[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 93 (Monday, July 18, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 18, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                         CONCERN OVER THE F-22

 Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, having had the opportunity to 
thoroughly review the F-22 test and evaluation master plan [TEMP], I 
was very disturbed by the apparent lack of electronic combat 
effectiveness testing prior to flight testing. My concern only grew as 
answers from the Air Force to followup questions made it clear that the 
Service is very comfortable with the notion of dodging effectiveness 
testing until the F-22 is already in production.
  Unfortunately, developmental testing has increasingly come to be seen 
as a potential source of embarrassment by program managers. Rather than 
viewing developmental testing as a learning tool, an iterative process 
of testing, analyzing, and fixing preparatory to the commitment to 
production, program managers treat developmental testing as a ``pass/
fail'' gauntlet that has the potential to blacken programs in the eyes 
of Service, DOD, and congressional overseers.
  The foolishness of avoiding developmental testing was made all too 
obvious by the B-1B and the ALQ-161. Facing budgetary and schedule 
pressures, the B-1B program office ducked developmental testing. The 
result: disaster. The ALQ-161 failed operational testing miserably. In 
fact, because the fundamental design of the system was itself flawed, 
any fix involved a major compromise of capability. In the end, millions 
of dollars and almost a decade later, we still do not have a cost-
effective solution to the many problems experienced by the ALQ-161.
  It appears to me that the F-22, a vastly more complicated system 
boasting sensor fusion and integrated avionics, is headed for exactly 
the same outcome. The F-22 program office is skipping developmental 
testing and waiting until operational testing, when the F-22 already 
will be in production, to discover whether its multibillion dollar 
avionics package actually works--not turns on, but actually increases 
the likelihood that the F-22 can dominate the skies over enemy 
territory and survive.
  Fortunately, I am not alone in my concerns. I ask that a letter to 
Air Force Secretary Widnall signed by myself and my esteemed 
colleagues, Senators DeConcini and Mack, be inserted in the Record at 
the end of my remarks.
  The letter follows:


                                                  U.S. Senate,

                                    Washington, DC, July 13, 1994.
     Hon. Sheila Widnall,
     Secretary of the Air Force, the Pentagon, Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary Widnall: We are writing to express our deep 
     concern over the fact that the F-22 Test & Evaluation Master 
     Plan (TEMP) by-passes the Real-time Electromagnetic Digitally 
     Controlled Analyzer & Processor (REDCAP) and Air Force 
     Electronic Warefare Evaluation Simulator (AFEWES) facilities. 
     As a result, no electronic combat (EC) effectiveness testing 
     confirming whether the F-22's combination of stealth, speed, 
     and integrated avionics actually exploit and/or degrade air 
     defenses, improve mission effectiveness, or increase 
     survivability will be conducted until Operational Test & 
     Evaluation (OT&E). As the ALQ-161 vividly demonstrates to 
     this day, OT&E is too late to implement cost-effective fixes.
       The Air Force justification for avoiding REDCAP and AFEWES 
     is two-fold: (1) ``[t]he integrated avionics concept of the 
     F-22 hinges on sensor fusion . . . requir[ing] the successful 
     correlation of multiple signals from a single source . . . 
     [t]his capability does not exist in current Hardware in the 
     Loop (HITL) facilities . . .'', and (2) ``The F-22 does not 
     employ countermeasures against the EW/GCI/C3 threats 
     simulated at REDCAP and the majority of threats simulated at 
     AFEWES are not considered primary threats to the F-22.''
       Neither position is credible. REDCAP and AFEWES, together 
     or apart, do have the capability to test the F-22's 
     integrated avionics. Briefings to that effect have been 
     ignored. If the F-22 cannot demonstrate offensive air 
     superiority mission success in the modern IADS/EW/GCI/C3 
     environment simulated at REDCAP, then it will be no less 
     dependent than the F-15C on intelligence, AWACS support, and 
     active and passive suppression of enemy air defenses. As for 
     ``primary'' threats, AFEWES airborne interceptor simulations 
     will include the Fulcrum, Flanker, and Foxhound by the end of 
     FY95. Clearly, a thorough test plan for F-22 avionics would 
     include REDCAP and AFEWES.
       Challenged on the lack of EC effectiveness testing, the Air 
     Force countered that ``[o]pen air subsystem testing on the . 
     . . flying test bed provides many of the same benefits as 
     HITL testing . . . provides a more realistic environmental 
     than HITL testing . . . [and] . . . provides an early 
     assessment of system effectiveness prior to [EMD] aircraft 
     flight testing''. This is contradictory. Subsystem testing 
     lacks the sensor fusion deemed critical to proper avionics 
     testing. The supposed inability of HITL facilities to test 
     the fully integrated avionics suite eliminated REDCAP and 
     AFEWES from the F-22 test plan. Furthermore, open air testing 
     cannot possibly duplicate the threat densities required, nor 
     is it controllable or repeatable.
       We believe that both an Air Force and Congressional review 
     of the avionics portion of the F-22 TEMP is in order. The F-
     22 System Program Office considers the F-22's avionics too 
     complicated to be properly tested prior to OT&E, but it is 
     that very complexity that demands exhaustive effectiveness 
     testing prior to production. We look forward to hearing from 
     you on this matter prior to make-up of the Senate Defense 
     Appropriations bill.
           Sincerely,
     Connie Mack.
     Dennis DeConcini.
     Alfonse D'Amato.

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