[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 92 (Friday, July 15, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 15, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                     U.S. TROOPS MEAN U.S. PROBLEMS

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                            HON. DAN BURTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, July 14, 1994

  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, there is much discussion these 
days about a potential settlement between Israel and Syria that would 
entail a United States peacekeeping presence on the Golan Heights. This 
is a very serious issue worthy of debate, but I am sorry to say that 
such debate has been lacking up till now.
  In the interest of promoting such debate, I commend to all my 
colleagues' attention these two excellent articles, one by Frank 
Gaffney and one by Yoram Ettinger.

                [From the Jerusalem Post, July 7, 1994]

                     U.S. Troops Mean U.S. Problems

                          (By Yoram Ettinger)

       Involving American troops in an Israeli-Syrian peace 
     agreement is not just a suggestion floating somewhere between 
     Jerusalem and Washington.
       Congressman Lee Hamilton, chairman of the House Committee 
     on Foreign Affairs, recently indicated that a US survey is 
     already underway to determine the specific locations of a US 
     peacekeeping force on the Golan. The survey's underlying 
     assumption is that Israel will evaluate the entire Heights.
       Assad's military potential and his record of brutality and 
     unpredictability, the brief life-span of hundreds of Mideast 
     agreements and the violently abrupt nature of their 
     abrogation make Israel's risks in evacuating the Golan 
     substantial.
       An American force would supposedly constitute an essential 
     reassuring component.
       But to bolster a potentially vulnerable accord, US presence 
     on the Golan must be durable, and politically/militarily 
     sustainable. Moreover, it must be compatible with US 
     interests, lest it be summarily withdrawn.
       Is the deployment of US peacekeepers (monitoring or combat, 
     unilateral or multinational) consistent with such 
     requirements?
       Unlike US observers in Sinai (22,000 square miles of empty 
     desert) US personnel on the Golan (450 sqm) would be situated 
     about 25 miles from two of the most notorious training/
     operatonal centers of international narco-terrorism: Damascus 
     and the Syrian-controlled Beka's Valley (``Medellin East.'')
       They would be stationed in a neighborhood the size of a 
     small US congressional district, populated by well-armed 
     Afghan, Hizbullah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Abu Nidal, Jibril, 
     Habash, Hawatmeh, PLO, PKK, Japanese Red Army, Latin 
     American, West European and Southeast Asian terrorists.
       Moreover, these terrorists are proxies of hostile radical 
     regimes (Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, etc.). They would enable 
     their patron regimes to intimidate Washington, constrain its 
     ability to respond to provocations elsewhere (e.g. the Gulf 
     area), and extort political concessions by targeting US 
     servicemen. The states sponsoring the terrorists would, 
     meanwhile, preserve the element of deniability.
       A truly effective US combat force is precluded--even 
     theoretically--by the diminished overall size of the US 
     military. One may safely predict, then, a possible withdrawal 
     of the peacekeepers in face of hostage-taking and casualties.
       Such a withdrawal would be perceived as another retreat 
     (following Beirut, Somalia and Haiti), further eroding the US 
     posture of deterrence and shrinking public support for 
     essential overseas military involvement.
       While on the Golan, the US presence would constrain Israel 
     by forcing it to coordinate preemptive and reactive 
     operations with the US, thus inadvertently shielding 
     terrorists. It would also deny the US the benefits from 
     Israel's ``unauthorized actions'' (e.g. the 1981 bombing 
     of Iraq's nuclear reactor).
       Requiring Israel to seek prior approval in countering 
     belligerence would strain US relations with Israel. At the 
     same time, appearing to have enabled Israel to act freely, 
     would damage US-Arab ties.
       However, as demonstrated by the precedent of the 1982/83 US 
     episode in Lebanon, and evidenced by Mideast complexities, 
     one can expect the relationship between the US and both 
     sides--essential to the achievement of a genuine peace--to be 
     undermined.
       In addition, a US presence at a stormy junction bordering 
     Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and numerous terrorist groups, 
     could draw the US unwillingly into inter-Arab and Arab-Israel 
     disputes. It would certainly deepen the involvement of Russia 
     (which has resumed strategic cooperation with Syria), France 
     (which still views Lebanon as a French auxiliary), and other 
     powers, further exacerbating global and regional tensions.
       A Washington power broker recently agreed that the question 
     of a complete withdrawal from the Golan should be decided by 
     Israeli voters. But the fate of US peacekeepers and their 
     implications for US national security should be debated by 
     the American public and the appropriate congressional 
     committees, independent of Israel's stance on the Golan.
       Keeping in mind the American public reaction to US military 
     involvement in Lebanon and Somalia, and recognizing the 
     likely pitfalls of a US force on the Golan, such an 
     undertaking would probably not be politically/militarily 
     sustainable.

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