[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 92 (Friday, July 15, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 15, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                       UNANIMOUS-CONSENT REQUEST

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we go next to 
one of the amendments on the list, the amendment by the Senator from 
Alaska [Mr. Murkowski]; upon completion of that amendment, then the 
Senator from Florida be recognized to bring up whatever amendment he 
has that is on the regular list.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Vermont propound that as 
a unanimous-consent request?
  Mr. LEAHY. Yes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, Senator 
Domenici is here patiently trying to get in line. I would suggest to 
the chairman that we simply modify the UC agreement to allow Senator 
Domenici to be next in line after Senator Graham.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I do so. Let me restate it.
  I ask unanimous consent that we go now to Senator Murkowski, who will 
bring up an amendment. Upon the completion of that amendment, the 
Senator from Florida [Mr. Graham] will be recognized to bring up his 
amendment. Upon completion of that or the setting aside of that 
amendment, we go to the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Domenici] to bring 
up his. All these are amendments that are on the agreed list.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Alaska.
  Will the Senator from Alaska tell us which amendment he is offering, 
so we may know how much time is allotted under the unanimous-consent 
request?
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I believe the total time that was 
allotted was 50 minutes equally divided, and I will not take that time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. I believe the Senator had two amendments, one 
of which was for 50 minutes. Will the Senator tell me which one?
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. The North Korea amendment was 50 minutes. It is my 
understanding the other two amendments are accepted by both sides, but 
I intend to mention them and get clearance.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator have a number on the 
amendment he is offering?
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. The Senator does have a number. The initial number is 
2272, which there will be a substitute for in a sense of the Senate 
replacing the amendment. The other one is 2273, which is the North 
Korean amendment which will be offered, and I will ask for a rollcall 
vote. The other one that has been accepted is the United States-Japan 
friendship amendment. I believe that is amendment 2274.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. For the Chair clarification, the Senator is 
offering Amendment 2273 at this point?
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I will be asking for clearance on the other two 
amendments that have already cleared and am formally asking for a 
rollcall vote on the North Korean amendment which again is No. 2273.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is then recognized to offer 
amendment No. 2273 and has a 50-minute time limit for that debate, as I 
understand it.
  So the Senator is recognized for offering 2273.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I would assume that there will be no 
objection to clearing the other two since one has already passed.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, we have approved so many through late last 
night, I am not sure of the numbers. One of those has already been 
adopted by the Senate.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I believe that is correct. My understanding is it has 
been cleared.
  Mr. LEAHY. Why not go forward on this and we will double check.


                           Amendment No. 2273

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Dole offered amendment No. 2273 for himself and Mr. 
     Murkowski.

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following 
     section:
       No funds appropriated under this Act or any other Act may 
     be made available to the Democratic People's Republic of 
     Korea until the President certifies and reports to Congress 
     that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea:
       (1) does not possess nuclear weapons;
       (2) has halted its nuclear weapons program; and
       (3) has not exported weapons-grade plutonium.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, this amendment simply states that North 
Korea will receive no United States foreign assistance until the 
President certifies to Congress that, first, North Korea does not 
possess nuclear weapons; second, North Korea has halted its nuclear 
weapons program; and third, North Korea has not exported weapons-grade 
plutonium.
  Mr. President, I know that my colleagues share my apprehension over 
possible instability in North Korea in the aftermath of the death of 
Kim Il-song, who was referred to as the ``great leader.'' Reports 
indicate that Kim Chong il, Kim Il-song's heir, has consolidated his 
power and is expected to take over after the funeral of his father on 
July 17.
  The change in regimes seems to present the world with an age-old 
problem, and that is ``The devil you know is better than the one you 
don't.''
  In the case of North Korea, Kim Il-song had been around for probably 
as long as any leader in recent history, and the outside world had at 
least some idea of what he is capable of doing.
  Kim Il-song was the leader who launched the invasion of South Korea 
in 1950 resulting in the death of 3 million of his countrymen and more 
than 33,000 American troops; the leader whose agents detonated a bomb 
in Rangoon killing 16 South Korean officials, among them members of the 
Cabinet--including one of my friends, Bum Suk Lee; the leader who 
sanctioned the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight killing 115 
passengers and crew, and the leader whose military hacked American 
personnel to death in sight of the United States guards in the DMZ.
  Kim Il-song leaves a very unpredictable legacy, and he leaves it to a 
very unpredictable son. I have not met anyone in the U.S. intelligence 
community who has any first-hand information about Kim Chong il. There 
are reports that it was Kim Chong il who actually orchestrated the 
Korean Airlines bombing.
  While the long-awaited change in leadership would cause concern 
whenever it occurred, the apprehension has increased measurably because 
of North Korea's suspected nuclear activity. Now, more than ever, the 
United States must demand that North Korea simply come clean on past 
nuclear activities and follow through on past commitments to allow the 
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to have complete access 
to nuclear facilities, both suspected and declared.
  So, Mr. President, for that reason I am offering an amendment on 
behalf of myself and Senator Dole that says that this body, the United 
States Senate, will not provide any aid to North Korea until the 
President certifies that three specific conditions have been met.
  The first condition is that North Korea does not possess nuclear 
weapons. If North Korea possesses a nuclear weapon already, the weapon 
must be destroyed. This was the path taken by South Africa when it 
signed onto the IAEA safeguards back in 1991. We should expect no less 
today from North Korea.
  The second condition is that the North Koreans halt their nuclear 
weapons program--halt it. We mean that. This includes full compliance 
with the terms of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and the January 30, 
1992, full-scope safeguards agreement between the IAEA and North Korea.
  The third condition is that North Korea has not exported weapons-
grade plutonium to other countries on missiles or otherwise.
  As this amendment makes clear, it is up to the administration, as the 
party directly negotiating with the North Koreans, to send a clear and 
strong message that the United States is prepared to offer incentives 
for North Korea, but that it must be on our terms.
  Unfortunately, up to now, our strategy with North Korea has been less 
than consistent. Everyone who has negotiated deals in the Asia Pacific 
understand a key point that I think the United States negotiators have 
missed from time to time: That Asians understand strength and 
consistency. I think it is fair to say that our policy has lacked both.
  A quick review of the chronology of our negotiations prior to the 
decision to seek sanctions, that was later put aside in light of former 
President Carter's visit to Kim Il-song, reveals a process that has 
been dominated by North Korean delay tactics.
  It is more than 2 years now, more than 2 years, Mr. President, since 
North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards 
Agreement that requires regular inspection of its nuclear facilities. 
It is more than 1 year since North Korea threatened to pull out of the 
NPT because the International Atomic Energy Agency was demanding access 
to the two undeclared nuclear sites. But we are no further along in 
halting the nuclear program than we were before.
  Let me share with you, Mr. President, the charts that show this 
chronology more vividly.
  Starting in 1992, in January, North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, which permits regular 
inspections of its nuclear facilities.
  Then the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, conducted 
sporadic inspections in 1992 and noted various discrepancies.
  Here we are in January, a year later, 1993, and North Korea refuses 
IAEA requests to inspect two undeclared, but suspected, nuclear sites. 
One might wonder what their objective was in refusing access to these 
two sites. I say it is because they are developing nuclear 
capabilities.
  In February 1993, a month later, the IAEA sets March 31 as the 
deadline--that was the first--for North Korea to agree to the 
inspection of the two sites.
  The next month, March 1993, North Korea announces its intention to 
withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the United 
States begins, negotiations with North Korea.
  This was clearly a path of inconsistencies.
  June 1993, North Korea suspends the threat to withdraw from the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but continues to refuse inspections.
  November 1993, President Clinton announces that North Korea will not 
be allowed to possess a single nuclear weapon.
  March 1993 through December 1993, the administration holds two rounds 
of high-level negotiations with the North Koreans.
  And then, at the end of the year in December 1993, the President 
announces an agreement with North Korea to allow inspections at seven 
declared sites.
  Here we are going from January 1992 to December 1993, and clearly, no 
progress, in spite of the fact that our President announced that the 
North Koreans would not be allowed to possess a single nuclear weapon.
  So let us turn to the next chart, Mr. President.
  January 1994, the International Atomic Energy Agency refuses to 
accept North Korea's terms for a limited inspection.
  February 6, 1994, North Korea and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency reach an agreement on details of inspections.
  Looks like progress.
  March 1994, the inspectors enter North Korea after delays in getting 
visas. I happen to have some knowledge of that. Not only were the visas 
delayed, they were cut short. They actually cut short the time that was 
requested by the IAEA inspectors. So it was an unsatisfactory effort, 
and clearly the intention of the North Koreans are suspect.
  March 21, the IAEA board of governors announces that because 
inspections were not complete, the agency was unable to draw 
conclusions as to whether there had been diversions of nuclear 
material.
  March 31, nonbinding statement by the United Nations asking North 
Korea to allow inspectors back in mid-May.
  April 1994, North Korea announces its intention to remove spent fuel 
rods at reprocessing plants. The United States tells North Korea that 
the IAEA inspectors must be present during removal of the rods.
  May 19, North Korea begins removing spent fuel rods from the reactor 
without--without--the IAEA inspectors present, a violation of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  May 21, the United States announces that it will resume high-level 
negotiations. This buys more time for the North Koreans.
  June, the IAEA announces that it can no longer assure continuity of 
safeguards.
  June, the United States cancels high-level negotiations and threatens 
to go to the United Nations for economic sanctions.
  And in June, IAEA board of governors votes to cut off technical 
assistance. China, I might add, abstains.
  June 13, North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the 
IAEA.
  So here we are, January 1992, when the North Koreans signed the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards and here we are, July 1994, 
still nowhere with regard to the inspections.
  And what has happened? Clearly, the North Koreans have had nearly 2 
years--2 years--of jawboning. But from that standpoint, they gained the 
time to develop a greater nuclear capability.
  Since North Korea threatened to pull out of the IAEA in June, we have 
had four significant events.
  First, the United States declared it would seek U.N. sanctions 
against North Korea.
  Second, former President Jimmy Carter visited Kim Il-song.
  Third, the United States agreed to resume high-level negotiations 
with North Korea. The talks began on July 8, but then they were 
postponed because of the death of Kim Il-song.
  Fourth, North and South agreed to hold a summit, scheduled for 
sometime in July. This may or may not be postponed. We will have some 
idea after the funeral ceremonies are over, which I believe will be the 
17th of this month.
  But the point is, Mr. President, for more than 2 years, the late Kim 
Il-song has dictated and our negotiators have basically conceded, in a 
good-faith effort perhaps, but concessions nevertheless. The North 
Koreans have gained the advantage of time to achieve their objective of 
technological advancement.
  The North Koreans have extracted concessions from us. We have agreed 
to the high-level talks. The United States suspended joint military 
exercises with the South Koreans, team spirit, in a willingness to 
cooperate with the North Koreans.
  The United States delayed sending the Patriot missile requested by 
our military; we finally sent them by ship.
  The North Koreans got another year to work on their nuclear 
capability.
  The North Koreans moved spent fuel rods into the cooling pond without 
the IAEA monitor procedures in place.
  What do we get out of this, Mr. President? It is pretty hard to 
identify anything.
  The IAEA still is unable to verify whether nuclear activity took 
place. Two suspected nuclear sites remain off limits. North Korea is a 
month or so away, as we understand now, from being able to reprocess 
spent fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium, which will give them the 
capability to develop perhaps four to six more bombs.
  Dr. Davis, Assistant Secretary for Political and Military Affairs at 
the State Department, testified before the Foreign Relations Committee 
back in March that she was not concerned about the loss of time because 
the North Koreans told us that their program was frozen.
  Well, Mr. President, I am concerned, and I am sure a majority of my 
colleagues are too. By allowing North Korea to continue their drive 
toward nuclear capability, we face a more ominous enemy than we did 
just last year.
  If the new North Korean regime is ready to put aside its drive toward 
nuclear arms and to move toward a family of nations, then I believe the 
United States should rightfully welcome such a move and offer rewards. 
However, I strongly believe that the North Koreans must offer the 
concessions, and not the other way around.
  For far too long, we let Kim Il-song dictate the terms of the 
negotiations while he gained the valuable time to push the suspected 
nuclear program ahead. From the track record, it was hard to tell which 
country in the negotiations was the tiny, isolated, terrorist regime 
violating international agreements and which country was the superpower 
that was pulling the weight for the international community. I think 
this must change.
  This amendment, Mr. President, sets goalposts for the new leadership 
in North Korea, Kim Chong il, and signals the United States 
administration that this body, the United States Senate, is ready to 
provide carrots and assistance to North Korea, but only after explicit 
guarantees about their nuclear program and their weapons program are 
met. No longer can we afford this extended delay in negotiations.
  Again, I want to note the words spoken by President Clinton back on 
November 7, 1993, ``North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear 
weapon.''
  I agree with the President's statement. That is exactly what this 
amendment is about. The President must certify that North Korea does 
not possess a nuclear weapon at such time as we consider giving them 
any type of United States aid or assistance.
  That concludes my remarks. It is my intention to ask for the yeas and 
nays on this amendment. I am sure the floor leaders, both for the 
majority and minority, have some comments relative to his position. At 
the conclusion, it would be my intent to briefly clear the sense-of-
the-Senate amendment which is pending and I believe has been cleared, 
on Pan Am 103.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I commend the distinguished Senator 
from Alaska for his outstanding work here on a very important topic and 
clearly the most troublesome area in the world today. That is exactly 
what the Senator from Alaska has been speaking about. I am in strong 
support of his amendment.
  Mr. President, the crisis in Korea has been brewing for some time. In 
December 1991, faced with a threat from the Bush administration to seek 
global sanctions, North Korea agreed to sign a safeguards treaty with 
the IAEA. Since then Korea has engaged in a dangerous diplomatic game, 
inching forward toward accommodating international concerns then 
abruptly retrenching and closing off negotiations and inspection access 
to facilities.
  After an abbreviated period in which they allowed the IAEA access to 
sites they selected, in February 1993, the IAEA demanded inspection 
rights to the Yongbyon site, setting a March 31 deadline. The Clinton 
administration initially supported this demand and the President made 
stemming the flow of weapons of mass destruction his highest priority.
  The North's response was to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty altogether.
  By April, Secretary Christopher was publicly warning the United 
States would seek international sanctions and threatening enforcement 
action if the IAEA safeguards terms are not met. By June, with 
absolutely no change in North Korea's position, we were conceding and 
offering assurances against the threat and use of force and promising 
noninterference in North Korea's internal affairs.
  By July, the Clinton administration was back to tough talk. After his 
visit to Korea and the DMZ, the President declared ``we cannot let the 
expanding threat of these deadly weapons replace the cold war nightmare 
of nuclear annihilation.'' He pledged United States support for South 
Korea's defense and suggested, once again, we would seek international 
sanctions. Once again, suggestion dissolved into submission.
  After protracted and unproductive negotiations the administration 
decided to cancel joint United States-South Korean military exercises 
sending another signal that when the going gets tough, we make 
concessions.
  When the IAEA Director General raises international alarm because 
monitoring devices are running out of film, the administration 
announces the North has agreed to one inspection of seven sites the 
Koreans have picked. The IAEA rejects this step as unacceptable and 
almost 2 months later the administration takes the bold step and 
announces sanctions are one option under discussion.
  Then as now, the North Koreans simply waited for the policy to change 
again. By my count, in the last 6 months alone sanctions withdrawn, 
diluted, and derailed at least a half dozen times. No doubt the most 
embarrassing moment came when former President Carter announced the 
administration would suspend the U.N. sanctions effort, only to be 
first contradicted by the White House then embraced.
  Mr. President, unlike Haiti where the victims of our inconsistency 
wash up on our shores every day, the flip flopping on Korea puts 38,000 
American soldiers and their dependents, our Nation and our allies in 
jeopardy. Confusing the national security lines which simply cannot be 
crossed invites aggression.
  President Clinton has said if the North invades, Korea would be worth 
fighting over. I agree, but what if the North simply stalls? What if 
the North's end game is to buy time to build a nuclear inventory for 
use or sale?

  The administration's ill-conceived and inconsistent policy of tough 
talk and little action has produced no tangible results. We have made 
no progress in 18 months in determining the status of nuclear material 
diverted in 1989. We have no assurances of the future handling or 
disposition of the fuel rods recently removed. IAEA inspectors still 
have restricted access and as we know were denied the opportunity to 
monitor the recent transfer of fuel rods.
  The North is not building a record of trust or confidence. Quite the 
contrary, in fact, is the case. Their suggestions of compromise are 
never matched with corresponding action.
  On the other hand, our suggestions for compromise have routinely been 
followed by concessions.
  I recently was struck comments of a Democrat who closely monitors our 
policy toward Korea. When asked about the negotiations the response was 
blunt, ``These aren't negotiations, this is a fire sale and American 
security is on the block.''
  I fear the concession will continue and we will actually shift from 
simply refraining from carrying through or threats to actually offering 
incentives such as foreign aid to the North. And, we will offer those 
incentives without securing meaningful results.
  I think this amendment to assure North Korea meets it's international 
obligations prior to providing assistance are absolutely essential to 
our security interests.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator from Kentucky speaking on the 
time of the Senator from Alaska? The Senator from Alaska has 17 minutes 
30 seconds remaining.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. The Senator will yield, but it is my intention to 
clear the other sense of the Senate. So I defer to the floor managers.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, on my time, as soon as we complete this, I 
am probably going to yield back all my time--well, let the Senator from 
Kentucky finish what he is saying and then maybe we can wrap up all 
this.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, last week Kim Il-song died and in doing 
so provoked yet again a controversy. He is only equaled by Stalin in 
brutality. He is directly responsible, as we all know, for the attack 
that precipitated the Korean war. Fifty-five thousand Americans were 
killed in that conflict. We know he could be held directly accountable 
for the terrorist attack in Rangoon which killed 17 members of the 
North Korean Government. Who could forget the savage attack in 1957 on 
the DMZ when American servicemen were beaten and axed to death in plain 
view of people on the other side?
  In spite of all this, this horrible reputation that will live in 
ignominy forever--President Clinton felt the need to express his 
condolences on behalf of all Americans for the loss of Kim Il-song. He 
expressed his appreciation for Kim Il-song's leadership.
  The Republican leader of the Senate, a decorated veteran, criticized 
these remarks, suggesting none of the American families of Korean vets 
would mourn for 1 minute the loss of Kim Il-song.
  Unfortunately, he was immediately attacked by the New York Times for 
his lack of diplomacy. I think it is perfectly clear that Senator Dole 
was right.
  There are two interesting articles which I would like to call to the 
attention of my colleagues, commending the Republican leader for his 
observations on the passing of Kim Il-song, someone for whom 
condolences are clearly not appropriate--a Mike Royko column in the 
Chicago Tribune of July 12, and an editorial in the New York Post of 
July 13.
  Mr. President, both of these editorials point out the appropriateness 
of the observations of the Republican leader on the passing of one of 
the truly evil people in world history. I ask unanimous consent they 
appear in the Record at this point.
  There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Chicago Tribune, July 12, 1994]

                Kim Il Sung's Death Is Nothing To Mourn

                            (By Mike Royko)

       A panel of Washington TV talkers was snickering about the 
     dig that Sen. Robert Dole took at President Clinton.
       If you missed it, Dole criticized Clinton for conveying the 
     condolences of the American people to North Korea on the 
     death of dictator Kim Il Sung.
       Dole suggested that veterans of the Korean War and their 
     families wouldn't be mourning the death of the man who 
     started a war in which so many Americans died.
       This amused the Washington talkers. Pundit Robert Novak 
     said Dole was having a slow day without any TV appearances, 
     so he pounced on Clinton's condolences to get media 
     attention. The others chuckled at Novak's wit and insight.
       They might be right. Dole is a partisan politician, and he 
     doesn't skip many opportunities to zap his adversaries.
       But does that mean Dole was wrong?
       I happened to be driving in my car when I heard the radio 
     news item about Kim Il Sung's death.
       My first thought was: ``Too bad he didn't croak 50 years 
     ago, the rat.''
       Remember, we are talking about a world class villain. While 
     he didn't operate on the big scale of a Stalin or Hitler, he 
     shared their cold-blooded instincts.
       Because of his lust for power, more than 1 million Korean 
     civilians died, men, women, children. More than 53,000 
     Americans and 200,000 Korean troops were killed. The entire 
     country was devastated. He believed in torturing prisoners of 
     war, letting some starve to death.
       And since that war ended 41 years ago, he's been looking 
     for other ways to stir up trouble. He captured an American 
     ship and tormented the crew. He ordered a civilian airliner 
     shot down. And most recently he has given much of the world a 
     nervous twitch by trying to build nuclear weapons.
       So if there was any reaction in this country and other 
     civilized lands, it should have been to order a round and 
     toast his departure.
       Then the radio news item went on to the fact that Clinton 
     had conveyed condolences to the North Korean people ``on 
     behalf of the American people.''
       And my surprised reaction was: ``Hey, I am an American 
     person. If I want my condolences conveyed, I will convey them 
     myself. And the only emotion I want to convey is my disgust 
     that this vile buzzard lived to the overripe age of 82, 
     causing nothing but misery and suffering.''
       Of course, say foreign policy whiz will say that Clinton 
     was merely practicing smart diplomacy, that he did the 
     correct thing because we are trying to establish warmer 
     relations with North Korea in order to discourage them from 
     building nuclear weapons.
       That may be true. And if Clinton wanted to be diplomatic 
     and express his personal condolences, it's OK. He could have 
     even said that he was conveying Hillary's, too, and the 
     condolences of the White House staff and all of his friends 
     back in Arkansas.
       He could have sent a floral display, for all I care. Maybe 
     with a ribbon that said: ``Kim Il Sung--gone but not 
     forgotten.'' Or he could send an audio tape of him playing 
     ``Amazing Grace'' on his saxophone.
       But it seems presumptuous of him to casually toss about the 
     condolences of every person in this country. If he wants to 
     send flowers, he shouldn't put our names on the card without 
     asking.
       That's what I don't like about diplomacy. So much of it 
     isn't sincere. I doubt if there is even one person in this 
     country who can truthfully say he feels sad about the death 
     of Kim Il Sung. Well, maybe one or two. Even John Gacy had 
     his weird admirers.
       Most Americans didn't know who Kim Il Sung was because we 
     aren't keen on foreign affairs, except those of the British 
     royal family. And those who did know who he was were relieved 
     that he's no longer with us.
       So I agree with Dole on this issue. If the brainwashed 
     people of North Korea want to weep and wail because they have 
     lost their wacky leader, that's their business.
       But the president of the United States should not be 
     expressing our condolences for the death of a monster who 
     caused the death and misery of millions of people. Someone 
     who would have done it again, on a much grander scale, if he 
     had the opportunity.
       If Clinton wanted to say something, he might have dropped a 
     brief note to Sung's son, Kim Jon Il, who will probably be 
     North Korea's next dictator, saying: ``Just heard about your 
     dad. I hope you won't be as big a loony tune as he was.''
                                  ____


                [From the New York Post, July 13, 1994]

                         Misplaced Condolences

       Should President Clinton have expressed ``sincere 
     condolences to the people of North Korea'' after the death of 
     Stalinist dictator Kim Il Sung? Should the President have 
     volunteered pointed ``appreciation'' for Kim's ``leadership'' 
     during the last months of his life in facilitating the high-
     level diplomatic talks on North Korea's nuclear program that 
     commenced recently in Geneva?
       We think not.
       President Eisenhower had it right when Joseph Stalin died 
     in 1953. If it's impossible to say anything both positive and 
     true about a recently departed international personality, 
     it's best to say nothing at all.
       Kim Il Sung was a brutal dictator and a thug; he shaped the 
     world's last genuinely menacing communist police state and, 
     in his last years, Pyongyang's quest for nuclear weapons made 
     North Korea a greater threat to stability in Asia than it had 
     ever been. We don't know how many Korean lives Kim Il Sung 
     snuffed out during his half-century reign; but certainly--as 
     Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole of Kansas noted Monday--he 
     bore a significant measure of responsibility for the Korean 
     War a conflict in which more than 50,000 American servicemen 
     died.
       The President may think diplomatic protocol requires 
     expressions of both ``sincere condolences'' and praise 
     whenever foreign leaders die. If so, he's been badly advised. 
     And while we deem the current diplomatic discussions 
     pointless and misguided, it would have been reasonable for 
     Clinton--who actually believes in the talks--simply to 
     declare his hope that they go forward.
       The added comments bespeak either rare naivete or a 
     stunning willingness to utter meaningless platitudes. Either 
     way, Clinton struck the wrong note.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. I ask unanimous consent the pending amendment be 
temporarily laid aside so the Senator from Alaska can bring up the 
amendment related to Pan Am 103.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


     JAPAN-UNITED STATES FRIENDSHIP COMMISSION--AMENDMENT NO. 2274

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise today to ask my colleagues to 
support an amendment to the enabling legislation of the Japan-United 
States Friendship Commission. The proposed amendment strengthens the 
criteria for membership on the Commission and broadens the investment 
authority of the Commission.
  The Japan-United States Friendship Commission was created by Congress 
in 1975. The purpose of the Commission, as defined in the Japan-United 
States Friendship Act is to promote ``education and culture at the 
highest level in order to enhance reciprocal people-to-people 
understanding and to support the close friendship and mutuality of 
interest between the United States and Japan.'' To carry out its 
purpose, the Commission has promoted scholarly, cultural, and public 
affairs activities between our two countries. In recent years, the 
Commission has also supported a series of policy research projects 
important to the bilateral relationship. In light of the increasing 
interdependence of the United States and Japan and its attendant 
friction and misunderstandings, the work of the Commission is more 
important than ever.
  Evaluating the various proposals requires an increasingly detailed 
knowledge of Japan, a qualification that was not codified in the 
original enabling legislation and not necessarily observed in the past. 
To correct this deficiency, my proposed amendment codifies membership 
criteria.
  When Congress crated the Commission, it provided it with an endowment 
of $18 million and an approximately equivalent amount of Japanese yen. 
Like a private foundation, the Commission spends the interest earned by 
this endowment on grants to support training programs at universities, 
research institutions, media organizations and the like across the 
United States. The Commission is unique because it is the only source 
of funds dedicated to support these activities that Americans can use 
without fear of carrying out consciously or unconsciously, the aims and 
agendas of self-interested institutions and organizations. The 
Commission appears annually before Congress to seek appropriations of 
its interest earnings.
  Unfortunately, artificial limits on investment authority for funds 
have begun to severely erode the Commission's financial base. 
Currently, the enabling legislation requires that the Commission invest 
its funds in Treasury bills and notes exclusively, As old notes at 10 
percent and higher now begin to mature, the Commission is forced to 
place them back in notes at historically low rates. This further erodes 
their earnings. The power of the Commission to make grants has eroded 
to less than one-quarter of its original purchasing power.
  My amendment would address this problem by allowing the Commission to 
invest in the full range of instruments of debt that are guaranteed 
both in principal and interest by the U.S. Government, such as GNMA's, 
as well as Treasury instruments. Such a change will allow the 
Commission a certain degree of relief from a policy imposed on it when 
the impact of inflation and low rates of return on operating expenses 
were not foreseen by the Congress.
  On this point, I would note that at least two Federal commissions 
created after the Japan-United States Friendship Commission have this 
broader investment authority written into their enabling legislation. 
These are the Barry M. Goldwater Scholarship and Excellence in 
Education Foundation and the Harry S. Truman Scholarship Foundation.
  I urge my colleagues to support this modest change to the Japan-
United States Friendship Act to enable the Commission to continue its 
worthwhile activities.


                    amendment no. 2272, as modified

(Purpose: Sense of the Senate urging United States Government agencies 
     to provide information to victims of international terrorism)

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I send a sense-of-the-Senate amendment 
to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Pryor). The Chair asks which amendment 
does the Senator from Alaska desire to modify?
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, it is a substitute for 2272.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, the amendment is 
modified. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Alaska [Mr. Murkowski], for Mr. Helms for 
     himself and Mr. Murkowski, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2272, as modified.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of the first Committee amendment, insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC.  . POLICY REGARDING PROVIDING INFORMATION TO VICTIMS OF 
                   INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

       Policy.--It is the Sense of the Senate that:
       (1) in order to assist the families of U.S. citizens who 
     have been the victims of terrorist acts, U.S. government 
     agencies should provide or facilitate the acquisition of 
     evidence relevant to the actions brought by American citizens 
     against States that support terrorist acts or against 
     individuals accused of committing terrorist acts.
       (2) the U.S. government should cooperate with U.S. citizens 
     to the extent that such cooperation does not significantly 
     prejudice a pending criminal investigation or prosecution, or 
     threaten national security interests of the U.S.

     SEC.  . REPORT ON STATUS OF EFFORTS OF U.S. AGENCIES TO 
                   ASSIST AND PROVIDE INFORMATION TO VICTIMS OF 
                   INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

       Provided further:
       (1) The Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
     Attorney General, should provide a report to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress within 30 days on U.S. agencies' 
     efforts to provide information and assistance to the families 
     of the victims of Pan Am Flight 103.
       (2) The report should include a description of efforts to 
     criminally prosecute those responsible for the bombing of Pan 
     Am Flight 103 and efforts to provide information in civil 
     actions against States that support terrorism or individuals 
     who commit terrorist acts.

  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I am somewhat shocked that my original 
amendment was not accepted. It simply said that U.S. Government 
agencies should be required to share information with individuals who 
have brought civil actions against a foreign state that sponsors acts 
of international terrorism or against individuals who have been accused 
of terrorist acts.
  The amendment was inspired by the tragic bombing of Pan Am 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, killing 270 passengers, 
including 189 Americans.
  For 6 years, the families of the victims have been seeking justice 
and retribution but the wheels of justice have turned slowly.
  Currently the bureaucrats at the Departments of State and Justice do 
not have to do anything to further information sharing. There is no 
requirement to share information, and consequently a positive act or an 
affirmative decision must be first initiated from within the 
bureaucracy to share information with civil litigants. My sense-of-the-
Senate revises the process. The presumption would allow the bureaucracy 
to share the information unless there is a compelling reason not to do 
so.
  I am told that the bureaucrats down at the Department of Justice 
oppose my amendment. I don't have their formal statement but the legal 
mumbo jumbo seems to boil down to one concept--as between the victims 
of terrorism and a terrorist state, such as Libya, the United States 
Government would prefer to remain neutral.
  I don't think that's what this body believes our U.S. agencies should 
be doing. Under this sense-of-the-Senate, this body would be on record 
supporting the policy that the United States Government should share 
information in these civil suits unless there are sound national 
security reasons or prosecutorial reasons to withhold Government 
information regarding international terrorist states or groups.
  I am pleased that the managers have accepted this sense-of-the-
Senate, and I will work to have my original amendment adopted at a 
later date.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I note this has been cleared. Thee is no 
objection to this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2272), as modified, was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2273

  Mr. LEAHY. Do we now return to the previous amendment by the Senator 
from Alaska?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question now occurs on amendment 2273, of 
the Senator from Alaska.
  The Senator from Alaska has 4 minutes.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I yield back my time.
  Mr. LEAHY. I yield back the time on this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
2273.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Boren] and 
the Senator from Colorado [Mr. Campbell] are necessarily absent.
  Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Coverdell] 
and the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Pressler] are necessarily 
absent.
  I also announce that the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. Wallop] is absent 
on official business.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Wyoming [Mr. Wallop] would vote ``yea.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Exon). Are there any other Senators in the 
Chamber who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 95, nays 0, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 200 Leg.]

                                YEAS--95

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Danforth
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mathews
     McCain
     McConnell
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                             NOT VOTING--5

     Boren
     Campbell
     Coverdell
     Pressler
     Wallop
  So the amendment (No. 2273) was agreed to.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  The Chair will advise the Senator from Vermont that under the 
previous order the Senator from Florida is to be recognized.
  The Chair recognizes the Senator from Florida.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me a couple of 
minutes?
  Mr. GRAHAM. I yield to the Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, a number of Senators on both sides have 
been asking me where we stand. We have been trying, as the Chair knows, 
to yield back time and trying to move rapidly. We are now going to go 
to amendments by the Senator from Florida. I understand from the 
Senator from Florida that we may be able to move that in less time than 
planned, and we would go to the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Domenici].
  Again, I urge Senators, if we have something that we know is going to 
pass overwhelmingly, if we could resist the temptation for rollcall 
votes--because I understand leadership has other matters coming up this 
afternoon--we could move this before we are finished.
  That is all I am going to say.
  I thank the Senator from Florida for his customary courtesy.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bryan). The Senator from Florida.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Thank you Mr. President.


                    Amendment No. 2290, As Modified

  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a 
modification to amendment 2290, which is at the desk, be read.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Vermont [Mr. Leahy], for Mr. Graham, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2290, as modified.

  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 34, line 13, insert after the word State 
     ``determines and reports'' and strike on line 14 
     ``certifies''.

  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I believe that with that modification, 
this amendment will be acceptable and it will therefore be unnecessary 
to have the full 50 minutes used or a rollcall vote.
  I would like, however, just to briefly give to the Senate the 
background and rationale for Senator DeConcini and others having 
proposed this amendment.
  Mr. President, the United States has had a drug-control policy which 
had two parts: A demand-suppression component which attempted to reduce 
the level of consumption by United States citizens of drugs, while at 
the same time we had a supply-suppression component which attempted to 
reduce the amount of drugs coming into the United States available for 
consumption.
  That supply suppression has had primarily a border interdiction 
tactic; that is, through the use of Department of Defense intelligence 
gathering and surveillance capabilities, various law enforcement 
agencies, such as Coast Guard, Customs, and the Department of Justice 
activities, we have attempted to arrest the inflow of drugs close to 
our border.
  In February of this year, the U.S. Drug Coordinator, Dr. Brown, 
announced a new strategy. The new strategy is based not on border 
protection but rather on source country activities.
  I am quoting from the statement that was released by the Drug 
Coordinator on February 9, 1994 in which he states:

       The new international strategy calls for a controlled shift 
     in emphasis from transit zones to source countries.

  He continues on:

       Cooperation with other nations that share our political 
     will to defeat the international drug syndicates is at the 
     heart of the international strategy. Its primary goals are to 
     increase multilateral and other organizations response to the 
     drug threat, and to aggressively increase illicit crop 
     eradication to stop fast developing opium, and to reduce coca 
     cultivation by 1996.

  Mr. President, we are rapidly implementing this strategy in terms of 
drawing down resources that have been committed in the past to our 
transit zone border protection supply-repression policy. As an example, 
the Customs air and marine interdiction program has been cut by $52.6 
million. One-third of the overall air and marine budget in fiscal year 
1994 has been eliminated. The Department of Defense spending on 
protection and monitoring activities was cut by $22 million in fiscal 
year 1995, and had previously been cut by approximately $130 million in 
the current fiscal year, or a total of over $150 million reduction in 
what the Department of Defense had been committed to in terms of 
transit zone interdiction. The Coast Guard interdiction funds have been 
cut by $5l.3 million.
  What this means is that there are fewer cutters and aircraft 
interdicting narcotics smuggling just off our coast.
  Mr. President, that is what our drug strategy has done in terms of 
this controlled shift. An absolute critical component of this new 
strategy working is that the source countries, particularly the 
principal producers of cocaine, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, are full 
participants in this effort to suppress the supply.
  Senator DeConcini and I visited those countries in February of this 
year. One of the things that was obvious, and pointed out both by U.S. 
representatives and by the source countries, was that they are very 
dependent on the United States for military supplies that are utilized 
in the counternarcotics effort.
  For example, we visited a military airfield in Colombia where the 
very aircraft that were intended to be used in suppressing drugs, 
things such as interdicting illicit aircraft that were coming across 
the border going into the small jungle airfields where the cocaine 
laboratories were operating, those aircraft were sitting on the ramp, 
and had been sitting on the ramp for extended periods of time. The 
reason that they were not operable was because they did not have the 
spare parts necessary to get them in the air. And the reason they did 
not have the spare parts was because of U.S. prohibitions on military 
sales to those countries for those aircraft.
  I believe that we start with the premise that the antidrug effort is 
at least an equal effort between the United States and the source 
countries. Arguably, it is primarily in the interest of the United 
States to have an effective suppression policy.
  So it was within that context that I was concerned with language in 
the original subcommittee bill that would have required a certification 
by the Secretary of State that any foreign military sales to Bolivia 
and Colombia were used by such countries primarily for counternarcotics 
activity.
  My concern is both because that could have had the effect of 
adversely impacting our national interest in the effective source 
country international narcotics suppression effort; that it could have 
rendered this controlled shift from transit zone to source countries 
not a controlled shift, but effectively an abdication of any policy, 
and that would have had the effect of not reducing this flow of drugs 
into the United States. Also, it was not pragmatically sensitive to the 
fact that the militaries in these countries are quite small.
  Colombia has only a few military aircraft and, yes, those aircraft 
are used for counternarcotics purposes, but also they have other 
purposes. As an example, recently there were reports about how 
effective the Colombian military had been in the providing of emergency 
assistance to the victims of the recent Colombian earthquakes. I 
imagine that those same helicopters and aircraft in the Colombian Air 
Force used for emergency purposes were also aircraft that had been used 
for counternarcotics purposes.
  So it would be very difficult, in my judgment, to make a 
certification that those funds had been used primarily for 
counternarcotics activities, even if those activities had been the 
plurality of the use of the aircraft, boats, or other equipment that 
were committed to the counternarcotics function of that particular 
nation.
  So we have softened that language in this amendment to state that the 
Secretary of State will determine and report that such funds have been 
used primarily for counternarcotics purposes. Then it would give the 
Secretary of State and the Congress, and other interested agencies and 
citizens of the United States, an information basis upon which to 
evaluate how these military sales were being conducted.
  While I support this modification and I believe that it moves in the 
direction that is necessary to build the partnership between the United 
States and source countries, I urge that as we face these debates in 
the future, we be sensitive to the fact that we have made this 
fundamental change in our drug policy; that that change of source 
country eradication and interdiction critically depends upon the 
effectiveness of the source countries being a full partner in that 
effort; and finally, that we not send either substantive restraints or 
intangible signals that will be interpreted in these source countries 
as a statement of lack of respect, a lack of a willingness to treat 
them as a full partner in this effort, which might result in a less 
than committed effort in a war that we have been talking about for 
years and now must have a full commitment to win.
  So, Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the modified amendment 
which has been submitted. I appreciate the good efforts of the chairman 
of the subcommittee and his staff for working toward this resolution. I 
hope that this amendment will be accepted.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need.
  Mr. President, the Senator from Florida [Mr. Graham] is one of the 
leaders in this body in the fight against drugs. He is also a 
recognized expert in the whole Caribbean, Central America, and South 
America area. I know how hard both he and the Senator from Arizona have 
worked. The Senator from Arizona [Mr. DeConcini] is a former prosecutor 
and chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and is also a 
recognized expert in the field of counternarcotics. The Senator from 
Florida is the chief sponsor of this legislation, and he has been 
sensitive to the human rights concerns raised earlier.
  I think the modification he has made to his amendment is an excellent 
one and it makes it possible for us to continue in the effort of 
counternarcotics that he and I and the Senator from Arizona and others 
definitely want, but also to keep control of the issue of human 
rights--again, an area where he and I and the Senator from Arizona have 
great concerns. I also compliment Senator Dodd, the Senator from 
Connecticut, and his staff, who have worked so hard on this.
  I might ask the Senator from Florida, so I will understand the 
schedule--and I will support his amendment--I understand we will go to 
this amendment now on a voice vote rather than a rollcall vote. Is it 
the Senator's intention to withdraw his other amendment?
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, not at this moment. Our staffs, in 
consultation with other concerned officials, are working on the second 
amendment, which relates to Peru, to see if there can be a satisfactory 
resolution of that issue. If that in fact is possible, it would be my 
intention to offer a modification to amendment No. 2291 to effectuate a 
resolution.
  Mr. LEAHY. The reason I asked the Senator that, I was going to 
suggest we yield back our time, dispose of the current amendment, and 
then, even though the unanimous consent agreement would allow him to 
take up his next amendment, allow the Senator from New Mexico to go 
immediately with his under a unanimous consent agreement that I would 
propound, and then upon the completion of his amendment, go back to the 
amendment of the Senator from Florida.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I appreciate very much the graciousness of 
that invitation. My concern is that I do not know whether we will be in 
a position to offer a modified amendment within 30 or so minutes.
  Mr. LEAHY. If that is the case, we will simply bring in another one 
and ask another unanimous consent. I am trying to protect the Senator's 
rights.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Then I accept the offer of the Senator from Vermont, with 
the understanding that I might, at an appropriate time, move to lay 
aside my second amendment, No. 2291, if we are not in a position at 
that time to offer a modification to 2291.


                      UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that upon the 
completion of the pending amendment, it then be in order to recognize 
the Senator from New Mexico for his amendment; that upon the completion 
of that amendment, the Senator from Florida then be recognized again 
for his amendment, or for whatever other action we may take at that 
time.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Reserving the right to object. What is the time 
agreement on the second Graham amendment?
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, the time agreement on the second amendment 
is 20 minutes, equally divided.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I think Senator Helms is the last one in line. I want 
to make sure there is enough time left.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________