ``(3) in providing necessary financial support during 
     periods of unemployment.
       ``(b) Assistance may be provided under subsection (a) only 
     if the Secretary determines that such assistance is essential 
     to maintain the judgment and emotional stability of such 
     employee and avoid circumstances that might lead to the 
     unlawful disclosure of classified information to which such 
     employee had access. Assistance provided under this section 
     for an employee shall not be provided any longer than five 
     years after the termination of the employment of the 
     employee.
       ``(c) The Secretary may, to the extent and in the manner 
     determined by the Secretary to appropriate, delegate the 
     authority to provide assistance under this section.
       ``(d) The Secretary shall report annually to the Committees 
     on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives with respect to any expenditure made pursuant 
     to this section.
       ``(e) For the purposes of this section, the term 
     `intelligence agency or component' means the National 
     Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the 
     National Reconnaissance Office, the Central Imagery Office, 
     and the intelligence components of the military 
     departments.''.
       (2) The table of sections of Chapter 81 of such title is 
     amended by adding after the item relating to section 1598 the 
     following new item:

``1599. Post employment assistance regarding certain civilian 
              intelligence personnel.''.

       (b) Repeal of Duplicative Authority.--
       (1) Defense intelligence agency.--Paragraph (4) of Section 
     1604(e) of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.
       (2) National security agency.--Section 17 of the National 
     Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is repealed.
       (c) Savings Provision.--The repeals made by subsection (b) 
     do not affect rights and duties that matured before the date 
     of enactment of this section.


                   amendment offered by mr. glickman

  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment, printed in the 
Record of July 12 at page H552. It is the open-budget amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Glickman: At the end of title I 
     (page 4, after line 23), add the following:

     SEC. 104. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INTELLIGENCE BUDGET.

       (a) Amounts Expended and Amounts Requested.--(1) The 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is 
     amended by adding at the end of title I the following new 
     section:


     ``annual report of amounts expended and amounts requested for 
            intelligence and intelligence-related activities

       ``Sec. 109. At the time of submission of the budget of the 
     United States Government for a fiscal year under section 
     1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall submit to the Congress a separate, 
     unclassified statement of the aggregate amount of 
     expenditures for the fiscal year ending on September 30 of 
     the previous calendar year, and the aggregate amount of funds 
     requested to be appropriated for the fiscal year for which 
     the budget is submitted, for intelligence and intelligence-
     related activities of the Government.''
       (2) The table of contents at the beginning of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after the item 
     relating to section 108 the following new item:

     ``Sec. 109. Annual report of amounts expended and amounts 
       requested for intelligence and intelligence-related 
       activities.''.

       (b) Congressional Authorization of Intelligence 
     Activities.--Section 504 of the National Security Act of 1947 
     (50 U.S.C. 414) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following:
       ``(e) A bill or joint resolution, and any amendment 
     thereto, which authorizes the appropriation of funds for a 
     fiscal year for all intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States may set forth in an 
     unclassified statement the aggregate amount of funds 
     authorized to be appropriated in that bill or resolution for 
     such fiscal year for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the United States.''.
       (c) Effective Date.--(1) The amendment made by subsection 
     (a) shall take effect with respect to the budget submitted 
     for fiscal year 1996.
       (2) The amendment made by subsection (b) shall take effect 
     with respect to bills, resolutions, and amendments, 
     authorizing the appropriation of funds for all intelligence 
     and intelligence-related activities of the United States for 
     fiscal year 1996.

  Mr. GLICKMAN (during the reading). Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Kansas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that debate on 
this amendment and all amendments thereto be limited to 40 minutes, 20 
minutes to be controlled by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], and 
20 minutes controlled by myself.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Kansas?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] will be 
recognized for 20 minutes, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] 
will be recognized for 20 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman].

                              {time}  1640

  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  Madam Chairman, this is the 17th authorization bill which the 
Intelligence Committee has brought to the House floor. Although those 
bills have had many differences, they have shared one common 
characteristic. The amounts they have authorized for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities could not be discussed publicly. The 
intelligence budget, in almost all of its component figures and 
certainly in the aggregate, has been classified since the advent of the 
modern intelligence community immediately following World War II. It 
remains classified today.
  Despite a constitutional requirement that there be a public 
accounting of the expenditure of public moneys, Congress has taken the 
position that, for the intelligence budget, national security concerns 
outweigh the taxpayer's right to know. During the cold war, this 
position was defensible, but we now live in a different world, and it 
is time for that position to be reexamined.
  The amendment I am offering with the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. 
Torricelli] would provide for the annual public disclosure of the 
aggregate amount spent on, and requested for, intelligence programs and 
activities. Only disclosure of the total amount would be required, not 
disclosure of the budget of any intelligence agency nor the amount 
spent on a particular intelligence operation.
  Under existing standards, information may only be classified if its 
disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national 
security. Earlier this year, the Intelligence Committee held 2 days of 
hearings on the classification of the intelligence budget. I was not 
persuaded that national security would be imperiled in any way by 
making the aggregate figure public. The Soviet Union, the only entity 
with an arguable capacity to profit from knowing the yearly sum of the 
amounts the United States spends on intelligence, no longer exists. It 
is difficult to imagine any potential enemy for whom possession of the 
aggregate U.S. intelligence budget figure would make any difference. 
Besides, that number is probably the worst kept secret in Washington 
right now.
  The witnesses who argued at the hearings for continued classification 
did so either on the grounds that an aggregate figure would have no 
meaning to the average American, or that disclosure of the aggregate 
figure would be just the first step down a ``slippery slope'' which 
would inevitably lead to the disclosure of programmatic details. 
Neither of these arguments provide a grounds for classification. The 
utility of the information is irrelevant, and questions about whether 
to extend disclosure beyond the aggregate figure would have to be 
decided on their own merits weighing the public's right to know against 
national security interests.
  Unless a justification on national security grounds exists, keeping 
the intelligence budget total secret only serves to prevent the 
American taxpayer from knowing how much money is spent on intelligence, 
and that is why the National Taxpayers Union has endorsed this 
amendment. I do not accept the notion that, if the public knew how much 
it costs to maintain a robust intelligence capability that there would 
be no support for it. On the contrary, a strong case can be made 
publicly about the essential role played by intelligence in helping 
policymakers respond to threats such as weapons proliferation and 
terrorism. As the public's understanding of why the United States must 
continue to possess a preeminent ability to collect, analyze, and 
disseminate intelligence grows, so too will support for the necessary 
funding. Continuing to classify the aggregate budget figure in the 
absence of a justifiable reason to do so only deepens the suspicion 
that secrecy is necessary to protect a budget which cannot otherwise be 
defended.
  Madam Chairman, let us strike a blow for open government today by 
adopting this amendment. I am convinced that no damage to the national 
security will result. I am convinced that the American people should 
know in the aggregate what we spend on intelligence in the same way 
they know in the aggregate what we spend on defense or on the Justice 
Department programs. That is their right to know as a taxpayer of this 
great Nation of ours. Classification should be reserved for that 
information which truly needs to be kept secret. The aggregate 
intelligence budget figure is not that kind of information.
  Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Madam Chairman, with great respect I disagree completely 
with the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman], my friend. He said the 
cold war is over.
  Madam Chairman, the bear is sleeping. The bear is not dead.
  There are still, Madam Chairman, 45,000, give or take, nuclear 
missiles extant over there, and our former concerns about the cold war 
ought to be supplanted with the problem of nuclear proliferation and 
terrorism. We are told there will be some 20 countries with the 
capability by the end of this decade of delivering a nuclear missile. 
That ought to bother us. Our lack of information about North Korea, the 
Middle East, and Nagorno-Karabakh; the nature of the problems are more 
difficult now than if we just had the good old Soviet Union to worry 
about.
  But the question is what good, what possible good, is served by 
making public a number that people continue to speculate about. There 
are six committees, subcommittees, of this Congress that have that 
information handed to them: The Committee on Appropriations, the 
Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, in the House and in the Senate. Why do we need an 
intelligence committee? We need it to represent the rest of us, to get 
information that ought to remain secret. Why is the aggregate of the 
budget for the intelligence agency secret? Because any additions would 
have to be justified and explained.
  Madam Chairman, any new appropriation will provoke the question, What 
do we need this for? More satellites? More covert resources? More 
people who can speak Farsi or Pushtoon? This is information that 
Congress receives through its appointed subcommittees, and any Member 
who really has a burning need to know what that aggregate figure is can 
go up and look at it. It is available in the classified annex.
  What useful purpose is served by making it public? I will tell my 
colleagues what purpose is served: to let people speculate on what it 
is for, how much goes for this and this, how much goes to the DIA, how 
much goes to the CIA, how much for overseas.
  It is wrong, Madam Chairman. It is mischievous, and it just is not 
necessary, and, recognizing my time is up, I just say that the 
gentleman said the utility of this information is irrelevant. I really 
do not think he means that because anything that is irrelevant, we 
ought not to waste our time on.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from 
New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli].
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Madam Chairman, as the cold war entered its last 
decade, the CIA was estimating that the Soviet Union had an economy 
two-thirds the size of our own and closing fast. The decade before, 
they failed to notice the Egyptian preparation to invade Israel or the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, only to be outdone by their failure to 
recognize that Iraq was invading Kuwait.
  Historians may conclude that the United States won the cold war 
because of the strength of our culture, or our economy, or the courage 
of our soldiers, but the simple truth is that an American intelligence 
community that was not properly supervised, or restrained, or directed, 
failed in the intelligence war against communism.
  It is now time to understand these lessons and prepare the CIA for a 
very different post-cold-war environment because, while the Defense 
Department and every component of the Pentagon is preparing for this 
new time, new budgets, new training, new assignments, the intelligence 
community is not, and that is not only a waste of resources, but it is 
dangerous in not preparing for new dangers in a new environment.

                              {time}  1650

  This country does indeed face new hostilities, narco-traffickers, 
terrorism, Third World conflicts, but with an intelligence community 
that is stuck in time, stuck in time like any other department of a 
government that was not properly and thoroughly under the scrutiny of 
the American people. Not an intelligence community, not 5 or 10 Members 
of Congress, but the American public, like every other branch of 
government. The simple truth is that change will never occur until this 
shroud of secrecy is lifted and accountability is established.
  The truth is, the secrecy of the intelligence community, the hiding 
of their budgets, does not protect them against any foreign adversary. 
It protects them against the American people. It protects them against 
accountability for waste or fraud or mismanagement or poor leadership. 
These are the things that are happening.
  I understand that there was once a rationale. In the cold war we made 
all kinds of compromises, with civil liberties, our best instincts, the 
things that were most important. We wiretapped, we supported dictators. 
We made all kinds of compromises. But at this point, those compromises 
are not possible, nor are they necessary.
  The gentleman from Illinois argues that, indeed, the Soviets are a 
looming danger to return again. Russia has been invited into NATO. They 
are going to be doing joint exercises. They come to the Group of Seven 
nations with our President to plan our economic future.
  But, still, we are not arguing the intelligence community should not 
do planning. We are not arguing that most of what they do should not be 
in secrecy. We are arguing that their gross budget number should be 
shared with the American people. That is all.
  Is this the proposal of some wild group of fanatics? It has been 
endorsed by two former Directors of the CIA, passed twice in the sense-
of-the-Senate resolution by the U.S. Senate, endorsed even by the 
President of the United States during his last campaign, and now by the 
chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  No wild idea. The intelligence community itself, for almost 20 years, 
has had leadership that has discussed it or proposed it. These new 
adversaries, the Cubas, the Iraqs, the Libyas, what is it they would 
gain if we were to share this information with the American people? The 
argument with the Soviet Union was clear. If they knew our total 
spending, they could duplicate it. They could understand what we were 
doing and dissect it.

  What is it that Libya would gain, or Iraq? If the public press is to 
be believed, the truth is the American intelligence community today 
spends more money--by the popular press--than the total military 
establishments of all but four nations on Earth. Indeed, the popular 
press claims that the U.S. intelligence community is not only more than 
the defense establishments, but more than the gross national product of 
every one of the states on the terrorist lists and all those that have 
been cited on this floor as potential adversaries.
  My colleagues, for this system to work, for efficiency, and, indeed, 
for our national security, only one group can be trusted with the truth 
for accountability and performance. It is the American people. For 42 
years we have made a gross exception to the U.S. Constitution which our 
Founding Fathers recognized would offer protection against abuses in 
Government. Article 1, section 9, clause 7, we were required to give a 
regular statement and account of expenditures to the people of the 
United States. We have overlooked that, for grave national security 
purposes in the cold war, as we did in the war before it. We can no 
longer justify this constitutional exception.
  I urge my colleagues to cast this vote, so that every vote you cast 
after it can be informed. Because without it, the amendment that will 
follow for a 10-percent cut, the amendment that will follow for other 
cuts, the vote itself on this budget, in good faith, few Members but 
those on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence themselves 
should cast.
  Otherwise, you should come to this floor and cast a vote for 
``present,'' because a 10-percent vote may be too much; it may be too 
little; it may be just right. The truth is, you do not know, and the 
American people do not know, unless we share this one number and let 
them know what is being done for their own security. Surely we owe them 
that much, to trust them with this simple information.
  Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Young].
  Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Madam Chairman, not withstanding the eloquence 
of our previous speaker, I do not think he would want to mislead anyone 
into believing the President supports this amendment today. He did 
mention this as a candidate, when he was campaigning. But once 
candidate Clinton became President Clinton, he recognized that 
governing is a lot more different than campaigning. A statement from 
the Executive Office of the President dated July 19, sent to the 
Congress today, says: ``The administration opposes any change to H.R. 
4299 that would disclose or require the disclosure of the aggregate 
amount of funds authorized for intelligence activities.''
  I think it is very clear that the President opposes this amendment 
today.
  Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Madam Chairman, I am somewhat taken aback by the antipathy 
demonstrated by the gentleman from New Jersey for secrecy. The secrecy 
that has characterized the behind closed doors meetings on the health 
care reform has been epidemic. The secrecy on the crime bill, the 
meetings among the Democrats trying to work their problems out, I have 
yet to be called to a meeting, and I am a conferee on the crime bill. 
Why they should oppose secrecy in the intelligence aggregate I can't 
imagine.
  Now, I served on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for 
several years. I served under several chairmen. I can think of the 
gentleman from Ohio, the gentleman from California, the gentleman from 
Oklahoma, and the present gentleman from Kansas. Are they not doing 
their jobs?
  As I heard the gentleman from New Jersey complain, proper oversight 
is not being accorded the intelligence agencies. Why, I thought that 
was the function and the purpose of the intelligence committees. The do 
their job, in the Senate and the House, not only the intelligence 
committees, but the Committee on Armed Services in the Senate and 
House, and the Committee on Appropriations in the Senate and the House, 
and you can get the total figure in the classified annex. There is 
really no pervasive secrecy, but there is no need for this to be made 
public.
  So I just am not persuaded at all by the gentleman from New Jersey.
  Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
consume.
  (Mr. COMBEST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I have a statement I would include for 
the Record. I do not want the body to think that my not reading this 
statement is any indication of my concern or lack of concern about this 
amendment. It is not.
  I would like to just point out a few things. This House had a vote 
last year about this time. I think maybe with two or three exceptions, 
every Member of the House that is a Member today was a Member at that 
time. A similar amendment was defeated by almost 100 votes.
  I strongly oppose the gentleman's amendment. He knows it is done in 
good faith. It is just a difference in direction and feeling. The 
Director of the CIA, Mr. Woolsey, has repeatedly indicated this is a 
bad idea. As the gentleman from Florida pointed out, the 
administration's policy statement is in opposition to this amendment or 
the effect of this amendment.

                              {time}  1700

  Madam Chairman, do I think that it would be a disaster if this 
amendment passed? I mean honestly I could not say that it would be. The 
gentleman had indicated that this is probably the worst kept secret in 
town. Could be.
  But any time that there is an article written and there is an assumed 
amount, whatever it may be, approximately X amount spent on 
intelligence, it is always a part of a story on some other subject. If, 
in fact, we do release publicly the amount that is expended on 
intelligence, that will become the story. And then at that point, the 
components of intelligence will become the other parts of the story, 
with endeavors to find out exactly what we are spending on the variety 
of component parts.
  And will it lead to other disclosures about other portions of 
intelligence? I think it will. And I would predict that it would. I 
think this is one of those instances, Madam Chairman, that we should 
err on the side of caution. I can understand the interest in some 
Members in making this public for the public's standpoint, but the 
figure itself would do nothing to inform the public. It would only be 
that we would have to go into the intricate details of many highly 
classified programs to truly get at where the money is going.
  I do not see, when I come to work every day, people lining the halls 
to visit their Members of Congress to suggest to them that we should 
make the intelligence budget public. I think people understand that 
there are things that have got to be kept secret, that there are things 
because of national security that are best not divulged as no other 
nation, democracy in the world that has an intelligence community does 
release their figure. And I think that, in prudence, that this 
amendment should be defeated, that we should continue on the path that 
we are and that if we are going to err, Madam Chairman, we err on the 
side of caution.
  Madam Chairman: I strongly oppose the amendment to disclose the total 
budget for the U.S. intelligence community. Disclosure of the aggregate 
intelligence budget would be the first step down a road to disaster for 
our national security.
  The CIA Director, James Woolsey, has repeatedly stated that this is a 
bad idea. President Clinton thinks so as well. In fact, nondisclosure 
has been the practice of every President since Truman. The President is 
right to oppose disclosure because it will endanger our national 
security.
  It would hinder our ability to collect timely and accurate 
intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of foreign powers. 
Publishing the annual intelligence budget totals would, over time, give 
potential adversaries growing insights into our intelligence 
capabilities and priorities, especially when that information is 
correlated with information they obtain from espionage and other means. 
This will help our adversaries' efforts to counter our capabilities. 
With the rapidly growing availability of ever more powerful computer 
technology, more countries will be capable of correlating and 
analytically exploiting this information. Moreover, some cooperating 
foreign governments which share important intelligence with us, on 
condition of secrecy, may very well become concerned about what 
confidential information Congress will decide must be disclosed next 
and reduce their cooperation with our Government. Both of these factors 
can harm our intelligence efforts.
  I can understand those who in the spirit of openness believe that the 
American people need to know how much money is being spent on 
intelligence. However, a misinformed electorate is worse than an 
uninformed electorate. Providing the total intelligence budget alone is 
tantamount to misinforming the American people. Without knowledge of 
any of the principal components of the budget, that number is 
meaningless to the nonexpert. How will they make judgments as to 
whether we should increase or decrease this number? Or, for example, 
whether we should spend more on satellites or less on human 
intelligence? They will not be able to without more information. But, 
to provide more information provides more data helpful to those whose 
interests are hostile to those of the United States.
  How much information is enough? Clearly, release of the aggregate 
budget is only the beginning. As I have already said, the number alone 
is meaningless to the American public without more data on what the key 
program elements are in the total figure. Once begun, there will be no 
end to pressure to disclose more and more information on the budget, 
intentionally and unintentionally, in a frustrated effort to explain 
how we arrived at the total and why it changed from one year to the 
next. Then, it will be why can't we disclose the total budget for each 
component agency in the intelligence community, or for substantive 
programs such as counterterrorism, nonproliferation, or support for 
military forces. I expect there would also soon be a move to disclose 
how many people work in the intelligence community. Once again, the 
total number of personnel working on intelligence would be meaningless 
to the average citizen without further breakdown. Again, we would walk 
a path with no end in sight except for, in my view, great harm to our 
Nation's first line of defense.
  We still have an array of enemies lined up against us. Greater 
instabilities seem to be befalling the world. Russia has the potential 
of turning into a state posing an even greater threat to world 
stability than the Soviet Union. Will the Ukraine really honor its 
recent commitment to denuclearize? Will North Korea allow intrusive 
IAEA inspections? How are we going to verify its protests that it is 
not building a nuclear weapon? Can Kim Chong-il hold on to power, and 
what policies will he carry out? Intelligence will be critical to our 
efforts to verify their claims. As President Ronald Reagan said 
repeatedly, ``trust but verify.''
  We can ill-afford to take chances with our national security, 
especially when there is no discernible offsetting benefit. Disclosure 
would not add a whit to the already high level of accountability which 
is the result of the most extensive and microscopic system of 
legislative oversight of intelligence budgets and activities in the 
world. If the intelligence budget is to be cut, so be it. But, this 
should be done by the Congress and the committees it has tasked with 
the primary oversight responsibility after full consideration of both 
the cost and value of what is to be cut. Disclosure is not a calculated 
risk. It is neither necessary nor useful. It is a reckless roll of the 
dice. Accordingly, I continue to vigorously oppose any initiative to 
disclose the aggregate total for the intelligence budget.
  Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  There are other countries that do release parts or all of their 
intelligence budget. But part of this has to do with the general 
philosophy of government. What is it that we keep secret? We keep 
secret those things that relate directly to national security. All else 
the public should know. That was the Founding Fathers' argument in this 
great country of ours. That is why they said, we shall have a statement 
of account of all expenditures, receipts and expenditures, because 
these are hard-earned tax dollars paid by people.
  Yes, they may not be lining my offices to find out what we spent on 
intelligence, but they want to know how their government is spending 
their money generally. After all, they are hard-earned tax dollars. So 
to justify keeping something secret has to relate to national security.
  The aggregate intelligence budget does not. Yes, it is true if we 
break it down, it might. We are not talking about doing that here. But 
we are saying, just as people need to know what we spend on defense and 
agriculture and the Federal judiciary, so should they know in the 
aggregate what we spend on intelligence functions.
  Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. 
Skaggs].
  Mr. SKAGGS. Madam Chairman, I think the gentleman from Texas has his 
finger on the issue, which is, on what side do we err.
  He would have us err on the side of caution, but where is caution 
here? Caution, it seems to me, is fulfilling, as the gentleman from 
Kansas [Mr. Glickman] has suggested, the fundamental premise of this 
democracy which is trusting the people of this country with information 
about their government, unless, unless a real and substantial burden of 
proof is satisfied that the information, if disclosed, would risk our 
national security or our clear national interest.
  The gentleman, again, rhetorically asks, what difference would it 
make if this information is out there? I would offer in rebuttal that 
it is not appropriate for us to be so paternal toward the people of 
this country as to prejudge what information is to be found useful to 
them or not about their government.
  They have a right to know unless we can demonstrate clearly that 
disclosure would harm our national security.
  And this is not without some modest risk, but I think the risk is in 
the next interation, not this iteration. And the slippery slope 
argument that we have all heard about this, that if we disclose this 
number, what is next, there need not be a next. But this information, 
this overall aggregate number really is a significant piece of 
information by which the American public can judge the operations of 
their government, the priorities that this Congress has in its 
stewardship of their public tax dollars and of our public 
responsibility.

  Absent a clear and overriding national security interest, which I do 
not think can be sustained here, we ought to be able to present this 
information to the people about how we are spending their money.
  Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Laughlin].
  (Mr. LAUGHLIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LAUGHLIN. Madam Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the 
amendment by the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence. While we all can read and understand the 
Soviet Union does not exist anymore and, therefore, some would say we 
no longer have a need to keep the intelligence budget figure aggregate 
figure secret, many of us on this committee, indeed anyone that reads 
very much knows there are pressures in the Russia federation, the 
Republic of Russia, to bring this empire back into existence and indeed 
much of the military capability of the Soviet Union still exists 
intact.
  I wonder why it is necessary, after the history of our Nation of 
having a secret intelligence budget, why it becomes necessary in this 
unstable world that we have today, with hot spots throughout, to bring 
this intelligence budget figure public, after these many years of 
history of keeping its secret.
  Once it is disclosed, I ask the distinguished chairman or anyone 
else, how do we get it secret again, when world events predictably can 
and probably will change that will cause us to see a need as we have 
done in the past to have that intelligence budget secret?
  It is difficult to explain this number. What good does it do if we 
tell the American people what the aggregate bottom line number is 
without saying what it means? And then having to divide it between the 
civilian side of the intelligence over at the CIA and then trying to 
explain the military side of it. I would say to those that say it will 
open the slope to go down and ask more questions and those who want to 
reveal this figure will indeed say to justify the figure, we have to 
reveal more.
  I would urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment and keep the 
budget figure secret.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli].
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Madam Chairman, there is, at least at this point in 
the debate, things upon which we can agree.
  It was suggested by the gentleman from Texas that, in fact, no one 
has seen people lining the Halls of the Congress demanding this 
information. That is the point. That is exactly the point.
  Speaking hypothetically, if the American people knew, if the facts 
sustained it, that in fact we came to a conclusion that we could reduce 
military spending because the Nation was secure, but not intelligence 
spending, if they thought in their own minds the future of the country 
would be decided by education and job training, but the resources were 
going into intelligence, they would be lining these Halls. That is the 
point. The people are removed from the judgment.
  At the end of the day, we have to ask ourselves why. It is not only 
bad policy. It is against the law. The Constitution requires it and for 
a reason. Can anyone rise on this floor and say that if Qadhafi or 
Saddam Hussein had this information the Nation would be imperiled? What 
would they do with it? They can read in newspapers what the estimates 
are. They could not possibly duplicate it.
  The only protection this number's withholding is given is scrutiny of 
the agency itself. Spies are caught but the public cannot demand cuts 
because they do not know what the number is from.

                              {time}  1710

  There are inefficiencies. Members are not getting information. There 
are the wrong priorities, but it is not justified.
  Madam Chairman, this is not because we care about national security 
less. It is because we care about it more. The intelligence community 
did not adequately serve this country at a moment of great peril. There 
are still dangers in the world, and if it is going to serve it in the 
future, we need public accountability. This is a responsible vote, 
supported by leadership for the last 20 years of the CIA, and now the 
leadership of this committee. Vote for the amendment.
  Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I might 
consume in conclusion.
  Madam Chairman, I would just say there is a dangerous slope that we 
are moving toward, and that is moving toward the beginning of a 
disclosure of very highly classified and sensitive programs. I would 
also mention that while it was mentioned earlier that there were, I 
believe, two former heads of the CIA who supported it, I might say 
every President since Truman has opposed it, including the current 
President, in both rounds, and the current DCI, for concerns of where 
it might lead us. I would urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment.
  Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of our time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] is recognized 
for 3\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I thank my colleague, the gentleman 
from Texas. I know we disagree on this issue, but we agree on more 
issues than we disagree on, and we are very agreeable even on the 
disagreements.
  Madam Chairman, I want to repeat to my colleagues, the National 
Taxpayers Union has endorsed this amendment, and I want to read from 
their letter to me and to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. 
Torricelli]:

       The time has come to carefully direct the light of 
     accountability to a budget area long shrouded in darkness. 
     There is no longer any valid reason why the total annual 
     amounts spent on the intelligence budget should remain as 
     secret as the individual projects within the same budget.
       Your amendment, in our view, reflects the proper balance 
     between changing times and the continuing need for some 
     secrecy. No actual or potential U.S. adversary could gain an 
     advantage merely by knowing our Nation's overall expenditure 
     on intelligence activities. Your amendment protects our 
     national security because specific funding for individual 
     intelligence missions would remain secret.

  The National Taxpayers Union endorsement I think is a very important 
one for this bill, for this amendment, Madam Chairman.

  I want to talk for a moment, Madam Chairman, about what two prior 
directors of the CIA have said about this amendment. Mr. Gates, during 
his nomination process to be head of the Central Intelligence Agency in 
September 1991, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
said the following:

       My own view is that at a certain point, if the Agency is to 
     play the role that I think it needs to play, we're going to 
     have to take some chances. And so, from my personal 
     perspective--and it's not ultimately my decision, I suppose, 
     but the President's--I don't have any problem with releasing 
     the top line number of the Intelligence Community budget. I 
     think we have to think about some other areas as well. But, 
     as I say, it's controversial.

  Later on, on February 23, 1994, I asked Director Woolsey and former 
Director Gates:

       I want you to tell me what damage would be done to national 
     security from the disclosure of just the aggregate 
     intelligence figure * * *.

  Here is Director Woolsey:

       Setting aside the issue * * * of the so-called ``slippery 
     slope'' * * * then acknowledged changes in the total year to 
     year would become far more likely to require precise 
     justification in the public debate * * *. Formal 
     acknowledgement of the level would put substantial pressure 
     on executive branch officials and those who participate in 
     the debate in the Congress to give reasons for those changes 
     publicly. That is a big part of my problem.

  My own belief is, I respond to that kind of thing with the question, 
``Isn't democracy troublesome? Isn't it difficult to have to justify 
changes, aggregate changes, in budgets?'' Yes, it is inconvenient, and 
potentially it is a problem, but the question is does it violate our 
national security to disclose the aggregate budget figure. Director 
Woolsey, while he does not want to do it, does not say it violates 
national security.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GLICKMAN. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Madam Chairman, in addition to Director Woolsey, in 
fact, Stansfield Turner, a former Director, Mr. Gates, Bobby Inman, the 
people who have been the pillars of the American intelligence 
community, have all come to that judgment that it would be in our 
interest, not against our interest.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, in all fairness, Director Woolsey does 
not say he is for it, but he does not give the reason that it is a 
national security problem.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. If the gentleman will continue to yield, and the 
others have all come out for it.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Former Director Gates on February 23, 1994, again, 3 
years later, says the following:

       It seems to me that there is nothing intrinsically 
     sensitive about the aggregate figure of the budget for the 
     American intelligence community. A general notion of what 
     that figure is broadly about is already public * * *. Since 
     most people have a fairly good idea of what the aggregate 
     number is, I then puzzle over why there is the desire to make 
     that number official and to confirm it * * *. I think it is a 
     mistake officially to confirm it * * *.

  Madam Chairman, I would, parenthetically, say he has changed his 
position slightly there.
  Then he goes on: ``Once confirmed officially, it makes it impossible 
not to begin to break'' it down and to explain what it is about.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I guess my point is that all this 
discussion is based on the idea that it is inconvenient. It is 
difficult to talk about this issue, because then we are going to have 
to explain it to the American people. Again, Madam Chairman, I say that 
is what democracy is about. I urge the adoption of my amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas 
[Mr. Glickman].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 194, 
noes 221, not voting 24, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 332]

                               AYES--194

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (NJ)
     Bacchus (FL)
     Barca
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Berman
     Bilirakis
     Bonior
     Brooks
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (OH)
     Cantwell
     Carr
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Coyne
     Danner
     de Lugo (VI)
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Duncan
     Durbin
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Inslee
     Istook
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klein
     Klug
     Kreidler
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Leach
     Lehman
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Long
     Lowey
     Maloney
     Mann
     Manton
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCloskey
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Moran
     Murphy
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Norton (DC)
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Orton
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Ravenel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Roemer
     Rohrabacher
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Roth
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sangmeister
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schenk
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shays
     Shepherd
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Smith (IA)
     Spratt
     Stark
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stupak
     Swett
     Swift
     Synar
     Thomas (CA)
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Unsoeld
     Valentine
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Wheat
     Whitten
     Williams
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates
     Zimmer

                               NOES--221

     Allard
     Andrews (TX)
     Applegate
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barlow
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Borski
     Browder
     Brown (FL)
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Byrne
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chapman
     Clinger
     Coleman
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooper
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Darden
     de la Garza
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dingell
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards (TX)
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Fish
     Ford (MI)
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Gallegly
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Grams
     Grandy
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hoagland
     Hobson
     Hochbrueckner
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Huffington
     Hughes
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hutto
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kopetski
     Kyl
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (FL)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     Lloyd
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     McCandless
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McCurdy
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     Meyers
     Mica
     Michel
     Miller (FL)
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myers
     Ortiz
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Romero-Barcelo (PR)
     Roukema
     Rowland
     Santorum
     Sarpalius
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Shaw
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sundquist
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas (WY)
     Thompson
     Torkildsen
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Weldon
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff

                             NOT VOTING--24

     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Bryant
     Edwards (CA)
     Faleomavaega (AS)
     Ford (TN)
     Frost
     Gallo
     Gingrich
     Jacobs
     Machtley
     Martinez
     Richardson
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Royce
     Slattery
     Smith (NJ)
     Stokes
     Underwood (GU)
     Washington
     Wilson
     Wise

                              {time}  1735

  Mr. HOLDEN and Mr. MANZULLO changed their vote from ``aye'' to 
``no.''
  Mr. ROSE and Mr. HEFNER changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                    amendment offered by Mr. conyers

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Conyers:
       In section 601, amend subsections (a) and (b) to read as 
     follows:
       (a) DIA.--
       (1) Purposes.--The purposes of this subsection are to--
       (A) create an objective and effective office, appropriately 
     accountable to the Congress, to initiate and conduct 
     independently inspections, investigations, and audits 
     relating to programs and operations of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency;
       (B) provide leadership and recommend policies designed to 
     promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the 
     administration of such programs and operations, and detect 
     fraud and abuse in such programs and operations;
       (C) provide a means for keeping the Director of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency fully and currently informed about 
     problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of 
     such programs and operations, and the necessity for and the 
     progress of corrective actions; and
       (D) in the manner prescribed by the amendments made by this 
     subsection, ensure that the Senate Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence are kept similarly informed of significant 
     problems and deficiencies as well as the necessity for and 
     the progress of corrective actions.
       (2) Establishment of office of inspector general.--The 
     first section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 
     U.S.C. App.) is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(2) by inserting after ``the United 
     States International Trade Commission,'' the following: ``the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency,''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(i)(1) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency shall be appointed by the Director of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency (in this subsection referred to as the 
     `Director') without regard to political affiliation and on 
     the basis of integrity, compliance with the security 
     standards of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and prior 
     experience in the field of foreign intelligence and in a 
     Federal office of Inspector General.
       ``(2)(A) Notwithstanding the second sentence of section 
     8G(d), the Director may prohibit the Inspector General of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency from initiating, carrying out, or 
     completing any audit, inspection, or investigation if the 
     Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to 
     protect vital national security interests of the United 
     States.
       ``(B) If the Director exercises any power under 
     subparagraph (A), the Director shall submit an appropriately 
     classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such 
     power within 7 days to the intelligence committees. The 
     Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time such 
     report is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the 
     protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the 
     Inspector General with a copy of any such report. In such 
     cases, the Inspector General may submit such comments to the 
     intelligence committees that the Director considers 
     appropriate.
       ``(3) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency shall take due regard for the protection of 
     intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all 
     reports issued by the Office of Inspector General of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency, and, to the extent consistent 
     with the purpose and objective of such reports, take such 
     measures as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of 
     intelligence sources and methods described in such reports.
       ``(4)(A) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of each 
     year, prepare and submit to the Director a classified 
     semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office of 
     Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency during 
     the immediately preceding 6-month period ending December 31 
     (of the preceding year) and June 30, respectively. Within 30 
     days after receipt of such reports, the Director shall 
     transmit such reports to the intelligence committees with any 
     comments the Director may deem appropriate. Such reports 
     shall, at a minimum, include a list of the title or subject 
     of each inspection, investigation, or audit conducted during 
     the reporting period and--
       ``(i) a description of significant problems, abuses, and 
     deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and 
     operations of the Defense Intelligence Agency identified by 
     the Office during the reporting period;
       ``(ii) a description of the recommendations for corrective 
     action made by the Office during the reporting period with 
     respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies 
     identified in clause (i);
       ``(iii) a statement of whether corrective action has been 
     completed on each significant recommendation described in 
     previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective 
     action has been completed, a description of such corrective 
     action;
       ``(iv) a certification that the Inspector General has had 
     full and direct access to all information relevant to the 
     performance of the functions of the Inspector General;
       ``(v) a description of all cases occurring during the 
     reporting period where the Inspector General could not obtain 
     documentary evidence relevant to any inspection, audit, or 
     investigation due to the lack of authority to subpoena such 
     information; and
       ``(vi) such recommendations as the Inspector General may 
     wish to make concerning legislation to promote economy and 
     efficiency in the administration of programs and operations 
     undertaken by the Defense Intelligence Agency, and to detect 
     and eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and 
     operations.
       ``(B) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency shall report immediately to the Director whenever the 
     Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or 
     flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the 
     administration of programs or operations. The Director shall 
     transmit such report to the intelligence committees within 7 
     calendar days, together with any comments the Director 
     considers appropriate.
       ``(C) In the event that--
       ``(i) the Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency is unable to resolve any differences with the Director 
     affecting the execution of the Inspector General's duties or 
     responsibilities; or
       ``(ii) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible 
     alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary 
     information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or 
     audit,

     the Inspector General shall immediately report such matter to 
     the intelligence committees.
       ``(D) Section 5 shall not apply to the Inspector General 
     and the Office of Inspector General of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency.
       ``(5) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the 
     Director, the Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency shall select, appoint, and employ such officers and 
     employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions of 
     the Inspector General. In making such selections, the 
     Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and 
     employees have the requisite training and experience to 
     enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the 
     Inspector General effectively. In this regard, the Inspector 
     General shall create within the organization of the Inspector 
     General a career cadre of sufficient size to provide 
     appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the 
     effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
       ``(6) Beginning with fiscal year 1996, there shall be 
     included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget 
     a separate account for the Office of Inspector General of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency.
       ``(7) In this subsection, the term `intelligence 
     committees' means the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.''.
       (3) Implementation.--The Director of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency shall, by not later than 60 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act and in accordance with 
     the amendments made by this subsection--
       (A) establish the Office of Inspector General of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency;
       (B) appoint the Inspector General of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency; and
       (C) transfer to that Office the office of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency on the day before the date of the 
     enactment of this Act known as the ``Office of Inspector 
     General''.
       (4) Transfer of resources of existing office.--The 
     personnel, assets, liabilities, contracts, property, records, 
     and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, 
     allocations, and other funds employed, held, used, arising 
     from, or available to the office in the Defense Intelligence 
     Agency on the day before the date of the enactment of this 
     Act known as ``Office of Inspector General'' are hereby 
     transferred to the Office of Inspector General of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency established under the amendments made by 
     this subsection.
       (5) Termination of existing office.--The office in the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency on the day before the date of the 
     enactment of this Act known as ``Office of Inspector 
     General'' is terminated effective on the date of the 
     establishment of the Office of Inspector General of the 
     Defense Intelligence Agency pursuant to the amendments made 
     by this subsection.
       (6) Conforming amendment.--The first section 8G of the 
     Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended in 
     subsection (c) by striking ``subsection (f)'' and inserting 
     ``subsections (f) and (i)''.
       (7) Reports to intelligence committees.--
       (A) Reporting requirement.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of 
     title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following:

     ``Sec. 427. Reports on activities of the Office of Inspector 
       General of the Defense Intelligence Agency

       ``(a) Reporting Requirement.--The Director of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency shall submit to the intelligence 
     committees any report or findings and recommendations of an 
     inspection, investigation, or audit conducted by the Office 
     of Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency which 
     has been requested by the Chairman or Ranking Minority Member 
     of either of the intelligence committees.
       ``(b) Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section, 
     the term `intelligence committees' means the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and 
     the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.''.
       (B) Clerical amendment.--The analysis at the beginning of 
     subchapter I of chapter 23 of title 10, United States Code, 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:

``427. Reports on activities of the Office of Inspector General of the 
              Defense Intelligence Agency.''.

       (b) NSA.--
       (1) Purposes.--The purposes of this subsection are to--
       (A) create an objective and effective office, appropriately 
     accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct 
     independently inspections, investigations, and audits 
     relating to programs and operations of the National Security 
     Agency;
       (B) provide leadership and recommend policies designed to 
     promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the 
     administration of such programs and operations, and detect 
     fraud and abuse in such programs and operations;
       (C) provide a means for keeping the Director of the 
     National Security Agency fully and currently informed about 
     problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of 
     such programs and operations, and the necessity for and the 
     progress of corrective actions; and
       (D) in the manner prescribed by the amendments made by this 
     subsection, ensure that the Senate Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence are kept similarly informed of significant 
     problems and deficiencies as well as the necessity for and 
     the progress of corrective actions.
       (2) Establishment of office of inspector general.--The 
     first section 8G of that Act is amended--
       (A) in subsection (a)(2), as amended by subsection (a)(2) 
     of this section, by inserting after ``the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency,'' the following: ``the National Security 
     Agency,''; and
       (B) by adding after subsection (i), as added by subsection 
     (a)(2) of this section, the following:
       ``(j)(1) The Inspector General of the National Security 
     Agency shall be appointed by the Director of the National 
     Security Agency (in this subsection referred to as the 
     `Director') without regard to political affiliation and on 
     the basis of integrity, compliance with the security 
     standards of the National Security Agency, and prior 
     experience in the field of foreign intelligence and in a 
     Federal office of Inspector General.
       ``(2)(A) Notwithstanding the second sentence of section 
     8G(d), the Director may prohibit the Inspector General of the 
     National Security Agency from initiating, carrying out, or 
     completing any audit, inspection, or investigation if the 
     Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to 
     protect vital national security interests of the United 
     States.
       ``(B) If the Director exercises any power under 
     subparagraph (A), the Director shall submit an appropriately 
     classified statement of the reasons for the exercise of such 
     power within 7 days to the intelligence committees. The 
     Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time such 
     report is submitted, and, to the extent consistent with the 
     protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the 
     Inspector General with a copy of any such report. In such 
     cases, the Inspector General may submit such comments to the 
     intelligence committees that the Director considers 
     appropriate.
       ``(3) The Inspector General of the National Security Agency 
     shall take due regard for the protection of intelligence 
     sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued 
     by the Office of Inspector General of the National Security 
     Agency, and, to the extent consistent with the purpose and 
     objective of such reports, take such measures as may be 
     appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence 
     sources and methods described in such reports.
       ``(4)(A) The Inspector General of the National Security 
     Agency shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of each 
     year, prepare and submit to the Director a classified 
     semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office of 
     Inspector General of the National Security Agency during the 
     immediately preceding 6-month period ending December 31 (of 
     the preceding year) and June 30, respectively. Within 30 days 
     after receipt of such reports, the Director shall transmit 
     such reports to the intelligence committees with any comments 
     the Director may deem appropriate. Such reports shall, at a 
     minimum, include a list of the title or subject of each 
     inspection, investigation, or audit conducted during the 
     reporting period and--
       ``(i) a description of significant problems, abuses, and 
     deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and 
     operations of the National Security Agency identified by the 
     Office during the reporting period;
       ``(ii) a description of the recommendations for corrective 
     action made by the Office during the reporting period with 
     respect to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies 
     identified in clause (i);
       ``(iii) a statement of whether corrective action has been 
     completed on each significant recommendation described in 
     previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective 
     action has been completed, a description of such corrective 
     action;
       ``(iv) a certification that the Inspector General has had 
     full and direct access to all information relevant to the 
     performance of the functions of the Inspector General;
       ``(v) a description of all cases occurring during the 
     reporting period where the Inspector General could not obtain 
     documentary evidence relevant to any inspection, audit, or 
     investigation due to the lack of authority to subpoena such 
     information; and
       ``(vi) such recommendations as the Inspector General may 
     wish to make concerning legislation to promote economy and 
     efficiency in the administration of programs and operations 
     undertaken by the National Security Agency, and to detect and 
     eliminate fraud and abuse in such programs and operations.
       ``(B) The Inspector General of the National Security Agency 
     shall report immediately to the Director whenever the 
     Inspector General becomes aware of particularly serious or 
     flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the 
     administration of programs or operations. The Director shall 
     transmit such report to the intelligence committees within 7 
     calendar days, together with any comments the Director 
     considers appropriate.
       ``(C) In the event that--
       ``(i) the Inspector General of the National Security Agency 
     is unable to resolve any differences with the Director 
     affecting the execution of the Inspector General's duties or 
     responsibilities; or
       ``(ii) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible 
     alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary 
     information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or 
     audit,

     the Inspector General shall immediately report such matter to 
     the intelligence committees.
       ``(D) Section 5 shall not apply to the Inspector General 
     and the Office of Inspector General of the National Security 
     Agency.
       ``(5) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the 
     Director, the Inspector General of the National Security 
     Agency shall select, appoint, and employ such officers and 
     employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions of 
     the Inspector General. In making such selections, the 
     Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and 
     employees have the requisite training and experience to 
     enable the Inspector General to carry out the duties of the 
     Inspector General effectively. In this regard, the Inspector 
     General shall create within the organization of the Inspector 
     General a career cadre of sufficient size to provide 
     appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the 
     effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
       ``(6) Beginning with fiscal year 1996, there shall be 
     included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget 
     a separate account for the Office of Inspector General of the 
     National Security Agency.
       ``(7) In this subsection, the term `intelligence 
     committees' means the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.''.
       (3) Implementation.--The Director of the National Security 
     Agency shall, by not later than 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act and in accordance with the amendments 
     made by this subsection--
       (A) establish the Office of Inspector General of the 
     National Security Agency;
       (B) appoint the Inspector General of the National Security 
     Agency; and
       (C) transfer to that Office the office of the National 
     Security Agency on the day before the date of the enactment 
     of this Act known as the ``Office of Inspector General''.
       (4) Transfer of resources of existing office.--The 
     personnel, assets, liabilities, contracts, property, records, 
     and unexpended balances of appropriations, authorizations, 
     allocations, and other funds employed, held, used, arising 
     from, or available to the office in the National Security 
     Agency on the day before the date of the enactment of this 
     Act known as ``Office of Inspector General'' are hereby 
     transferred to the Office of Inspector General of the 
     National Security Agency established under the amendments 
     made by this subsection.
       (5) Termination of existing office.--The office in the 
     National Security Agency on the day before the date of the 
     enactment of this Act known as ``Office of Inspector 
     General'' is terminated effective on the date of the 
     establishment of the Office of Inspector General of the 
     National Security Agency pursuant to the amendments made by 
     this subsection.
       (6) Conforming amendments.--The first section 8G of the 
     Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended in 
     subsection (c), as amended by subsection (a)(6) of this 
     section, by striking ``subsections (f) and (i)'' and 
     inserting ``subsections (f), (i), and (j)''.
       (7) Reports to intelligence committees.--The National 
     Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended 
     by adding at the end the following:
       ``Sec. 19. (a) The Director of the National Security Agency 
     shall submit to the intelligence committees any report or 
     findings and recommendations of an inspection, investigation, 
     or audit conducted by the Office of Inspector General of the 
     National Security Agency which has been requested by the 
     Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either of the 
     intelligence committees.
       ``(b) In this section, the term `intelligence committees' 
     means the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate.''.
       (8) Relationship of inspector general of department of 
     defense to those of dia and nsa.--Section 8 of the Inspector 
     General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following:
       ``(h)(1) The Inspector General of the Department of Defense 
     shall not have any authority to conduct any activity with 
     respect to any matter that the Secretary of Defense 
     determines relates solely to the Defense Intelligence Agency 
     or the National Security Agency.
       ``(2) Upon request of the Inspector General of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency or the National Security Agency, the 
     Inspector General of the Department of Defense may provide to 
     the Inspector General making the request such resources 
     (including personnel) as are appropriate to enable that 
     Inspector General to carry out activities authorized by this 
     Act.''.

  Mr. CONYERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Hastings). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  (Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, the amendment I am offering with Mr. 
Clinger inserts substitute text for subsections (a) and (b) of section 
601 of the reported bill. In summary, it amends the Inspectors General 
Act of 1978 by creating two new inspectors general for the Defense 
Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.
  Let me first start by acknowledging the ranking Republican of the 
Government Operations Committee, Bill Clinger, for his close assistance 
in crafting this amendment. I would also like to thank the chairman of 
the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Glickman, and his ranking member, Mr. 
Combest, for their cooperation.
  The Intelligence Committee has included in H.R. 4299 a provision 
creating independent IG's for both DIA and NSA. The need for these 
offices was established in closed hearings held by the Intelligence 
Committee. The Government Operations Committee was not involved in 
those hearings. The committee's interest is simply in protecting the 
integrity and independence of the inspectors general, and ensuring that 
each inspector general has the tools to perform the job.
  Unfortunately, section 601 as reported by the Intelligence Committee 
creates several problems. First, the IG's are not part of the 
Inspectors General Act, and thus would not be accorded the authorities 
and responsibilities of the other IG's. Our amendment places these 
offices within the protections of the IG Act.
  Second, the new IG's duplicate the existing responsibilities of the 
Defense Department's inspector general. Essentially, the Defense 
Department IG would have the same duties as the newly created NSA and 
DIA IG's. We would thus have two IG's, perhaps competing with each 
other, responsible for each agency. Our amendment resolves this 
duplication by ensuring that the new IG's have sole responsibility for 
NSA and DIA. The existing Defense IG can assist in investigations, but 
does not have authority over investigations solely within those 
agencies.
  I would also point out that the amendment requires detailed reporting 
by these IG's to the Intelligence Committees. Given the sensitive 
nature of these agencies, we believe that this is the most appropriate 
mechanism for oversight.
  Our amendment is therefore primarily a technical one, and does not 
change the substance of what the Intelligence Committee has reported. 
The amendment will serve to clarify the responsibilities of the IG's, 
eliminate duplication, and provide the authorities and protections of 
the Inspector General Act.
  I urge its adoption.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CONYERS. I am delighted to yield to the gentleman from Kansas.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, we have been advised informally that 
while the Committee on Armed Services has some concerns about the 
gentleman's language, that we have no objection to the amendment and we 
will accept it on our side. I just wanted to let the gentleman know 
that so he might feel perhaps delighted at my acceptance and not want 
to speak any longer.

                              {time}  1740

  Mr. CONYERS. I want to thank my colleague on Judiciary and the 
chairman of this important committee and floor manager for his 
cooperation. This is a perfecting amendment, and we are not going to 
take much time.
  What we corrected are two essential problems. One, we place the 
I.G.'s within the Inspector General Act, and we eliminate the 
duplication and conflict between the new I.G.'s and the existing 
Defense Department I.G. by leaving any issues that cross agency lines 
to be dealt with by the Secretary of Defense as the arbiter. This 
brings us into conformance with the Inspector General Act, ensures 
continuing independence of the I.G.'s, and requires detailed reporting 
by the I.G.'s to the Intelligence Committee.
  We think that that satisfies the concerns of the floor manager and 
many others that are on the appropriate committees that are concerned.
  Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  (Mr. CLINGER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of this amendment 
offered by the chairman of the Government Operations Committee, Mr. 
Conyers.
  Chairman Conyers and I drafted this amendment, in consultation with 
our colleagues on the Intelligence Committee, to modify a provision in 
the Intelligence authorization bill which has the unintended 
consequence of creating overlap and potential jurisdictional conflict 
between the Department of Defense office of inspector general and the 
newly created offices of inspector general in the Defense Intelligence 
Agency and the National Security Agency.
  As reported by the Intelligence Committee, the bill would allow the 
Defense inspector general to continue its activities within the Defense 
Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, despite the 
presence of independent inspectors general within these agencies. The 
amendment offered today states explicitly that only the Defense 
Intelligence Agency or National Security Agency inspectors general will 
have jurisdiction over audits or investigations that fall solely within 
their respective agencies. This is a necessary modification to the 
Intelligence authorization bill in order to clarify the responsibility 
of each inspector general. The Defense Department's inspector general 
will be authorized to provide assistance to these new offices upon 
request.
  The Government Operations Committee has a long tradition of working 
to protect the integrity and effectiveness of the Federal inspectors 
general. Since the Inspector General Act's inception in 1978, we have 
remained committed to ensuring that these guardians against waste, 
fruad and abuse are equipped to do their jobs with minimum interference 
and maximum independence. This amendment is the latest illustration of 
that commitment, and will ensure that the Defense Intelligence Agency 
and the National Security Agency receive an appropriate level of 
oversight.
  I have welcomed the opportunity to work with Mr. Conyers and our 
colleagues on the Intelligence Committee in a bipartisan effort to 
ensure the Defense Department's inspector general and the new 
inspectors general created by this bill can work in cooperation with 
each other. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of this 
amendment.
  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. CONYERS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  (Mr. COLEMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  This amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan and the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania is intended to incorporate the provisions 
of H.R. 4299 which establish a statutory office of inspector general at 
the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency into 
the Inspector General Act of 1978. The amendment is also intended to go 
further than H.R. 4299 to clarify the responsibilities of the statutory 
IGs at the DIA and NSA with respect to the responsibilities of the 
Defense Department Inspector General. This amendment makes sense and it 
should be adopted.
  The amendment has the same purpose as H.R. 4299: To create 
independent and effective inspector general offices at the DIA and NSA 
to properly conduct audits, inspections, and investigations of the 
programs and operations of these agencies, and to keep the directors of 
the respective agencies and the congressional intelligence oversight 
committees informed of significant problems and deficiencies. By 
incorporating the provisions of H.R. 4299 into the 1978 act, the new 
offices will benefit from the guidance of past precedent and case law 
when there is a question of interpreting the provisions of the act.
  The Conyers-Clinger amendment has the same effect as H.R. 4299 with 
one exception. H.R. 4299 stated that nothing in its provisions was 
intended to affect the authorities or responsibilities of the inspector 
general of the Department of Defense. This language was criticized for 
creating redundancy and overlap. The Conyers-Clinger amendment thus 
makes clear that the DOD IG does not have authority to conduct any 
activity with respect to any matter the Secretary of Defense determines 
relates solely to the DIA or NSA. Where a departmentwide inspection of 
personnel policies is in question, the DOD IG would have authority to 
review DIA and NSA personnel policies, but an audit of a classified DIA 
or NSA program which the Secretary of Defense determines relates solely 
to the agency concerned should be conducted by the DIA or NSA IG, not 
the DOD IG.
  The congressional intelligence oversight committees have been 
concerned for a number of years over the efficacy and effectiveness of 
the offices of the inspectors general at DIA and NSA. The committee 
believes the programs and operations of these agencies have not been 
priorities of the Department of Defense IG--understandably--since they 
are relatively small in cost and scope. Setting forth in the law the 
authorities, responsibilities, and reporting requirements of the DIA's 
and NSA's IG's should increase the professionalism of these offices and 
bring greater inspector general attention to the sensitive programs and 
operations undertaken by DIA and NSA.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Conyers-Clinger amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers].
  The amendment was agreed to.


                   amendment offered by mr. traficant

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant: Page 5, after line 23, 
     insert the following new section:

     SEC. 303. PURCHASE OF AMERICAN-MADE EQUIPMENT AND PRODUCTS.

       (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that, to the greatest extent practicable, all equipment and 
     products purchased with funds made available in this Act 
     should be American-made.
       (b) Notice Requirement.--In providing financial assistance 
     to, or entering into any contract with, any entity using 
     funds made available in this Act, the head of each agency of 
     the Federal or District of Columbia government, to the 
     greatest extent practicable, shall provide to such entity a 
     notice describing the statement made in subsection (a) by the 
     Congress.

  Mr. TRAFICANT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, this budget is classified. There is a 
lot of stuff going on. This is a stealth Buy American amendment. I do 
not want to know; you do not have to tell me. I would just like to see 
them buy, whenever possible, some American-made goods and products and 
keep the train coming down the track. It helps our workers.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would say that even though the budget 
has a stealthy flavor to it, I want you to know that the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Combest] and I are doing our best to make sure the 
intelligence community buys American products, and we are inspired by 
your push on this issue on this bill and others, and we intend to 
accept this amendment.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. COMBEST. I could not have said it better myself. We certainly 
agree to the amendment.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I urge approval of the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
  The amendment was agreed to.


                    amendment offered by mr. sanders

  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Sanders: Page 4, after line 23, 
     insert the following:

     SEC. 104. LIMITATION ON AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED

       (a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
     notwithstanding the total amount of the individual 
     authorizations of appropriations contained in this Act, 
     including the amounts specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 4299 of 
     the One Hundred and Third Congress, there is authorized to be 
     appropriated for fiscal year 1995 to carry out this Act not 
     more than 90 percent of the total amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
     Year 1994.
       (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) does not apply to amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

  Mr. SANDERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Vermont?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment which I 
am offering together with my friend from New York, Mr. Owens, to cut 
the intelligence budget by 10 percent.
  Mr. Chairman, the Sanders-Owens amendment is the same as the one 
which we offered last year, and which was supported by over 100 Members 
of this House. It provides for a cut of 10 percent from the level of 
this year--which was in turn essentially the same level as last year, 
and which has been publicly reported by such publications and 
organizations as the Washington Post, the New York Times, the 
Democratic Study Group, and others to be about $28 billion. After 2 
years of delay, it puts us on track to fulfilling President Clinton's 
promise during the 1992 campaign to cut $7 billion from the 
intelligence budget over the 5-year period 1993-97.
  We need to make this cut for reasons that people all over America--if 
not necessarily in Washington--recognize. We need it because we have a 
$200 billion deficit and a $4 billion debt. We need it because the cold 
war is over, the Soviet Union has disappeared, and for decades, as the 
New York Times noted, ``spy agencies spent two-thirds of their budget 
dollars to track the Soviet threat.'' And we need it because, as the 
House Appropriations Committee pointed out in its report last 
September, the intelligence community received over a 100-percent 
increase in real dollars between 1982 and 1992.
  In this situation, it is absurd to keep on funding the intelligence 
agencies at cold war levels, and to insist on maintaining their budgets 
at the same level year after year. When we are already spending $100 
billion a year defending Europe and Asia and when we outspend all our 
potential enemy nations by over 10 to 1, are we really just as insecure 
as when the Soviet Union existed? While we are cutting back on all the 
rest of the Government--including social programs, farm supports, and 
environmental protection as well as defense--how can the intelligence 
agencies claim to be exempt?
  Frankly, Mr. Chairman, I get a little sick and tired when every day I 
hear Members of Congress rant and rave about the budget deficit, and 
tell us how it is imperative that we make cuts in Social Security, 
Medicare, Medicaid, veterans' needs, funding for education--and then, 
having said all that, they proceed to vote no reductions for the 
intelligence budget. We have the highest rate of childhood poverty in 
the industrialized world, including 5 million children who go hungry 
each day--and we do not have the money to protect our kids. We have 
millions of senior citizens unable to afford their prescription drugs, 
and we don't have the money to protect our senior citizens. We have 
millions of working class young people unable to afford the cost of 
higher education--and we do not have the money to educate our young 
people. But somehow, just somehow, when the CIA, the NSA, the DIA, and 
the other intelligence agencies come asking, the money suddenly 
appears. It suddenly and magically appears. No problem with funding 
now.
  Mr. Chairman, this debate is not really so much about the 
intelligence budget, as it is about our national priorities. The 10 
percent cut proposed by this amendment--$2.8 billion--is equivalent to 
about one and a half spy satellites. One and a half spy satellites is 
what we can purchase for $2.8 billion. Now let me tell you, in the real 
world, what $2.8 billion could purchase. In a nation frightened of 
crime and overburdened with high property taxes, $2.8 billion 
distributed to our States would pay for 40,000 more police officers in 
community policing programs. In the real world, when young people 
clamor to get a higher education but cannot afford it, $2.8 billion 
would fund 200,000 more students in the President's National Service 
Program. At a time when millions of children enter school far behind 
their peers, $2.8 billion would fund Head Start participation for 
nearly 700,000 children. At a time when cities all over America 
struggle with the crisis of homelessness, $2.8 billion would provide 
HUD-assisted housing for nearly 3 million homeless families. In terms 
of our environmental needs, $2.8 billion would fund the entire 
hazardous waste cleanup program.
  And let me repeat--for those whose primary concern is the Federal 
deficit--that $2.8 billion would reduce our annual budget deficit by 
1\1/2\ percent.
  That is what we are debating today, Mr. Chairman. We are debating 
whether we defend our national security by pretending that the cold war 
is still going on, or by recognizing our country's economic crisis. We 
are debating whether to continue spending billions putting spy 
satellites into orbit to spy on a Soviet Union which has disappeared--
or whether to take care of our own country. That is the basic question, 
my colleagues, and I ask you to choose to truly defend our national 
security. Vote for the Sanders-Owens amendment, and restore some common 
sense to our budget priorities.

                              {time}  1750

  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to get a time limit on the 
remaining time in this debate. The gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] 
has already spoken about 5 minutes. I would ask unanimous consent that 
all debate on this amendment and any amendment thereto be limited to 30 
minutes, equally divided, 15 minutes to myself and 15 minutes to the 
gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders].
  Mr. COMBEST. I have no objection, Mr. Chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Hastings). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from Kansas?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] 
will be recognized for 15 minutes, and the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. 
Glickman] will be recognized for 15 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman].
  Mr. GLICKMAN. I yield myself 5 minutes.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] for 
offering this amendment. I think it is an important amendment to 
discuss, although I think the amendment is misguided and should be 
defeated.
  In the first place, when you come down to this floor and you listen 
to the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders], and then previously 
listened to people on the other side, you would then think that you 
were talking about two different bills. Folks on the Republican side of 
the aisle have been arguing that the intelligence budget has been cut 
radically in the last 10 years. Mr. Sanders, of course, comes here and 
said it has not been cut enough.
  Here are the facts: The committee bill is 3.8 percent below the 
fiscal 1994 authorized level, approximately 2 percent below the fiscal 
1994 appropriated level and the fiscal 1995 request. That is not taking 
into account inflation. So we are seeing a reduction in the 
intelligence community budget. The numbers of people who are employed 
in the intelligence community is coming down approximately 20 percent. 
This is the third year in a row they recommended less than requested by 
the President or authorized the year before.
  Significant additional reductions, however, will imperil 
modernization programs for satellites, signals, and imagery collection 
systems, which are needed to keep pace with technological advances and 
which will ultimately save money through consolidation of activities.
  Let me tell you what this stuff does so that you will have some idea. 
What it does is it provides information for military commanders. So, if 
we have a military conflict in Korea or if we have a military conflict 
in Haiti or if we have a military conflict in the Middle East, there is 
modernization of our imagery, satellites and signals intelligence going 
on, which accounts for one of the reasons why the numbers are not going 
down faster. My point is that we could find ourselves in a military 
conflict in Haiti or Korea or the Middle East or perhaps in 
humanitarian efforts in central Africa, and you have to have that kind 
of imagery in order to protect American troops, American people and 
other people who are threatened. These improvements are definitely 
needed.
  We have activities all over the world against terrorism, against 
proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Some of 
that is human intelligence, some of that is signals intelligence, and 
some is satellite intelligence.
  A cut of this magnitude would be extraordinarily serious dealing with 
those particular problems.
  Just yesterday there was a bomb in Buenos Aires which dealt serious 
damage to the Jewish community in Argentina, which is likely to have 
been caused by international terrorist activities, which will require 
the United States and the Argentinians and people around the world to 
focus on as part of this international terrorist conspiracy to blow up 
and destroy American and freedom-loving interests around the world. 
This amendment would strike at the heart of the ability to try to find 
those particular culprits.
  I am particularly worried about nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons. The Russians still have thousands of them, thousands of 
weapons, any one of which could kill 15 or 20 million people in this 
country. You have to have the technical, satellite, signals 
intelligence, and the human capability to find out where those things 
are.
  Now, can I tell you that a 10-percent cut is going to destroy the 
ability of the intelligence community to do everything they do? I do 
not know if I can tell you that they would destroy it, but I can tell 
you this, that it puts us at a very great degree of risk. That is 
exactly what we do not need right now. We think we have cut this budget 
as far as we can.
  I am just telling you right now that I do not want to have on my 
hands a terrorist activity in this country or around the world which 
could have been prevented by modernizing our satellite capability or a 
release or sale of nuclear or chemical or biological weaponry or 
missile systems which could find themselves in the hands of a Saddam 
Hussein or some other ruthless dictator.
  So I think while I understand the purposes of the amendment, I think 
an amendment of this magnitude is ill-conceived, and I urge my 
colleagues to defeat it.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Owens].
  (Mr. OWENS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, this debate is an educational debate for the American 
people. Everybody talks about the deficit, and most people act as if 
the deficit was created by God. The deficit is not created by God; the 
deficit is made up of stupid decisions that have a Central Intelligence 
Agency at the same level it was during the height of the cold war. We 
are spending for intelligence as much as we were spending when the 
other superpower, the Soviet Union, existed. We always said that 50 
percent--as I was saying, this is an educational debate for the 
American people. We will not change anybody's mind in this House. The 
military-industrial complex has given its orders. We know the votes 
will come down a certain way as a result of that. So we are talking to 
the American people about what makes up the deficit.
  The deficit can be brought under control without cutting education 
programs, without cutting libraries, without cutting jobs training 
programs. All of these kinds of programs have been cut in the last 
year. We have cut $60 million out of the job training for teenagers, in 
order to move it over for displaced workers. We did not have to do 
that. We need more money to train displaced workers, we can get it out 
of the budget reserved for the intelligence community. The intelligence 
budget cannot be defended with any kind of logic or reason. Nobody is 
able to bring forth any logic which makes any sense. To talk about the 
dangers in the world of terrorism and other kinds of threats, nuclear 
threats from North Korea, they were always there along with the Soviet 
Union. Once the Soviet Union, the only superpower that has the capacity 
to deliver nuclear bombs from their soil to our soil, is eliminated, 
then we are in a different world. The Soviet Union's secret police, 
unlike our secret police, the CIA, the Soviet Union secret police have 
opened up their archives, a large portion of the archives. They 
demystified their intelligence community. We do not even want to 
disclose to the American people the total amount of money we spend on 
intelligence. We just voted that down.
  The orders came down from the military-industrial complex, ``Don't do 
it.'' So the puppets moved in line, and they lined up to vote. Logic 
cannot prevail in this kind of situation. We have the Congressional 
Budget Office. Last year, the Congressional Budget Office suggested, 
recommended a 20-percent cut. A 20-percent cut in the overall 
intelligence budget was recommended by the Congressional Budget Office.

                              {time}  1800

  Now, Mr. Chairman, those are the people we pay to monitor very 
closely the logic of what we are doing with our budget. We are only 
asking here for a 10-percent cut, a 10-percent cut of what the most 
conservative estimates put at a $30 billion budget. We do not know 
officially, we cannot represent it, we cannot pretend we know 
officially, but the New York Times and certain other sources that 
really know what is happening in America, always they have consistently 
pegged the intelligence budget at $30 billion.
  Of course we should go and ask Aldrich Ames. Aldrich Ames would have 
told us it might take a tip, we might have to pay Aldrich Ames 
something, but he can tell us, probably, what the overall budget is.
  Aldrich Ames was, as my colleagues all know, a highly placed official 
at the very top of our country's intelligence operation who for 9 years 
was a spy for the Soviet Union, and, in order to shut him up and not 
let him tell the American people about what is going on inside of the 
old boys network of the CIA, they gave him life imprisonment instead of 
death. As my colleagues know, he committed wholesale treason. 
If anybody deserves the death penalty, it certainly ought to be Aldrich 
Ames. But Aldrich Ames walked away. A deal is being made with his wife 
because he knows too much. He could tell us that if the Soviet Union 
was paying him as a spy for them, if he was being paid $2 million, then 
what do we pay our spies, the ones we get from the Soviet Union? Our 
rate of pay is probably higher, so the CIA is probably paying Soviet 
spies, East German spies, all kinds of people they manufacture, they 
are probably paying them at a higher rate than $2 million for the work 
they do. Aldrich Ames got $2 million.

  Aldrich Ames in his parting shot accused the CIA of being an old boys 
network that was obsolete, and that is what we are dealing with, my 
colleagues. We are dealing with an old boys network that is obsolete, 
and it is driving a $30 billion budget.
  Thirty billion is not the total budget for the CIA, but they are the 
kingpin of the intelligence community. There is Army intelligence, 
satellites; there is a whole lot of stuff out there. But $30 billion, 
if we take 10 percent of that, $3 billion can fund a lot of repairs to 
school buildings that have lead poisoning problems, and they have 
asbestos problems, and $3 billion could build a lot of schools. Three 
billion dollars could relieve the pressure on a lot of school board 
budgets.
  Three billion dollars could provide for a health care program that 
would end the kind of tuberculosis which has crept back into not just 
our homeless community, but there is a high school out in California 
where there is a large infection of tuberculosis in the high school.
  Now we cannot provide the money to take care of basic health care 
problems and basic education problems. We tell the American people that 
there is a deficit, we must deal with the deficit. I agree there is a 
deficit. The deficit was created by irresponsible spending. Now we have 
an opportunity to cut the deficit, and we can cut the deficit without 
hurting the security of America at all.
  The CIA does not have the capacity to do the job that needs to be 
done with respect to terrorism. They do not know enough Arabic. They do 
not have enough people to deal with the fundamentalist Islamic 
revolution. They cannot deal with that. The CIA cannot deal with the 
problem in Haiti. Nobody in the U.S. Government can tell us how many 
people are being massacred in Haiti, what the conditions are in Haiti. 
The CIA cannot tell us what is going on in a country which is less than 
700 miles from Florida.
  As my colleagues know, the CIA does not have any black agents. The 
CIA is not modernized. The diverse world it has to face; it has no 
agents to do that. It does not have any females. The females, the few 
of them that are there, recently brought a suit about what is going on 
there, so we got an obsolete operation. The head of the CIA yesterday 
admitted that it is a white male dominated old boys network. If the 
head of the CIA admits that, then my colleagues know we have got 
serious problems. We are spending on this white male dominated old boys 
network which is obsolete, we are spending at least $2 billion on that 
agency alone, and they have control of a $30 billion intelligence 
budget. The American people need to know, if we want to cut the 
deficit, we want to cut the deficit, at the same time provide for 
Federal money for libraries, we want to provide for Federal money to 
help take care of the problems our schools are facing, we want to take 
care of the health problems, and there are a lot of places where we are 
wasting money, and one of them is in the intelligence budget. Three 
billion dollars we gain by passing this 10-percent cut.
  So I say to my colleagues, ``Let's pass it and get a $3 billion to 
give to good programs.''
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Combest].
  (Mr. COMBEST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, while I greatly respect the sincerity of 
the distinguished gentleman from Vermont, I must say that I find his 
amendment to limit this year's authorization for intelligence to 90 
percent of last year's level to be reckless in the extreme. In my 
statement in support of this bill I have already talked at some length 
about my extreme disquiet over our committee's turning out a bill which 
continues the trend of making deep cuts to intelligence. At that time I 
cited several facts which illustrate the depth of the commulative 
annual cuts we have seen to intelligence this decade.
  I would like to repeat a few of them here and cite some new ones. 
First, the repeats:
  Fact No. 1. In real terms the intelligence budget has been cut in all 
but 1 of the last 6 years.
  Fact No. 2. The intelligence community is already being downsized at 
twice the rate recommended by the President's National Performance 
Review for the Government.
  Fact No. 3. The $7 billion that President Clinton proposed to cut 
from intelligence by 1997 has already been achieved and will, at 
current rates, end up being more than double that by 1997.
  Fact No. 4. The authorization bill this year authorizes in real terms 
almost 15 percent less than our authorization 2 years ago, and that was 
at a level which then-Intelligence-Committee-Chairman McCurdy claimed 
could not be further reduced without the risk of ``severe damage.'' 
That higher level was, he said, ``the outer limit on which the 
intelligence community can expect to reduce spending.''
  And now a few more facts:
  Fact No. 5. This bill already reflects in real terms a more-than-6-
percent decline in intelligence spending from last year.
  Fact No. 6. At the current rate of cuts, the intelligence budget in 
inflation-adjusted dollars will, by the end of this decade be less than 
60 percent of what it was in 1989.
  Fact No. 7. The budget for national programs for next year was--as 
submitted by the administration--already $1.3 billion less than what 
the administration projected just last year.
  Mr. Chairman, the effect of the gentleman's amendment would be to gut 
intelligence and to cripple a key element of our national security and 
leave our Government whistling in the dark when dealing with the issues 
of regional stability, weapons proliferation, terrorism, global fair 
trade and competitiveness, and strategic and tactical military 
preparedness.
  The intelligence community has already begun a process of closing 
down capabilities which we can ill afford to give up. Having, several 
years ago, already reduced its resources covering the former Soviet 
Union, the intelligence community is now in a process of eliminating 
coverage completely against many targets and even regions worldwide. 
Programs to modernize, upgrade, and save money in the out-years by 
revamping technical collection systems have been slowed down or 
shelved. On the analytic side the situation is as bad or worse. 
Military analysis has been left perilously thin; many arms control and 
weapons analysis offices have been cut back to fractions of their 
former size despite the growing problem with the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems; other 
analysis are overwhelmed with the demands for more and better analysis 
of the multiplicity of issues which the administration faces 
politically and economically around the globe.
  The fact that this amendment sets an arbitrary figure for cuts as 
opposed to making specific proposals for savings is indicative of its 
poor rationale. The gentleman from Vermont has presented his amendment 
without reading the committee's classified report showing an itemized 
breakout of how intelligence funds are spent. Those Members who want to 
cut intelligence further need, at the least, to exercise their right, 
indeed their duty, to make such proposals only after viewing the 
committee's detailed mark and identifying specific program areas to be 
cut. At that point, the responsible Member will realize that in a 
budget as lean as the one in this bill, for every supposed saving there 
is in reality a very clear and high cost in terms of lost national 
security.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Nevada [Mr. Bilbray].
  Mr. (BILBRAY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Chairman, as my colleagues know, I think it is 
interesting that every year the chairman of our committee gets up and 
asks Member to go up to room 405, which is where the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence meets, and ask for a look at the budget. The 
budget is open to any Member of the Congress to go up and look at. One 
does not have to be a member of the Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence or a member of the leadership, but every year Members get 
on this floor and with good intentions ask for cuts of 10 percent, 5 
percent, 2 percent, and as they never go up and look at the budget, 
they do not know what they are asking us to cut.
  Now Members that have served on this committee for a number of years 
or some of us that are now in their second year on the committee have 
worked diligently in doing the budget. We understand where the money is 
being spent. We analyzed it. We had hearing after hearing to determine 
whether it is needed. But yet the Members ask for the cuts, and in 
reference to the gentleman from Vermont and the gentleman from New 
York, Mr. Chairman, I have talked with staff, and they have not gone up 
and looked at the budget. They should look at it, they should analyze 
it, they should go through it and see what it is all about. But to come 
off the top and say, ``Let's just cut it, let's not look at it''; they 
do not know what it is for, where it is coming from, and I think it is 
very important to understand it. They should look at it because the 
world is a dangerous place. It is as dangerous as it was when the 
Soviet Union existed. We have more targets, we have more problems, more 
areas to focus on and more people to be retrained because many of our 
analysts were analyzing areas of the Soviet Union and trained in that 
area. Now we have Iran, we have North Korea, we have Iraq which we just 
had a war with, and I think it is so important we analyze it.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues, before they make these judgments, 
to go upstairs, go through the budget, look at what it is, and then 
make their decision whether it should be cut.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Hawaii [Mrs. Mink].
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I want to tell the American people listening 
to this debate that once you look at that budget, you can no longer 
talk about it. You cannot disclose anything. We are forbidden from 
talking about the figures. So they ought to know for a fact that we do 
not look at it, because we do not want to be in a position of being 
criticized for discussing a budget we looked at. I urge full disclosure 
of the total amount, and we can talk to the public about the total 
amount.
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I take the 
well today to support the amendment to cut 10 percent from the budget. 
I do so not because I do not respect the diligent work of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence in determining what our needs our, but 
just as an individual citizen in this great country. I understand that 
the circumstances in the world have changed. We do not have the same 
threats which generated this huge spending in the cold war situation.
  Times are different. You cannot make a sensible argument by saying we 
have new threats, new enemies. These very same countries existed 
previously as threats to our security, and the intelligence community, 
I am sure, was embarking upon whatever strategies and investigations 
that those situations required in Iran and Korea and other places.
  They have risen up into prominence and have become our priorities, 
but they are certainly not such that they overcome the spending cuts 
which are, I think, prompted by the changes of circumstances.
  Now, if this country had resources which it could spend, I would say 
perhaps this debate would be a needless effort. But all of us 
understand the crisis of spending in this country and the enormous 
needs that our people experience and tell us are unmet, and we are 
helpless in providing them the resources to meet these needs.
  I serve on the Committee on Education and Labor, and it pains me 
every year not to be able to fund the programs as the needs occur. We 
have always said that the American country needs to be able to compete 
globally in terms of education, in terms of our economy. Yet we are not 
providing funds for our young people to go on to the universities and 
colleges and be able to compete. We have limitations on the number of 
Pell grants and scholarships, and we are cutting back constantly on 
graduate education and resource assistance.
  Now, is it possible that a country as great as ours cannot divert 
funds away from intelligence institutions like the CIA and recommit 
these moneys to the education of our young people?
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
California [Ms. Harman].
  (Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, this budget and these issues are a matter 
of intense interest to me and my constituents. I have done my homework, 
though not on the committee, and have been briefed on this intelligence 
budget, and have paid a visit to that top floor of the Capitol. My 
conclusion is that the Sanders amendment is not in our national 
interest, and I strongly oppose it.
  As I said last year, intelligence funding is intelligent funding. I 
believe that intelligence is a crucial investment, for much the same 
reason that I support aid to the former Soviet Republics. It is 
proactive. The money we spend for these programs helps us avoid 
spending greater sums later, because we can identify threats early on 
and organize our response.
  Our intelligence capabilities were a major factor in the Persian Gulf 
war. They improved our battle management, increased our knowledge about 
Iraq's capabilities, and helped pave the way for the gulf war and the 
liberation of Kuwait.
  My district has made a major contribution to the tactical 
intelligence systems that are funded jointly by the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Armed Services, and I 
think these systems are more vital than ever in these times of rapid 
international change.
  Since 1990, more than 20,000 jobs have been eliminated at the 5 major 
prime contractors which develop intelligence collection systems. That 
represents a 75-percent reduction in the work force involved in 
intelligence programs. Most of that loss has occurred in southern 
California, and, because there were no alternative jobs, these people 
have left the industry and are not likely to return to work on critical 
national intelligence programs in the future.
  Mr. Chairman, statistics like those I have just quoted are 
devastating to our industrial base, our intelligence industrial base, 
and our national security. I strongly urge a ``no'' vote on the Sanders 
amendment.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Nadler].
  (Mr. NADLER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, it is difficult to debate a budget and urge 
or defend a cut in the budget when the budget is secret and we cannot 
say how much we are spending or how much the proponents or opponents of 
amendment propose to spend, although rumor has it, rumor from the New 
York Times and everywhere else, it is somewhere in the neighborhood of 
$30 billion. Maybe that is true.
  But what one can say, however, is that in the last few years, the 
world has undergone an immense change. The cold war has ended. The 
great adversary, the evil empire, which itself spent many, many 
billions of dollars every year on armaments, on intelligence, on 
counterintelligence, which we had to spend many billions of dollars on 
for intelligence and counterintelligence and counter-
counterintelligence, is no more. Why is it that our budgets do not 
recognize the world sea change, the sea change in the condition of the 
world?
  It is true, of course, there are many things that our intelligence 
must do. We must know what is going on. Much of what we must know about 
what is going on really consists of people studying periodicals and 
literature in libraries to find out what is going on in cultural change 
and in religious change and political change around the world. Some of 
it is still handled through satellites and such.
  But the fact is, that with the Soviet Union gone, with the cold war 
over, if we cannot reduce our intelligence budget by 10 or 20 percent, 
then we are wasting a heck of a lot of money. It is particularly true 
in view of the fact that the intelligence community missed the greatest 
political event of the last quarter-century, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. So one wonders how efficiently they were spending that money in 
the first place.
  In summary, Mr. Chairman, we ought to be able to reduce our 
expenditure and spend it more usefully on housing and education and 
things vital to national security here at home.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Cunningham].
  (Mr. CUNNINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, it befuddles most of us. We talk about 
a strong crime bill, and the Black Caucus fights against strong crime 
measures. And the liberal from New York fought against registering 
child molesters and woman stalkers. But yet he is up here, ``Let's cut 
intelligence; let's cut defense.''
  We cut the defense of this country down to the bone marrow. During 
Desert Storm the intelligence agencies in defense, and I saw a lot of 
Members sitting around here sleeking around, wondering what the 
terrorist activity was. In foreign countries, the word is well, the 
Soviet Union is gone. It is only Russia right now. Why are they 
building four Typhoon-class submarines and investing in nuclear subs 
and subs that cut cables? Yes, our intelligence agency knows that.
  So why, if the Soviet Union is gone, are they doing that? I never 
fought against the Soviet Union. I fought in Vietnam and I fought in 
Israel. I never fought against the Soviet Union. But we are looking at 
Somalia, we are looking at Haiti. God knows Haiti. And we do not need 
intelligence for that? And we are cutting ourselves to the quick.

                              {time}  1820

  And some of the rhetoric, ``We want a strong crime bill, but by the 
way, let's cut all of our intelligence.''
  I look at what kind of message are we sending when we talk about 
priorities in cutting. The Constitution of the United States provides 
for defense. We have an education budget. I serve on that committee as 
well. But the social welfare program has failed. It has failed. When we 
are trying to cut everything that we have for our own defense in this 
country, including our intelligence agencies, if anybody ought to be 
mad at the FBI and CIA, it was me.
  During the Desert Storm they gave our freshman class a lecture 
telling about the terrorist activity. I went to my district and they 
left it cut off.
  We need them and we need them desparately. We have the other funds 
for education and those kinds of things.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  Let me put this debate into some perspective. As I understand it, the 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli] earlier indicated that our 
intelligence budget, our intelligence budget is more than the entire 
defense budgets for all of our potential enemies combined. What we are 
talking about is funding the intelligence agencies at roughly the level 
as when the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union were in existence.
  Earlier the gentleman from Nevada asked if some of us on this side 
had gone into the special room and looked at the intelligence budget. 
The gentleman from New York [Mr. Owens] gave the answer that we had 
not, the reason that we had not. But there is a more important reason.
  I have not gone into that room, but in my State, I have talked to 
parents whose children are hungry. I have talked to elderly people who 
cannot afford prescription drugs. I have talked to senior citizens who 
are getting by on Social Security. As mayor of the largest city in the 
State of Vermont, I have seen homelessness. I have seen the social 
misery that is going on all over this country.

  This debate is primarily not about the intelligence budget. If we 
give them $28 billion, they will take it; if we give them $100 billion, 
they will take it. What this debate is about is national priorities. It 
is the hypocrisy of Members coming up here every day talking about the 
deficit, talking about cutting Social Security, Medicaid, education, 
but not wanting to cut in any significant way the intelligence budget.
  What this debate is about is national security. It is whether we will 
tolerate having 5 million children hungry, having the highest rate of 
poverty among children in the industrialized world.
  Do Members want to know what national security is? It is feeding 
hungry children. It is educating the young. It is providing jobs for 
the unemployed. It is not spending more money on intelligence than the 
entire defense budgets of all our enemies combined. That is called 
overkill.
  It is no secret to the Members of this body that Congress is not held 
in high esteem by the American people. This debate indicates why. We 
cannot talk about being serious about deficit reduction, we cannot talk 
about sensible national priorities and vote to keep the intelligence 
budget at the same level as it was at the height of the cold war.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
  I urge my colleagues to vote ``no.'' I must say, I find it somewhat 
disingenuous for Members to come here and talk about the budget in such 
detail without actually going upstairs and reviewing that budget. I 
agree with my colleague from Nevada, that budget, many billions of 
dollars, is available for access by all Members of Congress. And while 
I understand the argument, those who do not want to go up there might 
be somehow inhibited by what they see, it still defies my imagination 
that Members would come here to cut that budget without going upstairs 
and actually seeing what is debated and what is part of the 
intelligence budget.
  The fact of the matter is, this country is still threatened. We are 
threatened by Korean troops from the north. We are threatened by Iraqis 
and Iranians. We are threatened by perhaps American troops who may find 
themselves in harm's way in Haiti. We are threatened by nuclear-tipped 
missiles being sold around the world. We are threatened by chemical and 
biological warfare. We are threatened by Third World countries in the 
arms game and we are threatened by terrorists at home and abroad.
  Intelligence is a pretty good insurance policy to protect against 
that threat. We hope we never have to pay the piper on that insurance, 
if we do not pay the premium. That is what we are doing right now. We 
are paying the premium on that insurance policy. It is good sense for 
this country. I urge my colleagues to vote down the Sanders amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Hastings). The question is on the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 106, 
noes 315, not voting 18, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 333]

                               AYES--106

     Andrews (ME)
     Barca
     Becerra
     Bonior
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (OH)
     Cantwell
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     de la Garza
     DeFazio
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Duncan
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Ehlers
     Engel
     English
     Evans
     Farr
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gutierrez
     Hall (TX)
     Hamburg
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Inslee
     Jacobs
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Klink
     Kreidler
     Lambert
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Maloney
     Markey
     McDermott
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Murphy
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Norton (DC)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Penny
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Poshard
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Roemer
     Rohrabacher
     Roth
     Rush
     Sanders
     Schroeder
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shays
     Slaughter
     Stark
     Strickland
     Stupak
     Synar
     Thompson
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Unsoeld
     Valentine
     Velazquez
     Waters
     Watt
     Wheat
     Whitten
     Williams
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Yates

                               NOES--315

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews (NJ)
     Andrews (TX)
     Applegate
     Archer
     Armey
     Bacchus (FL)
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barlow
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Beilenson
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (FL)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Byrne
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cardin
     Carr
     Castle
     Chapman
     Clement
     Clinger
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooper
     Coppersmith
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Darden
     de Lugo (VI)
     Deal
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards (TX)
     Emerson
     Eshoo
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (TX)
     Fish
     Ford (MI)
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Grams
     Grandy
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Herger
     Hoagland
     Hobson
     Hochbrueckner
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Huffington
     Hughes
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hutto
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Istook
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, Sam
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klein
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kopetski
     Kyl
     LaFalce
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lehman
     Levin
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (FL)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     Lloyd
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Mann
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Martinez
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCandless
     McCloskey
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McCurdy
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Meek
     Menendez
     Meyers
     Mica
     Michel
     Miller (FL)
     Mineta
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myers
     Neal (NC)
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Paxon
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Ramstad
     Ravenel
     Reed
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Romero-Barcelo (PR)
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Sabo
     Sangmeister
     Santorum
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schenk
     Schiff
     Schumer
     Scott
     Sharp
     Shaw
     Shepherd
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stump
     Sundquist
     Swett
     Swift
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Upton
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Waxman
     Weldon
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--18

     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Brewster
     Faleomavaega (AS)
     Ford (TN)
     Gallo
     Gingrich
     Green
     Machtley
     Richardson
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Slattery
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Underwood (GU)
     Washington
     Wilson

                              {time}  1843

  Ms. SCHENK and Ms. SHEPHERD changed their vote from ``aye'' to 
``no.''
  Mr. HALL of Texas and Mr. VALENTINE changed their vote from ``no'' to 
``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to let Members know the schedule for the 
evening.
  We will have two amendments that we will consider. Then the Committee 
will rise and finish this bill tomorrow.
  We will have one suspension vote, as I understand it.


                    amendment offered by mr. skaggs

  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Skaggs:
       At the end of title VII (page 39, after line 4), insert the 
     following:

     SEC. 703. REPORT CONCERNING THE COST OF CLASSIFICATION.

       Not later than 7 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit 
     to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate a report (in a classified and 
     unclassified form) which identifies the following:
       (1) The cost of classifying documents and keeping 
     information classified by each agency within the intelligence 
     community.
       (2) The number of personnel within each such agency 
     assigned to classifying documents and keeping information 
     classified.
       (3) A plan to reduce expenditures for classifying 
     information and for keeping information classified, which 
     shall include specific expenditure reduction goals for fiscal 
     year 1995 for each such agency.

  Mr. SKAGGS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Hastings). Is there objection to the 
request of the gentleman from Colorado?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, very briefly, this amendment merely directs 
the Director of Central Intelligence to comply with the reporting 
requirement that was included in the report to last year's 
authorization bill, a requirement that has not yet been complied with, 
dealing with the costs and the personnel involved in maintaining 
classified information within the intelligence community.
  All of the other agencies of the executive branch of government have 
complied with this requirement in the report that was filed by OMB back 
in the spring. This is an effort to further get the attention of the 
intelligence community that they, too, need to provide this information 
as previously requested by Congress.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I fully support the amendment. We were 
prepared to accept it with the understanding that we will reconsider 
the need for it in conference based on the progress made at that point 
in meeting the schedule promised last night by Ms. Woolsey.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, we are happy to accept the amendment with 
the conditions the chairman laid out.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
  The amendment was agreed to.


                    amendment offered by mr. gilman

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment, and I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Gilman: At the end of the bill 
     insert a new Title IX--INTERDICTION OF AERIAL DRUG 
     TRAFFICKING.

     SECTION 901. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

       It is the policy of the United States to provide 
     Intelligence assistance to foreign governments to support 
     efforts by them to interdict aerial drug trafficking. In 
     providing such assistance, the United States seeks to 
     facilitate efforts by foreign governments to identify, track, 
     intercept, and capture on the ground aircraft suspected of 
     engaging in illegal drug trafficking, and to identify the 
     airfields from which such aircraft operate. The United States 
     does not condone the intentional damage or destruction of 
     aircraft in violation of international law, and provides 
     assistance to foreign governments for purposes other than 
     facilitating the intentional damage or destruction of 
     aircraft in violation of international law.

     SEC. 902. AUTHORIZATION.

       The President is authorized to provide Intelligence 
     assistance to foreign governments under such terms and 
     conditions as he may determine in order to carry out the 
     policy stated in section 901. Activities directed by the 
     President pursuant to this title shall not give rise to any 
     civil or criminal action against the United States or any of 
     its officers, agents, or employees.

     SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       The Congress urges the President to review in light of this 
     title all interpretations within the Executive branch of law 
     relevant to the provision of assistance to foreign 
     governments for aerial drug interdiction, with an eye to 
     affirming that continued provision by the United States of 
     such assistance conforms fully with United States and 
     international law.


            modification of amendment offered by mr. gilman

  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to an agreement with the gentleman 
from Kansas [Mr. Glickman], I ask unanimous consent that my amendment 
be modified, and I offer a substitute amendment to be considered in 
lieu of the amendment printed in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will report the amendment, as 
modified.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment, as modified, offered by Mr. Gilman: At the end 
     of the bill insert a new Title IX--INTERDICTION OF AERIAL 
     DRUG TRAFFICKING.

     SECTION 901. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

       It is the policy of the United States to provide 
     intelligence assistance to foreign governments to support 
     efforts by them to interdict aerial drug trafficking. The 
     United States does not condone the intentional damage or 
     destruction of aircraft in violation of international law, 
     and provides assistance to foreign governments for purposes 
     other than facilitating the intentional damage or destruction 
     of aircraft in violation of international law.

     SEC. 902. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

       The Congress urges the President to review in light of this 
     title all interpretations within the Executive branch of law 
     relevant to the provision of assistance to foreign 
     governments for aerial drug interdiction, with an eye to 
     affirming that continued provision by the United States of 
     such assistance conforms fully with United States and 
     international law.

  Mr. GILMAN (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment, as modified, be considered as read and 
printed in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from New York?
  There was no objection.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New York that the amendment be modified?
  There was no objection.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment in response to a 
policy change by the administration that has jeopardized the ability of 
our Nation to win the war on drugs. On May 1 of this year, as a result 
of a legal review undertaken within the Department of Defense, the 
administration suspended a variety of counternarcotics assistance 
programs with the Governments of Colombia and Peru.
  Most importantly, the administration stopped providing intelligence 
information to those governments for use by them in tracking and 
intercepting airplanes suspected of transporting narcotics toward our 
shores.
  This policy change was adopted without any prior consultation with 
the Congress, or indeed, as I understand it, without any prior 
consultation with the Governments of Colombia and Peru.
  By all accounts, the results of this policy change have been 
disasterous. The suspension of United States assistance has given the 
narcotraffickers virtual free reign over the skies of Colombia and 
Peru, and has resulted in a significant upsurge in the volume of 
cocaine headed for the United States.
  This is an appalling situation, and it has to stop.
  My amendment is intended to express the concern of the Congress over 
this situation, and to open the way for the administration to solve the 
problem.
  The amendment clarifies that it is the policy of the United States to 
provide intelligence assistance to foreign governments like Colombia 
and Peru for use by them in interdicting aerial drug trafficking. Such 
assistance is provided not in order to facilitate the intentional 
damage or destruction of aircraft by such governments in violation of 
international law, but rather to assist the interdiction of aircraft by 
such governments by means that do not involve the damage or destruction 
of aircraft in violation of international law.
  This does not mean that it is contrary to U.S. policy for foreign 
governments to use U.S. intelligence information to damage or destroy 
aircraft in all circumstances. To the contrary, there are circumstances 
in which international law permits governments to damage or destroy 
aircraft. For example, it is clear that governments may act in self-
defense against airplanes that are endangering the lives of others. 
Similarly, in time of war, or if a country has declared a national 
emergency in accordance with article 89 of the Chicago Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, the usual rules do not apply.
  The clarification of U.S. policy set forth in my amendment should 
help the administration reach a different conclusion on the legality of 
continued provision by the United States of intelligence information to 
foreign governments for purposes of aerial drug interdiction than the 
administration reached the last time it looked at this question.
  In its review earlier this year, the administration apparently 
assumed that Colombia and Peru are likely to use United States-provided 
intelligence information to shoot down aircraft in violation of 
international law. It is not clear to me, however, that Colombia and 
Peru are likely to use this information in a manner inconsistent with 
their obligations under international law.
  If Colombia and Peru are not likely to act in violation of 
international law, then an additional legal concern identified by 
the administration--that officials of Colombia and Peru may be 
violating criminal provisions of the Aircraft Sabotage Act, 
particularly title 18, United States Code, section 32(b)(2)--appears to 
have been exaggerated.

  Section 32(b)(2) makes it a U.S. crime for persons to damage or 
destroy certain aircraft even if there is no nexus between the 
underlying act and the United States--that is, no involvement of U.S. 
citizens and no other connection to U.S. territory. Ordinarily the 
United States would be without jurisdiction to criminalize acts with no 
relationship to the United States, but section 32(b)(2) relies on the 
international legal principle of universal jurisdiction as a basis for 
applying U.S. criminal law.
  Universal jurisdiction exists only with respect to certain heinous 
violations of international law, such as genocide and piracy. The 
damage or destruction of civil aircraft in flight in violation of 
international law is a recognized basis of universal jurisdiction, and 
it is upon this basis that the criminal proscriptions of section 
32(b)(2) rest.
  It is obvious, however, that universal jurisdiction does not exist 
with respect to actions that do not violate international law. It 
should not be hard, therefore, for the administration to interpret 
section 32(b)(2) as applying only to acts over which the United States 
has jurisdiction in accordance with international law.
  It follows that if Colombia and Peru are not violating international 
law, their officials cannot be violating section 32(b)(2).
  An additional legal concern identified by the administration is that 
U.S. officials providing intelligence assistance to Colombia and Peru 
may be violating title 18, United States Code, section 2(a) by aiding 
and abetting violations by officials of those Governments of section 
32(b)(2). Of course, this concern is misplaced if, in fact, Colombian 
and Peruvian officials are not violating section 32(b)(2).
  Even if Colombian and Peruvian officials were deemed to be violating 
section 32(b)(2), however, there can be no aiding and abetting 
liability on the part of United States officials unless those officials 
act with the specific intent to facilitate unlawful activity. The 
statement of U.S. policy contained in section 901 of my amendment makes 
clear that it is not the intent of the United States to facilitate 
unlawful activity. To the contrary, section 901 states that the United 
States does not condone the intentional damage or destruction of 
aircraft in violation of international law.
  In any event, the Attorney General's prosecutorial discretion can be 
used to ensure that U.S. officials are not prosecuted for carrying out 
the policy of the President.
  I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that the administration has proposed 
legislation to resolve the intelligence sharing problem that arose as a 
result of the administration's legal review. That proposal would have 
us amend section 32(b)(2) to create an exemption for the intentional 
damage or destruction of aircraft in certain circumstances.
  I am not unalterably opposed to such an approach. I believe, however, 
that we must proceed cautiously in amending U.S. criminal law in this 
regard, not least because many other countries have criminal laws 
similar to section 32(b)(2), and we would not want to suggest to those 
countries that they may exercise their universal jurisdiction to 
prosecute U.S. officials for actions that we thought were prohibited by 
section 32(b)(2) in the first instance.
  I will remain willing to discuss possible refinements of my amendment 
with the administration as the legislative process unfolds. In the 
meantime, Mr. Chairman, I urge the adoption of my amendment.

                              {time}  1850

  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GILMAN. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Kansas.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I commend the gentleman's amendment. I 
could not have supported it as originally drafted, but he has modified 
it to make sure there is a strong policy statement and that there is a 
sense of the Congress that we are helpful to the Andean nations in 
supporting their aerial antidrug interdiction efforts. Therefore, I 
support the amendment.
  Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for his support.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GILMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  (Mr. COMBEST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, we certainly accept the amendment and I 
support the gentleman's amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment provides a clear statement of 
congressional intent on counterdrug air interdiction. It helps the 
administration move forward on resolving the current impasse between 
Colombia and Peru and the United States.
  No radar tracking data has been given to the Colombians or Peruvians 
since 1 May. Consequently, there has been an increase in drug 
trafficking flights from Peru to Colombia with a corresponding increase 
in the amount of cocaine being processed for onward shipment to the 
United States.
  We need to resume cooperative counterdrug programs with 
Colombia and Peru. The cut off in radar tracking information has 
aggravated tensions and impacted negatively on all counterdrug 
programs. This amendment will help repair damage due to the cut off by 
showing that we are moving to correct the law.
  Mr. GILMAN. I thank the gentleman for his support.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Hastings). The question is on the 
amendment, as modified, offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Gilman].
  The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Montgomery) having assumed the chair, Mr. Hastings, Chairman pro 
tempore of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, 
reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill 
(H.R. 4299) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 
purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

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