[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 87 (Friday, July 1, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 1, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZA- TION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the 
Senate will now resume consideration of S. 2182 which the clerk will 
report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 2182) to authorize appropriations for fiscal 
     year 1995 for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, for military construction, and for defense 
     activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe 
     personnel strength for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, 
     and for other purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.

       Pending:
       (1) Johnston Amendment No. 1840, to restore funding for the 
     National Defense Sealift Fund and reduce funding for the LHD-
     7 Amphibious Ship.
       (2) Dole/Lieberman Amendment No. 1851, to terminate the 
     United States arms embargo applicable to the Government of 
     Bosnia and Herzgovina.
       (3) Nunn/Warner Modified Amendment No. 1852, to express the 
     sense of the Congress that the United States should work with 
     NATO Member nations and members of the United Nations 
     Security Council to endorse the efforts of the contact group 
     to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       (4) Levin Amendment No. 2142, to strike out the funds for a 
     B-2 Bomber Industrial Base Program and make available such 
     funds for environmental restoration activities at military 
     installations approved for closure.
       (5) Warner Amendment No. 2143, to eliminate the disparity 
     between effective dates for military and civilian retiree 
     cost-of-living adjustments for fiscal year 1995.


                    amendment no. 1852, as modified

                    amendment no. 1851, as modified

  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time until 9:10 a.m. shall be 
for debate on amendment No. 1852, as modified, and amendment No. 1851, 
as modified. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, it is my understanding, as the Chair just 
reported, we will be on the Bosnia amendment and the time is 
controlled.
  Will the Chair remind the Senate as to how the time is controlled?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time will be controlled by the 
Senator from Georgia and the minority leader.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Connecticut [Mr. 
Lieberman] is recognized.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I yield myself 4 minutes from the time 
controlled by the minority leader.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator is recognized.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, those of us who are supporting the 
amendment offered by the Senator from Kansas and myself and several 
other bipartisan cosponsors, have reached some conclusions about the 
war in the Balkans which has gone on now for almost 3 years, killing 
over 200,000 people, creating 2 million refugees, and it is that the 
Serbs are the aggressors; that an aggression by one nation against 
another nation has occurred; and that the Serbs have carried out a 
consistent pattern of brutal, barbaric acts including the systematic 
use of rape as an instrument of war, random killings of a nature that 
raise itself to genocidal because it is directed against noncombatants, 
civilians, simply because of who they are, which in this case is 
Bosnian Moslems.
  Mr. President, those of us who submit and support this amendment feel 
that the United States has an interest in this conflict, first, in 
standing up against aggression by one nation against another; second, 
in not standing idly by while genocidal acts occur; and, third, in 
acknowledging that what happens in Europe has twice drawn us into world 
wars in this century and we have a strategic interest in preserving 
order there, particularly in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union with all the potential for ethnic conflict elsewhere as 
has occurred in the Balkans now.
  We also feel that while we have an interest in the Balkans, it is not 
sufficient to justify sending American soldiers there. It is sufficient 
to support lifting the arms embargo so that the victims of aggression 
and genocidal acts will at least have the means with which to defend 
themselves. To deny them that is an invalid act, contrary to 
international law, contrary to the best moral principles upon which 
this country is founded.
  The administration is opposing the amendment that we have introduced, 
and that troubles me. It disappoints me because the administration 
itself adopted last year a policy of lift and strike to combat Serbian 
aggression in the Balkans--lift the embargo and strike from the air. 
And the intention of this amendment is simply to carry out that policy.
  The House of Representatives a while ago adopted a similar amendment 
by 66 votes. This Chamber on May 10 adopted two amendments, one like 
ours demanding the unilateral lifting of the embargo, the other 
suggesting a multilateral lifting under certain conditions. Some of our 
colleagues voted for both amendments on the theory that they were 
making a statement: that they preferred the embargo to be lifted 
multilaterally but would support unilateral lifting if necessary, and 
they wanted to give the administration time to carry out that policy.
  Mr. President, that vote occurred in this Chamber on May 10. It is 
now July 1 and nothing has happened to bring about a multilateral 
lifting of this policy. So we are here again today with two choices. In 
my opinion the choices are clear. Only one amendment, the amendment 
that Senator Dole and I have introduced, with several bipartisan 
colleagues, lifts the arms embargo. It requires it. The other amendment 
is a sense of the Congress with no effect in law. The other amendment 
is full of conditions. The other amendment endorses the carving up of 
Bosnia and puts America in a position to have to send American soldiers 
to keep a peace which will be unstable.
  Mr. President, the Bible tells us that the sound of the trumpet 
should be certain on who will follow us into battle.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I yield myself an additional 30 seconds.
  Only one amendment sounds a certain trumpet. That is our amendment. 
The second is uncertain and responds to the cries of the people of 
Bosnia for help with a face turned essentially in the other direction.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Dole-Lieberman amendment and 
oppose the Nunn-Warner amendment.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Who yields time?
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I believe I have been allocated 2 
minutes for the Dole-Lieberman amendment.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator is recognized for 2 
minutes.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, I rise to speak on behalf of the Dole-
Lieberman amendment, as originally introduced with my cosponsorship, to 
require the immediate lifting of the United Nations arms embargo on 
Bosnia.
  That embargo, I believe, fails the tests of legality, of morality, 
and of statesmanship. It is neither consistent with American traditions 
or values, nor with our long-term interests. And the strategy of which 
it is a part will not bring lasting peace to the region.
  The embargo flies in the face of article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 
which grants to every State the inherent right of self-defense. With 72 
percent of its territory occupied by Serbian-supported militias, there 
is no denying that Bosnia has been the victim of externally inspired 
aggression and has every right under international law to defend 
itself.
  It has been asserted that the United States must not lift the embargo 
unilaterally because to do so would violate a Security Council 
resolution. But, Mr. President, that resolution has validity only 
insofar as it is consistent with the United Nations' own charter.
  The charter exists to implement international law, not to empower the 
Security Council to override that law or the charter's own provisions. 
One may attempt to argue political reasons against unilateral U.S. 
action, but it strains credibility to claim a legal barrier.
  As mandated by the Security Council, the embargo was directed against 
Yugoslavia at a time when Bosnia did not even exist as an independent 
State. It is a legal absurdity to assert that the same embargo extends 
to a new nation, internationally recognized, which is no longer a part 
of Yugoslavia and, indeed, is the object of attack by the regime 
against which the embargo was levied in the first place.
  In moral terms, this embargo is an abomination. It denies a small 
State the means to defend itself against aggression. It denies a people 
the wherewithal to fend off violent assaults intended to wipe the off 
the map by murder or forced flight. It binds the victim while 
benefiting a predatory regime and its proxies, whose leaders have been 
denounced by our own Government as war criminals.
  If the embargo itself is immoral, it is the instrument of an even 
more bankrupt policy, namely the effort to impose an unjust peace on 
the victims of aggression. United States diplomacy is focused now on 
persuading the Bosnians--among others--to accept a 
territorial settlement, the so-called 51/49 map, which consolidates and 
legitimizes a large portion of Serb conquests. Maintenance of the 
embargo serves to weaken the Bosnians' resistance to these efforts. 
Such a strategy is inconsistent with our deepest values and ideals as a 
nation, and it is in total opposition to our historical tradition. The 
defenders of the embargo maintain that lifting it will being more 
fighting and suffering to Bosnia. They are probably right. But the 
implication of their argument is that submitting to aggression is 
preferable to paying the price of freedom. We have here, Mr. President, 
the modern equivalent of the ``better Red than dead'' thesis of the 
1950's. It is the sort of proposition which the American people have 
always rejected with the contempt it deserves. And we cannot in good 
conscience seek to impose it on others.

  Mr. President, the embargo and current United States policy on Bosnia 
also fail the test of realism and statesmanship. An unjust peace 
imposed on Bosnia will not long endure. Rather, it will sew the seeds 
of renewed conflict as soon as the Bosnians bind up their wounds and 
arm themselves--as they eventually will, whether or not a formal 
embargo persists.
  The region of ex-Yugoslavia has long been a cockpit of strife--and 
the suffering and atrocities associated with the current war have 
contributed further to deeply rooted national and ethnic antagonisms. 
It is sad, but true, that the only real guarantee of a durable peace in 
ex-Yugoslavia--or at least an extended interval of peace--is a stable 
balance of power or a state of mutual exhaustion among the contending 
parties. It is clear from their valiant struggle, which reflects their 
past history, that the Bosnians are defiant of adversity and far from 
exhausted. And no stable balance of power exists or can exist so long 
as the embargo conveys an artificial--and inevitably temporary--
advantage on Serbia and its proxies. Consequently, no unjust peace 
settlement imposed on Bosnia under the shadow of the embargo will 
endure. The embargo has already begun to erode in some respects and 
will melt away more quickly, in substance if not in form, as soon as a 
settlement is reached. Serbia's military advantage will erode as Bosnia 
arms itself, and the stage will have been set for another war.
  If lifting the embargo now leads to further strife, it also makes it 
likely that the outcome of that conflict--and the peace that follows--
will be more durable than anything produced by a sham settlement 
imposed from the outside. Whether it is more just can only be decided 
by the fortunes of war when the Bosnians no longer have one hand tied 
behind their back. But one thing is certain: an imposed settlement 
along the lines now proposed offers neither justice nor peace. What it 
offers is merely a brief respite from the political inconvenience this 
war represents for the leaderships of those Western countries which are 
pushing this plan.
  Even that, however, it likely to prove illusory. It is clear that an 
imposed settlement will require the presence of massive outside 
military forces to separate the parties and monitor a ceasefire, and 
that such a force is unlikely to materialize without the large-scale 
participation of the United States. The figure most quoted is 25,000 
U.S. troops. Are the American people--or this Congress--prepared to 
tolerate, much less support, the dispatch of thousands of Americans to 
sit on an ethnic powder keg which may explode in their midst and will 
certainly explode the moment they depart? And to do this all in the 
name of defending a status quo founded on brutal Serb consquest? I 
think not, Mr. President. America will have no part of such an 
expeditionary force, and because it will not, the current effort to 
impose a settlement based on the 51/49 map will collapse of its own 
weight.
  Mr. President, in our careers as legislators we are called upon to 
cast many votes. A rare few of those decisions go beyond the conduct of 
the Nation's business to define the essence of the Nation's conscience. 
In so doing, they define as well how posterity will judge our own 
careers as public men and women and what we stood for in this Chamber. 
This is such an occasion--and an opportunity to stand up for both moral 
principle and practical realism. I urge my colleagues to join me in 
voting to lift immediately the United States embargo on Bosnia.
  Mr. President, in summary, I urge the immediate lifting of the U.N. 
arms embargo on Bosnia. The embargo violates fundamental international 
law and the United Nations Charter granting every State the right of 
self-defense.
  Some claim we must not act unilaterally lest we violate a Security 
Council resolution, but that resolution is valid only so far as it is 
consistent with the United Nations' own charter and is not where Bosnia 
is concerned.
  In moral terms, this embargo is an abomination. It denies a nation 
and a people the means to fend off violent assaults intended to wipe 
them off the map by murder and forced flight.
  It binds the victims while benefiting the aggressor, and is the 
instrument of an even more bankrupt policy which seeks to impose an 
unjust peace on the victims of aggression.
  Those who argue that lifting the embargo will bring more fighting and 
suffering in Bosnia are probably right. But the implication of their 
argument is that submitting to aggression is preferable to paying the 
price of freedom.
  This is a proposition that American people have always rejected with 
the contempt that it deserves. The embargo and current policies also 
fail the test of realism. An unjust peace imposed on Bosnia will not 
endure. The region has long been a cockpit of strife. Sadly, the only 
real guarantee of a durable peace is a stable balance of power or a 
state of mutual exhaustion. The Bosnians are far from exhausted, and no 
stable balance of power can exist so long as the embargo conveys an 
artificial--and inevitably temporary--advantage on Serbia and its 
proxies.
  Mr. President, an imposed settlement will require a massive outside 
force which is unlikely without U.S. participation. I do not believe 
Americans will tolerate the dispatch of thousands of our soldiers to 
sit on an ethnic powder keg which may explode in their midst, and will 
certainly explode the moment they depart, all in the name of 
maintaining a status quo based on brutal Serb conquest, and an imposed 
embargo violating international law.
  America will have no part of such an expeditionary force, and because 
it will not, the current effort to impose a settlement will collapse of 
its own weight.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from 
Arizona.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Arizona [Mr. 
DeConcini] is recognized for 3 minutes.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Connecticut 
for his leadership in this area, along with the Senator from Kansas.
  I have some hesitation, I guess, in the sense that I want to see this 
administration succeed in its efforts in Bosnia, but I rise in support 
of the Dole-Lieberman amendment.
  Mr. President, as Chairman of the Helsinki Commission and Vice 
Chairman for the last roughly 10 years, I have had the occasion to 
visit the Balkans, and particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, on four 
different occasions.
  I have seen the most unfair treatment of an independent sovereign 
state of almost any place in the world that I can think of in recent 
history. Here is a nation that has been recognized by most nations, 
including the United States. And after it was recognized as an 
independent sovereign nation, an embargo and sanctions that were 
imposed on a former nation, called Yugoslavia, which no longer exists, 
was imposed on Bosnia. There is no longer a Yugoslavia as we knew it. 
That country has been divided democratically. And part of that division 
of course is Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  Now that embargo is being enforced by the United Nations, with 
support of the United States. It is not right. There is no 
justification for it, and we should not impose this on these people. We 
should impose an embargo on the Serbs and in the past were considering 
one on the Croats for some of their past atrocities. But now the Croats 
have made peace, and they have decided to be part of an independent 
country known as Bosnia and Herzegovina. But the Serbs refused.
  We must lift the arms embargo and let those people defend themselves 
and act with dignity; and yes, if they die, they die for their 
independence, their families, their country, and for what they believe 
in.
  That is easy for me to say because I do not have to go there and die. 
But how many of us in this country would stand by, or in this body 
would stand by, if another foreign country took 70 percent of our 
territory or even 1 percent of our territory? Would we permit that? We 
would not. We would fight. We would ask other nations to help, and we 
would be against any efforts to impose an embargo or sanctions on us 
that prohibited us from defending ourselves and regaining our 
territory.
  Now the United States is part of imposing a peace settlement that 
solidifies roughly 51 percent to the aggressor, to the country which 
committed genocide, the country that has caused ethnic cleansing and 
has murdered and raped people for the last 3 years.
  Mr. President, it is time to face this issue. It is genocide, just as 
it was during the Second World War. People ignored it then; people 
cannot ignore it now. We see it. We read it. I have talked to people.
  I sat as close as that chair to a man who is 54 years old, a Bosnian, 
who came out of a concentration camp, a death camp, who saw his mother 
left on the mountain because he was afraid she would be murdered and 
raped if he brought her down. And he is sure she is dead. He saw his 
wife and sister murdered, and one of them raped. He saw his brother 
beat to death over 2 days in the same concentration camp. Those are 
real people; those are real people.
  Who were the aggressors there? The Serbians, the Bosnian-Serbians; 
and the Serbian-Serbians armed those Bosnian-Serbians. We cannot 
continue, Mr. President, to accept this in this country.
  Mr. President, I rise to state my unequivocal support for the Dole-
Lieberman amendment to the Defense authorization bill.
  As we consider the amendments, I urge my colleagues to look at what 
has really happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Military confrontation 
has been relatively rare; more characteristic of this conflict is the 
senseless, continual shelling of innocent civilians who have been 
herded into destroyed cities and overcrowded villages by the Serb 
militants' ethnic cleansing campaigns. It has been estimated that 80 to 
85 percent of the casualties have been civilians, and the number of 
children killed is about equal to that of combatants.
  This can hardly be called a war at all. Aggression and genocide are 
more accurate descriptions. ``Warring factions'' misses the reality of 
the well armed-versus-the defenseless. ``Settling old ethnic scores'' 
overlooks the resolve of those surviving to maintain a multiethnic 
society even in the face of genocide and an unwillingness of the West 
to assist.
  At present, the Bosnian people and their representatives feel 
abandoned. They desperately want to remain part of Europe. But, in the 
face of threat to their continued existence, only the Islamic world 
willingly offers them the assistance they need. In their desperation, 
they are also more determined than ever to defend their country, 
despite the arms embargo.
  Yes, the Bosnians are recently able to take some offensive action 
against Serb positions. But we, in response, now pressure all sides to 
make peace, after the Serbs have taken and consolidated their holdings 
on over 70 percent of the country? Why are we now pressing for peace at 
any cost? Would we not fight to liberate territory taken from us? Would 
we accept an internationally imposed division of our country?
  Lifting the arms embargo increases the likelihood that the Bosnians 
and the Serbs will accept an agreement that is more balanced and 
viable. It also increases our ability to influence the Bosnians to 
ensure that liberation, and not revenge, is their objective.
  Will lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina unilaterally 
violate international law? No, because the embargo is legally invalid. 
The United Nations Charter supersedes Security Council resolutions, and 
under article 51 of the charter Bosnia and Herzegovina has the right to 
self-defense, including the right to receive weapons necessary to 
defend itself.
  Will lifting the embargo lead others to act unilaterally in areas 
contrary to U.S. interests? It would be hard for them to make the case 
for doing so. We are justifying our call on the basis of the sovereign 
right to self-defense, as stated in the U.N. Charter. Aggressor or 
repressive States like Iraq, Libya, Haiti, Serbia, and North Korea 
cannot be compared with Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country victimized by 
aggression. A case for the invalidity of U.N. embargoes on these 
countries cannot be made.
  Will lifting the embargo Americanize the Bosnian war? Not at all. It 
is precisely because the United States and other European powers have 
refused to stop Serb aggression and genocide that recourse must be made 
to give the Bosnians the means to do so.
  Will it hurt the Bosnian peace process? No. At present, the Serb 
militants have no incentive to give up any of the 72 percent of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina they now control. Arming the Bosnians will convince the 
Serb militants to stop playing their games, negotiate in good faith and 
implement the resulting agreement. It will also foster a viable Bosnian 
State for the future. It is the present course that has allowed the 
conflict to go on with no end in sight, and the death toll to reach the 
200,000 level.
  Will it allow the the Bosnians to seek revenge? There is a risk here, 
but the risk is greater if we press the Bosnians instead to accept 
defeat and the loss of their country. Faced with destruction, the 
Bosnians have become more committed than ever to maintaining a 
multiethnic state. Only a feeling of abandonment generates the 
desperation that leads to acts of revenge, as well as to greater 
influence from Islamic extremists.
  Does lifting the embargo mean taking sides in a complex war? Yes, but 
keeping an embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina knowing that the Serb 
militants have the preponderance of weaponry at their disposal is 
tantamount to siding with the Serbs. Moreover, supporting a victim's 
right to self-defense when facing aggression is a position of 
principle, not of favoritism.
  Now, those opposed to Dole-Lieberman have brought senior officials 
from the Clinton administration and European governments before the 
Senate to allege the opposte point of view on these questions. I 
appreciate hearing these views, but I also view the effort as 
potentially dangerous. Nothing can justify what the Serb militants have 
done in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but these militants have sought to 
justify their efforts, with some success, by saying it was our fault 
for recognizing Bosnian independence. The arguments made by opponents 
of Dole-Lieberman--that the Serbs will react negatively and fighting 
will intensify--are those that will then be used by Mr. Karadzic, Mr. 
Mladic, and Mr. Milosevic.
  They will be encouraged in their aggression, as they will sense that 
the United Nations and Europe will blame the U.S. Congress for what 
they do, rather than stand against further aggression.
  Is the unilateral lifting of the embargo our optimal choice for 
standing against aggression? For me, it definitely is not, but it is 
better than our current policy.
  In a recent article, even the Bosnian Prime Minister, Haris 
Silajdzic, asserts that it would be best for the international 
community to take direct action to stop Serb aggression. But he, too, 
concludes that the political will to do so remains shamefully absent.
  From the beginning, selective but substantial airstrikes by NATO 
should have been used to try to stop the Serbs. My guess is that it 
would have stopped them, but, even if it had not, it would have leveled 
the playing field. Followed by an arming of the Bosnians if necessary, 
we would not have had to confront ground troop deployments, nor the 
mess we have right now.
  But U.N. representatives even refuse to enforce the resolutions 
passed by the Security Council, such as those being violated by recent 
Serb activity in the Sarajevo and Gorazde exclusion zones. Given this 
dismal situation, there is no excuse for not letting the Bosnians 
defend themselves.
  Of course, we would all prefer to see the arms embargo wrongfully 
imposed on Bosnia and Herzegovina lifted multilaterally, but that, 
unfortunately, seems unlikely at present as well. It is not good enough 
for a President to say he supports lifting the arms embargo. While the 
administration is unable to get anybody to go along, its efforts have 
been half-hearted at best.
  This is all the more shameful in light of the broad consensus that 
the arms embargo was desired by the Serbian leaders who controlled all 
the weapons, and should never have been imposed on Bosnia in the first 
place. Instead, State Department efforts focus on trying to convince 
the Congress not to push this issue, and those of us who are pushing it 
are accused of bumper sticker diplomacy.
  This feckless stance convinces me that the Congress must act by 
supporting a unilateral lifting if necessary. Otherwise, nothing more 
will be done.
  I urge my colleagues to do what is principled here, and to vote for 
this amendment to the Defense authorization bill.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Who yields time?
  Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] 
is recognized.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, what is the time remaining on each side?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Georgia has 22 
minutes and 8 seconds; the minority has 12 minutes and 6 seconds.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I will certainly share my time if someone 
comes in. I will begin making remarks. If someone comes in that would 
like to be recognized, I will be glad to yield.
  Mr. President, there is one part of this debate that I think has been 
virtually overlooked; that is, what is the U.S. obligation under the 
U.N. Security Council Charter? I am not one of those who believes that 
the United Nations is right on everything, and that we ought to be 
signing up pledges of allegiance to everything the United Nations does. 
That body has made an awful lot of mistakes. But I believe when you 
sign an international charter and you are part of the organization, you 
ought to have consciousness of the obligations that you have subscribed 
to.
  Mr. President, the Security Council of the United Nations has broad 
authority under the charter, and it makes it very clear under that 
charter that the U.N. Security Council has responsibility in the 
international peacekeeping areas where they assume jurisdiction.
  We have heard over and over again about article 51. That article 
says, as the proponents of the Dole-Lieberman amendment have noted over 
a period of time, that ``Nothing in this present charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed 
attack occurs against a member of the United Nations * * *'' That is 
where the quotation usually stops; that is where we stop hearing about 
it. But the rest of that sentence says, ``comma,'' ``until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security.''
  Mr. President, the way I interpret it, that means until the Security 
Council has acted in an area. That does not necessarily mean they have 
absolutely succeeded. It means until they have acted.
  What has the Security Council done in regard to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina? We have heard this in testimony before our committee, and 
I have seen it in op-ed pieces over and over again. Well, this action 
by the Security Council was taken before there was a Bosnia, and 
therefore is not binding on Bosnia. We have heard that argument on the 
floor. We have said we have heard it in a valid resolution.
  Mr. President, what the people who are basically advocating that line 
of reasoning have omitted from their presentation, but it is an 
absolute crucial, I think, omission, is that the Security Council on at 
least 12 occasions since Bosnia became a sovereign nation or sovereign 
state has reaffirmed its action on the arms embargo, and the United 
States has voted for that. This is not something that was done over our 
veto, or we were not absent; we were voting for that. So the proponents 
of this resolution, my friend from Connecticut and my friend from 
Michigan, are among the strongest proponents of acting 
multinationally--particularly the Senator from Michigan--through the 
United Nations and Security Council. But the Senator and no one on this 
side of the argument has explained at all how we get around our 
obligation under the Security Council. We are basically about to pass a 
law--the Dole-Lieberman resolution--that defies the Security Council 
resolution and our obligation under that resolution.

  I am one who has said over and over again that I think the embargo 
has been a mistake. I think they ought to be in the Security Council 
every day saying that it ought to be changed; it does not make sense. I 
do not see how we can cavalierly forget about the fact that we are 
obligated under that charter and we have taken that pledge. In effect, 
this resolution violates the charter of the Security Council and our 
obligation.
  On January 8, 1992, after there was a Bosnia, the Security Council 
reaffirmed its Resolution 713 of 1991, September 25, and in paragraph 6 
of that resolution in 1992, after there was a Bosnia, ``reaffirm the 
embargo applied in paragraph 6 of Resolution 713, 1991 and in paragraph 
5 of Resolution 724, 1991, and decides that the embargo applies in 
accordance with paragraph 33 of the General Secretariat's report.''
  And that report specifically states, in part, that ``the arms embargo 
would continue to apply to all areas that have been part of Yugoslavia, 
decisions on the recognition of independent certain republics 
notwithstanding.''
  I do believe that those advocating passing this resolution have some 
obligation to tell us why we are not violating our own obligation and 
why we are not violating the Charter of the United Nations. Maybe there 
are a lot of people--maybe a majority of people do not care about that. 
But I think it is going to be hard to come back and talk about that on 
the other side of another question when there are different 
circumstances. It is going to be hard to point to Russia, France, Great 
Britain, or any other country, and say, ``Why do you not abide by what 
you said in the Security Council?'' when we ourselves are about to pass 
a resolution which would defy that obligation. Maybe somebody can 
explain it. But I have certainly seen no explanation of this anywhere 
of how we basically rationalize this course.
  Mr. President, I am not going to repeat all of the arguments I have 
made on this resolution. I know the majority leader will be here in a 
few minutes to make his presentation. I will repeat briefly what I have 
said in the past. I believe the arms embargo has been a mistake. But I 
believe that the way you lift that embargo is enormously important, not 
only in Bosnia, but also around the world. We have vital interests in 
Korea. I am not one of these who believes that problem has gone away. I 
do not believe that we may not have more difficulty. If we have more 
difficulty in North Korea, what we are going to do first, I trust and I 
believe, is go to the Security Council and ask them for sanctions 
against North Korea.
  We have 38,000 troops in North Korea. If we do not have any 
international cooperation, and if the North Koreans defy the 
obligations under the IAEA, which they have, and if they continue to 
move toward being a nuclear state, then we may have to take serious 
steps. If there are no sanctions involved, if there are no courses 
involved short of actual military steps, then, of course, we may have 
to take those military steps.
  Mr. President, I cannot conceive of the United States unilaterally 
defying the Charter of the United Nations Security Council resolution 
and its own vote in Bosnia, and then going straight back to the 
Security Council and saying to China, Russia, France, and Britain, who 
oppose what this resolution does here, ``We want you to help us on 
North Korea.'' I cannot conceive of how we would do that with any 
degree of success.
  So what we are doing, in my opinion, here is we are in a very 
understandable effort to ``do something'' on Bosnia, and we are 
forgetting the worldwide implications of what we do.
  Mr. President, I think it is important that we understand, also, that 
lifting the embargo unilaterally--and perhaps this is just being used 
as leverage to get the White House to be more assertive in a 
multinational way. If that is the motivation here, then I have some 
understanding of that. But if this is a serious resolution to say we 
really ought to, in law, require the lifting of the embargo, then 
somebody better think through how military forces are going to carry it 
out, because right now the United States is participating in an air 
protective zone. We are flying every day to protect that zone. We have 
flown thousands of sorties over there protecting the air zone. How does 
anyone believe we are going to get supplies in during an emergency 
situation, because if we lift the embargo unilaterally, the military 
and intelligence analysis is that the Bosnian Serbs, and even those in 
Serbia, will become very assertive, and the Bosnian Government will 
need immediate relief. And if we fly immediate relief in there and we 
do it in defiance of the United Nations and in defiance of NATO and in 
defiance of our allies, what are we going to do about the air cover we 
are participating in? Are we going to say to our F-15 and F-16 pilots 
do not shoot down the C-130's delivering arms, or are we going to say, 
``Pull out of that,'' or are our British and French partners going to 
say, ``We give up. We are going to get out of the no fly zone''? 
Probably the latter. Certainly, one of those courses. We are not going 
to shoot down our own aircraft.
  What are we going to do then when the British and French people pull 
out of the no fly zone? Who has the airplanes? It is not the Bosnian 
Moslems; it is the Serbs that have the airplanes. Then what are we 
going to do in America? Are we going to ask the British and French to 
help us now protect the Bosnian Moslems from the airplanes that we were 
flying the no fly zone over, but they are now going after the Moslems? 
Are we then going to do it ourselves and get in an air war? In my 
opinion, we will have to. In my opinion, we will also have to be 
prepared--and maybe we should have done this all along; there has been 
a case for it to some extent. We are going to have to go after 
strategic targets in Serbia, if the Serbs take action against the 
Bosnian Moslems with aircraft. And we have basically said to our 
colleagues and friends and allies that we are no longer going to 
participate in any kind of collective action.
  If we are marching off on our own, make no mistake about it, Mr. 
President, we are going to have to get in an air campaign of very 
significant proportions. We are going to have to take it, in my 
opinion, straight to Serbia. There are not enough good targets in these 
villages under attack; there are very limited targets. The lucrative 
targets are in Serbia. Are we ready to do that? If we are, go right 
ahead and pass this resolution.
  If we are ready to do it, we also better be prepared for what the 
Russians are going to do. Do I think they will get into the war? No, I 
do not. I do believe they will immediately lift the embargo on Serbia. 
I think they will lift the economic embargo within a week after we pass 
anything like this into law. When they do that, what we are going to 
have is the Bosnian Government beleaguered and outgunned and outarmed 
because we cannot get arms in there fast enough, individually and 
unilaterally, to protect them. They are going to be outgunned and 
outarmed, and they are going to have no air power, and they are going 
to have the United States as the ally--not the French, British, or the 
Russians. We are going to be defying all of those.
  It is going to be the United States. The same thing will apply at 
sea. We now have a collective embargo at sea. We are blocking goods 
from coming into the former Yugoslavia. What is going to happen there 
if we thumb our nose at the resolution and say we are going it alone, 
that we are tired of our allies, and we are defying the United Nations 
and defying the NATO alliance and basically do it ourselves? Are we 
going to go pull out of the sea embargo? If so, the squeeze on Serbia 
is over.
  So the net result of this is going to be not to strengthen the 
Bosnians, which we intend and certainly believe the proponents of this 
amendment intend this, but rather strengthening the other side.
  This resolution, if it passes in the form of law and gets signed into 
law, in my view, would be disastrous because it would be done 
unilaterally. If we do it collectively and if we do it in a careful way 
with our allies, if we lift that embargo, that is an entire different 
matter. I think that is the way to go.
  For one thing, if there is a peace accord, even if it does not last, 
in my view, then we ought to be lifting the embargo then and making 
sure that the sovereign State of Bosnia can protect itself. For another 
thing, we ought to be multilaterally advocating that the Bosnian Serbs 
defy the safe zones. We ought to be saying to our allies for goodness 
sake they are defying the United Nations resolution. Let us go in 
together and give the Bosnian Government a chance to defend itself with 
antitank weapons, with defensive weapons like mortars. That can be done 
collectively. Doing it collectively can be done, in my opinion, but I 
do not think it can be done unilaterally, not without severe damage.
  Mr. President, the last way that I think we can lift the embargo and 
do it in good conscience and do it with our allies is if the Bosnian 
Serbs do not agree to a just settlement. If they do not agree to a just 
settlement that then, in my view, at some point in the not too distant 
future we ought to be advocating strongly with our allies and United 
Nations that we basically collectively lift the embargo.
  My point, Mr. President, is I can see the good will and see the 
absolutely sincerity of the people who are pushing this resolution. A 
lot of my instincts are with them, because I think the embargo has been 
counterproductive.
  Mr. President, if we do this unilaterally not only will we regret it, 
the Bosnian Government will regret it because they are going to be 
outgunned. The implications of lifting this embargo unilaterally is 
that this becomes America's war. Lifting this unilaterally carries with 
it a very serious moral obligation to follow through.
  If we lift this unilaterally, we had better be prepared for at least 
a very serious air campaign against Serbia itself. That is the only 
kind of logical military consistency that can make sense. Even an air 
campaign against Serbia will not prevent some of these settlements from 
being overrun.
  Mr. President, in an evolutionary way, the embargo is already being 
lifted because we have recognized Croatia, but it is being done in a 
very evolving way. Croatia and Bosnia have merged together now. It may 
be temporary. It may not last. But arms are now getting through. More 
substantial arms are getting through than they have in the past.
  But we have not done it in defiance of the United Nations. We have 
not done it in a way that breaks up the no-fly zone. We have not done 
it in a way that breaks the embargo on Serbia. And we have not done it 
in a way that inflames the nationalist opinion in Russia and puts our 
allies and the people in Russia that we try to deal with in a very 
friendly way in a very awkward position so that they are the targets of 
not only extreme nationalists but also the broad body of public opinion 
that in my view would demand that the embargo be lifted against Serbia 
itself if the United States takes this action.
  So for all those reasons, Mr. President, I think people ought to 
think very seriously about what we are doing here. This is not a sense-
of-the- Senate resolution. The alternative is the Nunn-
Warner-Mitchell-Kassebaum amendment which is the sense-of-the-Senate 
resolution. But this is law. That is what we are talking about.
  Mr. President, I yield such time as the Senator from Virginia may 
desire.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Georgia has 5 
minutes remaining.
  The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator from Georgia has what time 
remaining?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Five minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Five minutes remaining.
  Mr. NUNN. The majority leader has a little time also.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I associate myself with the remarks of the 
Senator from Georgia. I have joined him as a principal cosponsor.
  The points that he made I agree with wholeheartedly. A unilateral 
lifting of the embargo would have far-reaching implications on our 
ability to continue to enforce sanctions on Iraq.
  In all likelihood it would, if not done in conjunction with our 
allies, deter any reasonable efforts to get the parties to reconcile 
their differences and to reach some type of a peace accord to which 
they would all sign.
  Lastly, a unilateral lifting would undoubtedly increase the killing 
if it is genocide, and indeed we all deplore the tragedy of the 
genocide that is taking place. It would increase.
  I recommended to the distinguished chairman of the committee that our 
committee invite those representatives from nations which are on the 
ground today and have been for some period of time, contributing their 
forces to the UNPROFOR efforts.
  My recommendations regarding these witnesses originated with my visit 
to the Foreign Office in Great Britain, where I received extensive, 
excellent briefings from the professional civil servants who have been 
following the important contributions, military and diplomatic, for 
years in this tragic conflict.
  Further, I express my great respect and appreciation to Ambassador 
Robin Renwick, who has represented, with distinction, the views of his 
Government, Great Britain.
  During the hearings on the morning of June 23d, the Armed Services 
Committee received testimony from the following witnesses: General 
Martinez Esparaza, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
Ministry of Defense, Spain; Jean Claude Mallet, Director of Strategic 
Policy, Ministry of Defense, France; Rupert Smith, Major General, 
Director of Strategic Policy, Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom; and 
Honorable Anders Troldborg, Deputy Minister of Defense, Denmark.
  These witnesses described the consequences they foresee if the United 
States should move unilaterally to lift the arms embargo in Bosnia. I 
ask unanimous consent that the statements from these witnesses be 
included in the Record.
  During the afternoon session, the committee was privileged to hear 
from Ejup Ganic, Member of the Presidency, the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; and Vice President of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, as well as a number of distinguished Americans; former 
Ambassador for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Max Kampelman; former 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, 
Richard Perle, and former Assistant Secretary of Public Affairs, 
Department of State, Hodding Carter. All of these witnesses spoke 
eloquently regarding the need to lift the embargo to enable the Bosnian 
Moslems to defend themselves.
  I ask unanimous consent that Vice President Ganic's statement also be 
included in the Record. I anticipate that several of my colleagues may 
want to include in the Record the statements of the other witnesses who 
appeared in the afternoon session.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

 Statement of Gen. Martinez Esparza, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
 for Policy, Ministry of Defense, Spain; accompanied by Gen. Luis Feliu

       General Esparza. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       First of all, on behalf of my Minister of Defense, Mr. 
     Garcia Vargas----
       Chairman Nunn. If you could pull that mike up just as close 
     as you can, the microphone, and talk directly into it.
       General Esparza. On behalf of my Minister of Defense, Mr. 
     Garcia Vargas, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 
     your kind invitation to come here so we have the opportunity 
     to present our views on this important and delicate subject 
     to you and your colleagues.
       Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce to the committee 
     General Feliu, who was Deputy Commander of UNPROFOR in 
     Bosnia-Herzegovina from July '93 to February '94. I feel that 
     it was a good idea to bring him here, and he will be prepared 
     to answer any questions you may wish to address to him.
       Chairman Nunn. General, you left in 1994, February of '94? 
     What was your position? You were Deputy Commander?
       General Feliu. I was Deputy Commander in UNPROFOR in 
     Bosnia-Herzegovina.
       Chairman Nunn. Good, Thank you. I would want everyone to 
     know that, and you would be willing to answer questions. 
     Thank you.
       General Esparza. Thank you, sir.
       Mr. Chairman, the basic objectives of the United Nations, 
     the European Union, and Spain, in Bosnia, I think are to 
     ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance, first; then, 
     to protect the declared safe areas; and, lately, to create 
     the conditions which will facilitate a negotiated settlement 
     by supporting the case-fire, dispersing of forces, the 
     reconstruction of cities, and the return to normal life.
       What are the present effects of the arms embargo? We think 
     that it helps to keep a combat level intensity far lower than 
     what could be expected if all parties, including the Muslims, 
     had access to all types of weapons. The embargo, therefore, 
     facilitates the control of heavy weapons by UNPROFOR, the 
     supervision of the case-fire, the suppressing of forces, and 
     the establishment of safe areas. In sum, Mr. Chairman, the 
     embargo contributes to the achievement of our objectives.
       What would the consequences be of a lifting of the arms 
     embargo on the Muslims? First of all, the Bosnian Serbs would 
     immediately declared UNPROFOR as a hostile force, and they 
     would not feel obligated to respect any previous commitment 
     or arrangements with the United Nations or the contact group. 
     It is difficult indeed to predict the specific actions which 
     the Bosnian Serbs might take against UNPROFOR and 
     humanitarian agencies. Their related force would feel 
     legitimated, and even compelled, to support the Bosnian Serbs 
     in full.
       The Russian Federation would find itself in a difficult 
     situation. It would lack the justification to continue 
     pressuring the Bosnian Serbs to accept a negotiated solution. 
     And it would probably favor a lifting of the sanctions on the 
     Serbs.
       We are absolutely sure that the Bosnian Serbs would 
     initiate an offensive against the Muslims, primarily in the 
     safe areas, before the Muslims would have time to receive any 
     weapons at all. The battles would worsen, thus interfering 
     with humanitarian aid and the free movement of UNPROFOR.
       The Muslims themselves would encounter serious 
     difficulties, even with heavy weapons, in recovering the 
     territory to which they aspire. And the possible territorial 
     gains would be minimum, if any, and would not justify the 
     heavy losses in human lives.
       In these conditions, Mr. Chairman, UNPROFOR would find 
     itself immediately forced to abandon the safe areas, to 
     withdraw from Serb territory, and quite probably from all of 
     the Bosnia-Herzegovina. The humanitarian agencies would 
     accompany UNPROFOR in its withdrawal. Public opinion in the 
     European countries contributing with forces to UNPROFOR would 
     understand, and would certainly support this withdrawal.
       On the other hand, Mr. Chairman, we think that there would 
     also be consequences for the fragile Croatian-
     Muslim Federation established with the decisive support of 
     the United States. What would the Croatians' reaction be? 
     Would they be willing to follow the Muslims in their 
     offensive? Would the Muslims continue to accept the 
     conditions of the Federation once they are armed? Would it 
     be possible to uphold the arms embargo on the Croatians in 
     a unified army of the Federation?
       On what and how would the embargo be lifted? On tanks and 
     army heavy weapons only? On placing helicopters also? On 
     ammunition and fuel supplies that we have to reach the 
     territory of the Muslims? How would the Muslims be supplied? 
     By land only, or by air and sea, as well? Through which 
     countries? Through Croatia and Serbia? What to do then with 
     the Operation Deny Flight if we supply them by air, that 
     operation that establishes an air exclusion zone, and with 
     the Operation Safeguard on the naval embargo? Would continue 
     these operations to be applicable? Would these operations be 
     applied only to the other parties and not to the Muslims? 
     Would NATO and Western European Union be able to reach the 
     necessary consensus to apply the embargo to only some of the 
     parties?
       Mr. Chairman, I think that there are a number of questions 
     that have a difficult answer. But if in addition the United 
     States lifts the embargo unilaterally, I think that you will 
     agree with me that this would mean some movement of 
     Washington away from its European allies. The decision would 
     create probably, Mr. Chairman, divisive tensions with NATO, 
     and I am sure you are award that the U.S. would have to 
     accept full responsibility for the consequences of the 
     situation provoked within Bosnia-Herzegovina by lifting the 
     arms embargo to the Muslims. And if UNPROFOR withdraws from 
     Bosnia, obviously, those European countries which withdraw 
     their forces from Bosnia would not be prepared, I think, to 
     send forces again. And I wonder, would the United States be 
     prepared to send forces in that case?
       In summary, Mr. Chairman, the entire negotiating process 
     would collapse, and there would not be a further opportunity 
     to solve the problem by diplomatic means for a long time. The 
     result would be war, interruption of humanitarian assistance, 
     and the detention of the reconstruction works. Several 
     European countries, Mr. Chairman, are making great efforts to 
     reconstruct two emblematic cities, Sarajevo and Mostar, and 
     to restore normal activities in and around those cities. We 
     think that the best way to contribute to the improvement of 
     the situation of the Muslim population and to a solution of 
     the conflict is to preserve in these normalization efforts, 
     building mutual confidence, reactivating economic activity, 
     and showing the population that the achievement of peace will 
     have its rewards.
       The Spanish forces in Mostar are witnessing the process and 
     are contributing actively to this process of normalization. 
     There is restoration of water and electricity supplies, the 
     reconstruction of bridges, roads, railways, the resumption of 
     essential public services--telephone communications, postal 
     services, public transportation, hospital care, schools, 
     airport activities--especially in the Muslim side of the 
     city, and that effort is proving to be the best weapon to put 
     an end to the conflict, Mr. Chairman.
       But then what are the alternatives? What else can we do? We 
     believe, Mr. Chairman, that the only action left is to exert 
     maximum political pressure by the United States, the Russian 
     Federation, and the European Union, and of course United 
     Nations, to attain the signatures of all the parties to a 
     final agreement.
       Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       Chairman Nunn. Thank you very much, General Esparza.
       Major General Smith?
       If you would pull that microphone very close and talk into 
     it. It is very sensitive.

Statement of Jean Claude Mallet, Director of Strategic Policy, Ministry 
                           of Defense, France

       Mr. Mallet. Mr. Chairman, Senators, I am here on behalf and 
     with the personal trust of the French Minister of Defense 
     Francois Leotard, who decided to answer positively to the 
     invitation launched by your, Mr. Chairman, and by your 
     ranking minority leader. I am certain you realize, through 
     this unprecedented gesture, the importance France attaches to 
     your present debate and its potential consequences.
       I will give you an in-depth view of the French Government's 
     studies to the issue of lifting of the embargo. It must not 
     be seen or understood that we have just rejected this as a 
     slogan that would not be accepted in France. It has triggered 
     in-depth studies, particularly in the Ministry of Defense.
       I have the honor to represent in front of you--
       Chairman Nunn. You said particularly the Ministry of 
     Defense?
       Mr. Mallet. Particularly, yes.
       Chairman Nunn. Okay, thank you.
       Mr. Mallet. I have the honor to represent in front of you a 
     country which has devoted a considerable amount of effort--
     political, financial, and human--in the Bosnian crisis, 
     sometimes at the expense of the lives of its soldiers since 
     we have had to see about 20 deaths--20 deaths exactly--and 
     about 300 casualties since we first sent military observers 
     in July 1991 at the request of the European Union and CSCE, 
     observers, monitors, ground troops, up to 6,000 now, a naval 
     battle group, AWACS, reconnaissance, and combat aircraft, 
     even the French Gendarmerie on the Danube are present in and 
     around former Yugoslavia.
       This important involvement stems from at least three 
     categories of motives: First, we feel the future of European 
     security is in many respects at stake again with this crisis 
     in the Balkans; second, humanitarian tragedies have 
     triggered, in particular in the summers of 1992 and 1993, an 
     increased effort; and third, we have thought that we needed 
     to design a containment policy in order to avoid the spill-
     over of the conflict in neighboring countries. 67 percent of 
     the UNPROFOR forces are European.
       Mr. Chairman, you have asked us to address two questions: 
     Why have we been resisting the Bosnian Government appeals for 
     the lifting of the arms embargo; what prospects do we see 
     today for the peace process? Up to a point, those two 
     questions are very clearly closely connected.
       I am convinced that the lifting of the embargo would mean 
     the end of any peace process and prospect for a very long 
     period of time. The lifting of the embargo is nothing but a 
     war-helping and nearly war-making measure. It would ruin, 
     without doubt, any present efforts to build a new momentum 
     towards a peace plan supported, as you have stressed yourself 
     Mr. Chairman, by the United States, Russia, and the European 
     Union powers. I will come back to that later.
       The lifting of the embargo--that is my second point--would 
     mean inevitably the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and trigger the 
     resumption of a fierce violence and war throughout Bosnia. In 
     that sense, it would be a tremendous drawback from what has 
     been achieved on the ground in particular since August 1993.
       Third, the lifting of the embargo means doubtless increased 
     deeper inevitable involvement of the allies, and among them 
     foremost of the United States of America in a war-like 
     situation. Before dealing with these points, I would like to 
     say a word on the issue of unilateral lifting, which I 
     understand has been a matter of debate here.
       With due respect, Mr. Chairman and Senators, I do not think 
     unilateral lifting, from an international point of view, 
     means leadership. But it is a sure recipe for international 
     disorder in the post-Cold War world. Let me just remind you 
     briefly, the text of the Security Council resolution of 
     September 1991, which is today the legal basis of the arms 
     embargo. It reads in its paragraph 6 that the Council has 
     decided on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter that the 
     member states will immediately enforce a general and complete 
     embargo, and I quote, until the Security Council decides 
     otherwise, end of quotation.
       We have, then, together subscribed to a text which imposes 
     on us to come back to the Security Council of which U.S. and 
     France and Great Britain in particular are prominent members, 
     if we wanted to change this piece of international law. Could 
     the United States, as such, and as a permanent member of the 
     Security Council and as a member state of the United Nations, 
     decide solely to place itself above the law it has 
     contributed to create? Could it consider such a clear 
     resolution as a worthless sheet of paper?
       This could probably mean the end of the game in the 
     Security Council in the new context, a year before the 
     celebration of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations 
     Charter signature on the 26th of June 1949. It could mean 
     after such a precedent that other members of the Council, 
     permanent or not, could see themselves free not to abide by 
     the resolutions they vote in the highest international body, 
     the body which authorizes or not the use of force and is 
     responsible for peacekeeping. So in that case, in that 
     hypothesis, who is next after U.S.? It would mean, of course, 
     or probably, a tremendous crisis with your European allies 
     and your Russian partner.
       Now, if we turn to the lifting of the embargo itself per 
     se, what do we see? We see first, as has been pointed out, a 
     quick, almost immediate decision to withdraw the United 
     Nations forces in this theater, at least in the French 
     Government opinion which I think is shared both by the United 
     Nations and or allies and partners. Some could say now, does 
     the international community, do the Muslims really care about 
     that? Let me dwell a little bit on UNPROFOR.
       Our forces are presently accomplishing a series of missions 
     thanks to which the situation has slowly been stabilized 
     since August 1993. I will just give you a few highlights of 
     these missions:
       Humanitarian aid has arrived, and since January 1994, for 
     the first time in the history of this conflict, humanitarian 
     needs are matched by humanitarian flows, and these needs have 
     been met since January 1994. I have charts at your disposal 
     on this.
       In the meantime, interposition between the warring factions 
     have multiplied. In Central Bosnia, in Sarajevo, in Gorazde, 
     there the blue helmets stand between two camps and avoid the 
     resumption of fighting.
       Third, they are guarding heavy weapons storages, and this 
     is another mission to which a lot of personnel have to be 
     devoted. There are, of course, a few violations of this rule, 
     and things can be improved. But there it is. In several 
     places, particularly Sarajevo, heavy weapons have been 
     withdrawn or stored. Do we want them back in the battlefield?
       Fourth, monitoring of the ceasefire or cessation of 
     hostilities is, of course, another mission which requires an 
     important number of units.
       So, the lifting of the embargo would make all of these 
     missions impossible for UNPROFOR because it means the 
     contrary.
       Humanitarian aid delivery means freedom of movement on 
     roads; free access to airports. Roads and airports would be 
     the place through which heavy weapons would have to be 
     delivered. They would then immediately be the targets of war 
     operations in order for one party to secure the deliveries 
     and for the other party to interdict those deliveries. 
     Communication axes, airfields, would be quickly the target of 
     attacks.
       Interposition missions would have to be abandoned for two 
     reasons: first, the resumption of large-scale battles in 
     these sensitive places in which they have to be met; second, 
     the loss of the impartial image of UNPROFOR in the eyes of 
     the Serbs. If we accept weapons deliveries for their enemies 
     we take sides. Withdrawal of UNPROFOR from these places would 
     trigger now battles in all places, Sarajevo, Central, 
     Eastern, Northern Bosnia. I have charts to show you where 
     UNPROFOR is now located in interposition missions.
       Some object that the Muslims are the best place to judge. 
     But you must be aware of their wishes. Prime Minister 
     Siladzic repeated them to the French Government a few weeks 
     ago. The Bosnian Government wants both, both the lifting 
     of the embargo and the maintenance of UNPROFOR presence. 
     Why? First, of course, because the Bosnian Government 
     would like to see UNPROFOR and the allies side by side 
     with them--and that is natural, we can understand that--
     but also because they know in spite of all that our 
     presence, our corresponding policy, has been a help since 
     at least a year. Let me give you a few illustrations of 
     what happened in the past 10 months.
       Humanitarian aid has been progressively and is now surely a 
     success. I have said that. The creation of the safe areas in 
     June 1993 has in effect stopped the Serb progression and 
     offensives, in particular in the Eastern enclaves. The 
     situation in Sarajevo is tremendously improved, as you have 
     said, Senator, since the ultimatum of last February, and the 
     Serbs are no more in a position to seize the Bosnian capital 
     as they were during last winter.
       During autumn and winter, the Muslim army extended its hold 
     in Central Bosnia, and you could see on maps the progress 
     they made between July 1993 and February 1994 to control a 
     wider space in Central Bosnia. So, on the whole, it must be 
     admitted that the presence of UNPROFOR has corresponded to a 
     period during which the situation of the Muslims has improved 
     on several aspects. But the lifting of the embargo, which 
     would trigger new combats and very likely an offensive by the 
     Serbs to anticipate Bosnian moves before the Bosnian army 
     gets stronger, would inevitably be the signal for our 
     withdrawal.
       This is not the only consequence. The logic in which we, 
     and foremostly you the United States, would be thrown in is 
     therefore a new buildup of war. I do not see how the United 
     States, having decided or supported the lifting of the 
     embargo, could stay out of the crisis. On the contrary, your 
     country would have to commit itself even more.
       Either in effect such a decision is simply a buzz word, a 
     leitmotif, a slogan, you have no intention to be part of the 
     game which is complex and far from here, and this can be 
     understood--but then why interfere with the present efforts 
     on the ground--or it means that you want to help the Muslims 
     and then the United States cannot stop there. You would have 
     to offer air protection, at least for a while, at the scale 
     of the whole battlefield, not only the safe areas as today.
       These strikes would accelerate UNPROFOR's dramatic 
     withdrawal. You would have to help directly or indirectly the 
     Bosnians so that they are trained to use heavy weapons, 
     tanks, et cetera, on a large scale; you would have to commit 
     yourself to avoid any extension of the conflict, in 
     particular if the Serbian army, led by Belgrade, felt itself 
     in a position to support the Bosnian Serbs. Large-scale air 
     campaign, military assistance, containment, these obligations 
     lead certainly to an ever-increased involvement of the United 
     States of America and some of its allies, not the other way 
     around.
       I hope these explanations are a help for you to understand 
     why we have been so reluctant to consider the option of 
     lifting of the arms embargo. In our view, this measure 
     pertains to the worst-case scenario and should not be 
     envisaged without having explored at length all the other 
     options. I understand the American administration has come to 
     similar conclusions recently. In our view, it is now time to 
     give all its chances to the peace process which has been 
     relaunched for several weeks.
       The French Government policy has always been to build up a 
     consensus between the United States, the Europeans, and the 
     Russians, in order to arrive at a balanced and shared view of 
     a peace settlement. Considerable time and political 
     involvement have been devoted in recent weeks to this 
     objective since the ultimatum of Sarajevo and Gorazde. In 
     that perspective, President Clinton's visit in Europe on the 
     50th birthday of the D-Day and talks in Paris are considered 
     by my Minister and my Government as a success for both 
     countries. We are close to an agreement on a map, a series of 
     measures, incentives, and disincentives accompanying the 
     plan, and a schedule.
       This convergence of the United States, European Union, and 
     Russia, is vital if we want a settlement, if we want peace. 
     If it is put at risk, if the parties think that we are 
     divided, they will exploit this weakness and this at our 
     and your and their expense. On territorial percentages, on 
     the map, on the definition of incentives, we are now 
     closer than ever. If we are united, there is a chance to 
     bring this conflict if not at once to a complete stop at 
     least to a beginning of a settlement. Reiterating the 
     leitmotif of the arms embargo is raising false 
     expectations and is a source of serious misunderstandings 
     and divisions with the Europeans and the Russians.
       In 1994, as we are celebrating the liberation of my country 
     by American troops with the help of French resistance and of 
     the free French, I would like to see the United States of 
     America and its European partners side by side in this 
     resolution of what we consider to be a major crisis. If we 
     achieve unity of vision, if we commit ourselves together both 
     politically and, when the time comes, in the field, we can 
     help to bring peace back in the Balkans.
       Believe me, lifting the arms embargo is the worst way to 
     get involved and stuck in the present drama.
       Thank you.
       [The prepared statement of Mr. Mallet follows:]

Statement of Rupert Smith, Major General, Director of Strategic Policy, 
                  Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom

       General Smith. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity 
     to put the military consequences of lifting the arms embargo 
     from the point of view of the United Kingdom. If we were to 
     take Bosnia-Hercegovina alone, we currently provide the 
     commander in Sarajevo and some 3,500 men deployed between the 
     southwest of Bosnia-Hercegovina and to Maglaj in the 
     northwest, and the enclave of Gorazde in the east.
       What follows is predicted on the following:
       That the United Kingdom's and the United Nations' aims are 
     to achieve a negotiated peace settlement, to ameliorate as 
     far as possible the consequences of the war on the 
     populations, and to contain the conflict.
       That the achievements by the military deployments and 
     actions to date are not to be risked as in themselves they 
     are important objectives on the way to achieving an overall 
     solution of peace in the Balkans. And these achievements are:
       The conflict has been contained to Bosnia-Hercegovina and 
     Croatia. There is a stable ceasefire between the Muslim and 
     Croat elements within Bosnia-Hercegovina. Negotiations 
     between Muslim and Croat are underway over the territory, but 
     they are likely to be protracted. The humanitarian crises 
     are, to a large extent, resolved, at least for the time 
     being. And UNPROFOR, where it is deployed, has very largely 
     prevented ethnic cleansing or genocide.
       There is a fragile cessation of hostilities around 
     Sarajevo, allowing normal life to begin again, and a very 
     fragile cessation of hostilities between the Bosnian Serb 
     Army and the Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces has existed 
     since the 10th of June.
       That the United Nations sanctions all military operations 
     in the theater and commands those on the land. The maritime 
     and air operations commanded by NATO are through the dual-key 
     arrangements in support of the United Nations land 
     operations.
       That the factions are fighting over the ownership of 
     territory on ground that favors the defense and concealment.
       And that Bosnia-Hercegovina in the face of the NATO no-fly 
     zone, the routes all lie through Croatia, and some involve 
     running the NATO WEU blockade in the Adriatic.
       The military consequences of lifting the embargo would be 
     that the Croatians would take their cut of the supplies 
     passing through their territory, thus altering the balance of 
     forces in the Krajinas, and risking containment.
       The Bosnian Croats may well consider that a qualitative as 
     well as quantitative improvement in the Bosnian Muslim arms 
     will alter the current balance against them, particularly in 
     artillery. And this may threaten the Muslim-Croat ceasefire 
     and the new federation.
       The Bosnian Serbs, faced with an imminent alteration in the 
     balance of forces, may well conduct a rapid preemptive 
     attack, threatening the existing ceasefires. The Krajina 
     Serbs may do likewise.
       Where these or this attack would fall is speculative, but 
     if we take the eastern enclaves just as an example, some 
     119,000 people would be put at risk. Where would they go? 
     What price ameliorating the humanitarian situation now?
       The Bosnian Serbs, Muslim and Croat, knowing replenishment 
     is in the offing, may intensive their actions immediately, 
     also risking the ceasefire.
       And here I must say that I do not think that rearming the 
     Bosnian Government forces will lead to their victory. I can 
     say that it will lead to an upsurge in bloody fighting.
       The Bosnian Serbs may seek a preemptive improvement in 
     their technology, particularly against United Nations and 
     NATO countermeasures. And this could risk the drawing in of 
     Serbia in providing these weapon systems.
       The United Nations and nongovernmental organization 
     hostages may well be taken, as we have seen before in the 
     circumstances that surrounded the events of Gorazde and 
     Sarajevo earlier this year.
       UNPROFOR may come under direct attack. Its isolated 
     detachments and the fact that many of its bases are in range 
     of Bosnian Serb artillery make it particularly vulnerable.
       Again, to take those eastern enclaves, 1,000 United Nations 
     troops drawn from the Dutch, the French, Ukrainians, 
     Norwegians, and ourselves would be at risk.
       Air power would then be required to halt the Bosnian Serb 
     attacks where it is mandated to be used. And there will be 
     great command and control difficulty in conducting this in 
     concert with UNPROFOR. This will not be a simple operation 
     for NATO.
       There will be a heightened probability of fratricidal 
     engagement or friendly fire incidents. There will be a 
     difficulty in acquiring targets that need to be attacked to 
     achieve the objective of halting the Serb attacks. The 
     tendency is likely to be to attack what can be attacked, thus 
     spreading the conflict further.
       This mission of halting Serb attacks is likely to involve 
     more resources than are currently deployed for the existing 
     close air support and safe area missions. And the 
     circumstances where air attacks are mandated will not 
     necessarily suit the requirements to defeat a Bosnian Serb 
     offensive.
       UNPROFOR is unsuitable, by its composition and equipment, 
     let alone its mandate, for operations to prevent or stop 
     those preemptive attacks by any of the factions. The attacks 
     are most unlikely to be halted in their totality by air power 
     alone. If the attacks persist or if the Bosnian Serbs merely 
     hold their ground in the face of Muslim attacks, we are 
     likely to be shown again that air power cannot hold or take 
     ground--the object for which the factions are fighting.
       The United Nations and NATO will be seen as definitely 
     partial, and because UNPROFOR are deployed, employed and 
     equipped for a mission different from that which will exist 
     after the embargo is lifted, they will become vulnerable and 
     elements will be at greatly increased risk.
       The mission of the air forces to provide protection and 
     support for UNPROFOR is different from that required for 
     stopping the Serb attacks. It is unlikely that there will be 
     sufficient resources to conduct both of those missions 
     simultaneously successfully.
       Who is to provide these extra resources to NATO, the United 
     States?
       These consequences will lead to negating the previous 
     achievements, will intensify and prolong the conflict, 
     exacerbate the humanitarian situation, risk spillage, and 
     inevitably draw in more forces and resources. And I suggest 
     that if the United States has lifted the embargo, the moral 
     responsibility for providing those forces will lie with the 
     United States.
       Finally, I will touch on the subjects of withdrawing 
     UNPROFOR.
       UNPROFOR, or elements of the force, will need to start 
     to withdraw, since it is difficult to see how they could 
     continue their mission with acceptable risk, if at all. 
     The terrain is difficult and limited routes exist on the 
     only way out to Split in Croatia. It would take time to 
     extract the whole force. The time taken to withdraw would 
     be such that if speed is essential, much equipment and 
     infrastructure would have to be abandoned.
       Giving notice of lifting the embargo so as to withdraw even 
     into garrisons would involve abandoning the current mission 
     and give the opportunities for the preemptive attacks by all 
     factions on each other and possibly on UNPROFOR. The 
     difficulties of withdrawal would be greatly exacerbated if 
     the Bosnian Croats and Muslims started fighting again, for 
     that would lie across the withdrawal routes, and if, as Mr. 
     Mallet covered, the lines of communication became the object 
     of the Serbs' preemptive attacks.
       Throughout this, there would be a need for adequate air 
     cover, and possibly maritime support throughout the 
     withdrawal. And again, this throws into doubt the adequacy of 
     the resources available to cover these separate missions.
       In sum, from the military point of view, the proposal to 
     unilaterally lift the arms embargo confounds the United 
     Nations' ability to achieve its aims, directly risks what has 
     already been achieved and makes it difficult or impossible 
     for UNPROFOR to continue to operate in Bosnia-Hercegovina.
       Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
       [The prepared statement of General Smith follows:]

Statement of Hon. Anders Troldborg, Deputy Minister of Defense, Denmark

       Mr. Troldborg. Mr. Chairman, the Danish Minister of Defense 
     Mr. Hans Haekkerup, as asked me first of all to thank you, 
     Mr. Chairman, and your important committee for inviting my 
     country to be heard here today. We see this as a clear 
     recognition of a common responsibility on the two sides of 
     the Atlantic for the development in the Balkans.
       The Danish Government is extremely concerned about the 
     situation in the former Yugoslavia. A total of some 1400 men 
     and women from Danish Armed Forces are today serving as UN 
     peacekeepers in Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Macedonia. 
     Denmark is a small country with five million people. If you 
     compare this to America it would correspond to a U.S. 
     contribution of some 70,000 soldiers.
       In Bosnia-Hercegovina Danish UNPROFOR forces have recently 
     been involved in direct ground action. As this committee may 
     know, our squadron of main battle tanks has had to answer in 
     a robust way in order to exercise the right of self defense 
     of UN forces.
       We think we have long ago passed the point where a fair and 
     just solution could be found. If the Muslim side should 
     regain their former territory it would be necessary to roll 
     back the Bosnian-Serb side, and such a solution cannot be 
     achieved by lifting the arms embargo or by using air power. 
     A rollback of the Bosnian-Serb side would require an 
     enormous number of ground troops, and no country or 
     organization seems prepared to commit that number of 
     troops to that purpose.
       We do not see a purely military solution to this conflict. 
     There is no acceptable alternative to a negotiated 
     settlement. Any solution not generally accepted by the 
     parties will inevitably lead to new conflicts. In our view, a 
     unilateral American lifting of the arms embargo would 
     question the vital ability of the Atlantic alliance to act 
     together in the new security environment. In the context of 
     the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, we believe that the 
     lifting of the arms embargo would have the effect of pouring 
     gasoline on fire and mean an all-out war. It would also make 
     it more difficult to maintain solidarity among UN members in 
     other embargo cases.
       Seen from a military perspective, it must be anticipated 
     that lifting of the arms embargo would immediately result in 
     massive Bosnian-Serb attacks to gain more terrain before the 
     Muslims could obtain the weapons and be trained in their use. 
     This could especially endanger the survival of the enclaves 
     Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde. Furthermore, it may cause the 
     conflict to spill over to neighboring countries. Serbia might 
     involve itself more directly in the conflict, it would force 
     other major actors on the international scene to support the 
     Bosnian-Serb side more actively, and it would most probably 
     also mean the collapse of the peace negotiations. And here, 
     the United States, Russia, and European Union have decided to 
     combine their diplomatic efforts. If the Muslim side gets 
     more weapons, it will be a signal to all parties, and not 
     only to the Serb side, that the outcome of the conflict will 
     be decided on the battlefield and not by negotiations.
       The UN personnel presently in Bosnia-Hercegovina is neither 
     organized nor is it equipped to take an active part in such a 
     conflict. It would thus raise the question of the withdrawal 
     of the entire UNPROFOR. We are convinced that many troop-
     contributing nations would give priority to the safety of 
     their personnel and would feel inclined to withdraw their 
     troops. Furthermore, the UNHCR and the NGO's working in the 
     area would surely have to stop the delivery of humanitarian 
     aid and also withdraw their relief workers. The consequences 
     of such a development need hardly to be spelled out.
       As a representative of a nation which attaches the greatest 
     importance to NATO, I must warn against the potential for 
     disruption of our alliance. Such a split, if it were to 
     occur, would be very serious to all of us. As allies, we may 
     no longer face an imminent military threat, but in the face 
     of serious instability on the European Continent we must 
     maintain NATO solidarity.
       Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
       [The prepared statement of Mr. Troldborg follows:]
       Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Mr. Troldborg.
       Mr. Mallet.

Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee--Dr. Ejup Ganic, Vice 
    President, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina--June 23, 1994

       Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee,
       On behalf of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina thank 
     you for this opportunity to testify on the issue that is so 
     vital to our future; the arms embargo on our country. I 
     arrived this morning from Sarajevo to be here for the 
     Senate's consideration of legislation of the arms embargo.
       Just two days before, Mozart's Requiem was performed by the 
     Sarajevo Philarmonic Orchestra conducted by Mr. Zubin Mehta, 
     in the burnt-out building of the National Library that was 
     almost totally destroyed by the heavy artillery of the 
     Yugoslav army.
       It has been three years since the Yugoslav army led by 
     Serbian generals, and under political control of the Belgrade 
     regime, launched aggression on those republics of the former 
     Yugoslavia in which people voted to join the western 
     democracies. Most of the aggression and destruction has been 
     perpetrated against the Bosnian country and people. As a 
     result of the arms embargo imposed on former Yugoslavia, we 
     have over two hundred thousand of our civilians killed in 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina, close to 2 million displaced and 
     about 66% of our territory occupied. Crimes against humanity 
     have been committed by the Yugoslav army and their allies and 
     surrogates. The arms embargo against the legitimate and 
     recognized Government of the Republic of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina was the policy--in effect the ``therapy'' that 
     the international community imposed on Bosnia for the last 
     two years to respond to aggression. This therapy created a 
     catastrophe for my country. It has failed simply because the 
     patient is dying. This therapy has to be changed.
       The illegal and invalid arms embargo has deprived us of our 
     right of self-defense. This right to self-defense was taken 
     from us, and with it the ability to protect our citizens, and 
     defend the sovereignty and integrity of our country. Belgrade 
     and its well-armed surrogates ignored their pledges, 
     signatures, and promises they made in all negotiations--at 
     the London conference, in Geneva, New York, Brussels, 
     Athens--because they wanted to and knew they could dictate 
     events in the negotiating process by telling us, straight to 
     our face--we have arms, you don't--that is the reality. If 
     you want your homes back, your land back, you have to push us 
     back out.
       Bosnia and Herzegovina is a small European country of 
     multiethnic character, which existed as a state in various 
     forms, for close to one thousand years. Before the aggression 
     on Bosnia, we asked the United Nations, most specifically, 
     Mr. Cyrus Vance, Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
     General at that time, to deploy UN troops on the borders of 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina and therefore to prevent aggression 
     from being initiated against this multiethnic country. The 
     request was turned down. I recall that one of Vance's 
     advisers told me: You have to have war first. There will be 
     casualties and then some kind of cease fire, at least 
     temporarily, and then we would come. He was unfortunately 
     right.
       About two weeks ago, the world celebrated the D-day. We saw 
     many, now older American veterans, who took part in that 
     heroic battle against fascism. We also saw many European 
     leaders shaking hands and taking pictures with them. These 
     same European leaders we saw during the D-day celebration 
     once again seem unable or unwilling to assume the task of 
     confronting fascism. Fifty years after the defeat of fascism, 
     what is happening in Bosnia today is fascism again, this time 
     of the Belgrade regime. The Belgrade regime planned and 
     executed massive ethnic cleansing with genocide, with 
     brutalities not seen in Europe since the end of World War II. 
     Massive rapes of women and girls, and other forms of terror 
     had been instilled to drive the population out, taking over 
     their private property, destroying historical buildings, 
     industrial infrastructure, cultural and religious monuments, 
     so that the population might never return. This repression 
     and genocide against the non-Serbian population is the 
     program of creating a ``Greater Serbia'' through the idea of 
     ethnic purity. Unfortunately, fifty years later in Europe, we 
     have fascism again on the rise. I ask if the world is 
     prepared to act and stop the Serbian fascism as was done 
     fifty years ago. At least say no to fascism by letting us 
     defend ourselves.
       We are asking you to lift the arms embargo so that we may 
     defend ourselves and secure a durable peace. We have not lost 
     the war. The Serbs tried by all means to destroy our country 
     and finish with us, but they have not succeeded, yet. Our 
     people are talented and educated, and with our bare hands we 
     resist and still hold under our control the major cities and 
     vital industrial areas. We organized our army to defend in 
     every cell of our society. Unfortunately, not more than 
     thirty percent of the soldiers have light weapons.
       We are asking you to lift the arms embargo in order to 
     create conditions for peace and for negotiations through 
     balance in weaponry. We had in fact asked you to lift the 
     arms embargo from the first day of aggression. You said that 
     the peace was coming. Now, more than two years later the 
     Serbian troops, loyal to Belgrade regime occupy 66% of the 
     territory, they killed more than two hundred thousand people, 
     and we are asking again, we are begging you to lift the arms 
     embargo because the peace is not possible under the present 
     environment of weapons imbalance. It is NOT too late. Lift 
     the arms embargo with a program to achieve peace. We need 
     arms to survive, not for victory, because of the losses that 
     we had and genocide we went through, we can never talk about 
     victory.
       We repeat over and over again: We are not asking for your 
     troops to fight for us on the ground. That is our job and our 
     task. But please, do not combine any more big words with 
     small deeds. God will not forgive you if you do nothing. 
     Doing nothing creates tragedy in Bosnia every day.
       For almost twenty-six months, your Administration is in 
     something like Hamlet--like dilemma: to be or not to be. But 
     this Hamlet-like dilemma, and the spirit of hesitation have 
     unfortunately allowed for dead bodies all over, as in 
     Shakespeare's tragedies. Stop this Hamlet's dilemma because 
     there is no more space for dead bodies in Bosnia. The peace 
     that we have been waiting for the last twenty six months is 
     not coming without your action.
       The United Nations are responsible for ineffective results. 
     Its resolutions are being ignored. The UN declared ``safe 
     areas'' have become the most unsafe places in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina. Remember Gorazde, over one hundred NATO jets 
     were on the disposal of the Secretary General and his Special 
     Representative, Mr. Akashi, to protect this safe areas and 
     give a lesson to the Serbs that the buck stops somewhere. 
     Mr. Akashi, supported by many of the same political 
     leaders who sat before you today, first allowed the 
     Serbian tanks to penetrate the safe area lines established 
     by the UN itself by declaring that there was no real 
     danger to the civilian population because the tasks were 
     too far from the potential victims. Then, when the Serbian 
     tanks came within a few yards of the Gorazde hospital and 
     other residential areas, the same man claimed that it was 
     technically not possible to confront the tanks because 
     they were too close to the residential areas and the 
     civilian victims. The Serbian generals instructed by the 
     Belgrade regime, did not allow General Michael Rose to go 
     to Gorazde and declared him the voluntary prisoners of 
     their army until they destroyed most of Gorazde. Some UN 
     generals who spoke openly like General Razek and General 
     Morillon, that the peace will not come in Bosnia as long 
     as the situation is handled by those who oppose lifting 
     the arms embargo were immediately sent home.
       America is a country of hard-working people. If you cannot 
     help us, then do not prevent the lifting of the arms embargo. 
     We know that Americans are against ethnic cleansing, against 
     genocide, against massive rapes and torture of our people. We 
     know that Americans are and have always been against fascism. 
     Oppose fascism of the Belgrade regime on Bosnia. No consensus 
     is required to oppose fascism.
       We count on American democracy, we count on the moralism of 
     American people and their commitment to legality. We are 
     looking to the United States Congress for America's 
     leadership. We hope for the proper action from America. The 
     ethnic cleansing as imposed by Belgrade regime destabilized 
     the world. Only in the stable world, will the United States 
     of America continue to prosper.
       Mr. Chairman, distinguished audience.
       Every day in Bosnia we pray for peace. We are hard working 
     people, we are a part of the European civilization. We do not 
     need anyone to work for us, we do not need money from 
     anybody. We need a chance to survive.
       At one time I was a lucky Bosnian. As an MIT student, many 
     years ago, I learned from my American roommates that the 
     ethnic purity concept was always fascism for American people. 
     Much of Europe, including its most economical advanced Member 
     States, still do not practice or even understand the concept 
     of a multiethic state. While your nation strives to perfect 
     this idea, too many European leaders still avoid it as an 
     undesirable contamination of their culture or history. The 
     leadership of American people, demonstrated today in this 
     room is a hope for all generations in Bosnia for a better 
     future.
       Thank you and I am at your disposal for any questions you 
     might have. I just came from Sarajevo after 26 hours of 
     flight, to be here with you today, and I am the one who feels 
     privileged.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will take a few moments to quote from 
the statements of several of these witnesses.
  First, the representative from Spain, and I quote:

       The Russian Federation would find itself in a difficult 
     situation. It would lack the jurisdiction to continue 
     pressuring the Bosnian Serbs to seek the negotiated solution, 
     and it would probably favor the lifting of the sanctions on 
     the Serbs. And therefore, to the extent to which Russia has 
     been a participant in the peace process that would cease with 
     the unilateral lifting.

  He continues:

       We are absolutely sure the Bosnian Serbs would initiate the 
     offensive against the Muslims primarily in the safe areas 
     before the Muslims would have the time to receive any weapons 
     at all.

  The representative from France stated:

       The lifting of the embargo means doubtless increase, deeper 
     inevitable involvement of the allies and among them foremost 
     the United States in a warlike situation.
       Before dealing with these points, I would like to say a 
     word on the issue of unilateral lifting, which I understand 
     has been a matter of debate here in the United States. With 
     due respect, I do not think unilateral lifting from an 
     international point of view means leadership, but it is a 
     sure recipe for international disorder in the post-cold war 
     world.
       Let me just remind you briefly the text of the Security 
     Council resolution of September 1991 which is today the legal 
     basis of the arms embargo. It reads in paragraph 6 that the 
     Council has decided on the basis of Chapter 7 of the Charter 
     that the member states will immediately enforce a general and 
     complete embargo, and I quote, ``until the Security Council 
     decides otherwise.''
       We have then together subscribed to a text which imposes on 
     us to come back to the Security Council of which the U.S., 
     France, and Great Britain particularly are prominent members, 
     if we wanted to change this piece of international law. So 
     the United States as such and as a permanent member of the 
     Security Council and a member state of the United Nations 
     decide solely to place itself above the law, it has 
     contributed to create, could it consider such a clear 
     resolution as the worth of a sheet of paper, the answer being 
     no.

  As the chairman said, if this action were taken unilaterally this war 
would be stamped ``Made in the USA.'' This testimony is unequivocal to 
the point that these forces would be severely hampered in their 
withdrawal. The weapons intended for the Bosnian Moslems would be 
intercepted by the Croatians. They would take a cut of the weapons. We 
do not know what quantity or what quality of weapons eventually would 
go to the Moslems.
  I want to add also the statement from General Smith who represented 
Great Britain. He said as follows.

       I do not think that rearming the Bosnian Government forces 
     will lead to their victory. I can say that it will lead to an 
     upsurge in the bloody fighting. United Nations and 
     nongovernmental hostages may well be taken, as we have seen 
     before in the circumstances that surrounded the defense of 
     Gorazde and Sarajevo this year. UNPROFOR may come under 
     direct attack.

  Consistent from each of the witnesses from the UNPROFOR forces was 
that this conflict will be enlarged, it will spread and in all 
likelihood it will become one in which the United States will be drawn 
into in a very major way.
  I want to acknowledge the help on this matter from the Ambassador 
from Her Majesty's Government, Sir Robin Renwick, who has been 
exceedingly helpful to this Senator and other Senators in getting a 
prospective from the United Kingdom.
  I urge the Senate to consider the Nunn-Warner amendment as the action 
this body should take at this critical point in time.
  Mr. President, I see the distinguished Senator from Kansas seeking 
recognition, and I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator's time has expired.
  The Senator from Kansas [Mrs. Kassebaum].
  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, how much time do I have?
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The minority leader has 11 minutes 
and 50 seconds.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Georgia 
would enter into a unanimous consent to extend the time available by 6 
minutes equally divided between the Senators.
  Mr. NUNN. I have no objection.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, I would ask for a couple minutes and 
ask my full remarks be made a part of the Record.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes I have to the Senator from 
Kansas.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Kansas, [Mrs. 
Kassebaum], is recognized for 3 minutes.
  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, as Congress speaks on this most 
important and difficult issue, as we have done so many times in the 
past couple of years, we must do so with great care and deliberation. 
Not only do our actions matter here but just as importantly our words, 
and there are two major pieces of legislation before us, as has been 
pointed out. One is the sense-of-the-Senate resolution, the Nunn Warner 
amendment, of which I am a cosponsor, and the amendment of Senator 
Dole.
  The Republican leader has anguished over this situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina for many years. There is no doubt about the sincerity of 
those who were supporters of the Dole amendment.
  But I think we must analyze carefully the two proposed amendments 
that are before us and ask ourselves what consequences might be the 
result of the action of one or the other.
  My serious reservations about the Dole amendment are twofold. One--
and this has been stated here frequently already on the floor--is that 
the unilateral action in lifting the embargo will set a dangerous 
precedent; and, second, that unilaterally lifting the arms embargo 
would lead to a serious rift between our NATO allies.
  I really feel, Mr. President, that at that particular juncture we do 
Americanize the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no 
question but that the Bosnian Moslems have been disadvantaged from the 
beginning. However, I strongly believe that the Nunn-Warner amendment 
offers a far more constructive approach. Support for the peace process 
and working for the multilateral lifting of the embargo represents the 
most responsible policy at this time.
  Mr. President, this is a very important issue before us. We cannot 
just lightly take a vote on these amendments as something that will not 
have consequences. We must think carefully about the ramifications of 
this. They are two very different approaches to an enormously important 
issue.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Who yields time?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I yield to the Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, two points.
  First, it has been argued that lifting the embargo would be bad for 
the Moslems. Letting the Moslems defend themselves, we are told, is 
going to lead to all kinds of terrible consequences to the Bosnian 
Moslems and the other Bosnians who are patriots to the Moslem 
government. We are told that if the embargo is lifted, that means the 
U.N. personnel are going to be leaving; that is going to be bad for the 
Moslems. Letting them defend themselves, we are told, is going to have 
harmful consequences for them.
  It seems to me we ought to listen to what is in their interest 
relative to the lifting of the embargo. Will the removal of the forces 
be something which is good or bad for the Moslem government? The answer 
is, they have said, ``If allowing us to defend ourselves means that the 
U.N. peacekeepers must leave, so be it.'' They have specifically said, 
``Please, thank you for your help, but let us defend ourselves. United 
Nations, if you must leave so we can defend ourselves, leave with our 
blessing, leave with our thanks, but let us defend ourselves. Leave.''
  It is a fundamental right under the United Nations Charter.
  Now the other problem with the Nunn resolution is it eliminates the 
prospect of a unilateral lifting of the embargo, unlike the Mitchell 
resolution that we voted on a few months ago which at least had the 
possibility that we would consider a unilateral lifting by its own 
terms back in May 1994. The Mitchell amendment said that the President 
would consult with the Congress relative to the possibility of lifting 
the embargo unilaterally. That is specifically in the Mitchell 
amendment.
  The pending Nunn amendment precludes the possibility that the embargo 
will be lifted unilaterally and therefore tells the Serbs, ``Have no 
fear.''
  The Russians have a veto over what we are going to do under the Nunn 
amendment, because, under the Nunn amendment, we have to go back to the 
Security Council to get an embargo lifted, and that means there is a 
veto over it. And the Serbs are told by the Nunn amendment, ``Have no 
fear. There will not be a lifting of this embargo.''
  That is the worst signal we can give to the Serbs. It means we are 
not going to see a negotiated settlement which is fair. It means there 
is more likely going to be a partition imposed which will not be a 
permanent, fair solution but a partition which will lead to the 
deepening and widening of this war.
  So I hope that the Nunn amendment is defeated and that the Dole 
amendment and resolution is adopted.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Would the Senator just yield to the Senator from Virginia 
to point out that Senator Nunn and I have modified the amendment--if 
the Senator will refer to page 3--to incorporate the language from the 
original amendment by the distinguished Senator from Maine, the 
majority leader. Therefore, I think the Senator is mistaken.
  Mr. LEVIN. If that amendment, modified late last night, provides 
right now a unilateral lifting of the embargo, that is a change from 
all the rhetoric we all hear about.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dorgan). Who yields time?
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Arizona [Mr. McCain].
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the Senator from Michigan just brought up 
an excellent point about the incredible intellectual arrogance of 
deciding for a country what is best for it, especially a country that 
has had 200,000 people killed, 2 million displaced, and is experiencing 
an ongoing tragedy. In other words, the sponsors of this amendment know 
better--know better--what is in the best long-term interests of a 
people who have had 200,000 people killed and 2 million people 
displaced.
  The Vice President of Bosnia, before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, stated it in far more graphic and compelling terms than I 
ever could, Mr. President. And I quote from his testimony.

       We are asking you to lift the embargo in order to create 
     conditions for peace and for negotiations through balancing 
     weaponry. We had, in fact, asked you to lift the arms embargo 
     from the first day of aggression. You said that peace was 
     coming. Now, more than 2 years later, the Serbian troops 
     loyal to the Belgrade regime occupy 66 percent of the 
     country, they killed more than 200,000 people, and we are 
     asking again, we are begging you, to lift the arms embargo 
     because the peace is not possible under the present 
     environment of weapons imbalance.

  Mr. President, please, everyone in this body, pay attention to these 
words from the Vice President of Bosnia, not someone who sits here 
comfortably in Washington, DC, not someone who is a grand strategist 
and thinker, but from one who has seen 200,000 of his countrymen 
killed, slaughtered in some of the most outrageous crimes of genocide--
crimes which are well known to this body.
  He said:

       We repeat over and over again, we are not asking for your 
     troops to fight for us on the ground. That is our job and our 
     task. But please do not combine any more big words with small 
     deeds. God will not forgive you if you do nothing. Doing 
     nothing creates tragedy in Bosnia every day.

  Mr. President, I would not mind listening to the general from Spain. 
I am sure the Spanish are well-known for their great military strategy 
and tactics. But I would much rather listen to the freely elected, 
democratic leadership of a country that is experiencing virtually 
unprecedented acts of genocide, rape, and murder.
  The Nunn-Warner amendment says,

       If the Bosnian Serbs, while the contact group's peace 
     proposal is being considered and discussed, attack the safe 
     areas designated by the United Nations Security Council, the 
     partial lifting of the arms embargo on the Government of 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina and the provision to that Government 
     of defensive weapons and equipment appropriate and necessary 
     to defend those areas.

  Yesterday's New York Times carries a quote from Brigadier General 
Ridgeway, the British commander of U.N. Forces in Southwest Bosnia, in 
which he says. ``There is no peace in Bosnia and no cease-fire.''
  I say to the sponsors of this amendment, General Ridgeway, the 
British commander of U.N. Forces in Southwest Bosnia, says there is no 
peace and there is no cease-fire. So part B of the Nunn-Warner 
amendment should be operative, and we should lift the embargo anyway. 
The conditions on the ground will not improve if we support a 
settlement that is unjust and unworkable. It is unjust because we are 
going to cede half the country to the Bosnian Serbs and provide them 
with a reward for their naked aggression, and it is unworkable because 
it is unjust.
  Should we ask any nation in the world to give up half their country 
because they have been the subject of aggression? I say no. The Nunn-
Warner amendment--by ratifying the contact partition plan--says yes.
  The Nunn-Warner amendment is fundamentally flawed in that it agrees 
to a peace settlement that ratifies naked aggression.
  Mr. President, finally, I would like to say that the idea of it being 
America's war if we allow these people to defend themselves is 
spurious. They believe they can defend themselves. They are not asking 
for our help. Let them try it. For the last 2 years they have 
experienced the embargo and lost 200,000 of their countrymen, had 2 
million displaced, and experienced the horrible things that do not need 
repeating here on the floor.
  Finally, the United Nations is in violation of its own charter. The 
charter says every Nation has a right to defend itself. To compare an 
arms embargo on Bosnia with that of Libya, Iraq, and Iran, which are 
outlaw nations, bears no relation to reality. If someone chooses to say 
that if we lift an arms embargo on a country which, by the way, was not 
even designated in the resolution--Yugoslavia was designated in the 
resolution--that we will have to lift other embargoes, I would say we 
would be doing the United Nations a favor by lifting the arms embargo. 
The United Nations, by imposing an arms embargo on a nation which is 
innocent in order to prevent it from defending itself, is in violation 
of its own charter.
  I hope the Senate will not send a mixed message today. I hope we will 
strongly support the Dole-Lieberman amendment and defeat the Nunn-
Warner amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Connecticut.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Alabama, Mr. 
Shelby.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, ``An international police force in a 
society of sovereign states is a contradiction in terms.''
  Although Prof. Hans Morgenthau made this statement nearly 50 years 
ago, the quotation could have easily emerged from any of the 
congressional debates regarding the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, 
particularly those relating to discussions on the fate of Bosnia.
  When the Senate sent its now infamous May 12 mixed message on lifting 
the arms embargo against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it 
required the Bosnian people to wait further on the international 
community--the society of sovereign states--to decide its fate while 
relying on the inept and inadequate protection of U.N. peacekeepers--an 
international police force. I was recuperating from surgery on May 12 
and therefore did not have a voice in that debate. However, today I am 
adding my voice to those of my colleagues who have called for a 
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo against the Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and I am pleased to be a cosponsor of the Dole-
Lieberman amendment.
  Mr. President, there is no need to reiterate the countless atrocities 
committed by the Serbians against the moslem population of Bosnia. 
These horror stories have been recounted and replayed time and again in 
the news media and within this Chamber. Nor do we need to discuss the 
overwhelming arms advantage of the Serbian forces. This fact is well-
known. The question we must ponder is whether we will continue to deny 
the Bosnian Moslems the right and means to defend themselves against 
their tormentors.

  When the Senate accepted the Mitchell amendment on May 12, it 
required the Bosnians to wait once more on the international community 
to decide its fate and protect its people. That amendment required the 
President to seek a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo.
  Even if the President had made an intensive effort to have NATO and 
the U.N. Security Council endorse a lifting of the embargo, which he 
has not, I remain convinced that such efforts would have been 
fruitless. Because of their very composition, international 
organizations will rarely reach consensus or act decisively without 
strong leadership from one or more member nations.
  For over 2 years, the Bosnian Moslems have suffered while NATO and 
the United Nations have reversed themselves, made idle threats, and 
failed to come up with a coherent policy on Bosnia that would end the 
conflict. Our multinational organizations have failed to resolve the 
simplest of problems in this situation. Therefore, I am absolutely 
certain that they will never agree on a contentious question like 
lifting the arms embargo.
  World leadership often requires unilaterial action. The United States 
cannot continue to defer its leadership role to fractious and 
increasingly ineffective international organizations. Sovereign nations 
will rarely reach a consensus without strong-willed leadership. For 
years the United States has provided that leadership, in many cases 
acting unilaterally or with the support of a limited number of nations. 
The lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia is exactly the type of 
situation where we must and should act unilaterally in a leadership 
role.

  Mr. President, make no mistake about it, I do not see an immediate, 
pressing national security interest in Bosnia. I cannot find a 
compelling reason to commit U.S. Forces to a centuries old, local 
ethnic conflict. However, I refuse to accept the argument that we 
should be complicit in thwarting the ability of the Bosnian people to 
defend themselves.
  The international community has shown itself incapable of defending 
the Bosnians. And although casualties are now over 200,000, many 
members of the international community, particularly within Europe, 
maintain that lifting the arms embargo will worsen the conflict. I 
cannot imagine how this conflict could worsen for the Bosnian people. 
Can we in good conscience, Mr. President, avoid taking this one step 
that might bring some balance to this horrible one-sided conflict while 
simultaneously issuing another vacuous internationalist promise to the 
Bosnians that the international community will protect them? Such 
promises are old and hollow. Mr. President, the Moslem population of 
Bosnia must be allowed to defend itself. Article 51 of the U. N. 
Charter states this right to national self-defense clearly as a matter 
of international law.

  Throughoug my tenure in the House and now the Senate, through both 
Democratic and Republican administrations, I have always been reluctant 
for the Congress to dictate foreign policy to the President. With 
respect to the arms embargo, however, there is both a moral and 
commonsense imperative to lift this embargo and to do it with or 
without the approval of the various international organizations. If 
this leadership will not come from the White House, then a reluctant 
Congress must lead. The United Nations and NATO have shown themselves 
incapable of protecting the Bosnian Moslems. We cannot expect these 
people to wait any longer on these collective bodies to reach a 
consensus or to take decisive action. I urge my colleagues to join me 
in support of the Dole-Lieberman amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? There are 2 minutes and 50 
seconds remaining.
  Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I yield myself that time to address, 
very briefly, the exchange between the Senator from Michigan and the 
Senator from Virginia about the fact that the Nunn-Warner amendment was 
modified last night to put back in some of the language that was in the 
earlier Mitchell amendment.
  That language does create a situation where the President--after 
following a series of steps before the United Nations, if they fail, 
and the Serbs break the peace--can then come and consult with Congress. 
Those are very tentative words that are part of a sense of the 
Congress, not an act of Congress such as the amendment that I am 
cosponsoring with the Senator from Kansas.
  As the Senator from Michigan has said, even looking at this language 
which slightly opens the door to unilateral lifting of the arms embargo 
in the Nunn-Warner amendment, matching that with what has been said on 
the floor by the proponents of the amendment this morning and before, 
it seems to me the Senate has only one choice. If you want to lift the 
arms embargo the only effective choice is to vote for the Dole-
Lieberman amendment. The other simply does not do it.
  Second, there has been discussion about the impact of lifting this 
embargo on other embargoes, such as the ones against Iraq and Libya. I 
would say in one sentence, we have to be able to distinguish between 
embargoes that punish aggressors and embargoes that punish victims, 
such as the embargo of arms sales and transfers to the Bosnians. The 
latter is an immoral embargo.
  Let us listen, as my colleagues have said, to the words of the duly 
elected leadership of Bosnia--not decide what is best for them--as Mr. 
Ganic, told the Armed Services Committee last week:

       We repeat, over and over again, we are not asking for your 
     troops to fight for us on the ground. That is our job and our 
     task. We are begging you to lift the arms embargo. But please 
     do not combine any more big words with small deeds.

  Mr. President, only one of these two amendments before the Senate 
combines big words with big deeds and that is the one that allows and 
orders the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo.
  Finally, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record two 
letters; one from the former Secretary of State George Shultz 
supporting the Dole-Lieberman amendment, and a similar letter from 
Ambassador Max Kampelman. I urge my colleagues to support the amendment 
and I yield any time remaining.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                    June 30, 1994.
       Dear Senators: I urge you to vote today for the Dole-
     Lieberman amendment to end the Bosnian arms embargo and 
     against the Nunn-Warner amendment.
       The issue is clear: American leadership is needed to create 
     a sustainable and just peace in Bosnia. The Dole-Lieberman 
     amendment calls upon the President to end the arms embargo 
     against the Bosnian government. Passage of this amendment 
     would strengthen the President's hand, both with our allies 
     and the aggressors, in obtaining a lasting settlement at the 
     negotiating table.
       At first, our allies will protest, but they will follow 
     American will and leadership. More than 100 UN-member nations 
     are already on record in favor of restoring Bosnia's inherent 
     right to self-defense. By the same token, rogue nations will 
     not seek to violate valid UN embargoes because the 
     resolutions legally enacted against the aggressor regimes in 
     power in Iraq, Haiti, Libya, and Serbia are not at all 
     analogous to an invalid, illegal embargo imposed against the 
     victimized nation of Bosnia.
       In addition to ensuring the maintenance of this invalid 
     embargo, the Nunn-Warner amendment would preserve the status-
     quo of failed American and European policies in Bosnia. 
     Indeed, this amendment actually endorses the Bosnian carve-up 
     plan prepared by the latest international ``Contact Group'' 
     (the United States, West European powers, and Russia, at 
     whose request the group was formed). It should give all of us 
     pause that, by the President's own admission, if this type of 
     plan is accepted, the United States will introduce tens of 
     thousands of U.S. ground troops as peacekeepers in Bosnia. 
     The Serbs would see our troops as peace-makers. The Bosnian 
     Army and people would see them as apartheid police sent to 
     keep Bosnians in their newly proscribed ``homeland.'' It is 
     difficult to imagine a more dangerous scenario.
       Three years of genocide and flaunting of international law 
     demonstrate that it is wishful thinking on the part of the 
     Administration to think that the Serbs will comply with this 
     plan, even if they actually sign it.
       In any case, however, this plan to reward Serbian 
     aggression and ethnically divide a country with one thousand 
     years of multi-ethnic history is fatally flawed and will not 
     work.
       I urge you to cast your votes today in support of the rule 
     of law our values as a nation and against genocide and brutal 
     aggression. I urge you to defeat Nunn-Warner and vote in 
     favor of Dole-Lieberman.
           Sincerely,
                                                    George Shultz.
                                  ____

                                    Washington, DC, June 30, 1994.
     Hon. Robert J. Dole,
     Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman,
     U.S.Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senators: It is my understanding that the President as 
     well as his associates and members of the Cabinet have been 
     personally and extensively involved in persuading the Senate 
     to vote against the proposal submitted by you to end the arms 
     embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina. it is not easy for any of 
     us to resist the urgings of our President, and I am reluctant 
     to do so, but I regret to say it appears he has once against 
     been misled by his advisors and moved in a direction which is 
     contrary to American interests, values and prospects for 
     peace and stability in Europe.
       The urgings include a belief that a peace agreement is 
     imminent in the Balkans. We have heard this for three years, 
     a period during which our lack of resolve has permitted 
     hundreds of thousands of people to be victims of unlawful 
     aggression and transformed more than 1 million human beings 
     into refugees. We, obviously, all hope that peace will come 
     to the area, but the current peace talks and the present 
     position of our government in preparing for those talks will 
     result in rewarding the Serbian aggressor at the expense of 
     the Bosnian victim. It is true we do not wish the Serbians to 
     enjoy the total fruits of their aggression, but we are 
     preparing to legitimize a result which will permit them to 
     keep approximately 50% of the territory they have immorally, 
     illegally and brutality seized. Such a ``peace'' cannot be a 
     lasting or stabilizing one. It is certainly not a fair one.
       American foreign policy must be committed to the principles 
     of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, which declare 
     all military aggression by one state against another to be 
     contrary to the rules of responsible international behavior 
     and thus illegal. Our current policy runs in the opposite 
     direction, in spite of our rhetoric.
       The only way to achieve a lasting and equitable peace is to 
     establish a level field so that Bosnia (in federation with 
     Croatia) can defend itself, restore its dignity and sit down 
     as an equal partner with the Serbian aggressor in an effort 
     to resolve the issues between them. It would be most 
     unfortunate for the U.S. Senate to lose its opportunity today 
     to assert its determination to restore balance in the area 
     and add meaning to the principle of non-aggression, on which 
     European stability and our security depend.
       You are aware that in this statement, I speak not only for 
     myself, but also for the Action Council for Peace in the 
     Balkans. Our Steering Committee includes liberals and 
     conservatives, Democrats and Republicans. Among its members 
     are: Morton Abramowitz, Fouad Ajami, Richard Allen, William 
     Brock, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Hodding Carter, 
     Walter Cronkite, David Dinkins, Frank Fahrenkopf, Geraldine 
     Ferraro, Henry Louis Gates, Leslie Gelb, Barbara Jordan, Max 
     Kampelman, Lane Kirkland, Jeane Kirkpatrick, John Lehman, 
     Alfred Moses, Edmund Muskie, Aryeh Neier, Paul Nitze, John 
     O'Sullivan, Martin Peretz, Richard Perle, Norman Podhoretz, 
     Eugene Rostow, Donald Rumsfeld, Carl Sagan, Albert Shanker, 
     George Shultz, Henry Siegman, John Silber, Helmut 
     Sonnenfeldt, Susan Sontag, George Soros, Paul Volcker, John 
     Whitehead, Elie Wiesel, Albert Wohlstetter, Elmo Zumwalt. Our 
     roster also includes a number of Members of the Senate and 
     the House of Representatives. The list continues to grow.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Max M. Kampelman.

  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, as I said during debate on the arms embargo 
last week, we have been down this road several times before. We have 
debated and voted previously, and in my view, we need not and should 
not take up this issue again, particularly as the President heads to 
the Group of Seven summit next week where he and his colleagues are 
expected, among other things, to endorse a plan to end the Bosnia 
conflict.
  If we adopt the Dole amendment, the outcome would be disastrous. 
Since the House of Representatives has already passed a similar 
amendment to the Defense Department authorization bill, we would be 
forcing the President to take very damaging action. There would be no 
turning back, no margin of error. And it would be the Congress that 
bore the ultimate responsibility for implementing a new, ill-conceived 
policy.
  During the Reagan and Bush administrations, several of my Republican 
colleagues frequently made the excellent point that our President 
deserved our support during times of major diplomatic discussions and 
initiatives. That principle applies to the current President as it did 
to the previous ones. At times of delicate international negotiations, 
any President deserves bipartisan backing. The national interest should 
be above partisan squabbling.
  In Naples, President Clinton will meet not only with the other G-7 
leaders, but with Russian President Yeltsin. Obviously, their agenda is 
not limited to Bosnia, but rather includes a wide range of pressing 
international economic and political issues.
  The points for and against lifting the arms embargo unilaterally have 
already been made. I would simply say at this juncture, urging 
unilateral action would be a reckless step that would undermine U.S. 
credibility and interests. I would urge my colleagues to oppose the 
Dole amendment.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, once again we are engaged in a debate over 
the question of unilaterally lifting the United States arms embargo 
against Bosnia. Proponents of that approach argue, as they have in the 
past, that the only real issue here is whether or not the United States 
is going to support the right of Bosnians to self-defense.
  I submit that this is not the issue. No one questions the right of 
the Bosnians to self-defense. The issue is whether or not the United 
States should adopt a unilateral course of action that abandons our 
neutrality, divides us from our allies, and holds out the real 
possibility of expanding and perpetuating the war--a war that has 
already raged for more than 2 years.
  Senators should not delude themselves. The consequences of adopting 
this amendment are serious and far reaching. If we lift the United 
States arms embargo unilaterally, as this amendment directs the 
President to do in response to a request for assistance from the 
Government of Bosnia, we will no longer be a neutral party. We will 
have taken sides.
  The Bosnian Moslems will regard us as their patron and protector. 
They, in turn, will be seen as our client by the Bosnian Serbs and 
their supporters in Belgrade and Moscow. If we unilaterally lift the 
arms embargo and provide arms to the Bosnian Moslems, the Russians, as 
they have already indicated, will respond by arming their 
traditional historic allies, the Serbs. Other nations will be 
encouraged to violate the United Nations-imposed arms embargo on 
Bosnia. The result will be more weapons, more war, more killing, more 
deaths.

  The prospects for a diplomatic solution--which have been more 
promising since the Russians joined the contact group--will be more 
remote. Moreover, the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Bosnia 
will come to a halt. Our NATO allies have made it absolutely clear that 
they are not in favor of lifting the arms embargo at this time. We 
should respect their judgment. After all, they are the ones with 
peacekeepers on the ground, not the United States.
  Let me remind my colleagues that our allies have over 16,000 troops 
in the former Yugoslavia. France has over 5,500 and Britain more than 
3,400. Canada and the Netherlands each have more than 2,000. Spain has 
nearly 1,500 on the ground and the Belgium has more than 1,000. The 
United States, as I said, has none.
  If we lift the embargo unilaterally, the threat to these peacekeepers 
could increase dramatically. In the face of that possibility, the odds 
are high that our allies will withdraw their forces. Withdrawal would 
be catastrophic for the international humanitarian relief effort in 
towns like Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica and Zepa where Bosnian 
civilians are surrounded by Serb forces. We would wind up in the 
contradictory position of trying to help the Bosnian Moslems 
defend themselves while at the same time contributing to the demise of 
the international effort that is helping them to survive. Many would 
point the finger at us and say now it is our responsibility to protect 
and feed threatened civilians. How many in this body are prepared to 
assume that role? Few, if any, I suspect.

  Proponents of lifting the arms embargo unilaterally argue that a 
stable peace can be established only if the Bosnian Moslems negotiate 
from a position of strength on the ground. This argument is based on 
the assumption that the Bosnian Moslems will be more victorious with 
more weapons at hand. That may be true. Certainly the Serbs are more 
powerful and better equipped at present. However, I question whether 
weapons alone will tip the balance.
  Over the last 25 months, the Bosnian Serbs have proven their 
determination to fight it out, even in the face of extreme odds. I am 
not at all convinced that they will retreat if confronted with a better 
equipped Bosnian Moslem force. And if they don't, the fighting will be 
more intense and prolonged.
  Mr. President, I understand the desire of Members of this body to do 
something to level the playing field in this conflict. I also 
understand the frustration that many have over the failure to resolve 
the conflict at the negotiating table. But breaking from our allies and 
following a course of action that threatens to expand the war and 
undermine the international community's collective effort to resolve 
this problem is not the answer.
  Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Dole-Lieberman 
amendment to lift the arms embargo against the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Given the House's approval of a similar amendment to this 
bill, this promises to be the decisive Senate vote on Bosnia. I would 
therefore like to explain my thinking in some detail.
  Our overriding goal in Bosnia must be to end the fighting. There have 
been opportunities over the past 4 years to pursue more ambitious 
goals, such as preventing the outbreak of violence in what was 
Yugoslavia, rolling back ethnic cleansing, or restoring Bosnia's 
territorial integrity. But these fell by the wayside as the United 
States and our European allies failed to take decisive action and the 
conflict continued, leaving us in June 1994 with only one feasible 
goal, ending the fighting.
  The fighting will end only when the Serbs stop their aggression. That 
will only happen when they have all the land they want, or when they 
meet the reality or threat of sufficient countervailing force to make 
further gains too costly. I can see only two sources of such 
countervailing force, Western militaries or the Bosnian Government's 
own military. However, it is clear that neither the United States nor 
our NATO allies will deploy sufficient military force to stop the 
Serbs. Thus, we have no reasonable alternative to removing impediments 
to the Bosnian Government's efforts to field sufficient force itself.
  The federation agreement between the Bosnian Government and the 
Bosnian Croats was an important step in this direction. It changed the 
dynamic of the situation, not only by ending government/Croat fighting, 
but also by putting Serb gains in the Croatian Krajina at risk. The use 
and threat of NATO force through limited air strikes has also helped 
somewhat. But, in the final analysis, the Bosnian Government will not 
be able to field sufficient countervailing force until the arms embargo 
against it is lifted.
  Last month, the Senate voted to lift the embargo. While the details 
of our votes may have been muddled, the message was clear. The clock 
was ticking, and if the administration did not incorporate lifting the 
embargo into its strategy, Congress would act. However, the 
administration has not pushed to get the embargo lifted in the U.N. 
Now, time is up. The embargo must go. Congress must take the initiative 
and act to lift the embargo unilaterally.
  This is not a cost-free step. After 4 years of missteps in the 
Balkans, there are no cost-free steps. The status quo certainly is not 
cost free. The only question is whether the costs of lifting the 
embargo unilaterally outweigh the benefits.
  Opponents of this amendment have asserted that the costs do in fact 
outweigh the gains. I disagree. Let me explain why by looking at the 
most important objections raised by opponents of this amendment.
  First, there is the argument that lifting the embargo unilaterally 
would destroy the peace process. It is true that the contact group 
countries have agreed on a proposal to partition Bosnia, with 51 
percent of the land going to the government/Croatian federation and 49 
percent to the Bosnian Serbs. As a carrot to entice the Serbs to accept 
this result, the group has held out the prospect of a lifting of 
sanctions against Serbia proper.
  The problem, of course, is that the Bosnian Serbs have no incentive 
to agree. They already hold over 70 percent of the land, outgun their 
opponents, face no real threat of countervailing force, and have not 
been stopped by sanctions against Serbia. I would argue that, far from 
undercutting the contact group plan, action to permit the Bosnian 
Government to defend itself would provide the Serbs an important 
incentive to accept it. Either the Serbs give back 20 percent of the 
land today, or face the prospect of the Bosnian Government perhaps 
taking back even more by force in the future.
  A related objection is that we would damage the peace process by 
destroying the contact group itself. Let's be realistic here. The 
Europeans, Americans, and Russians are all participating in the group 
because of their realization that continued fighting is not in their 
interests. That calculation of national interest should not change 
because of the prospect of a better balance of firepower between the 
warring parties. In any event, the goal is to end the fighting, not to 
give others a veto over American foreign policy.
  Second, some argue that lifting the embargo would put UNPROFOR troops 
at risk. This is a call for the troop contributing countries to make. 
If they judge the risk too great, they should withdraw their forces.
  These brave troops are doing wonderful humanitarian work on an 
immediate basis, but at the risk of becoming obstacles to decisive 
action to end the fighting. The fighting is the greater humanitarian 
problem, because it is the immediate cause of the suffering. We cannot 
allow UNPROFOR perversely to lead to continued suffering.
  A third objection is that we would be taking sides. Let's look at the 
facts. We have slapped an embargo on Serbia, which we enforce with 
warships. NATO aircraft have shot down Bosnian Serb planes and bombed 
Bosnian Serb positions. UNPROFOR has clashed with Bosnian Serb 
fighters.
  The point is not whether we take sides, but whether we get sucked 
into the conflict militarily. If we do not allow the Bosnian Government 
to defend itself, we will face increased pressures to intervene with 
our troops.
  The fourth, and most troubling, objection is that unilateral action 
by Congress would undercut the ability of the United Nations to 
implement and enforce sanctions. I will not go into the question of 
whether an embargo applied against Yugoslavia legally applies to the 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The point is that the U.N. resolution 
has become an excuse for inaction in the face of genocide. That simply 
is not acceptable.
  Opponents of this amendment argue that it would undercut actual and 
potential U.N. sanctions against such international outlaws as Iraq and 
North Korea. I do not agree. Let's remember what the United Nations is 
and is not. The United Nations is a forum for coordination and 
legitimization of national policies. It is not a sovereign 
supranational entity that forces member nations to take actions they 
believe to be against their national interests.
  For example, U.N. sanctions will remain on Iraq until it is no longer 
in the interests of the international community to keep them. When a 
critical mass decides that Iraq has fulfilled its responsibilities, the 
sanctions will be lifted. A country might point to the unilateral 
lifting of the Bosnia arms embargo by the United States as a cover for 
agitating to have the Iraq sanctions lifted, but it would only be a 
cover. Its decision would be based on its underlying interests. 
Unilateral United States action on Bosnia would not change these 
underlying interests, if the argue for keeping the embargo, it will be 
kept. If they argue against the embargo, they are unlikely to continue 
to abide by it regardless of what the United States does unilaterally.
  Similarly, China will not enforce sanctions against North Korea to 
please the United Nations. If China agrees to and implements sanctions, 
it will do so only--I repeat, only--if China's leadership believes that 
sanctions are in China's interests.
  Mr. President, I have gone on at some length because our vote on this 
measure is in fact a vote on a certain vision of America's role in the 
world. We have interests, including moral interests, in the world. We 
have responsibilities. And we have instruments for securing our 
interests and bearing our responsibilities.
  We have an interest in stability in the Balkans. We have a 
responsibility to end the genocide. And we have the instrument in 
lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government. Multilaterally if 
possible, by ourselves if we must, but the embargo must be lifted.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, this week we took note of an important 
anniversary--June 25, 1950. Forty-four years ago this week, Kim Il-song 
invaded South Korea. In a lightning strike the North reached the end of 
the Korean Peninsula beginning a war which cost the United States over 
55,000 lives.
  Now as we consider this amendment on Bosnia, I can't help but look 
back and think what would the world look like today if we denied the 
South the right of self-defense--what if we had decided to cede the 
territory to Russian, Chinese, and North Korean aggression?
  Well, if President Clinton had been in office I think that decision 
might have been made. I think it is possible that the perimeter of 
American security interests defined by Secretary of State Acheson 
excluding Korea would have been allowed to stand. In the years between 
the surrender of forces south of the 38th parallel at the close of 
World War II and 1950, from Washington's perspective, responsibility 
for Korea's sovereignty and future was turned over to the United 
Nations. At the time, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee endorsed the widely held view that Korea held no political, 
economic, or strategic interest unique to the United States--Korea was 
a U.N. issue.
  The parallels to events in Bosnia today are eerie. How quickly we 
have dismissed responsibility and leadership for the crisis in Bosnia, 
discarding the matter to the United Nations.
  Today, an independent nation, Bosnia, is under siege. Day in and day 
out women and children, the young and old suffer. But the crime in 
their suffering, the tragedy is they have been denied the right to 
defend themselves.
  In an attempt to stop the war an arms embargo was imposed on the 
former Yugoslavia. Since that U.N. embargo was imposed, Yugoslavia has 
disintegrated and five independent nations have emerged.
  Unfortunately, the embargo remains in place to the great disadvantage 
and destruction of Bosnia.
  Serbia, well-armed and with historic aggressive ambitions, has 
pounded Sarajevo, devastated Goradze, and torn Tuzla apart.
  And U.N. bureaucrats battle NATO commanders over when, where, and 
what the bombing targets should be. Unfortunately, the victors in this 
battle are Boutros Ghali, Special Envoy Akashi, and General Rose who 
seem to have gained control over the fate and lives of American 
soldiers and airmen.
  Confusion in the chain of command, the chaos in the agenda was 
particularly evident during the siege of Goradze. As NATO commanders 
were pressing air strikes to defend Goradze the U.N. Special Envoy 
stopped the aircraft mid-mission. Apparently, Secretary Christopher was 
so frustrated he called to protest this bureaucratic meddling. 
Secretary General Boutros Ghali would not take his call.
  So we've reached a bureaucratic standoff as Bosnia dies.
  I think Senators Dole and Lieberman are right. The United States must 
exercise leadership. We can't rewrite Bosnia's sorry history--nor our 
tragic role in contributing to this genocide.
  But, we can turn a page, we can change Bosnia's future. We can lift 
the embargo and save what's left of Bosnia.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise to say a few words about the events 
taking place in the former Yugoslavia and the legislation that we are 
considering at the present time.
  I'd like to begin by commending the distinguished minority leader, 
Senator Dole, as well as my colleagues from Connecticut, Senator 
Lieberman, for insisting that this matter be brought to the attention 
of the Senate. Their efforts have made it certain that the issue of 
Bosnia and the plight of the Bosnian people are given the treatment and 
the consideration they deserve.
  Mr. President, the amendment that has been proposed by Senator Dole 
and Senator Lieberman raises important and difficult questions that 
warrant the careful consideration of every Member of this body. In all 
candor, I must say that I find myself in agreement with much of what 
this legislation seeks to do.
  Like the sponsors of this amendment, I have watched as the Bosnian 
Moslems have been forced from their homes and subjected to murder, rape 
and unspeakable horrors. Like the sponsors of this amendment, I have 
watched as the Bosnian Moslems have become the victims of a cruel and 
deliberate policy of aggression and ethnic genocide.
  Like the sponsors of this amendment, I am frustrated by the apparent 
inability of the international community to bring an end to the war and 
bring an end to suffering of the Bosnian people. And like the sponsors 
of this amendment, I am certainly convinced that the arms embargo on 
the Bosnian Moslems has only worsened and prolonged this dreadful 
conflict--and that the time has come for the embargo to be lifted.
  To be candid, Mr. President, it is easy to see the appeal of the 
amendment by the distinguished minority leader. After all, this 
amendment merely gives effect to a sentiment that many of us have 
certainly felt: Just lift the embargo, do it right now, and don't worry 
about what the rest of the world thinks.
  Mr. President, I wish I could endorse the solution that is proposed 
in this amendment. Regrettably, however, I cannot. Despite the very 
best intentions of its proponents and its supporters in this Chamber, 
the policy this amendment proposes would be a dangerous course for this 
Nation, and a dangerous precedent for the future of multilateral 
cooperation.
  One year from now, Mr. President, in the year 1995, we will celebrate 
the 50th anniversary of the United Nations Charter. Happily, that 
anniversary comes about at a time when the age-old dream of that 
charter is finally within our grasp. The Soviet Empire is gone. The 
cold war is over. A collection of countries that was once hopelessly 
divided along political and ideological lines is now starting to think 
and act like a community of nations.
  We are finally nearing the day when nations will come together to 
meet their common challenges, when multilateral action will be a 
reality and no longer a far-flung dream. Already we have gained a 
glimpse of the possibilities. Thirty-two nations came together to turn 
back Saddam Hussein. A majority of 15 members of the Security Council 
agreed to impose multilateral sanctions on Iraq, on Libya, on Haiti.
  The United Nations and its many related agencies have provided 
humanitarian relief in Rwanda and Sudan, have monitored elections from 
Cambodia to El Salvador, and have dispatched peacekeeping troops to all 
corners of the world.
  None of this has been perfect or painless or has come without cost. 
Certainly there have been setbacks. Certainly there have been 
disappointments. Certainly we all would have liked to see the United 
Nations move more quickly and more effectively in a number of places, 
not least of which in the former Yugoslavia. On that there can be no 
doubt or disagreement.
  But I also think most of us would agree that the potential for 
international cooperation and coordination is far greater today than it 
has been in many, many years. We should think very long and hard before 
taking any action that could undo that very noble and very meaningful 
promise.
  That brings us, Mr. President, to the issue of the former Yugoslavia. 
Three years ago, in September 1991, the U.N. Security Council voted 
unanimously to impose an arms embargo on Yugoslavia--including, of 
course, what was then the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
United States voted for this resolution and pledged to abide by its 
terms.
  Now we are being told by the sponsors of this resolution that because 
we no longer agree with this arms embargo, all we need to do is to 
ignore it. We are being told that we can simply wash our hands of our 
commitment to the United Nations and walk away from a policy that we 
helped to develop and we helped to put into place. We are being told we 
can do this without consulting with our allies or with our many other 
partners in the international community.
  Just imagine for a second, Mr. President, the kind of Pandora's Box 
this would open. What if Turkey, or Jordan, were to decide that the 
U.N. arms embargo against Iraq was no longer in their interest? Would 
that give them the unilateral right to ignore the arms embargo?

  What if Canada, or Venezuela, were to decide that they no longer felt 
themselves bound by the U.N. trade embargo against Haiti? Would it be 
acceptable for them to ignore that embargo as well?
  What will we do when the British, or the French, decide to pull out 
their peacekeeping forces from Bosnia? What will we say when Russia 
decides to ignore the arms embargo on Serbia? How will we respond when 
China refuses to go along with sanctions on North Korea, if sanctions 
ever prove to be needed? What possible standing would we have to tell 
these countries otherwise?
  There are some in this Chamber who have argued that the U.N. arms 
embargo is illegal, that it violates Bosnia's right of self defense 
under article 51 of the U.N. Charter. I have heard compelling arguments 
made on both sides of that question. I do not presume to have a 
definitive answer.
  What I do know is this: Simply because we may think the arms embargo 
is illegal, that does not make the arms embargo illegal. Nor does it 
give us the right to ignore the embargo, any more than any of us would 
have the right to ignore a domestic law if we thought it was 
unconstitutional. Making ourselves the judge and jury of the United 
Nations serves nobody's interests, Mr. President. Not those of the 
United Nations. Not those of the international community. And certainly 
not ours.
  Today in the former Yugoslavia, there is an active effort under way 
to bring the warring parties to the peace table and bring about a 
negotiated end to the conflict. There is a peace proposal that is on 
the table at this very moment, one that has gained the endorsement of 
all the major international powers.
  It is a process that is fraught with difficulty and in the end it 
might very well fail, just as so many efforts in Bosnia have failed in 
the past. But I think it is worth giving a chance, Mr. President. And I 
am certain it is better than walking away from everything the 
international community has accomplished in the former Yugoslavia, not 
to mention the rest of the world.
  Walk away from NATO and the United Nations now, and we walk away from 
14,000 troops keeping the peace in Croatia and a multilateral force 
that is standing guard along the border of Macedonia. Walk away now, 
and we walk away from the only source of dialogue between the warring 
factions, a dialogue that has helped to prevent a wider war and even 
more bloodshed. Walk away now, and we walk away from an airlift of 
humanitarian assistance that has kept people alive in besieged areas of 
Bosnia for 2 years, longer even than the famous Berlin airlift of 1948.
  If you think that things cannot get worse in the former Yugoslavia, 
imagine what will happen when the peacekeeping troops are gone and the 
humanitarian assistance flights are stopped. Imagine what will happen 
when the Serbian forces are given access to more weaponry and 
ammunition from Russia. Imagine what will happen when the only lines of 
communication between the warring factions are severed. The result will 
only be more chaos, more bloodshed, and more loss of innocent life.
  Mr. President, I do not mean to suggest that the international 
community has done everything it can in the former Yugoslavia. Clearly 
there is more that the U.N. and other international organizations can 
and should be doing to bring a halt to the aggression by Serbian 
forces. But make no mistake, Mr. President--lifting the embargo 
unilaterally will not fix what is wrong with the international effort. 
It will simply destroy that international effort altogether. And that 
is not in anyone's interest, least of all the people of Bosnia.
  Mr. President, fortunately there is an alternative to the Dole 
amendment, and that is contained in the amendment put forward by the 
distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, 
along with Senator Warner. Their proposal calls on the United States to 
work with the members of NATO and the United Nations to preserve ``an 
economically, politically, and militarily viable Bosnian state.''
  The amendment also makes clear that if the Bosnian Serbs do not 
constructively respond to peace negotiations, the President is urged to 
immediately lend his backing in the U.N. Security Council to a 
resolution that would lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. If the 
Security Council fails to pass such a resolution, the President is 
urged to consult with the Congress with 5 days regarding unilateral 
termination of the embargo.
  Mr. President, regardless of what anyone in this Chamber thinks of 
the proposal that is presently before us, there can be no disagreement 
over one fact: What is happening in Bosnia today is an unthinkable 
tragedy. Thousands of innocent civilians have been killed and countless 
more have been tortured, raped, or brutally uprooted from their homes.
  The aggression and the genocide in Bosnia must be stopped. No human 
being with a conscience or a heart could possibly think otherwise.
  But the question before us this morning is not whether we approve of 
genocide or even whether we approve of all the actions that have been 
taken in Bosnia by the United Nations and by our partners in the 
international community. The question before us is whether we can do 
more to help Bosnia by working in cooperation with the international 
community, or by going it alone.
  Yes, Mr. President, let us stand up against genocide and ethnic 
cleansing. Let us stand up against aggression and the victimization of 
innocent civilians. Let us lift the embargo against the Bosnian people 
if that should prove necessary and let them defend themselves.
  But let us not take an action here in this Chamber that would destroy 
everything the international community has done to protect innocent 
lives and to keep the conflict in Bosnia from spreading even further. 
And let us not take an action that would seriously undermine the 
credibility of NATO and the United Nations, not to mention our own 
credibility as a supporter of those important institutions.
  Let there be no doubt, Mr. President: Lifting the embargo 
unilaterally would certainly do both of these things. That would not be 
in the interest of the United States. That would not be in the interest 
of the international community. And that would surely not be in the 
interest of the people of Bosnia.
  For these reasons, Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the Nunn-
Warner amendment.


                           Amendment No. 2142

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Under the 
previous order amendment No. 1851 and amendment No. 1852 are set aside 
and the Senate will resume consideration of amendment No. 2142 of the 
Senator from Michigan, regarding funding for the B-2 bomber. There are 
44 minutes remaining, 32 minutes under the control of the Senator from 
Michigan and 12 minutes under the control of the Senator from Georgia.
  Who yields time? The Chair recognizes the Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 4 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized for 4 
minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the amendment which I have offered on 
behalf of a large bipartisan group, including Senators Glenn, McCain, 
Cohen, Leahy, and others, would strike the $150 million which the 
committee added on for a B-2 industrial base program, so-called, an 
amount not requested by the administration, for which there is no 
militarily validated purpose. It would use that money instead to 
restore a part of the base cleanup fund which we borrowed for the 
California earthquake emergency.
  After that earthquake there was an emergency and we said we had to 
move immediately. What we did is we moved $500 million from the base 
cleanup fund into that emergency effort. What this amendment would do 
would be to say that we are not going to keep the B-2 road open. That 
was closed 2 years ago by this Congress. It was closed last year by 
this Congress. We capped the program at 20 B-2 bombers.
  Three different Secretaries of Defense have said we should cap the B-
2 bomber program at 20, two Presidents have said we should cap the B-2 
program at 20. This amendment of mine leaves that program capped and 
does not open the road to more B-2 bombers. It says we resolved that 
question, now let us not reopen it, add money to that B-2 industrial 
base program, when we need that money so badly elsewhere. And one of 
the places we need it, where we have made a commitment to the people of 
this country to restore the money, is that base cleanup fund.
  We have told people where there are bases that are closing, we will 
move promptly to provide for the reuse of those bases and we will 
provide promptly for the cleanup. What we have done, effectively, is 
borrow $500 million from that fund.
  Yes, the 1995 budget request of the administration is fully funded. 
But the 1994 funds are the ones that were borrowed. And the 1995 
request came to us before we used the $500 million from this fund for 
the California earthquake.
  The administration specifically supports my efforts to restore these 
funds and specifically opposes the use of $150 million for the so-
called B-2 industrial base fund.
  We have letters from Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry, the father of 
stealth, who has said we cannot afford more bombers, and we do not need 
more B-2 bombers. And this is what Secretary Perry wrote:

       One of the most difficult questions we have thus far faced 
     in our strategic planning about our defense industrial base 
     is the one about Stealth bomber production capacity.

  And in his letter he said:

       Given my deep personal convictions about the military 
     importance of stealth for nearly 2 decades, you can well 
     imagine why I have wanted to make sure we get this one right, 
     and I believe that we have.

  And then he goes on in this letter to describe why he does not 
support adding $150 million to the B-2 line.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has consumed 4 minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Chair would advise Members of the Senate that the Senator from 
Michigan has 27 minutes 50 seconds remaining and the Senator from 
Georgia has 12 minutes remaining.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I would yield 3 minutes to the Senator from 
Hawaii.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye] is 
recognized for 3 minutes.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I rise this morning to oppose the 
amendment just offered by the Senator from Michigan. As the Senator 
indicated, his amendment would delete $150 million which the bill 
authorizes for the express purpose of maintaining the tools and 
facilities on the last American line for bomber production.
  A key element of the U.S. industrial base for the production of 
modern bomber aircraft would be lost were the amendment to be adopted.
  Mr. President, I would like to say that I have no quarrel with the 
Senator from Michigan on the need to fund base closure activities. The 
bill before the Senate does just that. If we examine the bill before 
the Senate, we find that the bill already includes $2.676 billion for 
base closure activities. That is the President's request, and this bill 
fully funds that request. On the other hand, if the amendment is 
adopted, our Nation's industrial base for bombers will be lost forever 
because the amendment eliminates any funds to preserve the capacity to 
produce any more bombers.
  Our Nation's foremost expert on bomber and stealth technology 
recently testified before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, and 
this is what he said:

       We don't have anything in our program to sustain a bomber 
     industrial base. That is a weakness of this program that 
     we're presenting to you and you may rightly challenge and 
     criticize that assumption.

  He went further to say:

       The most logical way of maintaining a bomber industrial 
     base is to continue to build more B-2's. That's not only 
     because that's the best, the most cost-effective bomber we 
     can describe to you right now but because we could make a 
     very good use of the extra B-2's if we had them.

  That is the testimony of the Secretary of Defense. Let us give the 
Department of Defense an opportunity to study and analyze the bomber 
force before we make this fateful decision.
  The testimony of the Secretary of Defense is that there is a weakness 
in the budget presented to the Congress, that it fails to protect the 
bomber industrial base. And, it is the Secretary who says the best way 
to sustain the industrial base is to build more B-2 bombers, because 
DOD could make very good use of extra B-2's, if we had them.
  Mr. President, I am a strong B-2 supporter and my colleagues know 
that. I recognize that the B-2 is the best bomber ever produced and, 
though it is expensive, I believe we should purchase more. The country 
learned many lessons from Desert Storm; one of the most significant 
lessons learned is that stealth works. The success of the F-117 in that 
war demonstrated to the entire world the advantages of stealth 
technology in military aircraft. The B-2 is the next technological 
leap; it is the stealth bomber.
  The B-2 bomber is a marvel of American technology. It has the 
capability to take off from bases in the United States and fly anywhere 
in the world, penetrate virtually any airspace, deliver a devastating 
blow, and return to the United States without stopping. In this era, 
when the United States is deploying fewer troops overseas at fewer 
locations, the global reach of the B-2 is essential to deterrence and 
to war fighting.
  Mr. President, the B-2 is essential. No other weapon can do the job. 
With mid-air refueling, the B-1B and B-52 can fly long ranges, but they 
cannot penetrate heavily defended airspace. Even the F-117 does not 
have the capability of the B-2 in that arena.
  Mr. President, as we debate this issue, I would ask my colleagues to 
bear in mind that the American public is increasingly reluctant to 
support U.S. interests abroad, if that means intervention and the 
possible loss of American life. If is self-evident that the best way to 
protect those who must go into harm's way is to provide them the best 
equipment to reduce casualties and deaths. ``Improved survivability'' 
is the term employed by the experts; in my generation it was known as 
returning home alive.
  Many of my colleagues are probably not aware that the Rand Corp. has 
been examining the war fighting effectiveness of the bomber force 
structure. Among its conclusions, Rand notes that a fleet of 38 B-2 
bombers and 40 B-52's would be as effective as a fleet of 20 B-2's, 40 
B-52's, and 60 B-1 bombers. That means that 18 additional B-2's could 
do the job of 60 B-1's. Millions of dollars could be saved through 
reduced military personnel and operations and maintenance costs; 
hundreds of lives would no longer be put at risk.
  I am convinced the results of a comprehensive cost and operational 
effectiveness analysis will show that, in the long run, it would be 
more cost effective to purchase more B-2 bombers than to continue to 
fix and upgrade the existing conventional bombers and maintain the 
fighter escorts and electronic warfare capability which is required to 
support conventional bombers.
  Mr. President, I do not make my argument on costs alone. The bottom 
up review concluded that 100 bombers are required to handle one MRC. It 
also assumed a force structure of 184 bombers. However, the Air Force 
plans to retain only 107 total bombers in its inventory, not more than 
80 of which are to be ready for combat. Exactly how this force 
structure will fulfill the requirements for fighting two nearly 
simultaneous major regional contingencies has not been answered to my 
satisfaction by any DOD official.
  Considering the uncertainties of force structure and cost 
effectiveness, I believe all my colleagues should agree it makes great 
sense to maintain the capacity to build additional B-2 bombers.
  Mr. President, this amendment asks the wrong questions and provides 
the wrong answers. We know that, if the amendment is adopted, the last 
bomber production line in the United States will be terminated--a key 
element of the defense industrial base will be irretrievably lost. What 
we don't know is how much alternative force structures cost and how do 
these costs compare to the acquisition and operation of more B-2 
bombers.
  On both of these counts, I urge my colleagues to defeat the Levin 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Maine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen] is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I have enormous respect for the Senator 
from Georgia and the Senator from Hawaii, but I must say that even 
conceding this is a wonderful flying machine, the question is: ``Can we 
afford it?'' Now we are talking about maintaining an industrial base 
fund, not just for 1 year but for next year, the year after that, and 
ad infinitum until we decide we need more B-2 bombers. So it is not 
simply $150 million this year. We have to calculate well into the 
future.
  Now, according to the manufacturer of the aircraft, they could 
probably construct another 20 B-2's for an estimated $12 billion. 
However, the Air Force and the Pentagon's Office of Strategic Systems 
indicates it would probably cost $19 billion, and I would submit that 
is probably an underestimate as well.
  But assuming we are willing to pay another $19 billion, the next 
question is what about the need?
  Now, the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], has already quoted 
extensively from the words of Secretary Perry and Deputy Secretary 
Deutch. I do not know if he has quoted from the Secretary of the Air 
Force, but Sheila Widnall says she is not impressed with the idea of 
preserving a bomber industrial base and she would not trade anything in 
her budget to get more B-2's.
  In an interview in Aerospace Daily this week she said:

       ``I think one can make industrial base arguments for almost 
     every system we're building. But * * * I think the aerospace 
     industry has never relied on the argument of the industrial 
     base'' to remain fresh and at the leading edge of technology.
       Although the Air Force ``obviously * * * would love to have 
     more B-2's * * * they're very expensive, and in terms of the 
     limited budget we do not have'' the resources to buy more 
     than those already planned. ``I don't see how we could do 
     it,'' Widnall said. ``We would have to give up something that 
     we consider to be a higher priority.''

  Well, what is the higher priority? The Air Force says there is no 
higher priority than what they have in the budget. Some advocates say, 
well, let us just retire the B-1 bomber fleet. One writer suggests let 
us retire all the B-52's, all of our ICBM's, a carrier battle group or, 
alternatively, a mechanized army division in order to sustain more B-2 
productions.
  Well, if we eliminate the B-1's and B-52's, that undercuts the 
argument we do not have enough bombers. Giving up another mechanized 
division would weaken the already questionable ability under the 
Bottom-Up Review to fight nearly two simultaneously regional 
contingencies. So these arguments do not seem to hold much water in 
terms of whether it is worth the costs when the need has not been 
identified by those who are in charge of the programs.
  I would like to go just one step further and question what the 
mission is. We have had from the very beginning a question about what 
the B-2 bomber was going to be used for. Initially, the B-2 was going 
to be a nuclear bomber hunting down mobile ICBM's in the Soviet Union. 
And when the Air Force was forced to back away from that claim, it was 
justified on the grounds that it was the only means to attack deeply 
buried Soviet command and control bunkers. And when that was shown to 
be inaccurate, it was justified as the only way to penetrate Soviet air 
defenses even though we have invested billions in stealthy air cruise 
missiles.
  When the Soviet Union dissolved, it was justified as an ideal 
conventional bomber for regional wars. You might think the B-2 is a bit 
overqualified for some of the Third World countries' but do not worry, 
it turns out that the B-2 is not quite as stealthy as originally 
planned.
  But now we are told by Mr. George Donahue, Rand's Vice President of 
Project Air Force:

       B-2's by themselves probably don't bring enough firepower 
     to stop the kind of armored invasions we have talked about. * 
     * * What we want to do is use the B-2's to make initial 
     attacks, suppress defenses, and then help the B-1's 
     penetrate. * * * The B-2's help the B-1's find targets, help 
     them locate defenses and avoid them, and then the B-1's come 
     in, drop their bombs and get out safely. . . The B-2's in 
     this role are helping to manage the battle. In fact, they are 
     performing roles rather similar to what JSTARS and AWACS 
     do, say, later in the war.

  If this is to be the role of the B-2--supporting the B-1, which would 
conduct the real bombing missions--then before another dime is 
committeed to the program, B-2 advocates have the obligation to explain 
why using the B-2 in this role would be more cost-effective than 
alternative options for supporting the B-1's operations.
  Before approving the committee's position, we should have in hand 
trade-off analyses showing that the B-2 is better suited and cheaper 
than using JSTARS, AWACS, electronic warfare aircraft, SEAD--or 
suppression of enemy air defense--aircraft, overhead assets, and the 
means to support the B-2.
  What we are seeing is yet another page in the constantly shifting 
arguments for the B-2 bomber, now the B-2 support aircraft.
  Some B-2 advocates point out that the B-2 has taken on many new roles 
during its long lifetime. But that was after it was deployed. Having 
successfully performed the mission for which it was designed, it was 
repeatedly modified to conduct new roles.
  In the case of the B-2, we have seen missions assigned and abandoned 
repeatedly before the B-2 has entered the force. Unlike the B-2, the 
constantly changing justification of the B-2 is not a result of its 
flexibility and capability but because each succeeding justification 
turned out to be unpersuasive.


                            brac restoration

  The other half of this amendment is that it would shift $150 million 
toward meeting the enormous costs of environmental cleanup of our 
defense facilities around the Nation, and specifically for the cleanup 
of those bases affected by the 1993 base closure round.
  Our ability to clean up closing bases so that the property can be 
released to the local communities for reuse is being hampered by our 
decision in February to rescind more than $500 million in BRAC funds in 
order to pay for the Los Angeles earthquake emergency supplemental. 
This was nearly half of this year's cleanup funding for the third BRAC 
round.
  DOD officials have testified that the funding shortfall in the BRAC 
cleanup account ``will delay the closure of some bases'' and that funds 
``will need to be restored to keep the BRAC process on schedule and to 
realize full savings from the infrastructure reductions.''
  The Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch, wrote the sponsors of 
the amendment 2 weeks ago to support the restoration of the rescinded 
BRAC funds ``to speed economic recovery of closure communities.''
  The Federal Government must fulfill its responsibility to clean up 
the potentially hazardous wastes at many of our bases. It is incumbent 
upon DOD and all Federal agencies to meet the cleanup standards that 
the private sector is forced to comply with. The Department of Defense 
must have the funds to restore these sites.
  We must ensure that all defense facilities are good neighbors and 
that they do not contaminate ground water or fisheries, or expose 
communities to hazardous toxic wastes. We cannot, in the process of 
defending our country, permanently pollute our communities.
  Economic recovery from base closure is difficult enough without the 
burden of potentially hazardous waste. The Federal Government cannot 
allow reuse efforts to be frustrated by the presence of environmental 
hazards.
  Ninety-three defense installations are currently on the Superfund 
National Priorities List, and 14 more have been proposed for addition 
to the list. Two bases in my home State of Maine are on the list, and a 
third has been proposed for addition. There are armed services 
Superfund sites in over 40 States, and every State has installations 
that are affected by the Defense Environmental Cleanup Program. Some of 
the wastes at these sites are unique to military activities, while 
others are similar to wastes generated by industrial and commercial 
sectors.
  The DOD facilities on the National Priorities List include bases that 
have been closed, some that are in the closure process, and many that 
are currently active. While this amendment will only directly affect 
the funding for bases closed in the 1993 BRAC process, increasing 
funding for one cleanup account may help to maintain current funding 
levels for the cleanup of currently active installations and bases 
closed in other BRAC rounds.
  In summary, Mr. President, the Department of Defense opposes the 
unrequested $150 million added for the B-2 and supports the restoration 
of funds for BRAC cleanup.
  I urge my colleagues to support the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has consumed 5 minutes.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Arkansas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. BUMPERS. I thank the distinguished Senator.
  Mr. President, nobody in this body should be deluded about what this 
debate is about. This debate is about buying 20 more B-2 bombers, which 
we do not need. The offer of 20 more B-2 bombers at a cost of $19 
billion or slightly less than $1 billion each, whereas the original 20 
are going to cost $12 billion, is a titillating offer.
  But we should also think, as we should think about every weapons 
system, do we need them? If they were going to sell those planes to us 
for $500 million each, would it be a good investment? The answer is no. 
We voted in 1992 and 1993 to cap the number of B-2 bombers at 20. If we 
put $150 million in, as the committee has suggested, to keep the bomber 
line on standby, you are going to be asked every year, as far as the 
eye can see, for $150 million each year to keep that line open.
  We had B-52's. The chart of the Senator from Georgia is a very 
interesting chart. I am not quarreling with it. But there is one thing 
it does not show on the chart; that is, we have 94 B-52H's--yes, the 
old workhorse B-52--94 of them. They talk about how many people are at 
risk in the B-2 because it is so stealthy. Nobody in the old workhorse 
B-52 is at risk. It is a standoff bomber that fires cruise missiles. 
The cruise missile is pilotless, and it is accurate.
  The other thing that I think perplexes me more than almost anything 
else is that we can never kill anything around here, no matter how 
outmoded the original purpose for building it might have been.
  I can remember, No. 1, when we started out on the B-2. I remember 
Bill Perry coming to my office. He was in the Defense Department under 
Jimmy Carter. He came to my office and described the B-2 for me. I was 
so excited I could hardly breathe at the thought of this top-secret 
bomber. It was going to cost between $300 million and $400 million. Do 
you remember the outrage in this country when it was discovered the 
thing was going to cost $500 million? There is hardly a whimper today 
when it is costing $2 billion, four times as much. That is what the 
announcement was back when everybody in the country was standing on 
their head because it was going to cost $500 million.
  Second, on the mission, the B-2, just like the liquid metal reactor, 
started because the Soviet Union was our bitter enemy. We wanted a B-2 
bomber that could penetrate the defenses of the Soviet Union. Now it is 
not a strategic bomber. For $2 billion you are getting a conventional 
bomber. We do not talk about bombing the Soviet Union anymore. Oh, we 
still have all these nuclear weapons and cruise missiles, and so on. 
But it is now a conventional bomber at $2 billion a whack.
  Mr. President, why do we want to spend $150 million, not just this 
year? But make no mistake about it, we are embarking on a $150 million 
expenditure to keep that line on standby until someday somebody is 
going to make the argument here: Yes, we do need to buy another 20 B-2 
bombers. Then we are going to be committing ourselves to a company 
which says they will sell us another 20 for $900 million each, or $950 
million each. That is the same company that promised to sell us the 
original 100 for between $300 million and $400 million.
  Again, Lucy Brown is holding the ball for Charlie Brown to kick and 
pulling the ball out from under him just before he gets to it. It just 
happens time and time again.
  We voted to cap the B-2 at 20. We ought to stick with that.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  I yield such time as I may have remaining back to the distinguished 
floor manager.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I will just take a couple of minutes of my 
time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas is right that the 
B-52's can indeed be used as standoff bombers. That is what we are 
going to have to use them for unless we get some more B-2's. The 
difficulty and the problem with the Senator's presentation is he acts 
as if the standoff weapons do not cost anything.
  Mr. President, the standoff weapons, when you have to use them 
without having B-2's go in first, you are going to have to use them in 
such quantities that they are going to cost more than the B-2's would 
cost, if you add them up. If you look at the Air Force assumptions, 100 
nonstealthy bombers, an average sortie rate per bomber of .7 per day, 
that is 70 bomber sorties per day, 20 weapons per bomber sortie, each 
standoff weapon that the Senator gives as his answer, averages about $1 
to $1\1/2\ million if you count 20 of them on that basis. That is 
compared to what it would cost if you can fly directly over and use the 
JDAM* weapon of 40,000.
  So you standoff and shoot from a distance with a B-52. That costs you 
about $1\1/2\ million apiece. We do not have them yet. That is what we 
do in this development. We used the whole inventory we had of Tomahawk 
missiles in the Persian war. We used them at the beginning.
  If you multiply this out, just simple math, for each day we use 
standoff weapons in a war, it will cost us about $2.2 billion. It takes 
us 1 week to achieve air superiority. You have spent $15.7 billion. But 
that is not in the headlines, and nobody really has quantified all of 
this.
  So what the Senator is arguing is correct. We can use standoff 
weapons on the B-52 and on B-1 because they cannot fly in over the 
target. The problem is those cost a fortune, and we are going to have 
to use them sparingly. It is not an argument against standoff weapons. 
We need them. But if we do not have the B-2 going in and clearing the 
way with the hard targets, we are going to spend more money on the 
standoff weapons the Senator from Arkansas wants than we would spend to 
build an adequate number of B-2's, and it is going to go on and on.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Michigan yield 1 
minute?
  Mr. LEVIN. Yes.
  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, let me respond to the Senator from 
Georgia in this way by saying, No. 1, the Senator is still anticipating 
a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. I am not. But I am not naive 
enough to say that we should not prepare for all eventualities. What I 
am saying is the threat that we have known all of these years is gone. 
Our bombers are not even on alert.
  No. 2, if we were going to discard the B-52's and eliminate what he 
considers to be the staggering costs of operating those, that would be 
one thing. But we are not. You buy additional B-2's, and all you are 
doing is piling that cost on top of the cost that we are going to have 
anyway. The Strategic Air Command says the B-52 is good until the year 
2030. That is 36 years from now. We are not going to throw a bomber 
like that away. We are going to continue to maintain them, and all we 
are going to do by buying 20 more is just put more costs on top of 
cost.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I think we are talking about past each 
other. The Senator could not listen to the earlier debate. I understand 
that, with the hour that it was. But we have been talking all the time 
about the conventional role of the B-2--conventional, not nuclear. The 
Senator's remarks about Russia and the Soviet Union have nothing to do 
basically with this debate.
  The other point the Senator made, I do not know where he gets the 
point about throwing away the B-52's. The B-2 is necessary to make the 
B-52 extend the life that long because the B-52 cannot fly over the 
target until somebody has cleared the way. That other has to be a 
standoff weapon or it has to be a stealthy bomber.
  So this is complementary to the B-52, not in lieu of the B-52. We 
want to keep those in inventory. I have reservations myself about the 
B-1. We are trying to test that out.
  But the Senator's point on the B-52 is totally opposite of the point 
that has been made here. The B-52 is going to be enhanced by having the 
B-2's because it can then fly over the targets and use smart weapons 
that cost $40,000 each instead of $1.5 million each.
  Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from 
Vermont.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont is recognized.
  Mr. LEAHY. I thank the distinguished Senator from Michigan.
  I listened to the debate here last night. I am delighted to hear the 
Senator from Georgia has some reservations about the B-1. I wish he had 
those same reservations when we had the debate on the B-1, because many 
of us raised questions about the amount of money we were spending on 
what appeared to be a ``flying Edsel.'' The Air Force lobbied hard for 
the B-1 and they found themselves with a bomber they wish they did not 
have. They are spending billions of dollars to maintain, to crew, to 
equip, and incidentally, to fix all the flaws in it. If the B-1 was a 
``flying Edsel,'' the B-2 is a ``flying Fort Knox.''

  It seems to be a case where we have forgotten that the cold war is 
over. It has ended. The Berlin Wall is down, and Russia wants to become 
part of the NATO alliance. But, incredibly, we are still figuring out 
how we are going to build a B-2 bomber that can get under Russia's 
defenses and bomb Moscow, if necessary. As I said earlier, I hope they 
do not bomb Moscow on the same day we are delivering the foreign aid 
that was voted for by this Chamber, because the message would be, 
unfortunately, mixed.
  In a town famous for euphemisms, the bomber industrial base we speak 
of is the weakest disguise yet for what is simply a $150 million life 
support system for the B-2 bomber. It is time to pull the plug on the 
B-2, because the bomber industrial base is just another coined phrase 
to keep the vault door open to the B-2 at the U.S. Treasury. The 
``flying Fort Knox'' wants a key to Fort Knox.
  Last year, when I brought up an amendment to cap the B-2 at 20 
planes, everybody from the distinguished Senator from Georgia, and 
others, said, ``Well, let us not have this debate. We will put this 
divisiveness behind us because we are going to cap it at 20.'' The Air 
Force solemnly promised, ``We are going to cap this sucker at 20, do 
not worry about it.'' But, now, as many of us suggested at that time, 
the Senate is voting to give a $150 million skeleton key to keep the B-
2 alive. Even though we voted to cap it at 20 planes, even though the 
Air Force promised to cap it at 20, they figured that was last year and 
by now everybody will have forgotten the issue.
  This is nothing more than a downpayment on spending billions of 
dollars on planes that the Department of Defense does not want to buy 
in the first place.
  We are always going back home on weekends, and I am sure everybody 
back home on the 4th of July will say that we are here to make the 
tough decisions. Well, we can make a tough decision for the taxpayers 
of America or an easy decision for the lobbyists of a couple of mega-
corporations. I think we ought to do it for the taxpayers of America. 
We should not vote today to retain our present fleet of bombers and 
exercise an option to spend billions more to supplement a commodity 
that is already overstocked. Let us see some truth in budgeting before 
we spend $150 million. Let us read the fine print.
  Northrop tells us each additional plane will cost only $600 million. 
Such a bargain. The planes cost $600 million, but that reportedly does 
not include the tools needed for routine maintenance and the operating 
manuals to explain the operation and repair of this complex machinery. 
We are talking about a $1 billion airplane.
  The cold war is over. Most Americans are adjusting to this reality. 
It would be nice if the U.S. Senate did the same. Let us end the era of 
work programs for defense contractors. Passing a defense budget that 
reflects a post-cold war defense policy would go a long way toward 
restoring the credibility of Washington and of our Government. We have 
an opportunity to do that by cutting programs rather than keeping them 
on a life support system.
  Mr. President, to summarize, sometimes it seems that the world 
changes just about everywhere except within the walls of this Chamber. 
When the cold war was heated, Senators promoting costly weapons systems 
would express concern over the penurious budget submitted by the 
Pentagon.
  Surely, they would argue, that the Defense Department was being too 
cautious, underestimating the funds necessary to ward off the growing 
might of the Soviet bloc.
  The cold war has ended, the Berlin Wall is down and Russia wants to 
become a part of the NATO alliance. But, incredibly, we now argue 
whether the Pentagon should stop building expensive weapons like the B-
2 that were intended for use against the evil empire.
  In a town that is famous for euphemisms, the bomber industrial base 
is the weakest disguise yet for what is simply a $150 million life 
support system for the B-2 bomber.
  Mr. President, it is time to pull the plug and let the B-2 expire. 
The bomber industrial base is just another coined phrase to keep the 
vault door open to the B-2 at the U.S. Treasury.
  Proponents of the bomber industrial base argue that to save millions 
already invested in this flying Fort Knox--we should invest $150 
million more. That's an argument that might be raised in bankruptcy 
court--but it has no place here.
  The fact is that this special provision will be nothing more than a 
downpayment on spending billions of dollars on planes that the 
Department of Defense does not want to buy in the first place.
  For months, the Northrop Corp. has been assuring Members of Congress 
and committee staff that the B-2 production line is withering away.
  Supporters of the B-2 argue that the Air Force has a policy of folly. 
Air Force officials intend to drastically reduce our bomber force as 
the last B-2 rolls off the assembly line. The Air Force plans to cut 
the U.S. bomber force to 107 aircraft by the end of fiscal year 1995.
  So, what is the solution proposed by the Armed Services Committee? 
The Air Force has been instructed not to mothball a single B-1 or B-52, 
and the committee added $150 million from the till to finance the B-2 
recovery.
  The American people send us here to make tough decisions--but I 
suggest this is an easy one--bordering on the obvious.
  We should not vote today to retain our present fleet of bombers and 
exercise an option to spend billions more to supplement a commodity 
that is already overstocked.
  Proponents of the bomber industrial base candidly admit that they are 
proposing a downpayment on 20 additional bombers. If we insist on 
exceeding the 107 bombers that satisfy Air Force strength requirements 
what is wrong with the bombers we already have? Is it not more of a 
waste to build new B-2's when we have spent billions on the B-1 program 
and upgraded our fleet of B-52's.
  The $150 million bomber industrial base proposal won't even yield us 
a valid cost estimate on what the extra 20 B-2 bombers will cost.
  Northrop tells us that each additional plane will cost only--only 
$600 million! They make it sound like a bargain! Tell that to the 
taxpayers of this Nation--and be sure to include Northrop's track 
record on past cost estimates.
  Let us see some truth in budgeting before we spend $150 million. Let 
us read the fine print to the taxpayers. The planes cost $600 million 
but that reportedly does not include the tools needed for routine 
maintenance and the operating manuals to explain the operation and 
repair of this complex machinery.
  The Senate should make decisions on when to spend millions of dollars 
based on independent estimates, not contractor estimates.
  Finally, Mr. President, I want to raise a question about the issue of 
industrial base. Nobody questions that our country needs to protect our 
ability to build sophisticated weapon systems as the defense budget 
declines. We have a responsibility to preserve important defense 
technology.
  I am not certain that ``bomber industrial base'' however meets this 
criteria. Is our interest in preserving knowledge or protecting defense 
industry shareholders?
  I would strongly support an initiative to assist the aerospace 
industry. We must maintain our commercial and military edge--but we can 
not be giving $150 million handouts to corporations while waiting for 
them to meet their revenue expectations.
  The cold war is over. I think most Americans are adjusting to this 
reality. It is time for the U.S. Senate to do the same, and end the era 
of work programs for defense contractors.
  Passing a defense budget that reflects a post cold war defense policy 
would go a long way to restoring the credibility of our Government in 
Washington. We have an opportunity to do that by cutting off programs 
rather than keeping them on a life support system.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senate that the Senator 
from Michigan has 11 minutes, and the Senator from Georgia has 5 
minutes 45 seconds.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, may I have 3 minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I regret that I have to oppose some of our 
committee's views on this particular item and support the Senator from 
Michigan, because I basically support the B-2 bomber. I supported its 
development, and support the aerodynamic development of the flying wing 
that we have never been able to really use successfully in this 
country. That has been developed here. The stealth characteristics go 
along with it. Aerodynamic characteristics. The more we learn about 
that, it allows us to lift more into the air with less airframe weight 
involved. It has those advantages.
  Mr. President, I must support the proposal by the Senator from 
Michigan because just for the expense of this airplane, as the 
distinguished Senator from Vermont just said, by the time you build the 
hangars for it--it requires special hangars--by the time you do all the 
things that have to be required for this, it comes out to probably $1 
billion per airplane. As much as I would like to have the B-2, we just 
cannot afford it. It is a matter of cost. That is the reason I started 
switching my votes from support to opposition to the B-2 almost 3 years 
ago.
  The Stealth does buy us time in military strategy, because it will be 
a while before radar designs catch up with the stealth characteristics, 
where the airplane can be seen again. And that can be done. It is 
expensive to do that, but the stealthy design is against current day 
radars, and it cannot guarantee that same kind of stealthy 
characteristic into the indefinite future.
  There is the talk about $150 million to ``keep the line warm.'' Well, 
line warm for what? We have B-52's and we have the B-1's that the Air 
Force says is the backbone of the bomber fleet now. I know we have the 
charts here that show how many conventional aircraft the Stealth bomber 
could replace. But the point you have to remember is that we already 
have those airplanes. It is not as though we were trying to decide 
today to buy B-2's, or B-52's, or B-1's; we already have the B-52's and 
B-1's. They are a given. We have them now, at no expense. Whether the 
Stealth will replace 20, 30, or 40 of those, you still come up with 
retiring good aircraft--you still replace good aircraft with a B-2 that 
is going to cost us probably--when you talk about hangars and support--
at least a billion dollars per airplane.
  What does the Pentagon think about this? And what does the Defense 
Department want to do on this? Well, here is Mr. Perry, our Secretary 
of Defense. He said earlier this year:

       We should recognize now that any additional money added to 
     sustain the B-2 line would be only the tip of the budget 
     wedge. The large amounts required either to buy more B-2's or 
     to sustain the B-2 production line, without producing more 
     planes, would have to be taken from more pressing military 
     priorities.

  Mr. President, that summarizes the whole argument. The Secretary of 
Defense says if they do not want to keep the line open, it is the tip 
of the budget wedge. We would be keeping a line open to spend money for 
a potential of production that we do not see in the future. As much as 
I admire the lift capacity and the stealthy characteristics, I think 
right now it is something we cannot afford. I say that as one who 
supported the B-2 from inception, up to where I felt it got flat too 
expensive to buy. We have aircraft to do the conventional bombing 
roles, and if we were buying new aircraft, we could replace them with 
B-2's. We are not. We have them in surplus and are laying them up, 
sending them into storage right now, even though they are still good 
aircraft.
  So much as I did support the B-2 in earlier days, I must say now that 
I have to vote with the Senator from Michigan and support his views on 
this.
  I yield back the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has consumed the additional 2 
minutes.
  Who yields time?
  The Senator from Michigan controls 5 minutes 50 seconds, and the 
Senator from Georgia controls 5 minutes 10 seconds.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from 
Arizona.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona, [Mr. McCain], is 
recognized for 3 minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I rise in support of the amendment of the Senator from Michigan, [Mr. 
Levin], and I also hope the colleagues would heed the words of Senator 
Glenn who probably has more knowledge of this kind of business and 
practical experience than certainly any Member of this body or many 
living Americans.
  Mr. President, we are asking again to maintain an industrial base. I 
have had representative after representative come to my office and sit 
down with me and say we need to maintain the bomber industrial base, we 
need to maintain the fighter industrial base, we need to maintain the 
missile industrial base. Whatever it is, that industrial base needs to 
be maintained.
  I would love to maintain all those industrial bases. The harsh 
reality we are facing is that the defense budget has been cut between 
35 and 40 percent and the cold war is over.
  As we all know, a couple years ago a very extensive Bottom-Up Review 
was conducted by the best minds that we could gather inside and outside 
the defense establishment of this country, led by former Secretary Les 
Aspin and General Colin Powell. Their conclusions were that we needed 
no more than 20 B-2 aircraft.
  Recently the Department of Defense has again gone back and reviewed 
the bomber requirements, and they state the Department has continuously 
examined the role of the B-2 in every aspect from a war-fighting 
perspective within the context of ongoing analysis of the bomber force 
and no requirement has emerged from this analysis to change the 
recommendation in the Bottom-Up Review for 20 B-2 aircraft.
  We are cutting weapons systems and procurement that were recommended 
in the Bottom-Up Review. Now we are making a $150 million down payment 
on what could turn out to be a $12 billion expenditure.
  Mr. President, there is also the question that perhaps Senator Glenn 
can address better than I can. But a bomber is an airplane. We did not 
need to maintain a bomber industrial base for the Northrop Corp., which 
builds the B-2. The last time they built a bomber was 40 years ago. 
Boeing has not built a bomber in over 30 years.
  Mr. President, a bomber is an airplane. As long as we have aircraft 
modernization, construction, and advancements made, then we will be 
able to build bombers.
  Mr. President, if this were 4 years ago, no one would be a more 
vociferous and stronger supporter of the B-2. The cold war is over. We 
now have different priorities. Those priorities are articulated, I 
think, very well, generally speaking, in the Bottom-Up Review. We 
should support it. We should support the Pentagon and make the tough 
decision, which is to finally let the bomber force grow cold.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  The Chair will advise the time is being charged against both sides.
  The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I want to yield most of the remaining time 
to the Senator from Nebraska. I do want to take just a moment though.
  Two times during this debate, people have said that I basically said 
a year ago that this debate was over. I want to read exactly what I 
said, Mr. President.
  This was September 10, 1993, the Congressional Record, and I wish to 
make it very clear what I said. I said:

       Mr. President, it is no secret that I do not believe that 
     limiting the B-2 to 20 was the wise decision. I have said 
     that before. I will say it again. But if we are going to have 
     more than 20 B-2's, it would have to only be done after very 
     thorough deliberation and debate. In my view it should only 
     be done if there are tradeoffs of the largest savings that 
     the B-2 renders us as opposed to the alternative means of 
     delivering long-range strike power.

  Which is what we have been debating.

       But the Senator has an amendment which is now the official 
     position of this administration. It was the official position 
     of the previous administration. It is not my own view, but if 
     we are going have a different view on it, it should be fully 
     debated and at that stage we would deal with this matter as 
     we would have to deal with it. So I do not want the Senator 
     to think that I agree with the substantive position. But I do 
     not think there is any difference between this amendment and 
     what the administration's position is at this point in time.

  That was the dialog with Senator Leahy.
  Senator Leahy responded:

       Mr. President, the Senator from Georgia and I are in total 
     agreement on the point that if we are going to go further, if 
     there is reason for it for national security, it should be 
     debated at that point. We are in agreement on that.

  I wanted to clarify the Record on what I said, I hope, all along in 
this matter.
  I yield the remainder of my time to the Senator from Nebraska.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska, [Mr. Exon], is 
recognized for 3 minutes 20 seconds.
  Mr. EXON. I thank the Chair and I thank the leader of the committee.
  I hope we can focus on the reasons that the Armed Services Committee 
took the action that it did. Basically, we provided $150 million to 
keep the option open to buy more B-2's in the future. I have not 
committed this Senator to stay that course.
  I think it is perfectly legitimate for the argument to go on about 
this as a down payment on the future. But I have not made that decision 
myself as of yet. The $150 million that is thrown around indicates it 
is a waste of money. The fact of the matter, as I said many times on 
the floor on this debate, the actual number is $75 million, because 
half of the $150 million will go for parts that we would otherwise have 
to buy in the future anyway to build the 20 bombers already authorized.
  So we are talking about $75 million as an insurance policy to give us 
a year to try to straighten out what I think is a totally confused 
policy with regard to bombers by the Air Force.
  To back up that point, I want to quote briefly from an article called 
``Inside the Air Force,'' which I believe came out this morning. Among 
other things, it demonstrates the total disarray with regard to the 
Clinton administration and the Pentagon with regard to what they think 
are the proper mix of forces, and that is what we are talking about 
with regard to the B-2.
  In this report it simply says that the ongoing national posture 
review, which is under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, which 
is expected to be completed this fall, is an option under which the Air 
Force would build 40 B-2's, an option. It goes on to say that the 
Defense Department did not request funds for the controversial bomber 
on the Senate floor, but the Air Force and the DOD leaders have 
privately made it known that they welcome additional B-2 funding, but 
they are not willing to expend political capital by formally requesting 
the funds.
  Mr. President, I simply say that this Senator, the chairman of the 
subcommittee of jurisdiction, is simply saying because beyond any 
questionable doubt the closed hearings we held where we called the 
Department of Defense people in clearly indicated to those who were 
there and those who listened that only 100 bombers to fight a two-front 
war probably is not enough.
  The questions that we asked were not answered by the people who were 
supposed to be in the know.
  I simply say that this Senator recommended the expenditure of $75 
million as an insurance policy, if you will, to give us a year to try 
to straighten out what I feel is a faulty total bomber and total mix 
force as presently presented to us by the Department of Defense and the 
administration.
  I yield the remainder of my time, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Michigan 
who has 2 minute 20 seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield that time to myself.
  Mr. President, in direct response to the suggestion of my good friend 
from Nebraska [Senator Exon], this is what Secretary Perry said:

       I carefully considered your suggestion that we should add 
     money to support the B-2 production line beyond what would be 
     needed to complete the 20 authorized planes. For several 
     reasons, I still believe our decision not to do so is still 
     the right one. We should recognize now that any additional 
     money to sustain the B-2 line would only be the tip of a 
     budget wedge.

  That is what we are voting on here. It is not just $150 million, 
although that is a pretty large sum of money for anything except the 
defense budget. We are voting on a funding wedge that will lead us into 
the future of untold billions of dollars.
  Two votes in the Congress said cap it at 20; three Secretaries of 
Defense said cap it at 20; two Presidents said cap the B-2 at 20.
  My good friend, Senator Nunn, as part of the debate in 1992 said: 
``Let us conclude the B-2 program at 20 as requested and put this 
divisive issue finally behind us.''
  Senator Exon said: ``Let us give it a decent burial as far as new 
procurement is concerned by cuts at 20.''
  Senator Thurmond said: ``Let us complete the B-2 bomber at 20.''
  It is time to make a final commitment and cease this annual debate.
  The $150 million added by the Armed Services Committee reopens this 
debate again. It does what the Air Force does not want. The Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force, General McPeak, says:

       We are not asking for more B-2's. Quite frankly, the 
     problem is the price, the cost. It is very expensive. So on 
     the forward financial planning assumptions we are making, we 
     do not see the headroom to drive more B-2's in there.

  Like that Energizer bunny, this B-2 just keeps going and going and 
going. Let us keep our commitment to cap it at 20.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Levin amendment 
to terminate vital funding necessary to preserve our B-2 bomber 
industrial base, and foreclose forever the option to continue 
production of the most advanced aircraft in the history of aviation. As 
has been pointed out, this debate is about our national security 
industrial base. Some want to trivialize what this means by calling it 
a ``jobs program.'' No doubt about it, millions of Americans have or 
will lose their jobs as President Clinton's massive defense cuts take a 
greater and greater toll. But in my view, the issue is a matter of 
preserving options in a very dangerous and unstable world. The broader 
question is whether America will choose to remain strong, or whether we 
will head down the old path of dismantling our defense and thus our 
ability to lead.
  Since the end of the cold war, America has discovered that new 
threats and greater instability have replaced the classic East-West 
confrontation that existed over the past 40 years. Clearly, the world 
remains a dangerous place, and new challenges to peace and American 
security emerge nearly every day.
  The world is far more complex than it was just a few years ago. In my 
view, America cannot afford to foreclose our options. The Levin 
amendment does just that.
  America has invested heavily in the B-2 bomber to make it the most 
technologically sophisticated and most flexible weapon system the world 
has ever seen. This achievement is a credit to American ingenuity and 
American commitment to strength. Thousands of people have dedicated 
their genius and skill to design and build the B-2. No doubt about it, 
we must preserve this national resource. We simply must retain the 
ability to produce the B-2.
  Too many of my colleagues forget that when you slash away at the 
defense budget, you are slashing away at people, communities, and 
entire industries which must ultimately respond to the next challenge 
that will come. The people of California know the impact of these cuts 
very well. The loss in economic terms has been astronomical, but the 
erosion in our national security cannot be as easily quantified--until 
it is too late.
  I have long supported the B-2 bomber program, and I will continue to 
support it because I believe that America needs this aircraft. I urge 
my colleagues to join me in opposing the Levin amendment. This is not 
the time to foreclose on our ability to keep America strong.


                    the b-2: 1995 dod authorization

  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the fiscal year 
1995 Defense authorization bill and the provision of $150 million to 
preserve for another year the only bomber industrial capacity we have 
in this country, the B-2 industrial base. Next year the Nuclear Posture 
Review, the independent Roles and Missions Commission report, the 
report mandated by this bill, on bomber force structure tradeoffs, and 
operational readiness tests on the B-1B will have been completed. These 
reports will give the Department of Defense, the administration, and 
the Armed Services Committee a clearer picture of the demands and needs 
to our bomber industrial base. To allow our B-2 bomber industrial base 
to deteriorate before these findings are presented would be, in my 
opinion, irresponsible.
  The Bottom-Up Review concluded that, under the most likely to 
scenarios, threats to U.S. interests and national security will be 
regional, short-warning scenarios in which long-range bombers and 
carrier-based tactical aircraft would be the most critical U.S. forces 
available early in a conflict. As the centerpiece of U.S. attack 
capability, the Bottom-Up Review called for a force structure of 184 
bombers. In addition, the Air Force ``Bomber Roadmap'' of June 1992 
identified a requirement of 184 total bombers, armed with precision 
conventional munitions, to deal with a single major regional 
contingency.
  Mr. President, despite the Bottom-Up Reviews determination that it 
takes 100 bombers to fight one major regional contingency [MRC] the 
United States should retain the capability to deal with not one but two 
nearly simultaneously major regional contingencies, the DOD budget 
request funds only 100 bombers during fiscal year 1995, and only 80 
thereafter. These funding proposals are unacceptable to achieve the 
goals of the Bottom-Up Review. Four recent independent studies have all 
found that the planned DOD force structure of 80 to 100 nonstealthy 
bombers with only 20 B-2's is inadequate to deal with two major 
regional contingencies.
  It appears as if our hollow foreign policy is now going to be backed 
up by a hollow military capability.
  Mr. President, not only would our current military capability be 
threatened by this year's DOD budget request, but the future capability 
of U.S. offensive operations will be severely damaged.
  The production base for bombers in this country is rapidly 
disappearing. On Tuesday, March 1, 1994, the Secretary of Defense, Dr. 
Perry testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee and I quote:

       We don't have anything in our program to sustain a bomber 
     industrial base. This is a weakness of this program that we 
     are presenting to you.

  Dr. Perry went on to say,

       The most logical way of maintaining a bomber industrial 
     base was to continue to build more B-2s. That's not only 
     because that is the best, most effective bomber we can 
     describe to you right now, but because we could make a very 
     good use of the extra B-2s if we had them.

  Many in Congress remember Dr. Perry when he was the Deputy Secretary 
of Defense for Research and Engineering in the late 1970's.
  Others remember him as being the father of stealth technology. No 
doubt he was largely instrumental in the development of the B-2 Stealth 
bomber. To be sure, Dr. Perry recognizes the value of the unique 
contribution the B-2 bomber makes to the defense of our country. And he 
has said so, time and again.
  Mr. President, in his Senate confirmation hearing before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, Dr. Perry also said the B-2 bomber would be 
his and I quote ``platform of choice'' for the delivery of precision 
conventional munitions in a regional defense strategy. He also stated 
that the current inventory of 20 B-2's is ``too thin'' to meet the 
regional defense mission requirements of the Defense Department.
  This is why, Mr. President, preserving the B-2 industrial base is so 
important to our national security structure and the readiness of our 
Armed Forces today and in the future.
  Unfortunately, Congress, as evidenced by past actions, has proven 
incapable of planing ahead, of keeping military capability and 
readiness posture during peace time at a sufficient and responsible 
level. After both World War II and the Korean war, U.S. Armed Forces 
were critically hindered in the Korean and Vietnam wars that followed, 
because our industrial base had not only deteriorated but was 
completely gone for certain weapons.
  To underscore this important point, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili, testified in February of this 
year--

       I think all of us would have difficulty explaining how we 
     measure the readiness of our industrial base, which is 
     crucial to our ability to sustain ourselves in prolonged 
     major operations. This has been a problem throughout this 
     century; and we have been shocked time and again to discover 
     that when we most need to mobilize, vital areas are paralyzed 
     or have atrophied so far that we have to rebuild from a dead 
     start.
  Mr. President, it is incredible to me that the Department of Defense 
and this administration are willing to allow our bomber industrial base 
to deteriorate at the same time that they are seeking sanctions on 
North Korea and facing the real possibility of a future conflict on the 
Korean Peninsula.
  Since the cold war has ended, defense spending has gone down, and it 
should have. However, the United States must be able to maintain 
readiness and offensive capability if it wants to continue to influence 
world affairs. In fact, it is arguable that defense spending has 
already been cut to a point where the ability of the United States to 
project credible strength is of serious concern.
  Mr. President, the post cold war reality is such that the constraints 
that used to face dictatorships and aggressive nations are no longer in 
place. The North Koreas, the Iraqs and Irans, and the warlords and 
military regimes of this world, are no longer under the direct control 
of the Soviet Union. As a result, hotspots are emerging all over the 
world and the United States is going to need a far reaching, quick 
strike ability to respond and protect our national security interests.
  The Center for Security Policy recently released a statement 
detailing why the B-2 bomber is essential to U.S. power projection in 
the post-cold war era. The following facts, taken from this statement, 
in my mind, all illustrate the importance of stealth bombers as a rapid 
response, low cost-of-life approach to protecting and projecting our 
national security interests.
  First, the contraction of our forward-based defenses only increases 
the value of long-range manned bombers. The fact that the United States 
is increasingly becoming a home-based force with relatively small 
overseas deployments and forward bases compounds these realities.
  Second, the need to minimize the number of U.S. service personnel put 
in harm's way in the course of such operations is growing.
  Third, in the post cold-war world, a premium will be placed on those 
military systems with considerable inherent flexibility and those with 
an ability to respond to emerging dangers quickly. It seems probable 
that strategic warning in the future will often be ambiguous and in any 
event less available than heretofore. As a result, significant U.S. 
power projection capability must be ready to go at a moment's notice.
  Fourth, the experience of Desert Storm demonstrated the high value of 
precision-guided munitions and ``stealthy'' weapons-delivery systems. 
In fact, no stealth aircraft were lost during the Gulf war due to the 
advantages of surprise, capability, and mobility.
  And lastly: Experience with building and maintaining the gulf war 
coalition suggests that effective multilateral solutions to 
international problems may only be available to the extent that the 
United States is in a position credibly to act unilaterally against 
threats to its interests and stability. And that coalition warfare in 
the future is likely to place an even greater emphasis on the United 
States unique ability to contribute power projection and precision 
strike capabilities.
  Mr. President, the B-2 bomber meets every one of these five new 
realities of the post-cold-war world. The B-2 has none of the 
shortcomings of the B-1 or B-52. It is the world's most capable bomber. 
It can go anywhere in the world without air support. Launching from 
bases within the United States, the B-2 can reach anywhere in the 
world.
  Most importantly, it can enter enemy territory and perform its 
mission without the need for support aircraft. The use of stealth 
technology, as proven in Desert Storm, will allow the B-2 to reach the 
enemy's most valued targets without detection.
  If America's vital interests dictate a quick and effective show of 
force or projection of power, the B-2 is the U.S. military's most 
responsive weapon system. No ship, tank, or aircraft can match the 
immediate projection of conventional power and presence.
  Mr. President, without the $150 million to preserve a portion of the 
bomber industrial base for this coming year, our future ability to 
develop Stealth bombers may be jeopardized.
  The production of Stealth bombers is an exacting task, one that 
requires a work force with special skills. Once skilled work forces 
have been dissipated, it will take many years to requalify a 
manufacturing capability and cost significant amounts.
  This $150 million appropriation would sustain key long-lead parts 
suppliers, halt the dismantlement of critical tooling, preserve a 
production capability for spare parts within the lower-tier vendor 
structure, and retain critical elements of the work force supplier. If 
Congress were to not appropriate these funds today and then decide next 
year to buy additional B-2's, this year's $150 million investment will 
cost $600 to 800 million next year.
  To conclude, Mr. President, Gen. John Loh, Commander, Air Combat 
Command, testified the current bomber force could not support even one 
major regional contingency until 1999. A Rand Corp. study supports 
General Loh's assessment that U.S. heavy bombers lack the size, 
capability, and modernization to secure U.S. interests through the year 
2000. To quote General Loh:

       The bomber industrial base provides the Nation with a 
     unique capability, and I believe it should be preserved.

  The general stated, and I quote again:

       I believe it is unique because when you look at aircraft 
     like the B-2 with its very large composite structures, with 
     its materials that are used in it, the manufacturing 
     processes, the material processes that are used to measure 
     its radar cross section for large aircraft, that these are 
     unique to that class of aircraft, to large bomber aircraft.
       These same technologies are not resident if you were to try 
     to use a large commercial transport technology. So I believe 
     that the industrial base that produced the aircraft like the 
     B-2, represents a significant national resource that will 
     wither away over the next couple of years if it is not 
     retained.''

  The B-2 can allow the United States to reduce defense spending and 
still project power credibly, effectively, and quickly. Let us learn 
from past mistakes and not vote to erode further our bomber industrial 
base. Let us not get caught off guard again and then be forced to spend 
more money than would have been necessary, if we had prudently kept the 
industrial base going.
  Mr. President, I commend Senator Nunn for including this provision in 
his bill. I urge my Senate colleagues to support Senator Nunn's Defense 
authorization bill as provided.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I am voting today for sufficient funds to 
keep open for 1 year the production line for the B-2 bomber.
  It is important to note these funds will not actually build any 
additional bombers. It will be used to build about $75 million worth of 
spares that will be needed for the current bomber fleet. The other $75 
million will keep the production line open until the Pentagon and 
Congress determine whether they want to make any additional bombers.
  My vote to keep the production line open is not a signal that I would 
vote next year to build additional bombers. That decision is one I will 
make after evaluating the various studies underway about the bomber 
force.
  I have voted in the past to limit the production of B-2 bombers to 
20. I have not changed my view at this point, but I am persuaded by 
Senator Nunn and others that this is the only chance to use the 
production line to produce some spares during these coming months and 
to keep the production line open for the potential of additional 
production if it is determined in the coming year that that would be a 
wise course.
  I am willing to support retention of that potential, but I am not yet 
persuaded that we need to purchase additional B-2 bombers.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, Senator Conrad and I would like to engage 
in a colloquy with the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, Senator Nunn, and the distinguished chairman of the Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee, Senator Inouye, on the matter of U.S. 
strategic forces. We first wish to commend Chairman Nunn for his able 
leadership in bringing to the Senate a responsible Defense 
authorization bill which provides key support for B-52 bombers and 
Minuteman III missiles as important elements of our Nation's strategic 
defense.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank my colleagues and would be pleased to engage in a 
colloquy.
  Mr. INOUYE. I, too, would be happy to discuss important defense 
issues with my colleagues.
  Mr. DORGAN. May I first ask Chairman Nunn if he shares our view that 
a robust and balanced strategic triad consisting of heavy bombers, 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine launched ballistic 
missiles is still needed for our national defense?
  Mr. NUNN. My colleagues and I do indeed share the view that a 
balanced triad best serves our strategic deterrence needs. Knowing of 
my colleagues' particular interest in the B-52 bomber force, I would 
say that the B-52's still provide the most visible leg of our national 
resolve. They remain survivable when placed on nuclear alert status, 
and they afford conventional warfighting flexibility as they presently 
carry a wider range of conventional and nuclear munitions than any of 
our other bombers.
  Mr. CONRAD. I am pleased to hear this. Would my colleagues from 
Georgia and Hawaii then agree that it is prudent to make investments in 
B-52 modernization?
  Mr. NUNN. I would generally concur that we should provide adequate 
funding to modernize the capability of B-52's, particularly with 
conventional air-launched cruise missiles, which are also included in 
the committee bill.
  Mr. INOUYE. I agree that the Nation needs to preserve our existing 
bomber force structure and intend to provide the 
necessary appropriations to retain the existing B-52 fleet. I will also 
endeavor to keep as many of those aircraft in full active status as 
possible. We must maintain significant numbers of B-52's if we want to 
maintain current capabilities and preserve our option to improve on 
those capabilities in a cost-effective manner over the next decade.

  Mr. DORGAN. Then the chairmen share our view that the 
administration's budget request creates a bomber gap in our ability to 
respond to two major regional contingencies, as outlined in the Bottom-
Up Review?
  Mr. NUNN. Yes. Recognizing that there are a number of analyses still 
in progress, my best judgment today is that we will need to retain a 
heavy bomber force of some 184 aircraft, including 94 B-52's currently 
in the inventory, to meet these requirements.
  Mr. INOUYE. I, too, believe we need to increase our bomber force 
beyond that recommended by the administration.
  Mr. CONRAD. Would the chairmen then conclude that we need to retain 
at least two B-52 bases for the foreseeable future in order to support 
a force of this size?
  Mr. NUNN. I would concur with that assessment. I would further state 
it is prudent defense planning not to locate all B-52 assets at a 
single base.
  Mr. INOUYE. The Senators from North Dakota raise an excellent point. 
We will need two bases on house a B-52 force of the size I believe 
should be retained.
  Mr. DORGAN. There is some concern that providing funding for 
procurement of additional B-52 bombers could crowd out the money for 
operating a robust force of B-52's.
  Mr. NUNN. Let me assure my colleagues that the resources for B-52's 
and B-2's, respectively, help us to achieve important military 
objectives. The procurement of additional B-2 bombers should not be 
seen as competing for funding for operating, maintaining, and 
modernizing a substantial B-52 force.
  It is important to note that the bombers do not compete, but instead 
complement each other in combat operations. Stealthy B-2's are needed 
to economically and assuredly suppress enemy air defenses so that B-52 
bombers can attack targets with relatively inexpensive short-range 
precision munitions. There is a synergistic relationship: B-2's provide 
the defense suppression for subsequent strikes by B-52's without the 
support of tactical theater fighters or the use of expensive, standoff, 
precision weapons.

  Mr. INOUYE. My colleague from Georgia has stated it very well. In 
effect, a limited number of B-2's extend the life of more numerous B-
52's by first taking out hard targets and suppressing enemy air 
defenses. The B-2 force also saves money by reducing the numbers of 
standoff munitions needed in cases where the B-52 would face inordinate 
risks from energy attacks.
  The key point is that we will increasingly depend on military forces 
based in the United States to defend our national interests around the 
world. The ability to project power globally depends to a great measure 
on maintaining a robust heavy bomber force of B-52's and B-2's.
  May I conclude by saying that I understand that strategic forces have 
a strong impact on my colleagues' home State of North Dakota. However, 
this is much bigger than a parochial matter--this is a matter of 
national security. I compliment Senators Conrad and Dorgan for their 
efforts on behalf of our Nation's defense.
  Mr. NUNN. I, too, want to congratulate my colleagues from North 
Dakota for making a spirited and cogent case for the retention of a 
balanced triad which includes substantial forces of both B-52 bombers 
and Minuteman III missiles.
  Mr. DORGAN. I thank the Chairmen for their remarks and for their 
outstanding leadership on national defense issues.
  Mr. CONRAD. I greatly appreciate the insights of the distinguished 
Chairmen and thank them for their courtesies.


                           Amendment No. 2143

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, amendment No. 2142 
is laid aside and the Senate will now resume consideration of amendment 
No. 2143 offered by the Senator from Virginia, [Mr. Warner], regarding 
cost-of-living adjustments for the military. Debate is limited on this 
to 20 minutes, divided equally between the Senators from Virginia and 
West Virginia.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Virginia 
[Mr. Warner].
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator from Virginia, as I understand 
it, has 10 minutes under his control. I see the distinguished chairman 
of the Appropriations Committee is here. The Senator from Virginia had 
an opportunity to speak last night. I will speak again this morning, 
but in deference to our distinguished senior colleague, I would presume 
he would want to go first.
  Mr. President, I am mistaken.
  I should then proceed with reference to the COLA amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will take but a minute or 2. I see my 
distinguished colleague from Ohio, Mr. Glenn, and I understand that 
there are other Senators who wish to speak. We are going to be very 
tight on the time allocation.
  Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that Senator Burns of 
Montana be added as a cosponsor of the COLA amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, make no mistake the Warner-Sarbanes COLA 
equity amendment is about keeping promises to our servicemembers. It is 
not about programs, or possible precedence.
  The Warner-Sarbanes amendment would authorize, subject to 
appropriations, for fiscal year 1995 the sum of $376 million to the 
Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund. It is identical to the 
amendment proposed by Representative Moran which was included in the 
House version of the DOD authorization bill.
  I emphasize, this is a 1-year fix that will allow the administration 
and Congress an opportunity to resolve this inequity. The Office of 
Management and Budget and the Budget Committee both have indicated 
their willingness to work to resolve this matter.
  Mr. President, the Department of Defense authorization bill 
authorizes $263 billion, the Warner-Sarbanes COLA equity amendment 
authorizes $376 million, 0.14 percent of the total DOD budget. As a 16-
year member of the Armed Services Committee, I am confident that there 
are offsets to be found in nonreadiness discretionary accounts.
  Mr. President, although Chairman Nunn opposes our amendment, I note 
that the chairman of the Subcommittee on Force Requirements and 
Personnel, Senator Shelby, supports the Warner-Sarbanes amendment. 
Additionally, the chairman and ranking member of the Military Readiness 
and Defense Infrastructure Subcommittee, Senators Glenn and McCain, 
support the Warner-Sarbanes amendment.
  Mr. President, I am sure my colleagues will agree that these key 
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee would not support 
Warner-Sarbanes if readiness was the bill payer.
  In summary, everyone--DOD, OMB, the Budget Committee and the Armed 
Services Committee--agree that there is an inequity between military 
and civilian COLA's and this inequity presents a morale problem within 
the active duty and retired military community.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to fix this Defense problem with 
Defense funds. The Warner-Sarbanes amendment is the only Defense fix.
  Mr. President, the issue here is not about programs. It is not about 
precedents. It is about people.
  I spoke earlier today with one of the chiefs of the armed services, 
who last night, along with the other chiefs, signed a letter. I assume 
that that letter may be a salute and a march off, but it does not come 
from the hearts of the chiefs. They know this COLA amendment is most 
necessary--the sum of $376 million compared to the $263 billion-plus of 
the overall budget is a modest sum--and sends a very clear, loud 
message to all men and women wearing the uniform today; that is, it 
puts in question their future retirement should they elect to be 
career. And that is unfair.
  Year after year, the military retirees are the ones that are singled 
out to bear the greater brunt of the cuts as we try and struggle with 
the deficit reduction measures.
  Mr. President, at this time I yield to the Senator from Ohio.
  How much time do I have remaining, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Graham). The Senator has 6 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. WARNER. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Ohio.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized for 3 
minutes.
  Mr. GLENN. Thank you, Mr. President. I appreciate the yielding of 
time from my distinguished colleague from Virginia.
  As chairman of the Committee on Governmental Affairs and a member of 
the Senate Committee on Armed Services, I have long supported equity 
between the retirement systems of military and Federal civilian 
retirees.
  However, in the process of marking up S. 2182, the Department of 
Defense Authorization Act, the Armed Services Committee voted to 
recommend that a committee amendment be offered during floor 
consideration of this act that would equalize COLA dates for military 
and civil service retirees by moving the dates for military retiree 
COLA's forward and the dates for civil service COLA's back in each 
fiscal year from 1995 through 1998.
  Adoption of such a proposal, would completely rewrite last year's 
budget reconciliation bill by--in effect--increasing instructions to 
the Governmental Affairs Committee and decreasing instructions to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee.
  Now that is unprecedented. In effect, we are robbing one retirement 
system to pay for another retirement system, and that is simply wrong. 
To propose increasing military retiree COLA's at the expense of 
civilian retiree COLA's--deliberately changing budget reconciliation 
instructions already acted on and across committee lines--is not 
equitable.
  Last year, the Committee on Governmental Affairs, produced savings by 
delaying civilian retiree COLA's by 3 months. We also eliminated the 
lump sum retirement benefit for civilian retirees for a savings of 
$8.614 billion over 5 years. This lump sum benefit was a repayment of 
employees' own contributions to their retirement system. Our Federal 
civilian retirement systems are quite different from military 
retirement in that employees contribute a portion of their salary for 
their benefits. They are also different in terms of age and years of 
service requirements.
  I am sure the argument is going to be made here that we cannot afford 
to do this because of our budgeting processes here, because of what 
money is in what funds, and we do not want to set any precedent what we 
put into entitlement from other funds, and so on.
  I agree with that. But try to explain that to some of these retirees 
who have paid into the fund and are now going to be dealt with 
unfairly. It is just not fair to them.
  I support the recommendation by Senators Warner and Sarbanes. The 
Federal and military communities are unanimous in their opposition to 
the Armed Services Committee's proposal, or any alternative that would 
provide COLA's to one group of retirees at the expense of another. This 
is why military, Federal employee and postal associations and unions 
are supporting the Warner-Sarbanes amendment.
  I have a ``Dear Colleague'' letter that Senator Roth and I put on all 
the desks last night. An attachment to that is a list some 30 or more 
different groups that support the Warner-Sarbanes proposal.
  The Warner-Sarbanes amendment would rectify the COLA disparity 
between the two systems in 1995 by shifting the COLA for military 
retirees to April through a reduction in the nonreadiness accounts in 
the defense budget. This will equalize COLA treatment of both military 
and civilian retirees. As you may know, the Warner-Sarbanes amendment 
was included in the House-passed DOD reauthorization bill.
  For many years, Social Security, the Civil Service, and the military 
retirement systems have used the same adjustments for inflation. Last 
year's budget reconciliation bill changed COLA's for Federal civilian 
retirees in one way and military in another. That is what we have been 
trying to avoid. Social Security was left untouched. I have 
consistently supported equitable COLA treatment between the three 
systems, and I favor raising the COLA for military retirees. However, I 
do not believe that the proposal being recommended by the distinguished 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee is the appropriate solution to 
COLA equity. In the interest of restoring equity and fairness, I urge 
the Senate to support the Warner-Sarbanes amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, we must run a very tight time schedule.
  I thank my distinguished colleague from Ohio.
  Mr. President, how many minutes do we have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator controls 2 minutes 28 seconds.
  Mr. WARNER. I wish to allow the Senator from Maryland, and the 
Senator from South Carolina, and indeed the Senator from Texas, to 
speak, and I want to allocate the time as judiciously as I can.
  The Senator from Maryland is the principal cosponsor. He was here 
until 1 in the morning
  If the Senator could take a minute.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I say to the Senator that I will try to 
do it in less than a minute, because we do want the benefit of the 
comments of our colleagues.
  Mr. President, I very strongly support this amendment. We have to 
bring the military retirees forward to April 1.
  In the total complex of the money allocated for the Defense budget, 
it is reasonable to do this. This is related to the Defense function. 
It is not outside the Defense function, because it has an important 
impact on the morale of people now in Defense and an important impact 
on people thinking about getting into Defense, if you are not going to 
cover the retirement situation and provide these COLA's. We have done 
it consistently. We should continue to do it.
  I very much hope Members will vote for the amendment pending before 
the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 1 minute has expired.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from 
Maryland. He has been along on this amendment from the very first day. 
I now yield to the Senator from Texas 30 seconds.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I appreciate so much the senior 
Senator from Virginia giving me this time. I understand that it is bad 
precedent to use discretionary money for this kind of entitlement. But 
sometimes you have to go outside the boundaries of what is absolutely 
rational and say we have to be fair. We must be fair. Our military 
retirees have put their lives on the line. We cannot let them down.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 30 seconds of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. WARNER. I yield the remainder of time to the distinguished 
ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, the Senator from South 
Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President. The amendment Senator Warner and I offer 
is a reasonable method to correct an inequity in the effective dates of 
the annual cost-of-living adjustments between Federal civilian retirees 
and military retirees.
  As a general rule, I do not support pay raises or COLA's for anyone 
until the budget is balanced. As long as we are faced with a large 
budget deficit, I do not think anyone should expect a pay raise. 
However, I do not want the military to be forced to carry the burden 
alone. As long as others are receiving annual increases, we must give 
the military similar increases.
  Last year, when we had to determine how to adjust the cost of living 
allowances for military retirees as part of the budget reconciliation, 
we talked about the inequity between COLA adjustment for civilians and 
military retirees. When the budget reconciliation got to the floor we 
were not able to correct the difference between the civilian and 
military retirement adjustment dates.
  This year, both military and civilian retirees received their annual 
cost of living adjustments on April 1. Unless we act, next year 
civilian retirees will receive a COLA adjustment on April 1, and 
military retirees will not receive their increase until October 1. Not 
only will we have let the military retirees down, but we will not have 
been fair to them. The House has addressed this matter in their bill in 
the same manner we advocate here.
  I know some Members may not endorse the concept of paying an 
entitlement from discretionary funds, but that is the only source 
available to this committee. We will not have a budget reconciliation 
this year, so we have no other option within the jurisdiction of the 
Armed Services Committee. The initiative only addresses one year. 
Perhaps, next year, we can find a solution in a budget reconciliation 
act, if one is necessary. Until that opportunity presents itself, I 
support keeping the military retirement COLA adjustments equitable with 
civilians.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.


                         the mandatory monster

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, last year, in reconciliation instructions 
from the Budget Committee, the Armed Services Committee was directed to 
save $2.4 billion in mandatory spending over the 5 years, from fiscal 
year 1994 to 1998. The Budget Committee assumed that the Armed Services 
Committee could reduce cost-of-living adjustments for retirees under 62 
to achieve these savings. The Armed Services Committee rejected this 
approach and instead recommended delaying COLA's for all military 
retirees. Ultimately the Congress agreed to the recommendation of the 
Armed Services Committee. Under the provisions of the 1993 Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act, the COLA which would have been paid to 
military retirees on January 1, will be delayed until October 1. The 
savings from this delay amount to $376 million in budget authority and 
outlays during fiscal year 1995.
  The amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Virginia [Mr. 
Warner], and the distinguished Senator from Maryland, [Mr. Sarbanes], 
seeks to undo this reconciliation provision. The proponents no longer 
believe it is right to delay cost-of-living adjustments for military 
retirees. I agree with the proponents. I do not want to delay retiree 
benefits, but how do they propose we pay for not doing so? The 
amendment leaves it up to the Appropriations Committee, which I chair, 
to decide whether and how the increased benefit should be funded. The 
proponents would have the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill cut 
other programs to pay for the increased benefit, but they do not say 
which programs. Let us be clear about this point, the proponents want 
to cut defense--a move most military retirees would oppose.
  Let me say that again. The proponents want to cut defense, a move 
that most military retirees would oppose if they understood what is 
going on here.
  And most Senators are not listening when we come in here at night and 
debate a matter--I was supposed to start my part in the debate last 
night at 10:30 or 11 o'clock. Does that make sense? Who is listening at 
10:30 or 11, other than perhaps somebody on the west coast and they 
have had their attention drawn to other matters in recent days. And 
then I was told: You can wait until tomorrow morning. You will have 10 
minutes.
  It reminds me of the days when I was in the House of Representatives. 
On one occasion, I was promised 10 minutes by the manager of a bill but 
by the time it came to my turn, I had 30 seconds left. Well, nobody is 
listening. But at least, for the Record, the proponents would have the 
Department of Defense appropriations bill cut other programs to pay for 
the increased benefit. But they do not say which program. They want to 
cut defense, a move that most military retirees would oppose, to pay 
for military COLA's.
  It is hard for me to believe this can be right. How many times have 
we been told that we cannot cut defense any further? How many times, my 
friends, the proponents of this amendment--how many times have they 
said you cannot cut defense further? How many times have we heard the 
same colleagues decry the growth in entitlement spending? Here we are, 
with discretionary spending, which includes nondefense and defense, 
over the next 5 years we are going to operate under a freeze. We are 
going to be operating virtually under a freeze with an increase of only 
$6 billion in discretionary spending over the period, whereas mandatory 
spending will increase over that same period by $824 billion.
  Yet, the proponents of this amendment are saying do not take it out 
of mandatory. That will only be growing $824 billion over the next 5 
years. Take it out of discretionary, which includes defense. That is 
operating under a freeze.

  It does not make sense. We do not have the money. Whatever cuts are 
made will be painful. The committee could choose to recommend 
additional military personnel cuts to fund the increase--a reduction of 
this magnitude, namely $376 million, would require releasing another 
21,000 military from the force next year.
  The proponents write, in their letter, that they would not take the 
cuts out of ``readiness'' funds. They do not say where the money should 
come from. Or which programs should be out. That decision is to be made 
by the Appropriations Committee. They do not say. They say it will not 
be taken out of ``readiness'' accounts. The amendment does not say 
that. It reminds me of the messenger's words in Shakespeare's King 
Henry VI:

     One would have lingering wars with little cost;
     Another would fly swift, but wanteth wings;
     A third thinks, without expense at all,
     By guileful fair words peace may be obtain'd.

  Mr. President, the committee might choose to eliminate funding for 
the CVN-76 aircraft carrier. This would save $2.4 billion in budget 
authority, but would only save $168 million in outlays. This is less 
than one-half of the outlays required to pay for the military 
retirement COLA increase. The Department of Defense Appropriation Bill 
would have to cut not only the carrier, but two of the three Navy DDG-
51 class destroyers as well, in order to generate $376 million in 
outlay savings.
  The 1990 Budget Enforcement Act gave us a tool to control 
entitlements called PAYGO. That legislation said entitlement increases 
could only be funded if offsets were found in other mandatory spending, 
or if revenues were increased. This amendment seeks to circumvent the 
only tool we have to control entitlements. I must say to my colleagues 
that I am all for supporting military retirees COLA's, but this is not 
the right way to do it. This is a slippery slope, and if we choose to 
go down this path, we are letting entitlement spending off the hook. We 
will have emasculated the provisions of PAYGO and we will be putting 
deficit reduction at risk.
  The amendment by the Senators from Virginia and Maryland is a well-
meaning amendment and it is a seductive amendment. It promises only 
fairness to our well-deserving military retirees, by eliminating 
``disparity between effective dates for military and civilian retiree 
cost-of-living adjustments for 1995.'' Who can fault the logic? I 
cannot. Are civilian retirees somehow more deserving of an earlier 
increase in their retirement pay due to cost-of-living expenses than 
military retirees? Of course not. But like many well-meaning, logical, 
seductive proposals that come before this body, here is one with 
pernicious--pernicious results.
  The sponsors of the amendment, the distinguished Senators from 
Virginia and Maryland, are attempting to force the use of discretionary 
funds, which are under the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committee 
and which are extremely constrained, to pay for a roll back in the 1995 
delay in military COLAs from October 1, to April 1.
  But that is not the only problem with this amendment. It is not just 
that our discretionary budget has been bled white, while the march of 
the full range of our nation's entitlement programs is climbing steeply 
into the stratosphere over the next five years. It is not just that 
$376 million will be stripped from the discretionary budget to pay for 
the amendment. It is the precedent that this amendment sets by changing 
mandatory requirements into discretionary responsibilities and 
encouraging Senators to attempt to authorize further new entitlement 
programs in the same manner in other authorization bills. The technique 
is simple--authorize a new entitlement program in an authorization 
bill, subject to appropriations. This is a blatant circumvention of the 
Budget Enforcement Act restriction on legislating new or increased 
entitlements without providing offsets to cover the costs. It is a 
blatant attempt to ease the restrictions agreed upon in last year's 
reconciliation act.

  Furthermore, are my colleagues aware that this amendment is good for 
only one year, and that the COLA inequity which it attempts to address 
continues through 1998; three additional years? If this precedent is 
allowed to stand, and the COLA adjustments such as the one proposed by 
the sponsors of this amendment are made again in the three additional 
out-years and paid for out of our discretionary accounts, they will 
total $2.4 billion. This is nearly half the growth for all 
discretionary spending, defense and non-defense, over the next five 
years. This seems foolish on its face, Mr. President.
  I must repeat that I am all for supporting military retiree COLA's, 
but this is not the way to do it. This is a bad deal for the retirees 
and for the budget and we would be well advised to find another way.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 
printed in the Record a letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
opposition to this amendment. The letter is signed by the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs and Vice Chairman and General Gordon R. Sullivan, 
Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, General Merrill A. McPeak, and General C.E. 
Mundy, Jr., all opposed to this amendment.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:


                                    The Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                                   Washington, DC.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: We are writing in regard to the proposed 
     Cost of Living amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill. 
     The inequality between military and civilian cost of living 
     adjustments (COLA) presents a moral problem within the active 
     duty and retired military populations. We urge 
     reconsideration of this imbalance.
       However, in seeking this correction we are also concerned 
     about the loss of readiness attendant with a cut in O&M 
     funds. Reductions in this account would have significant 
     impact. We urge resolution of the COLA inequity which is not 
     at the expense of the President's proposed defense programs.
           Sincerely,
         John M. Shalikashvili Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
           Staff; Gordon R. Sullivan, General, USA, Chief of 
           Staff, U.S. Army; Merrill A. McPeak General, USAF Chief 
           of Staff, U.S. Air Force; W.A. Owens, Vice Chairman of 
           the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Jeremy M. Boorda Admiral, 
           USN Chief of Naval Operations; C.E. Mundy, Jr., 
           General, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

  Mr. BYRD. I also ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the 
Record a letter from Leon Panetta, former Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, addressed to Mr. Nunn, dated June 29, in 
opposition to the amendment.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

         Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
           and Budget,
                                    Washington, DC, June 29, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: As you know, the defense authorization 
     bill passed by the House on June 9 contained a provision that 
     would adjust the affective date for cost-of-living 
     adjustments (COLAs) for military retirees to the same date as 
     for civilian retirees. We understand that your committee 
     considered this issue during your markup of the authorization 
     bill, and that Senator Warner intends to offer a similar 
     amendment on the floor of the Senate during consideration of 
     your bill. I am writing to let you know that the 
     Administration does not support the Warner amendment.
       We fully recognize the inequity--created by congressional 
     action last year--of the current situation where cost-of-
     living adjustments for military retirees lag similar 
     adjustments for civilian employees. The Warner amendment is 
     unacceptable, however, for two reasons. First, the amendment 
     would create a loophole in the basic process insuring 
     discipline in reducing deficits. Current budget guidelines 
     require increases in so-called mandatory spending to be 
     offset by cuts in comparable mandatory accounts. The Warner 
     amendment would create a dangerous precedent by financing 
     increases in entitlements through cuts in discretionary 
     programs. In effect, the Warner amendment undermines the 
     basic ``pay as you go'' precept for mandatory spending. If 
     enacted, this amendment would open wide the defense budget 
     and other discretionary funds to finance politically-popular 
     entitlement programs.
       Second, as you know well, the President has insisted that 
     the defense budget not be out further. The Warner amendment, 
     no matter how well intentioned would reduce resources 
     currently budgeted for high priority defense programs. 
     Moreover, since the Warner amendment would involve $375 
     million in outlays, this would necessitate offsetting cuts of 
     $500 million in readiness-related O&M funding, or as much as 
     $2 billion in procurement if readiness funding is to be 
     insulated from the effects of the amendment. The President 
     cannot support cuts in his defense program of that magnitude, 
     no matter how deserving the cause.
       For these two reasons, I request your support in defeating 
     the Warner amendment.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Leon Panetta,
                                                         Director.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am concerned that the Senate may be 
inclined to adopt the Warner amendment without thinking through the 
consequences of such an action. I would like to pose a few questions to 
the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee, who is 
unmatched in his knowledge of the rules of the Senate and his concern 
for the integrity of those rules and the integrity of the Senate.
  I have been advised that the House Budget Committee has determined 
that there is no Budget Act point of order against the Warner 
amendment, which was included in the House bill, and that the Senate 
Budget Committee has come to the same conclusion. I have also been 
informed that the Congressional Budget Office shares this view. Is that 
the Senator's understanding?
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senator is correct in his understanding 
about the amendment included in H.R. 4301, the House-passed Defense 
authorization bill. Both the House Budget Committee and the 
Congressional Budget Office examined the amendment, and the House 
Budget Committee determined that there would be no Budget Act point of 
order in the House. The chairman of the Senate Budget Committee has not 
officially stated his committee's position on the amendment and the 
Senate has not yet acted on the amendment. However, it does not appear 
that a point of order under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 would 
lie against the amendment in the Senate.
  The amendment of the Senator would leave it up to the discretion of 
the appropriations process whether a cost of living adjustment or COLA 
would be paid to military retirees 6 months earlier than mandated under 
current law. Because the amendment itself does not actually increase 
the entitlement, it would circumvent the pay-as-you-go requirement on 
mandatory spending included in the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act.
  Mr. NUNN. Of course one reason there is no point of order against the 
Warner amendment is that there is no COLA in the Warner amendment. This 
amendment, and the identical provision in the House bill, promises a 
COLA but does not provide one. It says there will be a COLA in April 
instead of October if the Appropriations Committee can find the money.
  But I also understand that if the DOD appropriations bill actually 
followed through on the actions contemplated by this amendment, that 
there would also be no point of order against that appropriations 
measure with regard to this particular provision. In other words, it is 
not merely the first stage of the process that has no point of order; 
the whole process would escape a point of order. Does the Senator from 
West Virginia share that understanding also?
  Mr. BYRD. The Appropriations Committee would be well within the rules 
to appropriate funds to pay the increased COLA. If the authorization 
bill passes the Senate with such an amendment, there would be no point 
of order under the Budget Act against a DOD appropriation bill that 
funds such a COLA adjustment, as long as the bill is otherwise within 
its 602(b) allocation.
  Mr. NUNN. Since the Warner amendment does not actually commit the 
Government to paying an earlier COLA, maybe some people feel it is no 
different than fully funding Head Start in an authorizing bill, knowing 
the money is not really there to back it up.
  Does the chairman of the Appropriations Committee believe this 
amendment is simply a harmless expression of support for military 
retirees?
  Mr. BYRD. No, I do not. In fact, I want to make clear to the chairman 
of the Armed Services Committee that this is not the same as 
authorizing funds for a discretionary program and leaving it up to the 
discretion of the appropriations process to determine whether the 
funding level for the program should be approved. This amendment 
authorizes what has up to this point been an entitlement program, one 
that must be paid, but now it would be left up to the Appropriations 
Committee to determine whether the enhanced benefit should be paid.
  I think all Senators should be aware that if this amendment is 
adopted, it means other Defense programs will have to go unfunded or be 
cut to pay for this increase. More important, if the Senate adopts this 
approach, this will only be the beginning.
  Mr. NUNN. The Senator has touched on the crucial issue here. It is my 
understanding that because there is no point of order against this 
amendment, it is basically possible to use this procedure to get around 
the pay-as-you-go process and fund any entitlement, under the 
discretionary caps, not as a mandatory program, but by cutting 
discretionary spending.
  For example, you could offer amendments to fund the first year of a 
new health care entitlement by cutting the space station. Or the next 
time a President refuses to extend unemployment benefits without a 
mandatory offset, you could go find a discretionary offset instead, 
maybe by claiming the savings from cutting still more Federal 
employees.
  I ask the Senator from West Virginia, does he agree that this 
principle goes much farther than whether you ought to be able to cut 
the Defense budget to fund one particular entitlement program that has 
some relationship to defense. Does not this procedure put any 
discretionary program at risk from any mandatory program?
  Mr. BYRD. The Senator is correct. If this approach is supported by 
the Senate, then other entitlements could also be made subject to 
appropriations. This opens the door for any entitlement program to be 
made discretionary and to be allowed to compete with other 
discretionary programs within the ceiling on discretionary funds. I 
should say to those on the other side of this issue, who are concerned 
about cuts in defense, that this approach is a guarantee that there 
will be additional cuts in defense, a guarantee.
  Mr. NUNN. It seems to me that the procedures of the Warner amendment 
could get us into trouble, and increase voter cynicism, by making it 
easy to promise what you may not be able to deliver.
  For example, under this procedure you can, as the House bill does, 
promise a group something--in this case, COLA equity. You may not have 
actually found the cuts to pay for it, as is the case with the Warner 
amendment. But you can put this type of language in an authorizing 
bill, promising benefits you may not have the money to pay for, and get 
the word out to your group that you have a way to take care of them, 
and get their hopes up and get them to call and write in support of 
your language.
  But you are really leaving it up to someone else to pay for it. And 
if the Appropriations Committee cannot find the money, then all those 
people who had their hopes up will blame the Appropriations Committee 
for not funding entitlement benefits that are not their responsibility 
to fund in the first place.
  I ask the chairman of the Appropriations Committee if he is concerned 
about that prospect.
  Mr. BYRD. I share the Senator's concern. Congress is criticized, dare 
I say vilified in the daily press, for failing to make tough spending 
choices. While I disagree with the accusations in the media, I agree 
that adoption of this amendment is the ``business as usual'' approach 
for which the Congress is so often attacked. The amendment would 
promise to pay a benefit, but fail to allocate funds for that purpose. 
It leaves it up to somebody else; namely, the Appropriations Committee, 
to do the dirty work of making other cuts to fund this increase.
  Mr. NUNN. I would also like to ask the Senator from West Virginia if 
he shares my concern that this procedure could end up haunting us by 
allowing people to get their foot in the door on all sorts of mandatory 
benefits by using floor amendments to appropriations bills to fund 
these new benefits, for example, more generous prescription drug 
coverage. These new benefits could be funded just for 1 year, like the 
COLA is in the Warner amendment.
  We all know what would happen. A program that is in reality an 
entitlement would be started up for 1 year as a discretionary program. 
Once the program is in place, people will still feel entitled to this 
new benefit--what do they care whether we call it discretionary or 
mandatory? So you will be able to start up a new entitlement program on 
an appropriations bill. But unlike the pay as you go process, you will 
not need 5 years' worth of offsets. You will only need to offset the 
first year of your temporary entitlement.

  But the pressure will be on all of us to keep funding this new 
program. I ask the Senator from West Virginia, can he envision all the 
requests he will be getting to find the money to keep funding new 
discretionary entitlement programs, in addition to all the requests he 
already gets to fund the current discretionary programs?
  Mr. BYRD. I fear that the Senator is absolutely correct. A new 
benefit program would be authorized as a discretionary program and the 
pressure could build for the Congress to cut other worthwhile programs 
to cover the new benefit.
  The Senator well knows that the Appropriations Committee gets 
literally thousands of requests every year for discretionary funds. 
Many if not most of the requests the committee receives are for 
increases above the current level. The Senator is also aware that the 
amounts allocated in the 5-year spending plan have already put the 
squeeze on discretionary spending. As the Senator may recall, mandatory 
programs under the fiscal year 1995 budget resolution are projected to 
grow by a total of $824 billion over the 1994-99 period. During this 
period, the cumulative increase just for military and civilian 
retirement programs will be $47 billion of that amount. During that 
same period, the budget resolution permits a scant $6 billion 
cumulative increase in all discretionary outlays. That means the 
Congress will not have even enough money to continue to operate the 
Government at its current level during the next 5 years.
  It is already very challenging for the committee to meet the needs of 
the country, to make the necessary investment in our children and our 
country's infrastructure. If the Congress is to redesignate 
entitlements as discretionary programs this could cripple the 
Appropriations Committee's ability to fund the needed discretionary 
programs.
  Mr. NUNN. Finally, I am concerned that starting a new budget 
procedure that allows direct spending programs currently under the 
jurisdiction of authorizing committees to be funded in appropriations 
bills could harm both the authorizing committees and the Appropriations 
Committee.
  I would be interested to hear the observations of the Senator from 
West Virginia on this point.
  Mr. BYRD. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee makes a very 
good point. The authorizing committees should not look at this approach 
as a panacea for its budgetary troubles, because it will radically 
alter the status quo on entitlements. If the Appropriations Committee 
is called upon to determine which entitlements are ultimately funded, 
the authorizing committee can be sure that it will be the priorities of 
the members of the Appropriations Committee that have precedence, and 
not those of the authorizing committees.
  The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner] has 11 seconds.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in that brief 11 seconds, this message. 
There are three categories of individuals primarily that receive COLA 
treatment from the Federal system.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. WARNER. Civil service was not cut. Civilians got 9 months, 
military 3 months. That is not equitable. This amendment is for 1 year 
to correct that out, and it is the responsibility of the Congress.
  I ask unanimous consent to put in the Record a list of those 
organizations which oppose the amendment by the distinguished chairman.
  There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

 Federal Civilian and Military Organizations That Oppose the Nunn COLA 
          Equity Substitute to the Defense Authorization Bill

       The Retired Officers Association,
       Non Commissioned Officers Association,
       Air Force Sergeants Association,
       National Association for Uniformed Services,
       The Retired Enlisted Association,
       Enlisted Association of the National Guard Association of 
     the U.S.,
       Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association,
       National Military Family Association,
       Commissioned Officers Association,
       Marine Corps League,
       CWO and WO Association, U.S. Coast Guard,
       Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.,
       United Armed Forces Association,
       Naval Enlisted Reserve Association,
       Navy League of the U.S.,
       The Military Chaplains Association,
       U.S. Army Warrant Officers Association,
       U.S. Coast Guard CPO Association,
       National Guard Association of the U.S.,
       Naval Reserve Association,
       Reserve Officers Association,
       Air Force Association,
       Association of Military Surgeons,
       Fleet Reserve Association,
       Association of the U.S. Army,
       American Federation of Government Employees,
       American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
     Employees, AFL-CIO,
       American Foreign Service Association,
       American Psychiatric Association,
       American Postal Workers Union,
       Federally Employed Women,
       Federal Managers Association,
       Fund for Assuring an Independent Retirement,
       Graphic Communications International Union,
       International Association of Fire Fighters,
       International Federation of Professional and Technical 
     Engineers,
       International Union of Operating Engineers,
       Laborers' International Union of North America,
       Military Sea Transport Union,
       National Association of Air Traffic Specialists,
       National Association of ASCS County Office Employees,
       National Association of Federal Veterinarians,
       National Association of Government Employees,
       National Labor Relations Board Union,
       National League of Postmasters of the United States,
       National Postal Mail Handlers Union,
       National Association of Letter Carriers,
       National Association of Postal Supervisors,
       National Association of Postmasters of the United States,
       National Association of Retired Federal Employees,
       National Federation of Federal Employees,
       National Rural Letter Carriers Association,
       National Treasury Employees Union,
       Organization of Professional Employees of the Department of 
     Agriculture,
       Overseas Education Association,
       Patent Office Professional Association,
       Public Employee Department AFL-CIO,
       Senior Executives Association,
       Service Employees International Union.

Federal Civilian and Military Organizations That Support the Nunn COLA 
          Equity Substitute to the Defense Authorization Bill

       None.

  Mr. MACK. Mr. President, my vote on the Warner amendment was about 
simple fairness. America's military retirees must never be treated as 
second-class citizens. Rather than holding back military retirees' 
COLA's for 6 months after civilian retirees have received theirs, 
Senator Warner's amendment treats everybody equally.
  By the same token, it hardly makes sense to penalize civlian Federal 
retirees for our desire to treat military retirees equitably. Thus, the 
Warner amendment was the best, and fairest, solution to this problem.
  I remain concerned about funding this COLA advancement out of DOD's 
operations and maintenance funds. Unfortunately, O&M has become the 
traditional source for funding new programs and initiatives, even 
though deep O&M cuts, especially in this time of huge and ill-conceived 
slashes to the overall Defense budget, can directly impact the 
readiness of out fighting forces. I sincerely hope another source can 
be found in conference.
  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I rise to support the amendment offered by 
the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner] and the Senator from Maryland 
[Mr. Sarbanes]. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Federal Services, 
Post Office and Civil Service, I must oppose any attempt to unfairly 
place the burden of equalizing the military retiree COLA's on the backs 
of Federal retirees. At the same time, I have a strong desire to see 
that justice is done to our Nation's military retirees.
  Mr. President, I have received countless letters and phone calls from 
my constituents, as well as Federal and military retiree groups. Both 
groups feel that military retirees have been treated unfairly and that 
something must be done to bring military retiree COLA's in line with 
Federal retirees.
  Mr. President, the Warner-Sarbanes amendment accomplishes just that. 
The Warner-Sarbanes amendment attains equity between the two COLA's by 
taking discretionary funds from the Department of Defense and 
transferring them to entitlement accounts. Although this may not be a 
perfect solution, it is the best that presents itself today. I am also 
happy that Senators Warner and Sarbanes are looking forward and trying 
to solve this problem in the long term. I look forward to working with 
my colleagues in this effort and I urge my colleagues to support this 
amendment.
  Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, I am here today to voice my strong 
support for restoring equal and fair treatment to military and civilian 
retirees. I rise in support of the Warner-Sarbanes amendment, which 
will correct the inequity between civilian and military retiree cost-
of-living adjustments.
  As a result of last year's budget reconciliation law, retiree COLA's 
have been delayed from January 1 to April 1. But starting next year, 
military retiree COLA's will be further delayed until October 1. This 
added delay of military COLA's is divisive and unfair to those who have 
loyally served our country. We have an opportunity today to fix this 
inequity; to right this wrong, through the Warner-Sarbanes COLA equity 
amendment.
  The amendment will shift the cost-of-living adjustment for military 
retirees from October 1 to April 1, bringing it in line with the 
civilian retiree cost-of-living adjustment. It will restore equal 
treatment to military and civilian retirees, without robbing one group 
to pay the other.
  By contrast, the other COLA amendment would steal from the pockets of 
Federal retirees in order to fill the pockets of military retirees. It 
would set the COLA date at July 1, partially restoring the military 
retiree COLA but further delaying the civilian COLA. I do not believe 
this to be equity. Rather, the Nunn amendment would create 
divisiveness, pitting retirees in competition with each other for their 
benefits.
  Mr. President, I respect and greatly admire those that have dedicated 
their lives and careers to serving our great country. Retirees who have 
served their fellow Americans on the battlefield and in our communities 
through public service all deserve the benefits they have been 
promised. I believe that all of these men and women should be rewarded 
fairly and equally. It is not fair or right to punish service to one's 
country. Nor is it right to reward one type of service at the expense 
of another.
  Mr. President, the Warner-Sarbanes amendment restores equal COLA 
treatment to all these dedicated retirees. It is not a matter of taking 
from one group to give to another. It is a matter of simple fairness 
and equality. That is why I cosponsored the Warner-Sarbanes COLA equity 
legislation, and why I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the 
COLA equity amendment right now.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I unequivocally support regular cost-of-
living adjustments, or COLA's, to Federal retirees and I oppose efforts 
to delay, cut, or eliminate them. Those who have worked hard in service 
to our country deserve to receive full COLA's. Therefore, the amendment 
offered by Senators Warner and Sarbanes is appealing. Nonetheless, I 
feel that providing COLA's is an issue which deserves a more permanent 
solution. I applaud the Senators who have offered this proposal to 
address the situation, however, I agree with the president pro tempore 
that funding such programs using discretionary funds is an unfortunate 
precedent. Fully funding COLA's is important and we should be able to 
solve these funding issues up front and in a proper manner, without 
having to search for stopgap measures each year.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I am pleased to be a cosponsor of the 
Warner amendment to end the current disparity in cost-of-living 
adjustment payment dates for military and civil service retirees.
  Since 1969, military and civil service retirees have been treated the 
same, receiving COLA's of identical percentages on identical dates. 
However, as the result of legislation passed last year, which I 
opposed, starting in 1995 military retirees will be required to wait 
longer for their annual COLA adjustment.
  Under current law, civil service retirees' COLA's will be adjusted 
April 1, 1995, while military retirees will have to wait until the 
following October 1 for theirs.
  Unequal treatment of military and civilian retiree COLA's is unfair 
and sends the wrong message to members of our Armed Forces. Restoring 
equality is fair and helps ensure that good people will stay in the 
service.
  The Warner amendment restores COLA equity between the two groups by 
moving military retirees' 1995 COLA adjustment date from October 1 to 
April 1, the same as civil service retirees.
  The Warner amendment also requires, in effect, that its $376 million 
cost for 1995 be paid for by making reductions elsewhere in the $270 
billion defense budget. This ensures there will be no overall increase 
in Federal spending or the budget deficit as a result of the amendment.
  Enactment of the Warner amendment will take care of the COLA 
disparity for 1995. However, because of the parameters of the DOD bill, 
the amendment cannot address the unequal treatment military retirees' 
COLA's also will receive in 1996-1998 under existing law. As a 
cosponsor of the original Warner bill, S. 1805, which would end the 
COLA disparity for all these years, I will work through the budget 
process next year to address the remaining years.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time having expired, the Republican leader 
is recognized for 5 minutes.


                           Amendment No. 1851

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I know that a number of my colleagues want 
to start voting right at 10:30 or shortly thereafter because of other 
obligations so I will try to condense my statement.
  Since last January, the Senate and the House have voted on several 
amendments or bills which urged or required the President to 
unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since 
then the administration has neither moved to unilaterally lift the 
embargo, nor pushed our allies or the U.N. Security Council to move to 
lift the embargo. Even though that was a pledge that we had last time 
we had the vote: Oh, we are going to get the United Nations to do 
something. Nothing has happened.
  In fact, since January the administration has moved further from the 
views of the Congress and closer to the position of some of our NATO 
allies, namely, the British and French, and now supports the ethnic 
partition of Bosnia. Under the so-called contact group proposal--and I 
have a map of that right here. Imagine sending American troops over. 
This is going to be Bosnia, according to the contact group, the blue 
part. I guess they are going to have little roads into those areas. Do 
you want to send 40,000 Americans over there, a few thousand there, a 
few thousand here, a few thousand here, a few thousand here, a few 
thousand here? That is the contact group proposal. Bosnia would be left 
with 51 percent and 49 percent would be awarded to the aggressor Serbs, 
that is, if they withdraw from the 70 percent of Bosnia they now 
occupy. And that is a big if.
  I want to draw attention, as I said, to the map here. It was 
published earlier this week by the New York Times and shows basically 
what the deal would be like. The Bosnian Government would get 51 
percent of Bosnia in several pieces--as I pointed out 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
pieces. Presumably, these pieces would be joined by a road or air 
corridor here or there. As everyone can see by this map, Bosnia would 
become an island nation surrounded by Serbian-controlled land. And to 
enforce this partition settlement, the administration is going to ask 
the Congress to send as many as 25,000 troops because this plan cannot 
be implemented without United States ground troops.
  Mr. President, this map alone reveals why the contact group proposal 
is unworkable, unjust, and impermanent. It is a proposed settlement the 
Nunn-Warner amendment endorses.
  I cannot believe we would endorse a settlement like this, but that is 
precisely what the Nunn-Warner amendment does.
  Now, the Nunn-Warner amendment was modified last night to include 
vague language calling on the President to propose or support a U.N. 
Security Council resolution terminating the arms embargo if--another 
big if--the Serbs do not ``respond constructively.'' I do not know what 
``respond constructively'' means, Mr. President, but I do know that 
last year when the Bosnians signed the Vance/Owen peace plan and the 
Serbs did not, the United States did not go to the U.N. Security 
Council to seek a lifting of the arms embargo. In fact, since the 
Clinton administration took office, it has not proposed a resolution in 
the Security Council to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia. Even though 
they talk about doing that--if you just vote one more time, we will go 
to the U.N. and ask them to lift the arms embargo --they have not done 
it in the past nor are they going to do it in the future.
  So let us be clear. Unlike the last time, this debate is not about 
the unilateral versus the multilateral lifting of the arms embargo. The 
administration does not even support the multilateral lifting of the 
arms embargo anymore. This time the debate is about whether to support 
Bosnia's right to self-defense or to support the ethnic partition of 
Bosnia and the deployment of United States troops to enforce it.
  So it seems to me we are not trying to tell our allies what to do. I 
think the real question is how dare we tell the Bosnians what to do. 
They are people, too, and they are doing all the suffering in Bosnia. 
If you have been there, you have seen it. The Bosnians not only have 
the most troops on the ground but they also have women and children who 
are being killed because their forces do not have sufficient weapons.
  The Washington Post reported yesterday that Vice President Gore 
scolded the visiting Bosnian vice president for his efforts to lobby 
United States Congress to lift the United States arms embargo on 
Bosnia. Did Vice President Gore also complain to the British, the 
French, Danish and Spanish for sending representatives to tesify before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee against lifting the arms embargo? 
Are we to assume now that the Europeans, the U.N. and the United States 
have the right to tell the Bosnians what to do? We are not trying to 
tell anybody what to do. We appreciate our allies, the British, the 
French. We also appreciate the Bosnians, and they are the ones who are 
suffering every day and every day and every day.
  We are not dying, so we can all stand here and say, oh, well, we do 
not want to do this. We do not want to upset our allies. They are not 
dying. We are not dying. The Bosnians are dying. And while we regret 
the soldiers serving in the U.N. protection forces have been killed, 
they always have the option of leaving. The Bosnians do not--Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is their country.
  Yesterday, I received a letter from Lady Thatcher. She begins,

       I am writing these lines to say how strongly I support the 
     proposal that the United States should lift its embargo 
     against Bosnia.

  She concludes by saying that,

       As on so many occasions, it falls to the United States to 
     give the leadership required to uphold that fundamental right 
     which precedes the U.N. Charter--the right to self-defense.

  I ask unanimous consent that the entire letter be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                      Margaret, The Lady Thatcher,


                                               House of Lords,

                                           London, 29th June 1994.

       Dear Senator Dole: I am writing these lines to say how 
     strongly I support the proposal that the United States should 
     lift its arms embargo against Bosnia.
       Right from the beginning of Serbia's war of aggression--
     first against Solvenia, then Croatia and now Bosnia--the 
     embargo has worked in the interests of the aggressor. It has 
     thus prolonged the war. The Serbs inherited the great 
     majority of the armaments of the old Jugoslav National Army, 
     one of the most powerful in Europe. The victims, by contrast, 
     were deprived of the means to defend themselves. There will 
     be no end to war in Bosnia until the aggressor is convinced 
     that the balance of advantage has swung against him. With the 
     Washington Agreement between the Bosnians and the Croats some 
     of the conditions for that have been created. One thing more, 
     however, is needed: the arms embargo against Bosnia must be 
     lifted.
       There is no moral or practical justification for the UN 
     embargo. Even its legality is questionable. As on so many 
     occasions, it falls to the United States to give the 
     leadership required to uphold that fundamental right which 
     precedes the U.N. Charter--the right to self-defense.
       Kind regards.
           Yours sincerely,
                                                Margaret Thatcher.

  Mr. DOLE. As Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher was a true leader and 
a staunch supporter of NATO. She is right. This debate is about 
leadership--American leadership to support the very principles and 
values we hold so dear.
  The bottom line is that the arms embargo is immoral and illegal. And 
so, our choice is clear: support the Bosnians' fundamental right to 
self-defense and lift the embargo--or support sending thousands of 
United States troops to partition Bosnia. History will judge our 
actions here today.
  Mr. President, I placed the Thatcher letter on every desk, along with 
a letter from George Schultz, former Secretary of State, who also 
supports lifting the arms embargo. I hope these letters will be 
carefully read by my colleagues.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader's 5 minutes have expired.
  Mr. DOLE. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, there are many ironies in the debate now 
underway. A little more than a month ago the Senate debated and voted 
on this very subject. One may ask, why are we debating it again so 
soon? Does it have anything to do with the events in Bosnia and the 
former Yugoslavia themselves? The answer is no. The Defense Department 
bill happens to be on the floor of the Senate and so because of that 
event, completely unrelated to the realities on the ground where the 
fighting has and is occurring, we are debating this amendment--the same 
debate we had a month ago, the same vote we had a month ago. That is 
not the way to make policy.
  Second, I wish to read to my colleagues from a copy of an analysis of 
the effect of the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the United 
States by the American Ambassador to NATO, the person who is most 
responsible for our dealing with our NATO allies.
  Support for NATO is broad and deep in the Senate. Many of those who 
are for this amendment say they are for NATO but in fact support for 
this amendment will seriously undermine our relationship with our NATO 
allies.
  Second, we focus a lot of attention here on foreign policy--Bosnia, 
Haiti, and other places. The most important relationships are between 
the United States, its principal allies in Western Europe, and Asia, 
and with Russia. This will seriously undermine our relations with 
Russia. Third, if we now unilaterally lift this arms embargo, we give a 
green light to all of those who want to get out of the sanctions 
against Iraq. And the Turks have made it clear they will do so, the 
sanctions against Libya, the sanctions against Cuba, the sanctions 
against Haiti and possibly the sanctions, if needed, against North 
Korea. The very people voting for this amendment who want to 
unilaterally lift sanctions in Bosnia would be against others doing the 
same thing with other sanctions. But in this case, we cannot say one 
thing and do another. Other people will watch what we do, and follow.
  The American Ambassador to NATO said that, if this resolution passes, 
there would be an immediate and severe increase in tensions with our 
NATO allies now contributing troops in Bosnia. The chances of effective 
cooperation with the United Kingdom, France, and Russia in pursuit of a 
peaceful settlement will be reduced dramatically. There will be a 
severe blow to U.S. leadership in NATO. Our ability to exercise 
effective leadership in NATO and former Yugoslavia would vanish. We 
could not assure agreement to provide air support for the Bosnians if 
the Serbs launch a major offensive.
  Let this be a marker. If this resolution passes and the embargo is 
lifted, the war will inevitably widen. There will be many more deaths, 
much more ethnic cleansing, and then it will be an American war and we 
will be back here with requests to send Americans over there to do 
something about it. That is something we have been completely unwilling 
to do.
  Here we are in the U.S. Senate with some Members of this Senate 
making statements that are insulting and demeaning to our NATO allies 
when, in fact, it is they who are shouldering the burden in the former 
Yugoslavia. Right at this moment, there are nearly 15,000 of our 
allies' troops in that region, and nearly 10,000 British and French 
alone. They have suffered nearly 1,000 wounded, and 50 killed. There 
are no Americans. Yet, here we are preaching to them telling them how 
wrong and weak-kneed they are when in fact they are willing to do that 
which we have been unwilling to do. There is not a single Member of 
this Senate who would vote to send a single American combat ground 
troop to former Bosnia; not one, including those who will vote for this 
resolution, who will make tougher and brave-sounding speeches, and 
insult the very people who have their men and women on the line.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader's 5 minutes have expired.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full 
text of a statement contained in a letter from the U.S. Permanent 
Representative on the North Atlantic Council to Senator Nunn with the 
enclosure be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                     U.S. Permanent Representative


                                On the North Atlantic Council,

                                                     July 1, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Sam: In response to your request, I am enclosing my 
     analysis of some of the effects of our position at NATO--and 
     on developments regarding Bosnia--if the United States were 
     to undertake a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo in 
     Bosnia-Hercegovina.
       I salute you for your leadership on this issue.
       With best regards,
           Sincerely,
                                                       Bob Hunter.


  negative consequences of unilateral lifting of arms embargo by the 
                             united states

       An immediate and severe increase in tensions with NATO 
     allies now contributing troops to UNPROFOR in Bosnia.
       Chances of effective cooperation with the United Kingdom, 
     France, and Russia in pursuit of a peaceful settlement will 
     be reduced dramatically.
       A severe blow to U.S. leadership of NATO, including erosion 
     of support for key U.S. initiatives, such as partnership for 
     peace.
       Our ability to exercise effective leadership in NATO on 
     former Yugoslavia--and thus the likelihood of any effective 
     NATO action on enforcement of UN decisions or on eventual 
     implementation--would vanish. We could not assure agreement 
     to provide air support for the Bosnians if the Serbs launched 
     a major offensive.
       Likely withdrawal of UNPROFOR within 1-3 months. The 
     decision to withdraw could be taken almost immediately by the 
     United Kingdom, France, Spain and Russia, and it is likely 
     that the UNSC would elect not to continue the operation with 
     remaining--mostly Islamic--troop contributors.
       A destabilizing effect on our relations with Russia. 
     Yeltsin would come under intense and probably irresistible 
     pressure to make large, overt arms shipments to Serbia.
       Over 3-6 months, a noticeable erosion in enforcement of 
     economic sanctions against Serbia.
       In the short and medium term, deterioration in the Bosnian 
     Government's military and political position. The BIH forces 
     will suffer some reverses if the Serbs, as is likely, launch 
     offensives against Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, and eastern 
     enclaves. This time, however, they will have less and less 
     international support.
       An increase in Serbian harassment, hostage-taking, and 
     other measures directed against Western, and especially 
     American, civilians.
       Likely severe worsening of conditions for the civilian 
     population; a greatly diminishing flow of humanitarian aid, 
     more ethnic cleansing, more flows of refugees.
       A probable need for the United States to go it alone in 
     providing military support to the Bosnian Government.

  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I want to take 1 minute of my leader 
time to conclude.
  This is a fateful time in the Balkans. The contact group made up of 
the United States, our European allies, and Russia is trying to bring 
about a peaceful settlement. The adoption of this resolution will 
undermine and terminate that effort. There will then inevitably be a 
wider war, and it will be an American war. The British and French have 
made it clear that, if this passes, they are going to pull their forces 
out. We will not send anybody there to replace them. In that vacuum 
will come more death, more destruction, more violence, and a much 
greater demand for American participation. We do not want that on our 
hands. We should not. We should vote for the Nunn-Warner resolution. It 
is a sensible policy for the United States, and for peace in the 
region.
  Mr. President, I thank my colleagues.
  I yield the floor.


                       vote on amendment no. 2142

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question is on 
agreeing to the Levin amendment.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, have the yeas and nays been ordered?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have not been ordered.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the Levin 
amendment. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and 
the clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 45, nays 55, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 179 Leg.]

                                YEAS--45

     Baucus
     Biden
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Cohen
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Feingold
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Hatfield
     Hollings
     Jeffords
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Mathews
     McCain
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Simon
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                                NAYS--55

     Akaka
     Bennett
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boren
     Breaux
     Burns
     Campbell
     Coats
     Cochran
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Danforth
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kerrey
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Pressler
     Robb
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Wallop
     Warner
  So, the amendment (No. 2142) was rejected.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader.


                      Unanimous Consent Agreement

  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, the vote which was just completed was 
conducted under the regular 15-minute schedule.
  Several Senators have other commitments. To accommodate them, I am 
going to now ask unanimous consent that the succeeding votes in this 
sequence of votes be for 10 minutes.
  I encourage all Senators to remain on the floor and make certain that 
the clerk notes their vote so that no Senator leaves thinking he or she 
voted when in fact the vote had not been recorded. That way we can get 
through this in a way to expedite the proceedings and accommodate the 
largest number of Senators.
  However, Senators should know that further votes will occur on this 
bill. We are going to complete action on this bill before we recess. 
Any Senator who leaves during the sequence of votes runs the risk of 
missing other votes as they are necessary to complete action on this 
bill.
  Senator Nunn advises me that he knows of at least 2 votes.
  Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that the remaining votes 
of this sequence be for 10 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                       VOTE ON AMENDMENT NO. 1852

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
proceed to vote on the Nunn Bosnia amendment. This is a 10-minute vote.
  The yeas and nays are requested.
  Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from Georgia. On this question, the yeas and nays have 
been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 52, nays 48, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 180 Leg.]

                                YEAS--52

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bingaman
     Boren
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Danforth
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Leahy
     Mathews
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Murray
     Nunn
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Simon
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                                NAYS--48

     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Brown
     Coats
     Cochran
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeConcini
     Dole
     Domenici
     Durenberger
     Feingold
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Jeffords
     Kempthorne
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Roth
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Wallop
  So the amendment (No. 1852) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. MITCHELL. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                       vote on amendment no. 1851

  The VICE PRESIDENT. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
proceed to vote on the Dole Bosnia amendment.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced, yeas 50, nays 50, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 181 Leg.]

                                YEAS--50

     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Brown
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     DeConcini
     Dole
     Domenici
     Durenberger
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Jeffords
     Kempthorne
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Robb
     Roth
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Wallop

                                NAYS--50

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bingaman
     Boren
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Conrad
     Danforth
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Leahy
     Mathews
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Murray
     Nunn
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Simon
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wofford
  So the amendment (No. 1851) was rejected.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. EXON. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                       vote on amendment no. 2143

  The VICE PRESIDENT. Under the previous order, the Senate will now 
proceed to vote on the Warner COLA amendment. The yeas and nays have 
not been ordered. All those in favor will say----
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The VICE PRESIDENT. The yeas and nays are requested. Is there a 
sufficient second? There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The VICE PRESIDENT. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Feinstein). Are there any other Senators 
in the Chamber who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 88, nays 12, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 182 Leg.]

                                YEAS--88

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mathews
     McCain
     McConnell
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Thurmond
     Wallop
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                                NAYS--12

     Boren
     Byrd
     Coats
     Danforth
     Hatfield
     Inouye
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Nunn
     Rockefeller
     Simon
     Stevens
  So the amendment (No. 2143) was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. SARBANES. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  (Later the following occurred.)


                   Change of Vote--Amendment No. 2143

  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, on rollcall vote No. 182, I voted 
``no.'' It was my intention to vote ``aye.'' Therefore, I ask unanimous 
consent that I be permitted to change my vote. This will not in any way 
change the outcome of the vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kerrey). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (The foregoing tally has been changed to reflect the above order.)
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be able to 
speak for 2 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, there was another amendment at the desk, 
and had this amendment been defeated, that was an amendment that would 
have been offered. That amendment would have accomplished the equity 
between military and civilians by having both sacrifice some.
  The amendment which the Senate overwhelmingly endorsed basically 
takes the money out of the defense budget. The Senate has spoken on 
this subject. My good friend from Hawaii will now have to try to find 
the money in the Appropriations Committee. If there is money to pay for 
this, we will have to pay for it. We have simply indicated that 
sentiment. The sentiment of the Senate is very clear, so I will not 
offer the amendment that would have treated this matter in a different 
way. It would be inconsistent with this amendment. I think this result 
shows very clearly that it would not pass. So I will not offer that 
amendment. That will allow us to go, I suppose, to the next rollcall 
vote.
  Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.
  Mr. STEVENS. Madam President, I would like to be recognized for 1 
minute. I voted against this amendment that has just been adopted 
because I believe it would require the Appropriations Committee to 
reduce the end strength of our military. It is unfortunate, and I think 
we must put the Senate on notice that we will find some way to 
accommodate equity in these COLA's, without requiring a reduction in 
the already very fragile military defense force that we have today.
  Mr. COATS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.
  Mr. COATS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for 1 
minute on the amendment that was just agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I want to associate myself with the remarks 
of the Senator from Alaska, and other, that have been made here. This 
was an extraordinarily difficult decision for me, because I so strongly 
believe that we need to support those who have served in uniform.
  By the same token, we were presented here with a choice that requires 
a very tough decision. I join the Senator from Alaska, and others, in 
trying to find a way to bring equity between Federal civilian retirees 
and military retirees, but not at the expense of digging into those 
active forces now that are being strained almost beyond their ability 
to perform their task and provide for our national security. I do not 
want to dip into discretionary funds that go to readiness and active 
duty.
  I regret that we had this tough vote a few moments ago, but hope we 
can find a satisfactory resolution. I appreciate the intent of the 
Senator from Virginia. I think it is something that we all support. We 
know that we have to fund this, and it is a tough decision to make now 
rather than later.

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