[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 87 (Friday, July 1, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 1, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZA- TION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 1840

  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, what is the pending business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is amendment number 1840.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, that is the Johnston amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the Johnston modified amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. I would suggest that we see if we could dispose of that 
amendment. I hope we could do it by voice vote.
  Mr. President, the amendment that is now pending is the Johnston-
Feinstein amendment. I do not see any need for a rollcall vote. I 
believe that amendment is going to be agreed to. We have already had a 
lot of discussion and some debate on that amendment, so I would ask 
that it be voted on by the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I would ask if the distinguished chairman 
and ranking member could possibly work with us during the vote so we 
could have some idea as to whose amendment is coming from where. There 
are several Senators with amendments, at least four or five on this 
side and several on the other side. Hopefully, I ask the distinguished 
chairman and ranking member, we could work out some order of amendments 
so we would have some idea, rather than all of us coming here and 
sitting around.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, we will work on that. I appreciate the 
suggestion.
  Mr. McCAIN. I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  If not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 1840) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.


                           amendment no. 2146

    (Purpose: To improve the reporting and investigation of sexual 
      misconduct cases involving Department of Defense personnel)

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. DeConcini] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2146.

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of title X, add the following:
            Subtitle __--Investigations of Sexual Misconduct

     SEC. 1081. DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS.

       (a) Establishment.--Chapter 4 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``Sec. 143. Director of Special Investigations

       ``(a) Appointment.--There is a Director of Special 
     Investigations who is appointed by the Secretary of Defense 
     from among civilians who have a significant level of 
     experience in criminal investigations. The Director reports 
     directly to the Secretary of Defense.
       ``(b) Senior Executive Service Position.--The position of 
     Director of Special Investigations is a Senior Executive 
     Service position. The Secretary shall designate the position 
     as a career reserved position under section 3132(b) of title 
     5.
       ``(c) Duties.--Subject to the authority, direction, and 
     control of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Special 
     Investigations shall perform the duties set forth in this 
     section and such other related duties as the Secretary may 
     prescribe.
       ``(d) Data Compilation and Reporting.--(1) The Director 
     shall obtain, compile, store, monitor, and (in accordance 
     with this section) report information on each allegation of 
     sexual misconduct of a member of the armed forces or of a 
     dependent of a member of the armed forces against a member of 
     the armed forces, against a dependent of a member of the 
     armed forces, or against a civilian not a dependent of a 
     member of the armed forces that is received by a member of 
     the armed forces or an officer or employee of the Department 
     of Defense in the official capacity of that member, officer, 
     or employee.
       ``(2) The information compiled pursuant to paragraph (1) 
     shall include the following:
       ``(A) The number of complaints containing an allegation 
     referred to in paragraph (1) that are received as described 
     in that paragraph.
       ``(B) The number of such complaints that are investigated.
       ``(C) In the case of each complaint--
       ``(i) the organization that investigated the complaint (if 
     investigated);
       ``(ii) the disposition of the complaint upon completion or 
     other termination of the investigation; and
       ``(iii) the status or results of any judicial action, 
     nonjudicial disciplinary action, or other adverse action 
     taken.
       ``(D) The number of complaints that were disposed of by 
     formal adjudication in a judicial proceeding, including--
       ``(i) the number disposed of in a court-martial;
       ``(ii) the number disposed of in a court of the United 
     States;
       ``(iii) the number disposed of in a court of a State or 
     territory of the United States or in a court of a political 
     subdivision of a State or territory of the United States;
       ``(iv) the number disposed of by a plea of guilty;
       ``(v) the number disposed of by trial on a contested basis; 
     and
       ``(vi) the number disposed of on any other basis.
       ``(E) The number of complaints that were disposed of by 
     formal adjudication in an administrative proceeding.
       ``(3) The Director shall make the information obtained and 
     compiled under this subsection available to the Secretary of 
     Defense, the Secretaries of the military departments, 
     Congress, any law enforcement agency concerned, and any court 
     concerned.
       ``(e) Direct Investigations.--The Director shall 
     investigate each allegation of sexual misconduct referred to 
     in subsection (d)--
       ``(1) that is made directly, or referred, to the Director, 
     including such an allegation that is made or referred to the 
     Director by--
       ``(A) a commander of a member of the armed forces alleged 
     to have engaged in the sexual misconduct or to have been the 
     victim of the sexual misconduct;
       ``(B) an investigative organization of the Department of 
     Defense; or
       ``(C) a victim of the alleged misconduct who is a member of 
     the armed forces or a dependent of a member of the armed 
     forces; or
       ``(2) that the Secretary directs the Director to 
     investigate.
       ``(f) Oversight and Quality Control of Other 
     Investigations.--(1) The Director shall monitor the conduct 
     of investigations by units, offices, agencies, and other 
     organizations within the Department of Defense regarding 
     allegations of sexual misconduct.
       ``(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Director may 
     inspect any investigation conducted or being conducted by any 
     other organization within the Department of Defense, review 
     the records of an investigation, and observe the conduct of 
     an ongoing investigation.
       ``(3) The Director may report to the Secretary on any 
     investigation monitored pursuant to in paragraph (1). The 
     report may include the status of the investigation, an 
     evaluation of the conduct of the investigation, and an 
     evaluation of each investigator and the investigative 
     organization involved in the investigation.
       ``(g) Powers.--In the performance of the duties set forth 
     or authorized in this section, the Director shall have the 
     following powers:
       ``(1) To have access to all records, reports, audits, 
     reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other 
     material available in the Department of Defense which relate 
     to the duties of the Director.
       ``(2) To request such information or assistance as may be 
     necessary for carrying out the Director's duties from any 
     Federal, State, or local governmental agency or unit thereof.
       ``(3) To require by subpoena the production of all 
     information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, 
     papers, and other data and documentary evidence necessary in 
     the performance of the Director's duties, which subpoena, in 
     the case of contumacy or refusal to obey, shall be 
     enforceable by order of any appropriate United States 
     district court.
       ``(4) To serve subpoenas, summons, and any judicial process 
     related to the performance of any of the Director's duties.
       ``(5) To administer to or take from any person an oath, 
     affirmation, or affidavit whenever necessary in the 
     performance of the Director's duties, which oath, 
     affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or 
     before an employee designated by the Director shall have the 
     same force and effect as if administered or taken by or 
     before an officer having a seal.
       ``(6) To have direct and prompt access to the Secretary of 
     Defense, the Secretary of a military department, and any 
     commander when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the 
     performance of the Director's duties.
       ``(7) To obtain for any victim of sexual misconduct 
     referred to in subsection (d)(1), from any facility of the 
     uniformed services or any other health care facility of the 
     Federal Government or, by contract, from any other source, 
     medical services and counseling and other mental health 
     services appropriate for treating or investigating--
       ``(A) injuries resulting from the sexual misconduct; and
       ``(B) other mental and physiological results of the sexual 
     misconduct.
       ``(h) Referrals for Prosecution.--(1) The Director may 
     refer any case of sexual misconduct described in subsection 
     (d)(1) to--
       ``(A) a United States Attorney, or another appropriate 
     official in the Department of Justice, for prosecution; or
       ``(B) to an appropriate commander within the armed forces 
     for action under chapter 47 of this title (the Uniform Code 
     of Military Justice) or other appropriate action.
       ``(2) The Director shall report each such referral to the 
     Secretary of Defense.
       ``(i) Staff.--(1) The Director shall have--
       ``(A) a staff of investigators who have extensive 
     experience in criminal investigations;
       ``(B) a staff of attorneys sufficient to provide the 
     Director, the criminal investigators, and the Director's 
     other staff personnel with legal counsel necessary for the 
     performance of the duties of the Director;
       ``(C) a staff of counseling referral specialists; and
       ``(D) such other staff as is necessary for the performance 
     of the Director's duties.
       ``(2) To the maximum extent practicable, the staff of the 
     Director shall be generally representative of the population 
     of the United States with regard to race, gender, and 
     cultural diversity.
       ``(j) Reports to Director.--Each member of the armed forces 
     and each officer or employee of the Department of Defense 
     who, in the official capacity of that member, officer, or 
     employee, receives an allegation of sexual misconduct shall 
     submit to the Director a notification of that allegation 
     together with such information as the Director may require 
     for the purpose of carrying out the Director's duties.
       ``(k) Annual Report on Sexual Misconduct.--The Secretary of 
     Defense shall submit to Congress an annual report on the 
     number and disposition of cases of sexual misconduct by 
     members of the armed forces and officers and employees of the 
     Department of Defense.
       ``(l) Definitions.--In this section:
       ``(1) The term `sexual misconduct' includes the following:
       ``(A) Sexual harassment, including any conduct involving 
     sexual harassment that--
       ``(i) in the case of conduct of a person who is subject to 
     the provisions of chapter 47 of this title (the Uniform Code 
     of Military Justice), comprises a violation of a provision of 
     subchapter X of such chapter (relating to the punitive 
     articles of such Code) or an applicable regulation, 
     directive, or guideline regarding sexual harassment that is 
     prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of a 
     military department; and
       ``(ii) in the case of an employee of the Department of 
     Defense or a dependent subject to the jurisdiction of the 
     Secretary of Defense or of the Secretary of a military 
     department, comprises a violation of a regulation, directive, 
     or guideline referred to in clause (i) that is applicable to 
     such employee or dependent.
       ``(B) Rape.
       ``(C) Sexual assault.
       ``(D) Sexual battery.
       ``(2) The term `complaint', with respect to an allegation 
     of sexual misconduct, includes a report of such 
     allegation.''.
       (b) Table of Sections.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of chapter 4 of such title is amended by adding at 
     the end the following:
``143. Director of Special Investigations.''.

     SEC. 1082. CRIMINAL FAILURE TO REPORT SEXUAL MISCONDUCT.

       (a) Offenses.--Chapter 109A of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) by redesignating section 2245 as section 2246;
       (2) by inserting after section 2244 the following new 
     section:

     ``Sec.  2245. Failure to report sexual misconduct

       ``(a) Failure To Act on Allegation of Criminal Sexual 
     Misconduct.--An officer or employee of the Department of 
     Defense or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States 
     who, in the official capacity of the officer, employee, or 
     member--
       ``(1) receives an allegation of criminal sexual misconduct 
     of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or of a 
     dependent of a member of the Armed Forces of the United 
     States against a member of the Armed Forces of the United 
     States, against a dependent of a member of the Armed Forces 
     of the United States, or against a civilian not a dependent 
     of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States;
       ``(2) is required by law to determine whether to initiate 
     an investigation of, or to determine whether to take 
     disciplinary action in the case of, the allegation; and
       ``(3) fails to submit a notification of the allegation to 
     the Director of Special Investigations of the Department of 
     Defense and to the immediate employment supervisor or 
     immediate commander, as the case may be, of the alleged 
     offender, shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, fined 
     under this title, or both.
       ``(b) Failure To Act on Allegation of Civil Sexual 
     Misconduct.--An officer or employee of the Department of 
     Defense or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States 
     who, in the official capacity of the officer, employee, or 
     member--
       ``(1) receives an allegation of civil sexual misconduct of 
     a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or of a 
     dependent of a member of the Armed Forces of the United 
     States against a member of the Armed Forces of the United 
     States, against a dependent of a member of the Armed Forces 
     of the United States, or against a civilian not a dependent 
     of a member of the Armed Forces of the United States;
       ``(2) is required by law to determine whether to initiate 
     an investigation of, or to determine whether to take 
     disciplinary action in the case of, the allegation; and
       ``(3) fails to submit a notification of the allegation to 
     the Director of Special Investigations of the Department of 
     Defense and to the immediate employment supervisor or 
     immediate commander, as the case may be, of the alleged 
     offender,
     shall be imprisoned not more than 1 year, fined under this 
     title, or both.''; and
       (3) in section 2246, as redesignated by paragraph (1)--
       (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (2);
       (B) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (5) and 
     inserting a semicolon; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(6) the term `criminal sexual misconduct' means engaging 
     in a sexual act or sexual contact in circumstances such that 
     the act or conduct constitutes a criminal offense under this 
     chapter, other Federal law, or State law; and
       ``(7) the term `civil sexual misconduct' means engaging in 
     a sexual act, sexual conduct, or other activity of a sexual 
     nature in violation of a statute, rule, order, or other 
     lawful authority that prohibits the activity but does not 
     authorize imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for a 
     violation.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of such chapter is amended by striking the item 
     relating to section 2245 and inserting the following:

``2245. Failure to report sexual misconduct.
``2246. Definitions for chapter.''.

       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 506(f)(3)(B) of the 
     Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 
     3756(f)(3)(B)) is amended by striking out ``section 2245(1)'' 
     and inserting in lieu thereof ``section 2246(1)''.

     SEC. 1083. PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION MATTERS.

       (a) Performance Evaluations and Benefits.--(1) The 
     Secretary of Defense shall prescribe in regulations a 
     requirement that the commitment of an officer or employee of 
     the Department of Defense and a member of the Armed Forces of 
     the United States to the elimination of sexual harassment in 
     the officer's, employee's, or member's place of work or duty 
     and at installations and other facilities of the Department 
     of Defense be one of the factors considered in--
       (A) the preparation of the evaluations of the officer's, 
     employee's, or member's performance of work or duties;
       (B) the determination of the appropriateness of a promotion 
     of the officer, employee, or member; and
       (C) the determination of the appropriateness of selecting 
     the officer, employee, or member to receive a financial award 
     for performance of work or duties.
       (2) The Secretary shall submit to Congress an annual report 
     on the implementation of the regulations required by 
     paragraph (1). The report shall contain an assessment of the 
     effects of the implementation of such regulations on the 
     number, extent, and seriousness of the cases of sexual 
     harassment in the Department of Defense. The annual report 
     under this paragraph shall be separate from the annual report 
     required by section 143(k) of title 10, United States Code, 
     as added by section 1081.
       (b) Eligibility for Promotions and Awards.--The Secretary 
     of Defense and the Secretary of the military department 
     concerned may not approve for presentation of a financial 
     award for performance of work or duties or for promotion any 
     officer or employee of the Department of Defense or any 
     member of the Armed Forces of the United States who--
       (1) has been convicted of a criminal offense involving 
     sexual misconduct; or
       (2) has received any other disciplinary action or adverse 
     personnel action on the basis of having engaged in sexual 
     misconduct.

     SEC. 1084. PROTECTION OF PERSONS REPORTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT.

       (a) Regulations of the Secretary of Defense.--The Secretary 
     of Defense shall prescribe regulations that prohibit officers 
     and employees of the Department of Defense from retaliating 
     or taking any adverse personnel action against any other 
     officer or employee of the Department of Defense or any 
     member of the Armed Forces of the United States for reporting 
     sexual misconduct by an officer or employee of the Department 
     of Defense or a member of the Armed Forces or for providing 
     information in an investigation, disciplinary action, or 
     adverse personnel action in the case of an allegation of 
     sexual misconduct by any other such officer, employee, or 
     member. The regulations shall include sanctions for violation 
     of the regulations.
       (b) Regulations of a Secretary of a Military Department.--
     (1) The Secretary of each military department shall prescribe 
     regulations that prohibit members of the armed force under 
     the jurisdiction of that Secretary from retaliating or taking 
     any adverse personnel action against any officer or employee 
     of the Department of Defense or any member of the Armed 
     Forces of the United States for reporting sexual misconduct 
     by any other officer or employee of the Department of Defense 
     or any other member of the Armed Forces or for providing 
     information in an investigation, disciplinary action, or 
     adverse personnel action in the case of an allegation of 
     sexual misconduct by any other such officer, employee, or 
     member.
       (2) A violation of the regulations prescribed pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) shall be punishable under section 892 of title 
     10, United States Code (article 92 of the Uniform Code of 
     Military Justice).

     SEC. 1085. SEXUAL MISCONDUCT DEFINED.

       In this subtitle, the term ``sexual misconduct'' has the 
     meaning given that term in section 143(l) of title 10, United 
     States Code, as added by section 1081.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Yes, I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard.
  The legislative clerk continued with the call of the roll.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. 
Wellstone, was here and wanted to make a statement. I was going to 
yield to him so I will proceed.
  Mr. President, I sent an amendment to the desk that I take very 
seriously and I hope my colleagues will bear with me while I talk about 
it for just a few minutes.
  Women in the U.S. Armed Forces are being subjected daily to sexual 
harassment ranging from verbal abuse to forcible rape. Who does the 
harassing. Men whom these women trust as fellow comrades-in-arms or--
even worse--superiors who use their authority to sexually coerce lower 
echelon military women and then intimidate them into silence.
  When victims of such abuse attempt to report it to higher military 
officials, they find their experience discounted as of minor 
importance, or as part of being in the military. The Tailhook scandal 
is only one example of the military's efforts to cover up and discount 
the magnitude of the sexual abuse problems of military women. Hundreds 
of individual, if not thousands of incidents occur every year. Both the 
incidents themselves and the subsequent cavalier treatment of the 
victims are unconscionable and can not be tolerated.
  Mr. President, I sat in horror 2 years ago as I heard Reservist 
Jackie Ortiz testify before the Committee on Veterans Affairs. Ms. 
Ortiz was sodomized by her company first sergeant while on duty in 18 
miles northwest of the Iraqi border during Operation Desert Storm. Ms. 
Ortiz immediately reported the incident. Instead of providing the 
immediate medical attention she required, her commanders placed her on 
unneeded guard duty for 6 straight hours and, then for 12 hours at a 
time. When the CID investigator finally arrived, Jackie was subjected 
to 6 hours of interrogation during which she was required to describe 
the incident in graphic detail time after time after time. For the next 
2\1/2\ months, Jackie remained under the command of her attacker, 
requiring face to face confrontation almost daily, and continued denial 
of medical attention. Despite the first sergeant's later confession, he 
received a promotion and was allowed to retire. Jackie received 
counseling from the Chaplain, the tentmate of the company physician.
  This is a real honest to goodness story, what happened to one of our 
military personnel in the Persian Gulf war.
  The committee that held those hearings under the distinguished 
chairman, Senator Cranston, also heard appalling testimony indicating 
that one study conducted by Dr. Jessica Wolfe showing that nearly 29 
percent of 113 Vietnam Era women had fallen victim to attempted or 
actual sexual assault, and that the rate is probably higher for war 
zone service. This is more than double the experience of American women 
as a whole. Not one of these women was raped by the enemy.

  Mr. President, it is true that the survey sample was small, but I am 
afraid Dr. Wolfe's study accurately reflects what is going on in the 
military and we must put a stop to it. The fact that no reliable data 
exists highlights the shocking indifference to this problem. Even if 
the 29 percent incident rate of that survey is ignored, the 1988 
Department of Defense own study of women who were on active duty 
indicated that 5 percent of the respondents reported actual rape or 
attempted rape or sexual assault. Even one applies that very 
conservative estimate to all women in the military, as many as 11,000 
military women would have been victims in 1 year alone.
  Mr. President, the Department of Defense does not have comparable 
crime records for the various services and the services themselves do 
not maintain consistent data on sexual violence. Moreover, the DOD has 
yet to request sufficient funds to achieve timely compliance with the 
National Incident-Based Reporting System. While I applaud the efforts 
to date of Assistant Secretary of Personnel and Readiness Dorn on the 
integration of the various services' criminal data reporting systems, I 
am advised that the Department has not developed a specific plan or 
identified resources to achieve compliance with by June 1, 1995, as 
required by the Uniform Federal Crime Reporting Act of 1988.
  Mr. President, I had thought, since the hearings before the Veterans 
Committee and the introduction of my bill in the 102nd Congress calling 
for an independent Office of Criminal Investigations, that the military 
could have made some progress in the reeducation of its personnel.
  In response to the Tailhook affair, the Navy Department reported then 
that it had implemented stand down orders which included meaningful 
programs to sensitize those ``good ole' boys''. The Secretary of the 
Navy unequivocally stated that the incidence of sexual misconduct, no 
matter how slight would quote, ``not be tolerated.'' The transformation 
of the Navy appeared, for the moment, to be genuinely under way. 
However, the cultural change was short-lived. Almost a year later 
negative signs resurfaced and the long-awaited inspector general's 
report remained stalled for months in a quagmire of doubletalk about 
the lack of a Secretary of the Navy of general counsel to release the 
report. That is the reason, we were told, that the report could not be 
released.
  While Air Force Secretary Widnall did come to the rescue of Sergeant 
Martinez in early June, the fact that a rescue had to occur underscores 
the basic problem here. No apology was provided and her superiors have 
not been reprimanded for retaliation against her for simply testifying 
before the House Armed Service Committee on harassment in the military. 
Moreover, her career is irreparably scarred. In the words of Sgt. 
Martinez herself, ``there's nothing to prevent something like this from 
happening again.''
  Boy, that is an understatement. I ask unanimous consent that at this 
point in the Record I may insert some articles from the Washington Post 
and New York Times.
  There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed 
in the Record, as follows:

                [From the Washington Post, June 8, 1994]

                 Marine Corps Drops Final Tailhook Case

       The Marine Corps has dismissed the last pending military 
     case stemming from the Tailhook scandal of sexual misconduct 
     at a naval aviators' convention.
       Lt. Gen. Charles C. Krulak dismissed the case against an 
     unidentified officer for insufficient evidence, according to 
     a Marine spokesman, 2nd Lt. Michael Neumann. Neumann declined 
     to provide further details.
       The dismissal, which took place last week, ends the year-
     long Marine Corps investigation into actions of its aviators 
     at the 1991 Tailhook convention in Las Vegas.
       More than 80 women allegedly were assaulted or harassed by 
     drunken Marine and Navy aviators at the convention, according 
     to Pentagon investigators.
       The Navy ended its investigation in February. The Pentagon 
     had referred 119 cases to Vice Adm. J. Paul Reason, the 
     Navy's top Tailhook authority. None of those cases resulted 
     in a successful court-martial.
       The Marine Corps reviewed 21 cases referred by Pentagon 
     investigators, and developed one additional case after 
     reviewing the Pentagon findings.
       Eight cases were settled in nonjudicial hearings. The 
     Marine Corps declined to say what punishments were given.
       Nine officers underwent extensive counseling, and one 
     officer received ``adverse material'' in his personnel file 
     and resigned. The other cases were dropped.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, Feb. 10, 1994]

                  Remaining Tailhook Case Is Dismissed

       Quantico, VA, February 9.--The remaining case stemming from 
     the drunken debauchery at the 1991 Tailhook convention was 
     dismissed because of insufficient evidence, an attorney said 
     today.
       Of 140 cases stemming from the scandal, no one has been 
     court-martialed. About 50 Navy and Marine officers received 
     administrative discipline.
       Quantico Marine Corps Base said Lt. Gen. Charles C. Krulak 
     had adjudicated the case against a Marine Corps lieutenant 
     colonel accused of misconduct without imposing punishment. It 
     did not identify the colonel, but the attorney for Marine Lt. 
     Col. Cass D. Howell identified his client as the defendant.
       Howell's attorney, David L. Beck of Knoxville, Tenn., said 
     all charges against Howell were dismissed Tuesday because of 
     insufficient evidence.
       ``We're just pleased with the results,'' Beck said. ``He's 
     maintained his innocence throughout.''
       Howell had been charged with lying and obstructing justice 
     during the Tailhook probe. He also had been charged with 
     assaulting a Tailhook investigator and with spending a night 
     during the convention at the Las Vegas Hilton with a woman 
     other than his wife.
       Pentagon investigators concluded that 83 women were 
     assaulted or molested at the convention. Many of the women 
     were molested on the hotel's third floor, where men lined the 
     hallway and grabbed women as they tried to pass.
       Krulak handled the cases against Marines charged in 
     Tailhook. On Tuesday, a military judge, Capt. William T. Vest 
     Jr., dismissed Tailhook charges against three Navy officers.
       Vest concluded that despite denials by Chief of Naval 
     Operations Frank B. Kelso II, Kelso witnessed sexual 
     misconduct at the Tailhook convention. Vest also said that 
     Kelso tried to limit the investigation of Tailhook to junior 
     officers to protect himself.
       The dismissals could mean that no one will face court-
     martial for Tailhook.
       The admiral handling Navy Tailhook cases, Vice Adm. J. Paul 
     Reason, has until Friday to decide whether to appeal Vest's 
     decision to throw out the charges against the three Navy 
     officers.
                                  ____


                [From the New York Times, June 10, 1994]

        Air Force Sergeant in a Sex Complaint Tells of Reprisals

                           (By Eric Schmitt)

       Washington, June 9.--Just a week after the Navy was forced 
     to apologize to a lieutenant who had suffered retaliation for 
     reporting sexual harassment to her superiors, the Air Force 
     today found itself in a similarly embarrassing spot.
       House members were furious and senior Air Force officials 
     were scrambling to head off potential trouble after an Air 
     Force sergeant said her commander had retaliated against her 
     after she returned from testifying before Congress in March 
     about sexual harassment.
       The sergeant, Zenaida Martinez, a 27-year-old military 
     police officer at Mildenhall Air Base in England, said in a 
     telephone interview today that shortly after she returned 
     from Washington, base officials interrogated her about 
     discussions she had had with civilian lawyers to prepare for 
     the March 9 hearing before the House Armed Services 
     Committee.
       She refused to tell investigators anything, citing lawyer-
     client privilege. As a result, she said, her superiors in 
     England last week told her that she was under a criminal 
     investigation for actions related to travel expenses, namely, 
     taking a $200 taxi from a London airport instead of a free 
     military shuttle bus. The sergeant said she had taken the 
     taxi after an airport official told her she had missed the 
     last bus to the base.
       Air Force officials in Washington refused to comment today 
     on whether the base's decision to start a criminal inquiry 
     into the cab fare was appropriate or to explain why her 
     actions could have been a criminal violation.
       The investigation into Sergeant Martinez's travel expenses 
     was directed by the base's inspector general, Col. Dennis 
     Adams, whom she has sued. The lawsuit accuses him of failing 
     to investigate her earlier allegations of sexual harassment 
     and reprisals for reporting the harassment--the very reason 
     she was summoned to testify.
       ``This is astounding,'' said Representative Patricia 
     Schroeder, a Colorado Democrat on the House Armed Services 
     Committee. ``This looks to me like a classic case of 
     reprisal. I can't believe this just goes on and on and on.''
       After a day filled with high-level meetings, Air Force 
     Secretary Sheila E. Widnall today invited Sergeant Martinez 
     for a private meeting in Washington as early as Monday to 
     discuss the matter. ``I want to assure her of our commitment 
     to eliminate all forms of discrimination, including sexual 
     harassment, and to eliminate any actual or perceived 
     reprisal,'' Ms. Widnall said in a statement.
       But the Air Force has refused to cancel the criminal 
     inquiry, saying it is sufficient for now to put it on hold, 
     even though senior Air Force officials do not dispute the 
     sergeant's version of events. Even if Ms. Widnall resolves 
     the matter, the Defense Department's Inspector General has 
     agreed to Sergeant Martinez's request to review the entire 
     incident.


                       ``It's all disappointing''

       ``I'm happy to go meet with the Secretary, but this whole 
     thing is not what I imagined when I joined the Air Force,'' 
     said Sergeant Martinez, who enlisted in 1986. ``It's all 
     disappointing and disheartening.''
        With the example of the Navy's action on a similar case 
     looming large, Ms. Widnall and her top aides are clearly 
     trying to extricate themselves from the embarrassing episode.
       ``On a case with this much visibility, the base commander 
     should have made his staff car available,'' a senior Air 
     Force official said, voicing exasperation.
       Navy Secretary John H. Dalton last week personally 
     apologized to Lieut. Darlene Simmons, a Navy lawyer who 
     testified at the same hearing with Sergeant Martinez, for the 
     harassment she experienced and the retaliation from her 
     commanders after she reported it.
       Sergeant Martinez's troubles all started in 1990, when she 
     said her master sergeant solicited her for sex, offering to 
     ``discuss my `career' after hours.'' When he persisted, 
     Sergeant Martinez said, she reported him to her commander but 
     encountered only ``delays and diversions.''
       Two years later, she said another sergeant in her unit 
     harassed her by ``explicitly describing the benefits of 
     having a sexual relationship with him.'' The man ``made me 
     understand that if I refused, my career would suffer.''
       When she did rebuff his advances, she said, the tires on 
     her car were slashed and wheel bolts loosened. ``The more 
     complaints I made, the more trouble I got into with my chain 
     of command in the squadron,'' Sergeant Martinez told 
     lawmakers in March.
       Sergeant Martinez said that she was given poor grades on 
     evaluation and that her chances for promotion plummeted. She 
     said she discovered that documents accusing her of poor 
     conduct had been placed in her personnel file without her 
     knowledge. The sergeant said she then learned she was the 
     focus of the official inquiry, not the men whom she reported 
     to.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, the list of known sexual assault and 
harassment casualties reads near as long as the call of quorum of the 
Senate--Lt. Paula Coughlin, Specialist Alexis Colin, Sgt. Zenaida 
Martinez, Lt. Darlene Simmons, Staff Sergeant Carol Furman, Private 
Pamela Clemm, Reservist Jackie Ortiz and Seaman Apprentice Mary Kelley 
Richard, Specialist Barbara Franco. Countless others have contacted my 
office, but requested that their identity be withheld after they have 
seen how other women had been treated. Actually, they said to me in 
more than one case how they felt they had been tortured by their 
professed comrades in arms for coming forward and reporting these 
abuses.
  Mr. President, as most Members in this body know, at least 83 women 
and 7 men were sexually harassed and physically abused during 
Tailhook's 35th annual convention. About half the 140 cases were 
dismissed for lack of evidence, 40-45 received letters of reprimand, 
but no courts martial were taken. Thirty-two Navy admirals and one 
Marine general were cited for failure to stop the abuses; all but two 
received nonpunitive letters of reprimand. Seven admirals lost their 
commands, were disciplined, or took early retirements in Tailhook's 
wake. And just 3 weeks ago today, the Marine Corps announced the 
dismissal of the last pending military case arising from the Tailhook 
scandal of sexual misconduct.
  Mr. President, when I heard that not one person accused of sexual 
misconduct went to trial, much less convicted, it sent a cold chill up 
my spine, and I will not forget it. I felt deeply saddened for the 
women in uniform who are victims and who will be victims and may be 
victims right now. Mr. President, who will these defenders of 
our liberty turn to now that they know that even all the publicity in 
the world nor a massive IG investigation will not help to guarantee 
their safety and most surely will not protect their careers, if they 
are a victim and the chances are very great that they will be.

  Sadly, the problem can be summed up into one tiny phrase, the U.S. 
military ``still just doesn't get it'', and that is the essence of my 
concern.
  Mr. President, before I begin the explanation of my simple bill, I 
need to quickly dismiss a memorandum in opposition to my amendment 
produced by the same office whose Tailhook investigation yielded no 
court martials which was circulated to some Senate offices, but not 
mine. As I am almost certain that my friend and colleague from Georgia 
will submit this memo for the Record, I would like to take a couple of 
moments to rebut the points made in this flawed analysis of the bill.
  First, this memorandum argues that my legislation would usurp and 
disrupt the operations of the DOD Inspector General and cause confusion 
as to which office has primary criminal and civil investigative 
jurisdiction. This argument grossly exaggerates the intent of this 
legislation beyond reasonable bounds and greatly offends me. This new 
Office of Special Investigations has no independent authority to 
conduct investigations. This legislation clearly states in unequivocal 
terms in section 143, paragraph (c) that ``subject to the authority, 
direction and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of this 
office shall perform the duties set forth in this section * * *.'' This 
section dictates that this office shall only obtain, compile, store, 
monitor, and report information on each allegation of misconduct. In 
other words, it audits the investigations conducted by military and DOD 
entities with such primary jurisdiction. In short, this argument in the 
memorandum signed by DOD Deputy Inspector General Derek J. Vander 
Schaaf is clear misreading of this proposed legislation.
  And I am disappointed that it would result in this kind of subterfuge 
to oppose a legislative solution to the outlandish problem within our 
military.
  Last, the memorandum claims that this new office could serve no 
beneficial purpose and would duplicate the Defense criminal 
investigative organizations oversight functions of IG, DOD. Mr. 
President, the IG, DOD, is incapable of providing any meaningful 
analysis given it lacks the raw data required to competently satisfy 
those responsibilities. No entity currently has such information; it 
does not exist and the DOD has yet to request the estimated $37 million 
required to integrate the various Defense criminal investigative 
organizations data. So here we have an instance where DOD has not even 
asked for the funds to implement what we have told them to do. 
Moreover, no entity can fulfill this function until it has adequate 
data until from military officials receiving the initial report from 
the victim.
  Until those officials receiving the reports are under the threat of 
criminal or civil penalties for failure to provide such data as this 
legislation requires, I contend this data will never exist or be 
produced because it has not been, and not even the money has been asked 
for so that it could be forthcoming.
  The IG-DOD also does not possess the funding resources or manpower to 
provide the specialized training required to respond to the 
deficiencies in the individual services branch investigative 
organizations. In short, the memorandum circulated here to discredit 
this amendment to some Senate offices--but not the courtesy to send one 
to me, we had to scrape and find one by accident almost--fails to offer 
any reasonable argument in opposition to the pending legislation.
  I am offended by its characterization and sweeping misstatements of 
fact. I hope the Senator from Georgia might not even rely on it.
  Mr. President, I began my work on this problem well before the 
Tailhook scandal blanketed the airwaves and front pages across this 
Nation in the spring of 1992. I was troubled by the number of 
constituents--we have many bases and defense establishments in 
Arizona--who were seeking my assistance because their chain of commands 
were unwilling to help victims of sexual misconduct and harassment. I 
approached the issue as I would any other. I sought the counsel of 
experts in the field. My staff was briefed by dozens of law enforcement 
investigators and prosecutors. As a former county attorney and member 
of the Judge Advocate General Corps of the U.S. Army, I also brought 
some firsthand experience.
  While the scandal served as a catalyst for more inquiry, it 
considerably hampered my investigation and retarded the receipt of 
crucial data on sexual violence. From the beginning, I sensed that the 
principal problem was systemic both in terms of investigation and 
prosecution.
  Some policymakers, including the House Armed Services chairman then, 
Chairman Aspin, had called for stripping the services of jurisdiction 
over these types of crimes, taking away all jurisdiction over sexual 
harassment or sexual misconduct. I did not concur with such actions 
because I thought it would be counterproductive. We need to work within 
the military and within the Defense Department.
  I also believe such a proposal would undermine military readiness and 
delay responsiveness to the problem in the chain of command. Most 
importantly, my experience as a former prosecutor had long ago taught 
me that the immediate investigations and evidence collection are of 
paramount importance to effective law enforcement in developing a case, 
if there is one to be developed. Thus, the various proposals for 
elimination of local jurisdiction over such investigation would be 
prohibitively expensive and would actually hinder, not enhance, 
prosecution.
  Mr. President, I instead sought to enhance the ability of each of the 
military investigators by creating a cooperative, supplemental 
investigative cadre of seasoned, experienced, Federal-civilian 
investigators to assist in an investigation when called upon, and, more 
importantly, to audit the handling of such cases.
  The legislation before the Senate today, in my judgment, is the 
product of many years of effort of trying to put together something 
real. Make no mistake. This legislation will not solve the problem of 
sexual misconduct and harassment and rape in the military. If it had 
been in place in 1991, I do not believe that the Tailhook scandal would 
have occurred.
  However, Mr. President, in my search for a solution I unveiled one of 
the biggest problems; that the virtual dearth of raw data on sexual 
misconduct is not available. I discovered that despite numerous 
congressional directives, reliable data on the problem of rape, other 
sexual assaults, and sexual harassment against military personnel and 
civilians by military personnel, no uniform collected data existed 
anywhere.
  In fact, the Senate Armed Services Committee itself criticized the 
Department of Defense in 1983 for its utter failure and apathy over the 
collection of crime data. In its report, report No. 980-53, at page 6, 
lines 30-32, it states that the committee ``was concerned about the 
need for an improved data base for analyzing military justice issues. 
The committee experts from the Department of Defense working with the 
Code of Military Justice Committee suggested the establishment of a 
uniform process and format to collect such data on key operational 
military justice indicators that will permit useful analysis of 
military justice trends and issues.''
  It is too bad that in 1983 we did not legislate something. Maybe this 
would not have occurred.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert a copy of the 
charter of the data collection working group of the Joint Service 
Committee on Military Justice at an appropriate place in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

   Charter of the Data Collection Working Group of the Joint-Service 
                     Committee on Military Justice


                                purpose

       The purpose of this chapter is to state the purpose for 
     which the Working Group is appointed and the goals which the 
     Working Group seeks to achieve.


                               background

       In S. Rep. No. 53, 98th Cong., lst sess. 6, 30-32 (1983), 
     the Senate Armed Services Committee stated that it ``was 
     concerned about the need for an improved data base for 
     analyzing military justice issues. The Committee expects the 
     Secretary of Defense, working with the Code Committee, to 
     establish a uniform process and format to collect data on key 
     operational military justice indicators that will permit 
     useful analysis of military justice trends and issues.'' 
     Consequently, the General Counsel, Department of Defense, 
     directed the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice to 
     establish a separate working group to study the matter and to 
     make recommendations to the Code Committee not later than 30 
     June 1994.


                                charter

       The separate working group shall hereafter be known as the 
     Data Collection Working Group of the Joint Service Committee 
     on Military Justice. Its short title will be the ``Data 
     Collection Working Group.'' The Data Collection Working Group 
     will be composed of representatives of the following: The 
     Judge Advocates General, the Director, Judge Advocate 
     Division, USMC, and the General Counsel of the Coast Guard.
       It shall be the function of the Data Collection Working 
     Group to study each service's military justice data 
     collection system and to evaluate the systems in light of the 
     concern expressed in S. Rep. No. 53. The Group shall endeavor 
     to identify the existing major information problems or 
     difficulties related thereto, and submit recommendations for 
     establishing a uniform process and format among the services 
     for collecting data on key operational military justice 
     indicators, which will produce information permitting useful 
     analysis by the Secretary of Defense, the armed services, and 
     Congress, of military justice problems, trends, and issues.

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, however, due to the tireless pursuit 
and patience of some in my staff, particularly Tim Gearan, and two 
interns, Matt Burnham and Neal Effron and a law school professor that 
was extremely helpful, seeking data to conduct a study on rape, I 
believe we have been able to piece together landmark evaluation of 
criminal sexual misconduct by military personnel. The preliminary 
finding of this study was prepared by Duke University law professor 
Madeline Morris.
  The findings raise serious questions about the problem of sexual 
misconduct in the military. The findings show that after controlling 
for age and gender, rates of violent crime appeared lower among the 
military than among the civilian population. However, in the most 
recent available data--and, believe me, it is hard to come by, as I 
pointed out--dating 1986 through 1992, the rate of reduction in the 
military rape rate is far less than among civilians. Actually, it is 
several times less, and the difference is highly significant.
  In contrast, the rate of reduction for murder non-negligent 
manslaughter, or aggravated assault, is consistent with the civilian 
rate of reduction. The preliminary finding of the study which has been 
validated by some of the country's best statisticians, including an FBI 
statistician, raises the urgent question of why are military services 
less effective in reducing rape than in reducing other violent crimes?
  The amendment I have offered today that is pending, would provide the 
raw data necessary to answer many of the questions raised by Professor 
Morris.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to enter a statement by 
Professor Morris in support of this legislation into the Record at the 
appropriate place.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 Statement of Prof. Madeline Morris, Duke Law School, on the DeConcini 
    Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994 To 
Establish Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense the Position of 
       Director of Special Investigations and for Other Purposes

                                   I

       Sexual abuse--including sexual harassment, sexual assault, 
     and rape--by members of our armed forces is a cause for 
     serious concern. Several recent commentators have suggested 
     that the problem of sexual abuse within the U.S. military is 
     one of substantial proportions.\1\ Several witnesses at 
     hearings before the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs in 
     1992 stated that the extent of sexual assault within the U.S. 
     military is underestimated because reporting is informally 
     discouraged, and because reports that are made are too 
     frequently swept aside.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Footnotes at and of article.
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       In fact, too little is known about the extent of sexual 
     assault by military personnel because little data collection 
     has been done on the issue.\3\ A large-scale study of active 
     duty military personnel conducted by the Defense Manpower 
     Data Center in 1988 found that five percent of the female and 
     one percent of the male personnel responding stated that they 
     had been the victims of actual or attempted rape or sexual 
     assault during the previous year.\4\ The study indicates that 
     the majority of perpetrators of all forms of sexual abuse 
     reported were other military personnel.\5\ However, the 
     purpose of the study was to measure victimization of military 
     personnel. It therefore did not seek to estimate rates of 
     sexual abuse perpetration by military personnel. It thus did 
     not, for example, examine sexual assault of civilians, 
     American or otherwise, by military personnel.
       A 1989 Navy study of sexual harassment rendered similar 
     results to the 1988 Defense Manpower Data Center study.\6\ 
     However, it too sought to measure victimization of rather 
     than perpetration by military personnel. For that reason, the 
     Navy study shared with the Defense Manpower Data Center study 
     the limitations noted above.
       A series of articles, cumulatively entitled ``Rape in the 
     Ranks: An Investigation into Rape in the U.S. Armed Forces,'' 
     was published by the Orange County Register in 1992. These 
     materials address the issue of perpetration of rape by 
     military personnel,\7\ and make some comparisons with 
     civilian rates.\8\ However, the materials are not purported 
     to represent a systematic study nor to control for the gender 
     and age differences in military and civilian populations. For 
     those reasons, the Orange County Register materials, while 
     providing some insights, must be viewed with caution.
       I am currently completing a study comparing the rape 
     proneness of military and civilian populations.\9\ Toward 
     that end, the study compares the rates of rape and other 
     violent crime by male U.S. military personnel and civilians, 
     in peacetime and during World War II (WWII).\10\ Some 
     preliminary findings from that study follow.\11\
       The study of military and civilian crime rates during World 
     War II (WWII) allows for a measurement of rape proneness of 
     military personnel in the combat context. The WWII data 
     suggest that rape rates follow different patterns from the 
     rates of other violent crimes in war, rising in peak violent 
     crime periods very disproportionately to the rates of 
     homicide and aggravated assaults.
       Specifically, during the breakout across France, August and 
     September, 1944, the average monthly murder/non-negligent 
     manslaughter rate of U.S. Army personnel in the European 
     Theater of Operations (ETO) was about half (47%) of the U.S. 
     male civilian rate, and the average monthly ETO aggravated 
     assault rate was about one sixth (18%) of the U.S. male 
     civilian rate. During the same period, the ETO rape rate was 
     2.86 times the U.S. male civilian rate. (All crime rate 
     comparisons are made after controlling for the age structures 
     of the two populations.)
       The relative crime rate pattern during the breakout into 
     Germany was very similar to the pattern during the breakout 
     across France. The rates of all three types of crimes 
     examined rose to even higher levels during the German 
     breakout than during the French breakout. But the relative 
     relationship of the three crime rates was strikingly similar 
     to the two periods: In each instance the increase in rape was 
     far greater than that in either murder/non-negligent 
     manslaughter or aggravated assault. During the period of the 
     breakout across Germany, March and April, 1945, the average 
     monthly ETO murder/non-negligent manslaughter rate was 
     essentially equal to the U.S. male civilian rate, and the 
     average monthly ETO aggravated assault rate was about one 
     quarter (27%) of the male civilian rate. During the same 
     period, the ETO rape rate was 3.66 times the male civilian 
     rate.
       The wartime data might seem to suggest that perhaps some 
     feature of combat itself tends to elevate rape rates far more 
     than rates of other violent crime. However, study of 
     peacetime data suggests that the features of combat cannot 
     fully explain the phenomenon of rape proneness in military 
     organizations.
       The results of the peacetime (1987-92)\12\ study, in short, 
     are as follows. First, the rates of violent crime (murder/
     non-negligent manslaughter, aggravated assault, and rape) are 
     lower, after controlling for age, among the male military 
     than among the male civilian population. Second, however, the 
     diminution in military rape rates from civilian rape rates is 
     less--several times less--than the diminution in the rates of 
     the other violent crimes. In other words, military rape rates 
     are reduced far less from civilian levels than military rates 
     of other violent crime.
       During the period 1987-1992, on yearly average, the Army's 
     murder/non-negligent manslaughter rate was about a fifth 
     (19%) of the civilian rate, its aggravated assault rate was 
     about a sixth (18%) of the civilian rate, and its rape rate 
     was approximately half (47%) of the civilian rate. For the 
     Navy, on yearly average, the murder/non-negligent 
     manslaughter rate was one fourteenth (7%) of the civilian 
     rate, the aggravated assault rate was one twenty-fifth (4%) 
     of the civilian rate, and the rape rate was approximately one 
     fifth (19%) of the civilian rate. For the Marine Corps, on 
     yearly average, the murder/non-negligent manslaughter rate 
     was approximately one eighth (13%) of the civilian rate, the 
     aggravated assault rate was one twenty-fifth (4%) of the 
     civilian rate, and the rape rate was approximately one fourth 
     (27%) of the civilian rate. For the same years, the Air Force 
     murder/non-negligent manslaughter rate was one twentieth (5%) 
     of the civilian rate, its aggravated assault rate was one 
     fiftieth (2%) of the civilian rate, and its rape rate was one 
     fifth (20%) of the civilian rate.
       Thus, military rape rates are diminished far less from 
     civilian levels than are military rates of other violent 
     crime. To simplify presentation, I have combined the murder/
     non-negligent manslaughter and aggravated assault data into 
     an index of ``other-violent-crime.'' Military populations' 
     diminution of other-violent-crime rates from civilian levels 
     can now usefully be compared with their diminution of rape 
     rates from civilian levels.
       On yearly average, the diminution in other-violent-crime in 
     the Army exceeded the diminution in rape by a multiple of 
     2.62. That is, the Army's ratio of other-violent-crime 
     diminution to rape diminution was 2.62:1. Or, put 
     differently, the Army diminution in rape rates from civilian 
     levels was only 38% of the Army diminution of other-violent-
     crime from civilian levels. The diminution in other-violent-
     crime in the Navy exceeded the diminution in rape by a 
     multiple of 4.93. Thus, the Navy diminution in rape rates 
     from civilian levels was only 20% of the Navy diminution of 
     other-violent-crime from civilian levels. The diminution in 
     other-violent-crime in the Marines exceeded the diminution in 
     rape by a multiple of 5.61. Thus, the Marine diminution in 
     rape rates from civilian levels was only 18% of the Marine 
     diminution of other-violent-crime from civilian levels. And 
     the diminution in other violent-crime-in the Air Force 
     exceeded the diminution in rape by a multiple of 11.03. So 
     the Air Force diminution in rape rates from civilian levels 
     was only 9% of the Air Force diminution of other-violent-
     crime from civilian levels.
       Regression analyses performed on these data determined 
     that, for each military service, the difference between the 
     diminution of rape and of other-violent-crime was 
     statistically significant. Thus, while the particulars differ 
     between the different services, all of the services show the 
     same overall pattern of diminishing all violent crime rates 
     including rape from civilian levels but diminishing rape 
     rates significantly less than the rates of other violent 
     crime. These data raise the question why military rates of 
     murder/non-negligent manslaughter and aggravated assault 
     are diminished so dramatically from civilian levels but 
     military rape rates are diminished so much less.
       In sum, in the peacetime period studied, military rape 
     rates were diminished substantially less from civilian levels 
     than were other violent crime rates. And in WWII, during peak 
     violent crime periods, rape rates were increased very 
     substantially over civilian rates, while the rates of other 
     violent crime remained below or essentially equal to civilian 
     rates. Thus, in war, military rape rates were increased far 
     more than other violent crime rates, and in peacetime, 
     military rape rates were reduced from civilian levels far 
     less than other violent crime rates.
       These data suggest that rape has been and continues to be a 
     more intractable problem among military personnel than are 
     other violent crimes. This finding underscores the need for a 
     serious effort to bring the rates of sexual abuse including 
     rape into line with the very low rates of other violent crime 
     among our military service personnel.

                                   II

       Notwithstanding the few studies that have been done to date 
     on the issue of sexual abuse by military personnel and the 
     anecdotal evidence such as that provided by witnesses at the 
     June 30, 1992 hearings of the Senate Committee on Veterans' 
     Affairs, there remains a dearth of information on the extent 
     of sexual abuse within the services, and on the handling and 
     disposition of sexual abuse cases.
       In order appropriately and effectively to address the 
     problem of sexual abuse by military personnel, it is 
     essential to have reliable information on the nature and 
     scope of the problem. For that reason, the annual report on 
     sexual misconduct, to be prepared by the Office of Special 
     Investigations as proposed in the DeConcini Amendment, will 
     be a tremendously important part of any serious remedial 
     effort.
       The need for an annual report on sexual misconduct such as 
     that proposed in the DeConcini Amendment will continue even 
     once the Defense Incident Based Reporting System (DIBRS) is 
     in place. The Uniform Federal Crime Reporting Act of 1988\13\ 
     provides that all federal agencies shall keep crime records 
     and information in a uniform manner, to be specified by the 
     Attorney General. The Attorney General has required reporting 
     in conformity with the National Incident Based Reporting 
     System (NIBRS) (which the Department of Defense will 
     implement as DIBRS). DIBRS is expected to collect information 
     on criminal and non-criminal sexual misconduct (and other 
     offenses) in all four services, from the law enforcement 
     through the investigation, prosecution, and corrections 
     stages.\14\ The DIBRS program has not yet been implemented, 
     but will be in the coming years. Once the DIBRS system is in 
     place, it will substantially facilitate--but by no means 
     render redundant--the data compilation and reporting 
     functions that the Office of Special Investigations will 
     fulfill in preparing the annual report on sexual 
     misconduct in the armed forces.

                                  III

       The DeConcinci Amendment also provides for several 
     important functions in addition to data collection. As 
     provided in the Amendment, the Office of Special 
     Investigations would provide oversight of all sexual abuse 
     investigations. The Amendment also provides for criminal 
     sanctions for failure to fulfill legal obligations to act on 
     allegations of sexual abuse, provides protection against 
     retaliation for reporting sexual abuse, and also makes 
     commitment to the elimination of sexual abuse a factor for 
     consideration in performance evaluations of personnel. All of 
     those provisions of the Amendment would be independently 
     significant and, also, together would send an important 
     message that sexual abuse by military personnel is viewed as 
     a serious matter which will be treated seriously.
       In sum, the DeConcini Amendment to the National Defense 
     Authorization of 1994 is in my view a very valuable step in 
     the handling of sexual abuse within our military services. 
     Though the Amendment will not alone eliminate sexual abuse by 
     military personnel, it will contribute significantly to 
     reducing the incidence of such conduct, and to improving the 
     handling of such cases when they do arise.

     \1\See generally Senate Hearing 922, 102 Cong., 2d Sess., 
     June 30, 1992 (including testimony of numerous military, 
     veteran, and academic witnesses on the extent of sexual 
     assault of U.S. military women by U.S. military men).
     \2\See Senate Hearing, supra note 1 at 12, 13 (testimony of 
     Diana Danis), 24 (testimony of Jacqueline Ortiz), 26 
     (testimony of Barbara Franco), 28, 33-34, 38-39 (testimony of 
     Kelley Richard).
     \3\See Senate Hearing, supra note 1 at 10 (testimony of Diana 
     Danis regarding the lack of incidence data on rape in 
     military); Gary Warner, Rape In Military: Vexing Problem but 
     Difficult to Measure, Orange Cnty. Register, July 11, 1992, 
     p. A1; 1990 Navy Women's Study Group, An Update Report on the 
     Progress of Women in the Navy III-28 (1990) (``The incidence, 
     the reporting, and the actions taken regarding sexual 
     assault/rape are not fully captured in any Navy data 
     base.''). Cf. 1990 Navy Women's Study Group, Id. at III-23 
     (``The lack of a data base and a common punitive charge for 
     sexual harassment inhibits command oversight and trend 
     analysis.'').
     \4\Melanie Martindale, Sexual Harassment in the Military: 
     1988 xiii (1988). The ``actual or attempted rape or sexual 
     assault'' category, though rather broad, was not further 
     subdivided in the study.
     \5\See Id. at 35.
     \6\See Amy L. Culbertson et al., Assessment of Sexual 
     Harassment in the Navy: Results of the 1989 Navy-wide Survey 
     (1992).
     \7\See, e.g., Gary Warner, Navy Rape Reports Tripled in Five 
     Years, The Orange Cnty. Register, May 18, 1992, p. A-1.
     \8\See, e.g., Gary A. Warner, Army Rape Rate 50 Percent 
     Higher than the Nation's, The Orange Cnty. Register, Dec. 30, 
     1992, p. A-1.
     \9\I use the term ``rape proneness'' to refer to proclivity, 
     predisposition, tendency, or likelihood to rape. A rape prone 
     individual or group would thus be one with a likelihood to 
     commit rape under some set of circumstances. Defined in this 
     way, rape proneness is meaningful only as a relative concept, 
     comparing the rape proclivity of one individual or group to 
     that of another. While it is meaningless to ask in the 
     abstract, ``is the military population `rape prone'?'', it 
     does make sense to ask whether a military population is more 
     or less prone to rape than its civilian counterpart--and that 
     is the question pursued in the study.
     \10\World War II was chosen for study because it is the most 
     recent war other than Vietnam in which the U.S. was engaged 
     for a prolonged period and in which troops had extensive 
     contact with civilians. Contact with civilians in Korea and 
     in the Persian Gulf was limited. Vietnam was not chosen for 
     study because it may have been unusual in its levels of low 
     troop morale which would presumably influence crime rates.
     \11\Because the study is still in the process of completion, 
     findings are subject to revision.
     \12\The ``peacetime'' period studied is 1987-1992. That 
     period includes of course January and February of 1991, 
     during which there was active fighting in the Persian Gulf 
     War. That combat period, however, had no discernable effect 
     on the relevant crime rates. Regression analyses performed on 
     the data excluding 1991 produced essentially equivalent 
     results to those produced when including the 1991 data.
     \13\28 U.S.C. 534 (West 1993)
     \14\Telephone interview with David F. Shutler, Lt. Col. 
     U.S.A.F., Deputy Director, Legal Policy, Requirements and 
     Resources, June 27, 1994.

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, the aftermath of rape may become even 
more disabling than the incident itself. I found this to be true when I 
was a prosecutor, and as a result commenced the first in Arizona of a 
victim witness program where we provided counseling, paid for by Pima 
County, for rape victims. Fear, anxiety, concern about personal safety, 
pregnancy, disease, are common immediately following an incident. Rape 
victims may become severely depressed, have suicidal thoughts, and 
experience social dysfunctions which affect not only personal quality 
of life, but also their work performance. Thirty-one percent of all 
rape victims in America develop what is known as rape-related post-
traumatic stress disorder, similar to PTSD experienced by combat 
personnel.
  Mr. President, I am not one that takes a great deal of time when I 
offer amendments. I am one that always, I believe, wanted to enter into 
time agreements. But this disturbs me, Mr. President, and I know it is 
infringing on the time of other people and where they may want to go.
  I have tried to get hearings on this legislation for more than 2 
years. I feel I need to talk about it, because there have been no 
hearings on this legislation. Moreover, I asked the Secretary of 
Defense during hearings before the Defense Subcommittee of 
appropriations over 2 years ago for comments on my bill. Today marks 
another day where I will wait in frustration for a response to those 
questions asked over 2 years ago.
  Women relive the trauma in an ongoing and intrusive basis. They are 
subject to daytime memories and nightmares, accompanied by intense 
psychological distress. Many deliberately restrict contact with the 
outside world in order to avoid remedies of reminders of the trauma. 
Compared with women who have never been raped, those with RR-PTSD are 
13.4 times more likely to have major alcohol problems and 26 times more 
likely to have major drug abuse problems.
  Trauma and other psychological disorders resulting from rape itself 
are compounded by an apparently permissive environment which encourages 
or at least does not adequately discourage the sexual mistreatment of 
military women. As stated earlier, the Senate Committee on Veterans' 
Affairs heard testimony on June 30, 1992, from three women veterans 
who, after being forcibly raped, were further brutalized by the 
indifference of higher echelon officers to whom they had turned for 
help. One, in fact, was demoted, while her abuser was promoted. Another 
woman, a career military person, was raped on two separate occasions 
during her time serving this country.
  These data lend credence to the increasing skepticism felt by the 
American public, and especially by the women who serve in our military, 
about the military's ability to police itself in the area of sexual 
misconduct. Clearly, a focused effort is required to redress the 
problem of sexual misconduct by military personnel. Something has to be 
done. I believe something will be done.
  The amendment I am offering today to the Defense authorization bill 
creates an Office of Special Investigations at the Department of 
Defense level. This new office will have oversight and audit 
jurisdiction over all reports of sexual harassment, abuse, and assault, 
and other related offenses by active-duty military personnel against 
other active-duty personnel and civilians. The Secretary of Defense is 
also empowered to direct the new office to investigate or assist in the 
investigation of cases being conducted by any military investigative 
service.
  Military victims of sexual assault will also be able to address their 
complaints directly to this office, rather than through the military 
chain of command, which we know does not work. In turn, this office 
would make the appropriate referral back to the chain of command and 
defense criminal investigative organizations. Most victims I have 
talked to simply do not believe that their allegations will be taken 
seriously and/or pursued vigorously by their supervisors in a male-
dominated profession. We need to assure them that will be done.
  The Office of Criminal Investigations will have a separate 
investigative staff with, to the fullest extent possible, professional 
expertise in sexual assault investigations. It will be independent and 
will have absolute authority to collect evidence and compel testimony 
and, when requested, secure appropriate, immediate medical treatment 
and psychological counseling for victims of sexual abuse.
  A principal element of the office will be the collection of data so 
we can get a better handle on the extent of the problem, including the 
number of cases that go to prosecution. The cost of operating this new 
office and staff is modest and expected to be no more than $1 million 
to possibly $4 million per year. This includes an office, a staff of 
approximately 15 to 20 support personnel and investigators, computer 
capability for a data base, equipment, travel, and medical and 
psychiatric support availability.
  This amendment would also establish a new Federal crime for failure 
by any commanding officer to promptly notify this new Office of 
Investigations of any report of sexual misconduct. Failure by a 
commanding officer to report sexual misconduct would be a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for up to 10 years.
  Mr. President, no other aspect of this bill is more important than 
the criminalization of the coverup of sexual misconduct. Without this 
provision, any data collected on reports will continue to be inaccurate 
and perpetuate an institutional culture of coverups of sexual violence 
against military women that has been going on probably since women have 
been in the military. Are we going to stand by when there are over 
200,000 fighting women who are defending our liberties and not do 
anything? We have an opportunity to do something. This is a tough 
measure, but I think it is long overdue.
  Mr. President, not one organization that represents women in the 
military opposes this legislation. In fact, the executive committee of 
WANDAS WATCH, a leading organization representing only women on active 
duty, endorses this legislation.
  I ask unanimous consent that a memorandum of June 22, 1994, from 
Susan Barnes, an authorized spokesperson and founder of this group, 
Standing Watch for Women Active in our Nation's Defense, their 
Advocates and Supporters, in support of this legislation, and the 
amendment, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                     [Memorandum from Wandas Watch]

     Re: Proposed amendments to FY 1995, Defense Authorization 
         Act.
     To: Tim Gearan.
     From: Susan Barnes.
     Date: 6/22/94.
       Thanks for your call and the copy of Senator DeConcini's 
     bill. We are delighted that the Senator is taking an interest 
     in this important issue and are pleased to say that we 
     support the bill.
       Our Executive Committee met last evening to review Senator 
     DeConcini's bill. We concluded that it would be a step in the 
     right direction provided that it is accompanied by a 
     requirement that the Department of Defense without further 
     delay issue a stronger set of regulations to deal with the 
     problem of reprisals for reporting sexual harassment.
       From the scores of complaints that WANDAS is now getting as 
     the result of the support we are providing to Air Force 
     Sergeant Zenaida Martinez, we know right now that the 
     Whistleblowers Act (10 USC Sec. 1034) is not working in its 
     present form. Unfortunately, although the current House 
     amendment to that Act was intended as a ``first step'' toward 
     a resolution of the problems highlighted by the military 
     women who testified at the HASC hearing in March, it is not 
     strong enough to rise to even that level,\1\ and our fear is 
     that without more this year, the military services will feel 
     free to return to their old practices and continue to sweep 
     the problem of sexual harassment and other forms of gender 
     bias under the rug.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\Sergeant Martinez, who is a very articulate young woman, 
     wrote a statement outlining her concerns about the bill. I 
     enclose a copy of her statement and our press release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The lawsuit we brought for Sgt. Martinez to force DoD and 
     the Air Force to comply with the Whistleblowers Act recently 
     resulted in a procedural ruling from the Court that 
     demonstrated that complainants under the Whistleblowers Act 
     have no protection from ongoing reprisals for reporting 
     unlawful complaints while the investigation drags on (a 
     principal motivator of the foot dragging is the fact that the 
     investigation is usually conducted by the very command 
     against which the complaint has been made.) The recent 
     reprisals suffered by Sergeant Martinez as the result of 
     her Congressional testimony is but the latest example that 
     proves that the current law is not working.
       Typically under the Whistleblowers Act the Department of 
     Defense Inspector General refers sexual harassment cases back 
     to the IG for the service of the complainant. The DoD IG's 
     stated reason for doing this is that the DoD IG gets too many 
     complaints to handle them all at the DoD level. In the 
     Martinez case, we argued that the Whistleblowers Act does not 
     permit the DoD IG's practice of referring the investigation 
     back to the chain of command. The Judge ruled against us on 
     that important point, and we will appeal; however, it appears 
     that the true solution lies in legislative reform. That is 
     why we believe that the approach taken by Senator DeConcini's 
     bill has merit, although we all understand that it is not 
     intended to solve all the problems.
       Senator DeConcini's bill in combination with ours could 
     make a big difference and additional amendments to the 
     Whistleblowers Act. Major revisions of the Whistleblowers Act 
     also are imperative. The Government Accountability Project is 
     currently circulating some proposals in that regard, and 
     WANDAS WATCH supports them.
       In the past month I have had three discussions with 
     Congresswoman Schroeder directly on these issues and, of 
     course, a number of discussions with her staff. It is my 
     understanding from those discussions that Mrs. Schroeder will 
     support an effort on the Senate side to strengthen the bill 
     that came out of the House to the extent that protocol 
     permits her to do so. It was Mrs. Schroeder who suggested 
     that we take our bill to improve DoD regulations to AF 
     Secretary Widnall when we met with her last week. We did so, 
     and Secretary Widnall has transmitted our proposal to 
     Secretary Dorn (her co-chair on the joint task force) who in 
     turn is circulating it to interested people in the Pentagon.
       We have sent our proposal to several Senators whom we hope 
     might be willing to take leadership roles to assure that 
     Congress does something meaningful this year. We appreciate 
     Senator DeConcini's willingness to ``step up to the plate.''

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, a great number of women choose to serve 
their country through careers in the military. American service women 
should not be subjected to this type of humiliation. They should not 
experience a sense of vulnerability engendered by the current 
permissive military environment. They should not be subjected to the 
terror and long-term incapacitation resulting from sexual assault. And 
they should not be subject to indifference from supervisors who are 
responsible for their safety.
  We need to send a message to our military that such an environment 
and such a behavior will not be tolerated. We can fix the problem by 
establishing an independent unit with jurisdiction over these offenses.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a brief question? 
I have a second-degree amendment prepared, and I would like to send it 
to the desk, if I could.
  I do not want to rush anybody. But if we each want 20, 30, or 40 
minutes on each amendment that I have heard of, now we are going to be 
here tonight, tomorrow, Sunday, and from now on. So if people are going 
to get anxious around here, saying why can we not have shorter 
speeches, I know everybody wants to present their full point of view, 
but we are going to have a difficult time finishing this at a 
reasonable hour tonight unless we all cooperate and make our points as 
briefly as possible.


      military culture must change if sexual harassment is to stop

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for this 
amendment, designed to be an important step toward combating sexual 
harassment in the military, and for the efforts of Senators Murray, 
Moseley-Braun, DeConcini and others involved in this effort. I have 
been impressed by their willingness to press the Pentagon hard in its 
handling of sexual harassment cases. It is long past due for Congress 
to take a closer look at the Pentagon's policies--and their enforcement 
of those policies--in this area.
  I believe Senator DeConcini's proposal to establish an independent 
investigative body within the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
deserves careful consideration. It may be time to establish such an 
independent office in the wake of the Tailhook investigations and other 
less notorious--but no less significant--cases of sexual harassment 
within the Armed Forces. Sexual harassment cases must be investigated 
and prosecuted as fairly, efficiently, and effectively as possible. 
That is still not being done consistently. I am concerned that Pentagon 
officials are still not doing enough to vigorously enforce their own 
policies on this matter.
  I am particularly concerned about a case that I have been working on 
together with Senator Durenberger and Congressman Vento involving a 
Minnesotan, Lt. (jg.) Rebecca Hansen. Her story has been told recently 
in several recent articles in the New York Times, the Washington Post, 
and elsewhere, so I will not rehearse it here.
  Lieutenant Hansen's case illustrates some of the myriad problems that 
are typically found in investigations involving sexual harassment or 
threats of reprisal and other forms of intimidation by military 
personnel, including administrative delays, insensitivity by 
colleagues, investigative carelessness, conflicting interpretations of 
military standards, and a lack of strong oversight by top military 
officials. Her case, and others like it, remind us all of the distance 
we still must travel to change a military culture which too often 
tolerates sexual harassment and abuse of some of its members. This must 
change.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, which I have 
cosponsored, to require the Pentagon to toughen its policies on sexual 
harassment, and to urge the Commission that is currently reviewing 
Pentagon policies in this area to assess and report to Congress on the 
merits of the proposal to establish a separate investigative body 
within the Office of the Secretary to deal exclusively with these 
cases.


                amendment no. 2147 to amendment no. 2146

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send a second-degree amendment to the desk 
and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for himself, Mrs. 
     Murray, and Ms. Moseley-Braun, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2147 to amendment No. 2146.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 1, strike out everything after ``subtitle'' down 
     through the end of the amendment and insert in lieu thereof 
     the following:

                  --Discrimination and Sexual Harassment


       SEC.   . DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES ON 
                 DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT.

       (a) Military Department Policies.--(1) Subject to paragraph 
     (2), the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air 
     Force shall review and revise the regulations of the 
     Department of the Navy and the Department of the Air Force, 
     respectively, relating to equal opportunity policy and 
     complaint procedures to ensure that such regulations are 
     substantially equivalent to the regulations of the Army on 
     such matters.
       (2) In revising regulations pursuant to paragraph (1), the 
     Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of the Air Force, as 
     the case may be, may make such additions and modifications as 
     the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate to strengthen 
     the regulations beyond the substantial equivalent of the Army 
     regulations in accordance with--
       (A) the recommendations of the Department of Defense Task 
     Force on Discrimination and Sexual Harassment; and
       (B) the experience of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 
     Corps regarding equal opportunity cases.
       (3) The Secretary of the Army shall review the regulations 
     of the Department of the Army relating to equal opportunity 
     policy and complaint procedures and revise the regulations as 
     the Secretary of Defense considers appropriate to strengthen 
     the regulations in accordance with the recommendations and 
     experience described in subparagraph (A) and (B) of paragraph 
     (2).
       (b) Requirements Regarding Report of Task Force on 
     Discrimination and Sexual Harassment.--(1) The Department of 
     Defense Task Force on Discrimination and Sexual Harassment 
     shall transmit the report of the task force to the Secretary 
     of Defense not later than October 1, 1994.
       (2) The Secretary of Defense shall transmit to Congress the 
     report of the task force not later than October 10, 1994.
       (3) Not later than 45 days after receiving the report, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall--
       (A) review the recommendations for action contained in such 
     report;
       (B) determine which recommendations the Secretary approves 
     for implementation and which recommendations the Secretary 
     disapproves; and
       (C) submit to Congress a report that--
       (i) identifies the approved recommendations and the 
     disapproved recommendations; and
       (ii) explains the reasons for each such approval and 
     disapproval.
       (4) The Secretary of Defense shall implement the approved 
     recommendations not later than April 1, 1995.
       The Advisory Board on the investigation capability of the 
     Department of Defense should consider and include in its 
     report--
       (1) whether the Department of Defense should establish a 
     separate unit to oversee all matters relative to allegations 
     of discrimination or sexual misconduct in the Department of 
     Defense; and
       (2) whether additional data collection and reporting 
     procedures are needed to enhance the ability of the 
     Department of Defense to deal with sexual misconduct.
       (d) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that regulations 
     governing consideration of equal opportunity matters in 
     performance evaluations include consideration of an 
     individual's commitment to elimination of discrimination or 
     of sexual harassment.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment that I sent to the desk on 
behalf of myself and the Senator from Washington, [Mrs. Murray], and 
the Senator from Illinois, [Ms. Moseley-Braun], is an amendment that 
deals with the same kinds of problems the Senator from Arizona is 
addressing.
  The difference is that this amendment basically takes the approach of 
dealing with what we already see happening at the Pentagon, building on 
a firm foundation. The Army has proposed certain regulations that have 
been carefully examined.
  I believe the Senators from Illinois and Washington will describe 
that.
  In addition to that part of the amendment, which is the heart of the 
amendment--it is their amendment really--that we have incorporated as a 
second degree, I do address the provision that the Senator from Arizona 
has in his amendment, but we do so in a way that gives us some 
flexibility when we receive the report from the advisory commission 
that has been reported by the President under the authorization bill 
last year and is headed up by Mr. Charles Ruff. And that commission is 
supposed to report in all of this area in December.
  The reason I send this to the desk in the form of a substitute is 
frankly I think that the Senator from Arizona has such a sweeping 
amendment that I am not sure of the implications of it.
  The Senator on page 9 of his amendment says:

       Each member of the armed forces and each officer or 
     employee of the Department of Defense who, in the official 
     capacity of that member, officer, or employee, receives an 
     allegation of sexual misconduct shall submit to the Director 
     a notification of that allegation together with such 
     information as the Director may require for the purpose of 
     carrying out the Director's duties.

  Mr. President, we have millions of people working in the Department 
of Defense. We have school teachers all over the world working for the 
Department of Defense.
  This amendment, as I read it, makes the failure to report any 
allegation of sexual misconduct, any allegation of sexual misconduct, a 
criminal offense by the individual who does not report it to the 
Director, to one person in Washington.
  This does not give any room for something that may be handled at the 
local level. People may think this is absurd, but I read this amendment 
to mean that if some third grade student comes in and says that someone 
told her a dirty joke or told him a dirty joke and that school teacher 
frankly does not report that to Washington that school teacher is 
guilty of a criminal offense.
  We want to deal with this problem, but we do not want to turn it into 
an administrative nightmare. I do not see how any individual could 
possibly fulfill the job that has been described in the first-degree 
amendment. They would be receiving allegations every day by the 
thousands perhaps, if this amendment is read literally.
  How many times a day in the whole Department of Defense does someone 
complain to someone else about sexual misconduct?
  I do not know where you draw the line on that. The judgment that 
would have to be made out in the field would be staggering.
  So I think we need to take this step by step and deal with it in the 
way we are trying to deal with it and make sure we send a message that 
this conduct will not be permitted and will be dealt with. But we 
better think before we make a criminal offense out of failure to report 
to Washington every single incident that may happen in the field 
throughout the whole world. That, I think, is something we better put 
up a little warning light on.
  Mr. President, I yield to my colleagues. I yield the floor and hope 
they will explain the amendment because it is their amendment, in 
essence.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator could get us 
copies of the amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. Yes, I will get the Senator a copy.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the 
substitute amendment proposed by Senator Nunn, Senator Murray, and 
myself.
  Actually, Mr. President, the good news in all of this is that the 
climate of opinion and the culture in this institution regarding issues 
of discrimination and sexual harassment has so changed and so been 
heightened that we have competing--maybe not competing--we are 
congruent, but we all have these different proposals to deal with the 
problem that 2 years ago was not even recognized as existing.
  I commend Senator DeConcini, who raised this issue months ago with 
me, at least, on the train one day. I know his sincere concern. I 
appreciate the passion of his remarks in that regard.
  We have tried to work together to come up with a not just congruent 
approach but come up with the same approach, and we have not really 
done that because we felt that it made sense in my opinion to reward 
initiatives that are already being taken to provide a remedy, a 
redress, a process for dealing with sexual harassment and 
discrimination, equal opportunity complaints.
  The Army has adopted such a process, and it is a process that so far 
is working. It is being improved over time, but it has already adopted 
such a process. It is a process that gives an individual the 
opportunity to speak, to have a hot line in the first instance, to file 
a formal complaint if it gets to that and only if it gets to that, 
because sometimes there could be confusion. But if there is a need for 
a formal complaint or the individual decides he or she is not getting 
attention that they require, they can file a formal complaint.
  That formal complaint--and I think this is interesting and positive 
about the process that is in place by the Army now--is that it can go 
to any number of people, including the individual's doctor, the 
individual's chaplain or minister, the individual's direct housing 
referral office, the EEO adviser, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
adviser, the inspector general, the judge advocate general, the 
military police or criminal investigator in the chain of command.
  So there are a number of options for an individual who has suffered 
from what he or she believes to be discrimination, either based on sex 
or on gender or on race. And I think that is an important initiative 
for the Army to have taken.
  The initiative of the second-degree amendment, Mr. President, 
essentially says we are going to take the Army's attempted experiment, 
the Army's procedure, which is shown to be a good procedure that has 
safeguards and time lines for reporting, 3 days for the complaint to be 
acted upon, 14 days for the decisionmaking, 7 days for appeal, if you 
do not like the decision, and then finally even further, a cooling off 
kind of period, a period in which there is final resolution. There is 
time lines and a process that is broad based. There is a process that 
allows for a number of different kinds of approaches in this very 
important and sensitive area.
  This process makes sense to us and is one that the second-degree 
amendment seeks to apply across the forces, the various Armed Forces. 
It says that the initiative the Army has taken in this regard should be 
recognized, should be supported, and we will give the other services an 
opportunity to pick up the same initiative so there will be a 
consistent, coherent process among all of the services for dealing with 
complaints of sexual harassment and denial of equal opportunity. We 
think that consistency makes sense.
  Further the second-degree amendment goes on and picks up where 
Senator DeConcini left off and says we will also take a look at whether 
or not a separate, freestanding agency is required in this area.
  So it really kind of says we are going to give the services the 
opportunity to develop inhouse something that works for military 
personnel and that preserves military readiness and is sensitive to the 
issue of discrimination and denial of equal opportunity and sexual 
harassment at the same time, and I think it makes sense for us as a 
body, Mr. President, to support that, to encourage that kind of 
initiative and to allow it to go forward and put it in place in all the 
other services.
  We understand that the Navy has already adopted or suggested they are 
going to adopt the Army approach. The other armed services can adopt 
the Army approach. So a woman in the military, for example, will not 
have to worry that there is one process over here, another process over 
there, and that if different branches of the service all have different 
rules, we have one set of rules for all of our military personnel and 
that, again, it seems to me to make sense.
  Mr. President, again, I congratulate and commend and thank Senator 
Nunn for his sensitivity and for listening and for helping us get to 
this point. I think he has come up with something that is a workable 
compromise that addressed the concerns expressed by Senator DeConcini, 
the concerns expressed by the military leadership, the concerns 
expressed by the women of this body, because all the women of this body 
had cosponsored Senator Murray and my amendment to begin with.
  So what Senator Nunn has done here is come up with a response that is 
responsive and responsible and that relates to and I think in a 
positive way says we are going to do this constructively as opposed to 
being in opposition to the military opposed to using a hammer they are 
going to use a glove and work on this issue in a way that will give 
real meaningful recourse to the women and men of the military who want 
to have some avenue for remedy of their sexual harassment or equal 
opportunity complaints.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, will the Senator from Illinois yield 
for a question?
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Yes.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I wonder if the Senator from Illinois will answer 
this. She made a statement that was of interest to me that the Army has 
adopted these regulations, and I believe that the distinguished Senator 
said it is working. I question that it is working. I hope it works, but 
I am advised it has only been effective since April 1, 1994. And I 
wonder on what basis the Senator from Illinois can think that this is 
really doing about the sexual harassment problem and sexual misconduct 
problem even within the Army.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. I respond to the Senator from Arizona that the 
association of women, the WANDA's--I do not know exactly what the 
acronym stands for. We will look it up. The women's organization for 
military personnel supports this approach.
  And the Senator is correct. The final part of this, the cooling off 
period and the post-appeal part of the process, is new and started in 
April. But the Army has been working on this since September of last 
year, 1993, and, I say to my friend, the Senator from Arizona, if 
anything, that, I think, undergirds and underscores the case made for 
the second-degree amendment. The Army came up with the process. They 
worked on it. The women worked with the issue. They said, ``Well, we 
need further refinement there,'' and they went to this final 35-day 
period so they refined it.
  The second-degree amendment says, well, we are going to take a step 
further and make this across the board and we will take a look at 
whether or not we need to go further and make even further adjustment. 
So this is a work in progress. It seems to me it is better to go with a 
work in progress that shows this kind of attention and applauds the 
initiative of the military to take that step, rather than go with a 
kind of draconian hammer approach and say let us throw out something; 
they are trying to do the right thing here, let us throw it out.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Will the Senator yield for another question?
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Let me just conclude.
  Again, I appreciate the passion and the commitment that the Senator 
from Arizona has demonstrated here. But, as he mentioned in his speech, 
having been a lawyer, having been a prosecutor, having handled cases 
like this, I come from a similar background. Having handled cases like 
this, I think that, if we have an opportunity here to give the military 
some opportunity to work out a positive process in a constructive way, 
then we ought to support that initiative. If it turns out it does not 
work, then maybe it will be appropriate to go with heavyhanded 
legislation and, you know, dictate from here.
  But given the fact they have worked this out already, I think it 
would be appropriate for us to incorporate that approach in the second-
degree amendment.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Will the Senator yield for another question?
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Yes.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. I thank the Senator.
  I appreciate her optimism that the military is now going to really 
adopt and do something when all the history is that this has not 
occurred. I cannot really believe for a moment the military is going to 
respond near as effectively.
  The executive committee of WANDAS WATCH stated, in a memorandum to my 
staff, Mr. Gearan, on June 22, that: ``Our executive committee met last 
evening to review Senator DeConcini's bill.'' The exact bill that is 
before the Senate. ``We concluded that it would be a step in the right 
direction, provided that it is accompanied by a requirement that the 
Department of Defense, without further delay, issue a strong set of 
regulations to deal with the problem of reprisals for reporting sexual 
harassment.''
  So this organization, I just want to advise my friend from Illinois, 
who specifically supports this legislation in conjunction with 
whistleblower protections akin to the approach taken by my friend from 
Illinois, Senator Moseley-Braun.
  But my question goes to the statement I believe the Senator from 
Illinois made that the amendment that the distinguished chairman has 
offered here says, let us take a look at this through this commission 
and see whether or not we need an independent office.
  And this study that is going to come back--I wonder if the Senator 
really believes, really believes, that there is a chance, a chance, 
that any Defense Department board or task force would ever come back 
with a criminal penalty for failure to report sexual harassment, 
because I do not believe they will.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. I say to my friend, the Senator from Arizona, the 
difficulty with this debate is that we are really on the same side and 
it kind of gets to be very difficult to have people on the same side 
parsing an issue in a way that makes sense.
  I have the exact same interests and the exact same goals that you do 
with this. The only question and the only difference between your 
legislation and the second-degree amendment is a matter of approach. 
The approach that we have in this legislation is an approach that has 
received support that comes out of the military itself, that so far is 
working and probably may have to go further. It may have to go to the 
point of having criminal penalties, et cetera, added. It may have to 
get to that.
  But it just seems to me, as a matter of timing, it makes sense to 
take the approach incrementally, to take the approach in a way that 
responds to the issue in a constructive, proactive way.
  There is an old expression, you know, the cure for a headache is not 
a bullet to the brain. It seems to me if you are going to cure this 
headache, we need to take the steps that have been demonstrated already 
and that I think are constructive.
  I yield to the Senator from Washington.
  Mrs. MURRAY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Boxer). The Senator from Washington.
  Mrs. MURRAY. I thank the Chair and I thank my colleague league from 
Illinois.
  Madam President, I am happy to join my colleague, Senator Moseley-
Braun, and the chairman in support of this amendment which we do 
believe is a good first step, and I assure you it is a first step, in 
addressing the problem of sexual harassment in our Nation's armed 
services.
  I am pleased to note that all 7 women of the Senate--Democrat and 
Republican--are cosponsors of the original amendment that the chairman 
has now incorporated into this broader amendment addressing sexual 
harassment.
  I want to take this opportunity to thank the Senator from Arizona for 
his work on this issue. As a cosponsor of his original amendment, I 
know that this is an approach that he has worked long and hard on, and 
I support him in that. And I assure him that we believe that the 
second-degree amendment that is before us is only a first step. We are 
going to be watching it very carefully. He raised very good and 
legitimate concerns and it is up to all of us, if this second-degree 
amendment passes, to assure that those are put in place and, if not, to 
do continued work on it.
  But most importantly, let me take this opportunity to thank Air Force 
Sgt. Zenaida Martinez, Navy Lt. Darlene Simmons, Marine Corps S. Sgt. 
Carol Fuehrman, former Army private Pamela Klemm, former Navy 
lieutenant Paula Coughlin, and other women like them who have had the 
courage to come forward--at great personal and professional risk--to 
speak out on this problem, and to offer meaningful solutions.
  It is because of--and on behalf of--these women that I speak out on 
the problem of sexual harassment in our military.
  We know that women in civilian life have a tough enough time when it 
comes to dealing with sexual harassment in the workplace. But for women 
in the military, the situation is even more difficult. Women in the 
military do not have a strong Federal law to protect them like title 
VII, nor do they have an outside judicial system to turn to.
  We recently met with the Joint Chiefs to discuss this problem, and I 
believe the message is beginning to be heard at the highest levels--
finally.
  I am extremely proud of our Armed Forces. Our Nation's military force 
remains the best trained, most capable military in the world. However, 
I know that Defense Secretary Perry and the Joint Chiefs agree with me 
that sexual harassment, like discrimination of any kind, undermines the 
readiness of our forces.
  The Pentagon's own statistics show that across the services, more 
than 60 percent of military women report having experienced sexual 
harassment.
  The Pentagon has long known that this problem is pervasive, and 
simply has not done anything about it. A Department-wide ``zero-
tolerance'' policy was issued in 1988. Notwithstanding this policy, the 
DOD, the Navy, and the Air Force have not taken any significant actions 
to enforce it.
  In fact, the Pentagon only formed its Task Force on Sexual Harassment 
after four military women testified at a highly publicized House 
hearing about their services' refusal to punish sexual harassment and 
the reprisals they suffered for reporting it.
  The Army, to its credit, has taken the problem more seriously, and 
has conducted a thorough review of its regulations. As a result of that 
review, the Army came out with a pretty good set of regulations, which, 
although not perfect, address many of the concerns our military women 
have raised.
  Today, we are building on this positive development.
  This approach uses the new regulations on sexual harassment adopted 
by the Army as the baseline. We require the Air Force and Navy to 
develop regulations that are equal or better than the Army regulations. 
Obviously, each service has special circumstances that have to be 
accommodated, and that is accounted for in the legislation.
  Right now the current system of separate regulations for the 
different services is not working. Only the Army has studied the 
problem seriously and has taken broad action. The regulations issued by 
the Air Force and Navy have no real protection against reprisals for 
reporting discriminations. Only the Army has a strong statement in its 
regulations against reprisals for reporting discrimination violations.
  Adopting the Army's regulations as a minimum standard will not fix 
all of the problems, but it will be a meaningful first step. The Army's 
regulations have incorporated many of the changes that the military 
women who have spoken out on this problem have said are needed.
  Our goal is to begin a process that will lead us to a uniformed 
sexual harassment and discrimination policy for all of the services, 
and a standard grievance procedure.
  Let me be clear--the approach we are supporting today will not end 
the problem of sexual harassment in the military. It is, however, a 
good and meaningful first step. What we begin today, we will add to 
tomorrow.
  I want our Nation's military women to be assured that we are with 
them on this, and we are with them for the long haul.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Madam President, Senator Murray and I are proud to 
propose this amendment, which has the support of all of the women 
Senators on both sides of the aisle. This amendment will improve the 
process of addressing, and fairly and aggressively resolving, equal 
opportunity complaints including sexual harassment across all branches 
of the armed services.
  This amendment will require all four services to implement the 
regulations of the U.S. Army related to the handling of equal 
opportunity complaints, including sexual harassment complaints.
  Mr. President, since the Tailhook Convention in 1991, the public has 
become aware of the problems of sexual harassment and sexual misconduct 
in the military. I abhor discrimination anywhere, but sexual harassment 
in the military is especially intolerable because the unit suffers, and 
readiness suffers.
  Teamwork and unit cohesiveness are vital to military preparedness. 
The ability of a unit to perform suffers when one highly trained member 
of the team is harassing another member of the team.
  The Army has recognized this, and has developed a set of regulations 
that address how sexual harassment and other equity complaints are 
investigated. But the goal is not just the investigation. The goal is 
to change behavior by having a clear process for handling complaints, 
and promoting a culture of zero tolerance by actions, not words.
  Why is this legislation needed? The Department of Defense's own 
statistics show that across the services more than 60 percent of 
military women report having experienced sexual harassment. A recent 
report of the Department of Defense Inspector General showed that the 
services have taken no meaningful action to deter reprisals. Only 6 
percent of the case files examined by the IG in the IG's review of the 
handling of actual cases in 1993 found that the Service involved took 
any action to detect or deter reprisals.
  Only the Army has studied the problem seriously and has taken 
sweeping action. Air Force and Navy regulations have no real protection 
against reprisals for reporting discrimination. The current system of 
separate regulations for separate services is not working.
  In September 1993, the Army implemented new regulations for 
investigating an equal opportunity complaint. Let me explain how it 
works.
  A member of the Army with a sexual harassment complaint fills out the 
equal opportunity complaint form explaining the nature of her 
complaint, and her requested remedy. The form itself guides the 
investigation step by step, because as the investigation goes through 
each stage, an additional part of the form is filled out. The form also 
creates a paper trail, so that no one in the chain of command or 
elsewhere can bury an investigation or lose a file.
  One of the most important aspects of the Army regulations is that 
they set up strict deadlines for the completion of each stage of the 
investigation. The deadlines ensure that the complaint is investigated 
quickly and thoroughly. If the investigator fails to complete each 
stage of the investigation on time, the investigator is required to go 
up his or her chain of command to get an extension.
  Under Army regulations, the person who investigates the complaint is 
not in the direct chain of command. If a complaint occurs in a company, 
the investigator would likely come from a unit other than the unit one 
step higher in the direct chain of command. This change provides for 
greater objectivity. When investigators come from within the chain of 
the command, the complaint may be seen as a reflection of the 
commander, and the way he or she runs the company. There can be a 
tendency to cover up complaints, instead of addressing the problems. 
Taking the investigations out of the direct chain of command is 
therefore critical.
  Finally, the Army regulations protect the women who make the 
complaint from reprisals. We learned during hearings held by the House 
Armed Services Committee that women commonly face reprisals for making 
sexual harassment complaints. There is a pattern of referring people 
who complain to a psychologist for counseling, in order to discredit 
her complaint. This must stop. Sexual harassment is not the victim's 
fault.
  The Army regulations are a work in progress and are continually being 
reviewed and fine tuned as the service gains experience investigating 
complaints. This regular review of the regulations and how they are 
working in the field is extremely important. I have written this 
amendment to allow the services flexibility to implement regulations 
appropriate to the conditions of each branch of the military. But make 
no mistake. The Army regulations should be seen as a minimum standard, 
and this amendment is a first step.
  We have a commitment to ensure that all of the members of the Armed 
Forces can serve and excel to their maximum ability. We must send a 
clear message that sexual harassment or any other harassment will not 
be tolerated.
  I urge the Senate to adopt this amendment. It puts the Senate on 
record that we will work with the military to root out sexual 
harassment and make our fighting force the best it can be.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, first, let me congratulate the Senator 
from Illinois and the Senator from Washington for what I think is a 
very responsible approach here. They have not only presented their 
ideas, but they have worked with the Department of Defense in a spirit 
of cooperation. They are building on a foundation and encouraging this 
effort rather than, as the Senator from Illinois said, hitting people 
over the head with a hammer. Sometimes you have to use a hammer, but 
when people are really trying and when they are really moving forward 
and doing their level best to get on top of a very difficult situation, 
a very important situation, I think that is the way to proceed.
  We are going to be watching this report very carefully. In the 
second-degree amendment we have incorporated the ideas of the Senator 
from Arizona in terms of asking the commission that is going to be 
reporting to take a look at what the Senator is proposing. So it is 
part of this second-degree amendment. It does not go as far as the 
Senator did, but his ideas are conveyed there.
  It is my hope that we can dispose of this matter now and move on to 
another amendment. I know the Senator from Oklahoma would like to 
present an amendment. I wonder if we can agree to the second-degree 
amendment being accepted?
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. NUNN. I will be glad to yield.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I can see where we are going here. 
But I must say with all due respect to the authors of the second-degree 
amendment, in my judgment--it is only one person's opinion and maybe 
only 1 out of 100--it is long overdue for the hammer and not the glove. 
If anybody here has talked to female members of the military, like I 
have and, I suspect, many of my colleagues have--do you know why you 
have talked to them, at least if they have come to you since you have 
been in Congress? It is because we are the only ones who will raise the 
issue. To leave this within the military, which historically disregards 
it and abuses the people who are the victims and who file the 
complaints, is just absolutely naive in my judgment.
  But I realize where the votes are here. I understand the strong 
feelings of, ``Let's try it. Let's work with the military. Let's give 
them a chance. And let's ask them to put together some data so maybe we 
can find out. And let's have an appeal process here within the 
military.'' So the military will all of a sudden wake up and say, 
``Hey, maybe we better take these seriously. Maybe we better keep some 
data. Maybe we better reprimand somebody. Maybe we ought to prosecute 
them.''
  That has not happened. We saw rape and sodomy just in this last war 
experience that this country went through. And what happened? The 
victim was brutalized--6 hours she had to explain the procedures and 
sexual acts that were committed by her commanding sergeant; 6 hours she 
was humiliated. What happened to the commanding officer after he 
confessed? He got promoted and got to retire. Tell me, that is what we 
want? Tell me that there is no need for a hammer?
  Madam President, I cannot let an opportunity for a hammer go by. It 
is long overdue. Members in this body know it is long overdue.
  I have been guilty, too. I have been in this body for 18 years and I 
have not offered this amendment until 2 years ago--or a year and a half 
ago, when I finally put it together where I could get enough data where 
I thought we could argue the case. May I suggest to the distinguished 
chairman--I know he wants to get on with it--that we have a rollcall 
vote on the second-degree amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I am going to vote against this 
amendment, not because this amendment is necessarily a bad amendment. 
It is better than zero--no question about it. But it does not do 
anything for women in the military to set up anything independent and 
to provide some real penalty for sexual harassment and for failure of 
reporting sexual harassment. I may be the only vote against this 
because at least this is an improvement. I suggest to the Senators from 
Washington and Illinois that it is an improvement and it is a step in 
the right direction and it is the first step, perhaps. But I, in 
conscience, cannot let it go any longer. I think it is time for a 
hammer. I am prepared to vote.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I think we are prepared to vote. I would 
say when the hammer hits it needs to be the right hammer and it needs 
to hit in the right spot. We have used hammers before.
  I say to the Senator from Arizona, in spite of the considerable 
improvement that must be done in the military in this area, in the 
courts of the military, and the appellate courts in the military, only 
the narcotics and drug cases exceed the sexual cases that are now in 
the courts. So I would not agree that nothing is being done.
  Madam President, I hope we could come to a vote. The yeas and nays 
have been ordered.
  Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, today I was unexpectedly delayed in my 
effort to reach the Senate floor to cast my vote or the Nunn second 
degree amendment to the DeConcini amendment No. 2146. Had I cast my 
vote, I would have done so in support of Senator Nunn's amendment, 
numbered 2147. I support the efforts of both Senators DeConcini and 
Nunn to provide stronger prohibitions on sexual harassment in the Armed 
Forces.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question occurs on amendment No. 2147.
  The clerk will call the roll. The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from Texas [Mr. Gramm], the 
Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield], the Senator from North Carolina 
[Mr. Helms], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Murkowski], are necessarily 
absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 93, nays 3, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 184 Leg.]

                                YEAS--93

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boren
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Danforth
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mathews
     McCain
     McConnell
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Wallop
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                                NAYS--3

     DeConcini
     Durenberger
     Kerrey

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Gramm
     Hatfield
     Helms
     Murkowski
  So, the amendment (No. 2147) was agreed to.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to reconsider the vote was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, amendment No. 2146, 
as amended, is agreed to.
  So the amendment (No. 2146), as amended, was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2148

       (Purpose: To prohibit Department of Defense funds from 
     being provided to institutions of higher education that deny 
     access for military recruiting purposes)

  Mr. NICKLES. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Nickles], for himself, Mr. 
     Thurmond, Mr. Lott, Mr. Mack, Mr. McCain, Mr. Coats, Mr. 
     Bennett, Mr. Brown, Mr. Faircloth, Mr. Grassley, Mr. Smith, 
     and Mr. Bond, proposes an amendment numbered 2148.

  Mr. NICKLES. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 249, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:

     SEC. 1068. MILITARY RECRUITING ON CAMPUS.

       (a) Denial of Funds.--(1) No funds available to the 
     Department of Defense may be provided by grant or contract to 
     any institution of higher education that has a policy of 
     denying, or which effectively prevents, the Secretary of 
     Defense from obtaining for military recruiting purposes--
       (A) entry to campuses or access to students on campuses; or
       (B) access to directory information pertaining to students.
       (2) Students referred to in paragraph (1) are individuals 
     who are 17 years of age or older.
       (b) Procedures for Determination.--The Secretary of 
     Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Education, 
     shall prescribe regulations that contain procedures for 
     determining if and when an educational institution has denied 
     or prevented access to students or information described in 
     subsection (a).
       (c) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     ``directory information '' means, with respect to a student, 
     the student's name, address, telephone listing, date and 
     place of birth, level of education, degrees received, and the 
     most recent previous educational institution enrolled in by 
     the student.

  Mr. NICKLES. Madam President, I will be brief. I wish to thank 
Senator Nunn and Senator Thurmond for their cooperation.
  This amendment is very simple, very direct, and it is very similar to 
legislation or an amendment that was adopted in the House. This 
amendment would deny Department of Defense research funds to 
universities that deny recruiters access to their campus. There was a 
study requested, and the Department of Defense found 140 institutions 
of higher education that, for some reason or another, whatever reason, 
have denied recruiters access to their campus.
  This amendment says if they did deny recruiters access, then, 
therefore, they would not be eligible to receive Department of Defense 
research and development grants or funds.
  This is cosponsored by Senators Thurmond, Lott, Mack, McCain, Coats, 
Bennett, Brown, Faircloth, Grassley, Smith, and Bond. It was adopted in 
the House by a vote of 271 to 176. I appreciate the cooperation of 
Senator Thurmond and Senator Nunn in accepting it.
  Let me say that I wish all of my colleagues could have attended a 
recent hearing held by the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee 
which looked into our problems of recruitment. The hearing made two 
points regarding recruiting that are pertinent to this debate.
  The first point is that the propensity of America's youth to join the 
military is on the decline as documented in the 1993 Youth Attitude 
Tracking Survey, known as YATS, which was issued in January of this 
year.
  The YATS showed that among 22- to 24-year-old men, 14 percent of them 
were likely to join the service in 1992. In 1993, that figure is down 
to 11 percent. In the cover memo on the YATS, Edwin Dorn, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Readiness, states the 3-point drop from 1992 
to 1993 is statistically significant.
  Madam President, it is easy to see that if the propensity for 
America's college-age youth to join the service has dropped, recruiters 
will have to visit more schools in order to meet the recruiting 
requirements for new talent.
  It was made perfectly clear in that hearing that military recruiters 
are barely reaching their goals of bringing new talent into the 
military. In fact, even in downsizing, an Army recruiter testified that 
his recruiting unit was not meeting its recruiting goals. With schools 
putting restrictions on military recruiters, it makes it even harder 
for them to meet their goals.
  These hearings also exposed that there is a perception among many 
college and university placement offices that the military is not 
hiring. We all know this is not the case, yet this perception goes 
unquestioned in many cases. This is due, in part, because approximately 
140 institutions of higher learning do not allow recruiters on campus 
to explain to its students that the military is still in search of 
young, bright, and energetic graduates.
  My colleagues understand that we depend upon an All-Volunteer Force 
to defend the freedoms we enjoy. To maintain a quality all-volunteer 
force, military recruiters need access to the best students in America. 
Today this is simply not the case.
  I remind my colleagues of the Army recruiter who stated before the 
Senate committee that his unit is not meeting its goals, and policies 
that bar recruiters from campus just compound the problem.
  This amendment is necessary because it addresses readiness. Readiness 
starts with recruiting, and if the military does not have access to 
some of the most talented students in our country, then we are not 
doing our best to defend America. I believe this is a great disservice. 
If this amendment is adopted and some schools change their policy, then 
the pool of available talent to the All-Volunteer Force will be 
increased.
  As critical as our personnel needs are, I also find it very 
hypocritical for these institutions that bar military recruiters from 
their campuses to have an open wallet policy to DOD grants and research 
money. However, when it comes to allowing the Pentagon an opportunity 
to hire the young men and women its budget helped to educate and 
inspire, these institutions have a closed-door policy.
  While some Members of this body would approve of this policy, there 
is none who could find it consistent or nondiscriminatory. Do you 
really want to vote for retaining this inconsistent and hypocritical 
practice? I certainly hope not. This amendment is an opportunity to 
stop this practice.
  Let me add that this amendment does not infringe upon an 
institution's right to take a stand on issues. If they choose to bar 
military recruiters, they may continue to do so. However, it does 
prevent an institution from accepting DOD money for research and then 
turning away the recruiters when they come to campus.
  Some may claim this amendment will chill academic freedom. Not so. In 
fact, true academic freedom would result if these institutions allowed 
military recruiters to come to campus and permitted the students to 
decide with whom they will or will not interview.
  In short, this amendment attempts to make the widest array of talent 
in our Nation's institutions of higher learning available to DOD 
recruiters. By doing so we will increase the readiness level of our 
military, and restore recruiting to many of our Nation's campuses.
  A vote for this amendment is a vote for readiness.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, Senator Nickles' amendment is a 
positive step toward keeping our college campuses open to military 
recruiters.
  Some colleges have decided to prohibit military recruiters access to 
their campus; deny them access to the students and certain student 
records. At the same time, many of these colleges and universities 
accept millions of dollars in contracts and grants from the Department 
of Defense. This is an example of having your cake and eating it too.
  Madam President, I think we all agree that the quality of our Armed 
Services has never been better. All of us have supported the efforts of 
the military services to recruit from groups who have high school 
educations or better. Those college or university administrators and 
any State officials who assist in barring military recruiters from a 
campus are denying the military the opportunity to explain the 
extraordinary opportunities available in the military today. They also 
deny those students who may be interested in serving their country easy 
access to information upon which they could base a career decision.
  The Nickles amendment is not different from the policy decision any 
major corporation might make if their personnel were barred from an 
institution. It is not unfair to refuse to pay money to an institution 
which denies access to their facilities. It is just good business.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for the amendment.
  Thank you Madam President.
  Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I rise today to offer my strong support 
for the Nickles amendment regarding the issue of defense funding for 
universities that do not allow military recruiting on their campuses.
  This amendment would not allow funds available to the Department of 
Defense to be provided by grant or contract to any educational 
institution that has a policy of denying, or which effectively 
prevents, the Secretary of Defense from obtaining access to campuses 
for military recruiting purposes.
  I truly do understand--and I share--the most valid concerns that the 
Senator from Oklahoma has regarding this issue. The quality of recruits 
in all of our branches of the Armed Forces is down significantly. The 
quantity of recruits and enlistees is also measurably down since 1992. 
One way to shore up that decline is to allow recruiting at universities 
around our Nation. If universities do not allow the Department of 
Defense to recruit on their campuses, I do not believe those same 
universities should be allowed to ask for grants and other contracts 
from the Department of Defense. I also understand the economic impact 
that this amendment may very well have on some educational 
institutions.
  However, universities can not have both ways. Our national security 
is the primary responsibility of the Federal Government. We must do 
what we can to support a strong military, and universities should 
assist in that process--not hinder it.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I urge acceptance of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question occurs on amendment No. 2148.
  The amendment (No. 2148) was agreed to.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. FORD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont is recognized.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I have an amendment which has 53 
cosponsors regarding antipersonnel landmines. I have discussed it with 
the distinguished manager of the bill.
  Two years ago I sponsored legislation that would have imposed a 1-
year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines. That 
legislation was signed into law by President Bush. Last year, my 
amendment to extend the U.S. export moratorium an additional 3 years, 
to overlap with a U.N. conference on landmines that is scheduled to 
begin next year, was adopted by the Senate on a rollcall vote of 100-0.
  That amendment called on the President to seek an international 
export ban, and further limits on the production and use of landmines. 
Last year I introduced on behalf of the United States a resolution at 
the United Nations calling for an international export ban. That 
resolution passed the U.N. General Assembly unanimously. It put all 
countries on record endorsing a halt to the export of landmines 
worldwide. Again, a tremendous step, with broad support for stopping 
the scourge of landmines.
  According to the administration, close to 20 countries have since 
either announced or adopted export bans similar to the one we passed 
here in the U.S. Senate.
  Madam President, each month over 1,200 people, most of them innocent 
civilians, are killed or injured by landmines. One hundred million of 
these tiny explosives, many of which can be produced for $3 apiece and 
are often no bigger than a shoe polish can, are strewn in over 60 
countries--100 million unexploded landmines in 60 countries. Each one 
waits silently, hidden by a few inches of sand or dust, for an 
unsuspecting person, often a child, to step on it. That child loses a 
leg, an arm, an eye or often their life.
  Landmines are unique because no matter how sophisticated, they are 
indiscriminate weapons. They cannot tell the difference between a 
combatant and a civilian or an elderly person and a child. But they can 
make whole areas of land uninhabitable, and they can be an effective 
force multiplier for the most rag-tag Third World army. You can have an 
ill-equipped, ill-trained, ill-prepared army, but they can be an 
enormous, potent force because they have landmines and they can use 
them as weapons of terror against innocent civilians or against anybody 
else.
  A $3 landmine can blow the leg off a child as well as it can blow the 
leg off the most highly trained, well-equipped American soldier or 
peacekeeper, medical aide, or missionary.
  Some say it is naive to think that by acting ourselves we can get 
others to act likewise. I strongly disagree. Our export moratorium 
showed what U.S. leadership can do. It inspired countries like Germany, 
South Africa, and France to follow the United States example. Italy is 
one of the world's largest producers and exporters of landmines. Last 
week, the Italian Defense Minister called for a ban on the production 
and export of antipersonnel mines. So has the Vatican; so has the 
Swedish Parliament. When the Swedish Parliament called for this, it was 
not just an empty gesture. Sweden was a major landmine producer.
  Our moratorium inspired a U.N. conference to review the outdated 
landmine protocol next year, and meetings to prepare for that 
conference have already begun in Geneva.
  It is interesting, Madam President, that a year ago the press hardly 
paid any attention despite the fact that landmines may have killed and 
maimed more civilians than all the chemical and nuclear weapons 
combined. What a difference a year makes. There is hardly a major 
newspaper in this country that has not reported on the landmine 
scourge.
  Two weeks ago, in an effort to keep the momentum going, I introduced 
here in the Senate, with 53 original cosponsors, the Landmine 
Protection Moratorium Act. That legislation would impose a 1-year 
moratorium on U.S. Government production and procurement of 
antipersonnel landmines. Its purpose is simple. It is intended to show 
the world that the United States is going to lead by example, and we 
are going to not only have the moral leadership but we are going to 
challenge other countries that produce these weapons to join us in 
stopping the carnage they cause.
  Over half the Senate has cosponsored this bill, and a number of 
Senators who have not yet cosponsored it have assured me they will vote 
for it. I think this is powerful proof of the depth of support in the 
Senate for dramatic action to deal with this problem. Republicans and 
Democrats, conservatives and liberals and moderates, all have joined as 
cosponsors.
  I believe that nothing short of a total ban on these weapons is going 
to stop their widespread use and slaughter of civilians and of 
children.
  Madam President, I have gone to refugee camps. I have gone to places 
where they use the Leahy War Victims Fund. I have gone to rudimentary 
hospitals in the Third World, and I have seen what landmines do. My 
wife is a nurse. She told me she had never seen anything in her 
experience to compare to the trauma caused to children from landmines.
  A total ban is a long-term goal, and there are many interim measures 
that could help reduce the toll. We need strong, enforceable limits on 
production, use, and transfer of landmines.
  If the United States continues to show the kind of bold leadership 
that captures the world's attention and forces other countries to 
answer why they too should not act forcefully to deal with this 
problem, the negotiations will succeed. Otherwise, we will see cosmetic 
changes, or measures which do not get at the heart of the problem. 
There is no escaping the fact that dozens of countries produce 
landmines, and a $3 Serbian mine is as effective, and some might argue 
more effective, as the most sophisticated self-neutralizing U.S. mine.
  Mr. President, it was my intention to offer my landmine production 
moratorium as an amendment to the Defense authorization bill, which we 
are debating today. I am convinced I have the votes to win. There is 
also strong support in the House for identical legislation that is 
sponsored by Congressman Lane Evans. He has been a strong leader in 
this field.

  But I have decided not to offer this amendment at this time. It is a 
difficult decision, and I have made it for a number of reasons.
  The administration, thanks to Secretary Warren Christopher, 
Ambassador Madeleine Albright, Ambassador Alan Holmes, Ambassador 
Thomas McNamara, and others, has become seriously engaged on this 
issue. We have had discussion in my office and in their offices, here 
and in New York at the United Nations.
  There are some in the Pentagon who oppose any action that would in 
any way limit their ability to produce, stockpile, or use landmines, or 
probably any other weapon. But that is not the administration's 
position.
  I met recently with Ambassador Alan Holmes and Ambassador Thomas 
McNamara. They described the two-track strategy the administration is 
pursuing. As an interim measure, the administration is seeking support 
from other landmine exporting nations to get an international export 
ban, and the administration is also conducting a policy review of 
broader options to deal with the problem of civilian casualties from 
landmines, and there are thousands and thousands of civilian 
casualties. Far more civilians are killed and maimed by landmines than 
combatants. Last year, I met with Secretary Christopher at length on 
this subject.
  According to a letter jointly signed by Secretary of Defense Perry 
and Secretary of State Christopher, which I received this week, the 
options being considered range from a total ban on these weapons to 
limits on their production, stockpiling, and use.
  Ambassadors Holmes and McNamara urged me to hold off offering my 
amendment at this time, to give the administration a chance to complete 
its policy review and to seek support from other nations for these 
measures. They said their process will take time and that a U.S. 
production moratorium could derail their efforts.
  Madam President, I have said time and again that the United States 
cannot solve the landmine problem alone, not when there are landmines 
in 60 countries and 100 million of them waiting to be exploded, to kill 
and maim. Only U.S. leadership and international cooperation can solve 
it.
  I have also said this is a long-term effort. I want to support any 
serious efforts the administration is making.
  But while I commend Ambassadors Holmes and McNamara for their 
attention to this issue--and I do commend them, and I will hold off for 
now to give them a chance to show what they can do--I want to issue a 
warning.
  We know we could have passed this today, but I am willing to hold 
back to enable them to move forward. However, I am very concerned that 
the administration may try to solve this problem with an elaborate, 
unenforceable international control regime that favors high-tech mines 
over others, which would not have a snowball's chance in hell of 
working. We are not dealing with countries like the United States and 
Great Britain and others who can afford all these highly sophisticated 
and expensive landmines and delivery systems. We are dealing with a 
problem, in 60 countries, of inexpensive mines.
  I am also concerned that United States may not be showing the kind of 
leadership in Geneva that I and a majority of Republicans and Democrats 
in the Congress are calling for. Apparently, the administration is 
proposing that the focus of the U.N. Conference on the landmine 
protocol be limited only to the use of landmines--only to the use--when 
they have to be addressing the broader issues of production, 
stockpiling, and transfer. I am very concerned the administration is 
pursuing an overly narrow approach that can result in only superficial 
changes to the already flawed landmine protocol. That would be an 
unacceptable result.
  The U.N. review conference is a unique opportunity, and squabbles 
over whether this is an issue of arms control or humanitarian law 
should not prevent a discussion of a broad range of options covering 
all the issues. Nor should the administration's plans to pursue an 
export regime or other controls, separate and apart from the landmine 
protocol, preclude trying to accomplish as much as possible in the U.N. 
conference.
  Finally, Madam President, I urge the administration to undertake a 
credible, independent analysis of the military utility of these 
weapons, compared to the immense economic and social damage they cause. 
Consider the danger these weapons pose for U.S. troops, whether in 
combat or on peacekeeping missions in places like Bosnia or Somalia. 
Consider what incentive there is for poor countries to stop producing 
$3 mines which do not self-neutralize, when we keep producing and using 
our sophisticated mines.
  Over half the Senate is standing ready to support a halt on U.S. 
production of antipersonnel landmines. During the coming months I and 
others will be listening closely to what the administration says in 
Geneva, and watching what it does here at home. This is a crucial year, 
and the test will be whether the administration can cast aside the 
conventional wisdom. Imagine a world without these weapons, and then 
believe that it is possible to get there and figure out how to do it. I 
believe it is possible. think of the benefits it would bring not just 
to the people of countries like Cambodia, Angola, and Nicaragua, but to 
our own soldiers.
  Mr. President, I want to thank the cosponsors of my legislation, and 
people everywhere who have called and written to me to express their 
support for it.
  I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Secretary Perry and 
Secretary Christopher be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                       The Secretary of State,

                                    Washington, DC, June 28, 1994.
       Dear Senator Leahy: We are writing to express our strong 
     support for your leadership in addressing the problem of 
     civilian casualties from anti-personnel landmines. As you 
     know, the Clinton Administration is committed to redressing 
     this problem and looks forward to continuing to work 
     cooperatively with you.
       We are committed to working toward an effective 
     international anti-personnel landmine control regime. The 
     Administration is conducting an intensive policy review to 
     determine the parameters of what the United States would 
     propose for a regime, both in the near term and the longer 
     term. A broad spectrum of options is under discussion, 
     ranging from a total ban on APL to export controls on all 
     types of APL, production and/or stockpiling restrictions, and 
     transparency measures. We expect whatever initial controls 
     can be agreed upon will be strengthened over time, and as we 
     assess the regime's international support and the 
     effectiveness of its implementation.
       While we have been strongly supportive of the current 
     export moratorium, we are concerned that the legislation you 
     are considering, which would ban U.S. production/procurement 
     of anti-personnel landmines, would be counterproductive to 
     the goal we all share of developing as quickly as possible an 
     effective anti-personnel landmine control regime. Pursuing 
     this legislation now would prejudge the U.S. negotiating 
     position, restricting our ability to conduct effective 
     consultations with countries critical to a control regime. It 
     also could impede our diplomatic efforts to build support 
     both for the export moratorium and an eventual regime.
       A control regime is just one aspect of our comprehensive 
     approach to the complex landmine problem. We will continue to 
     expand our demining programs, to work for successful 
     ratification of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and 
     to achieve our goals for significantly strengthening the 
     Convention, particularly its protocol on landmine use. 
     Together, these efforts represent a comprehensive strategy to 
     address the widespread humanitarian problems caused by 
     indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel 
     landmines.
           Sincerely,
     Warren Christopher,
       Secretary of State.
     William J. Perry,
       Secretary of Defense.

  Mr. LEAHY. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I have chatted with the floor leader of 
the bill, and we worked out three amendments that appear to have the 
agreement of both Democratic and Republican leaders on these issues, 
and I will then describe them in an amendment that we have talked 
about, which senator Simon and I will offer together.


                           Amendment No. 2149

   (Purpose: To establish additional United States policy concerning 
   burdensharing in NATO and to require additional information to be 
              included in the annual burdensharing report)

  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I rise to send an amendment to the desk 
and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Brown] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2149.

  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 200, between lines 8 and 9, insert the following:

     SEC. 1017. BURDENSHARING POLICY AND REPORT.

       (a) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States that the 
     North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies should 
     assist the United States in paying the incremental cost 
     incurred by the United States for maintaining members of the 
     Armed Forces in assignments to permanent duty ashore in 
     Europe solely for performing United States obligations for 
     support of NATO.
       (b) Implementation.--The President shall take all necessary 
     actions to ensure the effective implementation of the 
     burdensharing policy set forth in subsection (a).
       (c) Report.--The Secretary of Defense shall include in the 
     annual burdensharing report required by section 1002(d) of 
     the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985 (22 U.S.C. 
     1928 note) the following matters:
       (1) A specific enumeration and description of the United 
     States military resources and military personnel assigned to 
     permanent duty ashore in Europe primarily in support of NATO 
     and an analysis of the cost of providing and maintaining such 
     resources and personnel in such assignment primarily for that 
     purpose.
       (2) A specific enumeration and description of the United 
     States military personnel assigned to permanent duty ashore 
     in Europe primarily in support of other United States 
     interests in other regions of the world and an analysis of 
     the cost of providing and maintaining such resources and 
     personnel in such assignment primarily for that purpose.
       (3) A specific enumeration and description of the offsets 
     to United States costs of providing and maintaining United 
     States military resources and military personnel in Europe 
     that the United States has previously received from other 
     NATO member nations, set out by country and by type of 
     assistance, including both ``in-kind'' assistance and direct 
     cash reimbursement, and the projected offsets for the five 
     fiscal years following the fiscal year in which the report is 
     submitted.
       (4) A detailed identification of the costs associated with 
     maintaining United States military personnel in assignments 
     to permanent duty ashore in Europe for NATO and the 
     difference in cost that would result from stationing such 
     personnel at military bases within the United States and 
     continuing to assign to such personnel the mission to perform 
     United States obligations under NATO.
       (5) A comparison of the defense spending by each NATO 
     member country as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
     (GDP) beginning in 1985 and the projected future defense 
     spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product through 
     2000.
       (6) A review of all actions taken by the United States to 
     ensure the effective implementation of the United States 
     burdensharing policy set forth in subsection (a).
       (d) Incremental Cost Defined.--In this section, the term 
     ``incremental cost'', with respect to maintaining members of 
     the Armed Forces in assignments to permanent duty ashore in 
     Europe, includes the cost of transportation to and from duty 
     stations in Europe, any variation in the cost of housing and 
     food as compared to the cost of housing and food for members 
     of the Armed Forces stationed in the United States, and any 
     additional expenditures associated with infrastructure 
     necessary to support United States forces in Europe.

  Mr. FORD. Madam President, will the distinguished Senator yield for a 
question?
  Mr. BROWN. Certainly.
  Mr. FORD. I understand that the Senator has three amendments that he 
believes are acceptable.
  Mr. BROWN. Yes.
  Mr. FORD. I am trying to help expedite this and am acting on behalf 
of Senator Nunn. Could we have a copy of the amendments or the numbers 
so that we could be prepared and we might expedite their consideration?
  Mr. BROWN. Yes.
  Mr. FORD. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, this particular amendment deals with 
burden-sharing. There is a provision in the House bill that provides 
very strong terms with regard to burden-sharing, including an automatic 
formula.
  As I examined the question of burden-sharing, it struck me that there 
were some questions that we simply did not have the information on or 
the mechanics to proceed.
  Let me be specific. There was a question of whether or not we had a 
clear idea as to what portion of our troops in Europe were focused on 
providing services and defense for Europe and what portion were there 
for our convenience to serve other parts of the world.
  So, part of the report that is asked for here is to help us identify 
costs that are particular to NATO, at least, I believe are ones that 
they ought to share in the cost of, and what portions of those costs 
are not related to NATO and are for our convenience to serve other 
parts of the world. This will require that to be added to the burden-
sharing report.
  It also sets forth a definition of the incremental cost; that is, a 
request to identify the additional costs the United States suffers 
because the troops are stationed in Europe rather than having them 
stationed in the United States. This is also an item that I think is 
essential if we are going to insist on burden-sharing from our European 
allies.
  It also clearly calls for delineation of defense costs; that is, a 
comparative cost between the U.S. effort and our European allies.
  We believe these are necessary items to move forward. It is not as 
strong a burden-sharing amendment as appears in the House bill, but it 
is one, I think, that gives us a solid basis for moving ahead with what 
I consider to be meritorious efforts; that is, insisting our allies 
share in the burden of the defense.
  Madam President, my understanding is that this has been cleared on 
both sides.
  Mr. FORD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Mikulski). The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. FORD. Madam President, it is acceptable on the Democratic side. 
However, I might make one point. It may be extremely difficult for the 
Pentagon to separate U.S. station costs in Europe into NATO and non-
NATO categories. But the reporting amendment is acceptable, and I urge 
its adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  If there is no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the 
amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2149) was agreed to.
  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. FORD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2150

  (Purpose: To ensure that the President of the Republic of China on 
        Taiwan can enter the United States on certain occasions)

  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Brown] for himself and Mr. 
     Simon proposes an amendment numbered 2150.

  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the bill, add the following new 
     section--

     ``SEC.   . Visas for Officials of Taiwan.

       Section 4(b)(6) of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 
     3302(b)(6)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(A)'' immediately after ``(6)''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(B) Whenever the president of Taiwan or any other high-
     level official of Taiwan shall apply to visit the United 
     States for the purposes of discussions with United States 
     federal or state government officials concerning:
       (i) Trade or business with Taiwan that will reduce the 
     U.S.-Taiwan trade deficit;
       (ii) Prevention of nuclear proliferation;
       (iii) Threats to the national security of the United 
     States;
       (iv) The protection of the global environment;
       (v) The protection of endangered species; or
       (iv) Regional humanitarian disasters.
       The official shall be admitted to the United States, unless 
     the official is otherwise excludable under the immigration 
     laws of the United States.''.

  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, this measure is proposed by both Senator 
Simon and myself. It deals with the question of visas for visiting 
officials in Taiwan. We think it is helpful in laying out critical 
areas where visas are appropriate. It is my understanding it has been 
cleared on both sides.
  Mr. FORD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. FORD. Madam President, the amendment is acceptable on this side.
  Mr. COATS. Madam President, we have also looked at the amendment and 
find it acceptable.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If 
there is no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the 
amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2150) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. FORD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2151

 (Purpose: To require a study on the convergence of the Geosat and EOS 
                          altimetry programs)

  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
       The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Brown] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2151.
  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 249, between 7 and 8, insert the following:

     SEC. 1068. STUDY ON CONVERGENCE OF GEOSAT AND EOS ALTIMETRY 
                   PROGRAMS.

       (a) Requirement.--The Secretary of the Navy and the 
     Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration shall jointly conduct a study on the 
     convergence of the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration Earth Observing System Altimetry mission with 
     the Navy Geosat Follow-On program. The study shall assess 
     whether a converged system, which may involve minor 
     modifications to the Geosat Follow-On satellite, could--
       (1) satisfy the needs of the Earth Observing System program 
     for altimetry data;
       (2) reduce the expenses of the National Aeronautics and 
     Space Administration in satisfying such needs;
       (3) be available in time to serve as the follow-on to the 
     Topex/Poseidon mission; and
       (4) continue to meet the requirements of the Navy for 
     altimetry data at no additional cost to the Navy.
       (b) Consultation.--In concluding the study, the Secretary 
     and the Administrator shall consult with appropriate members 
     of the scientific community.
       (c) Report.--The Secretary and the Administrator shall 
     submit to the Committees on Armed Services, Commerce, Science 
     and Transportation and the Committees on Armed Services and 
     Science, Space, and Technology of the House of 
     Representatives a report on the results of the study 
     conducted under subsection (a), together with the 
     recommendations of the Secretary and the Administrator 
     thereon. The Secretary and the Administrator shall submit not 
     later than February 15, 1995.

  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, this amendment calls for a study. It 
looks at the convergence of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration Earth observing system altimetry mission with the Navy 
Geostat follow-on program. We believe that there is a potential here 
for savings with the comparison and analysis of the purposes of both 
programs. The purposes of the study, I think, will be cost savings and 
a coordination of these two important systems. I believe it has been 
cleared on both sides.
  Mr. FORD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. FORD. Madam President, I understand NASA supports this, and we 
recommend that the Senate accept this amendment calling for a study.
  Mr. COATS. Madam President, the minority staff and members also have 
examined this amendment and find it acceptable.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  If not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2151) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. FORD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2152

(Purpose: To make Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic eligible for 
allied defense cooperation with NATO countries, and for other purposes)

  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I rise to offer my last amendment, and I 
ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Colorado [Mr. Brown] for himself, Mr. 
     Simon, and Mr. Roth proposes an amendment numbered 2152.

  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle B of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1017. ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR PARTICIPATION IN 
                   ALLIED DEFENSE COOPERATION.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``NATO 
     Participation Act''.
       (b) Transfer of Excess Defense Articles.--The President may 
     transfer excess defense articles under the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961 or the Arms Export Control Act to Poland, 
     Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
       (c) Leases and Loans of Major Defense Equipment and Other 
     Defense Articles.--Section 63(a)(2) of the Arms Export 
     Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2796b) is amended by striking ``or New 
     Zealand'' and inserting ``New Zealand, Poland, Hungary, or 
     the Czech Republic''.
       (d) Loan Materials, Supplies, and Equipment for Research 
     and Development Purposes.--Section 65(d) of the Arms Export 
     Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2796(d)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``or'' after ``United States)'' and 
     inserting a comma; and
       (2) by inserting before the period at the end the 
     following: ``, Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic''.
       (e) Cooperative Military Airlift Agreements.--Section 
     2350(e)(1)(B) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking ``and the Republic of Korea'' and inserting ``the 
     Republic of Korea, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic''.
       (f) Procurement of Communciations Support and Related 
     Supplies and Services.--Section 2350(d)(1)(B) is amended by 
     striking ``or the Republic of Korea'' and inserting ``the 
     Republic of Korea, Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic''.
       (g) Standardization of Equipment With North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization Members.--Section 2457 of title 10, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new subsection:
       ``(g) It is the sense of the Congress that in the interest 
     of maintaining stability and promoting democracy in Eastern 
     Europe, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, those 
     countries should, on and after the date of enactment of this 
     subsection, be included in all activities under this section 
     related to the increased standardization and enhanced 
     interoperability of equipment and weapons systems, through 
     coordinated training and procurement activities, as well as 
     other means, undertaken by the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization members and other allied countries.''
       (h) Inclusion of Other European Countries Emerging From 
     Communist Dominations.--The President should recommend 
     legislation to the Congress making eligible under the 
     provisions of law amended by this section such other European 
     countries emerging from communist domination as the President 
     may determine if such countries--
       (1) have made significant progress toward establishing 
     democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian 
     control of their armed forces, and the rule of law; and
       (2) are likely, within 5 years of such determination, to be 
     in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic 
     Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North 
     Atlantic area.

  Mr. FORD. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been suggested. 
The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SIMON. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SIMON. Madam President, I rise to speak briefly on the amendment 
proposed by my colleague, Senator Brown, that I am pleased to be a 
cosponsor of.
  That amendment basically says that if the President of the United 
States wants to provide excess military equipment to Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic, the President can do that.
  There is, in these three countries, some concern about the stability 
of the giant to the east, Russia. No one, I think, for a moment 
believes that Poland is going to invade Russia, or Hungary is going to 
invade Russia, or the Czech Republic will. I do think the great threat 
to the world today is instability. We have changed from a world where 
the nuclear threat because of the confrontation of two giant nuclear 
powers is the great threat. It is now instability. And these three 
countries, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, have established 
solid viable democracies.
  I had an opportunity to work with the Polish Government. I can 
remember when the Presiding Officer in 1989 joined me as a cosponsor of 
the Polish aid bill, which helped Poland get a big start in their 
process of becoming a democracy. I think it is important that we extend 
these kinds of gestures.
  This leaves it up to the President. I think Senator Brown has crafted 
this very, very carefully. I think it is a good, solid amendment. I 
understand there may be some concern in the State Department that it is 
viewed as an anti-Russian amendment. Frankly, there is no reason that 
there should be any fear on the part of the Russians. I do not view it 
as an anti-Russian amendment. I am sure my colleague, Senator Brown, 
does not view it as an anti-Russian amendment. It is a chance for the 
United States to help lend some stability to countries that have some 
genuine fears.
  I hope this can get worked out. I am sure Senator Brown is amenable 
to language changes that do not just gut the amendment. But I think we 
ought to be moving in the direction the Brown-Simon amendment suggests.


                  amendment no. 2153 to amendment 2152

(Purpose: To make Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic eligible for 
allied defense cooperation with NATO countries, and for other purposes)

  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I send a second-degree amendment to the 
desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] proposes an amendment 
     numbered No. 2153 to amendment 2152.

  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       Strike all and insert:

     SEC. 1017. ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR PARTICIPATION IN 
                   ALLIED DEFENSE COOPERATION.

       (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``NATO 
     Participation Act''.
       (b) Transfer of Excess Defense Articles.--The President may 
     transfer excess defense articles under the Foreign Assistance 
     Act of 1961 or the Arms Export Control Act to Poland, 
     Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
       (c) Leases and Loans of Major Defense Equipment and Other 
     Defense Articles.--Section 63(a)(2) of the Arms Export 
     Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2796b) is amended by striking ``or New 
     Zealand'' and inserting ``New Zealand, Poland, Hungary, or 
     the Czech Republic''.
       (d) Loan Materials, Supplies, and Equipment for Research 
     and Development Purposes.--Section 65(d) of the Arms Export 
     Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2796d(d)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``or'' after ``United States)'' and 
     inserting a comma; and
       (2) by inserting before the period at the end the 
     following: ``, Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic''.
       (e) Cooperative Military Airlift Agreements.--Section 
     2350c(e)(1)(B) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking ``and the Republic of Korea'' and inserting ``the 
     Republic of Korea, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic''.
       (f) Procurement of Communications Support and Related 
     Supplies and Services.--Section 2350f(d)(1)(B) is amended by 
     striking ``or the Republic of Korea'' and inserting ``the 
     Republic of Korea, Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic''.
       (g) Standardization of Equipment With North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization Members.--Section 2457 of title 10, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new subsection:
       ``(g) It is the sense of the Congress that in the interest 
     of maintaining stability and promoting democracy in Eastern 
     Europe, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, those 
     countries should, on and after the date of enactment of this 
     subsection, be included in all activities under this section 
     related to the increased standardization and enhanced 
     interoperability of equipment and weapons systems, through 
     coordinated training and procurement activities, as well as 
     other means, undertaken by the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization members and other allied countries.''.
       (h) Inclusion of Other European Countries Emerging From 
     Communist Domination.--The President should recommend 
     legislation to the Congress making eligible under the 
     provisions off law amended by this section such other 
     European countries emerging from communist domination as the 
     President may determine if such countries--
       (1) have made significant progress toward establishing 
     democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian 
     control of their armed forces, and the rule of law; and
       (2) are likely, within 5 years of such determination, to be 
     in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic 
     Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North 
     Atlantic area and Europe.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I say to my friends from Kentucky and 
Georgia, I am sending that amendment at the request of Senator Brown 
who asked that I submit a second-degree amendment in order to preclude 
a second-degree amendment from the managers of the bill. Basically, it 
is to fill up the tree. I have no further comment on the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, the amendment I think is quite 
straightforward. What we are attempting to do is include Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic specifically in discretionary areas 
that many other countries now enjoy in their relationship with the 
United States.
  Those are specifically, if the President decides it is in our 
interests, the ability to transfer excess defense articles; if it is 
the President's decision that it is in our national defense interests 
to lease and loan defense equipment and other defense articles; and 
again, if it is the President's decision it is in our national 
interests and security interests, to loan materials and supplies and 
equipment for research and development purposes as well.
  Right now this discretionary authority lies within the powers of the 
President for such countries as Bahrain, Senegal, Oman, and Morocco. 
What we would decide is whether or not we would place Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary as these other nations.
  Let me emphasize, it is not mandatory. It does not force the 
President or the Congress to move anything in this area. But it does 
give specific reference to these three Republics, putting them on a 
par--where it can be done.
  Why should we be concerned about it? Every American remembers the 
tragedies that these countries have been through in this century. No 
one could forget the tragedy they have faced with the invasion of Nazis 
during World War II and with the also tragic takeover by Soviet 
interests in the cold war period following World War II.
  For these countries, national security and concerns about their 
independence are not simply something they speculate about; it is 
something they have lived through. It is a nightmare they have come to 
understand. They have a keen and abiding interest in ensuring that the 
freedom and democracy that sometimes Americans take for granted is 
ensured for their children and their grandchildren.
  Perhaps most hard to believe for Americans is that they not only look 
to America with pride and with friendship, but they look to us to 
ensure that they will be able to cooperate with America in ensuring the 
freedom of this world continues on. We are sent heartrending letters 
from Americans of Polish decent.
  I ask unanimous consent at this time to have printed in the Record a 
letter I received from the President of the Polish American Congress, 
and also from the Ambassador from Poland.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                     Polish American Congress,

                                       Chicago, IL, June 17, 1994.
     Hon. Hank Brown,
     U.S. Senator,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Brown: I have just received from Myra Lenard 
     of the Washington Polish American Congress office a copy of 
     the Amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act 
     which is cited as the Brown-Simon Amendment: NATO 
     Participation Act of 1994.
       On behalf of the Polish American community I extend my 
     sincere gratitude to you Senator Brown for all your efforts 
     in this regard. This amendment will not only help Poland, but 
     also maintain stability and promote democracy in Eastern 
     Europe. This amendment will ease the transition of Poland 
     into NATO by having Poland be included in the activities of 
     NATO forces.
       This amendment is being extensively reported in the Polish 
     Daily News (Dziennik Zwiazkowy), radio station WPNA and other 
     local Polish-American press.
       We will make every effort to assist passage of this 
     amendment in support of your efforts. Thank you again and we 
     look forward to a favorable vote in the Senate.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Edward J. Moskal,
                                                        President.
                                  ____

                                                    Embassy of the


                                           Republic of Poland,

                                    Washington, DC, June 22, 1994.
     Hon. Hank Brown,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Brown: I would like to express words of 
     appreciation and gratitude for planning to introduce, 
     together with Senator Paul Simon of Illinois, an Amendment to 
     make Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic eligible for 
     allied defense cooperation with NATO countries. I believe 
     this legislation is crucial for Polish and Central European 
     new security arrangements. It will in important way stimulate 
     integration with NATO and create excellent opportunity for 
     developing Polish-American cooperation and trade exchange.
       As the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Andrzej 
     Olechowski declared at the NATO Ministerial meeting in 
     Istanbul last week: ``the results achieved by Poland and 
     other countries in building democracy and a market economy, 
     their commitment to NATO values, rapid growth of their 
     interdependence with Western countries and institutions call 
     into questions the rationale for maintaining unchanged the 
     present membership in the Alliance. In fact these new 
     democracies fulfill or will soon fulfill criteria for NATO 
     membership set up in the Washington Treaty. Moreover, their 
     membership in NATO should be considered not only as a 
     response to their legitimate security aspirations but also as 
     an important condition for European stability''.
       Your skillfully prepared amendment Senator, fully 
     corresponds with the Polish view on security arrangements in 
     Europe and can be very beneficial for the United States, 
     Poland, and the NATO Pact.
       Thank you again for your significant initiative.
           With my highest regards,
                                                  Jerzy Kozminski,
                                             Appointed Ambassador.

  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I think Members will have an opportunity 
to review these letters and many, many others in their own files in the 
months ahead. I think they articulate some anxiety, the concern, and 
deep interest that Americans who have come from these countries have, 
as well as the existing citizens of Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic.
  Let me emphasize, while this provides for permission only and 
discretion in the hands of the President, that it is extremely 
important. It is important because these countries have become 
concerned when the United States was not active in urging their 
admittance to NATO. Our stance, the official stance of the United 
States, has been they may be eligible for membership in the future but 
at this point full membership should not be granted to them.
  What it does is raise what I believe is an unfounded concern, but a 
concern in these citizens that the United States may not be willing to 
work towards their independence; that the United States may be 
unwilling to stand up and ensure that they enjoy the freedoms that are 
so important to their people.
  Clearly, I think every Member of this Chamber would not want to see 
the freedoms of these republics jeopardized. They have made enormous 
progress, not only toward bringing democracy about in their countries, 
but privatizing their economies. Thus the importance of this amendment. 
By simply saying to these countries that we are going to put you on the 
list, and using their names where we can cooperate with them, it sends 
a new message to them. It sends a message we are interested in their 
security and their safety, and we are interested, at least in the long 
run, in cooperating with them.
  Should we try and coordinate our communication systems with them? I 
think we should. But, again, that is simply an option for the 
President.
  Should we try to coordinate the kind of military equipment we use 
with them? I think we should. But again this is simply an option for 
them.
  Should we send them a signal that we care about them and we do not 
want them to slip under the dark cloud of another Iron Curtain 
regardless from which direction it comes? I think we should.
  No American can look at the tragedy that those countries have 
suffered in the past half century and not feel an urgent need to 
reassure them and to encourage them. The last thing we want is for 
people in Eastern Europe to think that they are forced back into the 
old ways because the free countries of the world are not willing to 
stand beside them.
  This amendment more than anything else sends a signal of hope, of 
interest, of concern. I think it is a signal that is sorely needed. I 
believe every American has an interest in securing the peace and the 
freedom of Eastern Europe, and in a small way this signal will 
encourage those who have sacrificed so much to bring freedom to their 
country.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Speaking as a Senator from Maryland, I ask the 
Senator to add me as a cosponsor to the amendment.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I ask my friend, there is obviously some 
controversy and discussion surrounding his amendment, and I wonder if 
for the sake of moving forward he would agree and the managers would 
agree to temporarily setting aside this amendment while we try to work 
something out and we move on to another amendment. I wonder if that 
would be agreeable to, first of all, the Senator from Colorado.
  Mr. BROWN. I would be happy to do that. Obviously, this is something 
that we should be able to reach agreement on.
  Mr. McCAIN. I ask the Senator from Georgia, the distinguished 
chairman, if that would be agreeable.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, this amendment is opposed by the Foreign 
Relations Committee according to what we have heard. It would be very 
helpful if, while we are trying to get them over here to speak to the 
authors of the amendment to see if something could be worked out, we 
could temporarily set this amendment aside and let it recur as the 
pending business after we get another amendment done.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. COATS. Madam President, I think that is a very good suggestion by 
the Senator from Arizona. There are some considerations--I think a lot 
of people are sympathetic with what the Senator is trying to do. There 
is a process here that I think needs to be examined and given some time 
so that perhaps we can come up with an acceptable modification to which 
everyone can agree.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, in light of that, I ask unanimous 
consent that the pending Brown amendment and the McCain second-degree 
amendment be temporarily set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona has the floor.


                           Amendment No. 2154

 (Purpose: To limit the total amount that may be obligated or expended 
      for procurement of the first and second Seawolf submarines)

  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2154.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 22, between lines 9 and 10, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 122. SEAWOLF SUBMARINE PROGRAM.

       (a) Limitation of Costs.--Except as provided in subsection 
     (b), the total amount obligated or expended for procurement 
     of the SSN-21 and SSN-22 Seawolf submarines may not exceed 
     $4,673,371,000.
       (b) Automatic Increase of Limitation Amount.--The amount of 
     the limitation set forth in subsection (a) is increased by 
     the following amounts:
       (1) The amounts of outfitting costs and post-delivery costs 
     incurred for the submarines referred to in such subsection.
       (2) The amounts of increases in costs attributable to 
     economic inflation.
       (3) The amounts of increases in costs attributable to 
     compliance with changes in Federal, State, or local laws.

  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I had intended to ask for a rollcall 
vote on this amendment. I do not. I am in deep sympathy with all of my 
colleagues who would like to depart on this holiday weekend and also to 
the distinguished managers of the bill who are obviously trying to get 
done. Under normal circumstances, I would spend a lot of time on this 
amendment. But I would like to take as short a time as possible. And 
also while I am on this amendment, I wish to mention the situation as 
far as military construction is concerned, and then I would ask for a 
voice vote. I believe that this amendment is acceptable to both sides.
  Madam President, also I would like to point out I do not intend to 
offer an amendment to kill the Seawolf submarine at this time. I do not 
intend to because, frankly, there is no money authorized in this bill 
for the third Seawolf submarine, and so I do not intend to offer that 
amendment. I would state to my friends and colleagues, though, that 
next year there will be a requirement for additional authorization for 
a third Seawolf submarine. I will vociferously and energetically oppose 
that next year.
  At this time, however, I am going to try to bring the tremendously 
escalating costs associated with the Seawolf submarine under control, 
and I am very disappointed to tell my colleagues that last year we had 
a similar amendment pass by voice vote, which in itself means that no 
one objected to it, and yet the amendment was dropped in conference 
with the other body, and in the intervening time the costs of the 
Seawolf submarine went up again.
  Let me try to explain a little bit about the costs of the submarines 
and how basically the cost is out of control. Initially, the cost of 
the Seawolf submarine was estimated at $1.6 billion. Today, that figure 
has risen to $2.4 billion, an increase of $740 million. The cost of the 
SSN-22, the other one, was originally estimated at $1.7 billion, and 
that cost is nearly $2.3 billion, an increase of $560 million. The 
total cost of these two submarines has increased $1.3 billion--B, 
billion dollars--since the program began, a 38-percent cost increase.
  Madam President, the Congress has authorized and appropriated nearly 
$4.7 billion to buy two submarines. Two submarines have cost $4.7 
billion.
  I was not surprised, I must say, Madam President, when I received a 
letter from the Secretary of the Navy on June 9 stating that the cost 
of these two submarines had increased by another $125.5 million. When 
will it stop? Next year, Congress will be asked to approve funding for 
a third Seawolf submarine, currently estimated to cost $2.3 billion. I 
will oppose that authorization because I believe it would be throwing 
good money after bad. I also suspect that by the time the Senate 
debates authorizing the third submarine, the cost will have increased 
yet again.
  I will summarize the rest of my statement, Madam President, by saying 
in a time of declining defense budgets, which have seen a 35-percent 
cut since 1985 and another 10 percent cut is envisioned by 1999, we 
cannot afford to pay another dime for any militarily unnecessary luxury 
like the Seawolf submarine. I urge my colleagues to support the 
amendment.
  I understand that my colleagues from Connecticut will propose a 
second-degree amendment to the pending amendment. Their amendment would 
increase the cost cap in this amendment by $86 million, the amount of 
the Navy's most recent cost increase, which will be permissible under 
the specific terms of the amendment. I have no objection to 
incorporating that change in the amendment, and I would urge its 
adoption. I would expect one of the Senators from Connecticut over here 
pretty soon.
  In the meantime, Madam President, I wish to bring to the attention of 
the Senate that nearly $200 million in unrequested military 
construction costs are part of this bill. The bill before the Senate 
today already includes $545 million for military construction projects 
which were not included in the administration's request. These add-ons 
were requested by individual Members of the Senate for projects in 
their own States. Funding for these projects was made available at the 
expense of other high-priority programs like pay, readiness and 
training, and weapons systems modernization.
  I oppose the addition of all $545 million additional in military 
construction add-ons in the readiness subcommittee. I propose an 
amendment to transfer the funds to combat readiness and training. So 
these $545 million in add-ons are included in the bill before the 
Senate. And I now understand that the Senate will be asked to give 
perfunctory approval to another 26 projects totaling $190.8 million.
  Madam President, this has to stop, and I ask the distinguished 
chairman of the committee and the ranking member, when do we stop 
adding milcon money and at the same time cut the defense budget?
  I remind my colleagues that due to the passage of the Exon-Grassley 
amendment, $500 million was taken out of the defense appropriations, 
and yet in both the appropriating committee and in the authorizing 
committee we are adding hundreds of millions of dollars in military 
construction projects. Meanwhile readiness suffers, training suffers, 
recruiting suffers, and depot-level maintenance backlogs continue to 
rise. If you ask any military commander in the field, they will tell 
you that military construction projects are their last priority, not 
their first.
  Madam President, we are doing a great disservice to the people of 
this country in the expenditure of their hard-earned tax dollars by 
continuing to add on military construction project after military 
construction project.
  Madam President, again, for the last 10 years the defense budget has 
declined every year. Defense budget authority has declined by almost 41 
percent since 1985. At the same time, military construction budget 
authority has been reduced by only 29 percent. We have a terrible 
mismatch of infrastructure funding with a top line decline in the 
defense budget far more serious than that of the military construction 
budget.
  In the past 5 years, from fiscal year 1990 through 1994, Congress 
added over $4.4 billion in unrequested military construction projects 
to the defense budget. This equates to $880 million every year in 
projects designated for Members' districts or States. It has to stop. 
Senator Glenn and I have set up a set of criteria for inclusion of 
additional military construction projects. I hope that the 
distinguished chairman and ranking member would adopt that as one of 
the rules of our committee.
  I hope and pray that we can bring this to a stop. If for some reason 
the Defense budget turns around and we see increases, my objections to 
these additional MILCON projects will be dramatically reduced, although 
we will still need an orderly process that is based on merit as opposed 
to geography.
  Before I yield, maybe my friend, the distinguished chairman of the 
committee, would like to respond.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I would say to my friend from Arizona 
that, No. 1, we have not agreed to any amendments here on the floor on 
MILCON that I know of. There are amendments that are being proposed. 
They are being worked at the staff level. I believe Senator Glenn's 
staff is involved in it from our side. There are amendments that are 
being presented, as they always are. We are trying to apply the same 
criteria to those amendments as we did to the amendments we considered 
in the committee. Those criteria were suggested by the Senator from 
Arizona. So we are working that way.
  Any amendment that would be presented here would have to meet those 
criteria or we will not agree to them. Of course, Members have a right 
to present amendments. We have a right to say they have to go to a 
rollcall vote, and we have a right to say that we will not accept them 
unless they meet the criteria. That is what we are working on right 
now.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the chairman. I will ask for a voice vote at the 
appropriate time after my friend from Connecticut speaks.
  I yield the floor.


                Amendment No. 2155 to Amendment No. 2154

       (Purpose: To increase the maximum amount.)
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd], for himself, and 
     Mr. Lieberman, proposes an amendment numbered 2155 to 
     amendment numbered 2154.

  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On the first page, line 7, strike out ``$4,673,371,000'' 
     and insert in lieu thereof ``$4,759,571,000''.

  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, is this amendment being offered in the 
second degree?
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, this amendment is being offered in the 
second degree to the amendment offered by the Senator from Arizona.
  Madam President, this amendment is fairly straightforward. It seeks 
to cap the reasonable costs of the Seawolf submarine program while 
providing the Navy and the contractor--in this case the Electric Boat 
Division of General Dynamics--with the necessary flexibility to deal 
with uncontrollable changes that could occur in this program.
  I believe that our colleague and friend from Arizona has had the 
opportunity to see this amendment. We have circulated it, and I believe 
this modification is acceptable. I would like to take a minute or two 
and explain to my colleague the purpose and the rationale for it.
  Madam President, when the Seawolf submarine program was first 
proposed as the future Navy attack submarine technology for our 
country, the Pentagon and we envisioned a fleet of some 26 of these 
submarines. Today, that number has been reduced to just three.
  As a consequence of that revision, it would naturally follow that the 
per-unit cost of the reduced fleet would go up. That is something I 
think most of our colleagues are familiar with. That is precisely what 
has happened to this program. Obviously, the more units you build the 
unit cost comes down. When you reduce the number from 26 to three, the 
cost per unit would be higher than you originally envisioned. That is a 
typical research and design cost that would normally be spread across 
26 submarines. It must now be placed on top of just three. That is a 
very difficult pill to swallow. But, nonetheless, those are the facts.
  The program is now in its final phase. Deputy Secretary Deutch, in a 
significant program decision dated June 23, 1994, has in fact decided 
to move forward with a new attack submarine design that will be 
smaller, less expensive, and ultimately quieter than the Seawolf class 
submarine. Clearly we are on a new course.
  Madam President, I am not disputing at all the amendment for a cost 
cap on this Seawolf submarine program. Frankly, I commend my colleague 
from Arizona. We have our disagreements with a threshold question on 
the Seawolf. But as far as this particular amendment goes, I think it 
is a constructive amendment to try to contain the costs of these 
programs.
  I should add very quickly, however, that I do so with strong 
reservations about cost capping major weapon systems procurements 
without a clear road map for future modernization. In essence, we must 
be certain that the actions taken to curtail spending do not tie the 
hands of senior military planners with respect to future force 
planning.
  I understand and share the concern of my colleague from Arizona about 
escalating Navy construction costs in a declining budget environment. 
Therefore, Madam President, I offer, along with my colleague from 
Connecticut, Senator Lieberman, this second-degree amendment that would 
increase the Senator's cost cap by some $86 million, and would retain 
the identical exceptions language as proposed by my colleague from 
Arizona.
  Madam President, we do not do this lightly. I remain vitally 
concerned about the future of this Nation's submarine construction 
capability. I remain very concerned with attempts to squeeze programs 
to the point of near death.
  This amendment, I think, is a fair compromise. It seeks to cap the 
costs of the ongoing Seawolf program while maintaining adequate funding 
and authority for the Department of Defense, should uncontrollable 
costs increases occur.
  I thank my colleague from Arizona for his support of this amendment, 
and strongly urge our colleagues to support it. I hope that we can 
adopt this amendment and then move on with the completion of this 
program and the next generation of submarines.
  Allow me to yield the floor to my colleague from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Madam President. I will speak very briefly.
  Madam President, I rise to support the second-degree amendment of my 
colleague, the senior Senator from Connecticut. There is no secret to 
the fact that I believe in the Seawolf submarine. It is the world's 
best submarine and it should be a part of our strategic inventory 
because it is needed militarily and it provides the necessary bridge to 
production of a new attack submarine which will have Seawolf stealth 
but will be smaller and have a lower price tag.
  No one who believes in protecting our national security wants to do 
this. Everyone recognizes that we have crying needs in this country--
both in defense areas and domestic programs. We all want to make sure 
that taxpayer dollars are spent effectively, efficiently, wisely, and 
yes, frugally.
  I strongly support the Seawolf program. I want to see three ships 
produced as this administration has decided it must if we are going to 
meet our military needs and be able to produce globally competitive 
nuclear attack submarines in the next century.
  But I do not favor unlimited or uncontrolled spending. No one 
believes that authorization of a defense program should be seen as a 
blank check from the Federal Treasury and I do not believe that is what 
the Navy or the producer of the Seawolf want or expect. We all want to 
produce Seawolf submarines and every other piece of defense equipment 
at a cost which is reasonable and affordable. We have seen in the 
demise of the old Soviet Union what happens when a country fails to 
control its defense spending. We are not in a similar position here.

  I disagree with the Senator from Arizona about the way this program 
has been and is being managed. I am concerned, as we all are, about the 
costs of this system and other technologically advanced defense 
systems, but I believe that this program is being managed 
professionally and in a fiscally responsible manner. I believe the 
record to date fully bears this out.
  Thus, when my colleague from Arizona made it known that he was 
planning on offering an amendment to cap the costs of SSN-21 and SSN-
22, I chose to work with him to achieve our common goals of controlling 
costs, enforcing fiscal discipline, and protecting our scarce defense 
and national resources. I believe we have come up with a cap which is 
responsible and will permit this vital program to be completed 
successfully. The contractor is fully prepared to abide by these 
amendments.
  I should note for the record that the Navy has not agreed to either 
of these amendments. Their position is understandable. Construction of 
these incredibly complex submarines takes 6 years; technology changes 
in that time period, especially in electronics, and the Navy 
understandably wants to keep its options open to be able to issue 
change orders to obtain technological improvements when they occur. The 
Navy believes that some additional clarification of exceptions to the 
cap are needed to protect their ability to affect necessary changes in 
design or production due to submarine safety, personnel safety, valid 
programmatic reasons to support ship delivery, resolution of legitimate 
contractor and subcontractor claims, and the ability of the Government 
to meet its contractual liability. I do not believe that this amendment 
precludes the Navy from making necessary changes for these valid 
reasons. It will, however, require the Navy to return to the Congress 
to explain the proposed changes, the cost, and their rationale. This 
increases the administrative burden on the program managers in many 
respects, but I believe this is an acceptable price to pay for the 
potential benefit of increased protection of taxpayer dollars.

  Our second-degree amendment allows for the same increases in costs as 
did the Senator from Arizona--those which are due to factors which are 
beyond the control of the Navy or the contractor: inflation and changes 
in law. It also does not include the outfitting and post-delivery costs 
which are incurred when these ships go to sea. We have changed none of 
this from the Senator's underlying amendment.
  Our only change to the underlying amendment is that we have altered 
the imposed cap by $86.2 million to account for increases which are now 
known and certified by the Navy due to factors which are allowed by the 
exceptions I have just mentioned and that Senator from Arizona 
recognizes are necessary. Specifically, $34.8 million in inflation and 
labor index changes and $51.4 million in changes required to workman's 
compensation and negotiated benefits. This data comes to us in a letter 
addressed to Senator McCain dated June 9, 1994, signed by the Secretary 
of the Navy, John Dalton.

  The Secretary says in this letter that this data is the best estimate 
of the cost for SSN-21 and 22 and will be reflected in the fiscal year 
1994 ship cost adjustment report which will be delivered to the 
congressional defense committees shortly.
  Madam President, I believe that what we are doing here today in both 
the underlying and second-degree amendments is responsible and 
reasonable. I appreciate the forthright way in which my colleague from 
Arizona has worked with the Navy and the Armed Services Committee. We 
clearly have significant differences on other aspects of this important 
national security program, but there is no difference in our belief 
that responsible government is good government and we are pleased we 
have been able to jointly develop mechanisms to be accountable for the 
way we spend taxpayer dollars.
  I will support our second-degree amendment and the underlying 
amendment as modified and urge my colleagues to do the same.
  I ask unanimous consent that the letter from the Secretary of the 
Navy be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                          Office of the Secretary,


                                       Department of the Navy,

                                     Washington, DC, June 9, 1994.
     Hon. John McCain,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator McCain: The current best estimate of cost for 
     SSN 21 and SSN 22 is $4,799B, which is an increase of $125.5M 
     from the $4,673B which was reported in 1993 for the annual 
     Ship Cost Adjustment. This increase change, which will be 
     reflected in the FY 1994 Ship Cost Adjustment, is due to:

Increases to which the contractor is legally entitled to which are 
    beyond control of the government:                          Millions
  Inflation/labor indices.........................................$34.8
  Workmans Comp/Fringe Benefits....................................51.4
Contractually mandated adjustments due to negotiated changes or 
  requests for equitable adjustment................................39.3
                                                               ________

    Total.........................................................125.5

       Examples of contract increases to which the contractor is 
     legally entitled which are beyond the control of the 
     government may include items such as:
       The Government's pre-determined share of any further 
     allowable increases between contract target price and ceiling 
     price,
       Contractually mandated price increases for changes 
     resulting from compliance with changes in federal law [e.g., 
     environmental laws] and/or escalation in specified labor and 
     material costs,
       The difference between actual experience and the 
     historically conservative OMB inflation estimates mandated 
     for budget purposes and,
       The settlement of legitimate contractor claims or requests 
     for equitable adjustments.
           Sincerely,
                                                   John H. Dalton,
                                                        Secretary.

  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, this is I believe the successful 
completion of a dialog that began in the Armed Services Committee 
between the Senator from Arizona and this Senator. Obviously, we have a 
disagreement on the underlying program, the SSN Seawolf Submarine 
Program. But we have no disagreement on the desire to make sure that 
this program comes in at the lowest cost possible for the taxpayers.
  I enthusiastically support the Seawolf program. It will produce the 
three finest attack submarines ever made. They will be out in the 
waters for the next 40 years protecting us and those who follow us, 
performing a very wide array of missions.
  Building these Seawolfs is the most cost efficient way to preserve 
the submarine industrial base, which everyone agrees we need to 
preserve, to build the next generation of attack submarines, which 
everyone agrees we need to build.
  But no one should be given an open and blank checkbook. The amendment 
that we have agreed on with the second-degree amendment puts reasonable 
constraints on the Navy and the contractor in the construction of SSN-
21 and 22. Therefore, I support the second-degree amendment and am 
pleased to join with both my colleague from Connecticut and my friend 
and colleague from Arizona in doing so.
  I thank the Chair.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. PELL. Madam President, I rise to support the second-degree 
amendment offered by my colleagues from Connecticut.
  As many of my colleagues know, the administration has already decided 
to cap the Seawolf Program at three submarines, a great reduction from 
the 26 previously envisioned. As a result of this reconfiguration, the 
per-unit cost of each of the three submarines has obviously increased.
  I believe the amendment by my colleagues from Connecticut is fair and 
reasonable. It also accomplishes the goal sought by the Senator from 
Arizona, and that is to ensure the efficient, cost-effective production 
of these submarines.
  Madam President, I believe this amendment is a fair compromise and 
achieves the result we all desire. It caps the cost of the first two 
Seawolf submarines, which have been previously authorized and 
appropriated by Congress, while ensuring adequate funding for the 
successful completion of the program.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I thank both Senators from Connecticut 
for their agreement on bringing about cost caps to this very expensive 
program. I would remind them that the procurement cost total to date 
for two Seawolf submarines has been $10.4 billion. That includes R&D 
and all of that. But one must admit that that is a significant amount 
of money to spend for two submarines. In fairness, if a third one are 
were built, the number would be around 12.
  I would also suggest that we will save the debate on the merits of 
the weapons system for next year.
  I would like to thank the distinguished chairman and ranking member 
of the committee for adopting new sets of criteria for inclusion of 
military construction projects, and also for land transfers. I believe 
that we, as a committee, can function more efficiently and in a more 
cost-conscious fashion with the adoption of both of those. I appreciate 
the chairman and ranking member for adopting those.
  I say to my friends from Connecticut that I will be leaving this 
afternoon to attend the commission of a ship named after my father and 
my grandfather. Given the incredible labors of the Senators from 
Connecticut in behalf of the third Seawolf submarine, I will be 
suggesting that the third Seawolf submarine be named the Dodd-Lieberman 
or the Lieberman-Dodd, whichever is appropriate.
  Mr. DODD. Will my colleague yield on that particular point? I wanted 
to suggest, as our colleague from Arizona has been extremely aggressive 
in these last several years on the Seawolf Program, Senator Lieberman, 
my colleague from Connecticut, and I were going to suggest that they 
offer an amendment that we name the next Seawolf John McCain, in 
exchange for which he might move on to some other construction program.

  But, Madam President, I would be remiss, in all seriousness--and I 
apologize for not raising it myself. The father of our colleague from 
Arizona and his grandfather served this Nation of ours with incredible 
distinction. The fact that a ship in Bath, ME, is being dedicated, 
christened in the name and in honor of his father and grandfather is an 
honor that is long overdue. Both his father and his grandfather would 
be deeply proud of the service of their son and grandson in this body. 
I congratulate him.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank my dear friend from Connecticut for these very 
kind remarks.
  Madam President, I do not believe there is any more debate.
  I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2155) was agreed to.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the first-degree 
amendment, as amended?
  The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as amended.
  The amendment (No. 2154) was agreed to.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. BENNETT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah is recognized.
  Mr. BENNETT. Madam President, although this amendment will not be 
included in the Senate's version of the 1995 DOD authorization bill, I 
fully expect this issue to be addressed by the conferees.
  Under the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, Tooele Army Depot 
in Utah [TEAD] was realigned. This realignment will actually result in 
closure for many of the depot's functions. Yet, since TEAD is being 
realigned and not closed, employees are not eligible for automatic 
restoration of annual leave payments and housing relocation assistance. 
This definitional technicality is resulting in a great disparity and 
injustice to many of the employees of TEAD. Call it a realignment or a 
closure, the effect is the same.
  The fact that in most cases, a major realignment of an installation 
results in the same adverse impact on the employees of the installation 
as does a base closure, this issue should be addressed. I believe there 
is no sound basis for distinguishing between base closures and major 
base realignments so far as concerns the leave restoration provision of 
title 5. As a constituent pointed out:

       You take the maintenance and supply functions away from 
     Sacramento Army Depot and you have a depot closure. You take 
     the same functions away from TEAD, and you have some 
     functions (ammunition and chemical) remaining, so you have a 
     depot realignment. In both cases you are losing roughly the 
     same missions and the number of people. . . .

  All of TEAD's industrial missions are closing. The only part that 
will remain is the south area, a separate part of the base located 15 
miles away where 42 percent of the Nation's obsolete chemical munitions 
are stored. There will be virtually no possibility for employees at the 
industrial area to transfer to the southern area.
  Complicating the issue, is the Defense Logistics Agency [DLA] 
employees who are hosted by TEAD. DLA employees will be given the full 
benefits of automatic restoration of annual leave and housing 
relocation assistance. In a few cases, we have the ironic situation of 
a working couple at Tooele: one spouse working for the Army as a 
civilian who is not eligible, and the other working for the DLA who is 
eligible. The reason DLA is giving its employees the automatic benefits 
is that the 1993 BRAC listed DLA's warehousing activities at Tooele as 
being disestablished, which has been interpreted to mean closure.
  It would seem reasonable to designated TEAD employees working in 
functions or activities anticipated to be closed or severely curtailed 
be recognized under Public Law 102-484 and be authorized for leave 
restoration. This would allow personnel and the commander of the base 
with some needed flexibility.
  In light of the 1995 defense base closures, it is essential that we 
correct this inequity now to avoid greater problems later. people and 
their families are being negatively impacted by the 1993 BRAC 
decisions. The employee benefits packages were instituted to assist 
Defense Department civilians who would be separated because of those 
decisions.
  I look forward to having this issue addressed in conference, and 
thank the chairman for his assurances.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I say to my friend that we have talked 
about this issue and he brought it to my attention. I looked at it 
briefly, and I will be delighted to work with him and to keep in touch 
with him as we go to conference on this. I will listen to his views, 
and I assure him he will have my attention as we move into conference 
on this bill.
  Mr. BENNETT. I thank the chairman.


                           Amendment No. 2156

 (Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate concerning the training 
              and modernization of the Reserve components)

  Mr. BUMPERS. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk on 
behalf of myself and Mr. Ford, Mr. Bond, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. 
Bumpers, Mr. Daschle, Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. 
Feingold, Mr. Ford, Mr. Hollings, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Kohl, Mr. Lautenberg, 
Mr. Mathews, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Pell, Mr. Pryor, Mr. Robb, Mr. Sarbanes, 
Mr. Shelby, Mr. Wellstone, Mr. Wofford, Mr. Durenberger, Mr. Jeffords, 
Mr. Lugar, Mr. Burns, and Mrs. Boxer and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers], for himself, Mr. 
     Ford, Mr. Bond, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Bumpers, Mr. 
     Daschle, Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Dorgan, Mr. Feingold, 
     Mr. Hollings, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Kohl, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. 
     Mathews, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. Pell, Mr. Pryor, Mr. Robb, Mr. 
     Sarbanes, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Wellstone, Mr. Wofford, Mr. 
     Durenberger, Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Burns, and Mrs. 
     Boxer, proposes an amendment numbered 2156.

  Mr. BUMPERS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 126, insert after line 21 the following:

     SEC. 514. SENSE OF THE SENATE CONCERNING THE TRAINING AND 
                   MODERNIZATION OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS.

       (a) Findings, the force structure specified in the 
     Pentagon's Bottom Up Review assumes increased reliance on the 
     reserve components of the Armed Forces;
       (b) the mobilization of the reserve components for the 
     Persian Gulf War was handicapped by training, readiness, and 
     equipment shortfalls;
       (c) the mobilization of the Army reserve components for the 
     Persian Gulf War was handicapped by lack of a standard 
     readiness evaluation system, which resulted in a lengthy 
     reevaluation of training and equipment readiness of Army 
     National Guard and Reserve units before they could be 
     deployed;
       (d) funding and scheduling constraints continue to limit 
     the opportunity for combat units of the Army National Guard 
     to carry out adequate maneuver training;
       (e) funding constraints continue to handicap the readiness 
     and modernization of the reserve components and their 
     interoperability with the active forces;
       (f) Now, Therefore, it is the Sense of the Senate that the 
     Department of Defense should establish a standard readiness 
     and evaluation system and that it should provide in its 
     annual budget submissions adequate resources to ensure that 
     National Guard and reserve units are trained and modernized 
     to the standards needed for them to carry out the full range 
     of missions required of them under the Bottom -Up Review.

  Mr. BUMPERS. Madam President, I think the distinguished floor manager 
is familiar with this amendment. It is a sense-of-the-Senate 
resolution. It says:

       It is the sense of the Senate that the Department of 
     Defense should establish a standard readiness and evaluation 
     system and that it should provide in its annual budget 
     submissions adequate resources to ensure that National Guard 
     and Reserve units are trained and modernized to the standards 
     needed for them to carry out the full range of missions 
     required of them under the Bottom-Up Review.

  The genesis of this amendment is that a number of our National Guard 
units, including the 142d Field Artillery of Arkansas, when sent to 
Fort Hood prior to deployment to Desert Storm, had only about 50 
percent of the equipment they needed. I know that we cannot provide 
everything to avoid this kind of deficiency. But this is a sense-of-
the-Senate resolution. It is designed to let the Pentagon know that 
they should do their very best to comply with the Bottom-Up Review.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, let me make sure I understand the 
Senator's amendment. I believe this is an amendment that expresses the 
sense of the Senate that the Department of Defense would establish a 
standard readiness and evaluation system and provide adequate resources 
to ensure that National Guard and Reserve units are trained in the same 
standard as active forces, and the DOD should allocate sufficient 
resources to modernize the Reserve components to carry out the full 
range of missions assigned to them in the Bottom-Up Review. Is that 
capturing, pretty much, the amendment?
  Mr. BUMPERS. Yes.
  Mr. NUNN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Before we do that, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Pell be added as a cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2156) was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2157

  (Purpose: To reduce the amount of guidance systems provided for the 
                      Trident II Missile Program)

  Mr. BUMPERS. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2157.

  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       Strike line 23 on page 14 and insert in lieu thereof the 
     following: ``pedoes, $2,322,539,000, of which no more than 
     $535,300,000 are authorized to be appropriated for 
     procurement of 18 Trident II missiles and 14 Mark-6 guidance 
     systems.''

  Mr. BUMPERS. Madam President, if I could have the attention of the 
floor manager, this will only take a few minutes. It is a complicated 
amendment, but not if you understand it. I think if I could take 5 
minutes of the chairman's time, I believe that he and the committee 
will be willing to accept this amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. If the Senator will yield for a question. Just in the 
possible eventuality that the Senator is not persuasive to the managers 
and we have to oppose the amendment, would the Senator be willing to 
have a rather brief time limit on both sides?
  Mr. BUMPERS. Yes, of course.
  Mr. NUNN. Would the Senator prefer to wait on the time agreement?
  Mr. BUMPERS. I would like to explain the amendment and get the 
chairman's reaction to it.
  Madam President, every Trident II missile that we have on our 
submarines has a guidance system. That guidance system is the MK-6, 
commonly referred to as a Mark 6. Let me pause a moment to say that 
this amendment tracks precisely the recommendation of GAO, which has a 
draft report ready on this matter. The final GAO report has not been 
issued, but I can tell you that everything I am going to say in this 
debate is exactly what GAO has said regarding these guidance systems 
that we use on each one of our missiles.
  A Trident submarine has 24 missiles on board. Each one of those 
missiles, in order to hit its target, has to have a guidance system. 
That guidance system normally costs about $8.3 million. But the Navy 
has already bought some advance components so it is now spending $6.6 
million on each in fiscal year 1995. My amendment proposes to cut the 
procurement of those guidance systems in 1995 from 30 to 14, thereby 
saving $106 million. I might digress to say that we just adopted the 
Warner amendment with a big majority to restore military retiree 
COLA's, and I can tell you that this committee, when they get to 
conference with the House, is going to be looking for ways to fund that 
COLA.
  I do not put this money in base cleanup. I do not transfer it 
anywhere. I give it to the committee to try to meet what GAO says are 
more pressing needs.
  But here is how simple this is: When the Trident submarines go to 
sea, they take a few spare guidance systems just in case the guidance 
system fails on one of those missiles.
  But let me point out that while my amendment cuts the number of 
spares on each Trident submarine from six spares to four, during a 2-
year period, by adopting this amendment, you will increase the chance 
by six-tenths of 1 percent that 1 missile out of the 24 missiles on a 
submarine will fail in the years 2017 to 2018. That is a 2-year period, 
22 to 24 years down the pike. If you adopt this amendment, during that 
2-year period these 10 Trident submarines might have to reduce the 
number of spares on board from six to four.
  In the last 20 years, during 658 submarine patrols with the Trident I 
missile, on one occasion--and only on one occasion--have they had four 
failures. That one occasion did not affect their capability. It simply 
used up all the spares they had and that has happened 1 time out of 658 
patrols.
  Here is the GAO figure. If you do not remember anything else I say, 
please remember this. If you adopt my amendment to save this $106 
million, here is what you will be doing to our readiness on our Trident 
submarines. In the years 2017 and 2018--that is a 2-year period, only 
in that 2-year period--you will increase the chance of the failure of 
one missile on one submarine by six-tenths of 1 percent.
  If you do what the Pentagon wants to do, that is, have six spares on 
every submarine, you will have a 0.99979 assurance of total readiness. 
If you want to do what I am suggesting and what GAO has suggested, you 
will reduce that readiness to 0.99318, or roughly seven-tenths of 1 
percent in one 2-year period 24 years from now on one missile on one 
submarine.
  If that is not worth risking $106 million on, at a time when the 
Defense Department needs this money for much, much more pressing 
things, and which does not reduce their readiness one whit, I do not 
know what we can do around here.
  Madam President, everybody in this body knows that over the 20-year 
period that I have been in the U.S. Senate, I have taken on some major 
issues. I felt very strongly about some of them. I was disappointed 
about the B-2 vote this morning. But when it comes to pure common 
sense, intellectual honesty, defense readiness, the Senate will never 
have a better opportunity to save $106 million for virtually no risk 
whatever.
  I yield the floor, Madam President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. MURRAY). The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Madam President, since nobody wishes to respond at the 
moment, let me just make one other point.
  In addition to what I have just said, I want to point out that even 
under my amendment, the Navy will still have 121 guidance systems 
onshore. When a submarine comes back from patrol, if they have had a 
guidance failure, they simply take that guidance system to be repaired. 
You do not throw these away. These are not disposable. They are highly 
repairable. We repair them all the time.
  But if a submarine comes in from patrol and they find one of the 
guidance systems has failed during that patrol, they simply hand it to 
the mechanics, take a new one and put it on board. And the people 
onshore take the defective one and repair it, usually in a fairly short 
time.
  The GAO has not validated the Navy's need for 120 onshore. But if you 
want to talk about redundancy, I am telling you, I am not disturbed by 
that one whit. They can keep their 120 guidance systems onshore.
  The Navy is asking for 30 guidance systems in fiscal year 1995. I am 
saying 14 is not only more than adequate, but that we can save all this 
money and, in addition, I am saying that if we cut their purchases of 
MK-6's to 16 in 1995, they are probably going to come back the 
following year and ask for 12 more, and I am not going to resist that.
  These figures and facts are not mine. They come from the GAO. If this 
body wants to vote for a bird nest on the ground it will never have a 
better opportunity.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. the Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I will ask my friend from Arkansas whether 
the following is accurate, because it has been presented to me as being 
the case, that the Senator's argument and the GAO paper depends on 
three or four key assumptions that are crucial to the case that is 
being made here.
  First of all, it is my understanding that one assumption that this 
saving is based on is that the Trident submarines are retired after 
precisely 30 years of service life, that is, they will not be kept on 
past their normal service lives. Is that correct?
  Mr. BUMPERS. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. NUNN. So if you kept the Trident beyond 30 years, you would then 
have guidance systems that were no longer in production. That would 
cost a great deal of money and that would not be available because you 
would not have bought them.
  Mr. BUMPERS. The guidance systems would not be in production then 
anyway. Presumably, it would not because the Navy has said they want 30 
next year and they have not even asked for any in the next year, 1996. 
But if they do ask for an additional 12 in 1996, that is likely to be 
all they will ever ask for.
  Mr. NUNN. You are cutting down the number of them until presumably 
they would not be available. You would not have as many available if 
something went wrong or the Tridents did not have a longer service 
life. Is that right?
  Mr. BUMPERS. No, that is not entirely right.
  We lose irreversibly one guidance system a year. Some of our Trident 
submarines have been in service now for what?--14 or 15 years?
  We have 120 guidance systems onshore, plus all those on missiles, 
plus all these spares, about six per submarine, and we are going to 
only lose one a year. And if that is the case, you are going to have a 
lot more guidance systems 30 years from now than you could possibly 
use. You could extend the life of those submarines by 5 years, and that 
is probably going to be the maximum you are ever going to extend their 
usefulness. But if you extend the life of those submarines for 5 years, 
you are not going to suffer one bit. You are not going to buy 
additional MK-6's, so you simply start using up the 120 onshore, if you 
need to, and even that is a remote possibility.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Arkansas I am informed we use four 
a year just for the Trident test missiles we fire.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Yes, they do use about four a year in tests. They do not 
have to use four a year, but they do.
  Mr. NUNN. That is the plan they have.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Just a minute.
  Mr. NUNN. If I understand it--
  Mr. BUMPERS. Senator, my amendment takes that into consideration. The 
120 that we have onshore is in addition to the 4 the Navy uses each 
year for test purposes.
  Mr. NUNN. I understand also, and I pose this in a form of a question 
to my friend from Arkansas, that the saving that he is postulating here 
also depends on the failure rate of the Mark 6 guidance units never 
increasing above the units it is today. It is relatively new.
  Mr. BUMPERS. The Senator is correct. He is talking about the failure 
rates. I used the illustration a moment ago and the GAO used this in 
their report that only one time have we ever had four that failed on 
one submarine. Even if those four failures had occurred after my 
amendment became law, that still would not have decreased our 
effectiveness and our readiness one scintilla. And bear in mind, those 
four failures were not a loss, because all four were repaired.
  Mr. NUNN. It is also my understanding that the Senator's amendment 
and the GAO report are based on the assumption that guidance repair 
time for failed units does not ever exceed the norm established on the 
basis of our current experience? In other words, everything remains the 
same.
  Mr. BUMPERS. The Senator is correct. And that is an absolutely gilt-
edged assumption.
  Mr. NUNN. I also understand the rate of irreparable damage to the 
much more complex MK-6 guidance system will not be any higher than what 
we experienced on the more robust Mark-5 unit?
  Mr. BUMPERS. I say to the Senator, the Navy uses the same methodology 
for the Mark-5 and the Mark-6. I know what the failure rate on the 
Mark-6 has been. Of course, that is what my amendment deals with.
  You can build in redundancy and redundancy and redundancy, and I have 
tried to build in as much redundancy in this as would make any sense at 
all and still save $106 million.
  I can almost guarantee that we will never have a single missile fail 
if this amendment is adopted. Based on the 658 patrols I alluded to 
earlier, we certainly could not anticipate a failure. And even if we 
did suffer the loss, that cuts our warheads from 3,500 to 3,492. Hardly 
a devastating loss.
  Mr. NUNN. I think it is unfortunate that they have not gotten any 
response to the GAO report, but the information I have gotten 
informally is that basically, if the Senator is correct on all the 
assumptions--in other words, if all the best-case assumptions occur, 
the Senator is absolutely correct--we could save that much money.
  But if any of these assumptions are not correct, and they are all 
based on an early kind of sampling, based on the early life of this 
guidance system, if any of them are not correct, what we have done--in 
effect, we are as if somebody bought an automobile and nobody is going 
to make the batteries on that automobile after the initial purchase. 
And, therefore, the owner of the automobile tries to buy enough 
batteries to last a lifetime, knowing that if they did not hit it 
right, if they did not guess right, that they were not going to be able 
to find any more batteries unless they went back into production on 
something that is completely out of production.
  Of course, batteries are common and you can buy batteries anywhere, 
so people do not try to anticipate that when they buy a car.
  But when you are buying a Trident and nobody is going to make these 
things anymore and the guidance systems are not going to be made, then 
if you base the most optimistic assumptions here and something goes 
wrong and you do not have enough guidance systems, if any of these 
assumptions go wrong, then you are in real trouble. That is the 
opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Let me make a couple of points.
  No. 1, you could say the same thing about any missile. We are buying 
Trident II missiles right now, and in my opinion, in excess of what we 
ought to be buying. But if perchance we decided to go--this is a 
separate amendment and the Senator is familiar with my position on 
that--but if we decided to go with 12 missiles per submarine with eight 
warheads, rather than 24 missile with four warheads, as the Senator 
knows we would already have a lot more missiles than we would need. And 
anyway I assume that at some point, we are going to shut the line down.
  You can say this about virtually any weapons system we have. If we 
try to keep the line open on every weapon we want, we will never, 
never, have enough money for the real things we need in defense. We 
will never upgrade the National Guard and the Reserve along the lines 
of the amendment that I just offered awhile ago on behalf of Senator 
Ford and Senator Bond and myself.
  We simply cannot debate every issue on the assumption that we have to 
keep the line open for 20 or 30 years because we might need it.
  Now, here we are with what I believe, and what GAO believes, is a 
legitimate assumption that you are not only going to have enough under 
my amendment, but that you are going to have more than you could 
possibly need over the next 25 to 30 years.
  I have done my very best on this to be as honest as I could be in the 
numbers. They are taken from GAO's report. I admit I am no expert on 
this.
  I know the Senator does not want to jeopardize readiness and I do 
not, either. The only disagreements we have ever had are on redundancy. 
And here we have so much built-in redundancy on this.
  Let me make one other point. That is, the House of Representatives 
put some words in their bill, but they did not do anything to cut Mark-
6 purchases. The reason they did not is because they had asked for the 
GAO report. But the GAO report was not out at the time they adopted 
their defense bill.
  I do not know how this will turn out, but I would make one 
suggestion, and that is--and, you know, you will have my concurrence on 
this--if you accept the amendment and you go to conference with the 
House, you might do two or three things. No. 1, you will have had an 
opportunity to get the Navy's response to this. They can give you the 
whole rationale for why GAO is wrong, and I would like to see that 
myself. I mean, I am not infallible and GAO is not infallible and the 
Navy is not infallible.
  But I would like to ask the distinguished floor manager, who has a 
lot of native intelligence about things like this and has been doing 
this for a long time, if, in that keen mind of the Senator from 
Georgia, he concluded that GAO really is on to something here and that 
the Navy's response is weak, feeble, and not viable, that the Senator 
was going to be on our side on this. Because I know the Senator is 
going to have to be scrounging for money, as I say, just to meet the 
Warner amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. The Senator from Arkansas is entirely correct on that.
  I would suggest an alternative course. Rather than accept the 
amendment--we have right now an informal word that it would be a very 
high-level risk kind of set of assumptions--I would prefer we both try 
to get an answer out of the Navy and the Department of Defense and work 
together and have this addressed on the appropriations bill when in 
comes up. Because I do not see that we ought to basically adopt the 
amendment and then assume that in conference it might not be needed. I 
much prefer just to wait for another bill.
  The Senator makes a case here, and it is a persuasive case if the 
Senator's assumptions are correct. But the assumptions are based on the 
first couple of years of experience of a new system for which we simply 
do not know the failure rate or risk factors. And that is what GAO 
based it on, and you cannot fault their analysis.
  What you can fault, though, is their assumptions. And their 
assumptions may not be right. It may be they are right. If they are, 
then we ought to make the adjustments. But at this stage, it is just 
impossible to tell that. At least, I do not know it. I do not think 
anybody knows it on the floor of the Senate now. I do not think anybody 
could make that judgment.
  Mr. BUMPERS. I say to the Senator, I am told that Mark-6 has been in 
use now for 4 or 5 years. My amendment is based on the failure rate 
during that period of time.
  Let me just, if I may, read into the Record, for your attention and 
for the Record, a part of the appendix of the GAO report.
  ``The number of spare MX-6 guidance systems needed on board a patrol 
submarine was calculated based on the average number of initial unit 
failures per patrol per quarter over the past 2 years. Navy officials 
chose this method, claiming that it, one, weighs all patrols equally 
regardless of length; two, provides a conservative figure''--
  Let me repeat that.
  ``Provides a conservative figure; and, three, has proven successful 
in estimating spares for prior programs such as the Trident I. The 
Navy's guidance system operational readiness goal is to have adequate 
spares available 99.9 percent of the time.''
  Now, that is the Navy's goal.

       The Navy also included a 99 percent confidence level factor 
     in its calculations because, according to Navy officials, it 
     provided a more conservative result and helped ensure that 
     sufficient spares would be available even in the event of 
     unforeseen future systems problems. Based on this 
     methodology, the Navy calculated that six spare guidance 
     systems are required on each submarine.
  Madam President, the GAO did not fully accept all of the Navy's 
assumptions because the Navy could not back up what they wanted with 
what their experience had been. There was nothing in the Navy criteria 
to justify six guidance systems per missile. But let me stress that. 
Under my amendment, in only 2 years--and that is 24 years from now--in 
only 2 years, the year 2017 and 2018, will there be four MK6's on board 
each submarine instead of six.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, what I would like to propose to my friend 
from Arkansas--he may be correct here. GAO might be correct here. I 
simply cannot make the judgment, nor can I say to my colleagues on the 
floor in good conscience that I believe he is correct, because I really 
do not have enough response from the Navy or Department of Defense to 
the GAO report. But my understanding is that the Navy goes for a high 
percentage of readiness because they are not sure of their assumptions. 
If assumptions go wrong, and you have gone for 80 percent readiness and 
your assumption is wrong, all of a sudden you are down a whole lot 
lower than that.
  What I would like to suggest to my friend, as a way to bringing this 
to conclusion and perhaps agreement--if not we come to a vote--that we 
fence $106 million and basically require the Secretary of Defense to 
examine the GAO report, examine the Navy response to that report, and 
he not expend that money unless he believes it is essential, after 
looking at those reports, to the national security.
  But let him make the decision after he examines that. I just do not 
think the Senate is capable of making that decision. I know I am not 
capable of saying to my friends on the floor of the Senate today, we 
know exactly what the assumptions are and how they are going to play 
out. This is pretty intricate business here and there is a lot at 
stake.
  Mr. THURMOND. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. BUMPERS. I have enough respect for the Senator----
  Mr. THURMOND. Will the Senator from Arkansas yield?
  Mr. BUMPERS. I will be glad to yield.
  Mr. THURMOND. I am willing to go along with the suggestion made by 
the able chairman. If my colleague does not accept that, I suggest we 
just have a vote to move on.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Madam President, I want to make one other observation. 
That is that if you want to, you can save up to $318 million on 
guidance systems if you are willing to reduce the operational readiness 
on one missile on one submarine in that same 2-year period to .31253. 
Then, there would be a chance that you might have a submarine someplace 
in the next 20 years that would have one missile out of its 24 that 
would not fire. But rather than try to save $318 million, I have tried 
to comply with precisely the recommendations of the GAO, cut it off at 
.7 percent risk in one 2-year period on one missile on one submarine.
  I do not mind telling you, I am astounded that we would spend money 
like that for that kind of built-in redundancy.
  I want to say to the Senator from Georgia that I respect his 
knowledge and I respect his integrity on these issues. All I want to 
say is that once we get the Navy response, he and I sit down and 
discuss it; just an honest discussion, and ask ourselves if this is a 
place we can and should save $106 million? Or should we blow $106 
million just to satisfy ourselves on redundancy?
  The appropriations process is going to be coming along. We will have 
an opportunity then. In the Senator's request of the Navy, I would like 
the Senator to attach some urgency to it, because you never know when 
that appropriations process will be finished. We have in the past, as 
the Senator knows, passed appropriations bills before an authorization 
bill came out.
  All I am saying is that I would like to put some urgency to the 
request to the Navy so we can get that information back here before the 
appropriations process, so if the Senator and I still have a basic 
disagreement, we can look at it then. I do not think we have a 
disagreement now, I think the Senator is simply saying I want to hear 
the Navy's side on it before I make that decision.
  Mr. NUNN. That is right. The Senator is correct.
  In fact, I say to my friend from Arkansas, the suggestion I made I 
believe will convey the sense of urgency. Because if you fence the 
money, that means they cannot spend it until the Secretary of Defense 
makes the certification, and he would have to have the response from 
the Navy there. So the Navy has every incentive to accelerate that 
response.
  If we go this way, I think you have that sense of urgency built into 
the approach. But I would also be glad to sit down with the Senator, 
and the Senator from South Carolina, and the Navy people involved, or 
the people from the Secretary of Defense involved, and try to 
understand this completely and make a decision on it while we are in 
conference. Or if not, on the appropriations bill.
  Mr. BUMPERS. With that understanding, Madam President, I will 
withdraw my amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. Would the Senator like to have an amendment, or have us 
draw one up to reflect this fencing? That is not done now.
  Mr. BUMPERS. If my colleague would do that and just run it by me, I 
would appreciate it very much.
  Mr. NUNN. I appreciate the Senator's willingness to do that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator seek unanimous consent to 
withdraw his amendment? Does the Senator from Arkansas seek unanimous 
consent to withdraw his amendment?
  Mr. BUMPERS. I am sorry?
  Mr. FORD. You want to withdraw your amendment?
  Mr. BUMPERS. I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment, Madam 
President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
  The amendment (No. 2157) was withdrawn.


                           Amendment No. 2158

 (Purpose: To modify the requirements for transfers of Army M1A1 tanks)

  Mr. FORD. On behalf of myself, Senator Bond, Senator Nunn, and 
Senator Thurmond, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Ford], for himself, Mr. 
     Bond, Mr. Nunn, and Mr. Thurmond, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2158.

  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 247, line 6, insert ``, at no expense to the 
     Army,'' after ``Marine Corps''.
       On page 247, line 10, insert ``of the Army'' after 
     ``Secretary''
       On page 247, beginning on line 11, strike out ``not less 
     than'' and all that follows through line 12 on such page, and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``84 M1A1 tanks selected by the 
     Secretary of the Army.''.
       On page 247, beginning on line 20, strike out ``may not'' 
     and all that follows through line 24 on such page, and insert 
     in lieu thereof ``shall transfer not more than one M1A1 tank 
     to the National Guard for each M1A1 tank transferred to the 
     Marine Corps until the Secretary has transferred the total 
     number of tanks required in subsection (b). The tanks 
     transferred to the Marine Corps shall be in a material 
     condition comparable to the material condition of the tanks 
     transferred to the National Guard.''.

  Mr. FORD. Madam President, during and the Senate Armed Services 
Committee consideration of the 1995 defense authorization bill, an 
amendment was offered requiring the Army to transfer between 84 and 124 
M1A1 tanks to the Marine Corps. The amendment would have also 
effectively stopped the modernization of the National Guard, as 
Congress had directed a few years ago.
  As cochairman of the National Guard caucus I, and my fellow 
cochairman, Senator Bond from Missouri, believe this language should 
not be included as a part of this legislation because it violated the 
Goldwater-Nickles Act.
  In addition, there is not a valid Joint Chiefs of Staff requirement 
for the transfer of these tanks from the Army to the Marine Corps.
  The amendment at the desk is a compromise reached with the help of 
the chairman of the Armed Services Committee and its ranking member.
  The amendment would place a cap of 84 A1M1 tanks to be given to the 
Marine Corps as they become excess to the active duty Army. The 
amendment would also direct the Secretary of the Army to transfer an 
M1A1 tank on a one-for-one basis to the Marine Corps and to the 
National Guard. Furthermore, Madam President, it directs that this 
transfer of tanks to the Marine Corps will be made at no expense to the 
Army.
  The amendment would require the transfer of plain A1M1 tanks from 
active Army, not A1M1 common tanks. This will assure that these A1M1 
tanks would not have to be taken from active duty Army units.
  And so, Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder 
of my remarks be included in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I am deeply concerned about the provisions 
in this bill, directing the transfer of M1A1 tanks from the Army to the 
Marine Corps. The bill directs that any M1A1 tanks exceeding the active 
army requirements shall be transferred to the Marine Corps until their 
requirements have been met. It also specifies that the army may not 
transfer any additional M1A1 tanks to the Army National Guard until the 
total requirements of the Marine Corps are satisfied.
  I am not concerned about the relative priority of assigning equipment 
to the various military components. But I am troubled that this bill 
ignores the fact that the Department of Defense has previously 
addressed this issue in Colin Powell's Roles and Missions Report of 
February 1993.
  The roles and missions report stated that the Marine Corps would 
retain enough tank battalions to support amphibious operations and to 
outfit three maritime prepositioning squadrons. It directed the Army to 
provide any additional tank support required. However, the report did 
not identify any Marine Corps equipment shortfall or direct the Army to 
transfer any tanks.
  Since this time, Congress has directed establishment of a Commission 
to review roles, missions and functions of the armed services. That 
review is not scheduled to be completed until next year.
  The Chief of Staff of the Army is on record strongly opposing the 
provisions in this bill. He has stated there is a validated requirement 
in the Army which is greater than the number of M1A1 and M1A2 tanks 
which will be available and has urged the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff be given the opportunity to review and resolve this issue.
  I'd like to take a moment to discuss the problems of this provision.
  The Marine Corps contends that it has a requirement for 443 M1A1 
tanks, but their current inventory only totals 271 tanks. However, the 
Marines have not requested, justified, nor have the Joint Chiefs 
approved a Marine requirement for additional tanks. In fact, none of 
the CINC's of the unified and specified commands has identified a tank 
shortage in the Marine Corps Maritime Preposition Squadron Forces.
  While it's true that the total Army inventory of tanks exceeds 7,000, 
and the army intends to transfer 1,500 tanks to the National Guard as 
M1A2 upgrades are completed at the rate of 120 per year, this is part 
of a modernization plan following Desert Storm. Congress has directed 
the Army to modernize the Enhanced Readiness Brigades in the National 
Guard with the same priority applied to the active forces.
  And it's my understanding that at the same time the Army began its 
modernization program, the Marine Corps canceled its remaining buy of 
M1A1 tanks and retired more than 600 M60 series tanks from its 
inventory. One might assume this action constituted Marine Corps 
realignment to a lighter, more mobile force that would fight jointly 
with heavy force augmentation provided by the Army.
  We are not raising any objection to the 2-year plan to provide M1A1s 
to the Marine Corps Reserve in exchange for M1A2 upgrades. Clearly, the 
Department of Defense believes the Marine Reserve battalions will 
experience difficulty in training with only the eight tanks they 
currently have, and this action does not lessen the Army's warfighting 
capability nor disrupt the services's modernization plan for the 
National Guard.
  But the Department does object to the transfer of 84--maybe as much 
as 124--tanks, because the requirement has not been validated by the 
CINC's, OSD or the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  And finally, the Department of Defense agrees with the argument with 
the active Marine Corps could very well see action in a conflict before 
some Army National Guard units.
  However, the Department defers to the language of the Goldwater-
Nichols Act which charged the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
review service acquisitions that should emanate from requirements 
identified by the CINC's of the unified and specified commands.
  Madam President, the Senator from New Hampshire, Senator Smith, is on 
his way, should be here momentarily, and Senator Bond. I understand 
that Senator Smith wishes to say a few words. But we have worked out an 
agreement, and I do not think it will be too long.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  Mr. FORD. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been suggested. 
The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. BOND. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BOND. Madam President, I had planned to offer an amendment with 
my good friend, the Senator from Kentucky, to strike section 1066 of 
this bill.
  As the Senator has described, this section currently in the measure 
directs the Army to transfer up to 124 of the M1A1 heavy armored tanks 
from its active duty, first-to-deploy units to the Marine Corps.
  As has accurately been pointed out very well by my distinguished 
colleague and cochair of the National Guard Caucus, this provision 
ignores the process established in the Goldwater-Nichols law for 
consideration of this issue. It bypasses consideration by our most 
senior military experts. It bypasses consideration by the blue ribbon 
roles and missions commission which we established just last year, and 
it sets a very bad precedent for future similar efforts.
  The provision in the bill currently is opposed by the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili; the Chief of Staff of the 
Army, General Sullivan, and the White House.
  For my part, I think we ought to be paying some attention to the 
opinion of these senior military leaders. They are the people best able 
to make decisions about which services and which units should have 
specific tanks. That is why we set up the process, whereby the JCS is 
designated the appropriate authority to make these decisions.
  It does not make sense to overrule their decisions, take the 
authority away from them as the current provision would do.
  Now, I am not here to argue about whether or not the Marine Corps 
should have tanks or whether they have this version of tank or that 
version of tank or whether they should get them before Army units or 
after. These are not judgments that I am qualified to make. And I am 
willing to make a good guess that most of my colleagues in this body 
are not qualified to make them either. The people who are most 
qualified to make them are our most senior military leaders, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. That is why we gave them the authority to do so in the 
Goldwater-Nichols bill and subsequent legislation.
  Section 1066 would substitute in our judgment--and in my opinion, 
even worse--the opinion of the General Accounting Office for that of 
our military leaders. That just does not make any sense to me. I have 
had enough experience with the GAO to know they are wrong quite often, 
sometimes more wrong than right, particularly when they are as far 
afield from traditional accounting questions as this area of military 
strategy. I do not want to take a chance that the GAO knows a whole lot 
more about military strategy and tactics than the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.
  On that point, I would note that the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense did not concur with the findings of the GAO report on which 
this section is based. Specifically, OSD stated, ``A Marine Corps and 
Joint Staff position on overall tank allocation priorities and funding 
requirements has not been established. Until that occurs, there is no 
solid basis for further transfer of M1A1 tanks from the Army to the 
Marine Corps.'' That is from the GAO report, page 11.
  Madam President, I would state again that I have no objection to the 
Marines getting additional tanks. I want the Marines, and all of the 
services, to have the equipment they need to do their job and return 
home safely. At the same time, however, I would note that the Marines 
have not asked for tanks in this year or in future years. I certainly 
understand that these are tough budget times and that money is tight. 
But that means the services have to make tough choices, not force other 
services to pay for their equipment.
  Returning to the OSD response to the GAO report, they note that,

       The Marine Corps has not formally requested that additional 
     tanks be transferred from the Army to meet its requirements. 
     Each Service normally establishes its own equipment 
     priorities, based on their respective roles and missions, and 
     then develops procurement plans based on those priorities and 
     available funding. The Army has previously determined that 
     modern Abrams tanks were of sufficient priority to warrant 
     inclusion in funding plans. The Navy and Marine Corps, 
     however, have determined that procurement of additional tanks 
     was not warranted based on overall priorities and funding 
     constraints.

  It seems pretty clear to me, Madam President, that if the Marines had 
such a dire need for tanks, they would have asked for some. But they 
have not.
  Now let me turn for a moment to the issue of whether or not the Army 
has ``excess'' tanks. The proponents of this provision argue that the 
Army has over 7,000 tanks and that it certainly will not hurt them to 
give just a few to the Marines.
  Well, that is true. The Army does have a lot of tanks, but most of 
them are older M1 tanks, not M1A1's, and certainly not the M1A1 common 
tanks specified in this provision.
  Let me focus on that for just a moment. Section 1066 requires that 
the Army transfer M1A1 ``common'' tanks to the Marines. The word 
``common'' is significant because it designates a version of the M1A1 
with special characteristics, most notably heavy armor made of depleted 
uranium.
  The Army has only 834 of these common tanks. Not 7,000. And all but a 
few of these M1A1 common tanks are currently deployed in the Army's 
first-to-deploy active-duty units. There are 327 in the 1st Cavalry 
Division at Fort Hood, TX. There are 87 more at Fort Hood with the 2d 
Armored Division, and 129 in the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort 
Bliss, TX. And there are 267 in the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division 
at Fort Stewart and Fort Benning, GA.
  These are the units that will deploy first the next time we go to 
war. And this provision would require that they give up their tanks to 
the Marines with the likely result that they would be replaced by less 
capable M1A1 tanks without the heavy armor.
  The significance of these units can be illustrated by looking at the 
gulf war experience. The 24th Mechanized was the first Army Armored 
Division to deploy, arriving in Saudi Arabia in September. And the 1st 
Cavalry, another early deploying unit, played the key role of feinting 
a move up the middle of the front thereby allowing the VII Corps to 
make its now-famous ``Hail Mary'' sweep around the Iraqi forces.
  So I just want to make sure that Senators understand that the tanks 
we are talking about here are not surplus tanks; they are not coming 
out of excess stocks in Europe; they are not coming out of the National 
Guard; they are coming out of the Army's contingency forces, the first 
to fight when we go to war.
  So that is where we stand on the M1A1 common tank specified in this 
amendment. What about the basic M1A1? Once again, the Army does not 
have a surplus. In a June 22, 1994, letter to Chairman Nunn, Army Chief 
of Staff General Sullivan wrote, ``The Army does not have any excess 
M1A1 tanks.'' That is supported by OSD which, in commenting on the GAO 
report, characterized the number of M1A1 tanks as ``an insufficient 
quantity to meet current Army requirements.'' That is from the GAO 
report, page 13.
  I would like now to turn to another issue that is raised by the 
language in section 1066, the role of the National Guard.
  Section 1066 would prohibit the Army from transferring M1A1 tanks to 
the Guard until the Marine Corps has received its full requirement of 
tanks. Setting aside for a moment the fact that I am not sure there is 
currently any validated requirement for Marine Corps tanks, the 
prohibition on transfers to the Guard is a major problem.
  The President's Bottom-Up Review directed that there will be 15 
enhanced readiness combat brigades in the Army National Guard which 
``will be organized and resourced so that they can be mobilized, 
trained, and deployed more quickly to the fast-evolving regional 
conflicts that we expect in the future.'' That is from the BUR, page 
94. The report envisions that these enhanced brigades will reinforce 
active combat units by deploying within 90 days of the initial 
deployment.
  These enhanced brigades are going to play a clear role in any future 
conflict. The simple fact is that we are cutting so much of the Active 
Army structure, that we will not be able to conduct significant 
military operations in the future without using the Guard. For that 
reason, it is essential that these enhanced brigades have the same 
first-line equipment and training as the active units with which they 
will serve. That means they need to be replacing older tanks with 
M1A1's. Section 1066 would delay that modernization.
  The central point of all of this is that this measure, 1066, is not 
the right way to do business. If the Marines need tanks, they should 
request them as every service does for equipment it needs. That request 
should be considered by the Joint Staff and submitted to Congress. The 
whole process should be conducted in an above-board manner which gives 
all interested parties the opportunity to air their interests. Section 
1066 did not do that, and for that reason, as I stated earlier, I had 
planned to move to strike it.
  Over the past several days Senator Ford and I have been working with 
the chairman and the ranking member and the Senator from New Hampshire 
to try to find a way to address the concerns of all Senators. The 
compromise before us now is a result of those talks. Clearly, this is 
not a perfect compromise for my part. I continue to believe it is a 
sorry mistake to circumvent the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and substitute the opinion of the General Accounting Office. But like 
all compromises, it cannot make everyone happy. It can only split the 
difference. This compromise essentially does that.
  I hope personally when this bill goes to conference, the conferees 
will see fit to recede to the language in the House bill. That language 
directs this problem to the Joint Chiefs of Staff where it belongs.
  I express my thanks to the chairman of the committee, Senator Nunn, 
and to the ranking member, Senator Thurmond, for their efforts to work 
this issue out. I express my appreciation to Senator Smith for his 
willingness to work with us, and I urge all Senators to support this 
compromise amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  Mr. SMITH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, could I inquire? Could we get a time limit 
on this amendment?
  Mr. SMITH. I do not object to that, I say to my chairman. I 
anticipate at the most 30 minutes and probably less.
  Mr. NUNN. Would that be equally divided?
  Mr. FORD. Madam President, may I say to the chairman on my amendment 
that I believe the Senator from Missouri has concluded his statement. I 
am through with mine. So we would not need any time. The only time that 
would be necessary would be for the distinguished Senator from New 
Hampshire, whatever he thinks he needs; 30 minutes, and he may not use 
all of it.
  Mr. SMITH. Yes. I would say to the Senator from Kentucky that if 
someone else wishes to speak, we have reached an agreement on this 
amendment. I am not rising in opposition to it, but rising in support 
of it. Therefore, I do not see any reason that we could not have a time 
agreement.
  Mr. FORD. May I ask the floor manager? Could we have 30 minutes, 25 
and 5 for Senator Bond and me?
  Mr. SMITH. That is acceptable to me.


                           Order of Procedure

  Mr. FORD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that a time 
agreement be entered into on my amendment of 25 minutes to the 
distinguished Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. Smith, and 5 minutes 
equally divided to Senator Bond of Missouri and myself; and no second-
degree amendments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, I did not have the opportunity to speak 
to the Senator from Kentucky. But I would like to have the yeas and 
nays on the amendment, even though we are in agreement, to help 
strengthen the position somewhat in the conference.
  At this point, Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the 
Ford amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There does not appear to be a sufficient second.
  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, first of all, I want to thank Senator 
Ford, Senator Bond, Senator Thurmond, and Senator Nunn for working with 
me to work out a compromise on this amendment. I think the compromise 
is reasonable. Although I would prefer the committee language, I am not 
going to oppose the amendment offered by my colleagues.
  I want to give a brief overview on what the issue is here so that my 
colleagues can understand the issue. The Marine Corps has a requirement 
for 443 M1A1 tanks. They currently only have 271 in their inventory. 
There is a shortfall of about 172 M1A1's against the requirement. The 
breakdown of this 172-tank shortfall is 84 for the deployment on 
maritime prepositioning forces, 40 for the sustainment, and 48 for the 
Marine Corps Reserve.
  The total Army inventory of tanks, including active, Guard, and 
Reserve is more than 7,000 tanks. The Army intends to transfer 1,500 of 
these tanks to the National Guard by the year 2003, and plans to 
upgrade existing M1 tanks to the M1M2 configuration at the rate of 
about 120 per year. The Army is going to have ample tanks.
  The Armed Services Committee bill directs, and this amendment would 
direct, that 84 of these M1A1 tanks will go to the active duty Marine 
Corps. This will be sequenced one for one--one to the Guard, one to the 
Marine Corps--until the 84 tanks are reached, and then the rest will go 
to the National Guard.
  Under the DOD plan, the total Army inventory of tanks in 1997 will be 
6,828. And under our plan, it will be 6,744, a very minimal difference. 
That is why I believe that the committee position, slightly amended by 
the Ford amendment, is reasonable.
  Let me quickly go through the historical precedent regarding tank 
transfers. During the late 1970's when the Marine Corps was making a 
transition from the M48 to the M60 tank, the Marine Corps transferred 
approximately 400 tanks to Army for use in both the National Guard and 
for foreign military sales. Those tanks were purchased by the Marine 
Corps and transferred to the Army at no cost. So we do have some 
precedent the other way around.
  In the late 1970's, the Marine Corps had a requirement for 1,078 M60 
tanks. However, due to funding constraints, the Marine Corps was only 
able to procure 576 of the required 1,078. With the implementation of 
the maritime preposition concept in the early 1980's, the Marine Corps 
solicited the support of the Army to fulfill a portion of its short 
shortfall. From 1983 to 1984, the Army transferred 140 excess M60's to 
the Marine Corps to facilitate loading of the maritime prepositioning 
force.
  The procurement of the M1A1 by the Marine Corps was approved in 1985. 
However, funding constraints and later the determination by the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs that the United States had enough tanks, 
prevented the Marine Corps from buying the full complement that they 
now required.
  With the ongoing drawdown of Army forces in Europe, and the Army's 
identification of excess tanks available, the Marine Corps began 
negotiating with the Army about the potential transfer of M1A1s. To its 
credit, the Army agreed to the transfer of 50 of those tanks to satisfy 
the Marine Corps frontline active requirement. However the Marine Corps 
still remains 172 tanks short of fulfilling its requirement.
  The armed services bill with this amendment will simply continue the 
spirit of cooperation between these two forces. That is it.
  Additionally, I would emphasize to my colleagues, the bill authorizes 
about $216 million over 2 years to upgrade existing M1 Army tanks to 
the M1A2 configuration and in return transfer M1A1s to the Marine Corps 
Reserves on a one-per-one basis to remedy the terrible tank shortfall 
in the Marine Corps Reserve. That is the history.
  The first question that needs an answer is why did not the Marine 
Corps not buy the tanks? Those who oppose the committee's position have 
said they should have bought them when they had the chance.
  There are some good reasons why they did not buy them. First of all, 
3 years ago the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, then Colin Powell, stated 
clearly that the United States had enough tanks. Additionally, the 
Marine Corps did not have the money within their budget to purchase 
additional tanks at $3 million to $4 million per unit, especially when 
the chairman said the United States had enough already.
  The Army has said that these tanks were bought with Army money, and 
for that reason the Marine Corps should not get them. This is not Army 
money. It is not Marine Corps money. It is taxpayer money. It is money 
for the national security of the United States. They were bought for 
use in repelling a massive Soviet attack in Europe.
  That is no longer a realistic scenario. Future conflicts are likely 
to be regional, not global. And we are relying upon prepositioned 
forces out there ready to strike in a moment's notice or react in a 
moment's notice.
  To its credit, the Armed Services Committee recognized this and made 
the tank issue an urgent priority. By transferring this modest number 
of tanks, 84, to the Marine Corps preposition force, the committee 
acted responsibly I believe. And the amendment, I think, although it is 
slightly different, supports that responsible action.
  The committee position stands on its own merits. The reality is that 
within the current budget environment we simply cannot afford to base 
our defense policy on parochial considerations, be they National Guard, 
strictly Army, or strictly Marine Corps.
  The point is the Army has literally thousands of tanks that are 
excess to their requirement. Transferring only 84 of these tanks out of 
1,500 is not unreasonable, and will not affect the operational base of 
the Army.
  The committee should be commended for its leadership on this issue.
  It has been suggested that the Marine Corps does not need the tanks; 
that they do not need an M1A1 tank, and could instead turn all of its 
M1A1s over to the Army in return for the lesser M1 tanks. But again, 
this is a nonstarter. The Marine Corps decision to replace the M60 tank 
with the M1A came after careful analysis and years of research into 
alternative capabilities such as the M1 and the light armored vehicle.
  It became clear that the lethality needed to support the Marine Corps 
was only available by increasing the size of the tank gun from the 105-
millimeter gun to the 120 millimeter in the M1A1. The Marine Corps did 
not buy the M1 because it represented only a marginal upgrade from the 
M60, and did not include the 120-millimeter gun. The Marine Corps made 
a conscious decision to wait for the enhanced lethality and 
survivability of the M1A1 and its 120-millimeter gun.
  The M1A1 tank is the Marine Corps' only survivable and sustainable 
offensive combat vehicle that can defeat enemy tank forces and survive 
in the full spectrum of potential combat. As long as the Marine Corps 
has the expressed directed mission to conduct forcible entry and 
operations against hostile and armed forces, the M1A1 is essential.
  The 105 millimeter family of ammunition had reached its maximum 
potential in lethality because of the ballistics. The M1A1 transition 
was predicated on its lethality, and the additional antihelicopter and 
antibunker capability. These are facts.
  Regarding the issue of a Joint Chiefs' study, we, in the Senate, have 
a responsibility to exercise our oversight responsibilities. I take 
those very seriously. Deferring this issue to the Joint Chiefs ignores 
the problem and leaves our troops deployed in harm's way without the 
equipment they need to protect themselves.
  The role of Congress in equipping the Armed Forces to accomplish 
their missions is based on the U.S. Constitution, not the Goldwater-
Nichols Act. The Senate routinely settles these types of issues for the 
Joint Chiefs--routinely we do this. Every year we exercise our 
constitutional responsibility to raise and maintain the Armed Forces. 
This year, for example, we are going to decide how many helicopters 
will be built for the Army, how many F-18's and Aegis destroyers for 
the Navy and C-17 aircraft for the Air Force. We decide the conditions 
to be met before ships can be transferred, before they are retired and 
whether they will be in the active or ready reserve. We make the 
decisions from a position above the fray of interservice rivalries. 
That is our job. I think the chairman of the Armed Services Committee 
and ranking member do that job very well.
  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs does not ask that we let him decide 
all of these issues. Why is a transfer of tanks any different? This 
bill includes $216 million over 2 years to buy an additional 48 M1A1's 
for the Army. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was as designed to streamline 
the command structure, make management more cooperative and efficient, 
and, increase the authority of the combatant commanders. It also 
increased the role of the JCS Chairman.
  However, I can assure my colleagues it did not eliminate Congress' 
constitutional prerogative and role in this process. The issue is not 
whether we have the right to decide the issue. We do, absolutely. The 
issue is whether for political and parochial considerations we would 
want to abandon our responsibilities.
  In February of 1993, Colin Powell, chairman of the JCS, recommended 
to Congress that the Marine Corps retain enough tank battalions to 
support amphibious operations and fill three maritime pre-positioning 
squadrons. The Marine Corps requirement for these tanks, which was 
clear in the recommendation of Chairman Powell to fill these squadrons, 
has been pending 15 months. The new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has 
never specifically endorsed the requirement, that is true. I daresay he 
has not specifically endorsed hundreds of existing service 
requirements. Does that mean we have to stop authorizing every 
procurement until he has formally certified it? I say no.
  Over the last 3 years, the Marines transferred over 150 artillery 
pieces to the Army, self-propelled artillery pieces. The Marine Corps 
purchased them from their own budget. We have precedent for exchanging 
materials back and forth between the services.
  Now, let me go to another point, Madam President. Some say, ``why not 
let the Army provide all tank support?'' It is a very good question. 
The Marine Corps is a synergistic force which consistently trains under 
the philosophy of maneuver warfare and operates in a combined arms 
manner. This synergism provides the Nation an expeditionary power 
projection, and if a Marine Corps maritime pre-positioning squadron is 
2 days steaming from a conflict, with the equipment and supplies to 
sustain itself for 30 days, do we want to make them wait offshore for a 
period of who knows how long, before the Army can ship a brigade of 
tanks in? No. Should we tell the Army that their air defense and 
helicopter support should come from the Air Force and the Air Force 
only? I believe not.
  The Marine Corps is the Nation's premier 911 force and principal 
forcible entry capability. Having an indigenous M1A1 capability within 
the Marine air-ground task force is essential to meeting those 
requirements. Subcontracting this out exclusively to the Army is not a 
realistic approach.
  Let me go to the issue of the National Guard. I want to highlight how 
many tanks the Guard will have under the Armed Services Committee 
recommendation and the amendment. The National Guard will have a total 
of 438 M1A1's and 1,489 M1's in their inventory in 1994. Even after the 
transfer of the 84 M1A1 to the Marine Corps, the National Guard will 
possess 717 M1A1's and 2,000 M1's by 1997. The bottom line is that we 
are not hurting the National Guard at all. I want my friends in the 
Guard to understand that. That is not the case.
  Let us go to the bottom line. Those who go to battle first must have 
the equipment that they need to defend themselves and to execute their 
mission. That is essential in warfare. The Marine Corps forward-
deployed forces are our Nation's 911 force, as I said. They must act on 
an emergency basis. They will certainly engage in conflict before the 
National Guard will. This is not a rap on the Guard. It is a fact. The 
Marine pre-positioned forces deployed today, right now, out in the 
fleet, have only 52 percent of the tanks they need--52 percent. They 
have 30 tanks in their squadrons, and they need 58.
  I ask my colleagues, if it was your son or daughter out there in the 
Marine Corps who was forward deployed in harm's way, with only half the 
tanks they needed, would you like the tanks to go to the National Guard 
or to the Marine Corps MPF ships? I think that answer is pretty easy. 
The bottom line is that they only need 84 out of 1,500. That is all.
  I do not think that is an unreasonable position for the Senate to 
take. We are only talking about 84 tanks. The Guard will still get 
1,416 tanks, and the Army will still have nearly 7,000 in their total 
inventory. The Marines will get 84 tanks, and their forward deployed 
forces will have the equipment they need to protect our young men and 
women out there on the front line. These tanks, as I said earlier, 
Madam President, are owned by the American taxpayer. This should not be 
a battle between two services, and I regret that it somehow got to that 
point before the compromise. There is plenty of history where we have 
exchanged tanks in the past, and other military equipment as well, 
between the services.
  I urge my colleagues to support the amendment offered by the Senator 
from Kentucky. It is a very reasonable amendment. I appreciate his 
willingness to work with me to develop this. I want to close on one 
point.
  I will read from a letter I received from the former commandant of 
the Marine Corps during the Persian Gulf conflict General Gray, in a 
handwritten note at the bottom of a letter he sent to me yesterday, 
said this, and I ask my colleagues to heed his words:

       Sir, I am often asked why the Marines need tanks. Your 
     Marine tank battalions are the Nation's only tank battalions 
     trained and equipped for forcible entry amphibious 
     operations. In Desert Storm, Marine tanks helped destroy or 
     capture 1,040 enemy tanks, 608 enemy personnel carriers, 432 
     enemy artillery weapons, and controlled 20,000 enemy POW's. 
     They were vital to the breakthrough into Kuwait. Thanks 
     again. Semper Fidelis.

  Well, I cannot improve on that. He is the former commandant of the 
Marine Corps and was there when the Persian Gulf War broke out. I think 
he knows what he is talking about. This is a reasonable provision and a 
reasonable amendment. Again, I appreciate the cooperation of my 
colleagues.
  I also encourage my colleagues to enthusiastically support it. I hope 
the chairman would vigorously oppose, along with the ranking member, 
any attempt to take this language out in the conference report. Again, 
Madam President, before yielding the floor, I ask for the yeas and 
nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, could I ask the Senator from New Hampshire 
to accept the word of the managers that we will work very closely with 
him in the committee on this? Of course, he will be on the conference, 
because he has worked very hard on it. I think he has lots of good 
ideas and a good sense of priority here.
  Also, I would be working with the Senator from Missouri and the 
Senator from Kentucky, because I believe they have very strong feelings 
about the National Guard.
  We have to make some sense out of this whole thing and some sense of 
priorities in the right way.
  If we could avoid a rollcall vote, I think it would be very helpful. 
We have Senators around here who have amendments. We have Senators who 
want to make speeches. We have amendments we want to work out. If we 
take a rollcall vote, we are going to spend another 30 minutes. It will 
delay us.
  I do not believe, I say honestly to the Senator, on a workout like 
this a rollcall vote is going to make any difference. I think we can 
stipulate among the three of us to work this out that, if there were a 
rollcall vote, it would be about 98 to nothing.
  Mr. FORD. If there are 98 here.
  Mr. NUNN. If there are 98 here.
  But if we have a rollcall vote, there would probably be less people 
here in a few minutes. We just need the time.
  I will abide by whatever the Senator from New Hampshire wants to do.
  Mr. SMITH. Madam President, let me say to my chairman, who I have the 
greatest respect for, when he says he will enthusiastically support the 
matter in the conference committee, that is good enough for me. I look 
forward to being able to work with him in the conference, and I will 
accept the chairman's leadership on this point and retract my request 
for the yeas and nays.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator from New Hampshire.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?


                        marine corps tank issue

  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I wonder if the distinguished chairman of 
the Armed Services Committee would join me in a colloquy regarding the 
Marine Corps tank issue.
  Mr. NUNN. I would be happy to accommodate the Senator from New 
Hampshire.
  Mr. SMITH. The Armed Services Committee bill transfers 84 M1A1 common 
tanks from the Army to the Marine Corps to remedy a terrible shortfall 
within the Marine Corps Maritime Preposition Force Squadrons. This 
decision was based on a careful evaluation of the Marine Corps 
requirement, and a survey of the tanks which will come available for 
reissue as a result of downsizing and the Army modernization program.
  Mr. NUNN. The distinguished Senator from New Hampshire is correct.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, during the course of the past week, our 
distinguished colleagues from Kentucky and Missouri have raised some 
very strong concerns over the issue of transferring 84 M1A1 ``common'' 
tanks out of the Army inventory. It has been suggested that the 
transfer of M1A1 common tanks, as opposed to other variations of the 
M1A1, could have the unintended affect of delaying the active Army's 
modernization program.
  Senators Ford and Bond have suggested a compromise that would remove 
the reference to ``common'' tanks in this section, and authorize the 
transfer of 84 M1A1 tanks to the Marine Corps on a one-for-one basis as 
M1A1's are transferred to the National Guard.
  Although I strongly support the position of the Armed Services 
Committee, as reflected in the pending legislation, I am sensitive to 
the concerns that have been raised concerning the issue of ``common'' 
tanks. Before deciding on this issue, I would like to solicit the input 
of the distinguished chairman and ranking member of the committee.
  Since this amendment would modify the Armed Services Committee 
position, I would ask if the distinguished chairman supports this 
compromise?
  Mr. NUNN. I am happy to respond to my colleague. I supported the 
Armed Services Committee position on this issue, and I think the 
Senator from New Hampshire has done our Nation a great service by 
focusing the Senate's attention on the Marine Corps tank situation. I 
believe that the compromise is consistent with the Armed Services 
Committee position, and strikes an appropriate balance between the 
Marine Corps needs and the ongoing Army modernization program.
  Mr. SMITH. I appreciate the comments of my colleague from Georgia, 
and I thank him for his leadership. One further matter, that I believe 
is absolutely essential, is the issue of conference. As we know from 
experience, it can often be very difficult to find common ground with 
our House counterparts during the defense authorization conference. 
This issue, in particular, will require our vigilant and unwavering 
attention.
  If the Senate adopts this compromise, will they aggressively fight to 
preserve the tank transfer in conference?
  Mr. NUNN. Let me assure the Senator from New Hampshire. I fully 
support the transfer of 84 M1A1 tanks to the Marine Corps. If the 
Senate includes this provision in the bill, I will do everything in my 
power to preserve it in conference.
  Mr. SMITH. I thank my colleague for his assistance. I am absolutely 
committed to seeing this issue through and I appreciate the support of 
the distinguished chairman. With the assurance that the Senator from 
Georgia supports this transfer, and will do everything in his power to 
preserve it in conference, I will support this modification to the 
Armed Services Committee bill.
  Mr. FORD. Madam President, I think that it is all right for Senator 
Bond, and under the circumstance we will have a vote. I am willing to 
yield back my time if he is.
  I yield back the 5 minutes.
  Does Senator Smith yield back his time? Then we can go to the vote.
  Mr. SMITH. I do.
  Mr. FORD. All time has been yielded back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2158) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. FORD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  The Senator from Colorado.


                          Additional Cosponsor

  Mr. BROWN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to add Senator 
Mikulski as a cosponsor of the Brown-Simon amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum having been suggested, 
the clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Feingold). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.


                           Amendment No. 2159

(Purpose: To require the President to submit to the Senate as a treaty 
  any international agreement that modifies or establishes new legal 
  obligations for the United States under the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
                                Treaty.)

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  Mr. NUNN. Is this the ABM amendment?
  Mr. WARNER. Yes. And I would like to speak to that amendment, and at 
the appropriate time I would be glad to discuss it with the managers.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for himself, Mr. 
     Thurmond, Mr. Dole, Mr. Wallop, Mr. Smith, and Mr. 
     Kempthorne, proposes an amendment numbered 2159.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle C of title II, add the following:

     SEC. 224. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT ON AGREEMENTS THAT MODIFY 
                   OR ESTABLISH NEW LEGAL OBLIGATIONS FOR THE 
                   UNITED STATES UNDER THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE 
                   TREATY.

       (a) Requirement for Advice and Consent of Senate.--Whenever 
     the President negotiates an international agreement that 
     would substantively modify the ABM Treaty or establish new 
     legal obligations for the United States under the ABM Treaty, 
     the United States shall not be bound by such agreement unless 
     the agreement is entered into pursuant to the treaty making 
     power of the President under the Constitution (which includes 
     a requirement for advice and consent of the Senate.)
       (b) Agreements Included.--Among the international 
     agreements covered by subsection (a) are the following 
     agreements:
       (1) Any agreement regarding the succession of the 
     independent states of the former Soviet Union to the 
     commitments of the former Soviet Union under the ABM Treaty.
       (2) Any agreement that sets forth a demarcation between 
     theater missile defense systems and antiballistic missile 
     systems for purposes of judging compliance of theater missile 
     defense systems with the ABM Treaty.
       (3) Any agreement that imposes limitations on antiballistic 
     missile systems or components more restrictive than the 
     limitations already set forth in the ABM Treaty.
       (c) ABM Treaty Defined.--In this section, the term ``ABM 
     Treaty'' means the Treaty Between the United States of 
     America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
     Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed in 
     Moscow on May 26, 1972, with related protocol, signed in 
     Moscow on July 3, 1974.

  Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I could do one thing, I ask unanimous 
consent that the Senator from Idaho [Mr. Kempthorne], be added as a 
cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have not seen the amendment. I know the 
Senator from Virginia has been working on this amendment for some time. 
I do not know whether we can agree to the amendment or whether it is 
going to be objected to. I do not know what the view of the State 
Department is, or the Foreign Relations Committee.
  This is an important amendment. It would be my intent, if we cannot 
work it out, to offer a second-degree amendment to that. Now, I know 
the Senator, if he gets the floor again, can offer a second-degree 
amendment to it. I would prefer not to get into that kind of situation. 
I would also prefer not to have to simply waste time here by putting in 
a quorum call.
  So I would like to ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to offer 
a second-degree amendment to the Warner amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. WARNER. I believe, Mr. President, I had the floor.
  In the nature of a parliamentary inquiry, I think I was recognized, 
Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia has the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. All right.
  Mr. President, I was not trying in any way to play a game with my 
good friend. I simply sent the amendment to the desk and asked for its 
immediate consideration, and what has happened has happened. Is was my 
understanding I had not the lost the right to the floor and I had not 
intended to build a tree and thereby make it bulletproof.
  What I am hoping to do is to persuade the managers that this 
amendment could be accepted without a vote, and that the Senator from 
Georgia, if he sees fit, could bring forth an amendment to his liking 
and that, likewise, could be accepted. And then, at an appropriate 
time, in a conference scenario, after we have had the benefit of 
consultation with other interested Senators and other interested 
committees, we might be able to resolve it in a conference format. That 
had been my hope.
  I had been watching the floor and I sort of got the impression that 
the managers did not desire at this time rollcall votes. That was the 
intention of the Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Virginia, we do not 
mind rollcall votes where there is a disagreement. What I was trying to 
discourage was a rollcall vote where there was agreement. We are going 
to take more rollcall votes.


                Amendment No. 2160 to Amendment No. 2159

                   (Purpose: To provide a substitute)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe the best way to handle this, Mr. 
President, if I have the floor, is to send an amendment in the second 
degree to the desk and ask that it be reported. I will be glad to 
consult with the Senator from Virginia to try to see if we can work 
this out.
  But I have not seen his amendment. I have seen two or three versions 
of it, and I am not sure whether we can or not.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2160 to amendment No. 2159.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On the first page, strike out all after the first word, and 
     insert in lieu thereof the following:

       . CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE ABM TREATY LIMITATIONS WITH REGARD 
                   TO THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty limits the 
     development, testing, and deployment of defensive systems 
     capable of intercepting strategic ballistic missiles systems 
     and prohibit the deployment of nationwide antiballistic 
     missile systems.
       (2) The ABM Treaty was not intended to, and does not, apply 
     to or limit research, development, testing, or deployment of 
     missile defense systems, system upgrades, or system 
     components that are designed to counter modern theater 
     ballistic missiles unless those systems, system upgrades, or 
     system components are tested against or have demonstrated 
     capabilities to counter modern strategic ballistic missiles.
       (3) In November 1993, the United States entered into 
     discussions in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) 
     with Russia and the other independent states of the former 
     Soviet Union to differentiate between strategic missile 
     defenses, which are strictly limited by the ABM Treaty, and 
     antitactical ballistic missile technologies, which are 
     permitted but not technically defined.
       (4) The threat of proliferation of ballistic missiles to 
     additional countries is a real threat.
       (5) There is a shared interest among nations to be able to 
     counter that threat.
       (6) It is necessary that the ABM Treaty be clarified to 
     make it clear that the treaty permits theater missile 
     defenses that are capable of countering theater missiles 
     already deployed.
       (7) Executive branch officials have testified before 
     Congress that it would not bypass Congress in clarifying for 
     purposes of the ABM Treaty a differentiation between 
     strategic and theater missile defense systems and that 
     executive branch officials would consult closely with 
     Congress before the United States agrees in the Standing 
     Consultative Committee to such a clarification.
       (b) Submission of Proposed Agreement to Senate.--The 
     President shall submit to the Senate the final clarification 
     to the ABM Treaty, agreed upon between or among the nations 
     referred to in subsection (a)(3), that defines theater 
     missile defense systems before the clarification becomes 
     effective so that the Senate can make a determination on 
     whether the agreed clarification would substantively modify 
     the ABM Treaty or establish new legal obligations for the 
     United States in a manner that would require the advice and 
     consent of the Senate under section 2 of article II of the 
     Constitution.
       (c) Treaty Defined.--In this section, the terms ``Anti-
     Ballistic Missile Treaty'' and ``ABM Treaty'' mean the Treaty 
     Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
     Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic 
     Missile Systems, signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, with 
     related protocol, signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974.

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I know the Senator from Massachusetts has a 
very important matter he wants to discuss that does not directly relate 
to this bill. I hope he would be recognized. When someone has an 
amendment on this bill, he has assured me he would yield back so it may 
be considered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee and, indeed, at the time somebody wants to proceed forward--I 
know we want to finish this bill--I will not tie up the floor.

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