[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 90 (Wednesday, July 13, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 13, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
   EXCERPT FROM A SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS, GLAFCOS CLERIDES

 Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, some years ago, I was a Member of 
the House of Representatives and had the opportunity to have breakfast 
with Mr. Glafcos Clerides, then a political leader in Cyprus and now 
the President of Cyprus.
  Recently, the Ambassador from Cyprus to the United States, the 
Honorable Andrew Jacovides, gave me a copy of a speech given by 
President Clerides before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe.
  While it is a few weeks old, unfortunately, it is just as pertinent 
today as it was then.
  I believe that President Clerides has the personality, the will, and 
the ability to provide leadership on the Greek side; and from my one-
time meeting with the leader of the Turkish side, Mr. Denktash, I also 
believe that he has the ability to lead that side toward 
reconciliation.
  What is clearly needed is approval of the government of Ankara.
  I am sure Turkey is in a somewhat delicate situation and does not 
want to be perceived, in any way, as giving in to the Greeks. And yet 
the irony is that if Turkey improves her relationship with Greece and 
Armenia, it will help Turkey's position, in terms of the European 
Community, immensely.
  If Yasar Arafat and Yitzak Rabin can reach across their gulf to shake 
hands, and move toward peace in the Middle East, and if F.W. deKlerk 
and Nelson Mandela can reach across their huge gulf to bring about an 
improved situation in South Africa, it is certainly not asking too much 
for the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus to reach across a much 
smaller gulf to shake hands and make peace in that area.
  I hope significant steps can be taken.
  In the meantime, I would urge that small steps be taken. We have been 
waiting too long for the big steps.
  The reason that Jordan and Israel are able to move toward a peaceful 
resolution of their difficulties is the traffic that is taking place 
between the two countries for some time, even though there has been no 
formal recognition. There has been more traffic in 1 day between Jordan 
and Israel than there is in an entire year across the green line in 
Cyprus.
  I suggest some modest steps that could be taken in a positive 
direction:
  First, a small group of leaders on both sides of the green line 
should explore some small things that can be done to increase exchanges 
between the two sides. For example, I remember visiting on the Greek 
side at a school for the deaf that was doing woodworking. It was an 
impressive school. I asked the person in charge whether he would be 
willing to take students from the Turkish side, and he said he would. 
The numbers would not be great, but to have even a few students come 
over and have those who cannot speak to each other in formal language 
working together would be important to the nation. In a real sense they 
are almost an allegory for the two sides in Cyprus today, who cannot 
speak to each other. There are probably a half-dozen things like that 
involving only a very few people that could be arranged on both sides. 
In the scheme of things, it is not large, but it starts to thaw the ice 
a little bit.
  Second, I assume there must be campuses in the United States, and 
perhaps in other countries, where there are both Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish Cypriot students. Every student at a university is not 
emotionally equipped to start taking on new ideas and build 
friendships, but there are those among each group who are willing to 
listen to reason, be less emotional, and who would commit themselves to 
try to understand the other side's position a little more. Getting a 
few students together on a regular basis--and I would suggest once a 
week on a campus--is not going to immediately change the climate or the 
political reality in Cyprus, but in the long run, it will help.
  Third, I believe that Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash should agree that 
once every 2 months the two of them should get together for a visit, 
either in Cyprus, or New York, or some other mutually agreed upon 
place. I recall visiting Mr. Denktash after his son had been killed in 
an automobile accident and how moved he was by a gesture of friendship 
from Mr. Clerides at that time. This may seem to be a very small thing, 
but it is meaningful. And it means that there is at least a minimal 
fundamental understanding between the two men. Some may argue that 
their representatives have been getting together in New York and 
elsewhere. That is fine, but it is not the same thing as the two 
principles getting together.
  Mr. President, I ask that President Clerides' speech be inserted into 
the Record at the end of my remarks, and I am taking the liberty of 
sending a copy of this statement to Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash; to 
Prime Minister Papandreou in Greece, and Prime Minister Ciller in 
Turkey; and to the Cyprian Ambassador to the United States, Andrew 
Jacovides.
  I will be pleased to insert into the Record any response I receive 
from any of the parties.
  The speech follows:

 Exerpt From a Speech by the President of Cyprus, Mr. Glafcos Clerides

       Mr. President, having said the above I wish to take this 
     opportunity to turn to the question of Cyprus and to stress 
     that it is within this overall European orientation of our 
     country that we try to promote the solution of the Cyprus 
     problem.
       I wish to state at the outset in the most emphatic and 
     categorical manner, that my Government and I remain firm to 
     our commitment to spare no effort to find a just and viable 
     solution to the Cyprus problem and to make a success of the 
     negotiations, which take place with the good offices of the 
     Secretary-General of the United Nations as provided by United 
     Nations Security Council Resolutions.
       In line with that commitment, we have accepted the basic 
     principle that the political solution of the Cyprus problem 
     must allow the two ethnic communities to enjoy the maximum 
     degree of autonomy in internal administration, permitting at 
     the same time the bicommunal Federal Republic of Cyprus to 
     have one international legal personality, territorial 
     integrity, freedom from foreign forces on its territory, as 
     provided by United Nations resolutions, entrenchment of the 
     human rights in its constitution, compatibility of its 
     constitution with the Acquis Communautaire and entry into the 
     European Union.
       The question that is in the mind of all international 
     observers of the Cyprus situation is why has a solution 
     escaped us for so many years.
       Some international observers say that the failure to find a 
     solution is because the recent history of Cyprus, both before 
     independence and after independence, was such that because of 
     the intercommunal conflict there is deep mistrust between the 
     two communities. Others are of the opinion that the Cyprus 
     problem from an intercommunal one has been complicated by the 
     Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the continued occupation by 
     Turkish forces of substantial territory of the Republic. 
     There are also those who attribute the failure to the lack of 
     political will to find a solution by the parties concerned.
       That there is some mistrust between the two communities 
     cannot be denied. The leaderships of both communities, in 
     which I include myself, committed political mistakes in the 
     past and it is a futile exercise to try to apportion blame 
     and to throw accusations and counter accusations against each 
     other. What is needed is to recognize the fact that both 
     erred and to demonstrate the will not to repeat the mistakes 
     of the past.
       There can be no doubt that the Turkish invasion of Cyprus 
     complicated the situation. As a result of that invasion one 
     third of the Greek Cypriot population of the island were 
     expelled from their homes and properties and were made 
     refugees in their own country. One thousand six hundred and 
     nineteen Greek Cypriots are missing, Under the protection of 
     the Turkish occupation forces a separate state was declared 
     in the North and continues to be maintained by Turkey, 
     despite United Nations Security Council resolution 550 
     calling for its dissolution and calling on all United Nations 
     members not to recognize it. Despite United Nations Security 
     Council Resolution calling on both sides to avoid any acts 
     which will change the demographic composition of the island, 
     Turkey colonized the North by sending to Cyprus 80,000 Turks 
     from Turkey, which were installed in the properties from 
     which the Greek Cypriots were forced to leave. The Turkish 
     forces built a military line across Cyprus thus forcing a 
     military confrontation and preventing conduct between the two 
     communities.
       The massive military presence in Cyprus of 40,000 Turkish 
     troops and 400 armour cars, with air cover and naval support, 
     forces the Republic of Cyprus to maintain the National Guard, 
     to purchase arms and seek military support and joint defense 
     planning with Greece.
       I believe that the time has come, if progress is to be made 
     towards a solution of the Cyprus problem, to proceed to the 
     demilitarization of the territory of the Republic. Having 
     this in mind I addressed, on the 17th of December 1993, a 
     letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations making 
     the following offer:
       ``There is no doubt that the massive presence of Turkish 
     military forces in the occupied part of Cyprus creates 
     serious anxieties and mistrust amongst the Greek Cypriot 
     Community regarding Turkish intentions. It also imposes on 
     the Government of the Republic the need to increase the 
     defensive capabilities of the country by purchasing arms. 
     Further it makes it necessary to request military help from 
     Greece and to include Cyprus in the Greek defensive plans. 
     There are also indications that the above preparations, 
     though entirely defensive in their nature, are misinterpreted 
     and cause anxiety and mistrust within the Turkish Cypriot 
     Community regarding Greek intentions.
       ``After careful consideration, I came to the conclusion 
     that in order to brake the counter productive climate of fear 
     and mistrust and thus enhance the prospects of a negotiated 
     settlement the Government of the Republic should take the 
     following steps:
       ``(a) Repeal the National Guard Law, disband the National 
     Guard and hand all its arms and military equipment to the 
     custody of the United Nations Peace Keeping Force.
       ``(b) Undertake to maintain the Police Force of the 
     Republic at its present numerical strength armed only with 
     light personal weapons.
       ``(c) Undertake the total cost of a substantially 
     numerically increased United Nations Peace Keeping Force.
       ``(d) Agree that the United Nations Peace Keeping Force 
     will have the right of inspection to ascertain compliance 
     with the above.
       ``(e) Agree that the National Guard armour cars, armour 
     personnel vehicles and tanks, which will be handed to the 
     United Nations Peace Keeping Force for custody, can be used 
     by the United Nations Peace Keeping Force to patrol the 
     buffer zone and to prevent intrusions in it.
       ``(f) Deposit in United Nations account all money saved 
     from disbanding the National Guard and from stopping the 
     purchase of arms, after deducting the cost of the United 
     Nations Peace Keeping Force, to be used after the solution of 
     the problem for the benefit of both Communities.
       ``The above offer is made provided the Turkish side agrees 
     also that parallel to the above the Turkish Forces are 
     withdrawn from Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot armed forces 
     disband and hand their weapons and military equipment to the 
     custody of the United Nations Peace Keeping Force.
       ``I wish also to reaffirm what I have told Mr. Feissel 
     before leaving for New York i.e. that I am ready to discuss 
     the modalities regarding the implementation of the confidence 
     building measures and of course the solution of the Cyprus 
     problem.
       ``I hope Your Excellency, the Turkish side will respond 
     positively to my proposal, otherwise the only logical 
     inference to be drawn will be that the massive presence of 
     Turkish forces is not for the alleged safety of the Turkish 
     Cypriot Community, but for the perpetuation of the status quo 
     which, as stated in your report, has been created by military 
     force and is sustained by military strength and which the 
     Security Council has deemed unacceptable. Such an inference 
     will impose on my Government the need to substantially 
     increase the defensive capabilities of the Republic and to 
     enter into arrangements with Greece regarding a common 
     defensive plan.''
       Regrettably Turkey rejected my proposal.
       Coming now to the view that the failure of finding a 
     solution of the Cyprus problem is due to the lack of the 
     political will for a settlement by the Communities I have the 
     following observations.
       It is a fact that there is lack of political will by the 
     Turkish side. The Secretary-General of the United Nations in 
     his report to the Security Council document S/24830 of the 
     19th November 1992 stated that the effort to find a solution, 
     despite the intensive efforts made, failed because the 
     Turkish position was at variance with the set of ideas 
     prepared by the Secretary-General and made it clear that 
     there was a lack of political will by the Turkish side and 
     that this was the major obstacle in reaching an agreed 
     settlement.
       The Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report 
     of the 1st July 1993, document S/26026, informed the Security 
     council that despite intensive efforts and preparatory work 
     it was not found possible to secure acceptance by the Turkish 
     side of the confidence building measures and that the leader 
     of the Turkish Cypriot community had not promoted the 
     acceptance of the package of the confidence building measures 
     during his subsequent consultations in Ankara and Nicosia nor 
     did he return to the joint meeting in New York as he had 
     undertaken to do.
       Today, almost a year later, the situation is as follows in 
     the issue of the confidence-building measures: The Greek 
     Cypriot side accepted the paper prepared by the 
     Representatives of the Secretary-General of the 21st March 
     regarding the implementation of the confidence building 
     measures. Regarding the position of the parties the report 
     of the Secretary-General of the 4th of April 1994 document 
     S/1994/1330 states the following:
       ``The Leader of the Greek Cypriot community stated that, 
     while he did not like many of the changes which had been 
     introduced in the 21 March text, he was prepared to accept 
     that revised text if the Turkish Cypriot leader would do 
     likewise.
       ``Before leaving Cyprus on 23 March, Mr. Clark stated 
     publicly that he had not received from the Turkish Cypriot 
     side the agreement that he had hoped for on the 
     implementation of the package. He stated that there was still 
     time to reach an agreement before I had to submit my report 
     to the Security Council and that he hoped that news would be 
     received from the Turkish Cypriot side that would make an 
     agreement possible. He stated that Mr. Feissel would remain 
     in touch with both leaders.
       ``On 28 March, Mr. Feissel again met with the leader of the 
     Turkish Cypriot community to pursue discussion to reach an 
     agreement on the ideas for the implementation of the package 
     of confidence-building measures. At the conclusion of this 
     meeting, Mr. Feissel confirmed publicly that there had been 
     no new developments and that the Turkish Cypriot side had not 
     provided the response necessary to make an agreement on the 
     implementation of the confidence-building measures 
     possible.''
       From what has been stated so far, it is clear that the 
     Secretary-General has warned the Security Council that--
       (a) The unacceptable status quo is maintained by military 
     forces.
       (b) The failure to find a solution in November 1992 
     squarely falls on the Turkish side which did not have the 
     political will to conclude an agreement which was within 
     reach.
       (c) The failure to agree to the implementations of the 
     confidence-building measures in April 1994 also falls 
     squarely on the Turkish side.
       The Security Council has in its recent resolutions warned 
     that if no progress is made it will consider alternative 
     methods of promoting a solution. It is my firm belief that 
     the time has come for the Security Council to decide to act. 
     It must consider seriously the question of demilitarization 
     because as long as there is a massive Turkish Occupation 
     Force in Cyprus the Turkish side will continue to show lack 
     of political will for a solution to the Cyprus problem and 
     both communities will bear arms and live as potential 
     enemies.
       Despite Turkish opposition, Europe accepted our demand and 
     appointed an observer in the talks. We are happy that his 
     terms of reference are not only to keep the European Union 
     informed if progress is being made and consequently which 
     side is responsible for the lack of progress, but also to 
     inform whether the solution discussed is compatible with the 
     Acquis Communautaire. I believe also that it would give an 
     impetus to the solution of the Cyprus problem if substantive 
     talks for the accession of Cyprus to the European Union were 
     to start without delay.
       Mr. President, Members of the Assembly, ethnic differences, 
     micro-nationalism and the problems of minorities gave a rude 
     awakening to the euphoria that was created by the end of the 
     Cold War. It now seems that if we don't take immediate and 
     resolute action the issues of minorities and their rights, 
     along with the emerging wider confrontation between cultures 
     will be with us in the coming decades. Cyprus has every 
     potential to be a model of success and a source of hope in 
     our collective search for solutions. Problems of ethnic or 
     other communities are not solved by partition and forced 
     physical separation but by participation in democratic 
     institutions and effective constitutional and judicial 
     protection. Cyprus, at the crossroads of continents and 
     civilizations can be a vital bridge of communication 
     contributing to de-confrontation and understanding, provided 
     that it is itself free of internal fragmentation and 
     weakness.
       It is or dream to solve the problem of Cyprus not only 
     because this will be beneficial to both communities and to 
     the people of Cyprus irrespective of language, religion or 
     ethnicity but because we wish to bring Cyprus into the 
     European Union as a state based on the European concept of 
     democracy, freedom, justice, human rights and compliance with 
     the rule of Law.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mathews). The Senator from Delaware [Mr. 
Roth] is recognized for 10 minutes.

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