[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 91 (Thursday, July 14, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 14, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
             THE HOLLOWING OUT OF AMERICA'S ARMED SERVICES

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Frost). Under the Speaker's announced 
policy of February 11, 1994, and June 10, 1994, the gentleman from 
Missouri [Mr. Talent] is recognized for 30 minutes as the designee of 
the minority leader.
  Mr. TALENT. Mr. Speaker, I am happy to yield to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma to finish his story.


    third annual regulatory delay--the burden of regulation on the 
                          restaurant industry

  Mr. ISTOOK. We were caught in the middle of the Will Rogers' story.
  ``If we could stop the German U-boats, boil the oceans, the U-boats 
will pop to the top and you can shoot them.'' People said, ``I guess 
that sounds like an okay idea but how do you boil the oceans?''
  Will Rogers said, ``I'm just an idea man. I'm not a detail man.''
  I think that is what we see so often in Congress. We are supposed to 
be permitted to be idea people and not detail people and no matter how 
impractical things may be, we are not supposed to be judged on the 
basis of that. We have sure seen examples from you gentleman of 
improper regulations and it traces right back here to the halls of 
Congress.
  Mr. TALENT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today on the House floor to address 
again a subject I have addressed on no fewer than 3 occasions, that is, 
the hollowing out of America's armed services. In fact, in the middle 
of last year I formed an ad hoc committee on the hollowing out of the 
armed forces with the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. Kyl], the gentleman 
from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] and the gentleman from New York, [Mr. 
McHugh]. Since then we have done special orders on the general issue of 
the hollowing out of the forces, on the collapse of modernization 
programs in the United States Army, and on the terrible situation we 
have with the shortage of ammunition all throughout the services. My 
remarks tonight are on the subject of military pay and specifically on 
what happens when military pay lags behind civilian pay and also behind 
inflation.
  Mr. Speaker, what would you expect to happen under those kinds of 
circumstances? Well, you would expect that it would become more 
difficult to recruit high quality people to serve in the armed services 
and more difficult to retain the high quality people who are already 
serving there. My points tonight are threefold. First, history shows 
that in fact that does happen, in fact it did happen in the 1970's, 
when military pay lagged way behind inflation and when in fact we had 
great difficulty retaining the high quality people we had in the 
services and recruiting others.
  The second point is that military pay is again falling behind 
inflation, to approximately the same degree it did in the 1970's.
  The third point I want to make tonight is that the force is again 
hollowing out in the sense that we are losing quality people from the 
services and are finding it more and more difficult to recruit the kind 
of people we need to staff a high tech and modern American military.
  I begin, Mr. Speaker, with a history lesson and I go back to the 
years 1973 through 1979. These were the years in which the United 
States was governed by the Ford and then the Carter administrations. 
The chart to my left, Mr. Speaker, shows the gap between military pay 
and inflation that occurred during those years. Specifically the point 
of the chart is to show whether and to what extent increases in 
military pay kept up with inflation during those years. Taking 1975 as 
a base year, you can see very easily that between that year, 1975 and 
approximately 1980, at the end of the Carter administration, military 
pay lagged 15 percent behind inflation. In other words, if you had 
served in the American armed services in 1975 and had stayed in the 
services through the end of that decade, you would have suffered in 
real terms a 15 percent cut in the compensation that you received.

  Did this hurt the quality of the personnel and the quality of the 
force during that period of time? There is no question, Mr. Speaker, 
that it did. This is documented, it is accepted by everybody. I will 
use 3 indices tonight to measure the quality of the personnel during 
that time and then compare it to what happened in the 1980's and what 
is happening now. The first index I will use is the percentage of 
recruits during those years who had high school diplomas. I will also 
use the tests that the military gives to new recruits which are 
designed to show what is colloquially called the trainability of those 
recruits. In other words, how easy is it to train recruits to perform 
in military occupations? And I will also use reenlistment rates. What 
happened to those 3 indices of the quality of the forces from 1975 
through approximately 1980?
  Let us look first at the percentage of recruits who had high school 
diplomas. In 1976, 91 percent of the recruits in the American military 
had a high school diploma. That number is too low. It would be 
considered a serious problem if it existed today. That is where we were 
at in 1976.
  By 1980 the percentage of recruits who had a high school diploma had 
fallen to 82 percent. This means that 1 out of 5 of the new recruits in 
the American military, a high-tech, modern military on which the 
stability of the international order depends, 1 out of 5 of our 
recruits did not have a high school diploma. How trainable were those 
troops? The military gives tests to new recruits to determine how 
difficult it is to train them for military occupations. After they give 
those tests, they place the recruits into four different categories. 
Category 4 is very low trainability. People in category 4 are very 
difficult to train for any kind of a sophisticated occupation. In 1976, 
none of the recruits were placed in category 4. So zero percent of the 
recruits were considered to be very low trainability recruits. By 1980, 
10 percent of the recruits were in category 4. One out of every 10 
recruits in the American military in 1980 was considered very low 
trainability

  What about reenlistment rates? First-term reenlistment rates during 
this period of time held pretty steady but at a very low rate, about 40 
percent. As for second term reenlistments, in 1976 70 percent of the 
personnel who had an opportunity to sign up for a second term did. By 
1980 that figure had fallen to 61 percent.
  The quality of the force in those days got so bad, Mr. Speaker, that 
by 1981, early 1981, the U.S.S. Canisteo went to the Brooklyn Naval 
Yard to be overhauled, was refitted and was then supposed to set sail 
again. The captain of that vessel refused to take it to the high seas, 
because he refused to certify that there were an adequate number of 
skilled sailors so that that ship could go on its mission. His decision 
was reviewed by higher level authorities in the Navy and was upheld. He 
acted rightly in that decision. It was the only time in the history of 
the U.S. Navy when a naval vessel has been unable to take to the high 
seas because it did not have an adequate number of skilled sailors on 
board. That was the result of the 15 percent real cut in military pay 
that had occurred to the U.S. Navy and the other services from the 
years 1975 to roughly the year 1980.
  What happened after that? When President Reagan took office, his 
first step was a very large pay increase, approximately 14.3 percent. 
That was not an accident. That was what was necessary to move the 
services back to where they were in terms of purchasing power in 1975. 
In other words, he made up this gap which had existed in the military 
services from 1975 through 1980 and brought them back to where they 
would have been had their pay raises in the meantime kept up with 
inflation. It was not just the Reagan administration that did this. 
That pay raise was approved by an enormous bipartisan majority, 417 to 
1 in this House alone, and that pay level was pretty much maintained 
through the end of the Reagan years to approximately 1988 and 1989. 
There were other measures as well taken during this period of time to 
maintain morale and maintain the quality of the troops.
  Did those measures have an effect? The answer is that unquestionably, 
indisputably they did.
  Let us return again to the 3 indices that we used before. The first 
is the percentage of recruits having high school diplomas. The House 
will recall, Mr. Speaker, I said a moment ago that in 1980 only 82 
percent of the new recruits had a high school diploma. By 1983, 
virtually 100 percent of the new recruits had a high school diploma.
  The next index. The trainability of the new recruits, what did their 
test scores show?

                              {time}  2200

  In 1980, you will recall, Mr. Speaker, 10 percent of the recruits 
were in category 4. They were considered of very low trainability. By 
1986, that 10 percent had been reduced to zero. There were no new 
recruits that were considered to be of very low trainability. In fact, 
51 percent of the recruits by 1986 were classified in the top two 
categories. They were classified as highly trainable.
  Let us examine reenlistment rates. I spoke before about second term 
reenlistment rates. In 1980, they were 61 percent. In 1989, they were 
79 percent. Moreover, first term reenlistments had gone substantially 
up during the eighties from 40 to 60 percent.
  It was that force, Mr. Speaker, that fought Desert Storm in 1991--the 
force that was rebuilt in the 1980's by a joint effort from the Reagan 
administration and Congress. The foundation of that rebuilding, the 
first step that was taken, was making up for the pay gap that had been 
created in the late 1970's and that had resulted in the decline in the 
quality of the American military. People are the foundation of any 
modern force.
  What has happened since President Reagan left office? It is the same 
tale that we saw in the Ford-Carter years. First, some initial slippage 
under President Bush. There was a pay gap of about 3 to 4 percent 
during the Bush years.
  Now we see in the Clinton era, in the budgets that have been passed 
and the budgets projected under the President's 5-year plan, a decline 
similar to that which occurred in the Carter years.
  Mr. Speaker, unless this Congress acts or the administration changes 
its budget projections, military pay will be cut in real terms by 10 to 
12 percent by the end of this decade, from where it was at the 
beginning of the decade. The impact of these pay cuts is already 
evident.
  Let us go back to those three indices. In 1989, 100 percent of the 
recruits in the American military had high school diplomas. In the 
first 6 months of 1994, only 94 percent of the recruits had high school 
diplomas. We are already moving down in terms of the quality of the new 
recruits.
  What about trainability of those recruits? You will recall, Mr. 
Speaker, in 1989 zero percent of the new recruits in the American 
military were in category 4 regarding trainability. That is to say, 
none of the new recruits were rated very low in terms of their ability 
to be trained. By 1993, 4 percent of the recruits were in category 4. 
That means 1 out of 25 of the new people currently recruited in the 
military are very difficult to train for military occupations. This at 
a time when the technologies that the military must use are growing 
ever more sophisticated.

  In addition, Mr. Speaker, in 1989, 51 percent of the new recruits 
were in the top two levels of trainability, were considered to be 
highly trainable. That number slipped by 1993 to 38 percent.
  As far as reenlistment rates are concerned, the evidence is more 
mixed. The first term reenlistments are down. Second term reenlistments 
are holding. It is probably unfair to use this index now, because we 
have been experiencing such a substantial downsizing. It is very 
difficult to tell whether those who are failing to reenlist are doing 
so because they don't want to reenlist, or because they want to 
reenlist but there is no more space for them because of this very 
substantial downsizing.
  What can we say in summing up this chart, Mr. Speaker? In the late 
1970's, military pay was reduced in real terms by 15 percent. As a 
result of that, the quality of recruits and the retention rates dropped 
and seriously affected the quality of our armed forces.
  If the Clinton budgets go as projected, military pay will drop 10 to 
12 percent by 1998. In other words, we have begun a trend which is very 
substantially the same as what occurred in the Carter years. The trend 
is already having a negative impact on the quality of personnel. That 
impact is as certain as the turning of the Earth to continue and to 
deepen, unless the Congress does something to increase military pay so 
that it keeps pace with inflation in the coming years.
  The trend is made worse by another factor which is causing the 
quality of the force to hollow out, and I want to discuss that very 
briefly, and that is the increasing length of deployments abroad in the 
American military.
  This is substantially the result of the downsizing at the same time 
as we have increased what is called OPTEMPO. The American military is 
obviously undergoing a very substantial downsizing. It has ever since 
1986. The trend has accelerated ever since 1989. Yet our commitments 
abroad have not reduced.

  The number of our soldiers and sailors has gone down, but their 
commitments and the need to commit them abroad has not gone down. When 
you have fewer people and have more for them to do abroad, it means 
those left must be away from their home base or their home port longer, 
and that is what is happening, especially in the Navy and in the Air 
Force. Those are the two services I am going to discuss briefly 
tonight.
  The Navy has a rule regarding PERSTEMPO, which is the amount of time 
each year in which sailors are away from their home port. The Navy's 
rule is that it cannot keep sailors on board ship on extended tours 
longer than 50 percent of the time.
  If I have heard one admiral and one undersecretary speak to this in 
the last 18 months in my service on the Committee on Armed Services, I 
have heard 100. They say you cannot keep sailors away from the ``home 
port'' and their families, in peacetime, more than six months out of 
the year. If you do, they will leave the Navy.
  You can do it in war, because the sailors will sacrifice almost 
anything for America's vital interests, but they are not going to stay 
in the Navy if you make them do it in peacetime. Who can blame them? 
They do not sign on to be away from their families and homes more than 
half the time.
  Where are we with PERSTEMPO? Is the Navy meeting that minimum 50 
percent rule? Mr. Speaker, in the years 1991 through 1995, 89 Naval 
units, that is ships, squadrons, 89 Naval units, have been unable to 
meet the 50 percent requirement. Even worse, the sailors on aircraft 
carrier battle groups have been away from their families during this 5-
year period on average 56 percent of the time. Even where we are now, 
and the downsizing is not completed, we are not meeting the minimum 
requirements for PERSTEMPO that all the Navy senior officers and 
civilian officers agree we must meet.
  So we are paying these men and women less, and asking them to stay 
away from their homes longer. And the simple fact of the matter, as we 
experienced in the 1970's, is they will not stay in the Navy if we 
continue to ask them to do that. It is unfair to ask them to do that, 
and if the trend continues many high quality people will get out of the 
service.

  Mr. Speaker, the trend in the Air Force is even worse. The Air Force 
has been cut in total personnel by 25 percent since 1988, from 537,000 
to 432,000. At the same time, the number of people engaged in 
contingencies abroad has quadrupled. The OPTEMPO of the Air Force has 
not gone down since Desert Storm. It has gone up. We have called on the 
Air Force and are calling on it in Iran, Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia. We 
probably will be demanding service of the Air Force in Haiti. And this 
is at the same time as we are downsizing the troops and pulling people 
back to the continental United States.
  When you have fewer people and more duties away from home, Mr. 
Speaker, what happens? The troops that you have remaining must stay 
away from home longer. That is what is happening in the Air Force.
  The situation is getting so bad that for the first time the Air Force 
is beginning to measure the length of the average TDY, or temporary 
deployment abroad.
  In fiscal year 1994, the Air Force had 432,000 personnel, 17,242 
people occupied in contingencies during that fiscal year, and the 
average deployment abroad was 108 days. Men and women do not sign into 
the United States Air Force to stay 108 days away from home during 
peacetime.
  The problem is not limited to troops stationed in the United States. 
It is happening, Mr. Speaker, even to personnel who are stationed 
abroad.
  Let me recite some anecdotal evidence. For all air crews stationed in 
Europe, the average deployment time away from home in support of a 
contingency is 108 days. Since 1993, the average temporary deployment 
for AWACS crews has been 167 days. That means that these crews have 
been away from home for 46 percent of the year.
  Over the same period, the average temporary deployment for F-15 crews 
is 97.9 days, or 27 percent of the year. At Ramstein Air Force Base in 
Germany, the largest Air Force Base outside the continental United 
States, home to a major F-16 wing, the average deployment away from 
home in support of a contingency is 131 days. At Spangdahlm Air Force 
Base in Germany, the average duty time away from home is 110 days, or 
30 percent of the year.
  Recently the Marines have experienced a classic example of this 
problem with extended deployments abroad. It is the kind of thing that 
destroys morale in the service.

                              {time}  2210

  It is what happened to the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. The 24th 
MEU had been stationed in a support role or had been at sea in a 
support role in Somalia and in Bosnia. They were at sea for 6 months. 
They came home very recently.
  The typical procedure would be they would have a 10-day period 
completely off, when in essence they could take a vacation. And then 
they would have an extended period of time working at home port and 
living with their families. Halfway through the first 10 days home they 
were redeployed and reassigned to ship and sent out to Haiti. So they 
had been gone for 6 months. They came home for 5 days. Their families 
expected that they would have a vacation of an additional 5 days, and 
then be home for months at a time. And they were put back on board ship 
and sent to Haiti because we do not have enough people to cover the 
contingencies that we have abroad.
  That incident is going to ricochet, is ricocheting through the Marine 
Corps. What it says to the Marine Corps is that the administration and 
the Congress do not care about them, do not care about their families, 
do not care about their expectations. To do that to those people at the 
same time we are reducing their pay is criminal, Mr. Speaker.
  I have been in the Congress on the House Committee on Armed Services 
for 18 months. I have sat through a number of hearings in which senior 
officers have testified about the trends toward a hollow force: trends 
in pay, modernization, maintenance depots. These officers have 
expressed their concern over these trends. Publicly they are discreet; 
privately they are more explicit. But it is clear in either venue that 
they believe the force is on the ragged edge of readiness and will 
hollow if we continue underfunding the military.
  I have also talked, during that period of time, to a number of senior 
Members on both sides of the aisle who have expressed the same kinds of 
concerns to me. These Members are tremendously frustrated, Mr. Speaker, 
because many of them served in Congress in the 1970's. For them, and 
for those senior officers who served in the armed services in the 
1970's, the situation today is like revisiting a nightmare.
  Yet this body, as an institution, as a whole, continues as if it were 
in a daze, failing to confront, failing even to debate these kinds of 
issues and to examine the danger towards which we are headed.

  Mr. Speaker, this is not an academic debate or a political game. 
Sooner or later America's military is going back into battle.
  If it goes back hollow, if it goes back without quality people, if it 
goes back without high-maintenance units, if it goes back without 
adequate ammo, if it goes back without modern weapons, if it goes back 
without spare parts, if it goes back without adequate training, if it 
goes back hollow, a lot of people we send someplace around the world 
are not going to return.
  And it will not be because it was necessary for them to die. It will 
be because Congress did not live up to its responsibility to adequately 
prepare America's military for battle.
  A lot of families are going to lose husbands and fathers and brothers 
and sons, and it is not going to be their fault, Mr. Speaker. It is not 
going to be the fault of their comrades or their commanding officers. 
The fault is going to lay at the door of the institution which is 
assigned the constitutional responsibility of maintaining the armies 
and navies of the United States. That is the Congress of the United 
States.
  To hollow out the military, to make a mistake of that size once in a 
generation is a tragedy. To make it twice is unforgivable.
  Mr. Speaker, it is not the politicians who pay the price of a hollow 
force. It is the men and women of America's armed services who go into 
battle and do not return.

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