[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 90 (Wednesday, July 13, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 13, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                    THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, the death of Kim Il-song this past weekend 
has made an already dangerous and uncertain situation on the Korean 
Peninsula even more menacing and unpredictable.
  We should never mourn the passing of a dictator as brutal and 
malevolent as Kim. Yet with Kim's departure, we no longer know who, if 
anyone, is making decisions in North Korea.
  Kim was a man who had a firm and unquestioned grip on the reins of 
power. Over the course of a half century as North Korea's only leader, 
Kim created a personality cult so effective that he literally came to 
be revered as a god-king.
  Kim Chong-il, son of Kim Il-song, appears on his way toward replacing 
his father. The elder Kim had been grooming him for two decades to 
assume the mantle of leadership, and more than 10 years ago, Kim Il-
song designated him as his successor. Much doubt remains, however, over 
whether Kim Chong-il will be able to maintain power. He is an untested 
leader who commands very little of the respect accorded his father.
  The United States has virtually no capacity either to influence the 
struggle for power within the North or to ameliorate any unrest that 
might arise in the midst of that struggle. Moreover, we have absolutely 
no ability to foretell the intentions of the North, even if Kim Chong-
il successfully takes control. With Kim Il-song's death, a thick fog of 
uncertainty has descended over North Korea, both within its borders, 
and in its relations with the outside world.
  Yet that fog has not obscured all the problems presented by the 
North--indeed, some have even been clarified. For example, our goals in 
Korea remain the same: We seek a peaceful, stable, and nonnuclear 
peninsula, a North Korea that lives up to all its obligations under the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and full implementation of the Joint 
North-South Denuclearization Agreement.
  In addition, Kim's death has not changed the very limited timeframe 
we have available to settle the challenge posed by the North's nuclear 
program. Pyongyang made clear last month that the protective cladding 
on its spent nuclear fuel rods will deteriorate and begin to pose a 
serious safety hazard by the end of August.
  At that point North Korea will have to do something with the fuel, 
including, for example, reprocessing the fuel. Of course, weapons-grade 
plutonium will incidentally be produced as a result of reprocessing. 
But so long as International Atomic Energy Agency officials oversee the 
reprocessing and certify that the North maintains ``continuity of 
safeguards,''--an expression of magnificent vagueness--it will not have 
compromised its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
  The stakes in our confrontation with the North remain as high, if not 
higher, than ever. To begin with, should we allow Pyongyang to fulfill 
its nuclear ambitions, the NPT, coming up for renewal next year, would 
be rendered irrelevant.
  Moreover, all of East Asia would be destablized by a nuclear North 
Korea. Should Pyongyang be permitted to continue its nuclear weapons 
program, a regional nuclear arms race, including the two Koreas, Japan, 
and Taiwan, would almost assuredly ensue. With China and Russia already 
possessing nuclear weapons and historical, territorial, and political 
disputes festering among and between all six countries, East Asia would 
become a terribly dangerous place.
  So too might other regions of the world as Pyongyang can be expected 
to become a willing seller not only of the technology of nuclear 
weapons production, but even of the weapons themselves. Given the 
country's impoverishment and its history of unreserved weapons sales to 
rogue states, the Libyans, the Iraqis, the Iranians, and any number of 
terrorist organizations would suddenly have open access to the ultimate 
weapon of diplomatic blackmail.
  Of course, even if North Korea were not capable of producing nuclear 
bombs, Pyongyang's conventional weapons capabilities alone are enough 
to give one pause. The area around the military demarcation line 
dividing North and South is the most militarized terrain on the entire 
planet.
  If the worst were to occur, and war were to break out on the Korean 
peninsula, America's 37,000 troops stationed in the South would be 
treaty-bound to fight alongside the South Koreans. United States and 
Republic of Korea forces would certainly achieve victory, but at 
indeterminable cost. North Korea fields a military of at least 1.2 
million, with 65 percent of its forces offensively positioned on the 
demilitarized zone just 30 miles from Seoul. Pyongyang maintains the 
world's biggest special operations forces, has a large ballistic 
missile arsenal, and has produced chemical and biological weapons. Its 
massive artillery formations have the potential of blanketing the South 
with as many as 20 million shells each day.
  In the last Korean war, 54,000 Americans lost their lives, as did as 
many as 4 million others--South Koreans, soldiers from the more than a 
dozen member countries of the U.N. force involved in the conflict, 
North Koreans, Chinese, and Soviets. Another war could easily cost as 
many lives, if not more.

  Beyond the enormous, tragic human loss that would result from war, 
further potential dangers loom--economic chaos, perhaps an irreparable 
break in the United States-Japan alliance.
  Economic growth throughout East Asia--a key to global prosperity--
would suffer a severe setback. Even if North Korea were to collapse 
simply from internal stresses rather than war, reconstructing 
Pyongyang's economy could cost anywhere from $300 billion to $1 
trillion. Obviously, if war were to break out, the costs of the 
conflict and of reconstructing both Koreas would be far greater, 
certainly enough to have very negative consequences for the global 
economy.
  A war on the Korean peninsula also poses grave problems for United 
States-Japan relations. It is important to note that in defending South 
Korea, the United States implicitly would be defending Japan. As Tokyo 
has consistently noted in its annual Defense White Papers, the presence 
of United States forces in South Korea and our commitment to defend the 
South contributes to peace and stability throughout all northeast Asia, 
including Japan.
  Yet Japan has not only steadfastly avoided serious public discussion 
of the problems posed by the North, its weak political leaders languish 
in esoteric legal debate over what Japan can and cannot do should 
economic sanctions be imposed on the North, a blockade instituted, or 
conflict break out.
  Under currently accepted interpretations of the Constitution, if war 
did erupt, Tokyo would be forbidden from putting its forces on the 
line--except in the unlikely event that Japan were directly attacked by 
North Korea. Thus, Japan's 700 fighter planes, its state-of-the-art 
antisubmarine technology, its minesweepers, and its personnel would sit 
idly by as Americans and Koreans lost their lives, partly to protect 
Japan.
  When the war was over, and the accounting done, Americans would 
undoubtedly consider Japan an untrustworthy ally. We would 
ask why our sons and daughters had to die defending a country that 
assumed little or no risks itself, a country, moreover, that is so 
often viewed as having taken economic advantage of the United States 
for decades. Japanese impotence in the face of a war fought partly on 
its behalf could well push the crucial bilateral relationship to the 
breaking point.
  The goals, timetable, and stakes involved in the confrontation on the 
Korean peninsula suggest a number of actions we and our allies should 
undertake.
  First, while we should give a negotiated solution as much chance as 
possible, we must recognize the severe time constraints we face. We 
must, therefore, immediately and comprehensively define the ``freeze'' 
North Korea claims to have placed on its nuclear program. At a minimum, 
that definition must prevent North Korea from reprocessing any more 
nuclear fuel. It must include a freeze on the construction of the 
second unfinished reprocessing line, two partially completed nuclear 
reactors, and the fuel rods needed for those reactors. It must also 
permit an IAEA inspection regime that can fully verify the freeze 
remains in force. In addition, we must make it absolutely clear to the 
North Korea regime that should they initiate a war, that conflict will 
only end when that regime and their country are destroyed.
  Second, given the enormous military costs we face on the Korean 
peninsula I believe United States preparations intended to deter North 
Korean aggression should be sped up, though in such a way that we do 
not provoke the North into starting a conflict. We owe it to our 37,000 
troops stationed in South Korea to give them the best means possible to 
defend themselves.
  I believe the following steps should be considered: enhanced counter-
fire capabilities; an increased readiness posture of United States 
forces; deployment of additional troops, fighter aircraft, Apache 
helicopters, and a carrier battle group; the prepositioning of bombers, 
tankers, and stocks in the region; upgraded intelligence collection and 
sharing with South Korea; delivery of additional antitank weapons and 
precision-guided munitions; enhancement of defenses against chemical 
and biological weapons; deployment of additional mine countermeasure 
assets and antimissile systems; and actions to ensure compatibility of 
command, control, and communication systems between United States and 
Korean forces.
  Third, the administration must make a concerted effort to explain to 
the American people the vital interests we have at stake on the Korean 
peninsula, the risks we face, and the reasons we are willing to take 
those risks to protect our interests.
  Fourth, we should do all we can to work as closely as possible with 
all those countries that share our interest in addressing the North 
Korea problem--South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. The United States 
must be mindful, however, of sensitive circumstances Japan and China 
face in this situation.
  Japan's Constitution, for example, is nearly sacrosanct, and the 
Japanese public has understandable, historically based reasons for its 
strong pacifism. Yet Japan must address the tangle of legal and 
constitutional obstacles to its participation in applying sanctions, a 
blockade, or engaging in a military conflict with North Korea, as soon 
as possible and certainly before a crisis erupts in Korea. If not, the 
United States-Japan relationship could be put in grave danger.
  China is being pushed in two directions, but it should be in their 
interest to join us in creating a peaceful and nonnuclear Korean 
peninsula. A nuclear arms race in northeast Asia would pose a direct 
threat to China. A war on the peninsula would wreak havoc on the 
regional economy in which China is a central player. At the same time, 
however, 900,000 Chinese troops fought with the North during the Korean 
war. In addition, North Korea remains one of the last redoubts of 
communism.
  Time is of the essence if we are to solve the Korean peninsula. 
Clearly we cannot wait for a resolution of the power struggle in 
Pyongyang before we act. The stakes are simply too high.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor
  Mr. President, I make a point of order that a quorum is not present.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been suggested. 
The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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