[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 91 (Thursday, July 14, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 14, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
             PROPOSAL FOR A UNITED NATIONS ``FIRE BRIGADE''

  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I recently read a most interesting proposal 
by Timothy W. Stanley, president of the International Economic Studies 
Institute, and Lukas Haynes, at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, calling for the creation of a 5,000-strong rapid 
deployment force to assist in United Nations peacekeeping efforts. This 
idea, contained in a article entitled ``The U.N. Needs a `Fire Brigade' 
To Douse Regional Conflicts'' appeared in the July 5, 1994, issue of 
the Christian Science Monitor, is similar to one proposed by Sir Brian 
Urquhart.
  The authors recognize the need by the international community to have 
the ability to respond quickly to crises, such as recently in Rwanda or 
potentially soon in Haiti. They suggest a brigade size unit consisting 
of volunteers on leaves of absence from their own national services 
that would train as a unit in order to overcome some of the current 
logistics and communications problems apparent in U.N. peacekeeping 
operations.
  I ask consent that the article appear in its entirety following my 
remarks.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

      The U.N. Needs a `Fire Brigade' To Douse Regional Conflicts

                (By Lukas Haynes and Timothy W. Stanley)

       The alarm went off on April 6, 1994, when a plane carrying 
     the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down and the 
     first reports of widespread carnage flooded in. Instead of 
     sending international forces to stop the killing, the United 
     Nations troops on the scene were pulled out. Two genocidal 
     months, 300,000 deaths, and half a million refugees later, 
     the United States agreed to a U.N. force of 5,500 troops from 
     seven African countries. With luck, it may arrive in late 
     summer or early fall. In desperation, France has deployed a 
     force of 2,500 (including its Foreign Legion) despite being 
     perceived by Rwandans as partisan. It is far too late for the 
     dead and dying.
       ``We can do better,'' as President Clinton likes to say 
     about domestic policy, and the world must do better in 
     fighting conflagrations like Rwanda. Under current U.N. 
     procedures, once a new operation is approved, the secretariat 
     starts from a zero base of resources. The secretary-general 
     must constantly beg member states for the means to implement 
     Security Council resolutions. The answer: a volunteer U.N. 
     ``fire brigade''--a quick-response force to stop a low-
     intensity conflict before it rages out of control.
       What kind of a force makes sense? A standard regimental-
     size combat team with five key features: (1) a standing 
     force; (2) staffed by personnel who volunteered for U.N. 
     service; (3) detached from member states and national chains 
     of command; (4) equipped with on-hand ``interoperable'' 
     equipment; and (5) led by a unified command reporting to an 
     enhanced military staff at U.N. headquarters.
       Such a ``fire brigade'' would be deployed by airlift 
     immediately upon Security Council authorization without the 
     delay of assembling national contributions. It being a truly 
     international force, no parliament would need to debate why 
     its soldiers would be fighting machete-wielding Rwandans or 
     Haitian thugs.
       Such an integrated brigade would become well-disciplined, 
     elite Ranger-like units, training together for ``robust 
     peacekeeping,'' thus minimizing field confusion over training 
     and doctrine. New equipment would not need to be contracted 
     for in each new mission because the brigade would maintain 
     donated material (from the world's vast surpluses) in 
     prestocked regional depots. U.N. operational orders would not 
     be checkmated by national authorities and language 
     proficiency requirements would eliminate field miscues. 
     Soldiers like civil servants, would be paid by the U.N. while 
     on three-to-five-year leaves of absence from their own 
     national service.
       What would the brigade's mission be? It would not be a ``UN 
     Army'' for Chapter VII military enforcement--a proposition 
     many oppose. Large-scale Persian Gulf-type actions require 
     ad-hoc coalitions. This nucleus brigade would be for 
     short-term deployment in situations that do not require 
     high-tech weaponry. Its goals would be to establish an 
     early UN presence, to protect safe-haven boundaries, and 
     to demonstrate Security Council resolve. The brigade would 
     be used only with a political consensus, in the Security 
     Council and broadly within the region, and when its task 
     would be manageable with the small numbers involved.
       Because the brigade might come under concerted attack, the 
     Security Council would have to take steps to ensure that 
     appropriate backup forces were available. But the brigade's 
     principal goal would be to prevent outbreaks of fighting and 
     buy time for the deployment of a larger traditional peace-
     keeping operation.
       What are the obstacles and what would it cost? As with all 
     current peacekeeping efforts, the UN lacks an adequate UN 
     military command with communications and logistic staff--a 
     problem the Clinton administration has taken steps to 
     address. As for cost, in 1992 we used Pentagon data to 
     calculate annual costs of under $400 million for a more-
     ambitious ``UN Legion.'' If this brigade were to be stationed 
     at a base scheduled for closing, and use surplus equipment, a 
     5,000-strong force might cost only $200 million a year--a 
     bargain compared with the costs of relief and reconstruction, 
     let alone of a quarter-million human lives!
       A volunteer force is not a new idea. The UN's first 
     secretary-general. Trygve Lie, former diplomats (like Sir 
     Brian Urquhart), and the majority of a recent congressional 
     commission on improving the UN have recommended a 
     multinational force. US-UN policy was tragically set back by 
     the exaggerated backlash over US casualties in Somalia. While 
     geared to sensible reforms and sounder criteria, current US 
     policy has added doubt and delay to that inherent in UN 
     procedures.
       The US is not to blame for the current out-break of ethnic 
     anarchy. Nor should it take on every crisis. But it does 
     share the blame for the apathy and ``donor fatigue'' that 
     hobbles the UN. Dealing with destabilizing, low-intensity 
     conflict is difficult but necessary. It is time to seriously 
     consider a volunteer UN ``fire brigade'' to help contain the 
     blaze of localized conflict. Then, when the alarm bells ring, 
     someone will be there to answer the calls. For they will 
     surely continue to sound.

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