[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 92 (Friday, July 15, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 15, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
           STATEMENT ON THE NOMINATION OF DR. MORTON HALPERIN

  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, over 200 years ago, the founders of 
this great Nation of ours made a very wise decision. They decided that 
certain appointments to high political office would be made by the 
President but the power to do so was subject to the approval of the 
Senate. Our Founding Fathers placed in article II section 2 of the 
Constitution the 10 words, ``* * * by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate * * *.'' Those words make it the responsibility of the 
Senate to examine the fitness of Presidential appointments to certain 
positions within the Federal Government. Mr. President, we on the Armed 
Services Committee take that responsibility very seriously.
  President Clinton has made some interesting Department of Defense 
appointments since taking office. I have not objected to any of his 
choices, except one. I did not always agree with them, but I voted for 
them because I believe a President should have the people he wants 
serving in his administration unless they are incompetent or dangerous. 
Mr. President, Morton Halperin is dangerous. I want to make it clear 
that I am not here to restate a hearing that did not go well for Dr. 
Halperin. That record has been made and can be read by anyone who so 
desires. What I want to state today is that the Senate Armed Services 
Committee is extremely serious about its constitutional 
responsibilities. We are required to fully examine the background of 
all nominees that come before the committee for confirmation hearings.
  The Department of Defense and the White House hired Dr. Halperin as a 
consultant in January 1993 but did not send his name to the Senate for 
our advice and consent until August, 8 months later. He admitted to 
being quite active during this period and also admitted that knowingly 
and in violation of DOD rules and regulations he performed a number of 
functions that presumed our advice and consent. In so doing, Dr. 
Halperin appeared to take our constitutional responsibilities a lot 
less seriously than we did.
  Madam President, this was not an unknown person. Dr. Halperin has 
published more than a dozen books and more than 100 articles over the 
years. He has made some of the most outrageous statements I have ever 
read. Both in writing and at his hearing, he attempted to explain them 
away or deny that they meant precisely what a clear reading of them 
indicates. Some excerpts from Dr. Halperin's November, 1993, 
confirmation testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee were 
recently introduced into the Congressional Record. One statement was:

       I have been accused of believing that the United States 
     should subordinate its interests to the United Nations, never 
     using force without its consent and putting American forces 
     at its disposal. That is false.

  Madam President, Dr. Halperin may say in November 1993 this was false 
but earlier that same year, Dr. Halperin wrote in a publication 
entitled ``Foreign Policy'':

       The United States should explicitly surrender the right to 
     intervene unilaterally in the internal affairs of other 
     countries by overt military means or by covert operations. 
     Such self restraint would bar interventions like those in 
     Grenada and Panama, unless the United States first gained the 
     explicit consent of the international community acting 
     through the Security Council or a regional organization.

  Madam President, if Members of this body will review those remarks, I 
think they will see a serious conflict, at least one that is worth 
discussing with a person who is being considered for an Assistant 
Secretary of Defense.
  As I stated earlier, the Senate has the responsibility to advise and 
consent. We would be negligent in our duties if we did not attempt to 
figure out what Dr. Halperin really believed. As you can see, he says 
different things at different times. This is but one example and I 
would like to introduce for the record a number of quotes from Dr. 
Halperin that give me concern as to his fitness to serve in the 
Department of Defense or anywhere in the Federal Government. I have 
given a citation for each of these quotes so that Members can read them 
for themselves to determine if they are taken out of context. Let me 
read just two more to give the Senate a feel for the task the Senate 
Armed Services Committee faced in holding hearings to decide whether 
Dr. Halperin should be recommended to the Senate.
  In the past, Dr. Halperin has tried to assure us that the Soviet 
Union was of no danger to us. In his ``Defense Strategies for the 
Seventies,'' Dr. Halperin wrote:

       The Soviet Union apparently never even contemplated the 
     overt use of military force against Western Europe. * * * The 
     Soviet posture toward Western Europe has been, and continues 
     to be, a defense and deterrent one.

  Revelations since the fall of the Warsaw Pact have shown how much in 
error this statement was. His opinion of intelligence operations was 
expressed in a book entitled ``The Lawless State,'' as follows:

       Using secret intelligence agencies to defend a 
     constitutional republic is akin to the ancient medical 
     practice of employing leeches to take blood from feverish 
     patients. The intent is therapeutic, but in the long run the 
     cure is more deadly than the disease.

  Why he made this statement or how much he believed this to be true is 
of concern to the Armed Services Committee and to all Senators, I 
should think. Mr. President, I would also like to insert in the Record 
after my remarks a document that was prepared by Mr. Francis J. 
McNamara and given to the committee concerning Dr. Halperin. It 
chronicles for the committee Dr. Halperin's involvement with the 
Pentagon Papers, a renegade CIA agent named Phillip Agee and his early 
association with a convicted Vietnamese spy named David Truong. To have 
ignored information such as this would have been totally irresponsible. 
Dr. Halperin may have had an unpleasant experience before the Armed 
Services Committee and may have requested his name be withdrawn for 
that or any number of other reasons. What I don't want the Senate to 
think is that, because the hearings were terminated, all the areas that 
he was questioned on, both in writing and at the hearing, are therefore 
not true. Dr. Halperin--no one else--made the statements he was 
questioned about. He addressed them by attempting to explain that he 
either no longer held those views or that they were taken out of 
context or that he may not have written them as artfully as he could 
have. Most explanations were totally unacceptable to this Senator and 
others I have been told.
  Many members of the committee had significant problems with Dr. 
Halperin. I still do, and I believe from what I have read and heard, 
that he should not be allowed to deal in military matters, security 
matters or international relations. The President has placed him in 
another sensitive position at the national Security Council, and I 
believe the country will pay a price for that. This time, he chose to 
place him where the Senate could not give its advice and consent. I can 
fully understand why the President would choose to do this, if he did 
not want Dr. Halperin to be rejected by the Senate.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

  Selected Publication Titles by Morton Halperin Concerning the U.S. 
                         Intelligence Community

       ``Led Astray by the CIA,'' The New Republic, June 28, 1975.
       ``The Most Secret Agents,'' The New Republic, July 26, 
     1975.
       ``CIA: Denying What's Not in Writing,'' The New Republic, 
     October 4, 1975.
       ``The Cult of Incompetence,'' The New Republic, November 8, 
     1975.
       ``The Lawless State: The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence 
     Agencies,'' with Jerry J. Berman, Robert L. Borosage and 
     Christine M. Marwick, Center for National Security Studies, 
     Washington, 1976.
       ``Secrecy and the Right to Know,'' with Daniel N. Hoffman, 
     Law and Contemporary Problems, Summer 1976.
       ``Freedom Versus National Security,'' with Daniel N. 
     Hoffman, Chelsea House Publishers, New York, 1977.
       ``Top Secret: National Security and the Right to Know,'' 
     with Daniel N. Hoffman, New Republic Books, Washington 1977.
       ``Oversight is Irrelevant if CIA Director Can Waive the 
     Rules,'' The Center [for National Security Studies] Magazine, 
     March/April 1979.
       ``The CIA's Distemper,'' The New Republic, February 9, 
     1980.
       ``Secrecy and National Security,'' Bulletin of the Atomic 
     Scientists, August 1985.
       ``The Case Against Covert Action,'' The Nation, March 2, 
     1987.


           selected quotations attributed to morton halperin

       The achievement in which I take the greatest pride is the 
     largely behind-the-scenes efforts of the ACLU to defend the 
     First Amendment by defeating the flag-burning constitutional 
     amendment in both houses of Congress.--Washington Post, 8 
     September 1992.
       The constitutional rights of Americans have also been major 
     casualties in the ``war on drugs * * * Gross invasions of 
     privacy such as urine testing, excessive property forfeitures 
     and seizures without due process of law, the circulation of 
     extensive government files on suspected drug offenders, and 
     border patrols and checkpoints that inhibit free travel, all 
     are among the draconian actions deemed necessary to wage the 
     war on drugs.--``Ending The Cold War at Home,'' Foreign 
     Policy, Winter 1990-91 (with Jeanne Wood).
       (Morton Halperin's criticism of scientists who refuse to 
     help lawyers representing The Progressive and its editors 
     oppose government efforts to halt the magazine's publication 
     of detailed information about the design and manufacturing of 
     nuclear weapons:)
       They failed to understand that the question of whether 
     publishing the ``secret of the H-bomb'' would help or hinder 
     non-proliferation efforts was beside the point. The real 
     question was whether the government had the right to decide 
     what information should be published. If the government could 
     stop publication of [this] article, it could, in theory, 
     prevent publication of any other material that it thought 
     would stimulate proliferation.--``Secrecy and National 
     Security,'' The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 
     1985, p. 116.
       It is clearly a violation of the rights of free speech and 
     association to bar American citizens from acting as agents 
     seeking to advance the political ideology of any 
     organization, even if that organization is based abroad. 
     Notwithstanding criminal acts in which the PLO may have been 
     involved, a ban on advocacy of all components of the PLO's 
     efforts will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.--The 
     Nation, October 10, 1987.
       Having had administrative responsibility for the production 
     of the [Pentagon] Papers, I knew they contained nothing which 
     would cause serious injury to national security. I watched 
     with amazement as the Justice Department, without knowing 
     what was in the study, sought to persuade court after court 
     that they should be suppressed.--``Where I'm At,'' First 
     Principles, September 1975, p. 16.
       International terrorism is rapidly supplanting the 
     communist threat as the primary justification for wholesale 
     deprivations of civil liberties and distortions of the 
     democratic process.--``Ending The Cold War At Home,'' Foreign 
     Policy, Winter 1990-91 (with Jeanne Wood).
       Standard Form 86 (questionnaire for applicants to sensitive 
     or critical government positions) asks intrusive and 
     irrelevant questions regarding Communist party membership, 
     prior arrests (whether or not they resulted in a conviction), 
     drug and alcohol abuse, and private medical information, 
     including mental health history.--``Ending The Cold War At 
     Home,'' Foreign Policy, Winter 1990-91 (with Jeanne Wood).
       (Morton Halperin on classification of materials:)
       The first category [of documents that should be 
     automatically released] includes information necessary to 
     congressional exercise of its constitutional powers to 
     declare war, to raise armies, to regulate the armed forces, 
     to ratify treaties, and to approve official appointments.--
     Top Secret: National Security and the Right to Know, 1977.
       (Morton Halperin on the Freedom of Information Act:)
       Release under the FOIA have provided valuable background 
     information on already exposed CIA covert action * * * The 
     FOIA has not been a primary tool in uncovering previously 
     undisclosed CIA covert action. Explicit exemptions under the 
     Act for Information that could harm ``national security'' 
     have prevented such revelations.--``The CIA and Covert 
     Action,'' published by the Campaign for Political Rights of 
     which Halperin was a Steering Committee member, June 1982.
       (Morton Halperin on the Freedom of Information Act:)
       More recently, through the Project on National Security and 
     Civil Liberties, I have been involved in an effort to use the 
     Freedom of Information Act to pry ``secrets'' from the 
     national security bureaucracy.--``Where I'm At,'' commentary 
     by Morton Halperin, First Principles, September 1975.
       * * * I suggest * * * that the United States be prohibited 
     from being the first to use nuclear weapons. In my judgement, 
     there are no circumstances that would justify the United 
     States using nuclear weapons, unless those weapons were used 
     first by an opposing power.--``American Military 
     Intervention: Is It Ever Justified?'' p. 670, June 9, 1979, 
     The Nation.
       * * * Every action which the Soviet Union and Cuba have 
     taken in Africa has been consistent with the principles of 
     international law. The Cubans have come in only when invited 
     by a government and have remained only at their request. * * 
     * The American public needs to understand that Soviet conduct 
     in Africa violates no Soviet-American agreements nor any 
     accepted principles of international behavior. It reflects 
     simply a different Soviet estimate of what should happen in 
     the African continent and a genuine conflict between the 
     United States and the Soviet Union.--``American Military 
     Intervention: Is It Ever Justified?'', The Nation, June 9, 
     1979, p. 668.
       One of the great disappointments of the Carter 
     Administration is that it has failed to give any systematic 
     reconsideration to the security commitments of the United 
     States. [For example, President Carter's] decision to 
     withdraw [U.S. ground forces from Korea] was accompanied by a 
     commitment to keep air and naval units in and around Korea--a 
     strong reaffirmation by the United States of its security 
     commitment to Korea. This action prevented a careful 
     consideration of whether the United States wished to remain 
     committed to the security of Korea * * *. Even if a 
     commitment is maintained, a request for American military 
     intervention should not be routinely honored.--The Nation, 
     June 9, 1979, p. 670.
       The United States should explicitly surrender the right to 
     intervene unilaterally in the internal affairs of other 
     countries by overt military means or by covert operations. 
     Such self restraint would bar interventions like those in 
     Grenada and Panama, unless the United States first gained the 
     explicit consent of the international community acting 
     through the Security Council or a regional organization. The 
     United States would, however, retain the right granted under 
     Article 51 of the U.N. Charter to act unilaterally if 
     necessary to meet threats to international peace and security 
     involving aggression across borders (such as those in Kuwait 
     and in Bosnia-Herzegovina.)--Guaranteeing Democracy, Summer 
     1993 Foreign Policy, p. 120.
       The only way to stop this pattern [of abuse] is to impose 
     an absolute requirement of public approval to bar 
     paramilitary operations that are covert.--``Lawful Wars,'' 
     Foreign Policy, Fall 1988.
       (Morton Halperin's position on legislation to set heavy 
     criminal penalties for Americans who deliberately identify 
     undercover U.S. intelligence agents:)
       [Such legislation] will chill public debate on important 
     intelligence issues and is unconstitutional * * *. What we 
     have is a bill which is merely symbolic in its protection of 
     agents but which does violence to the principles of the First 
     Amendment.--UPI, April 8, 1981.
       (1971, Defense strategies for the seventies:)
       The Soviet Union apparently never even contemplated the 
     overt use of military force against Western Europe. The 
     Soviet posture toward Western Europe has been, and continues 
     to be, a defensive and deterrent one.
       (Concerning the espionage trial of Truong and Humphries:)
       Morton Halperin, told the news conference that the American 
     Civil-Liberties Union will file a friend-of-the-Court brief 
     challenging the conviction of the two men.
       He (Halperin) said it will challenge the theory that theft 
     of any informaiton developed by the government is a crime, 
     that espionage can be alleged without proving intent to 
     injure the United States, and that the President has inherent 
     approval to authorize searches and electronic surveillance 
     without a court warrant.--1978, Associated Press.
       (Concerning the espionage trail of Truong an Humphries)
       In my judgement there is nothing in those documents 
     relating to national defense * * * There is nothing in those 
     documents which might reasonably be expected to have 
     threatened United States foreign policy or benefitted another 
     nation.
       Halperin said that, ``I have closely examined seven cables 
     cited in the indictment and concluded that they had been 
     improperly classified as confidential or secret, and in one 
     case Top Secret.''--1978, Associated Press.
       In the name of protecting liberty from communism, a massive 
     undemocratic national security structure was erected during 
     the Cold War, which continues to exist even though the Cold 
     War is over. Now, with the Gulf War having commenced, we are 
     seeing further unjustified limitations of constitutional 
     rights using the powers granted to the executive branch 
     during the Cold War.--United Press International, January 28, 
     1991.
       Using secret intelligence agencies to defend a 
     constitutional republic is akin to the ancient medical 
     practice of employing leeches to take blood from feverish 
     patients. The intent is therapeutic, but in the long run the 
     cure is more deadly than the disease. Secret intelligence 
     agencies are designed to act routinely in ways that violate 
     the laws or standards of society.--The Lawless State: The 
     Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies, 1976, p. 5.
       You can never preclude abuses by intelligence agencies and, 
     therefore, that is a risk that you run if you decide to have 
     intelligence agencies. I think there is a very real tension 
     between a clandestine intelligence agency and a free society. 
     I think we accepted it for the first time during the Cold War 
     period and I think in light of the end of the Cold War we 
     need to assess a variety of things at home, including secret 
     intelligence agencies, and make sure that we end the Cold War 
     at home as we end it abroad.--MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour, July 
     23, 1991.
       [T]he primary function of the [intelligence] agencies is to 
     undertake disreputable activities that presidents do not wish 
     to reveal to the public or expose to congressional debate.--
     The Lawless State, 1976, p. 221.
       * * * The intelligence [service's] * * * monastic training 
     prepared officials not for saintliness, but for crime, for 
     acts transgressing the limits of accepted law and morality * 
     * * The abuses of the intelligence agencies are one of the 
     symptoms of the amassing of power in the postwar presidency; 
     the only way to safeguard against future crimes is to alter 
     that balance of power.
       Clandestine government means that Americans give up 
     something for nothing--they give up their right to 
     participation in the political process and to informed 
     consent in exchange for grave assaults on basic rights and a 
     long record of serious policy failures abroad.--The Lawless 
     State: The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies, 1976 pp. 
     222-57.
       Spies and covert action are counterproductive as tools in 
     international relations. The costs are too high; the returns 
     too meager. Covert action and spies should be banned and the 
     CIA's Clandestine Services Branch disbanded.--The Lawless 
     State, 1976, p. 263.
       Secrecy * * * does not serve national security * * * Covert 
     operations are incompatible with constitutional government 
     and should be abolished.--``Just Say No: The Case Against 
     Covert Action,'' The Nation, March 21, 1987, p. 363.
        * * * Covert intervention, whether through the CIA or any 
     other agency, should be absolutely prohibited * * *.--
     ``American Military Intervention: Is It Ever Justified?'' The 
     Nation, 9 June 1979, p. 670.
       The budgets of most intelligence agencies remain secret. 
     Such secrecy is not part of any legitimate national security 
     purpose * * * The CIA should be limited to collating and 
     evaluating intelligence information, and its only activities 
     in the United States should be openly acknowledged actions in 
     support of this mission. The agency's clandestine service 
     should be abolished.--``Controlling the Intelligence 
     Agencies,'' First Principles, October 1975, p. 16.
       It may be true that other nations have, and will continue 
     to engage in covert action. But this is far from proper 
     justification for its use by the U.S. Indeed, few nations in 
     the world have used covert action as aggressively and 
     comprehensively as the U.S. And in no other country does the 
     use of covert action conflict so violently with the guiding 
     principles of a nation's constitution and the desires of its 
     people * * * Covert action violates international law.--``The 
     CIA and Covert Action,'' June 1982 report produced by the 
     Campaign for Political Rights.
       The ACLU believes, and I believe that the United States 
     should not conduct covert operations * * * The record now 
     before this committee and the nation demonstrate that covert 
     operations are fundamentally incompatible with a democratic 
     society.--Testimony provided by Halperin before the House 
     Select Committee on Intelligence regarding Prior Notice of 
     Covert Actions to the Congress, April 1 and 8, 1987 and June 
     10, 1987, pp. 90 and 96 of the hearing record.
       The FBI should be limited to the investigation of crime; it 
     should be prohibited from conducting `intelligence' 
     investigations on groups or individuals or individuals not 
     suspected of crimes.--``Controlling the Intelligence 
     Agencies,'' First Principles, October 1975.
       The only way to stop all of this is to dissolve the CIA 
     covert career service and to bar the CIA from at least 
     developing and allied nations.--Morton Halperin's review of 
     Philip Agee's book Inside the Company; CIA Diary wherein no 
     mention is made of the fact that the book contained some 
     thirty pages of names of U.S. covert operatives overseas. 
     Review found in First Principles, September 1975, p. 13.
       In the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, the question must be 
     faced: Should the U.S. government continue to engage in 
     clandestine operations? We at the Center for National 
     Security Studies believe that the answer is `No'; that the 
     CIA's covert action programs should be ended immediately. The 
     risks and costs of maintaining a clandestine underworld are 
     too great, and covert action cannot be justified on either 
     pragmatic or moral grounds.--``CIA Covert Action: Threat to 
     the Constitution,'' Pamphlet published by the Center for 
     National Security Studies, 1976. Morton Halperin is listed as 
     a ``participant'' and at the time was Chief Editorial Writer 
     for the CNSS' publication, First Principles.
       Defenders of the CIA argue that the Agency's covert actions 
     protect the `national security.' Yet historically, covert 
     action has had little, if anything, to do with the reasonable 
     defense of the country * * * Morton Halperin * * * has stated 
     that he knows of no program of covert action which was 
     necessary to the national security.--``CIA Covert Action: 
     Threat to the Constitution,'' Pamphlet published by the 
     Center for National Security Studies, 1976. Morton Halperin 
     is listed as a ``participant'' and at the time was Chief 
     Editorial Writer for the CNSS' publication, First Principles.
       A bureaucracy trained in the nefarious tactics of espionage 
     and of covert action is a constant threat in an open 
     society.--``CIA Covert Action: Threat to the Constitution,'' 
     Pamphlet published by the Center for National Security 
     Studies, 1976. Morton Halperin is listed as a ``participant'' 
     and at the time was Chief Editorial Writer for the CNSS' 
     publication, First Principles.
       A bureaucracy skilled in deceit is suspect in any 
     government, but it is particularly destructive to a 
     republic.--``CIA Covert Action: Threat to the Constitution,'' 
     Pamphlet published by the Center for National Security 
     Studies, 1976. Morton Halperin is listed as a ``participant'' 
     and at the time was Chief Editorial Writer for the CNSS' 
     publication, First Principles.
       Covert operations involved breaking the laws of other 
     nations, and those who conduct them come to believe that they 
     can also break U.S. law and get away with it * * * Covert 
     operations breed a disrespect for the truth.--``Just Say No: 
     The Case Against Covert Action'' The Nation, March 21, 1987.
       * * * even if covert action is not `misused,' it still 
     corrodes our constitutional order.--``CIA Covert Action: 
     Threat to the Constitution,'' Pamphlet published by the 
     Center for National Security Studies, 1976. Morton Halperin 
     is listed as a ``participant'' and at the time was Chief 
     Editorial Writer for the CNSS' publication, First Principles.
       (Morton Halperin on Philip Agee's exposure of CIA agents 
     using State Department documents)
       It is difficult to condemn people who do that.--Testimony 
     before the House Intelligence Committee by Morton Halperin, 
     January 4, 1978.
                                  ____


   Morton H. Halperin and National Security Issues--A Partial Record


                        halperin and philip agee

       No country can be secure without good intelligence. Good 
     intelligence cannot be obtained unless the confidentiality of 
     a nation's operatives is maintained.
       No single individual has done as much harm to the CIA--and 
     thus in certain respects to the security of the U.S. and all 
     its people--as has Philip Agee, the renegade CIA officer who 
     resigned from the Agency at its request in 1968 and has since 
     devoted himself to exposing its covert personnel and friends 
     wherever and whoever they are.
       Agee has not achieved his success in this area alone. He 
     could not have inflicted the damage he has on this Country 
     without the help of his colleagues at CounterSpy and the 
     Covert Action Information Bulletin (CAIB), his two major 
     exposure instruments, and others who in various ways have 
     aided, abetted, publicized, defended and supported them and 
     him.
       Agee's first book, ``Inside The Company: CIA Diary'' 
     published in 1975, included an appendix that listed the names 
     of over 425 individuals and organizations (unions, 
     publications, corporations, banks, institutes, etc.) he 
     claimed were secretly employees, agents, or fronts for the 
     CIA. The book eventually was translated into ``at least 16 
     foreign languages,'' according to press accounts.
       His next book, ``Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe,'' 
     released in 1978, contained a list of over 700 alleged CIA 
     officers, agents, assets, informants, contacts and sources.
       Following this in 1980, came ``Dirty Work II: The CIA in 
     Africa,'' with its 238 page list of those supposedly 
     performing the same functions in that part of the world and, 
     in 1982, ``White Paper? Whitewash!,'' Agee's attack on the 
     State Department's ``White Paper'' on El Salvador.
       These books were supplemented by ongoing lists of 
     ``agents'' published in CounterSpy and Covert Action 
     Information Bulletin and by Agee's and his supporters' press 
     conferences, speeches and articles. By the end of 1981, 
     Agee's CAIBers were boasting that they had exposed over 2000 
     U.S. covert intelligence personnel.
       The vital intelligence loss to this country was 
     incalculable. Their usefulness destroyed, CIA personnel had 
     to be taken out of clandestine activities in the locales in 
     which they were serving, or transferred (usually with their 
     families) to new locations where they faced likely foreign 
     language problems, lack of contacts, new cultures to adjust 
     to and other problems limiting their effectiveness. The same 
     applied, of course, to those dispatched to replace them when 
     personnel with appropriate skills were available. The dollar 
     cost of these shifts ran to millions.
       The CIA station chief in Athens, Richard Welch, was 
     murdered by terrorists after two or three listings in 
     CounterSpy and then being identified in a local paper (which 
     checked with the magazine to confirm his identity). After 
     Agee visited Managua in 1981 and a pro-Sandinista newspaper 
     published a list of alleged CIA personnel in the U.S. Embassy 
     there, some received death threats. A number, fearful for the 
     lives of their wives and children, sent them out of the 
     country.
       These continuing exposures had extensive adverse effect on 
     CIA morale. Officers everywhere--and all their contacts, 
     too--lived in constant fear of being named next. The effect 
     on foreign sources, assets and agents, some of them 
     cooperative friends of the U.S. for decades, was particularly 
     devastating. They did not have the luxury of being able to 
     relocate themselves and their families to safer places. With 
     their parents, wives and children they had to stay in place, 
     in danger, no matter how sensitive and perilous their 
     positions. Sources began to dry up everywhere.
       CIA General Counsel Daniel Silver told the 1980 American 
     Bar Association convention in Chicago the exposures were ``a 
     devastating problem'' for the Agency. Deputy CIA Director 
     Frank Carlucci told the '80 convention of the Association of 
     Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) ``There is no subject on 
     which people in the Agency feel more strongly, nor on which I 
     feel more strongly. We must do something to solve this 
     problem.'' He had asked Congress, he said, ``What more do you 
     need to act, another dead body?''
       Following is at least part of the public record of Morton 
     Halperin's actions relative to CounterSpy, the Covert Action 
     Information Bulletin and Philip Agee:
       CounterSpy's publisher, the Organizing Committee for a 
     Fifth Estate (OC 5), according to its 1975 annual report, 
     ``had been instrumental in organizing several other 
     organizations'' that year, one of which was ``The Public 
     Education Project on the Intelligence Community (PEPIC) * * * 
     a year long effort.
       Morton Halperin, the report continued, was a member of 
     PEPIC's speakers bureau, all of whose members ``will be 
     donating their time, energy and fees to PEPIC to ensure its 
     survival.''
       The Senate Internal Security subcommittee, in its 1977 
     annual report, identified PEPIC as one of the ``several 
     fronts'' set up by Agee's OC-5 to accomplish its objective of 
     finding ``those individuals with research or organizing 
     abilities to join the Counter-Spy Team.''
       Halperin was Director of the Project on National Security 
     and Civil Liberties, jointly funded by the ACLU Foundation 
     and the Center for National Security Studies (CNSS) of the 
     Fund for Peace, which Halperin also directed. The Project 
     began publishing ``First Principles'', usually on a monthly 
     basis, in September, 1975 with Halperin its chief editorial 
     (``Point of View'') writer.
       CounterSpy describes itself as ``The Quarterly Journal of 
     the Organizing Committee for a Fifth Estate''. In addition to 
     publishing OC-5's 1975 annual report in its Winter '76 issue, 
     it included what it termed its ``Resource List'' of groups 
     working in ``the areas of national security and civil 
     liberties'', with the literature available from each. It 
     listed: Project on National Security and Civil Liberties 
     [Address and telephone number]; First Principles (newsletter 
     published monthly except July and August); Led Astray by the 
     CIA by Morton Halperin; The Abuses of the Intelligence 
     Agencies, ed. by Jerry Berman and Morton H. Halperin; and
       Center for National Security Studies [address and telephone 
     number same as above Project] [six items listed]; The Abuses 
     of the Intelligence Agencies by Jerry Berman and Morton 
     Halperin.
       CounterSpy's editors seemed to like the Berman-Halperin 
     ``Abuses work. Of the many items listed as available from its 
     resource list of 10 organizations, it was the only one 
     mentioned twice. Interestingly, however, they did not note 
     that Halperin was director of both the ``Project'' and the 
     ``Center'' on their resource list.
       One other item in the Winter '76 CounterSpy is worth 
     noting. The contents page, beneath the names of its editorial 
     board members and coordinators, printed this boxed item: 
     CounterSpy sends special thanks to: Morton Halperin [21 
     others were also named, with nine other names, like 
     Halperin's being in bold type].
       Agee's CounterSpy did not say what its ``special thanks'' 
     to Halperin were for. Perhaps he made many well-paid speeches 
     and gave all his fees, as pledged, to PEPIC, OC-5's front; 
     perhaps it was for his favorable review of Agee's ``Inside 
     The Company'' in ``First Principles'' (see following 
     paragraphs); it could have been for any number of things he 
     might have done for CounterSpy.
       Halperin favorably reviewed Agee's ``Inside The Company: 
     CIA Diary'' in the very first issue of ``First Principles.'' 
     Moreover, he managed to do so without even metioning the fact 
     that in his introduction Agee thanked the Cuban Communist 
     Party and Cuban government agencies for the ``important 
     encouragement'' and ``special assistance'' they had given him 
     in writing the book. Halperin also failed to mention the fact 
     that the book contained the names and identities of over 425 
     people in all parts of the world Agee claimed were officers, 
     agents and cooperators with the CIA.
       Giving full credence to Agee's allegations of horrendous 
     CIA wrongdoing, Halperin wrote: ``The only way to stop all of 
     this is to dissolve the CIA covert career service * * *.
       Halperin next wrote an article, ``CIA News Management,'' 
     published in the Washington Post (1/23/77) in which he 
     absolved Agee and CounterSpy of all blame for the 
     assassination of Richard Welch, the CIA Athens station chief, 
     placing responsibility for the killing on Welch himself and 
     the CIA.
       The following month, Halperin traveled to England to help 
     Agee who was fighting deportation from that country for 
     ``regular contacts *  *  * with foreign intelligence 
     agents,'' disseminating information ``harmful to the security 
     of the United Kingdom,'' and aiding and counseling others in 
     ``obtaining information'' which, if published, ``could be 
     harmful'' to the United Kingdom's security.
       Agee was deported from England despite Halperin's efforts 
     in his behalf.
       Halperin testified before the House Intelligence Committee 
     on January 4, 1978, rehashing his Washington Post accusations 
     against Welch himself and the CIA for Welch's death and again 
     cleansing Agee and CounterSpy of all blame.
       Referring to the exposure of covert CIA personnel by Agee 
     and others on the basis of information gleaned from State 
     Department documents, Halperin asserted: ``it is difficult to 
     condemn people who do that.''
       (Others have different views. In a 1980 Senate hearing on 
     an agent identities protection bill, former Senator Jake Garn 
     said Agee's actions ``border on treason'' and Senator John 
     Chafee stated it was his opinion that ``this willful 
     disclosure of the names of persons who are unlawfully engaged 
     in intelligence work for this Nation falls in the same 
     category *  *  * as an act of treason.'')
       The January 1978 issue of Halperin's ``First Principles'' 
     featured a page-one article by him, ``The CIA and 
     Manipulation of the American Press,'' in which he once more 
     played his tired refrain about Agee and CounterSpy being 
     blameless--and Welch and the CIA being the opposite--for the 
     station chief's death (he threw in some other items as well 
     to bolster his ongoing, basic theme of undemocratic CIA 
     operations).
       With Halperin's permission, his ``CIA News Management'' 
     column was republished in Agee's 1978 book, ``Dirty Work: The 
     CIA in Western Europe.'' Publisher Lyle Stuart proclaimed in 
     a newspaper ad for the book that it contained ``a list of 
     more than 700 CIA agents currently working in Western Europe. 
     It completely blows their cover.'' He then added: ``But 
     `Dirty Work' is more than that. A comprehensive picture of 
     the CIA emerges in `Dirty Work.' [two other contributors] * * 
     * and Morton Halperin have all shown considerable courage in 
     informing America about the seamy side of American espionage 
     * * *''
       There is no indication that Halperin was displeased by this 
     pat on the back from Agee's publisher.
       Halperin was chairperson of the Campaign to Stop Government 
     Spying (CSGS) which emerged from a Conference on Government 
     Spying he had addressed in Chicago in January 1977. Arranged 
     by the cited Communist front, the National Lawyers Guild 
     (NLG), the conference's co-conveners included the ACLU, with 
     Halperin director of its Washington office; the Center for 
     National Security Studies (CNSS), which Halperin directed; 
     the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, another 
     cited front for the Communist Party; the National Conference 
     of Black Lawyers, affiliated with the Soviet Union's then 
     international attorneys' front, the International Association 
     of Democratic Lawyers, and the Political Rights Defense Fund, 
     a front of the Trotskyist Communist organization, the 
     Socialist Workers Party (SWP). The conference's steering 
     committee included the SWP, ACLU, CNSS, NLG, Institute for 
     Policy Studies, and Agee's OC-5.
       Halperin's CSGS was an ``anti-U.S. intelligence'' 
     conglomerate composed of about 80 organizations. Listed on 
     its letterhead as a member of its steering committee was 
     Agee's CounterSpy.
       Halperin's CSGS changed its name the following year to the 
     more politically acceptable Campaign for Political Rights 
     (CPR), with Halperin still its chairperson. Its new 
     letterhead listed not only CounterSpy as a member of the CPR 
     steering committee, but also its successor, Agee's Covert 
     Action Information Bulletin (CAIB). Both publications were 
     heavily into the ``naming CIA names'' game.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\The original CounterSpy with which Agee was affiliated 
     began publication with its March 1973 issue; it ceased 
     publishing after its November 1976 issue--until publication 
     was resumed under new management in December 1978.
     Agee was not affiliated with the new CounterSpy, he and two 
     others formerly associated with it having announced 
     publication of its successor, the Covert Action Information 
     Bulletin (CAIB), while attending the Soviet-controlled 
     eleventh World Festival of Youth and Students in Havana on 
     July 28, 1978, the opening day of the festival. Free copies 
     of the first issue of CAIB, dated July 1978, were distributed 
     to those at the festival. Agee and his associates said the 
     CAIB was intended to be: ``a permanent weapon in the fight 
     against the CIA, the FBI, military intelligence and all the 
     other instruments of U.S. imperialist oppression.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       As chairperson of both the CSGS and CPR, Halperin must have 
     had some say about just which groups would be invited to 
     join, and which would be selected for leadership positions 
     in, his organization.
       There is no record that he ever opposed, or indicated 
     unhappiness about either U.S.-security-destroying publication 
     being in the organization's leadership.
       In late 1978, Halperin's CPR published a ``Materials List'' 
     to assist its members in their agit-prop work against 
     American intelligence agencies. Agee's ``Inside the Company'' 
     was included in it under the category ``Memoirs by Former 
     Employees'' and his Covert Action Information Bulletin under 
     ``Sources of Information.''
       ``Organizing Notes'' (``O.N.''), according to its masthead, 
     was ``published by the Campaign for Political Rights.'' 
     Released eight times a year, it was designed--like ``First 
     Principles,'' which it closely resembled--to keep its readers 
     abreast of current developments related to the CPR's basic 
     mission. Like ``First Principles,'' it had an ``Update'' 
     feature which it said was ``a combined effort of `First 
     Principles' and `Organizing Notes'.'' (``First Principles'' 
     had regularly featured an ``Update'' section).
       Halperin's name did not appear on the masthead of 
     ``Organizing Notes,'' but, as chairperson of the CPR he had 
     to be responsible for its contents, just as he was for the 
     contents of the CPR's ``Materials List.''
       ``Organizing Notes'' routinely promoted both Agee's CAIB 
     and CounterSpy as containing worthwhile information of value 
     to its readers.
       CAIB received promotional boosts in the following issues of 
     ``ON'': 1-2/79 p. 3; 4-5/79 pp. 8 & 19; 7-8/80 pp. 12 & 14; 
     7-8/81 p. 14.
       CounterSpy received the same treatment in these issues: 1-
     2/79 pp. 5 & 13; 4-5/79 p. 6: 8-9/80.
       This tabulation is based on a check of scattered issues of 
     ``ON.'' A thorough check of all issues would undoubtedly 
     reveal a considerably greater number of positive mentions. It 
     is interesting, too, to note what Halperin's ``ON'' 
     considered interesting in various issues:
       CounterSpy 12/78: ``lists numerous CIA agents now 
     overseas.''
       CAIB 1/79: ``reprints a top secret U.S. army memo on 
     infiltrating and subverting allies--although the Army 
     continues to deny it was an official document.''
       [Fact: the Army did more than deny it was ``an official 
     document.'' The alleged ``army memo'' [``F. M. 30-31B''] was 
     exposed as a KGB forgery. See House Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence, hearing, ``Soviet Covert Action 
     (The Forgery Offensive),'' February 1980, pp. 12, 13 and 
     Appendix: ``CIA Study: Soviet Covert Action and Propaganda,'' 
     pp. 66 and 67; 176-185.]
       It should be noted that, at the same time, Halperin's 
     ``First Principles'' promoted Halperin's ``Organizing 
     Notes.'' The following appeared in the former's May `77 
     issue: Campaign To Stop Government Spying. The Campaign is 
     now publishing a monthly newsletter, Organizing Notes. It is 
     available free to people organizing around the issue of 
     government spying. Contact them at [address and telephone 
     number] if you would like to be included on their mailing 
     list.
       Importantly, Halperin's ``First Principles'', like ``ON'', 
     also routinely gave favorable notice to the contents of 
     current issues of both CounterSpy and the Covert Action 
     Information Bulletin. In the period July-August '80 to 
     September-October '83, for example, at least eight issues of 
     CounterSpy were promoted in the pages of Halperin's ``First 
     Principles'', along with a fair number of the CAIB. The 
     following is one item that appeared in ``First Principles'' 
     regular ``In the Literature'' section, subsection ``News-
     letters, Journals, Etc'': ``Covert Action Information 
     Bulletin, Oct. 1981. In anticipation of Congressional passage 
     of the agents identities bill, CAIB publishes its last naming 
     names column, and indexes all previous identifications 
     (sic).''
       And Halperin says he does not approve of ``naming names''!
       If ``ON'' gave frequent favorable notice to Agee's CAIB, it 
     is also true that the CAIB returned the favor by drawing 
     favorable attention to Halperin's CPR. Examples:
       Agee's CAIB editorialized on pending CIA legislative 
     charter proposals in its June 1980 issue. In a subsection of 
     the editorial, ``The Work of the Left,'' it noted: 
     ``Throughout this Congressional debate, considerable and 
     effective pressure was brought to bear by the organized 
     opposition to government spying. The Campaign for Political 
     Rights (to which CAIB belongs), the Center for National 
     Security Studies, the American Civil Liberties Union [in all 
     of which Halperin played a leading role] all gathered support 
     against the charter . . . The struggle, to the surprise of 
     many, began to have results. By April, the charter was 
     `dead.'''
       Agee's CAIB, like all Communist-left publications and 
     organizations, was disturbed by the fact that Executive Order 
     12036 governing the intelligence community and signed by 
     President Carter on January 4, 1978, might be amended by the 
     Reagan Administration in such a way as to restore some of the 
     capabilities the Carter decree had denied the community.
       Commenting on the March 10, 1981 leak of the contents of a 
     new draft Reagan order, CAIB made the following statement in 
     its April 1981 issue: ``The proposal contains many . . . 
     authorizations for intrusive spying and manipulation by the 
     FBI and other intelligence agencies, even if all the 
     references to the CIA are removed. This proposal . . . also 
     4/81 pp. 3 & 51 must be opposed. Persons wishing further 
     information should write to: The Campaign for Political 
     Rights, [address].''
       The thinking of Agee's CAIB and Halperin's CPR on the 
     contents of executive orders governing the intelligence 
     community was obviously very similar.
       Under ``Other Publications of Interest'' in the July-August 
     issue of Agee's CAIB (p. 51), the following item appeared: 
     ``Bugs, Taps and Infiltrators: What to do About Political 
     Spying,'' 6-page leaflet free (contribution welcome); from 
     the Campaign for Political Rights: [address given]. A brief 
     outline of how to look for and what to do about 
     infiltrators.''
       [The ``Naming Names'' section of this CAIB issue identified 
     alleged CIA ``infiltrators'' in Canada, Central African 
     Republic, Ghana, Greece, Liberia, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
     Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan and Switzerland.]
       Halperin's ``Organizing Notes'' for 11/12/80 (p.10) 
     reported that on October 3, Judge Gerhard Gesell had ruled 
     that per the secrecy agreement signed by all CIA personnel 
     Agee could not publish any writing about the CIA in the 
     future without first submitting it to the Agency for review. 
     He threatened to cite Agee for contempt if he violated the 
     order.
       At the same time, however, Gesell refused to grant the 
     government's request that he confiscate the profits Agee had 
     made from the two books he had already written in violation 
     of his agreement.
       Why did he so rule? Halperin's ``Organizing Notes'' 
     reported: ``The Judge based his refusal on evidence presented 
     by the American Civil Liberties Union's Project on National 
     Security [chaired by Halperin] which supported Agee's claim 
     that the government selectively prosecuted only its critics 
     for violating CIA secrecy agreements.''
       The July-August '81 issue of Halperin's ``ON'' featured a 
     page one attack on the Supreme Court for upholding the right 
     of the Secretary of State to withdraw Agee's passport.
       Halperin's CPR staged a forum in Washington on May 27, 
     1982, entitled: ``Covert Operations Against Nicaragua.'' A 
     publisher's order form for Agee's ``dirty Work'' and ``White 
     Paper? Whitewash!'' was included in each press kit 
     distributed at the forum.
       Finally, Halperin campaigned hard against all bills 
     introduced to criminalize exposures of the identities of 
     intelligence personnel, though the Supreme Court had held (in 
     its Agee passport decision) that such activities ``are 
     clearly not protected by the Constitution.''
       Halperin not only testified against the bills but induced 
     others to protest their enactment. ``ON'' for 7-8/81, for 
     example, noted that his CPR had ``coordinated'' a letter 
     signed by 110 law professors addressed to members of the 
     House Intelligence Committee and Senate Judiciary Committee 
     urging the amendment of H.R. 4, the intelligence agent 
     identities protection bill that eventually became law, in a 
     manner desired by Halperin (i.e., to make it ineffective) 
     and, the previous September, had coordinated a similar letter 
     signed by 50 professors.
       What one newspaper described as ``a festive outdoor 
     ceremony'' was held at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, 
     on June 23, 1982 where President Reagan signed into law the 
     Intelligence Agent Identities Protection Act (H.R. 4), which 
     provides for fines and prison terms for those who 
     deliberately disclose the identities of U.S. intelligence 
     personnel. The President praised CIA employees on the 
     occasion as ``heroes of a grim twilight struggle.'' The last 
     two paragraphs of the news account read as follows:
       ``The American Civil Liberties Union has criticized the law 
     as a ``clearly unconstitutional infringement on the right of 
     free speech.''
       ``Morton H. Halperin, Director of the ACLU's Center for 
     National Security Studies, said the organization would 
     provide legal assistance to ``those whose ability to speak or 
     write is threatened by this legislation or effort to enforce 
     it by the Justice Department.'' (Washington Post, June 24, 
     1982)
       In June 1981, upholding the right of the Secretary of State 
     to lift Agee's passport, the Supreme Court reviewed some of 
     the well-publicized facts about him that should be kept in 
     mind as Halperin's generosity toward Agee and his apparat is 
     considered:
       At a 1974 London press conference, Agee announced his 
     ``campaign to fight the United States CIA wherever it is 
     operating'' and his intention ``to expose CIA officers and 
     agents and *  *  * drive them out of the countries where they 
     are operating'' while, in the U.S., he worked ``to have the 
     CIA abolished'' (Agee's words).
       A Federal District Court had found on Agee's part ``a clear 
     intention to reveal classified information and to bring harm 
     to the agency and its personnel.''
       Agee's exposures ``have been followed by *  *  * violence 
     against the persons and organizations identified.'' In 1974, 
     prior to the Welch murder, Agee's chief collaborator exposed 
     CIA personnel in Jamaica at a press conference there. Within 
     a few days, the home of the CIA station chief was raked with 
     automatic gunfire and gunfire also erupted when police 
     challenged men approaching the home of another identified CIA 
     officer.
       Reviewing these and other facts, the Supreme Court found 
     that Agee's activities not only presented ``a serious danger 
     to American officials abroad and serious danger to the 
     national security,'' but also ``endangered the interests of 
     countries other than the United States--thereby creating 
     serious problems for American foreign relations and foreign 
     policy.''
       As noted earlier, Agee did not do his damage to the U.S. 
     alone. No single person could do that. He needed his co-
     workers and colleagues at CounterSpy and Covert Action 
     Information Bulletin to help him. He needed more than that--
     the assistance of every other person who aided him in any 
     way. The Supreme Court's findings thus apply not only to 
     Agee, but also every worker for those two publications and, 
     it would seem to many, to others who did not support him 
     quite so directly, but who nevertheless helped him in very 
     real and important ways--people like Morton Halperin.
       Speaking through others, Halperin has flatly denied that he 
     has ever aided or abetter Philip Agee in any way.
       But what are the facts?
       Agee wanted support for the various fronts setup by the 
     Organizing Committee for a Fifth Estate, CounterSpy's 
     publisher, to promote both OC-5 and the magazine. Halperin 
     gave him that by serving on the speakers bureau of PEPIC. 
     More than that--presuming he lived up to his affidavit of the 
     time--Halperin gave every penny he earned from his speeches 
     to PEPIC.
       Agee wanted favorable reviews of his first book. Halperin 
     gave him one in the very first issue of ``First Principles.''
       Agee wanted favorable notice given to both of his principal 
     agent exposure instruments--CounterSpy and the Covert Action 
     Information Bulletin. Halperin gave him that repeatedly in 
     both ``First Principles'' and his ``Organizing Notes.''
       Agee wanted someone to represent him in his court fight to 
     retain the ill-gotten profits from his first two books. 
     Halperin gave him that through his Project on National 
     Security and Civil Liberties.
       Agee wanted someone to absolve him of blame for the 
     terrorist assassination of CIA station chief Richard Welch. 
     Halperin gave him that over and over again--in speeches, 
     testimony and writing.
       Agee wanted someone to dispute the statements of many 
     present and former CIA officials that he and CounterSpy 
     rather than the CIA and Welch himself were responsible for 
     Welch's death. Halperin gave him that repeatedly.
       Agee wanted some testimony that would help him fight 
     deportation from Great Britain and Halperin gave him that as 
     well.


               Halperin and the Vietnamese Communist Spy

       David Truong (Truong Dinh Hung) and Ronald L. Humphrey were 
     arrested in January 1978 on charges of espionage, theft of 
     U.S. government documents and conspiracy to injure the 
     defense of the Unite States.
       Humphrey, United States Information Agency communications 
     watch officer (a position giving him daily access to 
     sensitive cable traffic), had been taking classified 
     government documents, the indictment said, and turning them 
     over to Truong who, through couriers, had been delivering 
     them to North Vietnamese officials in Paris. Hanoi's 
     Ambassador to the UN and several other North Vietnamese 
     officials were named as unindicted co-conspirators, asked to 
     leave this country--and eventually did so.
       Truong, son of a wealthy lawyer and ``peace'' politician in 
     Saigon (later retired in comfort in Hanoi), came to the U.S. 
     in 1965 to study at Stanford. After getting his degree, he 
     moved East, first to Cambridge and then to Washington where 
     he became active in the ``anti-war'' movement, established a 
     U.S.-Vietnamese ``reconciliation'' front, lobbied ``peace'' 
     Members of Congress and their staffs (as Halperin did) and 
     gained considerable influence on the Hill.
       Truong and Humphrey were tried in May 1978, convicted, 
     sentenced to 15 years in prison, and began serving their 
     terms in January 1982 after an appellate court and the 
     Supreme Court rejected appeals from the trial jury's guilty 
     verdict.
       Their unsuccessful defense claim was that the documents 
     Humphrey gave Truong were not really sensitive, contained no 
     more than diplomatic chit-chat and could not harm the United 
     States.
       Halperin supported their claims, testifying in their 
     defense at the trial on May 10. He doubted that some of the 
     cables had been properly classified; others, he claimed, were 
     in no way related to the national defense, and he said ``no 
     information'' in any of the cables the pair had given the 
     Communists ``could injure the United States or be 
     advantageous to the Vietnamese.''
       He took this position despite the fact that on March 2, 
     1978, a week earlier, the court had taken a completely 
     contrary position, issuing a strict protective order ``to 
     prevent the disclosure or dissemination of the documents 
     listed in Appendices A and B, attached thereto * * * or any 
     portion thereof * * * or of the information contained 
     therein.
       In addition, a string of U.S. diplomatic and intelligence 
     officials contradicted Halperin's testimony.
       Halperin was eager to aid Truong and he did not wait until 
     May 10, the day he testified, to begin his assistance. In his 
     ``Pint of View'' for the April 1978 ``First Principles'', he 
     attacked the Carter Administration Justice Department for 
     bringing the indictment (though the trial had not yet begun 
     and he could not have known the essential elements of the 
     case) and with tortured legal argument assailed the presiding 
     judge for his pretrial rulings in favor of the government. 
     Keep in mind, Mr. Halperin is not a lawyer.
       Next, in another ``Point of View'' in the June 1978 ``First 
     Principles'', Halperin assailed both the jury for its guilty 
     verdict and the Carter Administration, saying the case 
     ``raised some very serious questions'' about whether it 
     ``understands what it is doing.''
       Finally, in the September `78 ``First Principles'' he 
     featured a ``Guest Pint of View'' which also assailed their 
     conviction. It was written by Daniel Hoffman, Halperin's co-
     author of ``Top Secret: National Security and the Right to 
     Know,'' who compared the Humphrey-Truong trial to that of the 
     dissident Scharansky in the Soviet Union.
       Later, in its June 1981 issue, Halperin's ``First 
     Principles'' initiated a Letters to the Editor column. The 
     one and only person who had a letter published in the first 
     column was David Truong who, of course, attacked the US 
     justice system, writing of ``the government's evident 
     misbehavior'' and the ``glaring denial of due process'' in 
     his trial.
       ``Organizing Notes'' of Halperin's CPR was as assiduous in 
     trying to help Truong as was Halperin himself in ``First 
     Principles.'' The issue of January-February 1979, for 
     example, reported that Truong's attorneys had filed an appeal 
     brief listing 14 reasons why the guilty verdict should be set 
     aside and that it would be argued before the appellate court 
     sometime in the spring; ``Contact Vietnam Trial Support 
     Committee,'' it said and gave the address and telephone 
     number of the group that had been set up in Washington to 
     raise funds for, and otherwise assist, Truong fight his case.
       The July-August '80 issue of ``Organizing Notes'' reported 
     that on July 17 a panel of the Court of Appeals for the 
     Fourth Circuit had declined to review the lower court verdict 
     and that Truong's lawyers would move for a rehearing before 
     the full court: ``For further information: Vietnam Trial 
     Support Committee,'' again followed by the group's Washington 
     address.
       The July-August '81 issue of ``Organizing Notes,'' the 
     periodical published by Halperin's CPR, reported that to 
     raise funds for Truong's defense, limited edition silkscreen 
     posters, each one signed and numbered by the artist, were 
     available for $15 each in quantities up to 100, and $10 each 
     for 101 to 405 copies (plus $1.50 each for postage and 
     handling): ``Vietnam Trial Support Committee, followed by the 
     committee's address and telephone number.
       ``Truong Case Raises Important Physical Search Issues'' a 
     January-February '82 issue article headline in ``Organizing 
     Notes'' announced. The article ended with an ironic 
     paragraph: ``As we go to press * * * The Supreme Court on 
     January 11 denied David Truong's petition for a writ of 
     certiorari, thereby precluding the possibility of further 
     review of the case. As such, Truong's 1978 conviction will 
     stand.''
       Not only the Court of Appeals, but in effect the Supreme 
     Court, had rejected Halperin's specious arguments in defense 
     of Truong.
       A final note: Truong was free on $250,000 bail pending the 
     outcome of his appeal from conviction when, in February 1979, 
     Halperin's CPR held a party in Washington to celebrate the 
     release the ``The Intelligence Network,'' a propaganda film 
     directed against the CIA, FBI and other US intelligence 
     agencies. David Truong showed up at the celebration. Halperin 
     smiling, posed with him for a press photo.


                 Halperin and The Pentagon Papers Case

       The so-called ``Pentagon Papers'' were a 47-volume, 2\1/2\ 
     million word collection of government documents relating to 
     the Vietnam War assembled per a June 1967 directive of 
     Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara by a team of about three 
     dozen Defense Department employees, including Halperin, then 
     a deputy assistant secretary. Completed in 1969, its contents 
     were classified TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE by Leslie H. Gelb, who 
     directed the project, Halperin and two McNamara military 
     assistants.
       Two former Defense and Rand Corporation employees, Daniel 
     Ellsberg and Anthony Russo leaked copies of 43 volumes of the 
     compilation some time later with the result that in mid-June 
     1971, while the U.S. was still fighting in Vietnam, the New 
     York Times, Washington Post, and Boston Globe began 
     publishing excerpts from them.
       Former President Lyndon Johnson termed the leak ``close to 
     treason.'' General Hyman and Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff early in the war and later Supreme Commander 
     of NATO, denounced it as ``a traitorous act.''
       The Nixon Administration had twice denied requests from 
     Senator Fulbright (D-Ark) for copies of the Papers on the 
     basis of Defense Department reviews which concluded that 
     ``the material, in our judgment, was of such a high degree of 
     sensitivity that it should not be transmitted outside the 
     executive branch.'' The DOD review of Fulbright's second 
     request was continuing just a week before the Times began 
     publication on June 13.
       The government immediately asked for a court injunction, 
     saying further publication would pose ``a grave and immediate 
     danger to the security of the United States.'' A temporary 
     stay was granted on June 27, but the Supreme Court reversed 
     it three days later, ruling 6-3 that, in light of First 
     Amendment rights, the government had not met the ``heavy 
     burden'' of justifying prior restraint.
       Ellsberg and Russo, the admitted purloiners of the Pentagon 
     Papers, were indicated on 15 counts involving violations of 
     the Espionage Act, stealing government property, and 
     interfering with the control of classified information.
       Halperin traveled to Los Angeles where the trial was held 
     and remained for five months, reportedly as leader of a team 
     of about 35 left-wing activist and lawyers assembled to work 
     for their acquittal (Ellsberg's chief defense counsel was the 
     late Leonard Boudin, a leading member of the National Lawyers 
     Guild and, according to a Federal court exhibit, a former 
     member of the Communist Party's National Committee; also, of 
     course, the father of Kathy Boudin, convicted in the 1981 
     terrorist Weatherman Nyack, N.Y. Brinks robbery-murders.
       Halperin also testified as a defense witness for the pair, 
     making the fantastic claims that, in his view, the Pentagon 
     Papers were not government documents but the personal 
     property of himself, Gelb and former Assistant Secretary Paul 
     Warnke; that they had been improperly classified, and 
     contained no information that would benefit an enemy of the 
     U.S.
       He was flatly contradicted on every point by other 
     witnesses. Gelb, for example, testified, ``I did not regard 
     the documents as my personal property.'' FBI agent Earl C. 
     Revels testified that when he first interviewed Halperin 
     about the leak, Halperin had told him that he, Warnke and 
     Gelb had delivered a 38-volume set of the papers to the 
     Washington office of Rand as agents of the U.S. government; 
     also that he had twice refused to grant Ellsberg access to 
     the study, but had finally done so though he feared Ellsberg 
     might be ``indiscreet'' in handling it. In addition, several 
     high-ranking military officers pointed out how hostile powers 
     could benefit from information in the Papers.
       The chief prosecutor, David Nissen, charged during 
     Halperin's March 23, 1973 testimony that Halperin had himself 
     violated security regulations by taking classified documents 
     when he left government service--a charge later affirmed in 
     the brief submitted to a Washington court by the Carter 
     Administration in 1978.
       The question of Ellsberg-Russo's guilt or innocence was not 
     settled by the court. A number of factors developed which 
     convinced the trail judge that separating legitimate from 
     illegitimate evidence was ``well-nigh impossible.'' He 
     therefore dismissed the case.
       One of the complications was that Ellsberg, a guest in 
     Halperin's home for a time during the period a warrantless 
     national security wiretap was in place on Halperin's phone 
     (May 1969-February 1971), had been overhead on the tap 15 
     times and the government took the position that, for national 
     security reasons, the contents of the taps could not be 
     disclosed.
       The previously-mentioned Supreme Court decision denying the 
     government request for a ban on further publication of the 
     Pentagon Papers provided telling commentary on Halperin's 
     testimony in the Ellsberg-Russo trail. Appended are excerpts 
     from that decision which clearly indicate that a majority of 
     the justices were convinced that--contrary to his testimony--
     the Papers contained sensitive information the release of 
     which would warrant prosecution under security statutes.

         New York Times Co. v. United States 403 U.S. 713(1971)


                       Excerpts From the Decision

       Justice Stewart (one of the majority), with Justice White 
     (also of the majority) concurring, noted that the Court has 
     been asked to prevent publication of material the Executive 
     Branch ``insists should not, in the national interest, be 
     published.'' He wrote: ``I am confident that the Executive is 
     correct with respect to some of the documents involved. But I 
     cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely result 
     in direct, immediate and irreparable damage to our Nation or 
     its people,'' so he had to join the majority in denying an 
     injunction.
       Justice White, with Stewart concurring, said that after 
     examining the materials the government said were ``the most 
     sensitive and destructive'' he could not deny that revelation 
     of them ``will do substantial damage to public interest. 
     Indeed, I am confident that their disclosure will have that 
     result * * * because the material poses substantial dangers 
     to national interests and because of the hazards of criminal 
     sanctions, a responsible press may choose never to publish 
     the more sensitive materials * * * a substantial part of the 
     threatened damage has already occurred. The fact of a massive 
     breakdown in security is known, access to the documents by 
     many unauthorized people is undeniable.''
       Termination of the ban on publication by this Court, White 
     continued in a blunt warning, ``does not mean that the law 
     either requires or invites newspapers or others to publish 
     them or that they will be immune from criminal action if they 
     do * * * failure by the Government to justify prior 
     restraints does not measure its constitutional entitlement to 
     a conviction for criminal publication.''
       ``The Criminal Code contains numerous provisions 
     potentially relevant to these cases * * * I would have no 
     difficulty in sustaining convictions under these sections.''
       Justice Marshall: ``At least one of the many statutes in 
     this area [control of sensitive information] seems relevant 
     to these cases.''
       Chief Justice Burger, a dissenter, deplored the haste with 
     which all proceedings in the case had been held: ``We do not 
     know the facts of the cases. No District Judge knew all the 
     facts. No Court of Appeals Judge knew all the facts. No 
     member of this Court knows all the facts * * * because these 
     cases have been conducted in unseemly haste * * *''
       ``To me it is hardly believable that a newspaper long 
     regarded as a great institution in American life (the New 
     York Times) would fail to perform one of the basic and simple 
     duties of every citizen with respect to the discovery or 
     possession of stolen property or secret government documents. 
     that duty, I had thought--perhaps naively--was to report 
     forthwith to responsible public officers. This duty rests on 
     taxi drivers, Justices, and the New York Times. The course 
     followed by the Times, whether so calculated or not, removed 
     any possibility of orderly litigation of the issues * * *''
       ``The consequence of all this melancholy series of events 
     is that we literally do not know what we are acting on * * * 
     the result is a parody of the judicial system * * *''
       ``I should add that I am in general agreement with much of 
     what Mr. Justice White has expressed with respect to penal 
     sanctions concerning communication or retention of documents 
     or information relating to the national defense.''
       Justice Harlan, also dissenting, with the Chief Justice and 
     Justice Blackmun joining, cited chapter and verse of the 
     haste mentioned by the Chief Justice and said: ``With all 
     respect, I consider that the Court has been almost 
     irresponsibly feverish in dealing with these cases.''
       Justice Blackmun, the third dissenter, said he, too, was in 
     ``substantial accord'' with what Justice White had said about 
     criminal prosecution. He added: ``I strongly urge, and 
     sincerely hope, that these two newspapers [the New York Times 
     and the Washington Post] will be fully aware of their 
     ultimate responsibilities to the United States of America * * 
     * I, for one, have now been able to give at least some 
     cursory study not only to the affidavits, but to the material 
     itself. I regret to say that from this examination I fear 
     that Judge Wilkey's statements [expressed in his Washington 
     Post decision] ``have possible foundation. I therefore share 
     his concern. I hope that damage has not already been done. 
     If, however, damage has been done and if, with the Court's 
     action today, these newspapers proceed to publish the 
     critical documents and there results therefrom what Wilkey 
     feared as possible, `the death of soldiers, the destruction 
     of alliances, the greatly increased difficulty of negotiation 
     with our enemies, the inability of our diplomats to 
     negotiate,' to which list I might add the factors of 
     prolongation of the war and of further delay in the freeing 
     of United States prisoners, then the Nation's people will 
     know where the responsibility for these sad consequences 
     rests.''

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