[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 87 (Friday, July 1, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 1, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZA- TION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.


                           Amendment No. 2166

(Purpose: To prohibit the acquisition of Milstar satellites Nos. 5 and 
      6 and accelerate development of the Advanced EHF satellite 
                         communications system)

  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows.

       The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Bumpers] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2166.

  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       Strike line 21 on page 27 and insert in lieu thereof the 
     following:
       ``(3) For the Air Force, $12,290,296,000, of which no funds 
     may be appropriated for parts and other costs associated with 
     acquisition of Milstar satellites numbers 5 and 6, and at 
     least $39,500,000 shall be authorized to be appropriated to 
     accelerate development of the Advanced EHF satellite 
     communications system.''

  Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, last year, in the Senate, there was a 
very strong sentiment for budget deficit reduction. The people back 
home had convinced the Members of this body, indeed, all the Members of 
Congress, that they were dead serious about getting our national debt 
and our annual budget deficits under control. Nevertheless, last fall 
during the appropriations process we were really only able to kill two 
programs that had a deficit reduction impact, the advanced solid rocket 
motor and the superconducting super collider.
  Today, I heard the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Domenici], stand 
behind his desk and say that he had voted for the Warner amendment 
which would restore the COLA's for military retirees and put them on a 
par with civil service retirees to begin collecting their cost-of-
living increase April 1, 1995.
  But, the Senator added, he would not have voted for it if he thought 
it was going to come out of the defense budget.
  Now, Mr. President, I sit on the Appropriations Committee. I chair 
the Subcommittee of Appropriations on Agriculture, and I and the 
members of my subcommittee have just gone through a very traumatic 
experience of trying to come up with a bill that would come within our 
allocation, which out of $13.8 billion represents almost a $700 million 
cut below a freeze.
  Half the Members of this body came to me before we marked up that 
bill and said, oh, Senator, I have to have this fish laboratory in my 
State. I have to have this poultry lab in my State. I have to have this 
and that and the other--mostly buildings and research projects--in my 
State. I need $10 million, which, I can tell you, because of the budget 
constraints we are under, is laughable. There is not $10 million in my 
subcommittee budget for anybody.
  This morning I offered an amendment, mostly for discussion, to try to 
save the easiest $106 million the Senate will ever get an opportunity 
to save. I agreed with the Senator from Georgia because I would have 
lost if we went to a rollcall vote--nobody enjoys losing--to an 
amendment which simply prevents the Navy from buying a number of 
guidance systems for Trident missiles unless the Secretary of Defense 
asserts they are absolutely necessary.
  Now I wish to discuss for a minute this amendment dealing with what 
we call Milstar. I daresay there are precious few members of this body 
who do not serve on the Armed Services Committee and the Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee who even know what Milstar is.
  I can tell you what it is. It is between $30 billion--not millions, 
billions. It is a satellite communications system. It is a system by 
which the Department of Defense puts satellites overhead to communicate 
with the forces in the field. It was begun as a concept in 1981--and 
listen to this, Mr. President--to fight a 6-month nuclear war with the 
Soviet Union.
  That was the rationale for Milstar in 1981--to be able to communicate 
with our forces during a 6-month nuclear war with the Soviet Union. To 
sensible people it was laughable then to think about a 6-month nuclear 
war. But like everything else, we started out building it for that 
purpose. And now that there is no threat of a nuclear war and we have 
become closer allies with Russia every day, it has not slowed the 
project up one whit.
  We are still feverishly building the Milstar system at an 
unbelievable cost. I will describe just briefly, Mr. President, what it 
is.
  (Mr. MATHEWS assumed the Chair.)
  This year, 1994, we deployed the first satellite called Milstar I. It 
is up there now. The first power system has already failed. It is now 
operating on backup power. The first power system failed within a week 
after it was launched and placed in orbit. We all hope that the backup 
power system does not go out, because if it does there is another $1 
billion or so down the drain.
  We are going to launch the second Milstar I in 1995. We will have two 
of them up there then.
  Then Milstar II, of which there will be four satellites. The first 
one will be launched in 1999, and the second one launched in the year 
2000. The third one in 2001, and the fourth one in 2002.
  Mr. President, this morning people had a chance to do something 
meaningful. We debated the B-2 bomber, which the Defense Department 
does not want. At that time, I said we cannot kill a system around here 
that the Defense Department wants; now we are to the point where we 
cannot kill what they do not want.
  The budget deficit and the politics of deficit spending is not what 
it was last year because the deficit is going down. There are a lot of 
people in this body who want the deficit as an issue, not a problem to 
solve, but an issue you go back home and talk to the chamber of 
commerce about. But, in any event, the Pentagon said we do not want the 
B-2, and the Senate said we do not care what you want, we are going to 
make you take it anyway.
  Last year the Defense Department went through what is called a 
Bottom-Up Review under the aegis of then-Defense Secretary Aspin. Here 
on this chart are the people who did the Bottom-Up Review on satellite 
communications. These are not babes in the woods. These are 
professionals who understand communications: Mitre, Lincoln Labs, 
Aerospace, Applied Physics Lab. That is who the Pentagon assigned to 
study Milstar and report back on the Bottom-Up Review.
  Here is what they reported back. They said, ``Plan now for transition 
to an advanced extra high frequency system.'' Do not complete the 
Milstar system, that is what the people who know more about this system 
than anybody, said we ought to do.
  The follow-on system to the Milstar is called Milstar III. It will be 
smaller and cheaper than Milstar I and Milstar II. The first one would 
normally be launched in the year 2006. These people say launch it in 
the year 2003, advance it 3 years, and do not deploy the last four of 
the six satellites you plan to deploy.
  They went ahead to say, if you do that, you only accept a ``moderate 
risk.'' But then they said, if you will do this the way we recommend, 
not only is the risk moderate, but from fiscal year 1994 to fiscal year 
1999, you would save $2.35 billion. And in the years fiscal year 1994 
to fiscal year 2011, you will save $4.75 billion.
  Mr. President, I make no bones about it. That would be my preference. 
I would kill this sucker in a New York minute, if I had my way. I will 
tell you in a moment why I would do it, and why it would save all that 
money, and why we would not be jeopardized if we did it. You think 
about that: $4.75 billion we could save if we took the advice of the 
very people that the Pentagon appointed to tell us what to do.
  Mr. President, GAO has also studied this system. You think about the 
professionals saying we ought to kill it now, and advance the extra 
high frequency follow-on system to the year 2003. But the GAO said do 
not be quite that dramatic. Just cancel the last two, number 5 and 
number 6, Milstar II satellites. If you do that, you will save $1.5 
billion between now and the end of the century.
  I want the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from New Mexico to 
tell me how we are going to pay for that COLA this morning. I voted for 
it too. But I am willing to pay for it. Everybody else wants to write 
to the veterans of this country, and say, ``I am your best new friend 
because I voted to move your COLA up to April 1, 1995.'' If somebody in 
that group happened to write back, and say, ``That is awfully nice of 
you, but how do you intend to pay for it?'' They will say, as Will 
Rogers said, ``Heat up the Atlantic to make the German U-boats 
surface.'' That is just one of those little details we will have to 
work out.
  Here is the simple chance to go through a very low risk change to the 
Milstar program, and save $1.5 billion.
  Mr. President, I will tell you something else. Technically this 
system ain't all it is cracked up to be. You can understand what they 
are saying on Milstar. But if you understand Donald Duck, you will 
understand it a lot better because human speech sounds like quacking. 
You can understand it. But as I say, if you are a duck, you will 
understand it better.
  Let me tell you that all I am suggesting is we cancel the last two 
satellites. That is the minimum thing to do; save this money. But one 
other thing: Do you know what you are getting for all of this $30 
billion expenditure? The Milstar II that we are going to launch in 1998 
will carry what is called 192 low-data channels. Each one of those last 
four will carry 192 low-data channels. Milstar has substantial amounts 
of anti-jamming equipment on it. We have another system up there right 
now called DSCS. The Iraqis did not even try to jam it during Desert 
Storm. It worked pretty well. But do you know what the DSCS system 
carries? Thousands, and thousands of messages per satellite. This one 
carries 192 for phone and teletype messages and 32 medium-data 
channels. That is the kind of a channel you can transmit imagery with. 
You can transmit like a FAX machine. So that is what you are going to 
get, 224 messages simultaneously for Milstar II, at an unbelievable 
cost.

  Mr. President, here are the different alternatives that have been 
presented either by the people who did the Bottom-Up Review or by the 
General Accounting Office. The professionals whom I referred to a 
moment ago looked at all four of these options:
  Kill the Milstar program now and save $6 billion between now and 
2000.
  Cancel Milstar II and accelerate the advanced extra high frequency 
system to 2003, save $3.5 billion.
  Cancel Milstar II, accelerate the advanced EHF to 2000, save $2.4 
billion.
  Cancel the last two Milstar satellites, advance the follow-on system 
to 2003, and save $1.5 billion.
  The professionals opted for this one: Cancel Milstar II now, advance 
the extra high frequency, follow on Milstar III, and save $3.5 billion.
  Senator Warner's amendment on COLA's for veterans would be a piece of 
cake if we did that. But it would also be a piece of cake if we did 
what the General Accounting Office and Dale Bumpers says we ought to 
do--that is, to cancel the last two, advance the follow-on system to 
2003, and save $1.5 billion.
  Mr. President, if I am any judge of what this body will do either 
tonight or during the appropriations process, people will come storming 
through that door over there; they still will not know one thing about 
Milstar; they will walk down to the floor of the Senate, and they will 
ask the floor managers, ``What is your vote on this?'' The manager will 
say, ``Well, I have moved to table. The Bumpers amendment would 
threaten our national security. He says there are savings, but there 
really are not,'' or whatever. I might get 30 votes, but if everybody 
is in a really good mood, I might get 40 votes, and we will go right on 
spending either $3.5 billion or $1.5 billion which we have to borrow to 
spend for a system that is questionable technically and economically is 
absolutely unaffordable.
  Mr. President, let me close by saying one other thing. The Air Force 
does not want the system. They do not want it. Do you know why they are 
going ahead with it? Because the Secretary of Defense said, ``Do not 
even think about it. Do not even consider accelerating Milstar III 
until we are ready to think about it in 2006.'' I am a fan of Bill 
Perry's. I have disagreements with him, but generally I think he is a 
good Secretary of Defense.
  But you think about that. The Air Force, in charge of building the 
system, said, ``We do not even want it,'' and the Secretary of Defense 
says, ``Do not say that out loud.''
  But coming back to where I started--and I know I am not likely to 
prevail tonight, and I am not likely to prevail in the appropriations 
process, because it is impossible, No. 1, to communicate what I have 
said on the floor tonight to every Member of the U.S. Senate. But I 
must emphasize, Mr. President, that this is not me talking. I am 
repeating what the most knowledgeable people in America have said about 
Milstar. The most knowledgeable people in America have said: Advance 
the smaller, cheaper extra high frequency system, Milstar III, to the 
year 2003, save yourself $3.5 billion.
  And the General Accounting Office, whom we all turn to for expert 
advice, said they have an alternative with even lower risk. If you do 
what we say, you lower the risk from moderate to something less than 
that--we will call it a low risk. They say just cancel the last two 
Milstars, advance the extra high frequency, and save yourself $1.5 
billion.
  If this were the Mafia, they would say, ``This is an offer you cannot 
refuse.''
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Exon], is 
recognized.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas and this Senator 
have worked together on many, many attempted cuts in the defense 
program and in other areas. In fact, I think that the Senator from 
Arkansas would concur because he wrote me a letter not too long ago 
listing the Senator from Nebraska as one of the leading supporters of 
all the Members of the U.S. Senate who have cooperated with him in 
trying to cut programs. I only say that to cite my credentials as a 
budget-cutter on things that I think are not necessary.
  I happen to feel that the Senator from Arkansas, with all good 
intentions, is chasing windmills on this particular measure. We have 
given it a great deal of consideration in the Armed Services Committee 
and especially in the strategic subcommittee that I chair. I will 
simply point out that I listened very carefully to the Senator from 
Arkansas when he was talking about $13 billion here and $17 billion 
there. But when we come right down to it, I simply say that if the 
amendment were accepted, then the Senator himself has said that we 
would have a savings of $1.5 billion, as I understood his 
presentation--which was a good one--if you believe that Milstar should 
be restructured in the manner that the Senator from Arkansas has 
outlined.
  So let us get this straight. This is not a multibillion dollar 
savings that the Senator is attempting with the amendment, as I 
understand it, that he has sent to the desk, but rather about $1.5 
billion. That is a lot of money, but I want to try and put this in 
proper perspective.
  The Senator has made some suggestions that we considered very 
carefully in the Armed Services Committee. We had a meeting with the 
GAO and looked at their report, and I think the Senator would agree 
with me that the GAO report, basically, as I think the Senator from 
Arkansas indicated, would knock out Nos. 5 and 6 satellites in this 
system.
  What the Senator is recommending, which we looked at somewhat 
favorably early on before we held all of our hearings, before we 
listened to the experts that we tend to rely on on these kinds of 
matters, what the Senator from Arkansas would be betting on is that 
with the changes that he has recommended, we would be betting on an 
untried and unproven technology that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and our Commander at STRATCOM 
headquarters have all told me is not a sure bet, nor in their opinion 
is it a safe bet.
  We could go into a lot of great detail on this, but I will simply say 
that I do not criticize those whom the Senator from Arkansas said, when 
the vote comes, when they come through that door, and come down here 
and ask the chairman of the Armed Services Committee what their vote 
should be, and I think he is very accurate; he probably would not 
prevail.
  But the question is, have we looked at this in the Armed Services 
Committee? Yes, we have in great detail.
  With the tight budget that we have today, that the Secretary of 
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the STRATCOM 
headquarters, and all of the other CINC's around the world who strongly 
support this proposition as we have it, and say it is necessary, I do 
not think it is too wrong for those who have not followed in great 
detail to come to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, in this 
case Senator Nunn, and say: How should we vote on this?
  Senator Nunn can speak better for himself than I can, but I know that 
we have coordinated our efforts on this. We have taken a look at the 
realistic situation as it is, not as we would like to see it.
  We believe that with the tight budget that is facing the Secretary of 
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and all of the CINC's that 
make up the decisionmaking process would not be throwing the money away 
on a Milstar program that they did not think was basically essential to 
protect our soldiers on the front line of battle in the field.
  That is what the restructured Milstar program that was restructured 
basically at the direction of the Armed Services Committee is all 
about.
  The Senator from Arkansas has mentioned that the Air Force is no 
longer solidly behind this program. I agree with him. That is why we 
think this program is so important, that we have decided that the Air 
Force's lack of interest in this program is such that it would be far 
better to transfer this program over, in this instance, to the Navy to 
proceed with it in the future.
  Why has the Air Force lost its enthusiasm for this program? I think 
it is quite justified from the Air Force's perspective. Originally, the 
Milstar program, as accurately and correctly described by the Senator 
from Arkansas, was one that was featured and centered on the former 
Soviet Union in the case of an all-out 6-month war, or shorter.
  At that time, under that original proposal, there would be computers 
in every bomber that was involved in our force because at that time it 
was essentially an Air Force program for Air Force response in the time 
of war.
  The program, as I said earlier, has been refashioned, has been 
reduced by billions and billions of dollars, and is strongly supported, 
not like it was by the Air Force. And I emphasize again I agree with 
the Senator from Arkansas that the Air Force is no longer solidly 
behind this program for the reason that the Air Force would like to 
have the money that they have to buy more airplanes, possibly like the 
B-2 bomber that was referenced in the remarks by the Senator from 
Arkansas.
  So it is true that the Air Force has lost interest in this, but for 
the reasons that I have cited I do not believe that the opposition of 
the Air Force, which I understand and have tried to fairly and 
adequately describe here on the floor of the Senate, is not a reason 
that we should take the gamble that the Senator from Arkansas suggests 
we take by expediting the program, and in the event that it would work 
we would save $1.5 billion.
  I talked specifically about this with the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili. He absolutely said, ``Senator, 
there is no reason that I can give you why we would abandon this 
program that I believe has a good chance of working eventually as we 
provided for and bet on something in the future that I am not sure 
of.''
  Therefore, I would simply hope that when the vote comes on this, we 
will vote down the amendment offered by the Senator from Arkansas, and 
I may have further to say on this later.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas.
  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I just will make a couple points.
  First, one of the great tragedies of this whole thing is there are 
very few people here, even on the Armed Services Committee and on 
Defense appropriations, who know that we have already spent $12 billion 
on this program and will spend $17 billion more. You are talking about 
a $30 billion communications system, and surely to goodness, as we look 
around, because the Warner amendment over the years--nobody knows this 
better than the chairman of the committee--is not just $300 million 
next year. In the outyears, it runs into billions. I know the Senator 
is greatly concerned about that, as am I.
  But I want to make one final point, Mr. President: Even though the 
deficit is headed south and the good news is the deficit this year is 
going to be even $35 billion more than we had anticipated, but we have 
been on this bill for 3 days and we have not cut one dime. On the 
contrary, we have added billions by the Warner amendment.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right.
  Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
  So the amendment (No. 2166) was withdrawn.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I think we are ready to take a number of 
cleared amendments.
  I will ask my colleague from South Carolina if he is prepared to take 
a number of these cleared amendments. I think we have a number of them 
we worked out on both sides.


                           amendment no. 2167

  (Purpose: To direct the Office of Personnel Management to conduct a 
study and, if feasible, establish an interagency placement program for 
Federal employees affected by reduction in force actions, and for other 
                               purposes.)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Lautenberg, I send an 
amendment to the desk and ask it be reported.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia (Mr. Nunn), for Mr. Lautenberg, 
     for himself, Mr. Wofford, and Mr. Bradley, proposed an 
     amendment numbered 2167.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 249, insert between lines 7 and 8 the following:

     SEC.   . INTERAGENCY PLACEMENT PROGRAM FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES 
                   AFFECTED BY REDUCTION IN FORCE ACTIONS.

       (a) Study and Report.--(1) No later than 6 months after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act, the Office of Personnel 
     Management, in consultation with the Department of 
     Defense, shall conduct a study and submit a report to the 
     Congress on--
       (A) the feasibility of establishing a mandatory interagency 
     placement program for Federal employees affected by reduction 
     in force actions; and
       (B) any action taken by the Office of Personnel Management 
     under subsection (b).
       (2) In conducting the study under this section, the Office 
     of Personnel Management, in consultation with the Department 
     of Defense, shall seek comments from all Federal agencies.
       (b) Agreements To Establish Interagency Placement 
     Program.--(1) If, during the 6-month period after the date of 
     the enactment of this Act, the Office of Personnel 
     Management, in consultation with the Department of Defense, 
     determines that a Government-wide interagency placement 
     program for Federal employees affected by reduction in force 
     actions is feasible, the Office of Personnel Management may 
     enter into an agreement with each agency that agrees to 
     participate, to establish such a program. A program 
     established under this subsection shall not be required to be 
     an interagency placement program as defined under subsection 
     (c)(3).
       (2) If the Office of Personnel Management makes a 
     determination to establish a program as provided under 
     paragraph (1), the Office shall include in the report 
     submitted under subsection (a) each agency that decides not 
     to participate in the program and the reasons of the agency 
     for the decision.
       (c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       (1) the term ``agency'' means an ``Executive agency'' as 
     defined under section 105 of title 5, United States Code, 
     and--
       (A) includes the United States Postal Service and the 
     Postal Rate Commission; and
       (B) does not include the General Accounting Office;
       (2) the term ``Federal employees affected by reduction in 
     force actions'' means Federal employees who--
       (A) are scheduled to be separated from service under a 
     reduction in force pursuant to--
       (i) regulations prescribed under section 3502 of title 5, 
     United States Code; or
       (ii) procedures established under section 3595 of title 5, 
     United States Code; or
       (B) are separated from service under such a reduction in 
     force; and
       (3) the term ``interagency placement program'' means a 
     program that provides a system to require the offer of a 
     position in an agency to an employee of another agency 
     affected by a reduction in force action, if--
       (A) the position cannot be filled through a placement 
     program of the agency in which the position is located;
       (B) the employee to whom the offer is made is well 
     qualified for the offered position;
       (C)(i) the classification of the offered position is equal 
     to the classification of the employee's present or last held 
     position; or
       (ii) the basic rate of pay of the offered position is equal 
     to the basic rate of pay of the employee's present or last 
     held position; and
       (D) the geographic location of the offered position is 
     within the commuting area of--
       (i) the residence of the employee; or
       (ii) the location of the employee's present or last held 
     position.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce an amendment 
on behalf of myself and Senator Wofford. Our efforts are motivated by a 
desire to help the Federal workers who lose their jobs as a result of 
Government downsizing and by a desire to make sure the Government is 
not automatically deprived of the talent and commitment of these 
workers.
  Let me outline the problem we face and the weaknesses in our present 
efforts to address it.
  As our Federal Government continues to downsize--272,000 civilian 
positions will be eliminated over the next 5 years--increasing numbers 
of talented, skilled, and dedicated Federal employees will lose their 
jobs. In an effort to be responsive to their human needs and to 
continue to use their talents in public service, different agencies 
have developed their own placement programs to assist former employees. 
The DOD's Priority Placement Program [PPP] is, by far, the most 
successful placement program in the Government. Since PPP's inception 
in 1965, over 100,000 Defense employees have been successfully placed 
elsewhere in the Department.
  But in a 1992 report, the General Accounting Office [GAO] noted that 
the PPP was not able to meet demand for placements because fewer job 
opportunities were available. This remains the case--there are 
presently more than 17,000 registrants in the program. The placement 
rate for the PPP has declined, falling from a high of 48 percent in 
1989 to 23 percent in 1991. The decline in this percentage can be 
expected to continue during the next 5 years.
  Employees of the Department of Defense are not the only Federal 
workers to be confronted with difficulties in finding suitable Federal 
employment after becoming dislocated as a result of a reduction in 
force. Although DOD will reduce the largest number of civilian 
employees over the next few years, most Federal agencies will be 
impacted by this drawdown.
  OPM currently operates two government-wide placement programs that 
supplement other Federal agencies efforts. According to a 1992 GAO 
report, OPM's program had 4,433 registrants and made 110 placements in 
fiscal year 1991. Although OPM has made some improvements to its 
programs since 1992, there clearly remains a need for a coordinated, 
mandatory, interagency placement program.
  Senator Wofford and I introduced legislation that would require OPM 
to establish such a program within 6 months. We would like to have 
offered that bill as an amendment to S. 2182; however, there are some 
who do not believe that the timing is right for a mandatory Government-
wide placement program. Working with the distinguished chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee, the Governmental Affairs Committee, and the 
administration, we believe we have crafted an approach which will offer 
meaningful help to Federal workers without imposing arbitrary deadlines 
on the Government.

  Here is what our amendment would do. It requires the Office of 
Personnel Management [OPM] to study whether a mandatory interagency 
placement program for Federal employees affected by reduction in force 
actions is feasible. Six months after the National Defense 
Authorization Act is enacted, OPM will report back to Congress with its 
findings.
  The program that this amendment requires OPM to study, would not 
supersede intra-agency placement programs. Only when an agency is 
unable to fill a position internally through its own placement program 
will the interagency placement program go into effect. When this 
occurs, an agency would be required to offer this position to a RIF'd 
Federal employee who is well qualified, located within the commuting 
area of the position, and has either the same job classification or 
basic rate of pay as the offered position.
  In compiling this study, OPM will have sought comments from all 
Federal agencies. Those Federal agencies who are opposed to an 
interagency placement program are required to explain their opposition.
  If OPM determines that such a program is feasible, it may begin its 
implementation within this 6-month period. It can do so on a 
Government-wide basis, if all agencies agree, or it can begin a more 
limited program with just the agencies that do not object to 
participating. The point is that we can begin to provide some real help 
to Government workers within 6 months.
  Before I conclude my remarks Mr. President, I want to explain why I 
believe this program is necessary.
  Mr. President, we want to reinvent Government. We have to reduce 
Federal employment. But we do not need to arbitrarily sacrifice the 
skills and dedication of these employees. By facilitating a Federal 
employee's effort to maintain a position with the Federal Government 
through the creation of a mandatory interagency placement program, I 
believe that this program will minimize the disruption created by 
reinvention and maximize the ability of existing Federal workers to 
continue to make a contribution to this country. I hope and expect that 
6 months after this bill is enacted, OPM will report to Congress that 
such a program is feasible and necessary and that the implementation of 
a mandatory interagency placement program has begun.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared on both 
sides of the aisle. It would require the Office of Personnel 
Management, OPM, in consultation with DOD, to conduct a study of the 
feasibility of establishing a nationwide interagency placement program 
for Federal workers affected by reductions in force.
  Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection to this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2167) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2168

 (Purpose: To provide for the payment by the Department of Defense of 
                  certain stipulated civil penalties)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this is an amendment on behalf of myself and 
Senator Thurmond. The amendment would authorize Secretary of Defense to 
pay stipulated fines and penalties in the amount of $500,000 assessed 
by the Environmental Protection Agency at the West Virginia Ordnance 
works.
  I send the amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Thurmond, for 
     himself and Mr. Nunn, proposes an amendment numbered 2167.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 110, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following:

     SEC. 357. PAYMENT OF CERTAIN STIPULATED CIVIL PENALTIES.

       Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by section 
     301(17), the Secretary of Defense may pay not more than 
     $500,000 to the Hazardous Substance Superfund established 
     under section 9507 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 
     U.S.C. 9507) as payment of stipulated civil penalties 
     assessed under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
     Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et 
     seq.).

  Mr. THURMOND. I have no objection to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2168) was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2169

  (Purpose: To authorize the conveyance of the Babbitt Housing Site, 
                Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant, Nevada)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Nevada, 
Senator Reid, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Reid, proposes 
     an amendment numbered 2169.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 306, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:
       (F) A parcel of property, including any improvements 
     thereon, consisting of approximately 440 acres located at the 
     Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plan, Mineral County, Nevada, and 
     commonly referred to as the Babbitt Housing Site.
       On page 311, between lines 22 and 23, insert the following:
       (F) In the case of the parcel referred to in subparagraph 
     (F) of that subsection, by conveying without consideration 
     all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to 
     the parcel to the government of Mineral County, Nevada.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this would convey 440 acres of property of 
the former location of the Babbitt Housing Area at the Hawthorne Army 
Ammunition Plant for economic development.
  The purpose of this amendment is to expedite the conveyance to local 
government in order to generate redevelopment. The conveyance would be 
subject to GSA expedited process the committee adopted in the markup.
  Mr. REID. Mr. President, I ask that the Senate consider an amendment 
to the fiscal year 1995 Defense Authorization bill to transfer 
ownership of the site of the former Babbitt House Area at Hawthorne 
Army Ammunition Plant. Under my amendment, the property would be 
transferred to Mineral County, NV, with the understanding that this 
land would be used to encourage economic redevelopment.
  Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant is the major employer in Mineral 
County, NV. However, over the past 15 to 20 years the ammunition 
production mission has been gradually eliminated at Hawthorne. This has 
resulted in corresponding reductions in employment which have had a 
serious economic impact on Mineral County. Because this is a rural 
county, recovery from this loss of jobs is extremely difficult.
  The ammunition plant previously used this site as a family housing 
area. However, the reductions in employment and the physical 
deterioration of the facilities have made it uneconomical for the Army 
to retain the housing area. The Army has demolished the housing units 
and is in the final stages of removing debris from the site. The Army 
has sent a letter stating they no longer need this property.
  Last year's Defense Authorization Act included provisions that 
encouraged land transfers to allow local governments to maximize their 
economic redevelopment opportunities after being impacted by Base 
Closure and Realignment actions. I ask that similar opportunities be 
given to Mineral County, NV. Even though the reductions at Hawthorne 
Army Ammunition Plant are not a result of the recent Base Closure and 
Realignment process, the local economic impacts are just as severe. 
This county has been suffering economic hardships for many years 
because of reductions at this military installation. Therefore, I feel 
that we should give this rural county the same chance that are given to 
communities impacted by more recent actions.
  The Babbitt Housing site is located on a U.S. highway just outside 
the community of Hawthorne, NV. It is ideally located for future 
economic development. Therefore, I urge the Senate to approve this 
amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I offer on behalf of myself and Senator 
Nunn an amendment that would enable the Secretary of Defense to pay a 
penalty to the Hazardous Substance Superfund. The Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Technology failed to request this authority 
in the budget submission. The authority to pay this penalty is 
necessary for the Army to fulfill its obligations in this important 
area. The Secretary of Defense must ensure the services have the 
authority they need to comply with federal law and meet their legal 
obligations.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2169) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2170

(Purpose: To authorize procurement of equipment for the Joint Training, 
 Analysis and Simulation Center for the United States Atlantic Command)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment I send to the desk would 
authorize up to $10.5 million within the total authorized for other 
procurement, Navy, to allow the U.S. Atlantic Command to begin 
procurement of command, control, communications, and computer equipment 
for the Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center. This amendment 
does not add to the overall bill.
  I send the amendment to the desk and ask it be reported.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Glenn, for 
     himself, Mr. Robb, and Mr. Warner, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2170.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of Division A, Title I, Subtitle A, insert the 
     following new section:

     ``SEC.   . JOINT TRAINING, ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION CENTER.

       Of the funds authorized to be appropriated for other 
     procurement for Navy $10,500,000 shall be available for 
     procurement of command, control, communications, and computer 
     equipment for Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center 
     for the United States Atlantic Command.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, this amendment would authorize up to $10.5 
million in fiscal year 1995 for the Navy to begin procurement of 
equipment to outfit the new Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation 
Center for U.S. Atlantic Command. The amendment does not add funds to 
the bill--it simply authorizes the Navy to use funds within the Other 
Procurement, Navy account to initiate this exciting new simulation 
center.
  Earlier this year, the Subcommitee on Military Readiness and Defense 
Infrastructure which I chair visited the Norfolk Naval complex to 
discuss readiness concerns with frontline operating units. During our 
visit, we met with Adm. Paul David Miller, the Commander in Chief of 
U.S. Atlantic Command to discuss readiness within USACOM.
  During that discussion, Admiral Miller briefed the subcommittee on 
the Command's plans for a Joint Traning, Analysis and Simulation 
Center. The purpose of this Center will be to provide cost-effective 
joint training to support U.S. Atlantic Command's program for training 
joint task forces through simulation.
  Mr. President, earlier this year the Defense Science Board Task Force 
on Readiness, chaired by former Army Chief of Staff General Shy Meyer, 
found that the Defense Department did not have good systems for 
measuring joint readiness. This task force urged DOD to ``provide 
greater emphasis on the joint forces perspective of readiness.''
  In my view, this new Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center 
is exactly the kind of effort that is called for by the Defense Science 
Board Task Force on Readiness. This Center will serve to improve and 
measure joint readiness, and provide a laboratory for the improvement 
of joint tactics, throughout U.S. Alantic Command.
  This new facility will be located in the building which was 
constructed for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in Suffolk, VA. This 
building is under long-term lease to the Navy. Since the Naval Undersea 
Warfare Center is leaving this building as a result of the BRAC 
process, the use of the facility as the site for the Joint Training, 
Analysis and Simulation Center will make cost-effective use of this 
facility.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter from Mr. Louis 
Finch, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness), to Senator 
Nunn describing the Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center be 
included in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:
                                                     Office of the


                                   Under Secretary of Defense,

                                    Washington, DC, June 23, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your recent 
     inquiries regarding the Joint Training, Analysis and 
     Simulation Center (JTASC). The purpose of this Center is to 
     provide cost-effective joint training to support the United 
     States Atlantic Command's (USACOM) program for training joint 
     task forces via simulation. This program will serve to 
     improve and measure joint readiness, provide a laboratory for 
     the improvement of joint tactics, and establish a secure 
     CONUS joint environment for the demonstration of new 
     technologies. It will occupy and use as a hub for these 
     efforts the facility in Suffolk, Virginia, that is being 
     vacated by the Naval Undersea Warfare organization.
       To ensure there is no duplication of efforts, the JTASC 
     fully intends to coordinate its efforts with those of the 
     Services and other joint training efforts including those of 
     the Joint Warfighting Center and the Armed Forces Staff 
     College in Tidewater, Virginia, and those of the United 
     States Special Operations Command for Special Operations 
     Forces. It is my understanding that $10.548 million is 
     required to finance the initial phase of this effort which is 
     to procure command, control, communications and computer 
     equipment for the Center.
       Thank you for inquiry on this cost-effective program to 
     improve joint readiness and other defense matters.
           Sincerely,

                                               Louis C. Finch,

                                Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,
                                                      (Readiness).
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge its adoption.
  I know Senator Thurmond will have a view on this and other 
amendments.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2170) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2171

(Purpose: To provide for the oversight of safety and the enforcement of 
        safety-related standards at defense nuclear facilities)

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Cohen, I send an 
amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for Mr. 
     Cohen, proposes an amendment numbered 2171.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 371, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:

     SEC. 3159. SAFETY OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT AT DEFENSE 
                   NUCLEAR FACILITIES.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
       (1) Effective oversight of matters relating to nuclear 
     safety at defense nuclear facilities and enforcement of 
     nuclear safety standards at such facilities are critical to 
     ensuring the safety of the public and the workers at such 
     facilities.
       (2) The Department of Energy has not devoted adequate 
     attention historically to matters relating to nuclear safety 
     at defense nuclear facilities.
       (b) Safety at Defense Nuclear Facilities.--The Secretary of 
     Energy shall take appropriate actions to ensure that--
       (1) officials of the Department of Energy who are 
     responsible for independent oversight of matters relating to 
     nuclear safety at defense nuclear facilities and enforcement 
     of nuclear safety standards at such facilities maintain 
     independence from officials who are engaged in management of 
     such facilities;
       (2) the independent, internal oversight functions carried 
     out by the Department include, at the minimum, activities 
     relating to--
       (A) the assessment of the safety of defense nuclear 
     facilities;
       (B) the assessment of the effectiveness of Department 
     program offices in carrying out programs relating to the 
     environment, safety, health, and security at defense nuclear 
     facilities;
       (C) the provision to the Secretary of oversight reports 
     that--
       (i) contain validated technical information; and
       (ii) provide a clear analysis of the extent to which line 
     programs governing defense nuclear facilities meet applicable 
     goals for the environment, safety, health, and security at 
     such facilities; and
       (D) the development of clear performance standards to be 
     used in assessing the adequacy of the programs referred to in 
     subparagraph (C)(ii);
       (3) the Department has a system for bringing issues 
     relating to nuclear safety at defense nuclear facilities to 
     the attention of the officials of the Department (including 
     the Secretary of Energy) having authority to resolve such 
     issues in an adequate and timely manner; and
       (4) an adequate number of qualified personnel of the 
     Department are assigned to oversee matters relating to 
     nuclear safety at defense nuclear facilities and enforce 
     nuclear safety standards at such facilities.
       (c) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall submit 
     to the congressional defense committees a report describing--
       (1) the actions that the Secretary has taken or will take 
     to fulfill the requirements set forth in paragraphs (1), (2), 
     and (3) of subsection (b);
       (2) the actions in addition to the actions described under 
     paragraph (1) that the Secretary could take in order to 
     fulfill such requirements; and
       (3) the respective roles with regard to nuclear safety at 
     defense nuclear facilities of the following officials:
       (A) The Associate Deputy Secretary of Energy for Field 
     Management.
       (B) The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs.
       (C) The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental 
     Restoration and Waste Management.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, this amendment would provide the 
oversight of defense nuclear facilities of the Department of Energy by 
requiring the Secretary to provide for independent oversight of nuclear 
safety.


                        nuclear safety oversight

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, shortly after taking office last year, the 
Clinton administration undertook a significant reorganization of the 
Department of Energy. Some elements of DOE's reorganization plan were 
commendable. Others, however, caused me some concern, particularly the 
fate of the Nuclear Safety Office.
  Under DOE's reorganization, the Nuclear Safety Office was folded into 
the Office of Environment, Safety and Health. The Office of Nuclear 
Safety is responsible for providing independent safety oversight of 
DOE's nuclear facilities. It is the only inhouse check on nuclear 
safety that is independent of those who manage DOE nuclear facilities.
  Partly in response to criticisms from Members of Congress and others, 
DOE transferred the Nuclear Safety Office intact, without reducing its 
staffing, at least initially. While this was a welcome decision, the 
reorganization had other effects on nuclear safety oversight that were 
of continuing concern.
  In order to have a sound basis for evaluating this matter, last April 
I asked the General Accounting Office to review DOE's restructuring of 
nuclear safety oversight and evaluate whether the proposed changes 
would improve or detract from DOE's ability to ensure nuclear safety.
  What the GAO found is disconcerting. After its year-long review, it 
reached three basic conclusions:
  First, DOE does not currently have an adequate number of qualified 
staff to oversee nuclear safety.
  Second, DOE does not have a mechanism to ensure that nuclear safety 
issues are elevated up the chain of command until they are resolved. As 
a result, DOE may fail to take action to correct known safety problems, 
``potentially posing unnecessary risks to workers and the public.'' 
This organizational flaw is particularly important because nuclear 
safety oversight officials told GAO that some DOE nuclear plant 
managers have become less responsive since the reorganization was 
adopted last year.
  Third, most importantly, GAO found that the independence of the 
nuclear safety oversight officials is compromised because they are now 
being directed to provide management assistance to those they oversee. 
The regulators are, in effect, being told to become part of plant 
management, undermining their ability to regulate in an objective, 
independent manner.
  Mr. President, the amendment I am offering does not seek to reverse 
DOE's reorganization. But it would direct DOE to take corrective action 
in the three problem areas identified by GAO so that nuclear safety 
oversight officials the tools they need to protect the public health 
and safety.


                          inadequate staffing

  First, my amendment would direct the Secretary of Energy to ensure 
that an adequate number of qualified personnel are assigned to perform 
independent nuclear safety oversight. It leaves the Secretary the 
discretion to determine the proper staffing levels, but requires her to 
report on actions she takes to ensure adequate staffing.


                        elevating safety issues

  With regard to the second problem, my amendment would direct the 
Secretary to ensure that DOE has a system for bringing nuclear safety 
issues to the attention of officials, including the Secretary, having 
the authority to resolve them in an adequate and timely manner.
  One might think that, surely, this must already be the case, but GAO 
found that:

       Because of limitations in DOE's existing methods for 
     elevating (nuclear safety) issues, senior line management and 
     the Secretary may not even be aware of significant nuclear 
     safety issues identified by the Nuclear Safety Office.

  Getting safety issues resolved is not merely a theoretical concern. 
GAO interviews of nuclear safety oversight officials in the field 
revealed that ``in some cases line management does not adequately 
respond to the Nuclear Safety Office's findings of significant safety 
problems.'' Moreover, some safety oversight officials report that 
``line management's responsiveness to the findings of the (nuclear 
safety office) representatives has declined over the last year,'' since 
DOE reorganized.


                       compromising independence

  Finally, the most disturbing finding of the GAO is that the 
independence of the Nuclear Safety Office is being compromised.
  Under well-established regulatory principles, DOE's nuclear safety 
oversight officials should be clearly independent of the nuclear 
facility operators they oversee and regulate. Failure to ensure 
independence can result in safety being sacrificed to other priorities.
  As noted in the GAO report:

       According to the National Research Council * * * 
     independent internal oversight is still essential to `provide 
     a second set of eyes' to monitor compliance and ensure that 
     any issues are resolved before an accident or other adverse 
     event occurs. In addition, the Internatioal Atomic Energy 
     Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have emphasized 
     that regulation of nuclear safety requires independence.

  But the GAO found that such independence may be impaired because 
nuclear safety oversight officials are being required to provide wide-
ranging assistance to nuclear plant operators they oversee. After 
identifying safety problems, oversight staff are helping plant 
operators correct those problems. In fact, oversight staff have been 
instructed to place equal importance on assisting management as on 
safety oversight.
  By helping plant operators correct their safety problems, the 
oversight staff is undermining its ability to be an independent judge 
of plant operators' actions. As the GAO noted:

       Senior (safety and health) Office officials may be less 
     inclined to report on and penalize poor nuclear safety 
     performance by line management if, at the same time, their 
     staff are helping line management to solve nuclear safety 
     problems.

  Mr. President, DOE's reorganization is forcing the Nuclear Safety 
Office to become a coach and a player at the same time it is supposed 
to be the referee. While DOE may claim the team plays better as a 
result, how can we now trust the referee's calls?

  The answer is unclear, at best.
  These concerns are not limited to the GAO. Last month, the Defense 
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board pointedly raised similar questions with 
DOE. The five-member Safety Board was created by Congress in 1988 to 
provide external independent oversight, outside the authority of DOE, 
of safety at defense nuclear facilities.
  In a May 6 letter to Secretary O'Leary, the Safety Board questioned 
whether DOE is adhering to such principles as the ``clear separation of 
line management responsibilities and functions from independent 
oversight functions.'' Citing ``the potential conflicts of interest'' 
involved, the Safety Board also questioned ``the inherent problems * * 
* of having the (safety and health) office provide both technical 
support to the line (management) and also conduct independent 
oversight.''
  A companion document issued by one Safety Board member noted that 
``The congressionally mandated test for adequacy as regards protection 
of the public health and safety at defense nuclear facilities is that 
practices be comparable to those in commercial nuclear power'' and the 
rhetorically asked ``does DOE provide for comparably clear and distinct 
separation of the responsibilities of line (management) and internal 
oversight organizations?''
  The answer, as the GAO found and DOE acknowledges, is absolutely not.
  My amendment would seek to correct the nuclear safety oversight 
staff's loss of independence by directing the Secretary of Energy to 
take appropriate actions to ensure that nuclear safety oversight 
officials maintain independence from those who manage defense nuclear 
facilities.
  I discussed this matter with senior DOE officials, including Under 
Secretary Charles Curtis and Assistant Secretary for Environment, 
Safety and Health Tara O'Toole. They assure me that, in a revision to 
its reorganization, DOE intends to create a separate Oversight Office 
that will be separated by a ``Chinese wall'' from assistance 
activities. This intent is confirmed by correspondence from Energy 
Secretary Hazel O'Leary, who writes that ```independent oversight will 
be assigned to a separate Office having no responsibility for 
assistance activities.''
  While these seemingly unamibiguous statements are consistent with the 
intent and language of my amendment, what is not clear is whether this 
new structure will provide for genuine independence and separation of 
oversight from line management.
  The Safety Board has directed DOE to report to it by August 4 on 
DOE's reorganization, with special emphasis on the independence of 
nuclear safety oversight. Because of the possibility that DOE's report 
to the Safety Board could be delayed and since my amendment also 
addresses the issues of staffing and processes for elevating safety 
issues, this amendment requires a one-time report from DOE. These 
reports should shed much light on whether this new reorganization plan 
will ensure genuine independence of oversight, as required by this 
amendment.

  I intend to carefully review these reports as well as consult with 
Safety Board members about them to determine whether the new Oversight 
Office and other arrangements effectively ensure such independence.
  If it turns out that they do not, I anticipate taking action at that 
time to ensure that this amendment's requirement for independence of 
oversight is adhered to by DOE.
  Mr. President, I would also note that at DOE's request, I have added 
a provision to my amendment specifying certain minimum authorities to 
be exercised by oversight officials. These include such things as the 
authority to assess safety and assess the performance of DOE program 
offices in carrying out effective environmental, safety, health and 
security programs, as well as to develop performance measures for such 
assessments. This provision does not seek to limit the authority of 
other DOE officials, such as those in line management, who are 
responsible for conducting self-assessments of safety and performance. 
But it does ensure that oversight officials have the tools required to 
do their job.
  Mr. President, safety should be the highest priority of DOE. 
Regrettably, however, nuclear safety has traditionally ranked low in 
DOE's priorities.
  A member of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board recently 
asked DOE a series of questions, including:

       Why should Congress and the public believe DOE has acted 
     responsibly in establishing a weaker organizational 
     arrangement than that of the (Navy's) Naval Reactors 
     (program) for inherently risky weapon activities like 
     disassembling nuclear weapons? Would they in the event of an 
     accident?
       In the event of an accident or serious disarray in safety 
     matters at a defense nuclear facility, would an objective 
     investigation from outside DOE find the current organization 
     sound from a safety point of view; or would DOE management be 
     found to have been negligent?

  While posed rhetorically as questions, the implicit answers seem 
obvious.
  By helping to restore the integrity of the nuclear safety oversight 
system within DOE, this amendment could reduce the risk of such an 
accident and help ensure that we will not be found to have been 
negligent. I urge its adoption.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the Record 
excerpts from the GAO report, the letter from the Defense Nuclear 
Facilities Safety Board to Secretary O'Leary, another document from a 
Safety Board member, an article published in the New York Times 
regarding this matter, and an editorial supporting my amendment.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

    Nuclear Safety: Unresolved Issues Could Impair DOE's Oversight 
                             Effectiveness

       To be effective, the organization responsible for the 
     independent oversight and enforcement of nuclear safety 
     within DOE must posses certain basic characteristics. These 
     include (1) adequate authority, (2) independence from line 
     management, and (3) an adequate number of technically 
     qualified staff. Although the Secretary has given the ES&H 
     Office additional authority, the Office does not have a 
     systematic approach in place for raising safety concerns up 
     the management chain of command--and ultimately to the 
     Secretary--if necessary to ensure their adequate resolution. 
     Furthermore, it is not year clear whether the ES&H Office 
     will have adequate independence and a sufficient number of 
     qualified staff to effectively perform the Office's nuclear 
     safety oversight and enforcement functions.


     es&h office's ability to elevate safety issues remains limited

       In 1989, the National Research Council recommended that, 
     whenever DOE overseers find safety problems at the 
     Department's facilities, they should bring the matters to 
     responsible line managers for resolution. If these line 
     managers do not take adequate actions to correct the 
     identified problems, the oversight office should have the 
     authority to raise its concerns up the management chain of 
     command, and ultimately to the Secretary, if necessary. The 
     ES&H Office has some capability to elevate safety issues up 
     the chain of command and, ultimately, to the Secretary. 
     However, no overall systematic approach exists for elevating 
     issues, and the existing methods for doing so do not ensure 
     that safety issues will always be elevated up the DOE 
     hierarchy when necessary. As a consequence, line management--
     contractors, DOE field office officials, and DOE headquarters 
     officials--may not take adequate or timely actions to correct 
     safety problems identified by the Nuclear Safety Office, 
     potentially posing unnecessary risks to workers and the 
     public.
       Because of limitations in DOE's existing methods for 
     elevating issues, senior line management and the Secretary 
     may not be aware of significant nuclear safety issues 
     identified by the Nuclear Safety Office.
       The ES&H Office also has some informal methods for 
     elevating nuclear safety issues to the Secretary because the 
     Assistant Secretary for ES&H has access to the Secretary and 
     may raise such issues with her. According to ES&H Office 
     officials, if the Office has a concern about any safety issue 
     and cannot reach agreement with line management about 
     appropriate action, the Assistant Secretary for ES&H can seek 
     the Secretary's involvement, although this is occurring less 
     frequently now than in the past. However, these informal 
     methods do not provide assurance that oversight officials 
     will always be successful in obtaining the Secretary's 
     involvement.
       Although officials in the headquarters ES&H Office state 
     that line management has become more cooperative under the 
     new administration, in some cases line management does not 
     adequately respond to the Nuclear Safety Office's findings of 
     significant safety problems. We asked the Nuclear Safety 
     Office's senior representatives at DOE sites for their 
     assessment of the performance of line management in 
     correcting the nuclear safety problems they had identified. 
     Most responded that this performance has been mixed; in some 
     cases, line managers have performed well in correcting 
     problems cited, but in other cases they have not. Some noted 
     that, while line managers generally correct individual safety 
     deficiencies cited, such as unlabeled waste containers, they 
     tend to respond less adequately to findings of significant 
     weaknesses in safety programs, such as inadequate monitoring 
     by management of safety conditions. Some also noted that line 
     management's responsiveness to the findings of the 
     representatives has declined over the last year.


    recent changes could impair the independence of the es&h office

       The ES&H Office's independence from DOE's line management 
     is important for the Office to carry out its nuclear safety 
     oversight functions as well as its responsibilities, under 
     the Price Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, for enforcing 
     nuclear safety regulations. Past reviews of DOE by the 
     National Research Council and us have stressed the importance 
     of independent internal oversight. According to the National 
     Research Council, although line management is responsible for 
     ensuring compliance with environmental, safety, and health 
     standards, independent internal oversight is still essential 
     to ``provide a second set of eyes'' to monitor compliance and 
     ensure that any issues are resolved before an accident or 
     other adverse effect occurs. In addition, LAEA and NRC have 
     emphasized that the regulation of nuclear safety requires 
     independence. In 1988, LAEA recommended that nuclear 
     regulatory bodies be functionally autonomous and that their 
     independence in evaluating safety issues not be compromised. 
     In 1990, NRC issued, as guidance for the agency's activities, 
     five ``Principles of Good Regulation,'' one of which was 
     independence. According to the NRC Commissioner who was the 
     principal author of these principles, independence is 
     important because it enables regulators to withstand 
     pressures to sacrifice safety for mission or production 
     concerns and therefore helps to ``maintain a solid course of 
     safety.''
       Recently, the Secretary of Energy has begun to change the 
     role of the ES&H Office. The Secretary has stated that her 
     vision is for a Department ``less founded on punitive 
     oversight and more based upon mutual trust and cooperation,'' 
     While the Secretary has declared that she wants the ES&H 
     Office to continue conducting independent oversight of line 
     management's performance, she has also emphasized that she 
     wants the Office to place equal importance on providing 
     expert advice and assistance to line management.
       While the ES&H Office's new emphasis on providing 
     assistance to and collaborating with line management may help 
     to improve line management's safety performance, it could 
     impair the Office's ability to independently oversee and 
     regulate nuclear safety within DOE. Oversight conducted by 
     the ES&H Office is the only departmental source of 
     information about safety performance at DOE facilities that 
     is independent of line management. By expanding its 
     assistance activities, the Office may have less staff 
     available to perform this oversight function. For example, 
     the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Safety told 
     us that the members of his staff assigned to help establish 
     the lessons learned program at the Hanford Site could never 
     be used to assess this program in the future because they 
     ``own'' it. In addition, senior Office officials may be less 
     inclined to report on and penalize poor nuclear safety 
     performance by line management if, at the same time, their 
     staff are helping line management to solve nuclear safety 
     problems.


                              conclusions

       The ES&H Office lacks a systematic approach for elevating 
     concerns about line management's responsiveness to findings 
     up the organizational hierarchy, and ultimately to the 
     Secretary, in order to enhance the visibility of these 
     concerns. Experiences of the former Director of the Nuclear 
     Safety Office demonstrate that, without a systematic approach 
     for elevating issues to the Secretary, attempts by oversight 
     officials to obtain access to the Secretary may not be 
     successful. An institutionalized approach for elevating such 
     concerns, along with existing informal methods for doing so, 
     can help ensure that, regardless of changes in 
     administrations and styles of management, senior line 
     managers and the Secretary are made aware of significant 
     unresolved safety problems and become involved in resolving 
     those problems before any adverse effects occur.
       The Secretary's vision for a more cooperative DOE, working 
     together as a team, is laudable. However, the ES&H Office's 
     new emphasis on assisting line management could impair the 
     Office's ability to independently oversee and regulate 
     nuclear safety within DOE. Independent internal oversight of 
     operations at DOE facilities is important in order to provide 
     the ``second set of eyes'' that the National Research Council 
     envisioned and to ensure that problems are identified and 
     addressed before workers or the public are placed at risk. 
     The Office of Enforcement, in particular, needs to be able to 
     independently pursue enforcement activities. By separating 
     its assistance functions organizationally from its oversight 
     and enforcement functions, the ES&H Office could help to 
     ensure that the independence of its oversight and enforcement 
     activities is not compromised or does not give the appearance 
     of being compromised. Further, in developing the approach to 
     be used by its new Office of Oversight, the ES&H Office needs 
     to place priority on ensuring the independence of its 
     oversight activities.
       Finally, although the ES&H Office plans to increase its 
     staffing levels, it is not yet clear whether the ES&H Office 
     will have an adequate number of qualified staff to carry out 
     its nuclear safety oversight and enforcement functions. The 
     Office's expansion of its assistance activities could limit 
     the number of staff available for these functions.


                            Recommendations

       We recommend that the Secretary of Energy establish a 
     systematic approach for the ES&H Office to elevate safety 
     issues up the chain of command, and ultimately to the 
     Secretary, when necessary to obtain their adequate and timely 
     resolution. Such an approach should include (1) the routine 
     issuance of formal reports on significant unresolved issues 
     to senior line officials and the Secretary and (2) direction 
     to the ES&H Office to notify the Secretary when significant 
     unresolved issues require the Secretary's involvement. Ensure 
     the independence of the ES&H Office's oversight and 
     enforcement functions by separating these functions 
     organizationally from the Office's assistance functions and 
     by developing an oversight approach that places a priority on 
     independence; and ensure the availability in the ES&H Office 
     of an adequate number of qualified staff to oversee nuclear 
     safety and enforce nuclear safety standards by determining 
     the number of staff needed to perform these functions and 
     reassigning staff accordingly.
                                  ____

                                       Defense Nuclear Facilities,


                                                 Safety Board,

                                      Washington, DC, May 6, 1994.
     Hon. Hazel R. O'Leary,
     Secretary of Energy, Washington, DC.
       Dear Secretary O'Leary: The Board is required by statute to 
     address three specific topics in its fifth annual report to 
     Congress:
       (1) An assessment of the degree to which overall 
     administration of the Board's activities are believed to meet 
     the objectives of Congress in establishing the Board;
       (2) Recommendations for continuation, termination, or 
     modifications of the Board's functions and programs, 
     including recommendations for transition to some other 
     independent oversight arrangement if it is advisable; and
       (3) Recommendations for appropriate transition requirements 
     in the event that modifications are recommended. [42 U.S.C. 
     2286e(d)].
       To fulfill this obligation, the Board must assemble 
     information from many sources including the Department of 
     Energy (DOE).
       The Board recognizes that under your leadership the 
     Department has been undergoing a major reorganization with 
     respect to its management of defense nuclear facilities. This 
     reorganization has affected the roles and responsibilities of 
     the various offices responsible for nuclear safety at DOE, 
     and extends to the contracting process as well as to line 
     management and independent oversight assignments. To carry 
     out its statutory duty, the Board must understand in detail 
     how certain aspects of this reorganization affect the 
     Department's programs for assuring public and worker safety, 
     for minimizing risk to life and property, and for protecting 
     the environment.
       The Board has determined that the Department should provide 
     a report, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286b(d), on two subjects 
     described in detail below. This information, which is 
     necessary for development of the fifth annual report, is also 
     consistent with the thrust of Board Recommendation 92-5 
     regarding the Board's need to keep apprised of changes 
     affecting safety in the defense nuclear complex. The report 
     need not be organized strictly according to the topics 
     listed. However, the report should clearly indicate where 
     each listed topic is covered.
       The DOE Report, pursuant to section 2286b(d) regarding 
     reporting requirements, should be transmitted no later than 
     90 days after receipt of this letter.

            I. Nuclear Health and Safety Management Program

       In this area, the report should:
       A. Provide a comprehensive exposition of the functions DOE 
     deems necessary for an effective nuclear safety management 
     program. This should consider:
       1. Applicable provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and the 
     Price-Anderson Act,
       2. Comparable Federal nuclear safety programs (Naval 
     Reactors, Nuclear Regulatory Commission),
       3. Areas highlighted by Congress in establishing the 
     functions of the Board, and
       4. Integration of public and worker safety programs, 
     including radiological and non-radiological components.
       B. Provide a brief summary description of the basic safety 
     management system that the DOE currently has in place for 
     satisfying its responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act 
     ``to protect or to minimize danger to life and property''. 
     The description should include:
       1. A flow diagram that depicts the considerations of safety 
     during the life cycle of a defense nuclear facility through 
     the major stages of: design, construction, operation, 
     decontamination and decommissioning, and environmental 
     restoration.
       2. The DOE process for establishing the safety management 
     plans for specific facilities, including a discussion of how 
     the management plan is adjusted as a facility transitions 
     from one stage to the next.
       3. The principal safety elements (rules, regulations, 
     orders, standards, and other requirements) that are 
     applicable at each of the above stages.
       4. The relationship between orders and standards identified 
     in Requirements Identification Documents (RIDS) and nuclear 
     safety regulations enforceable under the Price-Anderson Act 
     Amendments; indicate how compliance and enforcement will be 
     assured for both types of requirements.
       5. The adaptation of the basic safety management system for 
     defense nuclear facilities to the assembly and disassembly of 
     weapons and the conduct of weapons testing.
       C. Provide views on the advisability and feasibility of 
     establishing a DOE complex-wide self-appraisal capability 
     modeled on that used by the Institute for Nuclear Power 
     Operations (INPO).

  II. Nuclear Safety Responsibilities and Organizational Arrangements

       In this area, the report should:
       A. Define the safety responsibilities of all organizations 
     which have such responsibilities for defense nuclear 
     facilities, including DOE Headquarters, field offices, 
     contractors, and oversight organizations. The 
     responsibilities of the following Headquarters positions 
     should be addressed: Under Secretary, Assistant Secretaries 
     for Defense Programs, Environmental Management, Environment, 
     Safety and Health, the Associate Deputy Secretary for Field 
     Management, and the Directors for the Office of Laboratory 
     Management and the Office of Intelligence and Security. Where 
     safety responsibility has been assigned and then delegated, 
     this should be indicated.
       B. State the principles embodied in assignments of safety 
     responsibility for defense nuclear facilities, and compare 
     them to parallel principles applied in commercial nuclear 
     practice. Examples for such principles are: clear separation 
     of line management responsibilities and functions from 
     independent oversight functions and responsibilities; quality 
     assurance group reporting directly to high-level management.
       C. Identify potential conflicts of interest in existing 
     safety assignments, and what actions (if any) are planned to 
     eliminate these conflicts. For example, analyze the inherent 
     problems, whether real and perceived, of having a single 
     organizational element (ES&H) provide both technical support 
     to the line and also conduct independent oversight of DOE 
     compliance and enforcement programs. Another typical conflict 
     of interest is the assignment of both line management and 
     quality assurance functions to the same individual or group.
       D. Describe in detail how the Office of Environment, Safety 
     and Health will carry out independent oversight functions in 
     light of its assigned functions to assist line organizations. 
     Indicate how this Office will simultaneously assist line 
     management, assess performance, and conduct enforcement 
     actions at the same facility. Explain the actions to be taken 
     by this office in performance-based safety compliance 
     assessments at defense nuclear facilities, where performance 
     is measured against DOE safety orders, regulations, and other 
     standards and requirements of the contract.
       E. List special measures, if any, which have been taken or 
     will be taken to ensure that safety responsibilities for 
     defense nuclear facilities are well-defined and understood 
     throughout the Department, and its contractor organization.
       F. Differentiate the relative roles of the contractor, DOE 
     line management, and DOE oversight in executive safety 
     management functions such as development and issuance of 
     safety policies, orders, rules, standards and guides.
       G. Provide an appraisal of the Department's current 
     organization and capabilities relative to the safety 
     functions identified in Item IA, and delineate changes needed 
     to strengthen the nuclear safety management program.
       If the Department wishes further information on either the 
     intent of this report or its desired content, the Board is 
     available for further discussions. Alternatively, your staff 
     should feel free to contact Mr. Robert M. Andersen, the 
     Board's General Counsel, for further guidance.
           Sincerely,
                                                   John T. Conway,
                                                         Chairman.
                                  ____


Questions Regarding the DOE Organization Promulgated by the Secretary, 
                  Department of Energy, in June, 1993


              questions about the current doe organization

                        About Safety Principles

       1. Is the DOE organization based on the following 
     principles?
       The line organization is responsible for achievement of 
     safety.
       Confirmation that safety is being achieved must be provided 
     independently by an organization entirely separate from the 
     line.
       Assignments of responsibility must be set forth clearly in 
     writing, devoid of ambiguity and vagueness, at all levels 
     from the Secretary down to and including the contractor.
       These written assignments must be clearly understood and 
     implemented and confirmed as such.
       2. If the organization is not based on these principles, on 
     what principles is it based?

                    About Organizational Objectives

       3. Two stated objectives of the current organization are 
     to:
       assign more responsibility to field organizations and away 
     from headquarters, and to
       provide assistance to line organizations by the ASEH 
     organization.
       What specific measures are needed to implement these 
     generally-stated objectives and which of them have been put 
     in place during the year that has ensued since the 
     organization was established? What measures have been 
     planned, but await implementation?

                          About Administration

       4. Before the current organization was announced about a 
     year ago the safety responsibilities of the various 
     organizations involved were embodied in documents of many 
     kinds: Orders, directives, memoranda of understanding, 
     operations manuals, and the like.
       Has a systematic effort been undertaken by the organization 
     responsible for administering the Orders and directives 
     system to assure that documents of the kind referred to have 
     been revised so as to be consistent with the new 
     organization?
       If so, what is the status of this effort?

               About Conformance with National Standards

       5. National Standard ANSI/ANS 3.2-188, ``Administration 
     Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of 
     Nuclear Power Plants,'' includes the following provision 
     under Section 3.2: Assignment of Authority and Responsibility
       ``lines for authority, responsibility and communication for 
     the plant operating and support organization shall be 
     established and defined.''
       Does the current DOE organization meet this requirement and 
     other accepted standards governing commercial nuclear 
     practice?
       6. A further provision of ANS/ANS 3.2 is as follows:
       ``The organizational structure and the functional 
     responsibility assignments shall be such that: (1) Attainment 
     of program objectives is accomplished by those who have been 
     assigned responsibility for performing work. (2) Verification 
     of conformance to established program requirements is 
     accomplished by knowledgeable individuals who do not have 
     responsibility for performing or directly supervising the 
     work.''
       Is the planned use of EH personnel to ``assist line 
     organizations'' in consonance with separation of functions 
     intended by this provision?

                             About Staffing

       7. What changes in staffing have been made to achieve the 
     objectives of the current organization? Specifically, how 
     many individuals have been permanently reassigned from 
     headquarters in DP and in EM to field organizations? How many 
     positions (as distinguished from individuals)?

                      Congressional Mandated Test

       8. The Congressionally-mandated test for adequacy as 
     regards protection of public health and safety at defense 
     nuclear facilities is that practices be comparable to those 
     in commercial nuclear power. Are the principles on which the 
     current DOE organization is based comparable to those in the 
     commercial nuclear industry? For example, does DOE provide 
     for comparably clear and distinct separation of the 
     responsibilities of line and internal oversight 
     organizations?

            Associate Deputy Secretary for Field Management

       9. Are the nuclear safety responsibilities of the Associate 
     Deputy Secretary for Field Management (ADSFM) defined?
       10. If so, have they been documented? Where?
       11. The ADSFM has responsibilities for allocation of 
     personnel and funding among field offices. Does this not 
     endow ADSFM with a large influence on safety? Will ADSFM have 
     the technical personnel qualified to judge among competing 
     demands from field offices?
       12. The Board was informed by one operations officer 
     manager that ADSFM will prepare his performance appraisal. 
     Presumably this applies to other managers of field 
     organizations which report to ADSFM. Does this not give ADSFM 
     de facto influence in safety matters?
       13. To whom will differences between ADSFM and program 
     assistant secretaries be referred for resolution?
       14. Have memoranda of understanding or other arrangements 
     concerning their respective safety responsibilities been 
     prepared? If not, will they be prepared?
       15. It seems evident that ADSFM has some safety 
     responsibilities; likewise, the reorganization places 
     heightened responsibilities on operations offices. Have these 
     entirely new relationships been defined in writing? Will they 
     be?
       16. The Facility Representative (FR) ``. . . is responsible 
     to oversee the operating contractor to ensure safety of the 
     workers and public.'' DOE Orders 5000.3B and 5490.19 define a 
     FR as ``. . . the primary point of contact with the 
     contractor and will be responsible to the appropriate DOE 
     Program Secretarial Officer (PSO) and Head of Field 
     Organizations.'' In a letter dated September 10, 1993, 
     Secretary O'Leary stated ``The Office of Field Management is 
     responsible for managing the Department's Facility 
     Representative Program and will provide the centralized 
     directions and guidance necessary to ensure a consistent 
     approach across the complex. Is there not potential for 
     conflict between Assistant Secretaries with program 
     responsibilities and ADSFM which derive from this 
     arrangement?
       17. FM is the Office of Primary Interest for DOE Orders 
     4330.4A Maintenance Management Program, 4700.1 Project 
     Management System, and 6430.1A General Design Criteria.
       What are FM's responsibilities for ensuring the adequacy 
     and implementation of these orders which relate to safety?
       Are they in possible conflict with the responsibilities of 
     line organizations in these safety-related matters?

      Assistant Secretaries with Program Responsibilities (ASPRs)

       18. Have the safety responsibilities of ASPRs been defined?
       19. Some DOE documents obtained by the Board state or imply 
     that responsibilities of ASPRs remain unchanged. Moreover, 
     under the new organization, some key officials in 
     headquarters assert that they intend to act as if there were 
     no change. As previous questions indicate, there are clear 
     indications that responsibilities of ASPRs have, in fact, 
     changed. What has been done to clarify conflicting views 
     among ADSFM, ASPRs, and operations offices?
       20. Have the changes intended by current organization as 
     between ASPRs and field organizations been addressed 
     formally, as, for instance by memoranda of understanding?
       21. The Board is aware that ASEM recognizes the need to 
     define the respective responsibilities of EM headquarters and 
     field organizations and has begun the definition process. 
     When will this process be completed?

                 Office of Laboratory Management (OLM)

       22. Does OLM have any assigned responsibility for safety?
       23. Is it not reasonable to assume that matters involving 
     OLM may arise (e.g., maintaining weapons personnel capability 
     in laboratories) which affect safety? Does this not pose the 
     likelihood that at least four DOE organizational units 
     will be involved in matters affecting safety: ADSFM, ASPR, 
     OLM, and Albuquerque Operations Office?

               Office of Intelligence and Security (OIS)

       24. What are responsibilities of OIS for emergency 
     preparedness aspects of nuclear safety? Have they been 
     defined?
       25. Discussions with DOE gave evidence of uncertainties 
     about relationships among the emergency preparedness unit, 
     and ADSFM, ASPRs and Operations offices. How and when will 
     these be clarified?

     Assistan Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health (ASEH)

       26. Should not a basic responsibility of ASEH be to assure 
     the Secretary independently, that assignment of nuclear 
     safety lines of authority and responsibilities are well 
     defined, are coherent and unambiguous, and are clearly 
     understood among the organizations involved.
       Does ASEH recognize this as a basic responsibility?
       Has ASEH satisfied itself that these requirements have been 
     met or that satisfactory progress is being made in meeting 
     them?
       27. The ASEH organization includes the organizational unit 
     responsible for the content and development of nuclear safety 
     standards; it also includes the unit responsible for 
     independently confirming that they are being met by line 
     organizations. How is the possible conflict implicit in this 
     arrangement being addressed?
       28. Specifically, for example, ASEH is responsible for the 
     adequacy of DOE nuclear safety Orders and directives. They 
     are known to be in need of improvement. The ASEH also is 
     responsible for effecting such improvements. Who is 
     responsible for independent confirmation that adequate 
     progress is being made? (The far-reaching importance of 
     nuclear safety Orders and directives to the DOE system for 
     achieving safety makes this organization conflict a 
     substantial one.)
       29. The ASEH has stated that a function of EH is to assist 
     line organization in safety matters. Does this not create a 
     conflict of interest between providing assistance and making 
     independent assessments in the matters and issues?
       30. ASEH informed a Congressional Subcommittee that ``Our 
     approach is the `teaming approach' which Tom Grumbly (EM) and 
     EH are using to begin to apply sound worker protection 
     practices at EM sites.''
       How will EH make independent oversight assessments of EM 
     safety performance while carrying out a ``teaming approach'' 
     with EM?
       31. ASEH provided the Board on April 21 with the Work Plan 
     of the Radiation Control Program Evaluation Team. With 
     respect to organization, the Plan said: ``A coherent and 
     easily understood organizational chart should be prepared'' 
     and commented as follows: ``Currently, there is no clear 
     description of the organization which would allow an outside 
     viewer to understand the hierarchical pattern as well as 
     existing functional arrangements.''
       When will an organization chart be prepared?
       For such recommendations of the Team as are approved by 
     DOE, who will issue directions for their implementation?
       32. ASEH discussed site representatives with the House 
     Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation on March 17, 1994 
     and indicated that ``protocols'' for them would be prepared. 
     Are these protocols in place?
       33. The Board understands that a reorganization of EH is 
     about to be announced. Will the issues raised above be 
     clarified or resolved by the new organization?

                                General

       34. A recent GAO report exhibits a pronounced concern about 
     the reporting relationships between ASPRs and operations 
     offices. Have any written responses been made to these 
     concerns, as, for example to GAO or Congress.
       35. If ADSFM has responsibilities affecting safety (and 
     this appears to be self-evident), will it need personnel with 
     technical qualifications? How would this need be met, given 
     that ASPRs and operations offices all have serious shortages 
     of technically qualified personnel?
       36. The GAO report referred to earlier stated that ``over 
     90 percent of 114 senior DOE managers'' believed that 
     ``organizational lines of authority and responsibilities'' 
     need to be clarified. And this was evident to GAO even before 
     the new organization was established. What measures will be 
     taken to correct this situation? What organization has the 
     principal (lead) responsibility for correcting it? Does it 
     recognize that it has this responsibility? What has been 
     done to date?
       37. What senior official, at a level above those who are 
     themselves responsible for the problems implicit in the 
     questions above, is responsible for seeing to it that they 
     are resolved?
       38. The current organization was established a year ago. 
     Why have so many of the issues implicit in the questions 
     cited above remained unresolved? Have the impediments to 
     resolved them been removed?
       39. What would be comparison between the Naval Reactors 
     organization and that for other defense-related facilities 
     show as regards strength in protecting public health and 
     safety? Is there any doubt which is stronger?
       40. The strength of the Naval Reactors organization as 
     regards safety is due to strong direction and control from 
     headquarters. In contrast, the current DOE organization 
     intends that safety responsibility be shifted away from weak 
     headquarters organizations to equally weak field ones. What 
     evidence is there that the shift will work?
       41. How does DOE rationalize having two organizational 
     arrangements, which differ so much in features which affect 
     safety, as that for naval reactors and other defense 
     facilities?
       42. A decades-old criticism of DOE safety programs is that 
     they rely too much on contractors. The previous DOE 
     organization tried to correct this, in part by strengthening 
     headquarters authority and capability. Why was this direction 
     reversed? After a year is there any evidence of improvement?
       43. When Secretary O'Leary and the Board appeared recently 
     before the Senate Committee on the Armed Services, Senator 
     Exon, presiding, characterized the Naval Reactors program as 
     a ``model one.'' Also, the Naval Reactor program is the only 
     defense-related one excluded by Congress from Board 
     oversight. Taking this as generally representative of 
     Congressional attitudes, why should Congress and the public 
     believe DOE has acted responsibility in establishing a weaker 
     organizational arrangement than that of Naval Reactors for an 
     inherently hazardous weapon activities like disassembling 
     nuclear weapons? Would they in event of an accident?
       44. Has DOE issued any instructions or directives which 
     clarify or interpret the current organization since it was 
     announced a year ago? Identify them.
       45. Has any systematic attempt been made to ascertain 
     whether safety responsibilities are understood clearly at all 
     levels in headquarters and field organizations? If yes, with 
     what results? If not, explain not having done so?
       46. Commitments to the Board were made informally over a 
     period of many months that the new organization would be 
     explained so to answer Board questions. These commitments, 
     made by the Secretary, Assistant Secretary (EM), and 
     Assistant Secretary (EH), have not been met.
       What is to be read into this failure to meet commitments 
     concerning a matter of serious safety impact. Does it suggest 
     there may be structural or other weaknesses in the 
     organization which make it difficult to answer the questions 
     posed? In any event, should not the Board have been informed 
     as to why the commitments were not kept?
       47. In the event of an accident or serious disarray in 
     safety matters at a defense nuclear facility, would an 
     objective investigation from outside DOE find the current 
     organization sound from a safety point of view; or would DOE 
     management be found to have been negligent?
       48. Would it help DOE to convene a group of professionals, 
     experienced in managing or regulating nuclear facilities, to 
     review the current organization with respect to safety at 
     defense nuclear facilities?
       49. Would it not be prudent to obtain such advice before an 
     accident with the objective of preventing it, rather than 
     afterward to analyze its causes?
       50. DOE has had difficulty in implementing Board 
     Recommendation 90-2, regarding standards, issued over four 
     years ago. Field organizations have shown far less 
     understanding of the importance of this safety matter than 
     headquarters organizations. Why shift responsibility to the 
     field in such matters, when the need is to strengthen 
     headquarters ability to elicit performance by the field?

                [From the New York Times, June 21, 1994]

         Flaws Found in Insuring Safety of Nuclear Bomb Plants

                          (By MATTHEW L. WALD)

       The ability of the Department of Energy to identify nuclear 
     safety problems at its bomb plants and bring them to the 
     attention of top officials was significantly reduced by a 
     reorganization last year, a study by the General Accounting 
     Office, an investigative arm of Congress, has found.
       The department contended that the reorganization under 
     Energy Secretary Hazel R. O'Leary had made operations more 
     efficient and had created a more cooperative atmosphere. But 
     the Congressional investigators said it had ended the arms-
     length, independent position of internal safety regulators. 
     And when safety officials disagree about a procedure or a 
     physical problem in the weapons complex, the report said, 
     ``No overall systematic approach exists for elevating issues, 
     and the existing methods for doing so do not insure that 
     safety issues will always be elevated up the D.O.E. hierarchy 
     when necessary.''
       Identifying safety problems is a special problem for the 
     department, which is mostly self-regulated. The department 
     acknowledged in the mid-1980's that it had lost control of 
     its weapons-production complex and that resulting 
     environmental problems would cost tens of billions of 
     dollars.


                       secretary defends changes

       But Energy Secretary O'Leary said in a telephone interview 
     yesterday that the reorganization, integrating safety experts 
     with line managers, was helping to clean up the department's 
     environmental and safety problems. Before, she said: ``We had 
     lots of oversight but no action as a result of the oversight. 
     We need to get outcome as opposed to reports and studies.''
       Tara O'Toole, the Assistance Secretary of Energy for 
     environment, safety and health, said in a telephone interview 
     yesterday that the department's top officials had a good 
     system for identifying, discussing and solving problems. She 
     added that she now had influence over how money was spent to 
     solve problems by all operating departments. ``That's where 
     you get authority in Government,'' she said, ``not by 
     bursting into the Secretary's office--which I have also done, 
     by the way.''
       Safety officials' access to the Secretary has been a sore 
     point in the department. When Mrs. O'Leary, took office last 
     year, the department had an internal Office of Nuclear Safety 
     that was independent of other divisions and reported directly 
     to the Secretary. But Mrs. O'Leary moved that operation into 
     the Office of Environment, Safety and Health.
       The man who headed the safety office at the time, Steven 
     Blush, sent Mrs. O'Leary a bitter letter of resignation in 
     April 1993, saying that he had lost access to her because of 
     the management structure she had established. As a result, he 
     said, he had been unable to point out a plutonium 
     contamination problem at the Lawrence Livermore National 
     Laboratory in Livermore, Calif. The situation required 
     immediate evacuation of some workers there, he said, because 
     managers of the laboratory were not adequately dealing with 
     the situation.


                            previous system

       Mr. Blush was hired in the Bush Administration by Energy 
     Secretary James D. Watkins, a retired admiral Mr. Watkins had 
     modeled the department after the Navy's nuclear submarine 
     program, of which he was a veteran, so that it provided for 
     direct reporting to him of safety problems.
       But current officials of the department question how well 
     that worked. According to Dr. O'Toole, before the 
     reorganization, safety responsibility was spread among five 
     different officers. ``Senior nuclear managers would get 
     together and scream at each other,'' she said. ``They would 
     scream at each other in Admiral Watkins's presence, and he 
     would reach a decision. I don't call that a process.''
       Mrs. O'Leary, a lawyer and former utility company 
     executive, has concentrated on policy decisions rather than 
     specific engineering questions.
       The General Accounting Office report, which was requested 
     by Senator William S. Cohen, Republican of Maine, is the 
     second in the last few weeks to question the reorganization. 
     The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, an advisory 
     group, raised similar concerns in a letter to Mrs. O'Leary on 
     May 6.
       Senator Cohen said he planned to offer an amendment to the 
     Defense Authorization Bill, which could reach the Senator 
     floor this afternoon, to restore the separation between 
     regulators and managers. The report said that Mrs. O'Leary 
     wanted nuclear safety officials ``to place equal importance 
     on providing expert advice and assistance to line 
     management,'' and that those officials, formerly regulators, 
     were now using a ``mentoring approach'' in some areas. But 
     that, the report said, made it difficult for them to 
     regulate.
       Senator Cohen said in a statement that the reorganization 
     ``is forcing the Nuclear Safety office to become a coach and 
     a player at the same time it is supposed to be the referee.''
       While the Congressional report was short on specifics, it 
     did give one example of how the new arrangements could limit 
     the effectiveness of safety regulators. One Energy Department 
     official told the investigators that his staff had helped 
     establish a ``lessons learned'' program at the Hanford 
     Nuclear Reservation near Richland, Wash., to evaluate past 
     incidents as a guide to preventing them in the future. But 
     those staff members could never assess the quality of the 
     lessons learned program, he said, because having helped 
     create it, they now ``own'' it.
       But Mrs. O'Leary and Dr. O'Toole said that in such a case, 
     the mentors would never be sent back to evaluate the program 
     they had set up. Dr. O'Toole said it was essential that 
     safety regulators be involved in operations because the 
     department could never establish safety expertise in each of 
     its many line operations.
       Mrs. O'Leary said the department was in the middle of a 
     major expansion of its safety force, and had added site 
     representatives at two places that never had them: the 
     Fernald Field Materials Center, near Cincinnati, one of the 
     most polluted of the weapons plants, and Pantex, near 
     Amarillo, Tex., where nuclear weapons are now being 
     dismantled.
       Under Mr. Watkins, the department was still running various 
     chemical processing plants and preparing to reopen a nuclear 
     reactor to make bomb fuel, but it has since given up nearly 
     all processing activities. Nevertheless, the problems may be 
     getting worse, department officials say.
       ``D.O.E. facilities may be becoming less safe, because of 
     aging infrastructure, and the huge inventory we've 
     accumulated,'' Dr. O'Toole said. ``Things aren't O.K. now 
     that we've stopped making bombs.''
       ``Hazards, you name them and we've got them,'' she said.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2171) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2172

(Purpose: To provide for use of foreign contributions for the George C. 
Marshall European Center for Security Studies, and to waive charges for 
               participants in activities of such Center)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask it 
be reported.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2172.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 249, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:

     SEC. 1068. GEORGE C. MARSHALL EUROPEAN CENTER FOR SECURITY 
                   STUDIES.

       (a) Use of Contributions.--Funds received by the United 
     States Government from the Federal Republic of Germany as its 
     fair share of the costs of the George C. Marshall European 
     Center for Security Studies shall be credited to 
     appropriations available to the Department of Defense for the 
     George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. 
     Funds so credited shall be merged with the appropriations to 
     which credited and shall be available for the Center for the 
     same purposes and the same period as the appropriations with 
     which merged.
       (b) Waiver of Charges.--(1) The Secretary of Defense may 
     waive reimbursement of the costs of conferences, seminars, 
     courses of instruction, or similar educational activities of 
     the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies 
     for military officers and civilian officials of cooperation 
     partner states of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council or 
     the Partnership for Peace if the Secretary determines that 
     attendance by such personnel without reimbursement is in the 
     national security interest of the United States.
       (2) Costs for which reimbursement is waived pursuant to 
     paragraph (1) shall be paid from appropriations available for 
     the Center.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment relates to the George C. 
Marshall Center for security studies. The amendment has been proposed 
by the Department of Defense. The Marshall Center was the brainchild of 
General John Galvin who as the commander in chief, U.S. European 
Command, and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander recognized the need for a 
center in which military and civilian defense officials of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union could become familiar with the 
manner in which defense matters are dealt with in democracies with 
market economies. General Galvin's concept has been nurtured by his two 
successors, General Shalikashvili and General Joulwan and has been 
endorsed by Secretaries of Defense Cheney, Aspin, and Perry.
  The amendment accomplishes two things. First of all, it enables the 
Department of Defense to accept and use funds contributed by the German 
Government for the operation of the Marshall Center. The Marshall 
Center is in Garmisch, Germany and the German Government is 
coadministrator of the center. Second, the amendment would allow the 
Secretary of Defense to waive reimbursement from the countries of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for the cost of the courses 
and seminars at the Marshall Center if the Secretary determines that 
such is in the national security interest of the United States. The 
countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are not 
presently able to pay those costs. NATO countries, who have been 
invited to send one student for each course, will pay the expenses for 
their students.
  Mr. President, I believe this is a very important program and I 
strongly recommend the adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2172) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2173

 (Purpose: To authorize the appointment by the Secretary of Energy of 
       certain scientific, engineering, and technical personnel)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of 
Senator Glenn.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Glenn, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2173.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 370, strike out line 3 and all that follows through 
     page 371, line 6, and insert in lieu thereof the following:

     SEC. 3158. AUTHORITY FOR APPOINTMENT OF CERTAIN SCIENTIFIC, 
                   ENGINEERING, AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL.

       (A) Authority.--(1) Nothwithstanding any provision of title 
     5, United States Code, governing appointments in the 
     competitive service and General Schedule classification and 
     pay rates, or any other provision of law, the Secretary of 
     Energy may--
       (A) establish and set the rates of pay for not more than 
     200 positions in the Department of Energy for scientific, 
     engineering, and technical personnel whose duties will relate 
     to safety at defense nuclear facilities of the Department; 
     and
       (B) appoint persons to such positions.
       (2) The rate of pay for a position established under 
     paragraph (1) may not exceed the rate of pay payable for 
     Level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of 
     title 5, United States Code.
       (3) To the maximum extent practicable, the Secretary shall 
     appoint persons under paragraph (1)(B) to the positions 
     established under paragraph (1)(A) in accordance with the 
     merit system principles set forth in section 2301 of such 
     title.
       (b) OPM Review.--The Secretary shall enter into an 
     agreement with the Director of the Office of Personnel 
     Management under which agreement the Director shall 
     periodically evaluate the use of the authority set forth in 
     subsection (a)(1).
       (2) If the Director determines as a result of such 
     evaluation that the Secretary of Energy is not appointing 
     persons to positions under such authority in a manner 
     consistent with the merit system principles set forth in 
     section 2301 of title 5, United States Code, the Director 
     shall notify the Secretary of that determination.
       (3) Upon receipt of a notification under paragraph (2), the 
     Secretary shall--
       (A) take appropriate actions to appoint persons to 
     positions under such authority in a manner consistent with 
     such principles; or
       (B) cease appointment of persons under such authority.
       (c) Termination.--(1) The authority provided under 
     subsection (a)(1) shall terminate on September 30, 1997.
       (2) An employee may not be separated from employment with 
     the Department of Energy or receive a reduction in pay by 
     reason of the termination of authority under paragraph (1).

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would strike the current 
provision in the bill providing DOE with the authority to hire under 
exceptions to civil services laws and include a substitute provision.
  I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2173) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay 
on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2174

  (Purpose: To require a study on the feasibility and advisability of 
             beaming high power laser energy to satellites)

  The NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from California 
[Mrs. Feinstein], I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mrs. Feinstein, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2174.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment 
be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 59, between lines 9 and 10, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 250. STUDY ON BEAMING HIGH POWER LASER ENERGY TO 
                   SATELLITES.

       (a) Study.--(1) The Secretary of Defense and the 
     Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space 
     Administration shall jointly carry out a study to determine 
     the cost, feasibility, and advisability of the development 
     and utilization of a system to deliver energy to satellites 
     by beaming high power laser energy from ground sources.
       (2) In determining the cost, feasibility, and advisability 
     of the system referred to in paragraph (1), the Secretary and 
     the Administrator shall take into account the impact on the 
     environment of the development and utilization of the system 
     and the effect, if any, of the development and utilization of 
     the system on the arms control efforts or obligations of the 
     United States.
       (3) In carrying out the study, the Secretary and the 
     Administrator shall consider the development of a space 
     energy laser (SELENE) system using a free electron laser at 
     the Naval Air Weapons Station, China Lake, California.
       (b) Report.--The Secretary and the Administrator shall 
     jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a 
     report on the study required under subsection (a). The 
     Secretary and the Administrator shall submit the report not 
     later than July 1, 1995.

  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support this 
amendment to require a study on the feasibility and advisability of 
beaming high power laser energy to satellites for peaceful purposes. In 
particular, one such proposal is the Space Energy Laser--SELENE--
project, located at China Lake Naval Air Warfare Center in California.
  SELENE is an innovative proposal to develop a land-based powerplant 
to supply electrical power through laser light conversion to orbiting 
satellites. This power will extend the lifetime of satellites in orbit 
and make it feasible to insert smaller satellites into geostationary 
orbit at reduced cost. The system consists of a powerful free electron 
laser and a large adaptive optic telescope to beam laser power through 
the atmosphere to satellites in geosynchronous orbit. I understand that 
the concept of beaming laser power through the atmosphere has already 
been experimentally demonstrated.
  Most of the commercial satellites over the United States could be 
reached by a laser/telescope system located on the Naval Air Weapons 
Center at China Lake. Additionally, I believe China Lake would be an 
ideal location for SELENE because it has 260 clear days per year, more 
than any other feasible site in the United States; astronomical seeing 
is excellent, and the area is entirely surrounded by restricted 
airspace. In addition, SELENE would benefit California and the China 
Lake area by potentially bringing over 300 jobs and an annual operating 
budget of $50 million to the region.
  The Department of Defense should study the SELENE project and other 
innovative proposals, and conduct an environmental impact statement at 
the China Lake site. Further, because the SELENE project could be 
extremely beneficial to military, civil, and commercial users, a 
cooperative agreement with NASA should also be explored. This 
innovative proposal could lead to reduced satellite costs for both 
industry and Government, and would increase U.S. competitiveness.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment so that the Congress 
will be better informed and better able to make decisions on high power 
laser energy projects, such as SELENE, that could provide long-term 
benefits to the United States and the entire international community.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment requires the Secretary of 
Defense to study the cost and feasibility of the space energy laser at 
China Lake Naval Air Weapons Station.
  I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. THURMOND. We have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2174) was agreed to.
  The THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2175

 (Purpose: To improve the authority for Army industrial facilities to 
    sell manufactured articles and services to persons outside the 
                         Department of Defense)

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Nickles, I send an 
amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration. This is 
an amendment to authorize industrial funds for facilities to engage in 
the sale of nondefense goods and services.
  Mr. President, I understand this amendment has been cleared by both 
sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond], for Mr. 
     Nickles, proposes an amendment numbered 2175.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment 
be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 27, between lines 9 and 10, insert the following:

     SEC. 143. SALES AUTHORITY OF WORKING-CAPITAL FUNDED ARMY 
                   INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES.

       Section 4543(a) of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) in the matter above paragraph (1), by striking out 
     ``nondefense-related commercial'';
       (2) by striking out ``and'' at the end of paragraph (3);
       (3) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (4) 
     and inserting in lieu thereof a semicolon; and
       (4) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(5) the Secretary of the Army determines that the 
     articles or services are not available from a commercial 
     source located in the United States;
       ``(6) the purchaser of an article or service agrees to hold 
     harmless and indemnify the United States, except in cases of 
     willful misconduct or extreme negligence, from any claim for 
     damages or injury to any person or property arising out of 
     the article or service;
       ``(7) the article to be sold can be manufactured, or the 
     service to be sold can be substantially performed, by the 
     industrial facility with only incidental subcontracting and 
     it is in the public interest to manufacture such article or 
     perform such service; and
       ``(8) the sale will not interfere with performance of the 
     military mission of the industrial facility.''.

  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I want to thank the Senate Armed Services 
Committee members and staff for working closely with me on this 
amendment.
  It will allow Army industrial facilities to do defense related work 
outside DOD if no commercial source is available to do the work in the 
United States. This is important because current law would prevent this 
from happening.
  Current law could have forced the Army to purchase goods or services 
abroad if they could not be made or provided commercially in the United 
States. With this provision, these facilities will keep this work in 
the United States.
  Once again, I thank the committee members and staff for their 
cooperation and assistance in having this amendment included in the 
bill.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2175) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2176

  (Purpose: To authorize the Secretary of Defense to designate up to 
three industrial facilities of the Armed Forces to sell unique articles 
      and services to persons outside the Department of Defense.)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of the two Senators from 
California, Senator Boxer and Senator Feinstein, I send an amendment to 
the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia (Mr. Nunn), for Mrs. Boxer, for 
     herself and Mrs. Feinstein, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2176.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment 
be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 110, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following:

     SEC. 357. SALE OF ARTICLES AND SERVICES OF INDUSTRIAL 
                   FACILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES TO PERSONS 
                   OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

       (a) Authority To Sell Outside DOD.--The Secretary of 
     Defense may sell in accordance with this section to persons 
     outside the Department of Defense articles and services 
     produced in working-capital funded industrial facilities of 
     the Armed Forces that are not available from any United 
     States commercial source.
       (b) Designation of Participating Industrial Facilities.--
     The Secretary may designate up to three facilities referred 
     to in subsection (a) as the facilities from which articles 
     and services produced in such facilities may be sold under 
     this section.
       (c) Conditions for Sales.--A sale of articles or services 
     may be made under this section only if--
       (1) the Secretary of Defense determines that the articles 
     or services are not available from a commercial source in the 
     United States;
       (2) the purchaser agrees to hold harmless and indemnify the 
     United States, except in cases of willful misconduct or 
     extreme negligence, from any claim for damages or injury to 
     any person or property arising out of the articles or 
     services;
       (3) the articles or services can be substantially performed 
     by the industrial facility concerned with only incidental 
     subcontracting and that performance is in the public 
     interest;
       (4) the Secretary determines that the sale of the articles 
     or services will not interfere with the military mission of 
     the industrial facility concerned; and
       (5) the sale of the goods and services is made on the basis 
     that it will not interfere with performance of work by the 
     industrial facility concerned for the Department of Defense.
       (d) Methods of Sale.--(1) The Secretary shall permit a 
     purchaser of articles or services under this section to use 
     advance incremental funding to pay for the articles or 
     services.
       (2) In the sale of articles and services under this 
     section, the Secretary shall--
       (A) charge the purchaser, at a minimum, the variable costs, 
     capital improvement costs, and equipment depreciation costs 
     that are associated with the articles or services sold;
       (B) enter into a firm, fixed-price contract or, if agreed 
     by the purchaser, a cost reimbursement contract for the sale; 
     and
       (C) develop and maintain (from sources other than 
     appropriated funds) working capital to be available for 
     paying design costs, planning costs, procurement costs, and 
     other costs associated with the articles or services sold.
       (e) Delegation of Authority.--The Secretary may delegate 
     the authority to sell articles and services in accordance 
     with this section to the commander of each industrial 
     facility designated pursuant to subsection (b) in accordance 
     with regulations prescribed by the Secretary.
       (f) Deposit of Proceeds.--Proceeds from sales of articles 
     and services under this section shall be credited to the 
     funds, including working capital funds and operation and 
     maintenance funds, incurring the costs of performance.
       (g) Relationship to Arms Export Control Act.--Nothing in 
     this section shall be construed to affect the application of 
     the export controls provided for in section 38 of the Arms 
     Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) to items which 
     incorporate or are produced through the use of an article 
     sold under this section.
       (h) Definitions.--In this section:
       (1) The term ``advance incremental funding'', with respect 
     to a sale of articles or services, means a series of partial 
     payments for the articles or services that includes--
       (A) one or more partial payments before the commencement of 
     work or the incurring of costs in connection with the 
     production of the articles or the performance of the 
     services, as the case may be; and
       (B) subsequent progress payments that result in full 
     payment being completed as the required work is being 
     completed.
       (2) The term ``variable costs'', with respect to sales of 
     articles or services, means the costs that are expected to 
     fluctuate directly with the volume of sales and--
       (A) in the case of articles, the volume of production 
     necessary to satisfy the sales orders; or
       (B) in the case of services, the extent of the services 
     sold.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise today, an original cosponsor of 
this amendment, to give depot maintenance facilities the authority to 
provide goods and services to non-Department of Defense [DOD] 
customers. This is an important amendment, particularly for McClellan 
Air Force Base, which is a premiere Air Logistics Center in Sacramento, 
CA.
  The ability to provide such goods and services to non-DOD customers 
would achieve many goals, including: Enhance commercialization of dual-
use technologies; promote economic growth and create jobs; sustain and 
support capabilities needed for defense applications; increase 
utilization of defense assets which will lower operating costs to DOD 
and ultimately the American taxpayer; share the costs of maintaining 
the industrial base; remove barriers that prevent sharing of expensive-
to-duplicate capabilities; and provide State and local governments and 
commercial interests with access to capabilities that are not available 
in the commercial sector.
  Depot maintenance facilities like McClellan AFB have a great deal of 
dual-use capability. Unfortunately, much of this capability is not 
fully utilized because under current law depot facilities are 
restricted to supporting non-Federal customers in only research and 
development functions.
  This legislation permits the Secretary of Defense to designate up to 
three depot maintenance facilities, like McClellan AFB, as pilot bases 
with the authority to provide goods or services--not just research and 
development--that are not available in the private sector. The 
legislation contains a number of conditions that will ensure this new 
authority is not abused and that private sector interests are 
protected.
  The articles or services provided under the new authority cannot be 
available from a commercial source in the United States--this will 
ensure that the depot facilities will not be competing with the private 
sector. Also, the sale of the articles or services by the depot 
facilities cannot interfere with the military mission or related work 
performance of the facilities. In other words, the military mission of 
the depots will remain the primary mission, as it should.
  This legislation makes sense for the depot facilities, the potential 
customers of the dual-use capabilities, and the American taxpayer. In 
addition, for McClellan AFB in Sacarmento, it could mean increased 
workload and less excess capacity. I strongly support this amendment 
and urge its adoption.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, the amendment I have just sent to the desk 
authorizes the Secretary of Defense to allow up to three Armed Forces 
industrial facilities to sell goods and services to sources outside the 
Department of Defense. The amendment specifies that such sales can only 
be made when the Secretary of Defense determines that the transaction 
is in the public interest and when the goods or services in question 
are not available from a commercial source located in the United 
States. This final provision is very important because it guarantees 
that military depots will not compete for business with the private 
sector.
  This amendment will allow unique technologies with dual-use 
applications to be shared with the private sector. It is by any measure 
a win-win proposition for all concerned.
  Let me give an example of how this amendment may be applied.
  In 1989, the McClellan Nuclear Radiation Center was built at a cost 
of $16 million. The MNRC was created to provide real-time 
nondestructive analysis of aircraft structures and components. Because 
of its unique configuration, the MNRC can detect very low levels of 
corrosion within metallic structures. The MNRC is the only facility in 
the United States that can provide large structure, real-time neutron 
radiography.
  Recently, a major commercial airline was experiencing problems with a 
particular joint in several aircraft. Its most sophisticated diagnostic 
tests were unable to identify the problem. The airline asked the 
leadership at McClellan to try to solve this mystery. By utilizing the 
unique capabilities of the MNRC, they were able to identify the problem 
and the airline was able to fix it, ensuring safer aircraft for the 
flying public. The company was so impressed that it offered to pay the 
Air Force to use the MNRC on a regular basis, but because of existing 
laws and regulations that prohibit military depots from selling goods 
and services outside the DOD, McClellan had to decline the offer.
  The MNRC can also be used to produce medical isotopes that are used 
in cancer research and therapy. Currently, companies must often use 
foreign suppliers for irradiation services because of the lack of 
advanced reactors in the United States. The University of California at 
Davis considers the MNRC such valuable cancer-fighting tool that it 
wants to establish a research and patient treatment center at 
McClellan. Again, UC Davis and the patients at the treatment center 
would pay the Government for the privilege of using the MNRC. However, 
restrictive laws and regulations prohibit the MNRC from selling its 
unique services outside the DOD, even for such a clearly valuable 
purpose.
  Mr. President, it simply makes no sense to prohibit military depots 
from using their unique facilities to advance the public interest. It 
is especially nonsensical when commercial sources are willing to pay 
fair market value to purchase these unique goods and services. The 
money raised could be used to reduce the budget deficit or reinvest in 
critical technologies in both the civilian and military sectors.
  I am grateful that the chairman of the Armed Services Committee has 
decided to accept this amendment and I want to thank him and his staff 
for providing a number of useful suggestions.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would authorize the Secretary 
of Defense to designate up to three DOD industrial facilities to sell 
articles and services in DOD facilities to persons outside DOD as long 
as those sources are not available from any U.S. commercial source.
  I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. I have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2176) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2177

(Purpose: To provide transition assistance to certain workers affected 
    by reductions in United States exports of defense articles and 
                               services)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Pryor and Senator 
Bingaman, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] for Mr. Pryor, for 
     himself and Mr. Bingaman, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2177.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 188, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 924. ASSISTANCE FOR CERTAIN WORKERS DISLOCATED DUE TO 
                   REDUCTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE EXPORT 
                   OR DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES.

       (a) Assistance Under Defense Conversion Adjustment 
     Program.--Section 325 of the Job Training Partnership Act (29 
     U.S.C. 1662d) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)--
       (A) by striking out ``or by closures of United States 
     military facilities'' in the first sentence and inserting in 
     lieu thereof ``, by closures of United States military 
     facilities, or by reductions in the export of defense 
     articles and defense services as a result of United States 
     policy (including reductions in the amount of defense 
     articles and defense services under agreements to provide 
     such articles or services or through termination or 
     completion of any such agreements)''; and
       (B) by striking out ``or by closures of United States 
     military facilities'' in the second sentence and inserting in 
     lieu thereof ``, by closures of United States military 
     facilities, or by reductions in the export of defense 
     articles and defense services as a result of United States 
     policy'';
       (2) in subsection (d), by striking out ``or by the closure 
     of United States military installations'' and inserting in 
     lieu thereof ``, by closures of United States military 
     facilities, or by reductions in the export of defense 
     articles and defense services as a result of United States 
     policy (including reductions in the amount of defense 
     articles and defense services under agreements to provide 
     such articles or services or through termination or 
     completion of any such agreements)''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(f) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     `defense articles and defense services' means defense 
     articles, defense services, or design and construction 
     services under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et 
     seq.), including defense articles and defense services 
     licensed or approved for export under section 38 of that Act 
     (22 U.S.C. 2778).''.
       (b) Assistance Under Defense Diversification Program.--
     Section 325A of the Job Training Partnership Act (29 U.S.C. 
     1662d-1) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (b)(3)(A), by striking out ``or the 
     closure or realignment of military installation'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``, the closure or realignment of a 
     military installation, or reductions in the export of defense 
     articles and defense services as a result of United States 
     policy (including reductions in the amount of defense 
     articles and defense services under agreements to provide 
     such articles or services or through termination or 
     completion of any such agreements)'';
       (2) in subsection (k)(1), by striking out ``or by the 
     closure of United States military installations'' and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``, the closure of United States 
     military installations, or reductions in the export of 
     defense articles and defense services as a result of United 
     States policy (including reductions in the amount of defense 
     articles and defense services under agreements to provide 
     such articles or services or through termination or 
     completion of any such agreements)''; and
       (3) in subsection (o), by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(3) Defense articles and defense services.--The term 
     `defense articles and defense services' means defense 
     articles, defense services, or design and construction 
     services under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et 
     seq.), including defense articles and defense services 
     licensed or approved for export under section 38 of that Act 
     (22 U.S.C. 2778).''.
  Mr. NUNN. This amendment would revise the eligibility rules for the 
defense conversion work retrainer programs under the Job Training 
Partnership Act. The coverage would be expanded to cover workers who 
were dislocated because of reductions in the export of defense articles 
and defense services through U.S. policy.
  I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have no objection.


          jtpa services for dislocated defense export workers

  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, a great deal of attention has been focused 
on the plight of workers who have lost their jobs because of base 
closures or because of defense plant closures due to reductions in 
Pentagon procurement. The amendment I am currently offering would 
assist another group of defense workers who are dislocated due to U.S. 
Government policy, namely those workers who produce defense goods and 
services for export.
  As all of us know, a company must get the approval of the Federal 
Government to export weapons. Sometimes this authority is not granted, 
and as a result, companies must shut down production lines and layoff 
their workers. As U.S. weapons procurement falls, more and more defense 
contractors are looking for overseas markets for their products, so I 
imagine layoffs related to prohibited exports are increasing.
  These layoffs are the result of Government policy decisions just as 
the layoffs resulting from a base closure or reduced Pentagon 
procurement are. These workers have lost their jobs, not because they 
failed to compete effectively in the market, but because the conditions 
for their employment which were tied to Government policy, have 
disappeared. For this reason, I believe these laid off defense export 
workers deserve the same training and employment services under the 
JTPA program that other defense dislocated workers receive.
  There is another, even more compelling argument for making these JTPA 
benefits available, namely it helps reduce the pressure for weapons 
exported by creating alternatives for the workers involved in the 
weapons production. We have all heard the economic arguments that are 
sometimes used to justify weapons exports. If the foreign sales aren't 
approved, we are told, hundreds or thousands of workers will lose their 
jobs, and families and communities will be devastated. Few arguments 
are more persuasive with Members of Congress.
  Nevertheless, these foreign sales only exacerbate the arms 
proliferation problem threatening global security. One only has to look 
at the bloodshed in Rwanda, Bosnia, or the Middle East to appreciate 
the misery that arms proliferation is causing for poor, innocent people 
all across the globe. I regret our country's participation in the 
blooming trade, and I fear that it is becoming the policy of our 
country to become the arms merchant to the world. This amendment will 
make it easier for us to reverse this policy by making it less painful 
for us to deny permission to companies to export their weapons.
  This amendment does not authorize any new expenditures. Congress has 
already appropriated money in years past which remains available to 
provide JTPA services to defense impacted workers. The amendment will 
help bring equity to defense export workers and it will make it a 
little easier for us to put a check on deadly defense exports. I ask my 
colleagues' support for this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2177) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2178

 (Purpose: To revise the notice requirements applicable to pending or 
                actual terminations of defense programs)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Arkansas, Mr. 
Pryor, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia (Mr. Nunn) for Mr. Pryor, for 
     himself, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Hollings, Mr. Metzenbaum, Mr. 
     Bingaman, Mr. Pell, and Mrs. Boxer, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2178.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 249, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 1068. CHANGES IN NOTICE REQUIREMENTS UPON PENDING OR 
                   ACTUAL TERMINATION OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS.

       (a) Time for Notice Requirement After Submission of 
     Budget.--Subsection (a) of section 4471 of the Defense 
     Conversion, Reinvestment, and Transition Assistance Act of 
     1992 (division D of Public Law 102-484; 106 Stat. 2753; 10 
     U.S.C. 2501 note) is amended--
       (1) by striking out ``As soon as reasonably practicable'' 
     and inserting in lieu thereof ``Not later than 90 days''; and
       (2) by striking out ``and not more than 180 days after such 
     date,''.
       (b) Time for Notice Requirement After Enactment of 
     Appropriations Act.--Subsection (b) of such section is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking out ``as soon as reasonably practicable'' 
     and inserting in lieu thereof ``not later than 90 days''; and
       (2) by striking out ``and not more than 180 days after such 
     date,''.
       (c) Time for Notice Requirement on Withdrawal of 
     Notification.--Subsection (f)(1) of such section is amended 
     in the second sentence by striking out ``as soon as 
     reasonably practicable'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``not 
     later than 90 days''.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would change current 
requirements of the Secretary of Defense to notify defense contractors 
of the pending defense program reductions terminations from 180 to 90 
days. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. We have no objection.


              Early Notice of Defense Contract Termination

  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, this amendment represents another 
installment in our efforts to make the path of defense conversion 
easier for our Nation to travel. Right now, an average of 1,000 workers 
a day are losing their jobs due to reductions in defense spending. 
Aerospace employees in California, shipbuilders in New England, even 
missile workers in my own hometown of Camden, AR, have gotten their 
pink slips as defense contracts have been cut unexpectedly and 
productions lines closed. Too often these layoffs usher in a lengthy 
period of unemployment, financial hardship, and emotional turmoil for 
these workers before they find new jobs and get back on their feet.
  This amendment is designed to address the problem of unexpected 
layoffs and the lengthy periods of unemployment that usually follow by 
providing defense workers with early notice of defense contract 
terminations. Under the amendment, the Secretary of Defense will be 
required to notify prime defense contractors within 90 days after the 
submission of the President's budget or the enactment of an 
appropriations bill of the likely termination of major defense 
contracts. Prime contractors are in turn required to notify sub-
contractors of the termination, who are then required to notify 
employees.
  This early notification will obviously give workers more time to 
begin looking for a new job or to make other plans. The real 
significance of this amendment, however, is that when the early 
notification is given, it makes the affected workers eligible for the 
training, adjustment assistance, and employment services of the federal 
Job Training Partnership Act. Early access to these services lessens 
the time that these workers will be unemployed, thereby easing the blow 
of the contract termination.
  This recommendation for early termination notice was made by the 
Senate Democratic Defense Reinvestment Task Force, which I chair, in 
1992. This recommendation was enacted in the fiscal year 1993 DOD 
Authorization bill, and the requirement at that time was for a 30-day 
notice of contract termination. This period of time was found to be too 
short for the Department of Defense to comply with, so last year the 
notice requirement was increased to 180 days. This amendment attempts 
to strike a reasonable balance by setting the notice requirement at 90 
days, which will give the DOD adequate time to insure compliance, while 
providing affected workers the vital early notice that they need.
  This amendment will not cost the Government anything, it will not 
disrupt DOD operations in any way, but it will make a big difference in 
the lives of the defense workers who helped this country win the cold 
war. This may seem like a small, and even annoying, detail to some 
personnel at the DOD, but it is a very significant matter for defense 
workers who will be losing their jobs, and we owe them this much 
consideration. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2178) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2179

 (Purpose: To authorize the transfer of the vessel Guadalcanal (LPH 7) 
 to the Intrepid Museum Foundation upon decommissioning of such vessel)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Moynihan and Senator 
D'Amato, the Senators from New York, Mr. President, I send an amendment 
to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] for Mr. Moynihan, for 
     himself and Mr. D'Amato, proposes an amendment numbered 2179.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 249, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:

     SEC. 1068. TRANSFER OF OBSOLETE VESSEL GUADALCANAL.

       (a) Authority.--Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (d) of 
     section 7306 of title 10, United States Code, but subject to 
     subsections (b) and (c) of that section, upon the 
     decommissioning of the USS Guadalcanal (LPH 7), the Secretary 
     of the Navy may transfer the Guadalcanal to the not-for-
     profit organization Intrepid Museum Foundation, New York, New 
     York.
       (b) Limitations.--The transfer authorized by section (a) 
     may be made only if the Secretary determines that the vessel 
     Guadalcanal is of no further use to the United States for 
     national security purposes.
       (c) Terms and Conditions.--The Secretary may require such 
     terms and conditions in connection with the transfer 
     authorized by this section as the Secretary considers 
     appropriate.

  Mr. NUNN. This amendment offered on behalf of Senator Moynihan and 
Senator D'Amato authorizes the Secretary of Navy to transfer the 
obsolete vessel Guadalcanal to the not-for-profit organization Intrepid 
Museum Foundation, New York.
  I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. We have no objection.


                   transfer of the u.s.s. guadalcanal

  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, as we debate a defense authorization 
bill that reduces defense spending for the 10th consecutive year, I 
rise to offer an amendment that would in a small but significant way 
mitigate the effects of the declining budget. Among the ships scheduled 
to be decommissioned in coming months and years is the U.S.S. 
Guadalcanal. She still has some useful life in her hull, and rather 
than leave her to be scrapped this amendment would transfer ownership 
of the Guadalcanal to the Intrepid Museum Foundation in New York City. 
There she will be put to good use as a heliport, and as an important 
addition to the outstanding museum now occupying the U.S.S. Intrepid.
  The first Guadalcanal was launched in June 1943, less than a year 
after the onset of the bloodiest battles in the Pacific theater and 
less than a year before I enlisted in the Navy. That ship commemorated 
the 6-month struggle for a toehold in the Solomon Islands, a battle 
fought on land, sea, and air for a strip of land 90 miles long and 25 
miles wide. It cost 1,500 American lives and 5,000 casualties.
  The Guadalcanal distinguished herself in the Atlantic, earning three 
battle stars and sharing in the Presidential Unit Citation awarded to 
Anti-Submarine Task Group 22.3 On June 4, 1944, the Guadalcanal became 
the first American ship since 1815 to board and capture an enemy vessel 
when her troops boarded a disabled German U-boat before the crew could 
scuttle it. The Guadalcanal towed the U-boat to Bermuda, and the 
intelligence information from the captured sub was vital in protecting 
United States shipping the final year of the war.

  The current Guadalcanal was commissioned July 20, 1963, one of seven 
assault carriers in the Iwo Jima class designed to land troops and 
supplies by means of assault transport helicopters. In the 1960's she 
sailed mostly in the Caribbean, but also served as the recovery ship 
for the Gemini 10 and Apollo 9 spaceflights. More recently, the 
Guadalcanal served off Lebanon, in the Persian Gulf during Desert 
Storm, and off Somalia.
  The Guadalcana has done her job for three decades. In retirement, I 
propose that she continues to see helicopters take off and land, now 
for peaceful purposes, while continuing to remind us of her legacy and 
the sacrifices that brought us to a time of lessened threat and 
conflict. The Intrepid Museum will operate her as a much-needed 
heliport in midtown Manhattan. The venture should prove quite 
successful. Profits will be used to support the activities of the 
Intrepid Foundation, which are to operate a floating museum that brings 
to life much of the Nation's military history at sea and in the air, as 
well as the space program.
  The Intrepid Museum has demonstrated its ability to maintain and 
operate a decommissioned vessel such as this one. The Navy supports 
this transfer, and Mayor Giuliani welcomes it. I hope my colleagues 
will agree that it is an ideal next stage in the career of a proud and 
distinguished ship. I ask unanimous consent that letters from Admiral 
Natter, Deputy Mayor Reiter, and Larry Solinski of the Intrepid 
Foundation be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                    Office of Legislative Affairs,


                                       Department of the Navy,

                                    Washington, DC, June 23, 1994.
     Hon. Daniel P. Moynihan,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Moynihan: I am writing to convey Navy support 
     for your proposed amendment to the Fiscal Year 1995 Defense 
     Appropriation Bill concerning transfer of USS GUADALCANAL to 
     the Intrepid Museum Foundation. It is our intention to effect 
     this transfer at no cost to the government. We look forward 
     to continuing to work with the Foundation as this project 
     moves forward.
       As always, if I can be of any further assistance, please 
     let me know.
           Sincerely,
                                                      R.J. Natter,
                                          Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy.
                                  ____

                                              Office of the Mayor,


                                         The City of New York,

                                      New York, NY, June 23, 1994.
     Re Proposal to use the Guadalcanal as a heliport.
     Senator Daniel P. Moynihan,
     405 Lexington Ave.,
     New York, NY.
       Dear Senator Moynihan: I am writing to express the City's 
     support for the proposal by the Intrepid Museum to use the 
     Guadalcanal as a heliport. A rare opportunity exists to 
     satisfy both the City's heliport needs and ensure that the 
     Guadalcanal is preserved and memorialized.
       The process of securing all the necessary city, state and 
     federal approvals, as well as funding, for the project has 
     just begun. The City plans to work closely with the Intrepid, 
     the local community and elected officials to make this 
     proposal a reality.
       Any assistance you can provide would be greatly 
     appreciated.
           Sincerely,
                                                      Fran Reiter,
                                                     Deputy Mayor.


                          Intrepid Sea, Air, and Space Museum,

                                      New York, NY, June 24, 1994.
     Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Moynihan: The Intrepid Sea Air Space Museum is 
     in the unique position to provide an invaluable service to 
     the City of New York and needs your help.
       For some time, the City has been searching for a practical 
     alternative plan to solve its heliport problem. Of the four 
     existing heliports, two are under pressure to close down and 
     another must reduce its operations by half. At issue is 
     safety, noise and a public park. Because of safety and the 
     land congestion on Manhattan, a spacious heliport in midtown 
     is not possible. What is needed is a floating barge with a 
     hangar, flight deck and support facilities which could be 
     anchored in mid-town, yet be vehicle accessible and far 
     enough away from congestion to provide an acceptable level of 
     safety. Cost to do this however, puts it well beyond economic 
     feasibility.
       In December 1993, we discovered that the U.S. Navy is 
     taking USS GUADALCANAL, LPH-7, out of active service and 
     immediately scrapping her. Valued at 401 million dollars, 
     GUADALCANAL was the first built-for-the-purpose helicopter 
     carrier, considerably smaller and efficient to run, compared 
     to the big carriers. Surprisingly, she will not be put in 
     reserve at all, but go directly to scrap with all of her 
     systems in good working order. If someone could afford to 
     build her, she is exactly what is needed for Manhattan's 
     heliports.
       The city has no expertise at managing and preserving 
     historic ships. However, as the world's largest naval museum, 
     the Intrepid has substantial ability to do so. By locating 
     GUADALCANAL at the end of the Intrepid's pier, all of the 
     noise, safety and access issues are solved and the 
     communities are happy.
       GUADALCANAL also becomes the least expensive plan to 
     implement, roughly 7.5 million dollars for conversion and 
     site prep. Just building a helicopter landing platform in the 
     river without any support facilities is 12-14 million 
     dollars.
       Given time, the project is guaranteed success. But time is 
     not available, the ship is being stricken as a cost saving on 
     Sept. 1. She's already begun her ``take down'' period. A task 
     force has been set up, co-chaired by the Governor's and 
     Mayor's offices to expedite the permit and approval basis. 
     The Navy is comfortable as long as the Intrepid maintains the 
     ship as part of our collection.
       GUADALCANAL's facilities will be able to absorb the 
     closures and reduction of the existing heliports and even 
     anticipated growth. She also has facilities which could prove 
     invaluable: 300 bed hospital, berthing for 1800, shop 
     facilities and electricity generating equipment. We are 
     actively studying electrical generation and providing a site 
     for a New York State Veterans Foundation.
       Her compact size and efficiency make GUADALCANAL ideal for 
     the proposed use of a unrestricted municipal heliport. Any 
     excess income would provide support to the Intrepid Museum to 
     preserve the entire collection. This is especially critical 
     since the loss of considerable NYS support because of the 
     recession.
       Our critical path is the 7.5 million capital construction 
     to set up the municipal heliport for which we need 
     Congressional support.
       Once this is secure, the GUADALCANAL becomes a significant 
     symbol of conversion of an obsolete, yet valuable, military 
     asset into much needed civilian use while preserving the 
     vessel's significance as part of the museum.
       It is a rare opportunity to reuse something that would 
     otherwise be scrapped.
       Please call if you have any questions, we hope that your 
     good office can help to make this happen both for the 
     Intrepid and New York.
           Sincerely,
                                                Lawrence Sowinski,
                                               Executive Director.

  Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I want to join with my distinguished 
colleague, the senior Senator from New York, in supporting the transfer 
of the U.S.S. Guadalcanal (LPH-7) to the Intrepid Museum Foundation. 
Amphibious assault ships are, and have long been, central to the Marine 
Corps' ability to strike rapidly and stealthily from the sea. It is 
fitting indeed that the Guadalcanal be memorialized at the Intrepid 
Museum. All that the Marines are today traces back to that tiny island 
and a handful of men in a shoestring operation that began the long road 
to Tokyo. I commend my colleague for both his sense of history and his 
commitment to protecting and promoting the proud heritage of the U.S. 
Navy and Marine Corps.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2179) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2180

   (Purpose: To authorize funds for planning and design for military 
  construction for the consolidation of the operations of the Defense 
                    Finance and Accounting Service)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. 
Glenn] I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Glenn, for 
     himself and Mr. Thurmond, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2180.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

  On page 270, line 21, strike out ``$3,230,058,000'' and insert in 
lieu thereof ``$3,236,058,000''.
  On page 271, line 25, strike out ``$45,960,000'' and insert in lieu 
thereof ``$51,960,000''.
  On page 274, below line 25, add the following:

     SEC. 2408. PLANNING AND DESIGN FOR CONSTRUCTION IN SUPPORT OF 
                   CONSOLIDATION OF OPERATIONS OF THE DEFENSE 
                   FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE.

       Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 
     2405(a)(7), $6,000,000 shall be available for planning and 
     design activities relating to military construction in 
     support of the consolidation of operations of the Defense 
     Finance and Accounting Service.

  Mr. NUNN. This amendment adds $6 million to the defense agencies 
planning and design account for planning and design activities to 
support the DFAS site consolidation plans.
  I urge the adoption of the amendment.


  defense finance and accounting service planning and design amendment

  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, the amendment I am proposing will provide 
funds for planning and design activities to support the construction 
requirements for the consolidation of the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service [DFAS] operations.
  In May of this year, the Secretary of Defense approved plans to 
consolidate the DFAS operations at five centers and 20 satellite 
locations. Several of the sites selected in the consolidation plans 
require modifications to accommodate DFAS activities. Actual 
construction funds for these renovation activities will be requested 
beginning in fiscal year 1997. However, $6 million is required in 
fiscal year 1995 in order to properly plan and design these 
construction requirements.
  Adopting this amendment will allow the DFAS consolidation plans to 
proceed at a quickened pace and will facilitate the Department's 
efforts to put its financial house in order. I urge the adoption of the 
amendment.


       defense finance and accounting center design and planning

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, after almost a 1-year delay in 
consolidating the Defense Finance and Accounting Service operations, 
the Department announced their consolidation plan in early May of this 
year. What had originally been contemplated as 5 mega centers turned 
out to be 5 major centers and 20 satellite locations. Despite the 
delay, I applaud the Department's decision, especially since it 
included a site in Charleston, SC.
  Now that a decision on the location of the accounting centers has 
finally been announced, our communities are faced with further delay 
because the Department did not anticipate the planning and design 
funding for the increased number of satellite locations. This amendment 
would provide $6 million to support planning and design work at 12 
satellite sites. The funds for the remaining sites are already included 
in the budget request.
  Mr. President, this amendment will assist communities across the 
Nation and expedite efficiency in the finance and accounting system. I 
urge adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. President, we have no objection to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2180) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2181

    (Purpose: To require the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health 
   Affairs) to use certain cost experience in prescribing standards, 
limitations, and requirements relating to cost of pediatric care under 
   any managed care system established for the Department of Defense)

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Warner, I send to 
the desk an amendment that directs the Department of Defense to study 
costs of providing pediatric care in the Tidewater, VA Tricare 
Catchment and establish a baseline for pediatric care costs. I ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond] for Mr. 
     Warner, proposes an amendment numbered 2181.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 170, after line 24, insert the following:

     SEC. 710. COST ANALYSIS OF TIDEWATER TRICARE DELIVERY OF 
                   PEDIATRIC HEALTH CARE TO MILITARY FAMILIES.

       (a) Cost Analysis Required.--Not later than July 1, 1995, 
     the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) shall 
     determine the amount of the expenditures made by the 
     Department of Defense for pediatric care for each of fiscal 
     years 1992, 1993, and 1994 under the program for delivery of 
     health care services in the Tidewater region of Virginia 
     carried out pursuant to section 712(b) of Public Law 102-190 
     (105 Stat. 1402). The Assistant Secretary shall determine the 
     total amount of such expenditures and the amount of such 
     expenditures for each case.
       (b) Use of Analysis.--In establishing any managed care 
     system involving the furnishing of pediatric care by the 
     Department of Defense (including the furnishing of pediatric 
     care under the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the 
     Uniformed Services), the Assistant Secretary shall consider 
     the amounts determined under subsection (a) in determining 
     the appropriate standards, limitations, and requirements to 
     apply to the cost of pediatric care under the system.


  provision of pediatric care cost analysis for the tidewater tricare 
                                program

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, this amendment requires a cost analysis of 
the delivery of pediatric health care under the Tidewater Tricare 
Program operating in the Hampton Roads region of Virginia.
  These figures will be used to provide a baseline for the potential 
establishment of a capitated pediatric network demonstrating the 
feasibility of reducing total costs while improving access and quality. 
Analysis will be conducted by Tidewater Tricare based on demonstrated 
costs and need. The pediatric network should include all appropriate 
Military Treatment Facilities [MTF's] and community resources.
  The pediatric network would be established only after the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs certifies to Congress that the 
baseline costs for pediatrics have been fully identified, and that the 
capitated network would have a positive impact on costs, access and 
quality in the region.
  The Tidewater Tricare Program has been very successful in developing 
a multiservice approach to the delivery of health care to military 
families in my state. I believe Tidewater Tricare can serve as a model 
on which the Department of Defense can base the implementation of the 
lead agent concept throughout the 12 national regions as mandated by 
the Congress.
  If we are to achieve the goals of managed care in the Military Health 
Care System, it is essential that we have baseline data from which to 
proceed. My amendment can serve as the first step in achieving a 
national military capitated pediatric network that fully manages the 
care of all eligible children both within and outside the existing 
direct care system.
  Mr. President, I thank the chair, the managers of the bill, and 
express by deep appreciation for the support of all of my Senate 
colleagues.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we approve.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2181) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2182

(Purpose: To increase the authorization of appropriations for functions 
          of the Army for support of military family housing)

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on 
behalf of Senator Coats that adds $60 million to the Army family 
housing operations accounts fund to cover a shortfall in the 
maintenance of family housing and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond] for Mr. 
     Coats, proposes an amendment numbered 2182.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 252, line 15, strike out ``$1,668,086,000'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``$1,728,086,000''.
       On page 253, line 11, strike out ``$1,007,708,000'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``$1,067,708,000''.


                   additional family housing funding

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I offer the following amendment for 
consideration.
  As the defense budget has come down, one of the many factors of 
military life which has been effected is safe and secure housing for 
our personnel. No single quality of life issue matches the importance 
of proper shelter for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, and 
their families.
  During the last few years, the military has experienced a growing 
shortfall in the family housing operations and maintenance accounts. 
The challenge to our services in this changing fiscal and operational 
environment is to ensure suitable housing for service members. As funds 
for operations and maintenance shrink, much of the effort toward major 
repair, rehabilitation, and preventative maintenance has dwindled or 
has been eliminated altogether.
  Within the services there is no flexibility to solve this funding 
problem. They have no authority to transfer funds between the military 
construction [MILCON] and family housing accounts.
  The only other alternative available to them is to close housing 
units which cannot be economically repaired. This solution, however, 
does not save money. It merely shifts the bill from the family housing 
account to other military personnel accounts for moving expenses, 
temporary lodging allowances [TLS], and the basic allowance for 
quarters [BAQ] and variable housing allowance [FHA].
  In the Army, the funding shortfall in fiscal year 1995 will be $60 
million due to the deferral of required but not absolutely essential 
maintenance. The Army's housing inventory will decrease only 15 percent 
in the fiscal year 1985 to fiscal year 1999 timeframe, but funding for 
family housing will decrease by 35 percent. Some examples of the 
shortfalls, just within this service, are:
  Fort Dix, NJ--the repair of a fire damaged unit was deferred; 
maintenance in the 4th quarter of the current year will be limited to 
emergency repairs only.
  Fort Benning, GA--waiting time for housing increased by 5 months; 
interior painting extended to once in 5 years eliminate noncritical 
maintenance and repair.
  Carlisle Barracks, PA--56 housing units awaiting funds for asbestos 
removal; army war college students will paint their own quarters upon 
change of occupant.
  Fort Huachuca, AZ--canceled the self-help program; eliminated 
exterior painting; reduced common area upkeep by half, resulting in 
increased habitats for snakes and vermin.
  Fort Knox, KY--deferred lead-based paint removal; deferred freeze-
damage repairs.
  Fort Sill, OK--eliminated routine maintenance; eliminated interior 
painting and preventative maintenance.
  I offer my amendment to increase the amount of funds available to the 
Army's family housing operations and maintenance account by $60 
million.
  This is done in an effort to stem the deterioration of the existing 
inventory of military housing units available to our military members.
  Quality housing for their families is a very important element in the 
morale, performance and commitment of our service members. I urge my 
colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. This has been cleared on both sides.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2182) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2183

 (Purpose: To authorize the Secretaries of the military departments to 
  provide housing cost reimbursements or lodging in kind for Reserves 
       performing annual training duty or inactive duty training)

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I offer on behalf of Senator Nickles and 
Senator Lott, an amendment which authorizes the Secretary to reimburse 
Reserve citizens for costs incurred when they must occupy Government 
quarters during Inactive Reserve training. I ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Thurmond) for Mr. 
     Nickles, for himself and Mr. Lott, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2183.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 158, after line 24, insert the following:

     SEC. 655. PAYMENT FOR TRANSIENT HOUSING FOR RESERVES 
                   PERFORMING CERTAIN TRAINING DUTY.

       Section 404 of title 37, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (j) as subsection (k); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (i) the following new 
     subsection (j):
       ``(j)(1) In the case of a member of a reserve component 
     performing annual training duty or inactive-duty training who 
     is not otherwise entitled to travel and transportation 
     allowances in connection with such duty under subsection (a) 
     of this section, the Secretary concerned may reimburse the 
     member for housing service charge expenses incurred by the 
     member in occupying transient government housing during the 
     performance of such duty.
       ``(2) Any payment or other benefit under this section shall 
     be provided in accordance with regulations prescribed by the 
     Secretaries concerned.
       ``(3) The Secretary may pay service charge expenses under 
     paragraph (1) out of funds appropriated for operation and 
     maintenance for the reserve component concerned.''.

  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I want to thank the Senate Armed Services 
Committee members and staff for working closely with me on this 
amendment.
  Its purpose is to clarify the authority to spend appropriated funds 
to pay military transient housing service charges as they relate to 
reserve duty. Reservists are currently billed for their quarters while 
they are temporarily residing in Government housing during periods of 
annual active duty or inactive duty training.
  This amendment is important because without it reservists may be 
forced to pay for housing out of their own pockets while on training 
assignments. This could lead to a lack of drill participation and this 
would impact readiness and reserve retention.
  Once again, I thank the committee members and staff for their 
cooperation and assistance in having this amendment included in the 
bill.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2183) was agreed to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2184

  (Purpose: To require the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study of 
                spousal abuse by Armed Forces personnel)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from California, 
Senator Boxer, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia (Mr. Nunn) for Mrs. Boxer, for 
     herself, Ms. Mikulski, Ms. Moseley-Braun, Mrs. Murray, Mrs. 
     Feinstein, and Mr. Bradley, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2184.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1068. STUDY OF SPOUSAL ABUSE INVOLVING ARMED FORCES 
                   PERSONNEL.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Department of Defense has sponsored several highly 
     successful programs designed to curtail spousal abuse.
       (2) The readiness of the Armed Forces would be enhanced by 
     eliminating all forms of spousal abuse involving members of 
     the Armed Forces.
       (3) Available data on the frequency and causes of spousal 
     abuse involving members of the Armed Forces is not 
     comprehensive for the Armed Forces.
       (b) Study and Report Required.--Not later than 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Defense shall conduct a study on spousal abuse involving 
     members of the Armed Forces of the United States and submit 
     to Congress a report on the results of the study.
       (c) Content of Report.--The report shall contain the 
     following matters:
       (1) The frequency of spousal abuse involving members of the 
     Armed Forces.
       (2) A discussion of the possible causes of such spousal 
     abuse.
       (3) A discussion of the procedures followed in responding 
     to incidents of such spousal abuse.
       (4) An analysis of the effectiveness of those procedures.
       (5) A review of the existing programs for curtailing such 
     spousal abuse.
       (6) A strategy for the entire Armed Forces for curtailing 
     spousal abuse involving members of the Armed Forces.

  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, this amendment requires the Secretary of 
Defense to conduct a study on the problem of spousal abuse in the 
military and report back to the Congress within 6 months. I am honored 
to have as cosponsors of this amendment all the Democratic women of the 
Senate as well as the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. Bradley].
  The military reflects the problems we have in civilian life, so it 
should come as no surprise to anyone that there is a spousal abuse 
epidemic in the Armed Forces. Domestic abuse in the military is on the 
rise. In the Army, the total number of cases reported has increased by 
26 percent over the past 5 years.
  The Department needs to address this crisis head-on. It is far too 
important to sweep under the rug. But while the magnitude of the 
problem is disturbing, I believe that the Armed Forces are uniquely 
positioned to address it. Military leaders can send the message down 
through the ranks that family violence of any kind will not be 
tolerated. The Pentagon leadership must demand that Commanding Officers 
take action on all incidents of spousal abuse, and Commanding Officers 
must provide a safe environment for military families. They must demand 
that the soldiers, sailors, and airmen and women under their command 
treat all their colleagues with respect.
  The report required by this amendment will address the frequency of 
spousal abuse in the Armed Forces and discuss the causes of that abuse. 
The report will analyze the current programs for eliminating spousal 
abuse and, perhaps most importantly, the amendment requires the 
development of a comprehensive strategy for eliminating spousal abuse 
in the military.
  It is my hope that this final requirement will focus the Pentagon 
leadership on this problem. There are a number of programs designed to 
combat family violence in the military--some of them are highly 
successful--but I believe that a department wide approach is required.
  I understand that this amendment has been cleared on both sides, and 
I ask for its immediate consideration.


                        family advocacy program

  Mrs. BOXER. As the Chairman knows, I am very concerned with the 
problem of spousal abuse in the armed services and I have offered an 
amendment requiring the Department of Defense to conduct a study on the 
issue and transmit its findings to the Congress.
  It is my understanding that the Family Advocacy Program, the 
Department's principal program for the treatment and prevention of 
family violence in the armed services, is funded by the Department of 
Defense Domestic and Overseas Schools Program. I ask the Senator from 
Georgia, is my understanding correct?
  Mr. NUNN. The Senator from California is correct.
  Mrs. BOXER. It is my further understanding that the House version of 
the Department of Defense Authorization Act reauthorized the Department 
of Defense Domestic and Overseas Schools Program, which fully funds the 
administration's request of $79.2 million for the Family Advocacy 
Program.
  Mr. NUNN. The administration's request of $79.2 million for the 
Family Advocacy Program represents an increase of $1.3 million over 
last year.
  Mrs. BOXER. Although the Senate bill does not specifically address 
funding the Department of Defense Domestic and Overseas Schools program 
or the Family Advocacy Program, it reauthorizes the both programs and 
fully funds the President's budget request in that area.
  Mr. NUNN. The Senator from California is correct. Although the Senate 
committee did not specifically adderss the Family Advocacy Program, I 
do not believe that indicates any lack of support on behalf of the 
members of the committee. On the contrary, the committee has always 
been supportive of efforts to improve family stability.
  Mrs. BOXER. I thank the Senator for his comments. The report required 
by my amendment will include an evaluation of the effectiveness of 
programs designed to curtail spousal abuse in the Armed Forces. If that 
report recommends adjustments in the Family Advocacy Program, will the 
Senator consider implementing the recommendations in the next fiscal 
year?
  Mr. NUNN. I would certainly consider the recommendations of the 
report required by the Senator's amendment. I look forward to reviewing 
it.
  Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, I am pleased to rise in support of the 
amendment offered by the Senator from California, [Mrs. Boxer]. Like 
her, I was shocked by the statistics recently released on spousal abuse 
in our military. You have all seen them. I do not need to repeat them.
  Mr. President, violence in America goes deeper and comes closer to 
many families, civilian and military, than we would like to admit. 
Domestic violence, in particular, is America's dark little secret.
  A few weeks ago a woman told me the following story: Her husband used 
to beat her regularly. She wanted to leave, but feared the consequences 
for herself and her children. One day her 2-year-old witnessed her 
husband strangling her. Finally, that incident was the catalyst for the 
woman to seek refuge with her 2-year-old and her 4-year-old in a 
shelter for battered women. A few days later, the 2-year-old got mad at 
the 4-year-old. The mother turned to see what was the matter and 
witnessed the 2-year-old going for the throat of the 4-year-old. I have 
thought often about that image of violence being passed on from one 
generation to another.
  ``The most dangerous place to be,'' a policeman recently said, ``is 
in one's home between Saturday night at 6 p.m. and Sunday at 6 p.m.'' 
He forgot to add, ``Especially if you're a woman.'' A 10-year study 
found that in cases where the identity of the killer in known over one 
half of all women murdered in America were killed by a current or 
former male partner or by a male family member. Several studies have 
shown that women who have been victims of domestic physical assault may 
comprise up to 19 to 30 percent of injured women seen in emergency 
departments. These studies also show that violence against women in the 
home causes more total injuries in America than rape, muggings, and car 
accidents combined. Sudden, stark, incomprehensible, family violence 
doesn't just happen. It builds in a cycle of aggression and forgiveness 
and blame until it explodes. And the battered spouse is almost never a 
man.
  To counter domestic violence, we need to get it out of the closet and 
then help women find a way out of a brutal environment. Domestic 
violence is a problem at all income levels. It is more than a serious 
health care problem, it is a social sickness, a tragedy that is 
destroying families, and an experience that spreads violence to future 
generations.
  That is why this amendment is so important. It builds on the 
military's own efforts by mandating a study of both the causes of 
spousal abuse in the military and an analysis of current procedures for 
responding to this problem.

  But studying the problem is not enough. Every man's home may be his 
castle, but it is not his torture chamber in which he can beat someone 
less physically strong without consequences. Many men will deny the 
impulse and the existence of the behavior. Like drunks that have not 
quite reformed, they promise their partners and the world that the 
latest episode of violence will be the last episode of violence. Too 
often they go back on their word, and the cycle of aggression, seeking 
forgiveness, blaming the victim, and committing aggression starts over 
again.
  When a woman is the victim of domestic violence, she must have a 
place to go. There should be a counseling hotline so that experienced 
professionals can guide her to an appropriate place. Above all, there 
must be enough battered-spouse shelters with enough resources for 
relocation to give women some idea of where they can escape the fear of 
a threatening phone call or knock on the door in the middle of the 
night.
  But we have to do more than give women a place after they are beaten. 
We have to prevent the violence in the first place. I suggest that 
every health professional--doctors, nurses, physician's assistants, 
social workers, military and civilian--be trained to recognize domestic 
violence and to ask female patients about it. Asking the question 
hopefully will free women from considering beatings as a family matter 
that they are not sanctioned to discuss, even with their doctor. At a 
minimum, domestic violence should not be treated as a preexisting 
condition to deny women health insurance.
  But it is not just up to health care professionals. If we are going 
to stop domestic violence, each of us, in our own spheres of 
influence--home, work, PTA, Little League--has an obligation to 
acknowledge it occurs, recognize it when we see it, and say something 
about it. It is so much easier to overlook it, turn the other way, 
regard it exclusively as a family matter, pretend we do not have any 
responsibility. But if we are going to prevent it, we all do.
  With this amendment, Senator Boxer is not singling out the military 
for special blame or responsibility. But, as the figures show, the 
problem exists in military families and is growing at an alarming rate. 
This amendment, then, is one small piece in what must be a broader 
national strategy to bring the problem of spousal abuse out of the 
closet and address this dirty little secret.
  Mr. NUNN. This amendment would require the Secretary of Defense to 
conduct a study of spousal abuse by Armed Forces personnel and report 
the findings to Congress within 180 days. I urge the adoption of the 
amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. We have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2184) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2185

(Purpose: To authorize certain service schools to award masters degrees 
 and to establish a Board of Advisors for the Marine Corps University)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, for myself, I send an amendment to the desk 
and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2185.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 188, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following:

              Subtitle D--Professional Military Education

     SEC. 931. AUTHORITY FOR MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY TO AWARD THE 
                   DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES.

       (a) Authority To Award.--(1) Chapter 609 of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 7102. Marine Corps University: master of military 
       studies

       ``(a) Authority.--Upon the recommendation of the Director 
     and faculty of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 
     the President of the Marine Corps University may confer the 
     degree of master of military studies upon graduates of the 
     college who fulfill the requirements for the degree.
       ``(b) Regulations.--The authority provided by subsection 
     (a) shall be exercised under regulations prescribed by the 
     Secretary of the Navy.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``7102. Marine Corps University: master of military studies.''.

       (b) Effectiver Date.--The authority provided by section 
     7102(a) of title 10, United States Code, as added by 
     subsection (a), shall become effective on the date on which 
     the Secretary of Education determines that the requirements 
     established by the Command and Staff College of the Marine 
     Corps University for the degree of master of military studies 
     are in accordance with generally applicable requirements for 
     a degree of master of arts.

     SEC. 932. BOARD OF ADVISORS OF MARINE CORPS UNIVERSITY.

       (a) Board.--(1) Chapter 609 of title 10, United States 
     Code, as amended by section 931, is further amended by adding 
     at the end the following new section:

     ``Sec. 7103. Marine Corps University: Board of Advisors

       ``(a) In General.--A Board of Advisors to the President of 
     the Marine Corps University is constituted annually of--
       ``(1) the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of 
     the Senate, or the designee of the chairman; and
       ``(2) six persons designated by the Secretary of the Navy.
       ``(b) Terms.--(1) The persons designated by the Secretary 
     of the Navy shall serve for 3 years each except that any 
     member whose term of office has expired shall continue to 
     serve until the successor to the member is designated.
       ``(2) Members may be reappointed for one or more successive 
     terms.
       ``(3) If a member of the Board dies or resigns, the 
     official who designated that member shall designate a 
     successor to serve for the unexpired portion of the term of 
     the member.
       ``(c) Visits.--The Board shall visit the Marine Corps 
     University semiannually upon the call of the President of the 
     Marine Corps University. With the approval of the President 
     of the University, the Board, or any of its members, may make 
     other visits to the University in connection with the duties 
     of the Board or to consult with the President of the 
     University.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter, 
     as amended by section 931, is further amended by adding at 
     the end the following new item:

``7103. Marine Corps University: Board of Advisors.''.

       (b) Initial Designations of Members.--Of the members of the 
     Board of Advisors of the Marine Corps University initially 
     designated under section 7103(a)(2) of title 10, United 
     States Code, as added by subsection (a)--
       (1) two shall be designated for a term of 3 years;
       (2) two shall be designated for a term of 2 years; and
       (3) two shall be designated for a term of 1 year.

     SEC. 933. AUTHORITY FOR AIR UNIVERSITY TO AWARD THE DEGREE OF 
                   MASTER OF AIRPOWER ART AND SCIENCE.

       (a) Authority To Award.--(1) Chapter 901 of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec. 9317. Air University: master of airpower art and 
       science

       ``(a) Authority.--Upon the recommendation of the faculty of 
     the School of Advanced Airpower Studies of the Air 
     University, the Commander of the university may confer the 
     degree of master of airpower art and science upon graduates 
     of the school who fulfill the requirements for the degree.
       ``(b) Regulations.--The authority provided by subsection 
     (a) shall be exercised under regulations prescribed by the 
     Secretary of the Air Force.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``9317. Air University: master of airpower art and science.''.

       (b) Effective Date.--The authority provided by section 
     9317(a) of title 10, United States Code, as added by 
     subsection (a), shall become effective on the date on which 
     the Secretary of Education determines that the requirements 
     established by the School of Advanced Airpower Studies of the 
     Air University for the degree of master of airpower art and 
     science are in accordance with generally applicable 
     requirements for a degree of master of arts or a degree of 
     master of science.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would establish a Board of 
Advisors for the Marine Corps University and authorize the Marine Corps 
University and Air University to confer masters degrees to certain 
graduating students.
  I urge adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. We have no objection.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this is an amendment that would establish a 
Board of Advisors for the Marine Corps University and authorize the 
Marine Corps University and the Air University to confer master degrees 
to certain graduating students. This degree granting authority would 
become effective upon the determination of the Secretary of Education 
that the requirements established by these universities are in 
accordance with generally applicable requirements for masters degrees, 
and the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force would be responsible 
for enacting regulations to implement these authorities.
  Mr. President, the universities in question have developed graduate-
level curricula that support this degree granting authority. A 
professional master's degree with civilian accreditation will enhance 
the quality and status of these important schools, and culminate the 
efforts of these universities to broaden and improve military 
education.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2185) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. THURMOND. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2186

      (Purpose: To strike out section 246 (relating to live-fire 
    survivability testing of F-22 aircraft) and insert a substitute)

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Roth and Senator 
Pryor, I offer an amendment that would require the Secretary of Defense 
ask the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences 
to conduct a study on the desirability of waiving the requirement for 
full-scale, full-up testing of the F-22 survivability. I send the 
amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana (Mr. Coats), for Mr. Roth, for 
     himself and Mr. Pryor, proposes an amendment numbered 2186.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 52, beginning with line 20, strike out all through 
     page 53, line 20, and insert in lieu thereof the following:

     SEC. 246. STUDY REGARDING LIVE-FIRE SURVIVABILITY TESTING OF 
                   F-22 AIRCRAFT.

       (a) Requirement.--The Secretary of Defense shall request 
     the National Research Council of the National Academy of 
     Sciences to conduct a study regarding the desirability of 
     waiving for the F-22 aircraft program the survivability tests 
     required by section 2366(c) of title 10, United States Code, 
     and to submit to the Secretary and Congress, within 180 days 
     after the date of the enactment of this Act, a report 
     containing the conclusions of the Council regarding the 
     desirability of waiving such tests.
       (b) Content of Report.--The report shall contain the 
     following matters:
       (1) Conclusions regarding the practicality of full-scale, 
     full-up testing for the F-22 aircraft program.
       (2) A discussion of the implications regarding the 
     affordability of the F-22 aircraft program of conducting and 
     of not conducting the survivability tests, including an 
     assessment of the potential life cycle benefits that could be 
     derived from full-scale, full-up live fire testing in 
     comparison to the costs of such testing.
       (3) A discussion of what, if any, changes of circumstances 
     affecting the F-22 aircraft program have occurred since 
     completion of the milestone II program review to cause the 
     program manager to request a waiver of the survivability 
     tests for the F-22 aircraft program that was not requested at 
     that time.
       (4) The sufficiency of the F-22 aircraft program testing 
     plans to fulfill the same requirements and purposes as are 
     provided in subsection (e)(3) of section 2366 of title 10, 
     United States Code, for realistic survivability testing for 
     purposes of subsection (a)(1)(A) of such section.
       (5) Any recommendations regarding survivability testing for 
     the F-22 aircraft program that the Council considers 
     appropriate on the basis of the study.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, live fire testing is a key component of the 
Congress's fly-before-buy policy. Live fire testing is an objective 
check and balance on the Defense buying system. In the 1980's, Senator 
Pryor and I successfully led the fight to ensure that survivability was 
built into the design of platforms such as planes, tanks, and aircraft. 
The law states that survivability must be tested using a system in full 
combat configuration unless a program manager requests a waiver prior 
to the full-scale design phase. In a system where bureaucratic 
interests carry more weight than results, realistic tests of a weapon's 
protection for its crew are vital to those who must depend on the 
weapon in battle. The waiver process allows for other than testing of 
the combat configuration if the Secretary of Defense determines that 
survivability is adequately addressed by the program manager's plans 
for the design phase.
  Mr. President, I am concerned about the implementation of the live 
fire and lethality testing statutes. All major aircraft being developed 
by the Pentagon are avoiding tests for survivability and vulnerability. 
In the recent hearings on procurement reform bills, the General 
Accounting Office and the Defense Inspector General opposed the 
acquisition streamlining proposals that would weaken the current law.
  In 1992, the National Academy of Sciences' National Research Council 
assembled a distinguished team of experts in live fire testing at the 
request of the Secretary of Defense. The team was asked to make a 
determination about whether Defense Department regulations correctly 
implement the live fire testing law, 10 U.S.C. 2366. The team surveyed 
its application to new aircraft programs and produced its report last 
fall. The National Research Council found that the law ``makes a 
valuable contribution to vulnerability assessment and to the design of 
survivable aircraft.''
  Since that report was produced, the Air Force asked congress to waive 
the live fires testing laws for the F-22 Fights program. The F-22 is 
the Air Force's next generation fighter jet, slated to replace the F-15 
in air-to-air combat missions. It will incorporate stealth technology, 
composites, computerized flight controls. The total program cost is 
expected to top $70 billion. At this level of spending, a small 
improvement in survivability can generate significant savings, while 
overlooking a small vulnerability can have cost billions.
  The F-22 is currently in the final design phase, and the final design 
will need to be tested to see how easily it can be shot down. The 
program manager did not request a waiver as provided in the live fire 
testing laws prior to entering the final design phase. However, the 
program manager now wants to obtain a waiver and consequently has asked 
Congress to exempt the F-22 from the statutes.
  Mr. President, I have no reason to believe that the program manager 
is making his request in bad faith. His staff already has found a major 
flaw in the design of the wings whereby a single hit by a 30mm bullet 
would have shattered the wing. As a result of such component-level 
tests, the F-22 program manager believes that key flaws will be 
addressed and testing of an aircraft configured for comb at will not be 
necessary. Moreover, the program office estimates that about $250 
million could be saved by not conducting full-up tests, and there would 
be little additional value from such testing.
  It seems to me that the F-22 program manager should have requested a 
waiver within the law's guidelines, if he believed the costs outweighed 
its benefits. Then, the Secretary of Defense would have done the 
technical assessment required. Instead, he wants Congress to make this 
determination. Congress does not have sufficient technical insight into 
the trade-offs that need to be considered. In addition, the Pentagon's 
director of live fire testing has done calculations that show the cost 
of testing, at about a third of a percent of the total program cost, 
would be covered if even small design fixes resulted. Finally, this 
could set a bad precedent--the Congress being asked to do technical 
assessments and to waive the testing laws on major programs that the 
laws were intended to address.

  The amendment that Senator Pryor and I are proposing would give an 
independent organization the task of making recommendations on the 
waiver of testing for F-22. It is our intention that the National 
Research Council's distinguished team that prepared last year's report 
on live fire testing be reconstituted for this effort. They are well 
aware of the law, as well as the aircraft technologies involved here.
  I want to thank the distinguished Chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee and Senator Thurmond for their cooperation on this manner. I 
appreciate their support in getting this amendment adopted.
  Mr. NUNN. I urge the amendment be adopted.
  Mr. COATS. The administration has indicated support for this 
provision, and I urge the Senate adopt this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2186) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2187

(Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate that the Senate Committee 
 on Armed Services should hold hearings related to the procedures used 
    by the Department of Defense's investigative organizations when 
  investigating the death of a member of the Armed Forces who, while 
    serving on active duty, died from a cause determined to be self-
                               inflicted)

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Dole I offer an 
amendment which expresses the sense of the Senate that the Armed 
Services Committee should hold hearings related to DOD procedures for 
investigating the death of a service member from a cause determined to 
be self-inflicted. I send the amendment to the desk and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:
  The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats] for Mr. Dole, proposes an 
amendment numbered 2187.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place insert the following new section:

     SEC.  . REVIEW OF THE PROCEDURES USED BY DEPARTMENT OF 
                   DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE ORGANIZATIONS WHEN 
                   CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF A 
                   MEMBER OF THE ARMED FORCES WHO, WHILE SERVING 
                   ON ACTIVE DUTY, DIED FROM A CAUSED DETERMINED 
                   TO BE SELF-INFLICTED.

       Sense of Congress.--It is the Sense of Congress that, upon 
     receipt of the report required by section 1185 of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, the 
     Senate Committee on Armed Services should review that report 
     and hold hearings related to the procedures employed by 
     Department of Defense investigative Organizations when 
     conducting an investigation into the death of a member of the 
     Armed Services who, while serving on active duty, died from a 
     cause determined to be self-inflicted.

  Mr. NUNN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, this is an amendment which expresses the 
sense of the Senate that the Senate Armed Services Committee should 
hold hearings related to the procedures used by the Department of 
Defense's investigative organizations when they investigate the death 
of any member of the Armed Forces who, while serving on active duty, 
died from what appears to be a self-inflicted cause.
  Last week, I met with two of my constituents, Royal and Linda Shults 
of Atchison, KS. The story they related to me was extremely disturbing. 
However, it is one that I think is important to bring before the 
Senate. On July 2, 1992, Allen Shults was found dead in his living 
quarters at Keesler Air Force Base. The Air Force Office of Special 
Investigations determined that his death was due to asphyxia, induced 
by self-inflicted hanging. However, Mr. and Mrs. Shults soon learned 
that the official explanation of their son's death didn't fit with the 
facts. In fact, by conducting their own investigation, Mr. and Mrs. 
Shults have uncovered evidence of a material deficiency in the Air 
Force's original investigation.
  Unfortunately, the Shultses are not alone. There are families from 
all over the country, from California to Maine and from Minnesota to 
Texas who can identify with Mr. and Mrs. Shults. These families have 
come together to form ``Until We Have Answers,'' A nationwide 
organization made up solely of relatives of military personnel whose 
deaths occurred mysteriously and have been ruled self-inflicted. Each 
of these families tells of rushed, incomplete, and often fumbled 
investigations conducted by DOD investigative organizations.
  I am particularly concerned that, in an effort to close these cases 
quickly and to prevent embarrassment to local commanders and the armed 
services, deaths are often ruled self-inflicted without full and 
complete investigation.
  We owe the families of our military personnel more. This matter 
deserves the attention of the Armed Services Committee and I am pleased 
that the chairman and the ranking member have agreed to accept this 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2187) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion of the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2188

 (Purpose: To require a study and report on fiscal relief for certain 
Medicare-eligible military retirees who incur Medicare late enrollment 
                               penalties)

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Cohen, I offer an 
amendment which requires a study and report on financial relief for 
Medicare-eligible military retirees adversely affected by the closing 
of a military treatment facility with base closings.
  I send the amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats] for Mr. Cohen, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2188.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 167, beginning with line 14, strike all through 
     page 170, line 7, and insert the following:

     SEC. 708. STUDY AND REPORT ON FINANCIAL RELIEF FOR CERTAIN 
                   MEDICARE-ELIGIBLE MILITARY RETIREES WHO INCUR 
                   MEDICARE LATE ENROLLMENT PENALTIES.

       (a) Study.--The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with 
     the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall conduct a 
     study regarding possible financial relief from late 
     enrollment penalties for military retirees and dependents of 
     such retirees who reside within the service area of a base 
     closure site and who have failed to timely enroll in medicare 
     part B due to reliance upon the military treatment facility 
     located at such site.
       (b) Report.--Not later than March 31, 1995, the Secretary 
     of Defense shall report to Congress the results of the study 
     under paragraph (1). Such report shall also--
       (1) identify by base closure site the number of military 
     retirees within a 65 mile catchment area who have failed to 
     enroll in medicare part B and are subjected to late 
     enrollment penalties;
       (2) determine the estimated aggregate amount of the 
     penalties by base closure site;
       (3) describe the characteristics of the population that are 
     subject to the penalties, such as age and income level;
       (4) address the appropriateness of waiving such penalties;
       (5) identify the Department of Defense funds that should be 
     used to pay the penalties if waiving such penalties is not 
     recommended;
       (6) outline a program for a special medicare part B 
     enrollment period for affected retirees living near bases 
     already closed and bases which are designated for closure in 
     the future; and
       (7) include legislative recommendations for implementing a 
     program which removes the financial burden from the medicare-
     eligible beneficiaries who have been or will be adversely 
     impacted by base-closure actions.
       (c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
       (1) The term ``base closure'' means a base closure under a 
     base closure law (within the meaning given such term in 
     section 2825(d) of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 U.S.C. 2687 note)).
       (2) The term ``medicare part B'' means the public health 
     insurance program under part B of title XVIII of the Social 
     Security Act.
       (3) The term ``military treatment facility'' means a 
     facility of a uniformed service referred to in section 
     1074(a) of title 10, United States Code, in which health care 
     is provided.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, it is my hope that this amendment will help 
us ultimately to provide a measure of financial relief to military 
retirees who are facing significant increases in their out-of-pocket 
health costs due to a base closing in their area and the resultant loss 
of the medical facilities upon which they had come to depend for their 
care. This issue has been raised again and again in community meetings 
in my State as we have attempted to assess the impact of the closing of 
Loring Air Force Base, and I know that it is of concern to thousands of 
military retirees in other parts of the country as well.
  Many retirees have purposely selected their retirement homes based 
upon their proximity to military health care, commissary, exchange and 
other facilities. In fact, the Retired Officers' Association estimates 
that almost 70 percent of its members deliberately located near 
military installations so that they would have ready access to health 
care services.
  Military retirees do become eligible for Medicare when they turn 65. 
However, many of those living near bases have continued to rely upon 
military facilities for their health care needs and have elected not to 
enroll in Part B. Military health care has many advantages over 
Medicare, particularly for low-income retired enlisted personnel. There 
are no premiums, copayments or deductibles and prescription drugs are 
generally provided free of charge. Those retirees who elected not to 
enroll in Part B are therefore understandably concerned that, not only 
will they lose access to the free health care services they believe 
they were promised, but also that they are going to be socked with a 
substantial financial penalty for late enrollment--in addition to the 
new premiums, deductibles, and copayments--when they do enroll in 
Medicare.
  The burden of this late enrollment penalty will be particularly heavy 
for the retired enlisted personnel who make up the bulk of the military 
retiree population and who have average annual incomes of between 
$12,000 and $15,000 a year. For the 75-year old retired E-7 and his 
wife, living on a retirement income of about $13,000 a year, coming up 
with the $986.40 a year to cover their Medicare monthly premiums will 
be difficult. To impose a late-enrollment penalty on this couple would 
be almost usurious, exacting far more than the proverbial ``pound of 
flesh.'' It would effectively double their annual out-of-pocket costs 
for premiums alone to almost $2,000, or 15 percent of their total 
income. And the older the retiree, the greater the penalty is likely to 
be.
  The amendment I am offering requires the Secretary of Defense, in 
conjunction with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, to conduct 
a study of military retirees living in base closure areas to determine 
the extent to which they are affected by the Part B penalty and to make 
recommendations for ways to relieve them of this financial burden. It 
is my intent that Congress take action on these recommendations next 
year in order to provide a measure of financial relief for retirees who 
have been or will be adversely affected by base closure actions, and I 
urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2188) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2189

   (Purpose: To require a study on the offset of veterans disability 
  compensation by the amount of any separation benefits or incentives 
received by members of the Armed Forces upon separation from the Armed 
                                Forces)

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I offer, on behalf of Senator Thurmond, for 
Senator Jeffords, an amendment that directs the comptroller general to 
study and report on the offset of VA disability payments from voluntary 
separation and special separation bonus payments.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats], for Mr. Jeffords, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2189.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 158, below line 24, add the following:

     SEC. 655. STUDY OF OFFSET OF DISABILITY COMPENSATION BY 
                   RECEIPT OF SEPARATION BENEFITS AND INCENTIVES.

       (a) Study.--(1) The Comptroller General shall carry out a 
     study of the offset of the amount of disability compensation 
     from the Department of Veterans Affairs that is received by 
     an individual separated from the Armed Forces by the 
     amount of any of the following benefits:
       (A) Separation pay under section 1174 of title 10, United 
     States Code.
       (B) A special separation benefit under a special separation 
     benefits program carried out under section 1174a(a) of such 
     title.
       (C) A voluntary separation incentive under section 1175 of 
     such title.
       (2) In carrying out the study, the Comptroller General 
     shall--
       (A) determine the purposes for the availability of the 
     benefits referred to paragraph (1);
       (B) determine the justifications for the offset referred to 
     in that paragraph;
       (C) assess the effect of the offset by--
       (i) determining the number of members of the Armed Forces 
     who will separate from the Armed Forces during the period 
     beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending 
     on September 30, 1999;
       (ii) determining the number of such members who will be 
     provided a benefit referred to in that paragraph, and the 
     average amount of the benefit to be provided;
       (iii) determining the number of such members who will be 
     entitled to disability compensation from the Department of 
     Veterans Affairs, and the average monthly amount of the 
     compensation to which the members will be entitled; and
       (iv) evaluating the extent, if any, to which the offset 
     affects the capacity of members who are separated from the 
     Armed Forces to meet financial obligations (including 
     obligations relating to housing and medical care) of such 
     members that arise as a result of the service of the members 
     in the Armed Forces or the separation of such members from 
     that service;
       (D) determine the extent, if any, to which the offset of 
     disability compensation by the amount of a benefit referred 
     to in subparagraph (B) or (C) of paragraph (1) reduces the 
     effectiveness of the benefits in meeting the purposes 
     determined under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; and
       (E) determine the cost of the repeal of the offset.
       (b) Report.--(1) The Comptroller General shall submit to 
     the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on 
     Veterans' Affairs of the Senate and the House of 
     Representatives a report on the results of the study required 
     under subsection (a). The report shall include the 
     recommendations of the Comptroller General on improvements to 
     the provision of the benefits referred to in subsection 
     (a)(1).
       (2) The Comptroller General shall submit the report not 
     later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
     Act.
  Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. President, on May 25 of this year I introduced a 
bill, S. 2151, the Military Voluntary Separation Act of 1994, which 
would amend title 10 of the United States Code to repeal the 
requirement that amounts paid to a member of the Armed Forces under the 
Special Separation Benefits Program of the Department of Defense, or 
under the Voluntary Separation Incentive Program of the Department, be 
offset from amounts subsequently paid to that member by the Department 
of Veterans Affairs as disability compensation.
  I introduced this legislation because I believe a great injustice has 
been done to our Nation's veterans. The fact that these service members 
are not allowed to receive their separation bonuses and VA compensation 
concurrently is unjust. I see these two forms of income as having no 
link which would justify an offset. SSB and VSI separation compensation 
are for services rendered and compensation for assisting the Department 
of Defense in its downsizing. Veterans' disability compensation pay is 
compensation for a physical or mental disability incurred from service. 
By definition these are very different issues.
  The separation incentive bonuses offered by DOD are part of our 
Nation's Federal buyout program which is a separate issue from 
disability compensation.
  In looking at this issue, I am particularly concerned about Persian 
Gulf war veterans who chose to take a separation incentive bonus not 
realizing down the road they may incur a disability from their service 
and would not be able to receive their full compensation until their 
separation bonus was paid out.
  On top of this I am concerned as to whether or not DOD took any steps 
to help members who separate with the SSB or VSI bonus to adjust to 
civilian life. I have here with me a copy of DOD's Voluntary Separation 
Incentives booklet, which explains the SSB and VSI Programs and answers 
anticipated questions regarding the programs. Nowhere in the booklet 
does it mention that if a service member chose one of these separation 
incentives and then incurred a service-related disability that he or 
she would not be able to receive both their bonus and VA compensation 
concurrently. The booklet does clearly state, however, that ``the 
voluntary separation programs are not early retirement programs. They 
are intended to ease career changes for relatively young men and women 
who are likely to proceed immediately to new careers in the civilian 
sector which offer appropriate health care and other benefits.''

  It is important that Congress examine the offset rationale of these 
programs and look at possible policy changes to correct this injustice.
  I am offering an amendment today which will call for a GAO report to 
be done on the issue of concurrent receipt of SSB/VSI/Involuntary 
Separation and VA compensation. Specifically, the study will 
concentrate on three main issues:
  First, explanation and rationale of the current programs.
  Second, examination of the impact of the current program, for 
example: How many service members who take a separation bonus do not 
return to work after they separate from their service, and is this in 
any way related to their disability? How has the offset provision 
affected securing voluntary separation from the Military?
  Third, recommendations for policy changes, including a cost estimate 
if the offset was repealed.
  I plan to continue to research the impact of the SSB and VSI 
programs. I am hopeful that a GAO report will provide Congress with the 
necessary information to guide this body in further policy decisions 
relating to separation incentives.
  These men and women chose to devote their lives to serving our 
country. We need to make sure they are receiving the compensation and 
assistance they deserve.
  Mr. COATS. I understand the amendment has been cleared on both sides. 
I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2189) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2190

   (Purpose: To ensure that bomber aircraft of the Air Force are not 
                          prematurely retired)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of 
Senator Bingaman and Senator Domenici and I ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] for Mr. Bingaman, for 
     himself, and Mr. Domenici, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2190.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 25, between lines 2 and 3, insert the following:

     SEC. 132. RETIREMENT OF BOMBER AIRCRAFT.

       No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any 
     other Act may be obligated or expended during fiscal year 
     1995 for retiring, or preparing to retire, any B-52H, B-1B, 
     or F-111 bomber aircraft.

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment with my 
colleague from New Mexico, Senator Domenici, regarding U.S. bomber 
forces. This amendment would prohibit the expenditure of Department of 
Defense funds to retire B-52H, B-1B, or F-111 bomber aircraft in fiscal 
year 1995.
  In the report accompanying this bill, the Armed Services Committee 
put down a clear marker regarding the bomber force structure. The 
Committee points out that current DOD budget planning for the bomber 
force is below the minimum level necessary to deal with two nearly 
simultaneous major regional conflicts as laid out in the bottom-up 
review. The committee report also notes that the Department has been 
unable to offer ``a coherent and consistent'' explanation for the 
discrepancies between the bomber force needs identified by the bottom-
up review and its own budget guidance.
  In response to this situation, the committee directed in report 
language that the Department preserve all bomber force structure 
options for 1 year while additional bomber force structure and 
effectiveness studies are completed. This amendment would simply put 
this prohibition into law.
  Mr. President, this amendment is meant to convey that Congress is not 
willing to forego the bomber force structure we need to face future 
contingencies. Our amendment would retain the current structure for the 
B-52 and B-1 bomber forces, as the committee has recommended, and add a 
prohibition on expenditures leading to the retirement of the F-111 
bomber aircraft.
  We have added the F-111 because of recent statements by the Secretary 
of the Air Force that indicate the Air Force is looking toward 
retirement of this aircraft beginning in fiscal year 1996, despite a 
clear decision by Secretary Perry last fall to retain the F-111 in the 
force structure until at least 1999. The F-111 should be retained 
because it is a proven long-range hard-target killer with many years of 
service life remaining as a result of recent upgrades. It can deliver 
more smart bombs deeper than any other Air Force tactical aircraft. 
Without the loss of a single aircraft, it was used during the gulf war 
to destroy some of Iraq's most hardened command bunkers and the Al 
Almadi oil pumping facility and had the highest kill ratio for tanks 
and bridges. This is a capability we may need in future conflicts, and 
will not have until a new family of precision--guided weapons [JDAM] is 
developed and deployed into the bomber force at the end of the decade 
at the earliest.
  The Air Force has previously stated that it needs the F-111 to fill 
this gap. Earlier this year Air Force Chief of Staff McPeak, indicated 
in an interview that Aviation Week and Space Technology that the F-111, 
with its precision-guided missile capability, would be needed to fill 
the emerging bomber gap--the same gap identified by the Armed Services 
Committee in the report language I quoted above. The Under Secretary of 
the Air Force, Rudy DeLeon, made a similar statement during his 
confirmation process before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
Despite this, it was reported in the media on Monday that the Air Force 
would recommend retiring the F-111 in its fiscal year 1996 budget 
submission, on an action that would leave us with both a shortfall in 
the bomber force structure and a shortfall in tactical bombers to help 
bridge the gap.
  Mr. President, this amendment would seek to address this issue by 
maintaining the existing force structure during fiscal year 1995 while 
additional analyses regarding our future bomber force needs are 
completed. The amendment tracks with the committee's report and 
intentions.
  This afternoon Senator Domenici, Congressman Richardson, and I met 
with Deputy Secretary Deutch on the F-111 issue, and he told us that 
the current DOD plan is to retain the aircraft through 1999 because of 
its unique capability. He told us that there would be a strong burden 
of proof on the Air Force to justify any proposal for early retirement. 
I am confident that he and Secretary Perry will reject the new Air 
Force proposal, just as they rejected a similar proposal last year, and 
just as they did in similar circumstances several months ago when the 
Air Force proposed terminating the Milstar program.
  This amendment is a strong signal to the Air Force regarding 
Congress' position on bomber force structure. It is a straightforward 
amendment on an important issue. I believe that it has been cleared on 
both sides and I want to express my appreciation for the support of 
Senator Nunn and Senator Thurmond for the amendment. I urge my 
colleagues to support it.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I rise today to join my colleague, Senator Bingaman, to 
offer an amendment that will prohibit the expenditure of any of the 
funds authorized to be appropriated for the Department of Defense in 
fiscal year 1995 for the purpose of retiring, or preparing to retire, 
any F-111 and other bomber aircraft.
  Senator Bingaman and I met with Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch 
this afternoon. The Secretary informed us that because other DOD 
bombers lack precision guided munitions carrying capability the F-111's 
still provide a unique capability that will not be able to be 
duplicated in the near future.
  The Air Force has submitted its Program Objective Memorandum [POM] to 
the Secretary of Defense and it deletes the funding for the F-111's in 
fiscal year 1996. The Secretary of Defense will be reviewing the Air 
Force's plan and will make the final decision at some point in the near 
future.
  In our meeting today, Secretary Deutch stressed that a ``big burden 
of proof'' is on the Air Force to convince the Secretary of Defense 
that the F-111's should be retired before the President's Bottom Up 
Review says they should be retired. I do not believe retiring the F-
111's would be a wise decision, and I do not believe that the Air Force 
has any aircraft that is currently capable of duplicating the F-111.
  It is my hope that this amendment will send a clear message to the 
Secretary of the Air Force. The Bottom Up Review says that this unique 
aircraft is necessary to carry out the mission of the Department of 
Defense through fiscal year 1999. As a member of the Senate Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee, I intend to have similar language included 
in the Defense appropriations bill.
  I understand that this amendment has been cleared by both sides. I 
thank the chairman and ranking member of the committee for their 
support, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would put into law the 
prohibition in the committee report language directing the Department 
of Defense not to retire bomber aircraft during fiscal year 1995. It is 
consistent with the committee direction.
  It has been cleared on both sides. I urge its adoption.
  Mr. COATS. We have no objection to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2190) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2191

  (Purpose: To extend the authority to issue surety bonds for certain 
                        environmental programs)

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Thurmond and Senator 
Nunn, I send to the desk an amendment to extend the current provision 
for the issuance of surety bonds for the Department of Defense 
environmental cleanups. This would extend the period of authorization 
for issuance of these bonds from December 31, 1995 to December 31, 
1999.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana (Mr. Coats) for Mr. Thurmond, for 
     himself, and for Mr. Nunn, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2191.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 68, following line 20, insert the following:

     SEC. 323. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SURETY BONDS FOR 
                   CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS.

       (1) Section 2701(j) of title 10, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking out ``December 31, 1995'' and inserting 
     in lieu thereof ``December 31, 1999''.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I offer an amendment that would extend 
the current provision which provides for the issuance of surety bonds 
for Department of Defense environmental cleanups. This amendment would 
extend the authorized period from December 31, 1995 to December 31, 
1999.
  This provision would ensure that providers of surety bonds will not 
be exposed to liability beyond the terms and conditions of the bond. 
This is important because providers will not issue surety bonds if they 
will be liable for damages outside the terms and conditions of their 
bonds. This liability would effectively prohibit providers from issuing 
bonds. The surety bonds are essential for contractors who would obtain 
performance bonds for cleanup work.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2191) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2192

(Purpose: To require certain documentation and assessments in order to 
  assess the extent to which technology and industrial base programs 
            attain the policy objectives for such programs)

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator McCain of Arizona, I 
send an amendment to the desk that would require the Department of 
Defense to include an explanation in the award files for the technical 
reinvestment project of the relevance of each funded proposal for the 
national security objectives found in 10 U.S.C. 2501.
  The amendment would also require the General Accounting Office to 
conduct an assessment of the projects funded to date under the TRP and 
their relevance to those national security objectives.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats], for Mr. McCain, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2192.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 181, after the matter following line 16 and before 
     line 17, insert the following:

     SEC. 825. DOCUMENTATION FOR AWARDS FOR COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS 
                   OR OTHER TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE DEFENSE 
                   TECHNOLOGY REINVESTMENT PROGRAM.

       At the time of the award for a cooperative agreement or 
     other transaction under a program carried out under chapter 
     148 of title 10, United States Code, the head of the agency 
     concerned shall include in the file pertaining to such 
     agreement or transaction a brief explanation of the manner in 
     which the award advances and enhances a particular national 
     security objective set forth in section 2501(a) of such title 
     or a particular policy objective set forth in section 2501(b) 
     of such title.

     SEC. 826. COMPTROLLER GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF EXTENT TO WHICH 
                   TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE PROGRAMS ATTAIN 
                   POLICY OBJECTIVES.

       Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States shall 
     submit to Congress an assessment of the extent to which 
     awards for cooperative agreements and other transactions 
     under programs carried out under chapter 148 of title 10, 
     United States Code, have been made specifically to advance 
     and enhance a particular national security objective set 
     forth in section 2501(a) of such title or to achieve a 
     particular policy objective set forth in section 2501(b) of 
     such title.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment to the 
national defense authorization bill under consideration. The amendment 
involves the Technology Reinvestment Project or TRP.
  The TRP was established in fiscal year 1993 to help develop dual-use 
technologies with both military and commercial applications, and to 
help small defense firms diversify into commercial markets. For fiscal 
year 1993-94 combined funding was in excess of $1 billion and this bill 
would provide an additional $625 million in funding.
  The Technology Reinvestment Program has the potential to make an 
important contribution to our defense conversion effort and I strongly 
support it in concept. In reviewing the awards for last year, however, 
I identified successful proposals which, on their face, had no apparent 
link to the national security and defense objectives which underlie the 
TRP. Several examples of such program awards will suffice to 
demonstrate my concern: $15.8 million to demonstrate the feasibility of 
providing medical facilities with the ability to directly access the 
medical data bases of other hospitals; and $7.6 million to improve the 
efficiency of electrical power distribution.
  I am sure these are very worthwhile projects, and perhaps each can be 
shown to be directly relevant to national security and defense, but the 
connection is not apparent, at least not to me. As enunciated in 10 
U.S.C. 2501(a), TRP awards can be directed toward any of the following 
policy objectives:
  Supplying and equipping the force structure of the armed forces;
  Sustaining production, maintenance, repair, and logistics for 
military operations;
  Maintaining advanced research and development activities to provide 
the armed forces with systems capable of ensuring technological 
superiority over potential adversaries;
  Promoting defense industrial base surge capacity for national 
emergencies; and
  Furthering the missions of the Department of Defense through defense 
reinvestment, diversification, and conversion.
  If the goals of the TRP are to be served and abuses prevented, it is 
necessary that the link to particular policy objectives be demonstrated 
and articulated. To this end, the amendment, I am proposing today would 
require that the Department of Defense include an explanation in their 
award files detailing the relevance of each funded proposal to 
particular policy objectives.
  Further, now that the TRP has been in existence for 2 years, fiscal 
year 1993-94, it would be appropriate for the Government Accounting 
Office to review the program and assess its progress in light of stated 
policy objectives. My amendment would request such a study.
  It is imperative that we establish a sound and solid defense 
industrial base for the post-cold war era. Technology reinvestment must 
form a central part of this effort. Senate oversight to ensure that 
such funds are being directed properly to the areas where they can do 
the most good is essential and I ask my colleagues to support this 
amendment.
  Mr. COATS. I understand the amendment has been cleared.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2192) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2193

(Purpose: To require a study on the establishment of a land management 
                 and training center at Fort Riley, KS)

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Dole, I send an 
amendment to the desk to authorize a study on whether to establish a 
Department of Defense center for the study of land management and land 
management training. Such a center would facilitate coordination 
between the Department of the Interior and the Department of Defense.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats], for Mr. Dole, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2193.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 110, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following:

     SEC. 357. STUDY OF ESTABLISHMENT OF LAND MANAGEMENT AND 
                   TRAINING CENTER AT FORT RILEY, KANSAS.

       (a) Study.--The Secretary of the Army shall carry out a 
     study of the feasibility and advisability of establishing at 
     Fort Riley, Kansas, a center for the land management 
     activities and land management training activities of the 
     Department of Defense.
       (b) Report.--The Secretary shall submit to the 
     congressional defense committees a report on the study 
     required under subsection (a). The Secretary shall submit the 
     report not later than May 1, 1996.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment which 
requires the Secretary of the Army to study the feasibility of 
establishing a land management and training center. The Department of 
Defense manages more than 25 million acres of training lands that must 
be maintained to provide realistic training conditions. However, 
according to Army estimates, approximately 18,000 acres of Army 
training land is lost annually because of degradation due to overuse 
that renders the damaged training land impassable.
  It has been estimated that the cost of rehabilitating these lands is 
$77 million annually, a cost which exceeds the current land 
rehabilitation and maintenance [LRAM] budget of all installations. In 
my view, the loss of training land and the cost associated with 
rehabilitation of that land could be significantly reduced through 
improved management of training and the coordination of military 
training and land management activities. Additionally, land management 
research, installation-specific consultation, technical assistance, and 
implementation of new education and training programs will lower the 
Pentagon's land management cost and ensure that our troops have 
available to them the land necessary for realistic training. My 
amendment simply would require the Secretary of the Army to study the 
feasibility of establishing a center to provide the vehicle for 
integrating these elements into an effective land management resource 
for military trainers and installation managers.
  The training lands on military installations are required to support 
realistic training exercises, because without high quality lands on 
which to train, the readiness of combat units may be compromised. If 
training lands cannot support the training mission, the investment in 
the entire installation is in jeopardy. Training lands must be 
maintained in a condition of high quality for a number of reasons. I 
will not go into them all here now, but allow me to mention two.
  First, the quality of the training lands directly affects the quality 
of training on those lands. For example, damaged lands may hinder or 
prevent realistic maneuvers. Second, the quality status of the training 
lands directly affects the costs of conducting training exercises. 
Increased repair costs to vehicles, increased training downtime 
associated with increased service time for equipment, and increased 
injuries to troops are all examples of how poor training lands 
increases the costs of training.
  This amendment provides the Army with the means to develop a plan for 
addressing its growing costs associated with managing its training 
lands. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I understand this has been cleared on both 
sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2193) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2194

    (Purpose: To designate a site for the relocation of the public 
education facility of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, and for 
                            other purposes)

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Hatfield, I send an 
amendment to the desk to authorize the relocation of the National 
Museum of Health and Medicine from the Walter Reed Army Medical Center 
to a site on the Mall in the District of Columbia.
  This site should be selected in accordance with applicable procedures 
of the District of Columbia, the General Services Administration, the 
National Capital Planning Commission, and the Commission on Fine Arts.
  No funds are authorized in this amendment for the construction of a 
museum building.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats], for Mr. Hatfield, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2194.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place, insert the following new section:

     SEC.  . PUBLIC EDUCATION FACILITY OF THE ARMED FORCES 
                   INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY.

       (a) Purpose.--It is the purpose of this section to--
       (1) display and interpret the collections of the Armed 
     Forces Institute of Pathology currently located at Walter 
     Reed Medical Center; and
       (2) designate a site for the relocation of the public 
     education facility of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology 
     so that it may serve as a central resource of instruction 
     about the critical health issues which confront all American 
     citizens.
       (b) Site of Facility.--The public education facility of 
     Armed Forces Institute of Pathology shall be located on or 
     near the Mall on land owned by the Federal Government or the 
     District of Columbia in the District of Columbia.
       (c) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
     construed as limiting the authority or responsibilities of 
     the National Capital Planning Commission or the Commission of 
     Fine Arts.
       (d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``the 
     Mall'' means--
       (1) the land designated as ``Union Square'', United States 
     Reservation 6A; and
       (2) the land designated as the ``Mall'', United States 
     Reservations 3, 4, 5, and 6.
       (e) Sense of the Congress.--
       (1) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (A) the National Museum of Health and Medicine Foundation, 
     Inc. (a private, nonprofit organization having for its 
     primary purpose the relocation to the Mall and revitalization 
     of the National Museum of Health and Medicine), the Armed 
     Forces Institute of Pathology, and the Public Health Service 
     have jointly supported planning to relocate the Museum to a 
     site on land that is located east of and adjacent to the 
     Hubert H. Humphrey Building (100 Independence Avenue, 
     Southwest, in the District of Columbia); and
       (B) the National Museum of Health and Medicine Foundation, 
     Inc., is deserving of the encouragement and support of the 
     American people in its effort to relocate the National Museum 
     of Health and Medicine to a site on land that is located east 
     of and adjacent to the Hubert H. Humphrey Building, and in 
     its effort to raise funds for a revitalized Museum to inspire 
     increasing numbers of Americans to lead healthy lives through 
     improved public understanding of health and the medical 
     sciences.
       (2) Location.--It is the sense of the Congress that, 
     subject to appropriate approvals by the National Capital 
     Planning Commission and the Commission of Fine Arts, the 
     National Museum of Health and Medicine should be relocated to 
     a site on land that is located east of and adjacent to the 
     Hubert H. Humphrey Building for the purpose of educating the 
     American public concerning health and the medical sciences.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I wonder if Senator Hatfield would be 
willing to describe for the Senate the amendment he is offering to the 
fiscal year 1995 Defense Authorization bill regarding the public 
education facility of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.
  Mr. HATFIELD. This amendment designates a site on or near the 
National Mall for the National Museum of Health and Medicine. This 
museum will incorporate into its exhibits the public collections of the 
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.
  Mr. NUNN. Does the Senator's amendment involve any expenditure of 
Department of Defense funds for the design, engineering or construction 
of the National Museum of Health and Medicine or any commitment for 
such spending in the future?
  Mr. HATFIELD. It does not. The amendment is for the sole purpose of 
setting aside Federal property for the new site for this museum. To 
amplify this point briefly, the Army Medical Museum, which contained 
the public collections that are now part of the Armed Forces Institute 
of Pathology, was on the Mall until 1968. Before it was moved to its 
current location at the Walter Reed Medical Center, this was one of the 
most visited museums in Washington. The Army Medical Museum was renamed 
the National Museum of Health and Medicine in 1988. I believe that the 
relocation of this facility to the Mall will greatly enhance public 
access to important information and displays relating to health.
  Mr. NUNN. Is it the Senator's understanding that the sponsors of this 
project, the National Museum of Health and Medicine Foundation headed 
by former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, intend to raise the money 
needed for the construction of this facility from private sources?
  Mr. HATFIELD. That is my understanding.
  Mr. NUNN. The Department of Defense currently provides $1.5 million 
per year to maintain the collection of the Armed Forces Institute of 
Pathology. This is a longstanding, and, in my view, appropriate 
expenditure of DOD funds. I oppose any additional appropriation for the 
Department of Defense to fund architecture, engineering, or 
construction of this museum public facility.
  Mr. HATFIELD. I want to assure the Senator that I understand his 
previously stated opposition to earmarking DOD spending on behalf of 
museum projects. As I said earlier, I expect Dr. Koop and the 
foundation to raise the funds necessary for this project from the 
private sector. I do not intend to seek future DOD additional 
appropriations on behalf of the National Museum of Health and Medicine 
for design and construction of the new facility, or when constructed, 
for operation of the museum beyond current services Defense Department 
funding for the Museum.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe that the amendment proposed by 
Senator Hatfield is an important step toward enhancing a Federal museum 
for the purpose of educating the public on health related issues. I am 
pleased to accept the amendment.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I understand the amendment has been cleared 
by both sides.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment. This is a 
very important amendment. I talked with Senator Hatfield about it 
several times. They are raising the money for this Museum of Health and 
Medicine to be moved privately. The Department of Defense is in favor 
of this, but the Department of Defense feels strongly that it should 
not be called on to provide construction money for this museum. That 
was part of the colloquy between Senator Hatfield and myself making 
that clear.
  I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2194) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2195

     (Purpose: To make funds available for procurement of portable 
 ventilators for the Defense Medical Facility Office, Fort Detrick, MD)

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Dole, I send an 
amendment to the desk that would authorize the Army to purchase new 
ruggedized, light weight medical ventilators for field deployment. 
These are used to assist injured patients in breathing. These would 
also be purchased with commercial American-made sources, and they are 
American-made devices.
  I ask for immediate consideration on this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislation clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats], for Mr. Dole, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2195.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 110, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following:

     SEC. 357. PROCUREMENT OF PORTABLE VENTILATORS FOR THE DEFENSE 
                   MEDICAL FACILITY OFFICE, FORT DETRICK, 
                   MARYLAND.

       Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by section 
     301(5), $2,500,000 shall be available for the procurement of 
     portable ventilators for the Defense Medical Facility Office, 
     Fort Detrick, Maryland.

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce an amendment which 
authorizes the procurement of medical ventilators for the Armed 
Services. As my colleagues probably are aware, these devices are used 
to help a person breathe in a diversity of circumstances, anything from 
normal lung stiffness to collapsed lungs. In the past, ventilators, 
which are standard equipment in ambulances, operating rooms, and medic 
helicopters, have had problems adapting to this wide range of 
circumstances. Many were not made for use on all ages of people, or for 
ventilating progressively more difficult lung states, or, due to the 
weight of the device and its lack of ruggedness, for use in less 
technically supported environments.
  Since 1986, the Army has funded, off and on, development of a 
lightweight man-portable ventilator. However, due to shifting 
requirements, the services have not settled on a standard design. 
Recently, because of our operations in Somalia, the military made a 
stop-gap procurement of ventilator units that were later recalled by 
the FDA.
  During operation Desert Storm, military medical facilities were 
seriously lacking ventilators. The GAO testified that, on average, only 
60 percent of the needed medical equipment was deployed to Desert 
Storm. In addition, the Armed Services' medical facilities are using 
ventilators that are up to 20 years old, and it has been reported that 
two naval hospital ships were equipped with ventilators up to 25 years 
old.
  Mr. President, we certainly owe the men and women who put their lives 
on the line to guarantee our freedom the best medical equipment 
available. My amendment provides $2.5 million to authorize procurement 
of nondevelopmental, lightweight, portable, ruggedized ventilators 
which can be used for any sized human with any known lung dysfunction. 
These ventilators will allow the military to meet this critical need 
now. I ask my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2195) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2196

  (Purpose: To amend subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United 
   States Code, to prevent cost-of-living increases in the survivor 
  annuity contributions of uniformed services retirees from becoming 
effective before related cost-of-living increases in retired pay become 
                                payable)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of 
Senator Robb and ask that it be reported.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Robb, for 
     himself and Mr. McCain, proposes an amendment numbered 2196.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 138, between lines 11 and 12, insert the following:

     SEC. 634. COST-OF-LIVING INCREASES IN SBP CONTRIBUTIONS TO BE 
                   EFFECTIVE CONCURRENTLY WITH PAYMENT OF RELATED 
                   RETIRED PAY COST-OF-LIVING INCREASES.

       (a) Survivor Benefit Plan.--Section 1452(h) of title 10, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(h)''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(2)(A) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), when the initial 
     payment of an increase in retired pay under section 1401a of 
     this title (or any other provision of law) to a person is 
     later than the effective date of that increase by reason of 
     the application of subsection (b)(2)(B) of such section, then 
     the amount of the reduction in the person's retired pay shall 
     be effective on the date of that initial payment of the 
     increase in retired pay rather than the effective date of the 
     increase in retired pay.
       ``(B) Subparagraph (A) may not be construed as delaying, 
     for purposes of determining the amount of a monthly annuity 
     under section 1451 of this title, the effective date of an 
     increase in a base amount under subsection (h) of such 
     section from the effective date of an increase in retired pay 
     under section 1401a of this title to the date on which the 
     initial payment of that increase in retired pay is made in 
     accordance with subsection (b)(2)(B) of such section 
     1401a.''.
       (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall take effect with respect to retired pay payable for 
     months beginning on or after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.

  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I rise today to offer an amendment to 
correct an inequity in the contributions military retirees make to the 
Survivor Benefits Program. I'm pleased to note that Senator John McCain 
joins me as a cosponsor.
  As a result of last year's Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, COLA's 
for military retirees were delayed until April 1994. While I was not 
pleased with that decision, and will work to correct that small part of 
the OBRA, I voted for the overall package because I'm firmly committed 
to reducing our budget deficit. The bill did just that by almost $500 
billion over 5 years.
  Contributions to the Survivor Benefits Program are a fixed percentage 
of the military retiree's base pay. However, the Department of Defense 
has announced that it intends to increase contributions to the Survivor 
Benefits Program effective this past December because the legislation 
did not delay COLA's in the benefits received under the plan. While it 
is accurate that survivors' COLA's were not delayed, military retiree 
COLA's were, and therefore the retiree's base pay has not yet been 
increased.
  I believe that it is patently unfair to attempt to raise 
contributions to the Survivor Benefit Program when the base pay on 
which it is figured hasn't yet been raised. I know that when I 
considered the issue of military retiree COLA's, I expected that 
contributions to the Survivor Benefits Program would not increase until 
the retiree's base pay increased as well; indeed, that is the law.
  This seems like a clear case of the Department of Defense not 
interpreting the law as Congress intended, and the amendment I'm 
introducing here today will correct that. This amendment explicitly 
ties contributions to the Survivor Benefits Program to the retiree's 
base pay, no matter when the effective date of the retiree's COLA may 
be.
  Mr. President, I believe that we must take this corrective action in 
the name of equity for our military retirees. When they opted to enroll 
in this program to ensure the economic security of their survivors, 
they were told that their contribution would be a certain percentage of 
their base pay. We shouldn't allow this commitment to be changed on 
them now, and I encourage the speedy consideration and enactment of 
this amendment for the benefit of our military retirees who are being 
charged for increased survivor benefits even as we speak.
  I thank the Chair.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would preclude annual 
increases in the premiums military retirees pay to participate in the 
Survivors Benefit Plan before annual cost-of-the-living increases in 
retired pay are payable.
  I urge its adoption.
  Mr. COATS. We have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2196) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2197

 (Purpose: To provide for assignment of employees of federally funded 
research and development centers and Federal employees between Federal 
    agencies and federally funded research and development centers)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of 
Senators Bingaman, Domenici, Sasser, Kempthorne, Craig, and Mathews.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Bingaman, for 
     himself, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Sasser, Mr. Craig, Mr. Kempthorne 
     and Mr. Mathews, proposes an amendment numbered 2197.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection , it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:

     SEC. 1068. ASSIGNMENTS OF EMPLOYEES BETWEEN FEDERAL AGENCIES 
                   AND FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
                   CENTERS.

       (a) Authority.--Section 3371(4) of title 5, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking out ``or'' at the end of subparagraph (B);
       (2) by striking out the period at the end of subparagraph 
     (C) and inserting in lieu thereof ``; or''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(D) a federally funded research and development center.''
       (b) Provisions Governing Assignments.--Section 3372 of 
     title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Under regulations prescribed pursuant to section 3376 
     of this title--
       ``(1) an assignment of an employee of a Federal agency to 
     another organization or an institution of higher education, 
     and an employee so assigned, shall be treated in the same way 
     as an assignment of an employee of a Federal agency to a 
     State or local government, and an employee so assigned, is 
     treated under the provisions of this subchapter governing an 
     assignment of an employee of a Federal agency to a State or 
     local government, except that the rate of pay of an employee 
     assigned to a federally funded research and development 
     center may not exceed the rate of pay that such employee 
     would be paid for continued service in the position in the 
     Federal agency from which assigned; and
       ``(2) an assignment of an employee of an other organization 
     or an institution of higher education to a Federal agency, 
     and an employee so assigned, shall be treated in the same way 
     as an assignment of an employee of a State or local 
     government to a Federal agency, and an employee so assigned, 
     is treated under the provisions of this subchapter governing 
     an assignment of an employee of a State or local government 
     to a Federal agency.''.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, the amendment I am offering today on 
behalf of myself, Senator Domenici, Senator Sasser, Senator Craig, 
Senator Kempthorne, and Senator Mathews would amend the 
Intergovernmental Personnel Act to allow employees of all Federally 
Funded Research and Development Centers [FFRDC's] to utilize the 
Intergovernmental Personnel Act to be placed in federal agencies and 
Federal employees to use the act to be placed at all FFRDC's. It is 
meant to solve a problem which has arisen at three of those FFRDC's run 
by the Department of Energy, namely Sandia National Laboratories, Idaho 
National Engineering Laboratory, and Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
  On April 21, I introduced S. 2040, a bill almost identical to the 
amendment I am offering today, which was referred to the Governmental 
Affairs Committee. I deeply appreciate the prompt request for executive 
branch comment, which was made by Senator Pryor, chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service.
  In the last 2 weeks Senator Pryor has received comments from the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the Office of 
Personnel Management. The DOD and DOE comments express strong support 
for the legislation. The OPM comments express no objection to the 
purpose of the bill, but ask that a small change be made adding the 
words ``or an institution of higher education'' at two points in the 
bill so that all assignments under this program would be covered by the 
same rules. The amendment I am offering reflects the change requested 
by OPM. I ask unanimous consent that each of those letters appear in 
the Record following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I have also made a change requested by 
the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Federal Services, 
Post Office, and Civil Service, Senator Stevens. The amendment would 
clarify that a Federal employee on assignment through the IPA program 
to an FFRDC may not be paid more than the salary he or she is entitled 
to in his or her civil service position.
  I would advise the managers that I have cleared this amendment with 
Senator Pryor, Senator Stevens, Senator Glenn, and Senator Roth on the 
Governmental Affairs Committee and I believe the amendment has been 
cleared on both sides on the Armed Services Committee as well.
  It is very appropriate to offer this amendment on the defense bill 
because the main beneficiaries of this change will be the Departments 
of Defense and Energy, although other agencies, such as the Commerce 
Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the 
intelligence community will also benefit from my amendment.

  Let me briefly describe the problem which I am trying to address in 
this amendment. Almost all FFRDCs currently can utilize the 
Intergovernmental Personnel Act because they are run by universities or 
non-profit entities. That was the case at Sandia National Laboratories 
until last October 1 when management was turned over from AT&T, which 
had managed the lab for over 40 years, to Martin Marietta. The change 
in contractors also brought a change in the nature of the contract, 
consistent with contract management reform at DOE. The contract change 
has made Sandia employees ineligible to participate in the IPA program.
  Sandia employees have long served with distinction in a host of 
Federal agencies under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act. I have just 
mentioned some of those agencies. They bring special expertise in a 
broad range of technical areas to the executive branch. Unfortunately, 
unless this amendment is passed, that long history of service will be 
disrupted starting this fall.
  The reason is that the new contract with Martin Marietta is a fixed-
fee contract, whereas the old contract with AT&T was a no-profit, no-
fee contract. The resulting disruption in the IPA program for Sandians 
is clearly an unintended consequence of contract management reform at 
the Department of Energy.
  The amendment will also immediately allow employees of two other 
institutions in similar circumstances, Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, to utilize the IPA mechanism 
to be placed in Federal agencies. In light of the thrust of management 
reform at the Department of Energy, which is toward the use of for-
profit contracts with private sector contractors, as opposed to 
continued use of university or non-profit contractors, I believe many 
of the other DOE FFRDCs will soon also require the statutory change I 
am proposing to be able to utilize the Intergovernmental Personnel Act.
  I urge the adoption of the amendment.


                                      The Secretary of Energy,

                                    Washington, DC, June 17, 1994.
     Hon. David Pryor,
     chairman, Subcommittee on Federal Services, Post Office, and 
         Civil Service,
     Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, 
         D.C.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your request for 
     Department of Energy views on S. 2040, a bill to amend title 
     5, United States Code, to provide for the assignment of 
     employees between Federally Funded Research and Development 
     Centers and Federal agencies.
       The Department strongly supports S. 2040. This legislation 
     would provide Federal agencies, like the Departments of 
     Energy and Defense, with a valuable tool for executing 
     critical programs, especially highly technical programs, 
     while holding down permanent Federal employment levels. This 
     bill would expand existing authority to assign temporarily 
     employees of all Federally Funded Research and Development 
     Centers to Federal agencies. Temporary assignments such as 
     this have long been authorized between Federal agencies and 
     State and local governments and educational institutions, 
     including those laboratories operated for the Federal 
     government by university and non-profit organizations. 
     Although other Federal Funded Research and Development 
     Centers are similarly funded and operated, current statutory 
     limitations will not allow us to utilize the expertise of 
     their employees for temporary assignment with the Federal 
     agencies. This amendment would enable Federal agencies to 
     make greater use of this valuable personnel resource found in 
     all Centers.
       If you would like further information, your staff should 
     contact Ms. Mary Louise Wagner, Deputy Assistance Secretary 
     for Senate Liaison, at 202/586-5468.
       The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the 
     standpoint of the President's program, there is no objection 
     to the submission of this report to the Committee.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Hazel R. O'Leary.
                                  ____

                                            Department of Defense,


                                    Office of General Counsel,

                                    Washington, DC, June 17, 1994.
     Hon. David Pryor,
     Governmental Affairs Committee,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Pryor: This is in response to your request for 
     the views of the Department of Defense on S. 2040, a bill, 
     ``To amend title 5, United States Code, to provide for 
     assignment of employees of federally funded research and 
     development centers and Federal employees between Federal 
     agencies and federally funded research and development 
     centers.''
       S. 2040 is especially necessary at this time as it would 
     allow intergovernmental personnel currently assigned to the 
     Department of Defense to complete their assignments. It also 
     would ensure continuation of the expertise and assistance 
     from the National Laboratories directly to the Department of 
     Defense. It has been a longstanding practice to utilize the 
     services of intergovernmental personnel from the Department 
     of Energy weapons labs. These highly trained and experienced 
     individuals provide excellent service in dealing with the 
     myriad of technical and administrative tasks that confront 
     the Department of Defense. They also help train our military 
     personnel in the latest technology. The direct assistance 
     that these individuals bring to the Department is invaluable 
     in assuring that the best possible technical input is used by 
     Department policy makers. These individuals also help bridge 
     the gap between the Department of Energy and the Department 
     of Defense through staff coordination and to assure that the 
     best possible information to deal with nuclear safety, 
     reliability and security is available. The added technical 
     dimension that these individuals bring has continued to 
     assure the safety, reliability and security of the Nation's 
     nuclear deterrent.
       The Department of Defense strongly supports this 
     legislation. The Office of Management and Budget advises that 
     there is no objection from the standpoint of the 
     Administration's program to the submission of these views to 
     the Committee.
           Sincerely,
                                               Stephen W. Preston,
                                           Acting General Counsel.
                                  ____

         Office of Personnel Management,


                                       Office of the Director,

                                    Washington, D.C. June 24, 1994
     Hon. David Pryor,
     Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, 
         DC.
       Dear Senator Pryor: This is in response to your request for 
     the views of the Office of Personnel Management on S. 2040, a 
     bill ``To amend title 5, United States Code, to provide for 
     assignment of employees of federally funded research and 
     development centers and Federal employees between Federal 
     agencies and federally funded research and development 
     centers.''
       S. 2040 would extend the current provisions of law 
     providing for intergovernmental mobility assignments to 
     include federally funded research and development centers. 
     Thus, the bill would permit assignment of employees between 
     contractor-operated National Laboratories and Federal 
     agencies. The Office of Personnel Management has no objection 
     to the purpose of the bill. However, we do recommend that the 
     new subsection (e) that would be added to section 3372 of 
     title 5, United States Code, be amended to include 
     assignments to and from institutions of higher education, so 
     that all assignments under the mobility program would be 
     covered by the same rules.
       The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the 
     standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no 
     objection to the submission of this report.
           Sincerely,
                                                    James B. King,
                                                         Director.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would allow employees at not-
for-profit federally funded research and development centers to be 
detailed to Federal agencies, and vice versa, under the provisions of 
the Intergovernmental Personnel Act.
  I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. COATS. We have no objection to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2197) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment No. 2198

    (Purpose: To provide for selection of senior judge advocates by 
                           selection boards.)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask that 
it be stated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2198.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       Insert the following at the end of subtitle A of Title V:

     SEC.   . SELECTION FOR DESIGNATED JUDGE ADVOCATE POSITIONS.

       (a) To the extent that selection for the positions 
     described in subsection (b) is not governed by Chapter 36 of 
     title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense shall 
     prescribe regulations to ensure that officers selected to 
     serve in such positions are selected for such service by 
     boards governed, insofar as practicable, by the procedures 
     prescribed for selection boards under Chapter 36 of title 10, 
     United States Code.
       (b) The positions referred to in subsection (a) are--
       (1) the Judge Advocate General and Assistant Judge Advocate 
     General of the Army,
       (2) the Judge Advocate General and Deputy Judge Advocate 
     General of the Navy,
       (3) the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the 
     Marine Corps, and
       (4) the Judge Advocate General and Deputy Judge Advocate 
     General of the Air Force.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment requires the Secretary of 
Defense to ensure that officers selected to serve in senior JAG 
positions are chosen by impartial boards of officers.
  I believe this amendment has been cleared on both sides. I urge its 
adoption.
  Mr. COATS. We have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2198) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2199

 (Purpose: To exempt the provision of intelligence or other assistance 
  to foreign officials from civil or criminal liability in connection 
 with the destruction of an aircraft in a foreign country suspected to 
                    be engaged in drug trafficking)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Kerry, I send an 
amendment to the desk and ask it be reported.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Kerry, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2199.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 249, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:

     SEC. 1068. PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE AND OTHER ASSISTANCE 
                   WHERE DRUG TRAFFICKING THREATENS NATIONAL 
                   SECURITY.

       (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall 
     not be unlawful for authorized employees or agents of a 
     foreign country to damage, render inoperative, or destroy an 
     aircraft in that country's territory or airspace, or to 
     attempt to do so, if that aircraft is reasonably suspected to 
     be primarily engaged in illicit narcotics trafficking, 
     provided that the President of the United States prior to the 
     actions described in this subparagraph being taken has 
     determined.
       (1) that such actions are necessary because of the 
     extraordinary threat posed by drug trafficking to the 
     national security of that country, and
       (2) that the country has appropriate procedures in place to 
     protect against innocent loss of life in the air and on the 
     ground, which shall at a minimum include effective means to 
     identify and warn aircraft prior to the use of force.
       (b) It shall not be unlawful for authorized employees or 
     agents of the United States to provide assistance, including 
     but not limited to operational, intelligence, logistical, 
     technical and administration assistance, for the actions of 
     foreign countries set forth in subsection (a), nor shall the 
     provision of such assistance give rise to any civil action 
     seeking money damages or any other form of relief against the 
     United States or its agents or employees.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would provide that it shall 
be unlawful for a foreign country to damage, render inoperative, or 
destroy drug trafficking aircraft or for U.S. officials to provide 
assistance for such actions if the President determines that such 
actions are necessary because of a national security threat posed to 
the country involved and that the country has taken appropriate 
measures to protect innocent aircraft.
  Mr. President, this is a very important amendment and I believe it is 
necessary for me to explain why I can support it.
  The United States has historically been the world's leading proponent 
of international efforts to protect civil aircraft. The United States 
has led the way in ensuring that international law recognizes the 
importance of protecting civil aircraft in flight.
  On first blush, this amendment would appear to be inconsistent with 
our traditional approach and the requirements of international law. But 
on closer examination, I believe that it is consistent with 
international law because it carves out an extremely narrow exception--
an exception that is based on the national security threat posed by 
drug trafficking to Colombia and Peru--and because it also requires 
that action be taken to protect innocent aircraft.
  I believe that illegal drug traffickers, who are using their massive 
resources to corrupt government officials and to threaten those whom 
they cannot corrupt, and, who are in league with insurgents, pose a 
real national security threat to the Governments of Colombia and Peru. 
If I did not believe that those governments and the rule of law in 
their societies were threatened by drug trafficking, I would oppose 
this amendment.
  The amendment also requires the President to determine that the 
governments concerned have appropriate procedures in place to protect 
innocent aircraft. I would have to oppose this amendment if it did not 
have such a requirement. I understand that the Administration will 
insist that action against civilian aircraft be limited to certain 
designated areas of the host countries, that notice to airmen (NOTAMs) 
be issued to put all pilots on notice as to the designated areas, and 
that specific actions will be taken to identify and warn prior to the 
use of force against civil aircraft.
  Accordingly, because of the extraordinary circumstances that exist 
today and that pose a real national security threat to Colombia and 
Peru and because of the requirement that the President must determine 
that appropriate procedures are in place to protect innocent aircraft, 
I can support this amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I support the amendment from the Senator 
of Massachusetts because of the strong belief I hold that we must do 
all we can to combat the scourge of drugs that threatens our country 
today. It is clear that our Nation's crime increase stems from 
narcotics trafficking that is so prevalent in our major metropolitan 
cities and is extending into every town and city in our Nation.
  This amendment states that it is not unlawful for foreign countries 
who are fighting drug traffickers to attack air craft suspected of 
carrying drugs if our President has determined that the national 
security of the subject country is threatened by the drug trafficking 
operations, and the country has appropriate procedures to protect 
against shooting down innocent aircraft.
  This amendment also provides that it shall not be unlawful for U.S. 
personnel to provide assistance, including intelligence information, to 
foreign countries who meet the above conditions.
  Mr. President, I have been informed that the administration supports 
this amendment. I have already indicated my support for this amendment; 
however, I want to express some concerns.
  This amendment can only be applied to domestic law. The actions taken 
against aircraft suspected of carrying drugs could be a violation of 
international law and could subject the United States Government to 
claims before the World Court.
  Aircraft employed by foreign countries in drug interdiction 
operations may not be equipped with sophisticated radars and other 
target acquisition equipment which would enable them to minimize the 
possibility of shooting down an innocent aircraft.
  Let me emphasize again Mr. President, that I am supporting this 
amendment with these extraordinary provisions because I believe that 
the drug problem we face is extraordinary. I believe that illegal drugs 
threaten the fabric of our Nation and certainly threaten the national 
security of many foreign nations--especially the source countries for 
illegal drugs.
  It is my hope that this legislation will strengthen our ability to 
join with other countries to more effectively fight the narco-
traffickers who are doing so much harm to so many young people through 
the world.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, on May 1, the administration, without 
warning, shut off the provision of radar information to Colombia and 
Peru to track air shipments by drug traffickers over South American 
airspace.
  The decision was made because lawyers in the United States Department 
of Defense, later joined by lawyers at the Department of Justice, 
concluded that United States officials could theoretically be sued if 
the Governments of Colombia or Peru used the information to shoot down 
a civilian aircraft and someone was killed.
  While I understand the Government lawyers' concerns about the 
theoretical liability problem, this decision had several immediate 
negative consequences. It damaged U.S. international narcotics-control 
efforts, represented poor public policy, and brought about an 
unnecessary, self-inflicted wound in our international efforts to fight 
drugs.
  Prior to May 1, drug traffickers carrying cocaine on planes flying 
north through Colombian and Peruvian airspace had to worry about being 
tracked by Governments there, with their planes, crews, and cargo being 
seized at their destination, or being intercepted and forced down along 
the route.
  Since May 1, drug traffickers flying through Colombia and Peru have 
flown the friendly skies, care free, moving literally tons of dope 
ultimately bound for the United States.
  Indeed, my office has already heard from informants in the region who 
report that there has been a free-for-all over Colombian and Peruvian 
airspace since we stopped sharing the information. They say that the 
skies are open, and the drug spigots have been turned on.
  Unfortunately, the decision to halt the sharing of surveillance 
information simultaneously rewarded drug traffickers, punished those 
cooperating with us, and threatened fundamental U.S. interests. We 
ended one of the few strategies against drug trafficking that was 
actually working. We made hypocrites of ourselves in the eyes of our 
Latin American partners. We allowed drug traffickers to fly cocaine 
shipments out of Colombia and Peru with impunity.

  The highly theoretical concern that someday, someone, somehow, might 
sue a U.S. official as a result of a force-down was permitted to trump 
common sense, with the result that today, people all over this country 
may be exposed to additional cocaine in their communities.
  Over the past 4 years, the United States built for radar stations in 
the Andean region where most of the world's cocoa leaf is grown. The 
radars have worked in conjunction with AWACS surveillance planes to 
provide United States and Latin American Governments with detailed 
information on the routes of the hundreds of small planes suspected of 
transporting coca leaf and cocaine base from Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, 
and Colombia.
  The program became fully operational in 1993. It allowed the 
Colombian Air Force to identify 600 suspected drug flights last year, 
compared with the 250 suspected flights it was able to identify in 
1992. The information provided by the radar stations and the 
surveillance flights was primarily used to identify and then to destroy 
clandestine airstrips, drug labs, and warehouses used by the cartels. 
Of the 27 planes that were destroyed, most were on the ground.
  In Peru, a very aggressive force-down policy has been in place for 3 
years. In Peru, by some counts an estimated 30 airplanes owned by drug 
traffickers have actually been shot down. Another 190 have been tracked 
and stopped. Despite the anxieties of the Government lawyers who 
decided to shut down the U.S. assistance on May 1, to date, not a 
single liability suit against the United States or any U.S. official 
has been filed in connection with these legitimate law enforcement 
activities.
  Given the success of the Peruvian model, the Colombian Government 
adopted a force-down policy early this year. The policy had strict 
rules of engagement.
  Under those rules, first an aircraft is detected by any one of four 
military radars located at San Andres, Guajira, Araracuara, or Leticia. 
This signal is received at the national defence military headquarters 
in Bogota, where it is analyzed, and it is verified whether the 
aircraft is legally in transit. If this is not the case, Colombian 
officials order the nearest air base to send A-37, Kfir, Mirage, Ob-10, 
or Tucano fighter planes to intercept it. When radio communication is 
not possible, the intercepting aircraft must use the following visual 
signals: First, move from side to side and turn its navigation lights 
on and off to warn the aircraft it has been intercepted. Second, 
abruptly move away from the intercepted aircraft making a 90-degree 
turn upwards to tell it to continue. Third, lower the landing gear 
leaving the landing lights on. Then raise the landing gear to notify 
the aircraft it must land. Fourth, repeatedly turn all lights on and 
off. If the aircraft does not respond, it may be then shot down.

  As the Colombian Defense Minister summarized this policy, no plane 
would be forced down until Colombia had exhausted ``all visual and sign 
procedures. * * * Against an aircraft which does not identify itself, 
which has no flight plan and which does not comply with signals given 
by air force planes which intercept it.''
  I believe this Colombian policy is clear, strict, fair, and 
reasonable in responding to the threat of the approximately 600 drug 
planes a year that have been detected in illegally traversing Colombian 
airspace.
  But this policy concerned some of the United States Government's 
lawyers, who saw the theoretical potential for someone to sue the 
United States or United States officials if the Colombians made a 
mistake--even if we had nothing to do with the Colombian decision. This 
initial judgment was confirmed by other Government attorneys in the 
Justice Department, who argued that U.S. officials could be prosecuted 
in foreign courts for providing information that another country then 
used to shoot a plane down.
  So on May 1, the Pentagon--without anyone apparently bothering to 
inform President Clinton--suspended the flights, without warning the 
host Governments, citing the risk of liability to the U.S. Government.
  It is important to note that even lawyers disagree at to whether the 
Pentagon's legal interpretation is reasonable. As Lally Weymouth wrote 
in a recent column in the Washington Post, several former Bush and 
Reagan administration officials regard this reading of the law as 
overbroad in the extreme. They believed there was no problem in 
providing the radar information so long as U.S. personnel were not 
knowingly involved in a decision taken by a host country to shoot down 
a plane.
  Now, as an attorney who was once in the private practice of law, I 
can tell you there is a doctrine known as sovereign immunity. And what 
sovereign immunity does is essentially make it impossible for someone 
to sue U.S. officials for civil wrongs, unless the Congress has 
explicitly created authorization for such a suit through waiving 
immunity. There has been no such waiver in connection with the United 
States providing information that leads to the shootdown of drug planes 
by a foreign government. So it would seem to this lawyer that sovereign 
immunity would provide ample protection to the United States for any 
liability in connection with a foreign shootdown.
  But some of the Government's lawyers concluded otherwise, and the 
sharing of information with Colombia and Peru was stopped.
  One would think that to whatever extent the lawyers had a legitimate 
concern, they had options besides unilateral suspension. There have 
been any number of legislative vehicles on the floor of the Senate over 
the past 6 weeks which could have been used for a legislative fix. 
Instead, they cut off at the knees a program that was working. They did 
not consult with our allies--they did not consult with our 
Ambassadors--and it appears they did not consult with the highest 
levels of the administration, either, let alone the U.S. Congress.
  I first learned of the shift in policy at a private meeting in early 
May with the Colombian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Gabriel 
Silva, who complained to me with, justifiable distress, that our 
decision was providing aid and comfort to the Cali cartel, and helping 
them move dope into our country.
  I immediately expressed my dismay over the policy to senior 
administration officials, and learned to my surprise, that neither the 
United States Ambassador to Colombia nor Peru had even been advised 
about the policy change prior to the cutoff of information.
  Alvin Adams, United States Ambassador in Peru, in a May 3 cable 
explicitly complained that he received no word in advance.
  ``I have been through a lot in 27 years of service,'' Ambassador 
Adams wrote, according to a newspaper account. ``Of the little I can 
remember in my advanced middle age, this is--in my ken of experience--a 
standout.''
  ``We were just beginning to make the narcos uncomfortable,'' one 
Customs Service official familiar with the intelligence flights told 
the Dallas News.
  Key officials in Colombia and Peru have also been justificably 
critical of this decision by the United States, referring to it as 
evidence of hypocrisy and confusion.
  As the Dallas News reported, ``this is a shock, and it sends a 
terrible signal to Latin America,'' according to a Colombian official. 
The newspaper quoted the official as warning that Bogota is fed up with 
Washington. The Colombian official said that the program had benefited 
both sides, and was a key element in the war on drugs, and that the 
shut-down showed the United States was ``pulling out of the war.''
  Colombia's Air Force commander lodged a protest with the United 
States over the unilaterally suspension of radar operations, 
complaining about the lack of consultation, as well as the policy. The 
situation was made worse when United States officials suggested we 
could continue to provide the radar information, if Colombia agreed not 
to shoot drug traffickers' planes down.

  As the Washington Post quoted an angry Colombian official in a 
telephone interview, ``The U.S. cannot decide what we do in our 
airspace. That's a sovereign decision and we're not going to change it. 
If the U.S. doesn't cooperate with us, we'll request its radars to be 
withdrawn''.
  As press accounts have confirmed, many United States officials side 
with Colombia in the dispute. ``We're telling the Colombians they 
cannot shoot down planes in their own airspace, which is like another 
government telling us we cannot shoot down planes flying over the White 
House,'' said one State Department official, quoted by the Dallas News.
  A month ago, senior policymakers in the administration told me they 
agreed the decision was wrong, and promised to take action to remedy 
it.
  On June 21, President Clinton signed a proposal to allow U.S. 
officials to help foreign governments provide this information in 
circumstances when drug traffickers pose a national security threat to 
the host country and has appropriate procedures to protect innocent 
aircraft from attack.
  However, despite the President making this decision, the 
administration has confirmed that the President will not resume 
intelligence sharing until and unless the law is changed.
  Accordingly, I believe the Senate needs to act without further delay, 
to put our Government on the side of interdiction again.
  This amendment, which has been reviewed by the administration and 
which has its support, provides the following:

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall not be 
     unlawful for authorized employees or agents of a foreign 
     country to damage, render inoperative, or destroy an aircraft 
     in that country's territory or airspace, or to attempt to do 
     so, if that aircraft is reasonably suspected of being 
     primarily engaged in illicit narcotics trafficking.

  This declaration of lawfulness only applies when the President of the 
United States has determined that the actions are necessary in that 
country because of the extraordinary threat posed by illicit narcotics 
trafficking to the national security of that country, and that the 
country has appropriate procedures in place to protect against the 
innocent loss of life in the air and on the ground, which shall at a 
minimum include effective means to identify and warn aircraft prior to 
the use of force.

  In addition, the amendment provides for immunity against civil or 
criminal liability for U.S. officials to provide assistance under such 
circumstances.
  In short, it makes it a matter of law that U.S. officials need not 
worry about being sued for providing information gathered by radars and 
AWACS planes to the Colombians and the Peruvians to go after drug 
traffickers smuggling cocaine in airplanes, so long as reasonable 
procedures to protect innocents are in place. It also provides 
protection in U.S. courts against foreign officials being sued for a 
shoot down under circumstances where the shoot down is of a plane 
reasonably suspected to be engaged in drug trafficking, and reasonable 
procedures to protect innocents are in place.
  Under this amendment, the President's determination that a country 
meets the standards indicated--that a country faces an extraordinary 
drug threat and has adequate protective procedures in place--is not 
reviewable by the courts. This is consistent with past court decisions, 
such as the case of Dalton versus Specter, that such Presidential 
decisions are not reviewable.
  Under this amendment, there will be no basis for concern about the 
extradition of any U.S. Government employees or agents in cases where 
such persons are accused of crimes involving the shooting down of civil 
aircraft, or the aiding and abetting thereof.
  The term ``assistance'' is intended to be interpreted broadly in this 
amendment, which lists a number of types of assistance, but is not 
limited to the specific types listed.
  And the amendment also balances the legitimate concern of protecting 
the innocent with the need to go after drug traffickers.
  In order to be covered by this amendment, the President must 
determine not only that a foreign country faces an extraordinary threat 
from narcotrafficking, but also that it has appropriate procedures in 
place to protect aircraft from the improper use of force. At a minimum, 
the amendment requires that the foreign country have effective means to 
identify and warn suspect aircraft prior to the use of force.
  Other steps that the President may require are clear designation of 
areas in which use of force might be applied, formal notice to civil 
aviators, a prohibition on any use of force against commercial 
passenger airliners on scheduled flight plans, prior visual 
identification and radio warnings, and the firing of warning shots.

  The amendment applies to aircraft reasonably suspected of being 
primarily engaged in illicit narcotic trafficking. This would not, for 
example, include a commercial passenger aircraft on a scheduled route 
which happens to have, in addition to its passengers, some illicit 
narcotics on board. It would, however, encompass an aircraft being used 
at the time for narcotrafficking, even if the aircraft is ordinarily 
otherwise used for lawful purposes.
  I agree that this is a balanced approach, and I urge the Senate to 
adopt this language.
  But before we vote on this amendment, I want to address directly the 
position advanced by some that in the absence of this amendment, if 
Peru or Colombia shoots down a drug plane, they have violated 
international law.
  The contention that under current law, liability could attach is 
based on an interpretation of the Montreal and Chicago conventions on 
civil aviation. Under these conventions, governments are not permitted 
to use force against civilian aviation.
  But precisely because of the breadth of that proposition, the United 
States explicitly refused to ratify the portions of the convention that 
might create liability. We withheld our consent to the portion of the 
international law that has been asserted as the justification for the 
claims that a shoot down in which we participated might be illegal.
  Moreover, the Chicago convention's article 1 explicitly recognizes 
the basic rule that ``every state has complete and exclusive 
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.''
  Under the circumstances, there is substantial legal justification for 
a position that there is no potential for civil or criminal liability 
for any american official even without a change in current law.
  This is precisely the position of Peru, which also withheld its 
consent from the provisions of the conventions that would theoretically 
create the possibility of liability.
  Meanwhile, the Government of Colombia, which did ratify the 
conventions, interprets them so that it believes its policy is within 
the confines of international law.
  The Chicago Convention also has been interpreted to give the explicit 
rights to governments to declare states of emergency in certain 
aviation zones, and to suspend ordinary air travel rights in such 
zones. Once warning has been given that such a zone has been created, a 
state is entitled to protect itself, if it believes necessary, by 
shooting down a plane.

  Now in the case of Peru and Colombia, both Governments have 
considered flights of cocaine to pose that kind of a threat to their 
Governments. Frankly, I agree with them that the threat is real and 
fundamental. So under the Chicago Convention, their actions would 
appear to be legal under international law.
  So the notion that in sharing information with Peru and Colombia we 
are somehow violating international civil aviation law--taking these 
international conventions in their totality--is a matter on which 
lawyers can disagree on. It should not have been the basis for our 
making or not making policy against the drug cartels.
  As I have mentioned, I believe that sovereign immunity already 
protects the United States. But to deal with the concerns of the 
Government lawyers who feel otherwise, I would hope the Senate would, 
with the passage of this amendment, make the immunity so explicit that 
not even lawyers can argue about it.
  Adoption of this amendment on a vehicle certain to become law would 
also send the message to Latin America that we are not abandoning the 
effort against narcotics.
  As the Phoenix Gazette editorialized on June 1:

       Lacking real-time intelligence from the United States, 
     there's no way for Peru or Colombia to know where a drug-
     filled aircraft is flying or has landed. If these countries 
     can't force a drug trafficker plane to land, the result will 
     be an inability to prevent the movement of massive amounts of 
     pre-processed cocaine from Peru to Colombia. In the end, more 
     cocaine will enter the United States.

  As A.M. Rosenthal of the New York Times has written in his column of 
June 17, entitled ``Saving the President,'' the cut-off of information 
on drug planes by the United States is ``an error that has to be 
reversed if [President Clinton's] word is to be trusted in Latin 
America.''
  This amendment would swiftly reverse this error, put our Government 
back in the business of providing information to Latin American 
countries about the movements of drug planes, and help deny the drug 
traffickers open skies. I ask that the full text of this amendment be 
printed at the conclusion of my statement. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  Mr. NUNN. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Do I hear objection?
  Mr. COATS. We have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2199) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. COATS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2200

         (Purpose: To provide transfer authority for improving 
         counterproliferation activities of the United States)

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Domenici, I send an 
amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats], for Mr. Domenici, for 
     himself, and Mr. Bingaman, proposes an amendment numbered 
     2200.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 208, after line 24, insert the following:
       (c) Additional Authority To Transfer Authorizations.--(1) 
     In addition to the transfer authority provided in section 
     1001, upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that 
     such action is necessary in the national interest, the 
     Secretary may transfer amounts of authorizations made 
     available to the Department of Defense in this division for 
     fiscal year 1995 to counterproliferation programs, projects, 
     and activities identified as areas for progress by the Joint 
     Committee for the Review of Counterproliferation Programs 
     established by section 1605 of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 
     107 Stat. 1845). Amounts of authorizations so transferred 
     shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes 
     as the authorization to which transferred.
       (2) The total amount of authorizations that the Secretary 
     may transfer under the authority of this subsection may not 
     exceed $100,000,000.
       (3) The authority provided by this subsection to transfer 
     authorizations--
       (A) may only be used to provide authority for items that 
     have a higher priority than the items from which authority is 
     transferred; and
       (B) may not be used to provide authority for an item that 
     has been denied authorization by Congress.
       (4) A transfer made from one account to another under the 
     authority of this subsection shall be deemed to increase the 
     amount authorized for the account to which the amount is 
     transferred by an amount equal to the amount transferred.
       (5) The Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify Congress 
     of transfers made under the authority of this subsection.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I want to thank the managers of the defense 
authorization bill, Chairman Nunn and Senator Thurmond, for accepting 
this amendment. I believe it will assist the Department of Defense in 
protecting our national security.
  The amendment deals with the fact that more and more nations are 
acquiring, or are seeking to acquire, chemical, biological, and nuclear 
weapons, and the means to deliver them. These weapons are commonly 
known as weapons of mass destruction because a single weapon can kill 
hundreds or thousands of people.
  Despots and dictators already have chemical and biological weapons 
and some are racing toward a nuclear capability. It is even possible 
that these weapons could soon be in the hands of international thugs, 
terrorists, or transnational criminal gangs. The truth is, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a very real 
threat to the security of this Nation as well as American interests 
around the globe. And, unless we develop a capability to deal with this 
reality, we are placing the security of our Nation and its people at 
serious risk.
  Proliferation is a problem most observers fear from rogue nations 
like Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. Notwithstanding the fate of 
democracy and political reform in the former Soviet Union, we must not 
forget Russian and Ukrainian abilities to produce and deploy weapons of 
mass destruction. Despite the efforts of this administration we have 
not yet been able to negotiate a system of strict accountability over 
the nuclear and chemical weapons in the former Soviet Union.
  There has been more talk than action to prevent loose nukes, and the 
feared brain drain of Soviets capable of building nuclear and chemical 
weapons. Efforts by the Defense and Energy Departments to deal with the 
brain drain have been delayed time and again. In fact, recent press 
reports show that a number of former Soviet scientists are now on the 
North Korean payroll.
  The capacity to assemble nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
and their means of delivery is spreading well beyond Russia, China, 
India, and Israel. This is simply unacceptable. While some of our 
colleagues are still fighting a rear-guard action over issues related 
to future nonproliferation it is time to recognize the extent of the 
proliferation that has already happened.
  The bottom line is that the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction is the most perilous and profound security problem the 
United States faces in this post-cold war era. The threat is real.
  To deal with this threat, last December, then Secretary of Defense 
Aspin outlined the beginnings of the Defense Counterproliferation 
Initiative. The Defense Department has since moved toward the 
development of a comprehensive strategy. It must become a national 
strategy. Nothing less than a comprehensive, national strategy will be 
necessary for the success of this initiative.
  The strategy became clearer in May of this year when the Department 
of Defense provided an interagency report to the Congress on 
nonproliferation and counterproliferaion activities and programs. The 
report was presented to a very distinguished group of policymakers, 
scientists, and military professionals at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory on May 6. Attendees included the distinguished chairman, 
Senator Nunn, Deputy Secretary Deutch, and Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Owens.
  The report argues that the Nation should devote an additional $400 
million per year to address shortfalls in our counterproliferation 
efforts. These shortfalls are identified as areas for progress. At the 
conclusion of my remarks I would like to include the report's 
transmittal letter from Deputy Secretary John Deutch and a table 
showing the 14 areas.
  It is clear to me that a viable counterproliferation strategy must be 
broad-based and embrace all policy instruments including deterrence, 
active and passive defenses, and, if necessary, military interdiction. 
I believe the counterproliferation initiative should coalesce into a 
broad-based, integrated national effort, much like the containment 
policy that guided us through the cold war's first decades.

  The DOD report to the Congress moves us in this direction. But the 
problem is urgent. I believe we should get moving on the program before 
1996. Further, from a management perspective, I believe it would be 
better to ramp up to the annual funding level identified in the report 
on a more reasonable progression.
  The amendment that has been accepted by the managers gives the 
Department of Defense great flexibility to jump start this important 
initiative. It allows the Department of Defense to spend up to $100 
million dollars to address the counterproliferation shortfalls 
identified in the Deputy Secretary's report.
  I believe we should devote serious resources to the effort this year 
and the amendment allows that to happen.
  I want to thank the managers again for accepting this amendment.
  I ask unanimous consent the above-mentioned material be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                           The Deputy Secretary of


                                                      Defense,

                                       Washington, DC May 1, 1994.
       Members of Congress: Section 1605 of the FY94 Defense 
     Authorization Act directs the Department of Defense to lead 
     an interagency study of nonproliferation activities currently 
     underway in Executive Branch agencies. This letter transmits 
     the required report prepared in a collaborative effort by the 
     Departments of Commerce, Energy, State, and Defense; the 
     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the intelligence 
     Community, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the 
     Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the National 
     Security Council.
       President Clinton has identified countering the 
     proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their 
     delivery systems as ``one of the most urgent priorities.'' A 
     great deal has been accomplished by this administration 
     toward meeting this challenge, and the study provides a 
     welcome opportunity to report to Congress on current 
     activities, progress that has been made, and opportunities 
     for improvement.
       The terms of reference for the study as specified in the 
     authorizing legislation required a thorough review of all 
     activities underway in the relevant agencies that are 
     directly or indirectly related to nonproliferation or to 
     counterproliferation. Our charge was to focus on technologies 
     and programs that contribute to nonproliferation and 
     counterproliferation capabilities.
       Our review found that federal agencies have achieved 
     significant progress:
       1. Through its Nonproliferation Center, the Intelligence 
     Community has established effective interagency procedures to 
     identify intelligence needs for early detection of 
     nonproliferation threats.
       2. The Department of Energy maintains an extraordinarily 
     competent and broad technology base that has the potential to 
     make major contributions to nonproliferation and 
     counterproliferation technologies.
       3. The Department of Defense has developed an entirely new 
     approach for focusing counterproliferation programs in the 
     areas of technology and acquisition, intelligence programs, 
     and military planning.
       4. The Departments of State and Commerce are working on 
     new, expedited export control procedures to support 
     nonproliferation efforts.
       5. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has strengthened 
     its capability to coordinate arms control and disarmament 
     research through the Arms Control Research Coordinating 
     Committee and Annual Report to Congress on Arms Control 
     Research.
       Many agency programs that are not exclusively directed at 
     proliferation make important contributions to this objective, 
     such as reconnaissance systems, theater missile defense 
     systems, and political reporting. But we also found that 
     agencies have different management practices and procedures 
     that make it difficult to compare easily their proliferation 
     efforts. Thus, this initial study should not be viewed as the 
     final word in identifying gaps or overlaps among agency 
     program efforts. The report does, however, identify fourteen 
     priority areas for additional effort that we believe have the 
     greatest potential for making a contribution to our 
     proliferation technology efforts. Approximately $400 million 
     per year are required to pursue these initiatives. The group 
     assumed that this requirement could be addressed within 
     budget planning ceilings of the agencies for FY96 and later 
     years.
       Our effort also identified several areas where additional 
     progress is necessary. First, certain technologies are not 
     currently being pursued adequately; an example is biological 
     agent detectors. Second, generally it has proved easier to 
     develop promising new technology ideas than to field useful 
     new capability. This reflects the absence of a common program 
     structure that enables management and application of 
     resources government-wide to achieve desired ends. It is 
     important to assure that agency efforts are not too 
     fractionated and that a critical mass exists for development 
     and deployment of needed capability. Third, the reorientation 
     of national security programs to the post Cold War world, 
     including to our nonproliferation objectives, is still 
     incomplete. Fourth, our study demonstrates the value of 
     interagency attention and coordination to nonproliferation 
     and counterproliferation technology efforts that are being 
     pursued by several agencies. We describe an ongoing 
     interagency process that can continue the coordination and 
     oversight activity that this Congressionally mandated study 
     has begun.
           Sincerely,
                                                   John M. Deutch.

  Figure 1--Recommended increases in annual investment (for FY96 and 
         later) for non/counterproliferation areas for progress

                        [In millions of dollars]

Real time detection and characterization of BW/CW agents including 
  stand-off..........................................................75
Underground structures detection and characterization................75
Hard underground target defeat including advanced non-nuclear weapons 
  (lethal or non-lethal) capable of holding counterforce targets at 
  risk with low collateral effects...................................40
Detection and tracking of shipments and control and accountability for 
  stocks of WMD-related materials and personnel including worldwide WMD 
  and dual-use item tracking.........................................25
Capability to detect, locate and render harmless WMD in US...........10
Enhancement of collection and analysis of intelligence...............25
Support of chemical weapons convention and biological weapons 
  convention.........................................................10
Support of conclusion of a verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty..10
Capability to detect, locate and disarm, with high assurance and in a 
  timely fashion, outside the United States WMD hidden by a hostile 
  state or terrorist in a confined area..............................15
Passive defense capabilities enabling military operations to continue 
  in contaminated conditions--actual or threatened (low cost, 
  lightweight).......................................................15
Rapid production of protective BW vaccines...........................15
Detection and interception of low flying/stealthy cruise missiles....50
Transparency and control of foreign fissile material.................15
Safe disposition for foreign missile- and WMD-related materials (except 
  fissile material)..................................................20
Intercept capability in boost phase...............................(\1\)
Prompt mobile target kill.........................................(\1\)

\1\Adequately funded.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senator Domenici in 
sponsoring this amendment to provide Secretary Perry an additional $100 
million in reprogramming authority to implement the recommendations of 
the Joint Review Committee on Counterproliferation for additional 
research in this critical area. Secretary Deutch submitted the 
recommendations of the Joint Review Committee, which he chaired, on May 
2. That report looked toward additional expenditures of up to $400 
million in fiscal year 1996 in this area. Our amendment will allow 
Secretary Perry and Secretary Deutch to jumpstart that initiative if 
they can find sources of funds for these important research efforts 
within their budget.
  Mr. President, I believe that the central national security problem 
which this Nation faces following the collapse of the Soviet empire is 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of effective 
delivery vehicles for such weapons, particularly ballistic and cruise 
missiles. I commend former Secretary Aspin and Secretary Perry and the 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, for recognizing 
this and moving out to address the issue.
  On May 6 and 7 we had a very timely conference to discuss this issue 
and Dr. Deutch's report at Los Alamos National Laboratory. I commend 
Senator Domenici for initiating the idea for the conference and 
appreciate Senator Nunn's and Dr. Deutch's willingness to participate 
in the conference. That was obvious testimony to the importance 
attached to this issue in both the executive and legislative branches. 
The conference allowed us to build on the solid foundation which the 
report had made to defining a major Clinton administration initiative 
in this critical area.
  Congressional reporting requirements are often greeted in the 
executive branch with about as much enthusiasm as the bubonic plague. 
And often, I must admit, that's probably the right degree of 
enthusiasm. But sometimes a reporting requirement comes along at just 
the right time and helps catalyze executive branch focus in a critical 
area. The requirement which Senator Nunn put in title XVI of last 
year's defense authorization bill for the nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation report submitted by Dr. Deutch clearly is in this 
latter category.
  Let me conclude by making a couple of points on the 
counterproliferation initiative outlined in the Deutch report. First, 
as someone who has followed our nonproliferation policy, particularly 
in the nuclear and missile areas, fairly closely over the years, I was 
happy to see the emphasis in the report on our Government's 
nonproliferation activities. Several of the 14 priority areas 
identified in the report for additional funding will clearly strengthen 
our efforts to stem the tide of proliferation and allow us to 
demonstrate leadership in the multilateral arms control and export 
control regimes aimed at curbing proliferation.

  There is sometimes a sense that use of the word 
``counterproliferation'' connotes a diminution in our efforts to 
control proliferation before it happens and a focus instead on 
defeating proliferant states on the battlefield. I know that that was 
neither Secretary Aspin's nor Secretary Perry's intent in first using 
the word. I think a fair reading of this report makes it clear that 
that is not what is intended or contemplated. We will continue to do 
all we can to show leadership in the various multilateral control 
regimes, including trying to construct an effective COCOM successor 
regime.
  But these regimes, although effective if we show the necessary 
leadership, are also imperfect, as our experience in Iraq demonstrated 
and as our ongoing concerns in North Korea illustrate as well. There 
are clearly nations which put their economic interests ahead of 
preventing proliferation and there are clearly willing recipients of 
critical weapons technologies. So it is entirely appropriate for our 
CINC's to seek the tools they will need to deal with the sort of 
contingencies they may face as we enter the 21st century. Being 
prepared to counter proliferation when it occurs does not and should 
not diminish our focus on preventing it in the first place.
  The second point I will make is that I believe that this report has 
created the opportunity for a very effective partnership among the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the intelligence 
community. The Department of Energy's weapons laboratories have a long 
history of contributing to our national security well beyond the narrow 
nuclear weapons area because of the depth and breadth of their 
technical resources, particularly their people. As Judge Bill Clark's 
blue ribbon panel on our nuclear weapons program pointed out in 1985 
when they recommended a memorandum of understanding between DOD and DOE 
to involve the labs to a greater degree in conventional munitions 
research, these laboratories can and should make broad contributions to 
our national security.
  At the conference we heard that a similar memorandum of understanding 
on proliferation technologies is currently under discussion between the 
two agencies and I believe such an approach is entirely appropriate and 
can insure that we make the best use of our limited overall resources 
in this critical area. We clearly need to bring our best capabilities 
to bear in tackling this crucial problem. All three DOE laboratories 
have long and successful histories of contributing to our non-
proliferation efforts, and all three stand ready to build on that 
record of accomplishment.
  Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I understand the amendment has been cleared 
by both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2200) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2201

    (Purpose: To provide for the use of certain funds available for 
                    counterproliferation activities)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask it 
be reported.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for himself and Mr. 
     Bingaman, purposes an amendment numbered 2201.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 208, below line 24, add the following:
       (c) Use of Funds for Technology Development.--(1) Of the 
     funds authorized to be appropriated by section 201(4) for a 
     counterproliferation technology project in Program Element 
     602301E--
       (A) $5,000,000 shall be available for a program to detect, 
     locate, and disarm weapons of mass destruction that are 
     hidden by a hostile state or terrorist or terrorist group in 
     confined area outside the United States; and
       (B) $10,000,000 shall be available for the training program 
     referred to in paragraph (3).
       (2) The Secretary of Defense shall make funds available for 
     the program referred to in paragraph (1)(A) in a manner that, 
     to the maximum extent practicable, ensures the effective 
     utilization of existing resources of the national weapons 
     laboratories.
       (3)(A) The training program referred to in paragraph (1)(B) 
     is a training program carried out jointly by the Secretary of 
     Defense and the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation in order to expand and improve United States 
     efforts to deter the possible proliferation and acquisition 
     weapons of mass destruction by organized crime organizations 
     in Eastern Europe, the Baltic countries, and the former 
     Soviet Union.
       (B) The funds available under paragraph (1)(B) for the 
     program referred to in subparagraph (A) may not be obligated 
     or expended for that program until the Secretary of Defense 
     and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
     jointly submit to the congressional defense committees a 
     report that--
       (i) identifies the nature and extent of the threat posed to 
     the United States by the possible proliferation and 
     acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by organized crime 
     organizations in Eastern Europe, the Baltic countries, and 
     the former Soviet Union;
       (ii) assesses the actions that the United States should 
     undertake in order to assist law enforcement agencies of 
     Eastern Europe, the Baltic countries, and the former Soviet 
     Union in the efforts of such agencies to prevent and deter 
     the theft of nuclear weapons material; and
       (iii) contains an estimate of--
       (I) the cost of undertaking such actions, including the 
     costs of personnel, support equipment, and training;
       (II) the time required to commence the carrying out of the 
     program referred to in paragraph (1); and
       (III) the amount of funds, if any, that will be required in 
     fiscal years after fiscal year 1995 in order to carry out the 
     program.

  Mr. NUNN. I offer an amendment that would provide for the use of 
funds available for counterproliferation technology projects at the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency for two programs: $5 million for a 
program to detect, locate and disarm weapons of mass destruction, and 
$10 million for a joint DOD-FBI law enforcement training program to 
expand and improve efforts to deter the possible proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction by organized crime organizations in Eastern 
Europe and Baltic countries and the former Soviet Union.
  This amendment has been cleared on both sides.
  I ask unanimous consent that Senator Bingaman be added as an original 
cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment that would 
provide $5 million for a program to detect, locate, and disarm in a 
confined area, weapons of mass destruction which are clandestinely 
employed by a hostile state or terrorist, against U.S. military forces 
outside the United States, or possibly in the United States; and, $10 
million for a joint DOD-FBI law enforcement training program to expand 
and improve efforts to deter the possible proliferation of nuclear 
weapons by crime organizations in Eastern Europe, the Baltic countries 
and the former Soviet Union.
  The possibility of criminal trafficking of nuclear materials is a 
growing problem related to the dramatic growth of criminal activity 
emanating from the former Soviet Union, the Baltic countries and 
Eastern European nations.
  In addition to the traditional crime threats posed to the United 
States by organized crime groups in the former Soviet Union, the Baltic 
countries, and Eastern European nations, the possible theft of nuclear 
materials by these organized crime groups makes it imperative for the 
United States to act to prevent the proliferation of illegally acquired 
nuclear weapons/components and related materials, and in particular to 
prevent these materials from entering the United States.
  There is an urgent need for the United States to develop a program to 
deal effectively with the threat that foreign organized crime elements 
in the former Soviet Union, the Baltic countries, and Eastern European 
nations may be able to steal nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons 
components, and weapons-grade nuclear materials, and other weapons of 
mass destruction.
  The nuclear threat, with its potential for widespread disaster poses 
a grave, long-term organized crime danger to the security of the United 
States.
  The best available information to date indicates that there have been 
no diversions of weapon's grade nuclear materials. However, there have 
been a significant number of cases involving the theft and smuggling of 
relatively low-grade nuclear materials from within the former Soviet 
Union.
  Enhanced law enforcement efforts must be taken now to guard against 
nuclear weapons or weapons-grade material from falling into the hands 
of outlaw nations, organized gangs, or terrorist bands planning to 
carry out a catastrophic attack.
  Training programs are required to assist the law enforcement agencies 
of the countries of the former Soviet Union, the Baltic countries, and 
Eastern European nations to expand and improve their own efforts 
against the possible proliferation of nuclear proliferation by 
organized crime.
  Lastly, in the event that these weapons of mass destruction are 
stolen either by organized crime elements or terrorist groups and 
employed clandestinely against military bases overseas, or, find their 
way to the United States, we need the capability to detect, locate and 
disable them in a confined area. Mr. President, the report by the Joint 
Review Committee on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation 
Activities and Programs has identified this capability as a technology 
shortfall.
  Mr. President, given the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, it is imperative for the United States to act to 
prevent the proliferation of illegally acquired nuclear weapons/
components and related materials, and in particular to prevent these 
materials from entering the United States. We must also have the 
capability to detect, locate and disarm the weapons of mass 
destruction, in the event prevention fails.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, we have no objection to the amendment. I 
urge its immediate adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2201) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. COATS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2202

 (Purpose: To authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide assistance 
 to promote public participation in defense environmental restoration 
                              activities)

  Mr. NUNN. On behalf of Senator Kohl, I send an amendment to the desk 
and ask it be reported.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Exon). The Clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Kohl, for 
     himself, Mr. Feingold, and Mr. Pryor, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2202.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 325, between lines 4 and 5, insert the following:

     SEC. 2847. ASSISTANCE FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DEFENSE 
                   ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Establishment of Restoration Advisory Boards.--Section 
     2705 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding 
     after subsection (c) the following:
       ``(d) Restoration Advisory Board.--(1) In lieu of 
     establishing a technical review committee under subsection 
     (c), the Secretary may permit the establishment of a 
     restoration advisory board in connection with any 
     installation (or group of nearby installations) where the 
     Secretary is planning or implementing environmental 
     restoration activities.
       ``(2) The Secretary shall prescribe regulations regarding 
     the characteristics, composition, funding and establishment 
     of restoration advisory boards pursuant to this subsection, 
     if the Secretary decides to use this authority. Prescription 
     of regulations shall not be a precondition to establishment 
     of a restoration advisory board or impact restoration 
     advisory boards established prior to the date of enactment of 
     this section.
       ``(3) The Secretary may provide for the payment of routine 
     administrative expenses of a restoration advisory board from 
     funds available for the operation and maintenance of the 
     installation (or installations) for which the board is 
     established or from the funds available under subsection 
     (e)(4).''.
       (b) Assistance for Citizen Participation on Technical 
     Review Boards and Restoration Advisory Boards.--Such section 
     is further amended by adding after subsection (d), as added 
     by subsection (a), the following:
       ``(e) Assistance for Citizen Participation.--(1)(A) Subject 
     to subparagraph (B), the Secretary shall make available under 
     paragraph (4) funds to facilitate the participation of 
     individuals from the private sector on technical review 
     committees and restoration advisory boards for the purpose of 
     ensuring public input into the planning and implementation of 
     environmental restoration activities at installations where 
     such committees and boards are in operation.
       ``(B) A committee or advisory board for an installation is 
     eligible for funding assistance under this subsection only if 
     the committee or board is composed of individuals from the 
     private sector who reside in a community in the vicinity of 
     the installation and who are not potentially responsible 
     parties with respect to environmental hazards at the 
     installation.
       ``(2) Individuals who are local community members of a 
     technical review committee or restoration advisory board may 
     use funds made available under this subsection only--
       ``(A) to obtain technical assistance in interpreting 
     scientific and engineering issues with regard to the nature 
     of environmental hazards at an installation and the 
     restoration activities proposed or conducted at the 
     installation; and
       ``(B) to assist such members and affected citizens to 
     participate more effectively in environmental restoration 
     activities at the installation.
       ``(3) The members of a technical review committee or 
     restoration advisory board may, employ technical or other 
     experts in accordance with regulations prescribed under 
     subsections (d) and (e)(1) of Title 10, United States Code as 
     added by this section.
       ``(4)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the Secretary shall 
     make funds available under this subsection using funds in the 
     following accounts:
       ``(i) In the case of a military installation not closed 
     pursuant to a base closure law, the Defense Environmental 
     Restoration Account established in section 2703(a) of this 
     title .
       ``(ii) In the case of a technical review committee or 
     restoration advisory board established for a military 
     installation to be closed, the Department of Defense Base 
     Closure Account 1990 established under section 2906(a) of the 
     Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of 
     title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).
       ``(B) The total amount of funds available under this 
     subsection for fiscal year 1995 may not exceed $7,500,000.''.
       (c) Involvement of Committees and Boards in Defense 
     Environmental Restoration Program.--Such section is further 
     amended by adding after subsection (e), as added by 
     subsection (b), the following:
       ``(f) Involvement in Defense Environmental Restoration 
     Program.--If a technical review committee or restoration 
     advisory board is established with respect to an 
     installation, the Secretary shall consult with and seek the 
     advice of the committee or board on the following issues:
       ``(1) Identifying environmental restoration activities and 
     projects at the installation.
       ``(2) Monitoring progress on these activities and projects.
       ``(3) Collecting information regarding restoration 
     priorities for the installation.
       ``(4) Addressing land use, level of restoration, acceptable 
     risk, and waste management and technology development issues 
     related to environmental restoration at the installation.
       ``(5) Developing environmental restoration strategies for 
     the installation.''.
       (d) Implementation Requirements.--Not later than 180 days 
     after the date on which the Secretary announces a decision to 
     establish restoration advisory boards, the Secretary of 
     Defense shall--
       (1) prescribe the regulations required under subsections 
     (d) and (e)(1) of title 10, United States Code, as added by 
     this section; and
       (2) take appropriate actions to notify the public of the 
     availability of funding under subsection (e) of such section, 
     as so added.
       (e) The Secretary shall report to the Committees on Armed 
     Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives by 
     May 1, 1996, on the establishment of restoration advisory 
     boards and funds expended for assistance for citizen 
     participation.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would authorize the Secretary 
of Defense to create Restoration Advisory Boards at military bases that 
are being cleaned up and would direct the Secretary to make up to a 
total of $7 million available in fiscal year 1995 funds to provide 
financial assistance to the Restoration Advisory Boards to allow them 
to hire independent technical assistance.
  I urge adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, this amendment should be of interest to any 
Senator who has a military base with environmental contamination in his 
or her State. According to the Defense Department's latest report to 
Congress on the Defense Environmental Cleanup Program, that includes 
practically every member of this body.
  As the Defense Department downsizes or closes bases, there is a 
growing fear among citizens that environmental cleanup of toxic 
wastesites will be rushed and that, faced with tight budgets, the 
Defense Department may make decisions about the cleanup of these sites 
which are detrimental to the health and well being of citizens living 
nearby. This fear has become even more acute with the realization that 
the cost of cleaning up the 13,000 plus Defense toxic wastesites across 
the country could cost as much as $25 billion.
  This amendment attempts to protect the interests of local communities 
in the cleanup process and give them the means to participate in the 
difficult decisions about environmental cleanup which lie ahead. It is 
similar to a bill I introduced on the same subject but I have made a 
number of changes to address concerns raised by the distinguished 
chairman and ranking member on the Readiness Subcommittee, and by the 
Department of Defense and I thank them for their assistance in helping 
move this initiative forward.
  Let me repeat--the Department of Defense supports this amendment. 
This legislation puts into statute the establishment of citizen 
advisory boards by the Defense Department and lays out criteria for the 
make up of these boards. Most important, however, it permits the 
Defense Department to provide funding to the citizen advisory boards to 
allow them to obtain independent technical assistance.
  By setting a cap on overall spending for technical assistance 
funding, this amendment does not direct significant funds away from 
clean up itself.
  This amendment will not delay cleanup of bases, rather it will 
facilitate environmental cleanup. By ensuring that the views of local 
citizens can be heard, we can prevent strained relations between 
civilians and the military and the delays that often arise because of 
these tensions.
  This amendment is not designed to fund more studies. I think we all 
agree that there have been plenty of studies.
  Finally, this bill would not require new spending. Instead, it 
permits the Department of Defense to spend up to $7.5 million from the 
defense environmental restoration account and the 1990 base realignment 
and closure account for this purpose. And let me emphasize, to address 
the concerns of the Department of Defense, this is completely 
discretionary.

  Mr. President, this is a small price to pay for peace of mind. And, 
in the long run, investing the local community in the cleanup process 
will save millions of dollars that might have been spent in litigation 
down the road.
  This bill could have tremendous impact across the country. In my own 
State, where there is not a large military presence, there are 278 
contaminated sites at 47 installations and formerly used Defense sites.
  Let me just provide a little background for Senators who may not be 
familiar with the history of this initiative.
  Two years ago, all the parties involved in the cleanup of Federal 
environmental contamination came together under the auspices of the 
Keystone Foundation. For the first time, Federal, State, local, and 
Indian tribal officials, and community, environmental, and labor 
organizations, came up with a series of recommendations acceptable to 
everyone to improve public participation in the cleanup of these 
hazardous sites. These recommendations can be found in the interim 
report of the Federal Facilities Environmental Restoration Dialog 
Committee.
  The Defense Department endorsed the Keystone recommendations and has 
been working to implement them.
  The cornerstone of this effort is the creation of citizen advisory 
boards at each installation. These boards are made up of community 
members selected to give local input on cleanup issues to the Federal 
agency having jurisdiction over the site. In a pilot program the 
Defense Department has directed each of the services to assist 
communities in setting up citizen advisory boards at five installations 
with environmental contamination.
  In an effort to make these boards more independent and give them 
credibility in their communities, the Keystone participants recommended 
that the Federal agencies provide technical assistance grants to the 
boards, much like EPA does at Superfund sites, so the boards can hire 
experts to help them understand complex environmental impact statements 
and technical and engineering information provided to them by the 
Federal Government.
  Badger Army Ammunition Plant which is located in Baraboo, WI, is one 
of five installations designated by the Army to participate in the 
pilot program to implement the Keystone recommendations. Subsequent to 
its selection, a citizen advisory board made up of a cross-section of 
citizens who have been affected or could be affected by the 
environmental contamination at Badger was created to provide policy and 
technical advice on key cleanup decisions.

  The Board at Badger has been frustrated by its ability to receive 
technical assistance funding from the Department of Defense to hire 
independent technical advisers. Instead, the Army has encouraged the 
board to use the technical advisers employed by the Army. Yet, the 
environmental contractors working for the Army are not permitted to 
speak directly to members of the board when they have questions. All 
questions have to go through the Army.
  Although I have no doubt that the Army is operating in good faith, 
preventing the citizen advisory board from receiving independent 
guidance on technical matters violates the spirit of the Keystone 
process and puts the entire credibility of the board at stake. Our 
amendment would correct this problem.
  This bill is about empowering citizens who have taken on the 
difficult task of working side by side with the military to make sure 
that clean really means clean. Above all, this bill is about building 
trust between the Federal Government and our local communities.
  I urge my colleagues to support this effort so we can get on with the 
business of cleaning up our bases and making our communities, the 
water, the soil and the air, safe for our children.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, we have no objection to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2202) was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. COATS. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2203

  (Purpose: To establish as a civil service position the position of 
athletic director at the U.S. Military Academy, the U.S. Naval Academy, 
and the U.S. Air Force Academy, and to provide for the establishment of 
    nonappropriated fund accounts for the athletic programs of the 
                               academies)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from West Virginia 
[Mr. Byrd] I send an amendment to the desk and ask it be reported.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

  The legislative clerk read as follows:
       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Byrd, proposes 
     an amendment numbered 2203.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 249, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:

     SEC. 1068. ADMINISTRATION OF ATHLETICS PROGRAMS AT THE 
                   SERVICE ACADEMIES.

       (a) United States Military Academy.--(1) Chapter 403 of 
     title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:

     ``Sec. 4357. Administration of athletics program

       ``(a) The position of athletic director of the Academy 
     shall be a position in the civil service (as defined in 
     section 2101(1) of title 5). However, a member of the armed 
     forces may fill such position as an active duty assignment.
       ``(b) Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the 
     Army, the Superintendent of the Academy shall establish and 
     administer a nonappropriated fund account for the athletics 
     program of the Academy. The Superintendent shall credit to 
     such account all revenue received from the conduct of the 
     athletics program of the Academy and all contributions 
     received for such program.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``4357. Administration of athletics program.''.

       (b) United States Naval Academy.--(1) Chapter 603 of title 
     10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new section:

     ``Sec.  6975. Administration of athletics program

       ``(a) The position of athletic director of the Naval 
     Academy shall be a position in the civil service (as defined 
     in section 2101(1) of title 5). However, a member of the 
     armed forces may fill such position as an active duty 
     assignment.
       ``(b) Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the 
     Navy, the Superintendent of the Naval Academy shall establish 
     and administer a nonappropriated fund account for the 
     athletics program of the Naval Academy. The Superintendent 
     shall credit to such account all revenue received from the 
     conduct of the athletics program of the Naval Academy and all 
     contributions received for such program.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``6975. Administration of athletics program.''.

       (c) United States Air Force Academy.--(1) Chapter 903 of 
     title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:

     ``Sec.  9356. Administration of athletics program

       ``(a) The position of athletic director of the Academy 
     shall be a position in the civil service (as defined in 
     section 2101(1) of title 5). However, a member of the armed 
     forces may fill such position as an active duty assignment.
       ``(b) Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the 
     Air Force, the Superintendent of the Academy shall establish 
     and administer a nonappropriated fund account for the 
     athletics program of the Academy. The Superintendent shall 
     credit to such account all revenue received from the conduct 
     of the athletics program of the Academy and all contributions 
     received for such program.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``9356. Administration of athletics program.''.

       (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section 
     shall take effect 240 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would require that the 
service academy athletic directors be civil service positions and that 
the academy athletic programs be administered through nonappropriated 
fund accounts.
  I urge adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the media is again reporting on purported 
scandals at the Naval Academy. This time, the stories concern the Naval 
Academy Athletic Association's purchase of a condominium for the Naval 
Academy's athletic director and an alleged all-expenses paid Army-Navy 
football game weekend junket for Naval Academy officials and 
supporters, at a time when academy sports programs were being cut. The 
director of the Naval Academy Athletic Association has defended the 
decisions that were made. I do not offer a judgment on the actions or 
the allegations. I would observe, however, that given the unique 
institutional arrangement between the Naval Academy and the NAAA (N-
triple A), as the athletic association is called, the appearance of 
impropriety is difficult to avoid.
  The unique institutional arrangement between the Naval Academy and 
the NAAA is almost a century old. The NAAA, a tax-exempt organization 
created to promote and support Naval Academy athletics, receives no 
Government funds. Its revenues, derived from sales of tickets, 
television rights to Navy football games, membership dues, and 
investments, provide the NAAA with a $7 million dollar a year budget. 
From this, the NAAA pays the Naval Academy's athletic director's 
salary, some other Academy athletic officials' salaries, and provides 
full or partial funding for most Academy athletic programs. The 
athletic director, who oversees all Naval Academy sports programs as 
well as coaching the football game, is provided a residence within the 
Naval Academy grounds in Government-provided housing. The NAAA's budget 
is reviewed and approved by a Board of Control and by the Naval 
Academy's Commandant of Midshipmen and the Superintendent of the 
Academy.
  This does not sound very scandalous. However, the athletic director 
of the Naval Academy has another job. He is also the director of the 
NAAA. The associate director of athletics at the Naval Academy is also 
the treasurer of the NAAA. The condominium that the NAAA purchased as 
an investment currently serves as the residence of the athletic 
director while his residence on the Naval Academy is being renovated. A 
second residence purchased by the NAAA as an investment in 1982 was 
until recently rented to the Naval Academy's associate director of 
athletics, and treasurer of the NAAA, for $600 per month. According to 
his rebuttal to a June 13th Baltimore Sun article, the athletic 
director argued that purchasing a condominium for his use while his 
other residence was being renovated made sound fiscal sense, much wiser 
than renting. As investments, these property purchases may be sound, 
but having the stewards of the investment decisions benefit from the 
purchases so directly raises troublesome questions about conflicts of 
interest.
  In 1993, the NAAA recommended the elimination of four varsity sports 
that cost some $250,000 a year to maintain. A fifth varsity sport was 
reduced to club status, ending its financial support by the NAAA. 
According to the athletic director, quoted in the Baltimore Sun on June 
13th, the recommendations were based upon ``brigade and fan interest, 
availability of competition, and revenue potential'' as well as 
finances. None of those decision factors, I would point out, relates to 
the role of sports in developing leadership, teamwork, or physical 
endurance in our nation's future military leaders. That list of 
decision factors also does not indicate whether the Review Board 
created in 1992 to protect minor sports concurred in the 
recommendation.
  This situation illustrates some of the pitfalls and potential 
problems that can arise when conflicts of interest and lack of 
objective oversight of athletic budgets dominate an athletic program. 
It is a situation that, while unique to the Naval Academy among the 
military academy constellation, is not unique to military academies. 
The highly regarded March 1991 report of the prestigious Knight 
Foundation's Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, ``Keeping Faith 
with the Student-Athlete: A New Model for Intercollegiate Athletics,'' 
examined the growing abuses in college sports and proposed a reform 
agenda. Prominent among the report's recommendations is that ``no 
extra-institutional organization should be responsible for any 
operational aspect of an intercollegiate athletics program. All funds 
for athletics should be channeled into the university's financial 
system and subjected to the same budgeting procedures applied to 
similarly structured departments and programs.'' This conclusion by the 
major national Commission reviewing the state of intercollegiate 
athletics should be accorded important weight.
  Because of the Service academies' position as federally operated 
institutions, it seems highly persuasive to me that the concept of 
financial integrity should be a basic tenet of their athletic programs. 
The Air Force Academy and the Army's Military Academy at West Point 
already abide by this tenet. Their athletic directors are also civil 
service or active duty military personnel, with no dual roles as 
directors of non-governmental athletic associations.
  Therefore, I am offering an amendment that brings into conformity the 
practice of the Naval Academy with that of the other Service academies 
and that satisfies the principle of public accountability and financial 
integrity. This amendment requires that all revenue generated by the 
athletic program and associated activities at each Academy be placed in 
a non-appropriated fund account under the control of the Service and 
the Department of Defense. The receipts from ticket sales, television 
rights and the lucrative results of intercollegiate athletic events 
will go directly into the budget of the academies.
  Additionally, this amendment directs the Academies to fill the 
positions of athletic director, the primary policy-maker for the 
athletic department, with either a civil servant or a military officer, 
and not an employee of an outside organization.
  This amendment will codify existing relationships between athletic 
associations and institutions at the Air Force Academy and at West 
Point. The Naval Academy should also recognize and correct the 
relationships between itself and the Naval Academy Athletics 
Association. The amendment provides for a transition period of 240 
days, or eight months, after the date of enactment of this bill, in 
order to establish the fund and transition the athletic director 
position. While it may be difficult to end a long-established practice, 
the long-term interests of the Naval Academy will be better served by 
an arrangement that avoids even the appearance of impropriety, and 
promotes the concept of public scrutiny and accountability.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, we have no objection to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2203) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2204

  (Purpose: To revise the composition of the Commission on Roles and 
                     Missions of the Armed Forces)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Ford, I send an 
amendment to the desk and ask it be reported.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Ford, for 
     himself and Mr. Bond, proposes an amendment numbered 2204.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 185, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following 
     new section:

     SEC. 913. REVISION IN COMPOSITION OF COMMISSION.

       (a) Revision.--Section 952(b) of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 
     10 U.S.C. 111 note; 107 Stat. 1738) is amended--
       (1) in the first sentence of paragraph (1), by striking out 
     ``seven'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``eight''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2)--
       (A) by inserting ``(A)'' before ``The Commission''; and
       (B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(B) The additional member of the Commission appointed 
     under this paragraph after the date of the enactment of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 shall 
     have previous military experience and management experience 
     with the reserve components.''.
       (b) Appointment.--The Secretary of Defense shall make the 
     appointment required as a result of the amendments made by 
     subsection (a) not later than 15 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would add one additional 
member to the Roles and Missions Commission. This amendment would 
require that the new member shall have previous military experience and 
management experience with the Reserve components.
  I urge adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, last year, in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994, Congress directed establishment 
of a commission to review and report on the allocation of roles, 
missions, and functions of the Armed Forces.
  The intent was to ensure that we have effective post cold war defense 
forces, with proper alignment of roles and missions.
  The Commission is not expected to report until April or May of next 
year.
  While the guidance for establishment of the Commission specifically 
referred only to the Armed Forces, the role of the National Guard and 
Reserve components should have been considered a significant element of 
such a review.
  The bill we are considering recognizes that omission by adding a 
provision that will specifically include the Guard and Reserve 
components in the conceptual framework of the Commission's review and 
directs that the Commission address the roles, missions, and functions 
of the Reserve components within the total force.
  Unfortunately, the bill does not specify that the Commission itself 
must include at least one member representing the National Guard and 
Reserve.
  My amendment would direct that an additional Commission member be 
added who has previous military and management experience with the 
Reserve components.
  This provision will ensure that the peculiar requirements and 
benefits of Guard and Reserve components are recognized and considered 
in the final report.
  I urge support for this amendment and I thank the chairman and 
ranking member for their support.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President we have no objection to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2204) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2205

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Sarbanes, I send an 
amendment to the desk and ask it be reported.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Sarbanes, for 
     himself, Mrs. Kassebaum, Mr. Pell, and Mr. Helms, proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2205.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 198, line 3, insert before ``(f)'' the following:
       ``(3) Funds may not be provided under this section for a 
     fiscal year for any country which was not eligible in that 
     fiscal year for assistance under chapter 5 of part II of the 
     Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
       ``(4) Funds may not be used under this section for the 
     provision of military education or training, defense 
     articles, or defense services to any country.''

  Mr. NUNN. This amendment adds two additional limitations to the 
statutory structure for the Military-to-Military Contacts program.
  I urge adoption of the amendment.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, we have no objection to that amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2205) was as agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2206

 (Purpose: To express the Sense of the Senate that the Administration 
   has not adequately funded the Department of Defense's Future Year 
 Defense Program and that the Secretary of Defense should undertake a 
   comprehensive review of the Bottom-Up Review and the Future Years 
Defense Program and, upon completion of that review, establish required 
         funding levels and priorities, and for other purposes)

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Dole, I send an 
amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:
  The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats], for Mr. Dole, for himself, Mrs. 
Hutchison, Mr. Kempthorne, Mr. Coats, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Simpson, and 
Mr. Warner, proposes an amendment numbered 2206.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place insert the following new section:

     SEC.   . REVIEW OF THE BOTTOM UP REVIEW AND THE FUTURE YEAR 
                   DEFENSE PROGRAM AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW 
                   FUNDING REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds as follows:
       (1) Whereas the Administration commissioned the Bottom Up 
     Review to properly structure the Armed Forces of the United 
     States for the Post-Cold War Era;
       (2) Whereas the Secretary of Defense has testified that the 
     Department of Defense's Future Years Defense Program includes 
     $20 billion more in program funding requests during fiscal 
     years 1996 through 1999 than the defense funding levels in 
     the Administration's budget can support;
       (3) Whereas, the Secretary of the Navy has testified that 
     the Department of the Navy will only operate 330 ships rather 
     than the 346 ships required by the Bottom Up Review;
       (4) Whereas, in January 1994, in his Annual Report to the 
     President and the Congress, the Secretary of Defense reported 
     that the Air Force will field approximately 100 heavy bombers 
     rather than the 184 required by the Bottom Up Review;
       (5) Whereas the Department of Defense's plans for a major 
     regional contingency in the Far East call for 5 Army 
     divisions and the plans for a major regional contingency in 
     Southwest Asia call for 7 Army divisions, while the Bottom Up 
     Review plans for an Army of only 10 active divisions;
       (6) Whereas the Administration's budget assumes the 
     Department of Defense will save at least $6 billion from 
     procurement reform;
       (7) Whereas the first and second rounds of the Base 
     Realignment and Closure Commission have not yet achieved the 
     level of savings initially estimated, and the 1995 base 
     closure round may cost significantly more than is assumed in 
     the Administration's budget;
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the Sense of Congress:

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, this amendment expresses the sense of the 
Senate that the Department of Defense review the assumptions and 
conclusions of the Bottom-Up Review and report on the force structure 
required for an adequate defense.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, this amendment is simple and straight 
forward. The legislation expresses the sense-of-the-Senate that the 
Department of Defense should reexamine the Bottom-Up Review and 
President Clinton's future years defense program and report to both the 
Congress and the President on the force structure required to provide 
for an adequate defense for our Nation. It further states that it is 
the sense-of-the-Senate that the President's budget should adequately 
fund that plan. The reason I have raised this question is that despite 
all of the rhetoric, we have neither. According to the military 
experts, the force represented in the Bottom-Up Review is inadequate to 
meet our stated national security needs. And according to the 
administration's own experts, even that force is massively under 
funded.
  We have just concluded that commemoration of the 50th anniversary of 
the landings at Normandy. Many of the Members of this body participated 
in commemorative events either in Europe or here at home. I think its 
appropriate for us to debate our defense budget while our reflections 
on the sacrifices of 50 years ago are fresh in our minds.


                        the president's promises

  I have heard the President's pledge for a strong defense, his pledge 
to field the best equipped fighting force, and his pledge of support of 
our fighting men and women. The President has stated that he would cut 
defense no further. He has endorsed the Bottom-Up Review as the guiding 
document for our Armed Forces for the post-cold-war era. And he has 
assured us that the Bottom-Up Review Force is adequate for fighting two 
major regional contingencies, or MRCs, nearly simultaneously.


                        more hidden defense cuts

  While I have listened to the President's statements, I am concerned 
about the impact of his actions. In the state of the union address on 
January 25, 1994, President Clinton stated that the budget he would 
send to Congress would draw the line against further defense cuts. 
Let's be clear what this means. It means that the President remained 
committed to the huge cut of over $127 billion which he sent the 
Congress last year. The President's 5-year defense plan calls for an 
additional decline in defense spending of 10 percent in real terms. 
Regarding these additional cuts, the distinguished chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee said, ``if these additional hidden reductions 
are not reversed, I believe that they will seriously erode the future 
capability of our military services.'' I share the distinguished 
chairman's view and that is what this amendment is all about--to put 
the Senate on record on this point.
  The fact is, we are entering the 10th consecutive year of defense 
cuts. The defense budget before us, as reflected in this bill 
represents a reduction of approximately 33 percent over the 1985 
defense budget. By the end of the administration's future years defense 
program, defense spending will have fallen by 43 percent over fiscal 
year 1985. We are not cutting defense--we are gutting it.


                    buttom-up review is underfunded

  The Bottom-Up Review was commissioned by this administration to 
properly structure our Armed Forces for the cold-war era. This force is 
what the administration has told the American people is the minimum 
needed to ensure our national security. However, according to the 
administration's own defense experts, the future years defense program 
simply will not fund the force outlined in this plan. According to the 
Armed Services Committee's report, ``* * * as the Secretary of Defense 
testified before the committee, the Defense Department's future years 
defense program actually included $20 billion more in program funding 
during fiscal years 1996 through 1999 than the Defense funding levels 
in the administration's own budget can support.'' In other words, the 
Secretary of Defense is saying that the administration has underfunded 
its own defense plan, which the Secretary has called the ``Bottom 
Line'' for ``America's future security,'' by $20 billion. Let me add 
that the $20 billion figure is in dispute. Many defense experts believe 
the shortfall to be much greater--between $50 and $100 billion. 
Whatever the exact figure, the fact is that President Clinton's defense 
budget doesn't support his own force structure.
  The committee report goes on to state that if the overall defense 
budget is not increased in fiscal year 1996, ``funding for programs 
currently included in the Defense Department's planned fiscal year 1996 
budget will have to be cut.''
  The impact is direct. The Secretary of the Navy testified that the 
Department of the Navy will operate only 330 ships, as opposed to the 
346 ships called for in the Bottom-Up Review. Additionally, as the 
chairman has pointed out, the President's budget request would have 
funded only 100 bombers during fiscal year 1995 and only 80 bombers in 
the out years. This, despite the Bottom-Up Review's requirement for 184 
bombers. While I appreciate the committee's action to prevent further 
retirement of heavy bombers in fiscal year 1995 and the commitment of 
funds to preserve the bomber industrial base, I am concerned by the 
fact that the President's budget would not have adequately funded the 
minimum number of bombers required for this Nation's security. It is a 
fact that the Bottom-Up Review is underfunded and it appears that this 
administration, while making statements about commitment to a strong 
defense and demonstrations of support for our troops, is willing to do 
little if anything to address that problem. The result is the exposure 
of our fighting men and women to a greater level of risk.


               the bottom up review force is insufficient

  The administration's assurances that the Bottom-Up Review Force 
structure is sufficient to fight and win two major regional 
contingencies nearly simultaneously is not supported by the facts. Of 
the most glaring deficiencies is the fact that the number of army 
divisions called for by the President's strategy will not meet the 
military's stated needs for fighting and winning a major regional 
contingency in the Far East and a major regional contingency in 
Southwest Asia. During the Gulf war, the United States deployed seven 
divisions plus two armored cavalry regiments to Southwest Asia. 
Recently, General Luck testified that a major regional contingency on 
the Korean Peninsula would require at least 400,000 troops to reinforce 
the U.S. Forces already assigned to South Korea. If the United States 
had to face these two wars ``nearly simultaneously,'' the Army would 
not be able to deploy all the troops required. Remember that at the 
same time the United States is fighting these major regional conflicts, 
it also would have to maintain at least one division in Europe to meet 
our NATO requirements. And we can't forget the humanitarian missions 
and peacekeeping operations to which this administration has committed 
us. The fact is that the administration's Army force structure will not 
allow us to fight and win two MRCs nearly simultaneously and meet all 
of our other responsibilities.

  I remind my colleagues of the administration original policy of 
sizing U.S. Forces for what was termed a ``win-hold-win'' strategy. 
This strategy held that if the United States were fighting a regional 
conflict, and during that fight, a second regional conflict broke out, 
U.S. Forces would hold off the second aggressor until the first had 
been defeated. I think you will also recall that this notion was so 
widely discredited that the administration quickly announced that it 
had abandoned it. However, in my view, the force structure outlined in 
the Bottom-Up Review, is simply ``win-hold-win,'' with a new label. 
Like ``win-hold-win,'' the Bottom-Up Review assumes a late redeployment 
of critical assets, such as intelligence, command, and control, and air 
capabilities--that includes bombers, from the first contigency to the 
second ``as circumstances permitted.'' In fact, the forces required by 
the Bottom-Up Review strategy and the forces required to implement win-
hold-win are remarkably similar. As Dr. Dov Zakheim testified before 
the House Armed Services Committee, ``. . . there is no difference at 
all with respect to the force levels postulated for the Air Force under 
the two supposedly different strategies.'' Closer inspection reveals 
that the current force structure not only is insufficient for the 
Bottom-Up Review strategy, it would not even meet the requirements or 
``win-hold-win.'' The Air Force that was to be the foundation of ``win-
hold-win.'' But, as I have already pointed out, the Clinton 
administration requested funding adequate for only 100 bombers in the 
coming fiscal year. Dr. Zakheim went on to say, ``since bombers were 
essential to the effectiveness of the `win-hold-win' strategy, the cut 
in bomber forces calls into question whether the administration can do 
more than support a conflict in but a single theater.'' The assurance 
that the current force structure can meet two MRC's is absurd.

  In summary, the funding plan does not support the force structure, 
and the force structure won't do the job.
  During World War II, it took this Nation and our Allies almost 2 
years to amass the troops and material needed for victory. However, the 
simple fact of the matter is that we will never again have that kind of 
time to prepare for war. And you can be sure our enemies have learned 
from the mistake of Saddam Hussein, the next time we face an aggressor, 
that aggressor will not allow us with 6 months to prepare for the 
fight.
  Look at the war in Bosnia, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the nuclear 
buildup in Iran, and the situation on the Korean Peninsula. It should 
be obvious to all of us that the world is still a dangerous place. The 
amendment I have proposed would simply state the sense-of-the-Senate 
that we want a review of proposed defense spending and the Bottom-Up 
Review Force structure to ensure that we are ready to meet whatever 
threat may await us. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2206) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2207

    (Purpose: To require the Secretary of Defense to submit to the 
    congressional defense committees estimates of the total cost of 
           procurement of 20 additional B-2 bomber aircraft)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Vermont [Mr. 
Leahy], I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Leahy, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2207.
       On page 26, between lines 13 and 14, insert the following:
       (e) Estimates of Total Cost Required.--(1) Not later than 
     January 15, 1995, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to 
     the congressional defense committees two estimates of the 
     total cost of acquisition of 20 additional B-2 bomber 
     aircraft, including the cost of research, development, test 
     and evaluation and the cost of related military construction.
       (2) The Secretary shall assume for purposes of making one 
     of the estimates that such aircraft will be procured at the 
     rate of 2 aircraft in each of fiscal years 1997 and 1998, 3 
     such aircraft in each of fiscal years 1999 through 2002, and 
     4 such aircraft in fiscal year 2003. The Secretary shall 
     assume for purposes of making the other estimate that such 
     aircraft will be procured at an annual rate of 2.5 aircraft 
     beginning in fiscal year 1997.
       (3) In addition to stating the estimates in terms of 
     estimated total actual cost, the Secretary shall state the 
     estimates in terms of fiscal year 1995 constant dollars.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment requires the Department of 
Defense to provide to the congressional defense committees estimates of 
the cost to acquire another 20 B-2 bombers under two different 
production rate assumptions.
  Mr. President, this is information the committee and the Congress 
will need to obtain.
  I wish to make it clear that this is on behalf of Senator Leahy, who 
opposed the program, but the information will be informative to all of 
us.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, earlier today, the Senate defeated an 
amendment that I cosponsored which would have cut $150 million and 
close the B-2 production line. As the sponsor of the amendment last 
year that capped the B-2 program at 20 planes, I strongly oppose 
spending one additional dime of taxpayer dollars on keeping the B-2 
assembly line warm.
  The $150 million the Senate approved today is a downpayment for 20 
additional B-2 bombers. Incredibly, these funds were approved without 
any independent estimates on how much these planes will cost.
  The amendment I offer this evening does just that. This measure 
requires the Department of Defense to provide Congress with detailed 
estimates by January 1, 1995 on how much more the B-2 is going to raid 
the U.S. Treasury.
  I thank the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee for working with 
me on this amendment. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I do not believe we have any objection to 
that amendment. I urge its immediate adoption.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2207) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2208

     (Purpose: To provide for the review of cost growth in certain 
Department of Defense contracts and cost comparison studies for certain 
                    Department of Defense contracts)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of 
the Senator from Arkansas, Mr. Pryor, and ask it be reported.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. Pryor, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2208.
       On page 110, between lines 19 and 20, insert the following 
     new sections:

     SEC. 357. REVIEW BY DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF COST GROWTH 
                   IN CERTAIN CONTRACTS.

       (a) Review.--The Inspector General of the Department of 
     Defense shall carry out a review of a representative sample 
     of existing contracts for the performance of commercial 
     activities which resulted from a cost comparison study 
     conducted by the Department of Defense under Office of 
     Management and Budget Circular A-76 (or any other successor 
     administrative regulation or policy) to determine the extent 
     to which the cost incurred by a contractor under any such 
     contract has exceeded the cost of the contract at the time 
     the contract was entered into.
       (b) Report.--Not later than April 1, 1995, the Inspector 
     General shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of 
     the Senate and the House of Representatives a report 
     containing the results of the review carried out under 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 358. COST COMPARISON STUDIES FOR CONTRACTS FOR ADVISORY 
                   AND ASSISTANCE SERVICES.

       (a) In General.--(1) Chapter 141 of title 10, United States 
     Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     section:

     ``Sec. 2410l. Contracts for advisory and assistance services: 
       cost comparison studies

       ``(a) Requirement.--(1)(A) Before the Secretary of Defense 
     enters into a contract described in subparagraph (B), the 
     Secretary shall determine whether Department of Defense 
     personnel have the capability to perform the services 
     proposed to be covered by the contract.
       ``(B) Subparagraph (A) applies to any contract of the 
     Department of Defense for advisory and assistance services 
     which contract will have a value in excess of $100,000.
       ``(2) If the Secretary determines that such personnel have 
     that capability, the Secretary shall conduct a study 
     comparing the cost of performing the services with Department 
     of Defense personnel and the cost of performing the services 
     with contractor personnel.
       ``(b) Waiver.--The Secretary of Defense may, pursuant to 
     guidelines prescribed by the Secretary, waive the requirement 
     under subsection (a)(2) to perform a cost comparison study 
     based on factors that are not related to cost.''.
       (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter 
     is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

``2410l. Contracts for advisory and assistance services: cost 
              comparison studies.''.

       (b) Procedures for Conduct of Studies.--The Secretary of 
     Defense shall prescribe the following procedures:
       (1) Procedures for carrying out a cost comparison study 
     under subsection (a)(2) of section 2410l of title 10, United 
     States Code, as added by subsection (a), which may contain a 
     requirement that the cost comparison study include 
     consideration of factors that are not related to cost, 
     including the quality of the service required to be 
     performed, the availability of Department of Defense 
     personnel, the duration and recurring nature of the services 
     to be performed, and the consistency of the workload.
       (2) Procedures for reviewing contracts entered into after a 
     waiver under subsection (b) of such section to determine 
     whether the contract is justified and sufficiently 
     documented.
       (c) Effective Date.--Section 2410l of title 10, United 
     States Code, as added by subsection (a), shall take effect 
     180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment would provide for review of 
cost growth in certain DOD contracts and cost comparison studies in 
certain DOD contracts.
  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, the amendment has two parts which are 
designed to ensure that the taxpayers are to paying excessive amounts 
of money to private contractors. I am delighted that this amendment is 
already include in the House version of this bill. I am hopeful that 
this reform will quickly become the law of the land.
  Mr. President, not long ago, the Senate passed the Acquisition Reform 
Act which was intended to make our federal procurement system easier 
for the government to operate and to make it easier for contractors to 
deal with the government. While I supported that legislation, it is 
important to recognize that in addition to making our system simpler, 
we should also strive to make it more efficient and accountable.
  As I have stated, my amendment has two pars. The first section 
requires the DOD Inspector General to review a portion of the existing 
service contracts at DOD to determine if these contracts have 
experienced excessive overruns. This requirement is necessary due to 
the simple fact that all too many GAO reports, IG reports, and hearings 
like the one I have held on government contracts have documented that 
too often contract awarded to save money actually end up costing more 
than the federal employees that were replaced.
  Mr. President, this requirement does not prevent DOD from contracting 
out any services. But, it gives us some independent oversight over 
these contracts once they are awarded. Perhaps if the contractors and 
DOD know that the IG will be checking up on these contracts, then the 
taxpayers will not be forced to pay for the excessive cost growth that 
occurs all too often when government work has been farmed out to 
contractors.
  The second part of my amendment addresses those types of contracts 
that are not now subject to a cost comparison. I am speaking about 
consulting services or, as they are sometimes called, advisory and 
assistance services. If DOD wants to contract for lawn mowing services, 
they do a cost comparison between contractors and Federal employees. 
However, if DOD wants to contract for planning, managing, analyzing and 
other such services, then there is no requirement that they first 
compare the cost of using Federal employees versus contractors. This 
makes absolutely no sense.
  Mr. President, again, this requirement to conduct a cost-comparison 
does not prohibit DOD from awarding any contract. However, for the 
first time, DOD and others will at least begin asking a very basic 
question before awarding consulting contracts. Will it cost more to use 
Federal workers or private contractors to perform this work? This is 
information that any manager should have before making a decision that 
will cost the taxpayers large sums of money.
  Mr. President, this requirement does allow DOD to consider other 
factors not related to cost when they are performing these comparisons. 
For example, these other issues could include the availability of DOD 
personnel, whether the work is a one-time requirement, or a recurring 
need.
  Mr. President, this amendment sets the dollar threshold for 
conducting a cost-comparison at $100,000. I think this is a reasonable 
figure. When the Senate was considering the Acquisition Streamlining 
bill, there was much discussion of the need to raise the small purchase 
threshold from $25,000 to $100,000 in order to reduce the paperwork 
burden on the agencies. The Senate was informed that the vast majority 
of contract actions, close to 90 percent, were under this threshold. 
This means that the agencies could now begin to focus on the major 
contracts over $100,000. I think the same logic applies to cost-
comparisons for consulting contracts.
  In conclusion, Mr. President, these two requirements will provide DOD 
and the Congress with much needed information on the cost of using 
private contractors. This is a small but important step to take towards 
a more efficient and accountable government. I urge the adoption of 
this amendment.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, we have no objection to that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is an agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2208) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2209

(Purpose: To increase the authorization of appropriations for the Army 
  for ammunition in order to provide for an interim bunker defeating 
   capability until the short-range attack weapon is fielded, and to 
      reduce the amount provided for C-135 aircraft modifications)

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senators DeConcini, Ford, and 
McCain, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

       The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], for Mr. DeConcini for 
     himself, Mr. Ford, and Mr. McCain, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2209.

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 14, line 15, strike out ``$840,361,000'' and insert 
     in lieu thereof ``$848,122,000''.
       On page 15, line 9, strike out ``$6,602,994,000'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``$6,592,194,000''.
       On page 21, between lines 15 and 16, insert the following:

     SEC. 115. BUNKER DEFEAT MUNITION MISSILES.

       (a) Authority.--The Secretary of the Army may acquire up to 
     6,000 type classified standard bunker defeat munition 
     weapons.
       (b) Funding.--Funds authorized to be appropriated for the 
     Army for fiscal year 1994 shall be available for acquisition 
     of bunker defeat munition weapons in accordance with 
     subsection (a) as follows:
       (1) Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 
     101(4), $7,761,000.
       (2) Of the amount authorized to be appropriated by section 
     201(1), $2,600,000.
       On page 27, line 19, strike out ``$5,149,708,000'' and 
     insert in lieu thereof ``$5,152,308,000''.
  Mr. DeCONCINI. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Ford and Senator 
McCain, I offer an amendment to the fiscal year 1995 National Defense 
Authorization bill. Our amendment would authorize completion of 
research and development, and initial procurement, of the Army's Bunker 
Defeat Munition.
  After submission of the budget request, but prior to the committee's 
markup of the bill, the Army decided to terminate the Bunker Defeat 
Munition, or BDM, in favor of another weapon known as the short-range 
attack weapon, or SRAW, that would be integrated with a warhead known 
as the multi-purpose individual munition, or MIPM. The SRAW has been 
under development by the Marine Corps; the MIPM has been under 
development by the Army. The Army's decision to terminate BDM reflects 
a decision to develop the SRAW/MIPM jointly with the Marine Corps. This 
Army decision was welcome to the Armed Services Committee because the 
Congress last year had directed the Army and the Marine Corps to 
integrate these two programs and proceed rapidly to develop and field 
the weapon.
  The Army recommended termination of BDM because of budget 
constraints, the belief that the SRAW/MIPM would be a more effective 
weapon, and because the Army hopes that SRAW/MIPM would be available in 
just a few years.
  I understand the committee's position and the budget constraints 
facing the Army. However, since the Army Headquarters in the Pentagon 
made this decision, Senator Ford, Senator McCain, and I have been 
informed that the Airborne Corps and Forces Command have appealed to 
the army for an interim, limited procurement of BDM weapons. Our 
military forces have encountered situations in Operation Just Cause, 
Operation Desert Storm, and in Somalia where existing weapons were 
shown to be inadequate. Our rapid-deployment forces have an urgent need 
for an improved capability to breach bunkers, walls, earthen 
fortifications, and urban fortifications. BDM could be ready for 
production in a short period and could provide an improved capability 
until the SRAW/MIPW is fielded.
  Our amendment is designed to provide that capability. The amendment 
would authorize additional funds to complete development and begin 
production of BDM. It would also establish a legislative cap on the 
number of BDM weapons that the Army could acquire, to emphasize the 
point that this weapon will provide a limited, interim capability only.
  As an offset, we understand that the Air Force recently terminated a 
KC-135 tanker refueling system, which would make available more than 
enough funds to pay for this BDM initiative.
  I understand that the amendment is acceptable to both sides. I 
appreciate the assistance from the committee.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to cosponsor an amendment to 
the Fiscal Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Bill. The amendment 
would restore the $10.4 million requested for the Bunker Defeat 
Munition Program.
  The urgent requirement for a bunker defeat munition was established 
based on the lessons learned in Operations Just Cause, Urgent Fury, 
Desert Storm, and Desert Shield; and was reinforced during Operation 
Restore Hope. Additionally, the Bunker Defeat Munition fully meets the 
FORSCOM requirements for an interim individual munition to defeat 
bunkers.
  The fiscal year 1995 request reflects Congressional direction. 
Congress provided funding in fiscal years 1992-1994 to conduct a 
competitive evaluation of bunker defeat munition candidates; and the 
fiscal year 1994 Defense Authorization Conference included language 
directing the Army to pursue a limited, interim program for a bunker-
defeat system.
  The Army decision earlier this year to terminate the program was 
based on erroneous affordability assumptions and abandons a simple, 
cost effective solution. The BDM program testing has been highly 
successful and the program is on schedule. It can be fielded in the 
first quarter of fiscal year 1996. It is therefore apparent that the 
Army decision to cancel the BDM was premature and would leave the Army 
without an interim capability to defeat field fighting positions for at 
least another five or six years and wastes the $14 million that has 
already been spent on the program.
  My understanding is that this amendment is acceptable to both sides. 
The time and attention of the committee to this matter is greatly 
appreciated.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this amendment authorizes funds to complete 
R&D and begin production of a bunker-defeating weapon for the Army. It 
caps total procurement of the weapon at 6,000 rounds.
  Mr. COATS. We have no objection.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If 
not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 2209) was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2210

 (Purpose: To express the sense of Congress on providing for a twelfth 
Naval Amphibious Ready Group, and to authorize the Secretary of Navy to 
take certain actions to facilitate the establishment of such Amphibious 
                              Ready Group)

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, in behalf of Senator Lott, I send an 
amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats], for Mr. Lott, for 
     himself, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Cochran, and Mr. Heflin, proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2210.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 22, between lines 9 and 10, insert the following:

     SEC. 122. NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUPS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Extensive and compelling testimony from uniformed 
     military and Department of Defense leadership has been 
     received which supports a military requirement for twelve 
     Amphibious Ready Groups.
       (2) An official Department of Navy report required by the 
     Fiscal Year 1993 National Defense Authorization Act clearly 
     stipulates that a seventh LHD is required in order for the 
     Navy to achieve a force structure of twelve Amphibious Ready 
     Groups.
       (3) The Department of Navy has identified funds for the 
     purchase of LHD-7 in outyear budget projections.
       (4) A significant shortfall in amphibious shipping and 
     amphibious lift exists, both in the FY-95 budget request and 
     in outyear force structure projections.
       (5) Amphibious Assault Ships (LHDs) provide an important 
     contingency capability and are uniquely suited to respond to 
     world crises and to provide assistance after natural 
     disasters.
       (6) Twelve Amphibious Ready Groups are the correct number 
     to sustain forward deployment and contingency requirements of 
     the Navy.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--If is the sense of Congress that 
     the Secretary of the Navy should, plan for, and budget to 
     provide for, the attainment of a twelfth Amphibious Ready 
     Group as soon as possible. Further, the Secretary of Navy 
     should extend the existing contract option on the LHD-7 
     Amphibious Assault Ship in order to achieve twelve Amphibious 
     Ready Groups.
       (c) LHD-7 Contract Option Extension.--
       (1) The Secretary of Navy is authorized to extend the 
     existing contract option for the LHD-7 Amphibious Assault 
     ship if the Secretary determines that the extension would be 
     in the best interest of the United States.
       (2) The Secretary of Navy shall immediately begin 
     negotiations to extend the existing contract option for the 
     LHD-7 Amphibious Assault Ship Program.
       (3) On and after the date that is 30 days after the date on 
     which the Secretary notifies Congress of an intention to do 
     so, the Secretary may use such program funds authorized to be 
     appropriated for other Navy programs for such contract. The 
     notification shall include a description of the intended use 
     of the funds.
       (d) Report Requirement.--The Secretary Navy shall report to 
     the Congress, after December 31, 1994, but before March 31, 
     1995, Department of the Navy intentions related to contract 
     execution of the existing contract option for the LHD-7 
     Amphibious Assault Ship. The report shall include an 
     explanation of the Department's actions related to the 
     attainment of a twelfth Amphibious Ready Group and the costs 
     and benefits of extending the existing contract option on the 
     LHD-7 Amphibious Assault Ship.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, this is an amendment that expresses the 
sense of the Congress that the Navy should plan for and budget to 
provide for the attainment of the 12th Amphibious Ready Group. It 
authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to extend the existing contract 
option for LHD 7, directs the Secretary of the Navy to negotiate an 
extension of the contract option, and it authorizes the Secretary of 
the Navy to recommend a reprogramming of Navy funds for such contracts.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, during the Armed Services Committee 
consideration of the defense authorization bill, I offered an amendment 
which added money to the Ship Construction Navy Account for the LHD-7. 
The Navy currently holds a firm fixed-price option on LHD-7 which is 
set to expire on December 31, 1994.
  The Armed Services Committee agreed, by a vote of 14-6, to keep this 
option alive. Most everyone knows that the LHD-7 was funded by the 
Committee with moneys requested for the sealift program. Last week, 
during consideration of the Johnston amendment, I stated my interest in 
restoring money to the sealift account--but I also remained dedicated 
to preserving the Navy's options related to the LHD-7.
  This amendment, which I am offering on behalf of myself, Senator 
Cochran, Senator Shelby and Senator Heflin, achieves my objective of 
keeping the LHD-7 option alive. This amendment, which has been cleared 
on both sides, is a good amendment. It authorizes the Secretary of the 
Navy to extend the existing contract option on the LHD-7 and declares 
that Congress is firmly and unalterably committed to the Navy 
requirement for twelve Amphibious Ready Groups. In addition, the 
amendment reaffirms the compelling testimony presented by Navy and DOD 
personnel that the United States must have LHD-7 if we are going to 
reach our 12 Amphibious Ready Group requirement.
  The LHD serves as the premier warship in the amphibious fleet. Today, 
LHDs are deployed across the globe, protecting U.S. national security 
interests. One LHD is sailing off Haiti, supporting the Naval embargo 
and refugee processing in accordance with United States objectives. 
Another LHD is sailing off the coast of Somalia, ready at a moment's 
notice to assist in the evacuation of United States and humanitarian 
personnel should their lives be placed in danger. In addition, over the 
previous 6 months, LHDs have supported U.S. and NATO operations in the 
Adriatic related to the ongoing unrest in Bosnia.
  Under the Navy's new strategy ``* * * From the Sea,'' LHD's become 
the capital ship of the fleet geared toward brown-water operations, 
operations which are critical to success in regional contingencies. 
Given the validated military requirement for 12 Amphibious Ready Groups 
and the fact that seven LHDs are required to reach this force 
structure, this amendment is a significant achievement because it:
  Authorizes the Secretary to extend the contract option on LHD-7; and
  Authorizes the Secretary to execute this option if he determines it 
to be in the best interests of the U.S.
  I would also point out that in testimony before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, the Secretary of the Navy, John Dalton, testified 
that the Navy wants the ship, needs the ship, but just could not afford 
this ship at this time. The Secretary's testimony, while significant 
and clear, is only a small part of the justification for proceeding on 
this ship now. General Mundy, Commandant of the Marine Corps, stated 
that ``Twelve Amphibious Ready Groups are the minimum number 
required.''
  General Hoar, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Central Command 
testified that we need ``LHD-7 and 12 Amphibious Ready Groups to ensure 
that we maintain the Naval posture that is the backbone of our forward 
presence.'' In a required Navy report, signed by the Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral Kelso in March 1993, the Navy stated, ``The Navy's 
goal is 12 ARGs. * * * An additional LHD, the seventh, would be 
required to fully support the 12 ARG goal. * * *''


                       unanimous-consent request

  Mr. President, in order to more fully explain the requirement for 
LHD-7 and the importance of this amendment, I ask unanimous consent 
that accompanying this statement, Admiral Kelso's report and a chart 
documenting the extensive testimony supporting LHD-7 be included in the 
Record.
  Mr. President, this amendment authorizes the Secretary to maintain 
his options on LHD-7. This amendment advances the cause of LHD-7 by 
authorizing the Secretary to take specific actions--actions which if 
not taken will result in the Navy and Marine Corps failing to meet 
their stated military requirements.
  I urge the adoption of this amendment.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                           Department of the Navy,


                                      Office of the Secretary,

                                    Washington, DC, April 7, 1993.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am responding to Senate Armed Services 
     Committee Report 102-352, which directed Navy to report on 
     alternatives to meet amphibious lift goals in light of other 
     expensive programs and declining budgets, and to report on 
     options for maintaining combat logistics capability for the 
     projected reduced fleet.
       I am enclosing a copy of our study on amphibious lift 
     alternatives which was prepared by the Chief of Naval 
     Operations' staff with assistance from Headquarters, United 
     States Marine Corps. We concluded that pursuing construction 
     of a new design ``LPD like'' ship, called LX90 is the best 
     alternative, providing the proper balance of affordability 
     and capability to meet the 2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
     goal for the years ahead. This conclusion was reviewed and 
     approved by the Defense Acquisition Board in January 1993.
       I regret to inform you that due to the recent budget 
     decisions on force structure, the study on combat logistics 
     capabilities is being reworked. That report should be 
     provided by April 15, 1993.
       I am sending similar letters to Chairmen Dellums, Inouye 
     and Murtha. If I can be of any further assistance, please do 
     not hesitate to contact me.
           Sincerely,
                                               Frank B. Kelso, II,
                                    Secretary of the Navy, Acting.

 Report to Congress on Amphibious Shipping Requirements--Submitted by 
                 the Department of the Navy, March 1993


                               a. purpose

       The Senate Armed Services Committee Report for the Fiscal 
     Year 1993 Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of 
     the Navy to report to the defense committees on various 
     alternatives to meet the amphibious lift goal. The Committee 
     expressed concern over the approaching end-of-service life of 
     a large percentage of the current amphibious force, the 
     declining amphibious lift goal, and the viability of the 
     Navy's amphibious shipbuilding plan in an era of decreasing 
     resources.
       The Secretary of the Navy was directed to submit a report 
     to the defense committees that assesses five alternatives for 
     meeting amphibious shipping requirements.
       Extending the service lives of existing ships.
       Purchasing different types of amphibious ships to fill the 
     requirement.
       Purchasing and using some number of commercial-type vessels 
     to augment amphibious vessels in the assault.
       Changing the relative portions of the assault force carried 
     in the assault echelon (AE) versus the assault follow-on 
     echelon (AFOE).
       Expanding the portion of the Marine Corps forces supported 
     by prepositioning ships.
       This report provides background and a summary assessment of 
     each alternative. The Navy, with OSD review and concurrence, 
     concludes that the best shipbuilding alternative is a new-
     construction amphibious ship, currently identified as LX, and 
     that the current doctrine vis-a-vis AE/AFOE and 
     prepositioning is better than the two alternatives examined.


                             b. background

       The Service's fiscally constrained amphibious lift goal is 
     2.5 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs). This force must be 
     structured with the flexibility to construct Amphibious Ready 
     Groups (ARGs) to fulfill requirements for forward 
     deployments. The Navy's goal is 12 ARGs consisting of at 
     least three ships; a large helicopter deck ship (LHA, LHD), a 
     ship with secondary aviation support capability (LPD, new 
     LX), and one or more ships as required to support ARG lift 
     requirements (LSD, LST, LKA). Amphibious lift is 
     traditionally measured by assessing five carrying capacities: 
     troops, vehicles, cargo, VTOL spots, and LCAC spots. However, 
     the lift fingerprints must be properly combined for a ship to 
     effectively support a combatant force. For example, the 
     secondary aviation capability of the current LPD and the 
     planned LX is critical to allowing ARGs to be split into two 
     forces, a capability that has been used many times in the 
     past. The Service currently meets the MEB and ARG goals and, 
     despite the large number of ships scheduled to retire, plans 
     on continuing to maintain 2.5 MEBs of lift into the 2020s 
     through an achievable amphibious ship construction 
     program.
       As of 1 January 1993 there were 60 active amphibious ships 
     (including 2 LCCs that do not contribute to the lift goal) 
     and 8 ships appropriated or under construction (4 LDHs, 4 
     LSDs). Forty-five of these ships are scheduled to retire 
     between now and 2007. The block obsolescence problem the 
     Committee highlights is a specific concern that the Navy is 
     addressing. Figure 1 shows the lift capability of the current 
     force (including appropriated ships) using the planned 
     retirement schedule; the display assumes no further ships are 
     authorized. Without additional ships, the lift shortfall 
     becomes critical in 2004.
       The Navy has long recognized the block obsolescence problem 
     and began planning in 1988 by approving a Tentative 
     Operational Requirement (TOR) for a ship class (LX) to 
     replace vessels retiring during the next decade. In 1990, the 
     Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) approved Milestone 0 for the 
     LX and directed a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis 
     (COEA) to study the best means to meet lift goals through 
     Fiscal Year 2010. The LX COEA examined the cost of 
     alternative LX ship designs to maintain wartime and peacetime 
     forward presence amphibious lift goals. The operational 
     effectiveness of the alternatives was examined in terms of 
     suitability for MEB and ARG operations; support of the ship-
     to-shore buildup of Marines with landing craft and 
     helicopters; and survivability against enemy threats. The 
     COEA showed that in addressing the future lift shortfall, the 
     Navy should not replace retiring amphibious ships on a one-
     for-one basis. Rather, we should make up the shortfall by 
     replacing smaller and frequently single-dimension ships with 
     medium sized, multidimensional ships. The new ships must 
     provide both a full service aviation capability for several 
     helicopters and over-the-horizon (OTH) surface assault 
     capability similar to the capabilities currently provided by 
     LPD class ships.
       The Navy plans to procure 12 LX-class ships in addition to 
     the eight LHD and LSD class ships authorized or under 
     construction. These 20 ships (under construction or planned) 
     coupled with the 15 ships remaining from the current force 
     will result in a 35-ship amphibious force in 2008--11 LHA/
     LHDs, 12 LSD41/LSD49s, and 12 LXs. This compact, flexible 
     force will support 11 Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) for 
     forward presence and provide in excess of 2.5 MEBs lift, with 
     the exception of a minor vehicle lift shortfall after 2007, 
     as indicated in Figure 2. An additional LHD, the seventh, 
     would be required to fully support the 12 ARG goal, but is 
     unaffordable under the current fiscally constrained 
     shipbuilding plan. The Defense Acquisition Board reviewed the 
     COEA ad shipbuilding plan and gave Milestone I approval for 
     LX program development in January 1993.


                   documentation of lhd-7 requirement

       Gen Mundy, Commandant, USMC; 12 Apr 94--Testimony to SASC, 
     Regional Defense Subcommittee; ``12 ARGs are the minimum 
     required.''
       Gen Hoar, CINC CENTCOM; 3 Mar 94--Testimony to SASC; We 
     need ``LHD-7 & 12 ARGs to ensure that we maintain the Naval 
     posture that is the backbone of our forward presence.''
       Adm Owens, Vice Chairman, JCS, Chairman, JROC; 9 Feb 94--
     Testimony to SASC; 12 ARGs ``is the number we should continue 
     to use as our goal.''
       Adm Kelso, CNO; Mar 1993--Required Report; ``The Navy's 
     goal is 12 ARGs. . . .'' ``An additional LHD, the 7th, would 
     be required to fully support the 12 ARG goal. . . .''
       USMC Publication; 1994--Concepts & Issues, Page 2-6; ``USMC 
     needs 12th Big Deck (LHD) to support worldwide Forward 
     presence. . . .''
       Navy Publication; Aug 1993--Naval Surface Forces, Page 13; 
     Sustaining 12 ARGs is a ``top-level objective.''
       Adm Arthur, VCNO; 11 Dec 92; ``Navy/Marine goal of 12 ARGs 
     validated by JROC and is needed to support 3 forward deployed 
     ARGs mandated by JCS.''
       Adm Jeremiah, Vice Chairman, JCS; 31 Aug 92; ``JROC 
     determined Navy must maintain amphibious lift capability to 
     support both crisis response and our forward presence 
     requirements (12 ARGs).''
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am pleased there is authorizing 
language included in this bill to permit funds to be appropriated to 
keep the option to build LHD-7 alive. The importance of this ship to 
the Navy and Marine Corps has been strongly stated at hearings and is 
clearly spelled out in the report accompanying this bill.
  I appreciate the support of the managers and all others interested in 
this ship.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If 
there is no further debate, the question is on agreeing to the 
amendment of the Senator from Mississippi.
  The amendment (No. 2210) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           amendment no. 2211

  (Purpose: To establish conditions on certain contracts between the 
Federal Government and lessees and transferees of certain Department of 
                            Energy property)

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, in behalf of Senator Thurmond, who has 
offered this on behalf of Senator Bond, I send an amendment to the desk 
and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats], for Mr. Bond, 
     proposes an amendment numbered 2211.

  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 371, between lines 6 and 7, insert the following

     SEC. 3159. CONDITIONS ON CONTRACTS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL 
                   GOVERNMENT AND CERTAIN LESSEES AND TRANSFEREES 
                   OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROPERTY.

       (a) Conditions.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the head of a department or agency of the United States 
     may require as a condition of a contract with an entity 
     described in subsection (b) that such entity certifies to the 
     head of the department or agency the following:
       (1) That no officer, director, employee, or agent of the 
     entity has utilized in the preparation of the bid or 
     solicitation for the contract--
       (A) any records or systems of records of the Federal 
     Government that are covered by section 552a of title 5, 
     United States Code;
       (B) any information or data of the Federal Government that 
     has not been released or otherwise made generally available 
     for preparation of bids or proposals on the contract; or
       (C) any commercial information or data of another entity 
     that has not been released or otherwise made generally 
     available for that purpose.
       (2) That the entity has returned, destroyed, or otherwise 
     disposed of all documents received from the Federal 
     Government by reason of any earlier * * *
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, this amendment would require certain DOD 
contractors to certify that they have had no access to privileged 
information DOD contracts.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If 
not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from 
Missouri.
  The amendment (No. 2211) was agreed to.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I know that all Senators are anxious to know 
what we plan from here on.
  I can give them a report to the best of my knowledge. We have just 
handled 44 amendments, and these have been worked out over the last 
several days. So they are now part of the bill.
  There are several more amendments that are being cleared. I know of 
only one more amendment that could require a rollcall vote. That is the 
one that is about to be presented by Senator Wallop.
  My understanding is it will require a rollcall vote. I do not know 
the context of amendment now except in a general fashion. I will be 
working with others on the amendment. But we certainly can have and 
probably will have one more rollcall vote.
  The Senator from Wyoming has indicated to me that he does not intend 
to take a lot of time on this amendment, but that he prefers not to 
have a time agreement at this point.
  Mr. President, that is where we are at the moment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Wyoming.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I can assure the Senator from Georgia that 
it is not my intention by not entering into a time agreement to spend a 
lot of time. My honest feeling is that we can perhaps do this more 
quickly without a time agreement than with one.


                           Amendment No. 2212

(Purpose: To require a thorough evaluation of the risks and costs of a 
 potential deployment of United States forces to the Golan Heights for 
          peacekeeping operations before any such deployment)

  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Wyoming [Mr. Wallop] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2212.

  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 219, after line 19, insert the following:

     SEC. 1033. DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES FOR 
                   PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.

       (a) Limitation.--None of the funds authorized to be 
     appropriated for the Department of Defense by this or any 
     other Act may be expended for support of any deployment of 
     personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States to the 
     Golan Heights as part of a multilateral peacekeeping force, 
     as a unilateral peacekeeping force, or in conjunction with a 
     peace agreement between Israel and Syria that results in the 
     withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Force from the Golan 
     Heights until the Secretary of Defense submits to Congress, 
     in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a written 
     report on a potential deployment and the limitation in this 
     subsection ceases to be effective by operation of subsection 
     (d).
       (b) Content of Report.--The report shall contain the 
     following matters:
       (1) An evaluation of potential risks or threats to United 
     States forces from acts of terrorism, civil unrest, limited 
     armed conflict, or attacks by paramilitary groups presently 
     occurring in south Lebanon, or similar or related potential 
     acts.
       (2) An estimate of the size of the United States armed 
     force necessary to deploy for the peacekeeping mission and 
     the types of military equipment and material necessary to 
     deploy for such mission, and an estimate of the near-term and 
     long-term costs of the deployment and of the performance of 
     the peacekeeping mission.
       (3) An analysis of the availability of the personnel, 
     funds, equipment, and other resources necessary for 
     performance of the mission.
       (4) An assessment of the potential effects of the long-term 
     assignment of a substantial United States armed force to the 
     Golan Heights on United States global war fighting and 
     strategic capabilities outlined in the Bottom-Up Review of 
     the Department of Defense prepared by direction of the 
     Secretary of Defense in 1993.
       (5) An analysis of the responsibilities resulting from, and 
     the implications of, a United States deployment on the Golan 
     Heights with regard to sharing strategic intelligence and 
     warning with Israel, Syria, or both Israel and Syria.
       (6) An estimate of the likely duration of the deployment 
     and the conditions under which the deployed United States 
     forces would be withdrawn from the Golan Heights.
       (7) An evaluation of alternatives that could make the 
     deployment unnecessary.
       (c) Unclassified Version Required.--The Secretary of 
     Defense shall submit to Congress an unclassified version of 
     any classified report submitted under this section.
       (d) Condition for Termination of Limitation.--(1) The 
     limitation on use of funds in subsection (a) shall cease to 
     be effective at the end of 30 days of continuous session of 
     Congress after the date on which Congress receives a report 
     under subsection (a) unless, within such 30-day period, 
     Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving deployment of 
     personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States to the 
     Golan Heights.
       (2) For purposes of paragraph (1)--
       (A) continuity of session is broken only by an adjournment 
     of Congress sine die; and
       (B) the days on which either House is not in session 
     because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day 
     certain are excluded in the computation of any period of time 
     in which Congress is in continuous session.

  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, the Senator from Wyoming has not been on 
the floor. Is this the pending business? Do I need to set something 
aside?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, the time has come for Congress to begin 
considering a range of issues having to do with the administration's 
apparent willingness to see United States forces deployed on the Golan 
Heights as part of the Middle East peace settlement.
  Mr. President, before any such commitment is reached or finalized, 
Congress and the American people deserve to be consulted and informed.
  So in this regard with respect to the administration and the 
Congress, I rise to offer an amendment that would require the Secretary 
of Defense, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to submit a 
report to Congress clarifying the most significant issues that should 
be addressed before consensus can be reached on this matter.
  My amendment would prohibit the expenditure of funds appropriated for 
their deployment until 30 days after the Congress receives this 
required report.
  My amendment makes no judgment regarding the merits of a United 
States deployment on the Golan Heights, or the return of this territory 
by Israel to Syria. That is not the business of Congress, and it is not 
the intention of the amendment. It is not intended either to inhibit or 
to promote any particular outcome in this regard. It simply requires 
that the Congress be given information that it needs to be a genuine 
participant in the formulation of U.S. policy in this area.
  My amendment would not only satisfy Congress' need for information 
but it is consistent with the administration's recently released policy 
on peacekeeping operations.
  According to the White House report on this subject, published in May 
of this year--Mr. President, I show for the benefit of the Senate this 
document called ``The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming 
Multilateral Peace Operations.'' According to this report on this 
subject, ``Congress and the American people must be genuine 
participants in the processes that support U.S. decisionmaking on new 
and ongoing peace operations.''
  Let me restate that. ``Congress and the American people must be 
genuine participants in the processes that support U.S. decisionmaking 
on new and ongoing peace operations.''
  If the President, and if the administration, meant these words, if 
they are to have any meaning at all, my amendment should be welcomed at 
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.
  The questions in my amendment require the Secretary of Defense, or 
essentially those that are raised by the administration's own stated 
policy--again, according to its May 1994 report, when U.S. forces are 
involved in ``peace operations,'' the following factors are to be 
considered: Whether participation advances U.S. interests, and both the 
unique and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and 
are considered acceptable; whether personnel funds and other resources 
are available; whether U.S. participation is necessary for the 
operation's success; whether the role of U.S. forces is tied to clear 
objectives and an end point for U.S. participation can be identified; 
whether domestic and congressional support exists or can be marshaled; 
and, whether command and control arrangements are acceptable.
  In addition to these considerations, Mr. President, the 
administration's policy states that if there is a chance that U.S. 
forces may be required to engage in what they call ``peace 
enforcement''--that is, actually confront hostilities--the following 
factors must be considered: whether there exists a determination to 
commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly a defined objective; 
whether there exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively; and 
whether there exists a commitment to reassess and to adjust as 
necessary the size, competition, and disposition of our forces to 
achieve our objectives.
  Mr. President, it is my hope that the administration would view these 
factors as more than issues that need casual consideration. It is my 
hope that when they produced this document, they intended for it to be 
followed, that it was a statement of policy. Our experience in Somalia 
made clear that such considerations should be elevated to the level of 
requirements that must be fulfilled prior to U.S. engagement.

  In any event, Congress deserves to know how the administration views 
these matters prior to the deployment of U.S. forces as part of any 
peace operation. This is absolutely essential if these operations are 
to gain and sustain domestic support. And if we are to avoid in the 
future foreign policy fiascoes, such as those that have already taken 
place in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti, if the administration is serious 
about making Congress and the American people genuine participants in 
the processes that support U.S. decisionmaking on new and ongoing peace 
operations, they should then embrace my amendment. These are their 
words; this is their plan; this is their published policy. This is 
merely a reflection of that.
  Some have argued that it is premature to seek the kinds of answers 
posed by my amendment. Mr. President, I argue that it is overdue. 
Administration officials have publicly and repeatedly stated at 
congressional hearings, in speeches, and elsewhere, that the U.S. would 
be willing to send our forces to the Golan Heights as part of an 
Israeli peace settlement. Perhaps we will, and perhaps we should. But 
questions that the administration itself poses need to be answered, and 
Congress needs to be a participant. So the time is now for the 
administration to begin to make Congress what they wished in their 
policy--to be a genuine participant in this decision.
  In terms of timing, and whether it is premature to issue a report, 
let me note that my amendment does not require that a report be done by 
any date certain. It simply states that before any funds may be 
expended for deployment for U.S. forces, Congress must have 30 days to 
evaluate such a report. In this regard, the report could be submitted 
this year, it could be submitted next year; or any other time in the 
future, for that matter. This gives the administration time to consider 
evolving political and strategic circumstances. But, at the same time, 
it protects Congress' need for detailed information prior to the 
deployment of U.S. forces.
  Mr. President, it has also been argued that any amendment on this 
subject, even one that simply requests information, as does mine, could 
upset the delicate negotiations that are now ongoing. But, Mr. 
President, if the outcome of these negotiations is in any way 
contingent upon an American commitment to deploy Americans for the 
purposes of the Golan Heights, it is essential for the negotiators and 
for our own administration to know whether such a commitment is 
realistic and sustainable.
  The word of the United States is on the line. It has nearly been 
pledged, Mr. President, and it has been pledged without asking 
Congress, or informing Congress of the nature of the risk that may be 
taking place.
  Our commitment in the world must be a sustainable commitment, and in 
order for that to take place, Congress is entitled to know, and must 
know, what the risks are, what the benefits are, what our purpose is, 
how do we get in, and how do we get out. This type of an assessment is 
every bit as much in Israel's interest as it is in our own.
  The worst thing we could do for Israel, or the peace process, would 
be to make an unrealistic commitment, or to consider a deployment that 
is not up to the task. Before Israel is to withdraw from a 
strategically vital piece of land, it must know with certainty that the 
vacuum created will be filled. I have no objection to our being 
considered as the means, or part of the means, to filling that. But we 
who must pay for--in treasure and blood--the privilege of this, are 
entitled to know before making that commitment.
  We saw what happened in Somalia when the United States engaged our 
forces prior to adequately preparing them--or the American people, for 
that matter--for the challenges they would face. As the result of an 
American domestic outcry, they were withdrawn as quickly as they were 
deployed. We must not permit this to happen on the Golan Heights. No 
Israeli withdrawal would be preferable to one based on a hollow or 
unsustainable U.S. security guarantee.
  So, Mr. President, before the Congress and the American people are in 
a position to evaluate how realistic it is for the United States to 
make a commitment of its own forces as peacekeepers or peace enforcers 
on the Golan Heights, we must have the basic information requested in 
this amendment. The administration, again I say, should welcome this 
opportunity to put the horse before the cart; to put in place their own 
policy, which was stated in May of this year.
  So before our country and our people get into the business of 
guaranteeing the borders of friends and allies against hostile 
neighbors, we should think long and hard about the potential 
consequences of such an action. In this regard, I urge the Senate to 
recall comments made by Winston Churchill on the practical aspects of 
the Munich agreement of 1938, which consisted of a Franco-British 
guarantee on the border of Germany and Czechoslovakia. He remarked 
that:

       While a policy of guaranteeing foreign borders is always 
     hazardous, it may be justified in cases where the borders to 
     be guaranteed have just been strengthened.

  But as Churchill also noted:

       To make a border indefensible and then guarantee it is the 
     height of folly. The guarantor sponsors the deal primarily to 
     avoid military confrontation, but does so in a way that 
     ensures that any confrontation would occur on even more 
     unattractive terms. The interest of the guarantor becomes to 
     find every reason not to deliver on his pledge. This 
     encourages potential aggressors and dispirits the party whose 
     borders are guaranteed.

  Finally, when war comes, the guarantor must face the military 
realities he tried to avoid by sponsoring a militarily mindless 
diplomatic deal. We must never allow our close friend and vital ally, 
Israel, to be placed in such a situation. If adopted, my amendment 
assures us the process by which this would never happen. To our friend 
and ally, this is important; to our own people, this is important; to 
America's reputation in the world, this is important.
  I urge adoption of my amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I understand Senator Wallop's concern that 
the Congress be fully consulted before making a commitment to deploy 
U.S. military forces to the Golan Heights. I believe, however, this 
amendment is premature, based primarily on the strong, strong letter I 
received from Secretary of State Warren Christopher, dated June 24, 
1994. He notes that since the Madrid conference of 1991, successive 
U.S. administrations--not simply the Clinton administration, but also 
the Bush administration--have assured Israel and Syria that the U.S. 
would be prepared to help guarantee border security arrangements in 
support of an Israeli-Syrian agreement.
  The Secretary goes on to say that it is clearly premature to be 
discussing this issue prior to a formal request, which has not been 
made.
  He then states:

       In the event we are requested to play a role in the issue 
     of border security, such a request would be considered only 
     after full consultation with the Congress and in accordance 
     with our constitutional processes.

  The Secretary requests that we avoid legislation which has the effect 
of prohibiting U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations in the 
Golan, which the Wallop amendment would do.
  Mr. President, in light of Secretary Christopher's announcement that 
no formal request of the United States has been made to date and that 
any such request would be considered by the administration after full 
consultation with the Congress, I really do not believe this amendment 
is required. Although I can see a downside to the amendment, I do not 
see really an upside to the amendment.
  It may not do any harm, but it could. I believe it is much better to 
face this question when that question properly arises and we do have 
the assurance of the Secretary of State that the Congress would be 
fully consulted on this matter, and in his own words such a request 
would be considered only after consultation with the Congress and in 
accordance with our constitutional processes.
  Mr. WALLOP. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. NUNN. I am glad to yield for a question.
  Mr. WALLOP. Apparently the Secretary or his people have not read the 
amendment that is stated. This does not prohibit nor does it have the 
effect of prohibiting U.S. participation, and it does not ask for the 
report to be made directly or in any other time. It merely says that 
before such a commitment is made, that the Congress receives the 
report, be fully consulted, and that the funds be fenced for 30 days. 
It requires the United States to do nothing today or tomorrow. The 
timing of it would be entirely up to them. It prohibits nothing. Would 
you agree with that by reading the amendment?
  Mr. NUNN. I would say to the Senator from Wyoming, the way I read the 
amendment, it does require a report, and a rather narrow report.
  Mr. WALLOP. But at no particular time, is that not the case? Just 
prior to the commitment to deploy these troops, is that not the case?
  Mr. NUNN. Let me just read the amendment because that is the best 
evidence. It says:

       None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for the 
     Department of Defense by this or any other Act may be 
     expended for support of any deployment of personnel of the 
     Armed Forces of the United States to the Golan Heights as 
     part of a multilateral peacekeeping force, as a unilateral 
     peacekeeping force, or in conjunction with a peace agreement 
     between Israel and Syria that results in the withdrawal of 
     the Israeli Defense Force from the Golan Heights until the 
     Secretary of Defense submits to Congress, in consultation 
     with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a written report on a 
     potential deployment and the limitation in this subsection 
     ceases to be effective by operation of subsection (d).

  And then subsection (d) says here ``Condition for Termination of 
Limitation'':

       The limitation on use of funds in subsection (a) shall 
     cease to be effective at the end of 30 days of continuous 
     session of Congress after the date on which Congress receives 
     a report under subsection (a), unless, within such 30-day 
     period, Congress enacts a joint resolution disapproving 
     deployment of personnel of the Armed Forces of the United 
     States to the Golan Heights.

  And it goes on to state that if the continuity of session is broken, 
and so forth.
  I would say to the Senator that this does not preclude, as I read the 
amendment, the deployment of peacekeeping forces. But what it does is 
it sets up a potential obstacle to that and it sets up a thorough 
report.
  Frankly, I think all the information in the report is relevant and 
would be something we want in a normal process of consultation. I would 
have to talk to him, but I would think the State Department and the 
Secretary of State would be reluctant to set up something that appeared 
to be a hurdle in the eyes of those who are struggling in the Middle 
East to make peace and to come to some agreement between Israel and 
Syria, because someone in the Middle East might not read the amendment 
the same as we would read it here and might say, well, if it has to go 
to Congress and Congress has 30 days, if we go out on the limb and make 
an agreement that we may very well end up having the role played by the 
United States blocked by the Congress.
  I think it is the misreading of this amendment in the Middle East 
that would be the most dangerous side of the amendment.
  I do believe that the information that the Senator has asked for is 
all relevant information and would be things that we would have to 
consider.
  I just urge our colleagues not to pass an amendment like this that 
could be misread by people in the Middle East who are, particularly in 
Israel, going out in terms of their effort to secure peace and a 
settlement.
  I just would not want it to be misread or anyone to think that the 
Congress of the United States was saying, at 9:30 at night, with very 
little consideration of this on this bill, that we are basically posing 
an obstacle to them getting some kind of settlement, which we all hoped 
for over the years.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for a question, 
surely there should be a hurdle. Surely the President of the United 
States should not be able, without consulting the Congress and without 
giving us some means of controlling that commitment, to commit U.S. 
forces to a situation of extraordinary danger without such a report in 
our hand and without the ability of the Congress to act on it.
  I mean, that is not inconsistent with anything I have ever heard the 
distinguished chairman say about the commitment of U.S. forces. It is 
not meant to say that we cannot negotiate such a thing, but it is meant 
to say that we do follow what the President himself, in his report, 
said we should follow.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I understand where the Senator is coming 
from. I understand his concerns. But, given the assurances of the 
Secretary of State, I just do not believe this amendment is necessary. 
I believe it could cause problems, and I do not see the necessity of 
it.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one more 
question?
  Mr. NUNN. I am glad to yield for a question.
  Mr. WALLOP. Does the Secretary of State set forth a procedure in 
there by which the Congress can act before this commitment is made 
permanent?
  One of the things that worries me is that the Secretary of State, the 
President of the United States, and others, have acted as though this 
commitment has already been made. But if the Secretary of State lays 
down the procedure by which we can act before the commitment is 
ultimately made, perhaps that is all right, but I did not detect it.
  Mr. NUNN. I think the Senator makes a correct point there. I do not 
think the Secretary lays down any detailed procedure here. I do think 
he makes a firm commitment and he makes it very clear that they are 
going to basically consult with the Congress and not make anything 
effective until such time as Congress has been completely consulted.
  I cannot conceive of that mission being undertaken by our country, 
signed off on by the President and Secretary of State, without 
extensive consultation and advanced consultation with Congress. But 
exactly how the consultation will take place, no; the Secretary does 
not say that.
  Mr. WALLOP. In fact, I would say that I can conceive of it because 
they have been saying it, and that is one of the reasons.
  This is not meant to prohibit either the President or the Secretary 
of State or the United States from entering into an agreement and a 
commitment. It is only to ask the President and his Secretary of State 
to fulfill the promise they made to the American people in the report 
of May of this year.
  Mr. NUNN. I understand the Senator's position on that, and I think 
that I believe he is reading the amendment that way. I am just not at 
all sure it will be read that way around the world.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I want to respond to the Senator from Wyoming and the 
amendment that he has proposed.
  We are talking at a time when two countries that have been at war 
since 1948, over 45 years, seem to be talking--though not directly; 
through intermediaries--about making peace.
  It is possible that peace is overtaking the area. But the steps we 
see day to day--the arrangement with the PLO, the possible conclusion 
of an agreement with Jordan--each one of these steps is a step over a 
chasm. And when we talk about having a condition put down before an 
agreement can be executed, it lends another moment of instability.
  In my view, the Senator from Wyoming, in terms of the process, is not 
incorrect. I think that we should be consulted before troops go out. I 
think we ought to know about the extent of harm that might befall our 
troops. I think we ought to get a better idea how long we may be 
committed to an action.
  But, Mr. President, there is no treaty. This is certainly premature. 
The Secretary of State says so.
  I have a note from Senator Pell, who asks that we include his 
statement in the Record. Senator Pell is the chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee. He says:

       I oppose this amendment, which could have a very negative 
     impact on U.S. foreign policy interests in the Middle East. 
     The amendment would prevent the use of DOD funds--

  And he describes what the amendment would do. In the next paragraph 
he says:

       This amendment is unnecessary; President Clinton has 
     already committed in writing to consult with Congress before 
     making any commitments to Syria or Israel in a peace accord.
       Moreover, the amendment prejudges the outcome of the 
     Syrian-Israeli peace talks * * *
       It might also diminish the incentive for the Syrian 
     Government to sign a peace agreement * * *

  Mr. President, just to be sure, I will submit this statement for the 
Record so that there is not any editorializing or paraphrasing by 
myself.
  I ask unanimous consent to print Senator Pell's statement in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

        Amendment on the Use of U.S. Troops in Golan Settlement

       I oppose this amendment, which could have a very negative 
     impact on U.S. foreign policy interests in the Middle East.
       The amendment would prevent the use of DoD funds to support 
     the deployment of U.S. troops to guarantee a Syrian-Israeli 
     peace agreement, unless the Secretary provides certain 
     information to the Congress.
       This amendment is unnecessary; President Clinton has 
     already committed in writing to consult with Congress before 
     making any commitments to Syria or Israel in a peace accord.
       Moreover, the amendment prejudges the outcome of the 
     Syrian-Israeli peace talks and would have very significant 
     consequences in the Middle East. It would send a negative 
     signal to the Rabin government in Israel, which has made 
     courageous sacrifices in seeking peace with its neighbors.
       It might also diminish the incentive for the Syrian 
     government to sign a peace agreement with Israel.
       Finally, I would note that neither Syria nor Israel has 
     asked the United States to send troops to the Golan Heights. 
     If we pass this amendment, we would be limiting U.S. options 
     before any proposals are even on the table.
       There is no compelling reason to pass this amendment now, 
     but in light of the reasons I just outlined, there are a 
     number of good reasons to defeat it. I therefore urge my 
     colleagues to vote against the amendment.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Senator Pell says:

       Finally, I would note that neither Syria nor Israel has 
     asked the United States to send troops to the Golan Heights. 
     If we adopt this amendment, we would be limiting U.S. options 
     before any proposals are even on the table.

  Mr. President, I think that pretty well describes it.
  There is all kinds of symbolism attached to discussions that go on in 
the Middle East, and anything that suggests a precondition or a 
condition that is not part of a discussion I think could be very 
upsetting.
  I think that this is a poor time. We are at the current hour on a 
Friday night before the Independence Day holiday. It is obvious, by 
virtue of the votes that have been taken here now, that we do not have 
a full complement of Senators here. Many people felt that we would not 
have any further votes.
  But whoever does remain ought to certainly take into account that we 
have an opportunity to witness an incredible peace agreement being 
initiated, and we ought not to interfere in any way. This suggests that 
there is a kind of a precondition by structuring permission to have to 
be obtained before we can participate. I think we ought to be hands 
off, except for whatever we can do behind closed doors to help the 
process. I think it would be a negative influence. I think it is poorly 
timed, and I hope that we will be able to defeat this amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I join the distinguished Senator from 
New Jersey. I wish I did not have to, because I believe that the 
Senator from Wyoming has nothing really but the best interests in his 
heart in wanting to put forward this legislation.
  I do believe that it effectively sets up a series of questions, many 
of which are not answerable in advance, and all of which could cause 
serious problems right now.
  There are many in the Middle East who, kindly put, are mischief 
makers to the peace process. I think specifically on pages 2 and 3, 
subsection 1, 4, and subsection 5 present the real opportunities for 
mischief to be made to really delay what is the most pivotal peace 
process in the Middle East, that between two longstanding enemies, 
Syria and Israel.
  How can one really evaluate the potential risk or threat from acts of 
terrorism? If they say this is a criteria, clearly there are those that 
will go out of their way to show that they can in fact commit acts of 
terrorism.
  Even without this we have had acts of terrorism in the United States 
at the World Trade Center. I think, in a sense, this resolution could 
precipitate some things that are better left unprecipitated.
  It seems to me that even to have to state the degree to which one 
would utilize intelligence information and implications of utilizing 
that intelligence information is something that one does not know prior 
to any kind of military maneuver.
  If one is smart, you use intelligence and you use it fast and you use 
it wisely and you use it well and that is part of a military 
commander's decision. I do not really believe it should be the decision 
of the Senate of the United States.
  I think that at this time, and particularly this weekend, with Mr. 
Arafat going to Gaza, with the unpredictability of both sides to the 
reaction of the trip, for us to pass a resolution that has this kind of 
scope and could be possibly provocative would be a terrible mistake.
  I do want to thank, though, the Senator from Wyoming. I do know he 
means well and I do know this is put forward in a most sincere way. 
But, regretfully, I would strongly oppose this resolution.
  I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, with all due respect to the sponsor of the 
amendment, I could not help but think earlier this week when I read an 
op-ed piece in the New York Times just about the time the foreign 
operations bill was on the floor that we might see an amendment of this 
nature. And I thought it would be precipitous at best to have this 
amendment on the foreign operations bill or the defense authorization 
bill.
  We are talking about prejudging what might or might not happen as we 
go forward in the Middle East to bring about a real peace settlement.
  I yield to nobody in my antipathy toward the country of Syria. I feel 
it is a terrorist nation, a nation that trained, protected, and helped 
the terrorists who blew up the Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 
almost 250 brave Marines, during, incidentally, a time that the 
toughest, most hawkish administration since I have been in the Senate 
was in office. Yet the White House gave strict orders that the sentries 
should not even have live ammunition in their weapons; the same hawkish 
administration that made sure that the things that might have protected 
those Marines were not in place, tank traps and so forth.
  But, be that as it may, Syria was involved in the murder of those 
Marines.
  But, we have finally the possibility of peace in the Middle East. We 
have seen years of efforts at peace by both the Israelis and the 
Palestinians finally begin to bear fruit. I cannot believe there is any 
Member of this body that does not believe today that the Prime Minister 
of Israel and the Chairman of the Palestinians, Mr. Arafat, have really 
taken an historic step, not to make themselves friends of each other, 
because they never will be. Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat 
will never be friends. They will probably never really trust each other 
and they will never forgive each other.
  But they are making it possible for the children of Israelis and the 
children of Palestinians to live in an era when there may actually be 
peace, when there may no longer be the fear that they will die simply 
because they are Israelis or they are Palestinians.
  Should we not, as a country that has been more involved in that part 
of the world than any nation on Earth, stand ready to help the parties 
in any way that we can to bring about lasting peace, not just for the 
generations in power on either side today, but for the children that 
will be there tomorrow and into the next century?
  Should we not, as the United States, a country that spends tens of 
billions of dollars, plus so much of our efforts, diplomatic, strategic 
and otherwise in that area, should we not do everything possible to 
help them? That means not closing any doors in advance.
  The Senator from New Jersey is right. The Senator from California is 
right. Let us not close doors before those doors are even opened. Let 
us not put locks on doors that might be opened in the future.
  That is for the parties to decide. And when they do, then, if the 
United States is to play a role, let them come to us at that time and 
then let us decide, as a great and powerful Nation and one with so much 
of an interest here--let us decide then on the facts before us what we 
are going to do. But let us not make the decision tonight at 10 minutes 
of 10 on a Friday night when already one-fifth of the Senate has left 
this body to go back to their home States.
  There is no treaty between Syria and Israel. So we cannot decide 
today about a multilateral peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights. We 
cannot say to the parties that are there that we are going to close off 
any options before we are even asked to be involved. If we are asked to 
be involved--and I think both the Senator from Wyoming and I may well 
agree on this--if we are asked to be involved I believe it is a 
legitimate question for the U.S. Senate, whether we should be involved.
  I suggest it would be good for our country and our administration for 
us to stand here and debate that issue. But we have not been asked.
  Mr. President, I suspect most of the people who are here listening to 
this debate in the galleries or back home do not realize that we have 
American troops in a peacekeeping force in that part of the world. When 
Egypt and Israel signed what was a historic document, a peace treaty--
again not signed because both sides loved each other, but because they 
saw the benefits of peace--we sent American troops there who have 
stayed there. And it worked. It worked because both sides knew those 
American troops were a tripwire as much as anything else. And we have 
spent so much of our efforts, so much of our time bringing the parties 
this close together. Let us not close off any option.
  I will have some very strong views on this floor if we are asked to 
trust the Syrians or do anything with them. But until that day comes 
let us not reject any options.
  So, Mr. President, as the distinguished Senator from Georgia, my good 
friend with whom I have served now for 20 years knows, a number of 
these amendments that were not on my foreign operations bill, were 
going to be on his--or vice versa. I would say to my good friend from 
Georgia, that he got this one. But he also got my speech which I would 
have given in opposition to it, had it been on my bill.
  I yield to my friend from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. I would say based on world events, there will be some of 
these left over to you when we get your bill back up.
  I do not want to cut anyone off but I know people in their offices 
and people who are trying to get out of town--either tonight or early 
in the morning--would like to bring this debate to a conclusion because 
this is the last amendment that, I believe, is going to be contested.
  I think we have about 10 or 12 other amendments being worked out. I 
believe most of those can be worked out. I think after this vote we 
will be able to basically tell people--depending on what the leader 
wants to do on final passage--there will be no more votes.
  We may have a vote on final passage but that will not take long.
  So I would say to my friend from Wyoming, I do not want to push him 
because I know this is an important amendment. But if he is about ready 
to bring this debate to a close I will give him the final word here. I 
do not know if the Senator from Michigan wants to speak.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I do not have long. I would like to answer 
some of the points that were brought up.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming is recognized.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I particularly thank the Senator from 
California for realizing that, in the view of the Senator from Wyoming, 
this is a pro-Israel amendment.
  Mr. NUNN. Could I ask my friend from Wyoming, if he would be willing 
to vote at 10:15? That will give 20 minutes.
  Mr. WALLOP. Yes. Absolutely. That is longer than I need.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Mr. NUNN. There are some people who need to get back here. Is there 
objection to voting at 10:15 by anyone here on the floor? If not--I do 
not see anyone who objects--I ask unanimous consent that the vote on, 
or in relation to, Senator Wallop's amendment occur at 10:15 p.m., with 
no second-degree amendments in order thereto, and that the time between 
then and now be equally divided between Senator Wallop and myself.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Wyoming is recognized.
  Mr. WALLOP. On the 28th of June in the New York Times, Abe Rosenthal, 
a friend of mine, had a column called ``Americans on the Golan: Will 
Congress Debate the Issues?'' I will just read three short paragraphs 
from it.

       There are two issues. The second is whether it is wise to 
     commit U.S. troops as peacekeepers to the heights, one of the 
     world's more dicey pieces of strategic real estate.
       But first to be decided is whether Congress has not only 
     the right but the obligation to study the risks and benefits 
     beforehand.

  It goes on to say,

       Essentially--but sending U.S. troops to the edgy Golan is 
     American business. Recent history shows that it is far better 
     now for the U.S. and its allies if the American public has a 
     good idea of what it is getting into. That happened before 
     the Persian Gulf--but not before Vietnam.
       If I were an Israeli, I think I would oppose asking for 
     U.S. troops. Israel's strength as a small ally is that it has 
     not asked that foreign lives be put at risk for Israel.
       Inevitably, the payoff for an American detachment on the 
     heights would be loss of Israeli freedom of action for the 
     kind of military pre-emption that has helped protect the 
     country so far.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the entire piece be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                [From the New York Times, June 28, 1994]

                         Americans on the Golan

                          (By A.M. Rosenthal)

       This is the time for Americans and Israelis to start 
     talking in their own countries about whether American troops 
     should be stationed on the Golan Heights.
       That was the opening of this column on Nov. 30, 1993. Now 
     the Clinton Administration says it expects to send U.S. 
     troops to the heights as part of an international force if 
     Syria and Israel come to a peace agreement. But still there 
     has been no debate in Congress and none scheduled.
       There are two issues. The second is whether it is wise to 
     commit U.S. troops as peacekeepers to the heights, one of the 
     world's more dicey pieces of strategic real estate.
       But first to be decided is whether Congress has not only 
     the right but the obligation to study the risks and benefits 
     beforehand.
       Israel's Labor Government wants peace with Syria quickly. 
     Over a few years, Israel would turn back the mountain ridge 
     and high plateau from which Syria fired down on Israeli 
     villages for 20 years--until Israel captured the Golan in 
     1967.
       The present Israeli Government feels that prize of peace is 
     worth the risk. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin believes that 
     peace with hard-line Syria could open the way to peace with 
     many more Muslim countries.
       The Syrians stall--unwilling to give the full diplomatic 
     recognition Israel demands, even for those coveted heights on 
     the road to Damascus. But one day President Hafez al-Assad is 
     likely to grab the deal, a bargain.
       Israel tells him that its political clock is running out. 
     Israel will hold an election in 1996 and campaigning 
     will start in 1995. Many Israelis oppose giving back the 
     heights. The Labor Party wants to put the heights 
     controversy behind it by campaign time.
       None of the three governments involved want a Congressional 
     debate about U.S. troops. Whatever President Assad knows 
     about public discussion he detests. And, like most American 
     governments, the Clinton Administration prefers to present 
     diplomatic done deals before getting involved in 
     Congressional headaches.
       For the Israeli Government, a U.S. commitment about troops 
     is critical to rounding up Israeli voters. So Israeli 
     officials and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
     argue hard against Senate legislation, expected to be 
     introduced this week, to order a Defense Department study 
     before a commitment is made.
       The report would include assessments of how large the U.S. 
     force might grow, the risk that Iranian-paid Holy War 
     military groups in Lebanon would target American soldiers, 
     possibly with secret Syrian approval, and how long the 
     American commitment might last.
       Israeli Laborites see this movement for debate as coming 
     from Israeli and American opponents of the current peace 
     negotiations. To some extent that is true. But it also comes 
     from U.S. friends of Israel simply concerned about the impact 
     on U.S.-Israeli relations if American troops take serious 
     casualties under a commitment made without advance 
     Congressional backing.
       I think Israel should be getting much more than handshakes 
     and promissory notes from Arab nations in exchange for land. 
     But I also think that any risk Israelis take for peace are 
     essentially up to them.
       Essentially--but sending U.S. troops to the edgy Golan is 
     American business. Recent history shows that it is far better 
     now for the U.S. and its allies if the American public has a 
     good idea of what it is getting into. That happened before 
     the Persian Gulf--but not before Vietnam.
       If I were an Israeli, I think I would oppose asking for 
     U.S. troops. Israel's strength as a small ally is that it has 
     not asked that foreign lives be put at risk for Israel.
       Inevitably, the payoff for an American detachment on the 
     heights would be loss of Israeli freedom of action for the 
     kind of military pre-emption that has helped protect the 
     country so far.
       As an American friend of Israel, I am queasy about Israel 
     becoming more dependent on the U.S. On an issue of this 
     importance, Congressional discussion could clear up 
     legitimate doubts, or confirm them.
       Israel and Americans who oppose Congressional consideration 
     will probably win--a bad victory. Today, the movement for 
     debate comes from American friends of Israel. If that is 
     blocked, some soon tomorrow the demand will come from her 
     enemies.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, one of the reasons why I raise this is 
because, notwithstanding the claims of the Senator from Vermont and the 
Senator from New Jersey and others that it is premature--on the 14th of 
June, in front of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, Robert Pelletreau said, ``I 
think it is fair to say at this point that an international presence on 
the Golan, as part of security arrangements, is envisaged. And I think 
there is a large expectation that the United States will be part of 
that international presence.''
  These are not daydreams of the Senator from Wyoming, these are 
statements from this administration.
  I would say to the Senator from Vermont, the last I looked this was 
the defense authorization, and the last I thought, that this was the 
place where you dealt with the commitment of U.S. troops and 
expenditure of U.S. funds?
  Mr. LEAHY. If the Senator will yield briefly?
  Mr. WALLOP. Actually, I will yield on time not allotted to me.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time, so we can keep track?
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield 30 seconds to the Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. The fact is, this amendment was going to come up in the 
foreign operations bill, had that bill stayed on the floor. We were 
told that it would. I am not suggesting that the Senator has no right 
to bring it up on this bill. I just think it is a mistake to bring it 
up at this time, prior to any request by either Israel or Syria for 
this kind of help.
  Mr. WALLOP. I thank the Senator for his clarification. I do believe 
that it is appropriate to be on the defense authorization because, 
after all, this is a moment in time when military capability, 
authorized by this, may or may not be committed.
  Mr. President, I am not trying to do anything that the administration 
itself has not said was its policy. But, one of the things I ask the 
Senate to consider is, when they say in their report of May of this 
year that participation in U.N. and other peace operations--in addition 
to the factors listed above, ``We will consider the following factors: 
Participation advances U.S. interests and both the unique and general 
risks of American personnel have been weighed and are considered 
acceptable.''
  For heaven's sake my colleagues, is it to be the view of those 
opposing this amendment that we ought not to weigh the unique and 
general risks to American personnel and consider them acceptable?
  This is not being put in play as a means of stopping the peace 
process. Far from it. But is anybody here to tell me that the 
negotiators are able to make a commitment of the United States before 
involving the Congress and before getting the sense of whether or not 
these things can take place?
  Mr. President, it is sincere and in Israel's interest that they be 
able to depend upon us if we commit. Surely the Senators from 
California, New Jersey, and others, will admit, that if the United 
States makes a commitment, we have to be able to be dependent in that 
commitment.
  In a democracy, how can it be that we can be dependable if we put off 
until the end the political commitment that is so necessary to sustain 
the military and a security commitment?
  In other words, we have somehow or another to find the means by which 
the word of the United States can be relied upon by all parties, and 
including having brought the Congress in prior to the time American 
blood is to be shed, or exposed.
  The Senator from Vermont was talking about, we are closing off 
options for the children of tomorrow having this opportunity. Of course 
they are going to have the opportunity, but is that opportunity to be 
guaranteed solely with American blood without asking the Congress in 
advance?
  If the commitment has not been made, there is no problem. Nothing 
happens. There is nothing. In fact, if they make the commitment, 
nothing happens until such time as they wish to duly send the troops, 
and then they have to answer the questions that the President himself 
has said are the policy of the United States.
  That is not too much to ask. It is only 30 days. Weighing the risks 
to Americans is in the interest of Israel; weighing the risks to 
Americans is in the interest of Syria; weighing the risks to Americans 
is in the interest of American families committing them. But most of 
all, the reputation of the United States is on the line when that 
commitment is made, and we cannot be blackmailed into it and sustain it 
in a democracy. We must be participants in advance.
  Nothing about this amendment has anything more than that. It does not 
prohibit peace negotiations, but surely it does not say that the 
negotiator of the United States is able to commit without getting the 
guarantees of political support and sustainability from the Congress of 
the United States.
  Mr. President, I retain whatever time I may have.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Michigan the 
remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LEAHY). The Senator from Michigan has 8 
minutes and 40 seconds under his control.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield to the Senator from New Jersey 4 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Michigan. I 
do not think I will need 4 minutes.
  But somehow or another, Mr. President, when a debate like this takes 
place, often it starts to go astray, and when it does, we begin to 
invite other things. I do not know who has an exclusive here on whether 
or not we are going to put our troops in danger and making judgments 
upon that.
  Every one of us has the right and the obligation to be certain that 
if we put our troops someplace, that we provide them with the material 
and the cover to take care of them. Unfortunately, sometimes we have 
not done that and the Senator from Wyoming is right to be on the alert.
  But, on the other hand, here is an agreement that has yet to be 
drawn, the inference drawn from a hearing in which a State Department 
representative says that there might be an international presence, and 
certainly the United States would play a part, in the judgment of that 
individual. Perhaps so.
  But we are here to protect the people's interest, and I have no 
problem in believing the President of the United States has enough 
judgment and enough character to stand up when he sends a letter from 
his Secretary of the Department of State and says that he intends to do 
that. Obviously that is not good enough word for the Senator from 
Wyoming.
  Nevertheless, we tread where we ought not. There is an agreement very 
carefully studied, very carefully negotiated that could fall apart at 
any moment, and bloodshed is not new in that area.
  Mr. President, the last thing we need to do is contribute to any 
instability, any uncertainty about what an agreement might look like. I 
would caution all of our colleagues here, let us stay out of this for 
the moment. The dialog has taken place; we understand it. Now we can 
vote upon it and make certain that everyone is aware, that the record 
clearly contains a concern about those whom we might station there, 
whom we might send there.
  But I do not think we ought to preempt a treaty unless we want to 
make this generic and say that any time we send our troops into 
conflict that there has to be consultation. There is something, for the 
information of all, called the War Powers Act that calls for us to get 
involved at a time when we expose our people to harm's way.
  But tonight it does sound--and I believe the Senator from Wyoming 
when he says he intends this to be friendly to Israel. I think what it 
has to be is friendly to the world and friendly to the United States, 
and we ought to make sure that our friendship exists by stepping out 
when it is not yet our turn to become involved. I thank the manager.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER [Mr. Wofford]. Who yields time? The Senator 
from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. How much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Five minutes and 10 seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. I yield myself 4 minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this resolution would introduce into the 
most delicate of negotiations a significant element of uncertainty. I 
do not think it is even too strong to say that this could--this could--
be a monkey wrench in negotiations which we have been trying to 
promote.
  Now why is that? We have a War Powers Act. We have procedures on the 
books. When American troops might be put in harm's way, we have a 
statute which has certain requirements in it. That applies everywhere 
in the world under all circumstances from the perspective of American 
law.
  Then, all of a sudden, precipitously, without any prior consideration 
by the committees that have jurisdiction, we have an amendment on the 
floor on a Friday night at 10 o'clock, when at least 20 Senators are 
not here and are not even aware of this, we have an amendment being 
offered which suddenly, in one place in the world, introduces new 
procedures, new hoops, new restrictions. The one place in the world 
where the negotiations for peace are probably the most significant of 
any peace negotiations going on now, at least to American security and 
American foreign policy and American interests; the one place in the 
world, in the Middle East, new procedures are introduced, a new 
restriction, a new requirement that can only be read as a complication. 
We have a process that applies everywhere in the world--it is called 
the War Powers Act--before the President of the United States can 
introduce troops when there is a prospect of combat.
  That is what the Congress has passed; that is the law of the land. I 
urge us to follow the strong recommendation of the Secretary of State. 
He has written Chairman Nunn a letter urging us--urging us--not to take 
steps that will make progress more difficult, and those are his words.
  He is referring to an amendment, which I think quite clearly is the 
amendment of the Senator from Wyoming, that would place restrictions, 
restrictions that are not placed on him otherwise, restrictions that 
the War Powers Act did not place on him, restrictions that are not 
placed on him anywhere else in the world but in the most difficult, 
delicate and, I believe, most important of all negotiations occurring 
at this time.
  So let us not place this restriction on funds. The Secretary of State 
has made a commitment in this letter that in the event we are requested 
to play a role--notice, in the event we are requested to play a role on 
the issue of border security, such a request would be considered only 
after full consultation with the Congress and in accordance with our 
constitutional processes.
  I ask unanimous consent that the full letter of Secretary of State 
Christopher be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                       The Secretary of State,

                                    Washington, DC, June 24, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: It has come to my attention that the 
     Senate may soon consider an amendment to the fiscal year 1995 
     Department of Defense authorization bill which may have the 
     effect of prohibiting United States participation in 
     peacekeeping operations in the Golan.
       The nature of border security arrangements in the Golan 
     must be decided by Israel and Syria, in the context of their 
     bilateral negotiations. Since the Madrid Conference in 1991, 
     successive U.S. Administrations have assured Israel and Syria 
     that the United States would be prepared to help guarantee 
     border security arrangements in support of an Israeli-Syrian 
     agreement, subject to our Constitutional process, and that 
     the Administration is willing to consider a U.S. force 
     presence on the Golan should the parties make a request. 
     Moreover, in the past the United States has participated in 
     arrangements such as the MFO in the Sinai which have been 
     instrumental in helping Egypt and Israel reach a lasting 
     agreement. Foreclosure of the option on a U.S. presence would 
     be perceived by both parties as a lessening of our support. 
     It would very likely cause a major disruption in the peace 
     process, since we would no longer be able to provide our full 
     support for security arrangements the parties may deem 
     necessary to underpin a peace agreement. Without the 
     possibility of such an assurance, a peace agreement may 
     simply not be possible.
       We ask that you take whatever steps are appropriate to 
     ensure that this issue is not included in this, or other 
     pieces of legislation. Notwithstanding our assessment that 
     such a proposal may raise grave Constitutional concerns 
     regarding the President's duties as Commander in Chief and 
     his authority to conduct foreign relations, it is clearly 
     premature to be discussing this issue prior to a formal 
     request. As co-sponsor of the peace process we must put 
     ourselves in the position to taking steps that will make 
     progress more difficult, or even block it entirely. In the 
     event we are requested to play a role on the issue of border 
     security, such a request would be considered only after full 
     consultation with the Congress and in accordance with our 
     Constitutional processes.
       With best regards,
           Sincerely,
                                               Warren Christopher.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I hope this amendment will be defeated if 
it is not tabled. It introduces an element of uncertainty and 
confusion, an element which does not exist in any other negotiations 
going on in the world from the perspective of this Congress. It applies 
only in the Middle East and only in the Golan Heights, and of all 
places where I would think we ought to be promoting negotiations and 
not adding new restrictions and allowing the State Department to play 
the kind of role that it is playing constructively to promote 
negotiations it should be in the Middle East. We should not be 
introducing this note of uncertainty which could end up to be a monkey 
wrench in critical negotiations.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There appears to be a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I yield myself the remainder of my time, 
which is?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Two and one-half minutes.
  Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, let me begin by saying that the Senator 
from New Jersey said that we have the obligation when we deploy our 
troops to provide them with material and cover, and, indeed, we do. But 
the greatest obligation we have as a nation is to provide them with a 
sustainable political commitment because no amount of material or cover 
is going to protect them once deployed if we do not have that here.
  Now, notwithstanding the arguments that have been made, this is less 
than the War Powers Act and is intended to be. And this is not an 
inhibition to further negotiations, nor is it intended to be. But this 
is a reflection of President Clinton's policy, and it is not to inhibit 
negotiations but, in fact, Mr. President, to enhance them because if 
our negotiator cannot make certain that his commitment can be 
delivered, that negotiator has nothing with which to negotiate.
  But more to the point, it is said ``in the event we are to play a 
role.'' That is a quote from the Secretary's letter. We do not have any 
requirement for the Secretary to do a single thing except in the event 
that we are to play a role. But in that event, Mr. President, we are 
entitled to know what the risks and the unique characteristics of the 
involvement are. That is all this amendment asks.
  Now, these are not new rules, as the Senator from Michigan said, and 
these are not new procedures. These are things which the administration 
has said are its policy.
  Now, are we to believe that the policy statement published in May of 
this year is not a reflection of the administration's policy? And, if 
not, when will we have the one that is a reflection of it?
  All this amendment seeks to do is to reflect what the Secretary of 
State, the Assistant Secretary of State, others--I believe the Vice 
President--have said in statements that there is a coming commitment of 
deployment of U.S. troops in the Golan.
  Now, if that is not the case, they should not be saying it. If it is 
the case, they should be preparing for it--nothing more, nothing less. 
This has no ulterior motive than to try to say that when the United 
States is prepared to give its word, it is prepared to back it up with 
a sustainable political commitment.
  Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of our time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I note the statement of the Senator from 
Wyoming that this is less than the War Powers Act.
  Now, if it is less than the War Powers Act, it is not necessary 
because we already have the War Powers Act. If it is more than the War 
Powers Act, it introduces that note of uncertainty here and here alone, 
which is going to be the disturbing influence in those negotiations.
  If it is less than the War Powers Act, it is not needed. If it is 
more than the War Powers Act, it is dangerous, and, in any event, it 
introduces an element of uncertainty and confusion into negotiations 
which need our support and do not need us to introduce an element of 
uncertainty.
  I yield back whatever time I have.
  Mr. WALLOP. Will the Senator from Michigan yield for just one 
question?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Regular order.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, does the Senator have a question he 
wishes to ask?
  Mr. WALLOP. I was merely----
  Mr. MITCHELL. I ask unanimous consent the Senator be permitted to ask 
the question.
  Mr. WALLOP. I will be very brief, Mr. President.
  I ask the Senator from Michigan or the chairman, is it not the case 
that no President of either party has ever engaged in the War Powers 
Act in a peacekeeping operation? That is why it is less and that is why 
it is relevant.
  Mr. NUNN. I would have to say to the Senator I cannot give him a 
precise answer on that tonight. I would have to go back and do some 
research. I would not want to venture on that one. I would say that I 
would take his word for it.
  Mr. President, I think we are ready to vote.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. NUNN. Certainly.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I am advised that this is the last 
amendment which will require a recorded vote, and that there will be no 
request for a record vote on final passage. I am going to ask that 
question now so that if no Senator responds, I will take that to mean 
there will be no recorded vote on final passage so that Senators can 
regard this as the last vote prior to the recess.
  So is there any request by any Senator for a recorded vote on final 
passage of the bill?
  Hearing no response, therefore, there will not be a request for a 
recorded vote on final passage, and we are going to final passage right 
away. I wish to make that clear. There will be a few amendments that 
will be accepted and not require recorded votes. So we are going on 
good faith here in attempting to accommodate as many Senators as 
possible. We will finish the bill tonight. It will be passed by a voice 
vote so that everybody has that understanding. Accordingly, this will 
be the last rollcall vote.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, are the yeas and nays ordered on the 
amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. They are ordered.
  The question now is on agreeing to amendment No. 2212.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. MITCHELL. I announce that the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Biden], 
the Senator from California [Mrs. Boxer], the Senator from Colorado 
[Mr. Campbell], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd], the Senator 
from Kentucky [Mr. Ford], the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], the 
Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Johnston], the Senator from Massachusetts 
[Mr. Kennedy], the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Kerrey], the Senator from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Kerry], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. 
Lieberman], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Metzenbaum], the Senator from 
Maryland [Ms. Mikulski], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. Pell], the 
Senator from Alabama [Mr. Shelby], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. 
Simon], and the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Wellstone] are necessarily 
absent.
  Mr. DOLE. I announce that the Senator from Utah [Mr. Bennett], the 
Senator from Missouri [Mr. Bond], the Senator from Colorado [Mr. 
Brown], the Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen], the Senator from New York 
[Mr. D'Amato], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Faircloth], the 
Senator from Texas [Mr. Gramm], the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. 
Gregg], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms], the Senator from 
Arizona [Mr. McCain], the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Murkowski], the 
Senator from Wyoming [Mr. Simpson], and the Senator from Pennsylvania 
[Mr. Specter] are necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Wyoming [Mr. Simpson] would vote ``yea.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 3, nays 67, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 187 Leg.]

                                YEAS--3

     Nickles
     Thurmond
     Wallop

                                NAYS--67

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bingaman
     Boren
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Danforth
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Grassley
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Jeffords
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mathews
     McConnell
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Smith
     Stevens
     Warner
     Wofford

                             NOT VOTING--30

     Bennett
     Biden
     Bond
     Boxer
     Brown
     Campbell
     Cohen
     D'Amato
     Dodd
     Faircloth
     Ford
     Gramm
     Gregg
     Helms
     Inouye
     Johnston
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Lieberman
     McCain
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Murkowski
     Pell
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Specter
     Wellstone
  So the amendment (No. 2212) was rejected.


                          free electron laser

  Mr. ROBB. I rise to engage in a colloquy with my colleague regarding 
the development of a high-average-power Free Electron Laser [FEL] at 
the Continuous Electron Beam Accelerator Facility [CEBAF] in Newport 
News, VA.
  As my colleague knows, CEBAF is a national nuclear physics user 
facility managed by the Southeastern Universities Research Association 
for the U.S. Department of Energy. Its mission is to enable members of 
the physics community to conduct frontier basic research in nuclear 
physics and supporting disciplines. CEBAF is a pioneer in the 
development of superconducting radiofrequency technology and uses the 
most advanced application of this technology in the electron beam 
accelerator.
  Through experimentation with this technology, CEBAF scientists 
discovered that it is particularly adaptable to driving high-average-
power free electron lasers. This discovery is important because the 
development of such a free electron laser could be tremendously useful 
to the military, science and industry. In fact, it has already 
undergone peer review and has passed with flying colors.
  The next step for CEBAF is to build and demonstrate an industrial 
laser which can be used to develop and test processes for 
manufacturing.
  Does my colleague from Georgia with his knowledge of the Technology 
Reinvestment Program believe that the CEBAF free electron laser is a 
project that could merit funding through the TRP?
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my colleague from Virginia that the CEBAF free 
electron laser project does indeed seem to be the very type of 
technology that the TRP was created to advance. I look forward to 
working with my friend from Virginia to ensure that this worthy project 
receives every consideration in the TRP competition.


                       a time for sound judgment

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I rise to comment on our policy toward 
North Korea and to discuss my vote on a recent amendment offered by the 
Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain]. I reluctantly opposed his amendment, 
and I would like to explain why.
  The McCain amendment raised a critical issue: what our government's 
policy should be in dealing with North Korea, a nation that has seemed 
bent on breaking its nuclear nonproliferation treaty commitments.
  And the amendment itself contained a good bit of common sense. 
Whatever new talks may occur, we should unquestionably be prepared to 
support our ally, South Korea, in deterring or even repelling an armed 
attack by North Korea. I would also urge that we should be vigilant to 
a fault in preventing the production and export of nuclear weapons by 
North Korea. Furthermore, if North Korea reneges on its 
nonproliferation treaty obligations, I would support the imposition of 
international sanctions.
  On the other hand, I find it troubling that so many of my colleagues 
feel compelled to engage in what could be seen as verbal saber 
rattling. I am concerned that so many need to second-guess the 
President at a very sensitive moment in our relations with Pyongyang.
  As the Senate debated Senator McCain's amendment, the Clinton 
administration was mounting a major diplomatic effort to secure support 
for economic sanctions against North Korea. Yet former President 
Carter, in another example of his willingness to work for the cause of 
peace, took on a very delicate parallel mission at the same time. There 
has been criticism of this trip and of President Clinton's policy. 
However, with hindsight, we see that the Administration may have been 
on the right track.
  The two Koreas are working to schedule a historic summit meeting to 
discuss the nuclear proliferation issue. North Korea has stated that it 
will allow international inspectors to remain on the job. And North 
Korea has offered to halt its nuclear development program.
  I do not think this means that the crisis is over. However, these 
steps may hint at an eventual resolution of the crisis in Korea.
  Lastly, let me echo the comments of Senator Exon, the distinguished 
chairman of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Nuclear Defense and Arms 
Control. He incisively argued against approving such a sensitive 
resolution without first having considered it at a Senate hearing. 
Equally remarkable, Senator McCain sought to attach his amendment to 
the Federal Aviation Administration reauthorization bill.
  There is a time for everything in its season. But this is the season 
for sound judgment, not ill-considered resolutions. Therefore, I was 
constrained to oppose the amendment.


                           amendment no. 2148

  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, earlier today the chairman and ranking 
member of the Armed Services Committee urged the Senate to accept an 
amendment offered by Senator Nickles which prohibits the Department of 
Defense from providing funds to any institution of higher learning 
which will not permit military recruiting on campus. A similar 
amendment was adopted by the House by a nearly 100 vote margin. The 
Nickles amendment had the sponsorship of a substantial number of 
Senators, including the ranking member of the committee.
   Mr. President, my colleagues should understand that this amendment 
was designed among other things to punish institutions which refuse to 
permit recruiting by the Department of Defense because it discriminates 
against individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation. It is a 
statewide policy in New York not to permit discriminatory practices and 
the State University of New York adheres to that policy.
  It was clear that Senate support for the amendment was--as in the 
House--overwhelming and that a rollcall vote would not alter the 
outcome. Particularly given the fact that the chairman and the ranking 
member of the Armed Services Committee urged the Senate to adopt the 
amendment. A lengthy debate would not have altered this foreordained 
outcome.
  I urged the authors of the amendment and the managers of the bill to 
accept a modification of the amendment which would exempt institutions 
which have acted pursuant to a mandatory statute, rule, regulation or 
court order. This would have permitted institutions to comply with the 
New York rule without becoming the victims of reprisal. But the 
sponsors of the legislation would not accept the modification.
  Some have argued that an institution which does not permit recruiting 
should not accept research funds. Nonsense. The Department of Defense 
discriminates in recruiting. So far as I am aware it does not 
discriminate in distributing research grants. Would not the New York 
State policy of refusing to condone discrimination apply to research 
grants as well as recruiting if they were awarded on a discriminatory 
basis?
   Mr. President, opposition to discriminatory policies in the military 
is widespread. It has been denounced by no less a stalwart than our 
most distinguished former colleague Barry Goldwater.
  I cannot but believe that we will revisit this issue. The legislation 
will not take immediate effect. It calls for regulations to be 
promulgated.
  The provision the Senate has adopted today will weaken our military. 
It will keep research funds out of the hands of some of the Nation's 
finest educational institutions.
   Mr. President, schools should not be punished for taking a 
principled stand on recruiting. Today my colleagues are compounding the 
error of excluding competent persons from the armed services by also 
withholding research funds from some of our most competent researchers.


                       federal procurement reform

  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise to commend Defense Secretary 
Perry for moving out on the regulatory side of procurement reform. 
Wednesday he signed a memorandum to the Department, directing the 
maximum use of commercial products and commercial specifications in 
future procurement actions. By the same token, he directed that the use 
of unique, detailed military specifications [MILSPECS] only be by 
exception. I applaud Secretary Perry for his courage and vision.
  The action Secretary Perry took is an important step in the 
continuing process of Federal procurement reform. This action was 
specifically recommended in February 1993 by the Acquisition Law 
Advisory Panel, chartered by language in section 800 of the fiscal year 
1991 Defense authorization.
  The Panel recognized that while many changes were needed in statutes 
to empower reform in the executive branch, the heart of acquisition 
reform ultimately lies in cutting through the underbrush of excessive 
regulation and specification that plagues the procurement system.
  Mr. President, there should be no illusion about how hard it is going 
to be to effect REAL procurement reform. But it is critical to quit 
talking about all the procurement horror stories and start taking 
action to prevent them. The time for action has come. Secretary Perry 
is uniquely qualified to take the necessary actions. Wednesday's memo 
demonstrates again his willingness to do his part. The House's action 
earlier this week to pass their acquisition reform bill shows that 
Congress is willing to do its part.
  This year both houses have now passed bills based in large part on 
the section 800 panel report recommendations. We are moving to change 
the body of federal procurement law to make it easier to contract with 
small and women-owned or controlled business, expedite contracting, and 
save time and money by buying commercial items, whenever possible.
  I hope that we can complete action on S. 1587, Senator Glenn's 
procurement reform bill, before the August recess. In doing so, we will 
be reinforcing Secretary Perry's commitment to buy commercial items and 
use commercial specifications.
  Certainly, there will be some cases where it is necessary for the 
government to use MILSPECS. In the case of a unique combat weapons 
system, which must operate under the harshest conditions, military 
specifications for many components can protect lives, as well as 
taxpayers' interest. But in the vast majority of Government 
procurements, the use of commercial products and commercial 
specifications is the most inexpensive and sensible choice.
  The Defense Department is the biggest purchaser in the Government, so 
the use of commercial items in Defense Department procurements has the 
potential to save billions of tax dollars. The market place and level 
of customer sales determine the quality and price of the product for 
the Government.
  No more will the Services have to pay for wasteful layers of 
bureaucracy and paperwork associated with the old MILSPEC system. We 
should see fewer $500 coffeepots and be able to buy cookies from the 
same distributor as the local market, instead of from those willing to 
cook from 20 pages of Government specifications.
  Secretary Perry has taken an important, indeed crucial step to 
implement our reform efforts, by making the procurement of commercial 
items and use of commercial specifications the FIRST choice. Hereafter, 
program managers will have to justify their need for noncommercial 
items and MILSPECS to higher-ups.
  The burden of proof will be on those who advocate MILSPECS, whereas 
in the past, it has been on those who advocated commercial 
specifications. I'm glad he stepped out on this issue and am confident 
that he and the DOD will lead the way on acquisition reform.
  Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, I rise to comment briefly on S. 2182, the 
fiscal year 1995 Defense authorization bill. First, I want to commend 
Senators Nunn and Thurmond for doing an excellent job of maintaining 
U.S. defense capabilities within tight budget restrictions. S. 2182 
authorizes $263.3 billion, $300 million below the President's request, 
but roughly in line with the limits imposed by the 1993 Budget Act.
  S. 2182 funds key modernization initiatives as well as a significant 
increase in military readiness accounts in an effort to ensure that our 
forces are properly trained and equipped to do their job. The bill also 
includes a 2.6 percent pay raise for military personnel, 1 percent 
above the budget request. I am pleased with this increase and believe 
it is necessary to provide the men and women of our armed forces with 
the adequate compensation they deserve.
  S. 2182 authorizes 1.526 million active duty personnel and 995,300 
reserves--over 2.5 million highly trained, capable, and motivated men 
and women dedicated to defending our country. They are equipped with 
the world's most advanced weapons, and we continue to modernize our 
forces. I am convinced that the military forces authorized in this 
legislation are strong enough to guarantee our security at home and our 
interests around the world.
  The committee has made an especially important decision to maintain a 
strong long-range bomber force and reject the sharp cuts in the force 
proposed in the budget. The Department of Defense budget request 
reduced the bomber force from the current number of over 190 total B-
52, B-1, and B-2s to 126. The core of the proposed cuts was a reduction 
of the B-52H force from 94 to less than 50. Cutting so many B-52's 
would leave us unable to fulfill the conventional requirements 
identified in the Bottom Up Review and the nuclear requirements 
necessary to retain a credible deterrent.
  The Pentagon's Bottom Up Review [BUR] identified a requirement for 
100 deployable heavy bombers for a major regional contingency [MRC]. 
The 126 total bombers proposed for fiscal year 1995 would not provide 
100 deployable bombers, meaning we could not even meet the requirements 
for one MRC, much less the two nearly simultaneous conflicts assumed in 
the BUR. In fact, the BUR recommended a total bomber force of up to 184 
aircraft. The fiscal year 1995 budget submission is not even close to 
this number.
  The most cost-effective way to maintain our bomber force capability 
is to retain more bombers, especially B-52's. The B-52H is reliable, 
flexible, and does not require multibillion dollar upgrades to be 
conventionally capable. Only the B-52 can deliver air-launched cruise 
missiles [ALCM's], the Have Nap precision attack missile, Harpoon 
antiship missiles, and 12 different types of sea mines. The B-52 can 
also be easily modified to carry advanced precision-guided munitions 
currently under development.

  In addition to its conventional mission, the B-52 plays a key role in 
our country's strategic nuclear deterrent. The B-52 is tasked to carry 
roughly a quarter of our Nation's strategic arsenal and is the only leg 
of the nuclear Triad that can easily be recalled and relocated. The 
administration has not fully recognized this nuclear role in its plans. 
Adm. Henry Chiles, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, expressed 
his concern with the proposed B-52 cut when he stated before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee in April, ``I * * * have concerns about future 
bomber force adequacy if B-52 numbers are severely reduced.'' I am told 
that STRATCOM would like to have 32 B-52's reserved for a nuclear role. 
We can only accomplish this if we retain more B-52's.
  The Senate Armed Services Committee has recognized the shortfall in 
the proposed bomber force and has taken strong action to retain our 
bomber capabilities. I commend the Armed Services Committee for its 
actions. The committee has retained the entire force of B-52's and 
required the Air Force upgrade them all to carry advanced precision 
guided munitions. S. 2182 also contains funding to acquire additional 
precision-guided munitions and to convert ALCM's to a conventional 
role, a move that will enhance the capability of B-52's. All of these 
actions will improve our capabilities in the near term, while more 
advanced munitions are being developed.
  I also commend the committee for including a provision requiring that 
all 500 Minuteman III missiles be retained until Congress has fully 
reviewed the final results of the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review [NPR]. 
It would be imprudent to take down our ICBM's prematurely, and any 
decision affecting the makeup of our strategic forces must involve 
Congress. I fully expect that Congress will be briefed and consulted 
prior to the release of final NPR conclusions. Personally, I believe 
that we should continue to maintain a land-based ICBM force as a part 
of the Nuclear Triad. Discussion of sharp cuts in the Minuteman III 
force should be delayed until START II is fully ratified and 
implemented.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I rise in support of S. 2182. The 
post-cold-war era has brought about tremendous changes in our security 
environment. Shaping our military forces to meet the new and the old 
challenges requires strong leadership of the type that the senior 
senators from Georgia and South Carolina have provided to the 
committee.
  As we draw down our military forces to the lowest levels since just 
prior to the outbreak of World War II, we must be mindful that the 
threats we face are still global in nature and that the readiness and 
training requirements of a smaller military must be more rigorous to 
meet the various threats we must face.
  Mr. President, I am very concerned that cuts in our defense spending 
will leave us with a military force structure that is incapable of 
conducting two major regional contingencies at the same time. This 
would be disastrous, not only for the United States, but also for our 
allies.
  Right now the United States has the 12th largest army in the world. 
We have never had the largest army in the world even though we do have 
the best. While I do not advocate that we have the world's largest 
army, I think it is useful to have some perspective that the world's 
12th largest army could find itself fighting a war in two or more 
places at the same time. That, without question, is demanding 
extraordinary capability from a very small force. We are quite 
fortunate, that we do have the world's best Navy, Air Force, and Marine 
Corps.
  Mr. President, despite recent well publicized attempts at personal 
diplomacy in Korea, the situation remains serious. North Korea's 
nuclear weapons program continues unabated threatening the peace and 
stability of the region. The U.S. Congress has a duty and an obligation 
to ensure that our forces stationed in Korea and those who may be sent 
there in the event of hostilities are well equipped and well trained.
  When Kim I1 Song launched the Korean war 44 years ago the first 
United States forces to arrive at the scene were under the command of 
LTC Brad Smith and they were known therefore as Task Force Smith. The 
soldiers of Task Force Smith were brave soldiers but were disastrously 
ill equipped, their antitank projectiles literally bounced off North 
Korea tanks and Task Force Smith suffered horrendous casualties. As the 
current military draw down began Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Gordon 
Sullivan recalled the dark days at the beginning of the Korean war and 
warned that there must be no more Task Force Smiths. By this he meant 
that never again should we send soldiers into combat unless they are 
well trained and properly equipped with the best weapons available.
  The tragedy of Task Force Smith was, in many respects, unfortunately 
repeated in Somalia in 1993, when the commander on the ground requested 
tanks and armored personnel carriers and his request was delayed and 
delayed here in Washington and never approved. As we learned in the 
hearings in the Senate Armed Services Committee, as a direct result of 
that lack of response to the request of the commander on the ground, 
soldiers did not have the equipment they needed when they had to fight.

  Today our forces in Korea are faced with a dangerous and uncertain 
threat. We must learn the lessons of Somalia and do all we can to 
ensure that there are no more Task Force Smiths and no more lapses like 
Somalia. In Korea, we must ensure that our commander has everything he 
needs to deter the North Koreans from starting another Korean war and, 
should deterrence fail, everything he needs to decisively defeat a 
North Korean attack. Nowhere do our forces face a greater likelihood of 
armed conflict than on the Korean Peninsula.
  Unlike Somalia, where the United States had no strategic national 
interests, Korea is important to the United States. South Korea is a 
long time ally and its security is critical to stability throughout 
Northeast Asia. And we must take firm action to assure that the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty is not ignored by North Korea. Nuclear 
proliferation in North Korea must not be tolerated or surely it will 
not stop there. A nuclear game of one upmanship will surely be 
provoked.
  There can be no higher priority than United States forces in South 
Korea. This time there must be no equivocation, and even if it is up to 
Congress, we must provide our forces in South Korea with everything 
they need.
  Mr. President, in closing, I must state my deep concern for the 
continued decline in our defense expenditures. I fear that we are 
repeating the mistakes made in the 1970's. Since 1985, our defense 
spending will decline by 40 percent in real terms by the end of the 
current 5-year defense plan. In my opinion, the primary responsibility 
of the Congress is to provide for the common defense. We must be 
careful that we not fail in our constitutional responsibility with 
regard to the defense of this Nation. I will support this bill today, 
but we must assess carefully next year if we are moving too fast in the 
downsizing of our military and are therefore hurting our readiness.
  Mr. President, on April 19, 1951, Gen. Douglas MacArthur appeared 
before a joint session of the Congress. One of the most memorable line 
from his address was, ``In war there is no substitute for victory.'' As 
we again face a potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula, we should 
remember that in peace there is no substitute for preparedness. Thank 
you, Mr. President.


             persian gulf syndrome: more research is needed

  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, it was almost 4 years ago that then-
President George Bush ordered the deployment of American service men 
and women to the Persian Gulf. And less than a year later, these 
soldiers were given a hero's welcome upon their return home. Kuwait had 
been liberated, and relatively few lives had been lost in the process.
  But the effects of the Persian Gulf War did not end there. Not for 
the men and women who are now disabled by illness.
  We have all heard about their ``mystery'' illness, which has become 
known as ``Persian Gulf Syndrome.'' Common symptoms include extreme 
fatigue, joint and muscle pain, short-term memory loss, diarrhea, 
unexplained rashes, night sweats, headaches and bleeding gums. In 
addition, women veterans have experienced chronic or recurring yeast 
infections and menstrual irregularities.
  So far, doctors have been unable to come up with a single diagnosis 
that would explain such a wide variety of symptoms.
  We do not know for sure why these veterans are ill. What we do know, 
however, is that they were potentially exposed to a wide range of 
toxins and environmental hazards during their service in the Gulf. The 
list includes possible exposures to: smoke from oil well fires set by 
retreating Iraqi soldiers; industrial chemicals and pesticides; 
depleted uranium used in munitions; diseases endemic to the Persian 
Gulf; vaccines to prevent anthrax and botulism; anti-nerve agent pills; 
and chemical and/or biological agents. One toxin alone could be causing 
these symptoms, or they could be the result of two or more toxins 
working together. At this point, we simply do not know.
  One thing is certain, however. More research on Persian Gulf Syndrome 
is needed.
  We must not sit by while veterans get progressively sicker. Instead, 
we must try to find out why they are sick and how we can best treat 
their illnesses.
  I do want to acknowledge that many research efforts are underway to 
determine the cause or causes of these illnesses. But I am not 
convinced that we are doing all we can to get to the bottom of this 
problem.
  Already, we know that two important types of research are needed. 
It's my hope that the Senate will approve funding for them today.
  First, we should authorize an epidemiological study of Gulf War 
veterans and their immediate family members. This will allow 
researchers to study their illnesses thoroughly, as well as consider 
whether these illnesses are being transmitted from veterans to their 
spouses and children.
  Second, we should authorize funding for research into the health 
effects of pyridostigmine bromide, an anti-nerve agent that was 
distributed to the almost 700,000 American soldiers who fought in the 
Gulf War. This drug was meant as a proactive response to the possible 
use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein.
  The issue we must investigate is this: is pyridostigmine bromide, a 
drug meant to protect against the health effects of chemical weapons 
exposure, actually a cause of the debilitating health problems our Gulf 
War veterans are suffering from today?
  Pyridostigmine bromide has long been used in the treatment of Graves' 
disease, a neurological disorder. However, it has not been proven to be 
safe or effective for repeated use by healthy persons under any 
circumstances.
  In order to administer this unapproved drug to almost 700,000 healthy 
soldiers, the Department of Defense obtained a waiver from the Food and 
Drug Administration. The FDA based its decision on two assurances from 
DOD.
  First, DOD pointed to ten years of military research as evidence that 
this drug is safe. Second DOD promised to inform all soldiers about the 
investigational nature of the drug and to administer it on a voluntary 
basis.
  We now know that the Defense Department's claim of safety was not 
supported by its own research. We know that our soldiers were not 
adequately warned about the risks of taking this drug. And we know that 
at least some soldiers were ordered by their superiors to take this 
drug.
  We know all this because of an extensive investigation by the staff 
of the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee into the use of pyridostigmine 
bromide during the Gulf War. The findings of this investigation were 
released during a Committee hearing on May 6.
  The Veterans Committee staff found that in almost all of the Defense 
Department studies cited as evidence of pyridostigmine bromide's 
safety, the subjects had been screened to weed out those who might be 
hypersensitive to the drug. Yet during the Gulf War, this drug was 
passed out indiscriminately to all soldiers, regardless of their 
medical makeup.

  The Veterans Committee staff reported other troubling findings: DOD 
scientists concluded that pyridostigmine may actually make individuals 
MORE vulnerable to certain chemical agents; Recent research indicates 
that when used in combination with pyridostigmine, the pesticide DEET 
becomes ten times more toxic than when it is used alone. DEET and many 
other pesticides were widely used during the Gulf War; and the side 
effects associated with use pyridostigmine are strikingly similar to 
the symptoms reported by ill Gulf War veterans.
  Clearly, the possible role of pyridostigmine bromide in the illnesses 
of our Gulf War veterans needs to be thoroughly investigated. 
Independent research into both the long-term health effects of this 
drug and the synergistic effects of pyridostigmine bromide and 
pesticides or other environmental hazards should be undertaken.
  Mr. President, I believe that authorizing more research into the 
health effects of Gulf War service is just one of the steps that the 
Congress should take to help these ailing veterans. Additionally, we 
must ensure that these veterans receive the health care and 
compensation that they deserve.
  Title 38 now guarantees Gulf War veterans free priority health care 
for conditions that may be related to toxic exposures during service. 
Unfortunately, many veterans have reported that this legal guarantee of 
care is often not adhered to by the VA in practice.
  Specifically, veterans have encountered VA doctors who do not give 
much credence to the possibility that their illnesses may be 
attributable to various toxins. They also report having to wait several 
weeks for a doctor's appointment and then several hours before they get 
to see that doctor. This clearly does not qualify as priority care.
  VA is working to change this, however. Secretary Brown recently 
issued a directive to all VA medical center directors that instructs 
them to provide Gulf War veterans with timely and compassionate care, 
to assist them in applying for a Persian Gulf health registry 
examination, and to provide medical staff with the latest information 
on Gulf War illnesses. The directive also contains a clinical protocol 
which is to be followed when a VA doctor is unable to diagnose a 
veteran's illness.
  Many Gulf War veterans are also having trouble paying their bills 
because they are too sick to work. Unfortunately, however, those 
veterans suffering from undiagnosed illnesses are not currently 
eligible for compensation from the VA.
  I recently introduced legislation to correct this problem. My bill, 
S. 2178, would require the VA to provide compensation to veterans 
disabled by undiagnosed illnesses which become manifest to a degree of 
ten percent or more within three years of leaving active duty. Further, 
it would specify that VA must pay this compensation until such time as 
it can show that a veteran's illness is unrelated to his or her Gulf 
War service.
  I wish to thank Senators Akaka, DeConcini, Campbell, Moseley-Braun 
and Kennedy for cosponsoring this legislation, and I invite our 
colleagues to join us in this effort.
  Finally, I know that many of my colleagues may be concerned about the 
cost of additionally research or of compensation for undiagnosed 
illnesses. In these days of tight budgets, this is an understandable 
concern.
  I would simply point out, however, that the costs of war do not end 
simply because both sides have put down their weapons.
  So again, Mr. President, we must not ignore the plight of our 
veterans who are suffering from ``Persian Gulf Syndrome.'' I hope that 
the Senate will fund the research required to get to the bottom of the 
debilitating illness and will provide ailing Gulf War veterans with the 
assistance they need and deserve.
  In 1991, they stood tall for freedom. It is time for their government 
to stand up for them.


                                  NATO

  Mr. LEVIN. Will the distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Armed 
Services yield for a question?
  Mr. NUNN. I yield to the Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. As the distinguished chairman is aware, the Subcommittee 
on Coalition and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services 
held joint hearings this year with the European Affairs Subcommittee of 
the Foreign Relations Committee. These hearings contributed excellent 
insights on the future of the NATO alliance and other important issues.
  Our plan this year was to have a short portion of the committee 
report devoted to these hearings. In fact the staff prepared an 
excellent summary of the hearings which was to have been incorporated 
into the report. Unfortunately, the language was inadvertently left out 
of the committee report. Would the distinguished chairman allow the 
NATO language to be printed in the Record as a part of the Senate 
deliberations on our bill?
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the distinguished Senator for bringing this to my 
attention. I would certainly support the Senator's recommendation.
  Mr. Levin. I thank the Chairman. I recommend that the following 
language be made a part of the Record:


                   North Atlantic Treaty Organization

       The committee has closely followed historic developments in 
     the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since the end 
     of the Cold War. In the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two 
     States, signed in 1990, the NATO allies and the members of 
     the then-Warsaw Pact (including the Soviet Union) declared 
     that they were no longer adversaries and affirmed their 
     commitment ``to refrain from the threat or use of force 
     against the territorial integrity or political independence 
     of any State.'' Russia and other former Soviet states 
     reaffirmed these principles in the 1992 Helsinki Summit 
     Declaration and subsequent CSCE documents.
       Last January, NATO heads of state approved President 
     Clinton's plan to further recognize the new political and 
     security realities in Europe with the Partnership for Peace 
     program. Many nations from the former Warsaw Pact, both 
     eastern European and former Soviet republics, have 
     enthusiastically applied to participate in the program, 
     viewing it as the road to greater security and economic 
     cooperation with the West. Partnership for Peace provides a 
     foundation for stronger, eventually permanent, political and 
     military ties between NATO and its eastern neighbors, without 
     drawing new lines to replace the old Iron Curtain. The 
     Partnership establishes a cooperative, work-oriented 
     relationship between the alliance and potential new members. 
     It provides an opportunity for current NATO member nations to 
     gain confidence in the readiness and ability of Partners to 
     fulfill the obligations and mutual security guarantees of the 
     North Atlantic Treaty through direct contact and practical 
     cooperation. NATO's openness to expanding its membership 
     eventually creates an important incentive for the newly 
     independent republics of eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
     Union to foster freedom and democracy.
       Recognizing that these developments have closely 
     interrelated security and political ramifications, the Armed 
     Services Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing 
     Forces has held joint hearings on the subject of NATO's 
     future with the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European 
     Affairs, soliciting the views of a broad range of policy 
     experts with many years of combined experience in European 
     security issues. While their views, and those of committee 
     members, vary on the proper timing for extension of full NATO 
     membership to other nations in Europe, all agree that much 
     work remains to build a solid, larger and more relevant NATO 
     alliance on this new foundation of the Partnership for Peace.
       The committee notes that while the public clearly 
     understood NATO's original mission of providing for the 
     common defense of western Europe, it has almost no knowledge 
     of NATO's role in the stability of Europe after the Cold War. 
     The changes to NATO's mission, pronounced at various 
     ministerial meetings in Europe, are distant echoes at best to 
     a public unattuned to alliance pronouncements and preoccupied 
     with economic problems, crime, and America's involvement in 
     Somalia. In recent years, the NATO infrastructure account, 
     which funds critical alliance projects essential to NATO's 
     integrated military force structure, has suffered from this 
     lack of attention to NATO's role in the stability of Europe 
     and the newly independent nations on its perimeter. The 
     committee strongly recommends the authorization of the full 
     $219.0 million requested by the administration to meet United 
     States obligations to the NATO infrastructure fund.
       With all of these factors in mind, the committee strongly 
     encourages the Department to work toward demonstrating 
     significant progress toward in the coming year, especially in 
     the following areas:


      Integration of New Democracies and Relationship with Russia

       The committee expects the Partnership for Peace program to 
     show substantial evidence of progress toward integration of 
     additional nations into the working structure of NATO. NATO's 
     charter provides procedures for the addition of new members 
     at any time upon the assent of current member nations. Even 
     as NATO's Members debate the precise timing of full 
     membership expansion, there can and should be concrete 
     progress toward integration of Partners through joint 
     activities and expanded consultation.
       The committee notes with approval the Administration's 
     efforts to encourage stronger bilateral ties between NATO and 
     Russia, especially at the military-to-military level, and 
     encourages the Department to pursue aggressively policies 
     that increase security cooperation and decrease competition 
     between the Alliance and Europe's largest nation.


                       multinational peacekeeping

       In addition to pursuing integration of nations through 
     Partnership for Peace, the committee encourages the 
     Department and its representatives to work through NATO's 
     institutions swiftly to modernize NATO doctrine and practice. 
     This effort has lagged since the adoption of new strategic 
     principles at the 1990 NATO summit in London, and the 
     adoption of a new strategic concept which recognized 
     ``increased opportunities for the successful resolution of 
     crises at an early stage.'' As former SACEUR General John 
     Galvin has observed, NATO declared its intention to move away 
     from the concept of forward defense and become more 
     multinational, more mobile, more flexible, more ready for 
     rapid response in time of crisis. The Alliance should be 
     ready to respond to situations requiring peacekeeping 
     operations, as well as humanitarian and natural disasters.
       The crisis in Yugoslavia has evoked historic responses from 
     NATO, including multinational enforcement of a blockade at 
     sea, a no-fly zone in the air and close air support for 
     United Nations forces on the ground. NATO has fired the first 
     shots in anger in its history and caused casualties. Whether 
     NATO's responses are viewed as insufficient or excessive, 
     they underscore the urgent need for further development of 
     the doctrine, procedures and new internal structure which the 
     London and Rome summits promised. These developments will, in 
     turn, require changes in NATO's operational capabilities, 
     command and control procedures, equipment and personnel 
     priorities. The concept of combined joint task forces, 
     recently endorsed by NATO, is an important step in the right 
     direction which should be fleshed out at the earliest 
     opportunity. Alliance action to prevent or respond to 
     aggression will continue to require, first and foremost, the 
     combined political will of many nations. But the committee 
     encourages the Department to provide strong leadership in 
     rapidly adapting NATO's institutions to conduct multinational 
     peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations more 
     effectively in the future, so that the Alliance will be ready 
     when there is political will to act.


                          fostering democracy

       The U.S. should also take a more urgent approach to using 
     NATO forums and related institutions to prevent ethnic and 
     regional unrest in Eastern Europe that poses a threat to 
     democracy and human rights on the continent, and could pose a 
     security threat to NATO allies of the United States. The 
     committee notes that the Partnership for Peace framework 
     agreement requires each participating nation to recommit 
     itself to the basic principles of respect for borders and 
     international law, adherence to internationally-recognized 
     standards of human rights and civilian control of the 
     military. As former CSCE Ambassador Max Kampelman has 
     testified, inaction by NATO at the outbreak of hostilities in 
     the former Yugoslavia severely undermined these principles. 
     The committee encourages the Administration to take into 
     consideration the demonstrated performance of each state in 
     making good on these commitments, and encourages NATO to be 
     willing to reduce or terminate its cooperation with a partner 
     state if its performance is lacking. Toward this end, the 
     Department should consider recommending that NATO seek a 
     periodic public accounting or report by the Council of 
     Europe, Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe, or 
     other monitoring body on the human rights and democratic 
     principles performance of partners.


                  advanced battery technology research

  Mr. KOHL. I would like to address a question to the distinguished 
chairman on the issue of advanced battery technology research. As he 
may recall, in the FY94 conference report to the FY94 Defense 
authorization bill, the conferees agreed that portable power is vitally 
important to the soldier in the field and they called for a strong 
program in battery research, with an emphasis on low cost, recyclable 
and pollution-tolerant battery systems. The following programs are 
central to that effort: the advanced non-metallic rechargeable battery 
system, the safe rechargeable battery for the SEAL Delivery Vehicle, 
low cost reusable alkaline batteries for Sincgars radio, low rate 
``AA'' lithium carbon monoflouride batteries for Navy applications, 
high rate ``AA'' lithium carbon monoflouride batteries for Army 
applications, the ``AA'' zinc air battery for military applications, 
and the no lead added zinc carbon cell.
  Mr. NUNN. I appreciate the Senator from Wisconsin drawing the 
Senate's attention to these vital programs. As the Senator may know, we 
have included funds in our bill for battery research.
  Mr. KOHL. I would like to urge the Chairman to give every 
consideration during the Defense authorization conference to the 
advanced battery technology programs I mentioned.
  Mr. NUNN. I agree that we need to ensure that we provide the services 
with the funds to develop the next generation of batteries, and I will 
work in conference to see that we fund those programs that are most 
essential to that effort.


   manufacturing technology for the advanced research projects agency

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I would like to address a question to the 
distinguished Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services. Would the 
distinguished Chairman agree that the $371.1 million the Committee has 
recommended for Manufacturing Technology for the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, (ARPA), $4.0 million is available for the Institute 
for Advanced Flexible Manufacturing Systems?
  Mr. NUNN. The distinguished Senator from West Virginia is correct, 
and I believe that the Department of Defense will continue this 
important program. It is my understanding that the Institute for 
Advanced Flexible Manufacturing Systems has been working with the 
Department of Defense for several years and that the department has 
been pleased with the results of the research conducted at the 
institute.
  Mr. BYRD. Will the distinguished Chairman work with our colleagues in 
the House of Representatives to ensure that this project is included in 
the conference report?
  Mr. NUNN. As the distinguished Senator is aware, we can never foresee 
the outcome of the conference. As I recall, however, this program has 
done well in the conference discussions in previous years and we will 
certainly give it every consideration this year.


           the electric and hybrid vehicle technology program

  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, as we debate the Department of Defense 
Authorization Act, I would like to take this opportunity to bring to 
the Senate's attention a part of this bill which has important 
implications both for the advancement of military technology, the 
defense conversion efforts of our industries and for better air quality 
for us all.
  The Electric and Hybrid Electric Vehicle Technology Program 
administered by the Advanced Research Projects Agency develops vehicle 
energy technologies. The purpose of this program is to support the 
development of electric and hybrid-electric vehicles and to explore 
their potential to enable the armed forces as well as the commercial 
sector to achieve energy cost savings and comply with environmental 
goals in a safe, affordable high performance vehicle. These are truly 
``dual use'' technologies, offering benefits for both the military and 
commercial markets.
  These technologies involve power generation such as fuel cells and 
free-piston engine generators with the capability of using multiple 
fuels, power control technologies that use advanced motor and 
controller designs; energy storage devices such as flywheels, high 
energy density batteries and efficient battery charging; and strong, 
affordable composites for use in vehicle manufacturing.
  These developments are what some scientists are calling ``spin-on'' 
technologies because progress on the civilian side to provide clean 
fuel vehicles also have military applications.
  By reducing the amount of heat given off by the propulsion systems 
and operating quietly on battery power, the electrically powered 
vehicles are expected to be less vulnerable to detection in combat 
situations. This could lead to nearly silent vehicles for use in 
scouting enemy terrain or armored personnel carriers without exhaust 
pipes to escape detection by infrared detectors. In addition, some of 
the more advanced weaponry in the future will require mass electrical 
storage.
  The goal for these military vehicles is to achieve ranges of 300 
miles using hybrid electric vehicle systems, which are a combination of 
electric and conventional fuels, while maintaining current speed, 
acceleration and other performance requirements.
  A company in Georgia has used an ARPA grant to develop a computer-
controlled battery charger that could provide faster charging for 
military vehicles in wartime and for commercial electric vehicles now.
  At McClellan Air Force Base in California, defense conversion 
companies and other high-tech companies are developing energy 
efficient, low cost and strong fiber composite materials for military 
and civilian vehicles. FMC Corporation, which built the Bradley 
Fighting Vehicle, is developing an electric drive test vehicle.

  There are many more examples coast-to-coast that I won't take the 
time to detail here. But it is important to remember that advances in 
electric vehicles is also important for non-combat military vehicles. 
There are more than 136,000 electric vehicles in the Air Force, Army, 
and Navy. That's more than a quarter of all vehicles in the federal 
fleet. Many of these operate in communities with severe air quality. 
Placing a significant number of such clean fuel vehicles in these 
communities would enhance our efforts to improve the environment.
  Mr. President, I would like to ask the distinguished Chairman of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee if he would be willing to answer 
questions, of a clarifying nature, regarding proposed authorizations 
for dual-use electric and hybrid vehicles?
  Mr. NUNN. I would be pleased to respond to the Senator's questions.
  Mrs. BOXER. Of the $30 million authorized to be appropriated in 
fiscal year 1995 for electric and hybrid vehicles in Section 142 of the 
bill, $15 million is designated for procurement of electric and hybrid-
electric vehicles for military and commercialization of such vehicles 
for non-combat uses.
  The Chairman may be aware that the U.S. electric utility industry is 
currently undertaking a program known as ``EV America'' that is 
intended to commercialize electric vehicles through cost-sharing 
partnerships with the Federal Government to purchase electric vehicles 
and the placement and testing of those vehicles in private and 
government fleets of which the Department of Defense is the largest 
fleet operator in the Federal Government.
  I would like to ask the Chairman does the committee intend that this 
funding could be used to support a program for a private sector, cost-
sharing effort to commercialize electric vehicles for non-military 
uses, such as the ``EV America'' demonstration program?
  Mr. NUNN. The Senator is correct. Such a cost-sharing activity, as 
you describe, would be eligible.
  Mrs. BOXER. Finally, it is my understanding that section 231 of the 
bill authorizes $35 million in the Technology Reinvestment Project 
[TRP] for projects involved in demonstrating ``agile manufacturing 
enterprises.''
  Mrs. BOXER. As the Chairman is no doubt aware, one of the most 
critical technological advances required to reduce the production cost 
of electric vehicles is the ability to incorporate flexible 
manufacturing principles into their production. A highly successful, 
California-based advanced transportation technology consortium, 
CALSTART, has developed a program to demonstrate agile manufacturing 
techniques through the creation of an agile manufacturing plant at 
northern California's Alameda Naval Station, which is scheduled for 
closure.
  Is it the understanding of the Chairman that such a demonstration 
would be particularly suited to receive funding pursuant to the TRP 
agile manufacturing program?
  Mr. NUNN. Yes, it is and I expect that the Department will consider 
this critical program carefully during its competitive review of TRP 
proposals.
  Mrs. BOXER. I wish to thank the distinguished Chairman for his 
informative responses and his continuing leadership on these important 
programs.


             high altitude auroral research program (haarp)

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I would like to raise a matter addressed 
on page 86 of the committee report accompanying S. 2182 with the 
distinguished chairman of the committee, Senator Nunn, and the ranking 
member, the senior Senator from South Carolina, Senator Thurmond.
  I very much appreciate the authorization of funding to continue 
research conducted by the Air Force Geophysics Laboratory and the 
Office of Naval Research through the High Altitude Auroral Research 
Program, known as HAARP. I concur wholeheartedly with the committee's 
description of this project and the level of funding included for 
fiscal year 1995.
  The last section of the committee report on this matter has resulted 
in some uncertainty over how the Air Force and Navy may proceed on this 
project, and I hope that the chairman and the ranking minority member 
of the Armed Services Committee can assist in removing any ambiguity.
  The Air Force has made clear that development of the HAARP research 
facility will hinge on the results of testing and utilization of the 
subscale components now undergoing installation. The committee, and the 
Congress need to understand the expected schedule and cost to execute 
the HAARP initiative.
  Is it the intent of the committee that funds for fiscal year 1995 be 
held back until the Department of Defense commits itself to funding the 
full-scale facility in the fiscal year 1996 budget request?
  Mr. NUNN. I would respond to the Senator that the clear intent of the 
committee is that the funds can be obligated if the Secretary of 
Defense informs the Congress that, if the trials are successful, the 
project will be included in the future years defense plan, and full 
funding for the project will be requested in budget requests in future 
years. Is that the understanding of the Senator from South Carolina?
  Mr. THURMOND. The Senator is correct. The committee did not intend 
that the entire cost for a full-scale facility be included in the 
budget request for the single year 1996.
  Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Senators, and further ask whether it was the 
intent of the committee that, prior to the obligation of such funds as 
may be appropriated pursuant to this authorization, the Secretary of 
Defense provide the committee with a report detailing the anticipated 
future cost of the HAARP facility, and the schedule for construction 
and need for additional authorization and appropriation in future 
years?
  Mr. NUNN. The Senator from Alaska is correct. Recognizing the limited 
construction season available at the HAARP site, the committee 
understands that this project will proceed incrementally, and subject 
to the results of planned testing and evaluation. The Secretary's 
report, detailing the anticipated future costs and objective schedule 
for the HAARP facility will trigger the release of funds authorized for 
fiscal year 1995 for the HAARP initiative. The Secretary should submit 
this report by February 1, 1995.
  Mr. THURMOND. I join the chairman of the committee in endorsing this 
project, and concur that the Secretary's report should indicate the 
anticipated future costs and schedule for the HAARP facility.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I thank my two colleagues for their 
consideration of this matter, and their clarification of the 
committee's report. I look forward to working with them on this matter.


                              section 2826

  Mr. CHAFEE. I would like to engage the sponsor of section 2826 of S. 
2181 in a colloquy concerning certain language in that section. As the 
Senator from Nebraska is aware, section 2826 authorizes the conveyance 
to the Hall County, NE, Board of Supervisors of property located in 
Hall County, NE, the site of the Cornhusker Army Ammunition Plant. 
Specifically, I would like to obtain his interpretation of the language 
in subsection (b), which states:

       The Secretary may not carry out the conveyance authorized 
     under subsection (a) until the Secretary completes any 
     environmental restoration required with respect to the 
     property to be conveyed.

  My understanding is that the Cornhusker Army Ammunition Plant, in 
Hall County, NE, has been listed on the national priorities list, and 
thus cleanup of contamination at this site is governed by the Federal 
Superfund Program, as established by the Comprehensive Environmental 
Restoration, Compensation and Liability Act or CERCLA. Under section 
120(h) of CERCLA, the Secretary must, among other things, include in 
any deed transferring the Cornhusker site a covenant warranting that 
first, all remedial action necessary to protect human health and the 
environment has been taken before the date of transfer, and second, any 
additional remedial action found to be necessary after the date of 
transfer shall be conducted by the United States. Does the Senator from 
Nebraska agree that the phrase ``completes any environmental 
restoration required'' means compliance with CERCLA, including section 
120(h)?
  Mr. EXON. Yes, the Cornhusker Army Ammunition Plant is subject to all 
requirements of CERCLA.
  Mr. CHAFEE. I thank the Senator from Nebraska, Thank you, Mr. 
President.


        antiboycott provisions of the export administration act

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to speak on a problem that has come 
to my attention concerning sales of military equipment to foreign 
nations and the antiboycott provisions contained in the Export 
Administration Act. Those provisions prohibit foreign nations from 
requiring U.S. persons to help them boycott countries or companies from 
boycotted countries that are friendly to the United States.
  Mr. President, in the case of foreign military sales from the United 
States to foreign governments, our Government does not help foreign 
nations with their boycotts. But if a foreign country wants to purchase 
equipment through the foreign military sales channel and the Defense 
Department will not direct a sole source contract that has the same 
effect as a boycott, the foreign country has another channel to achieve 
the same goal. They can separate out the specific item of boycott 
interest and direct a U.S. company to buy it from a specific company, 
thereby excluding the boycotted company.
  Although this option is apparently not a technical violation of our 
current laws against boycotts, it is not right. It permits a 
backchannel means of perpetuating a practice we all find reprehensible, 
as the antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Act make 
clear.
  Mr. President, I want to close off this possibility, and I want to 
work with the chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, Senator Riegle, 
whose committee which has jurisdiction over the antiboycott provisions 
of the Export Administration Act is in the process of reauthorizing 
that act, to help resolve this problem.
  Mr. RIEGLE. I wish to thank my colleague from Michigan for bringing 
this matter to my attention and I share his concerns. The Senate and 
the House yesterday extended the current Export Administration Act for 
a 60-day period, since the act was scheduled to expire yesterday. 
During the period of interim extension, I plan to work with my friend 
from Michigan to see if we can find an appropriate way to resolve this 
problem with some germane language to the Export Administration Act.


                      end of embargo long past due

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, today we again consider alternative 
approaches to ending the UN-sponsored arms embargo on Bosnia-
Hercegovina. We do so just a few short weeks after the Senator 
approved, by narrow margins, another pair of conflicting amendments on 
this issue. The first required the President to lift the embargo 
unilaterally, the second multilaterally. Believe it or not, the Senate 
approved them both.
  At that time, I indicated that my patience regarding the embargo had 
worn thin. In my floor statement, I said:

       The senseless slaughter of innocent non-combatants, and the 
     persistent ethnic cleansing campaigns, must be stopped by 
     forceful NATO and UN action. We cannot continue to allow the 
     UN and Bosnian Muslim forces to bear the brunt of persistent 
     Serb harassment and attack. To do this, I believe we must 
     lift the embargo--now. If possible, we should do it with the 
     assent of the international community, in full recognition of 
     the implications of that action.
       That has not always been my position. For many months, I 
     opposed lifting the arms embargo. But I returned from my 
     sobering trip last December convinced that the embargo policy 
     is no longer sustainable. We must send a strong signal of our 
     willingness to at least allow the Bosnian Muslims to defend 
     themselves.

  I still believe this, with all my heart. The genocidal violence that 
has wracked the Balkans must be stopped, and if we are unwilling to 
send U.S. troops to intervene in the war (and I believe that would be a 
serious mistake) then we should at least be willing to allow the 
Bosnian Muslims to better defend themselves. The arms embargo has 
unfairly, even though unintentionally, penalized the Bosnian victims of 
this conflict. It should be lifted now. But I do not believe that we 
should lift it unilaterally in the midst of delicate negotiations 
involving our allies and the warring parties, before taking into 
account the potentially grave implications of that decision for those 
negotiations, and thus for peace in the region. Requiring the President 
to unilaterally lift the embargo now could scuttle the last--albeit 
dim--hopes for peace in the Balkans for a very long time.
  But despite progress toward a peace plan, prepared by the UN-
sponsored ``contact group'' and scheduled to be finalized by U.S., 
Russian, and European foreign ministers in Geneva on July 5, we are now 
here debating these amendments. We are debating them now not because of 
anything happening in Bosnia, but because the Defense bill happens to 
be on the Senate floor. That is not the way to make policy. We should 
be developing or re-assessing U.S. policy in relation to the changing 
military and political situation in the Balkans, not the schedule of 
the Senate.
  During the past week, I have consulted with many people about this 
issue--regional experts, concerned constituents, administration 
officials, and others. I have heard personally from President Clinton 
and his senior foreign policy advisors, and I understand the grave 
implications of this vote from the President's perspective for the 
peace discussions now underway. I urged the Majority Leader to make 
several key changes in the--amendment to reflect new developments in 
the peace discussions, to reiterate the requirement that the President 
shall promptly propose a resolution in the Security Council to 
terminate the arms embargo and, if that effort failed, to consult 
Congress within 5 days regarding its unilateral termination by the U.S. 
He agreed to make these changes.
  In addition, I asked the Administration for a letter which outlined 
its plans for the future, and clarified U.S. intentions with respect to 
lifting the embargo. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of this letter 
be printed in the Record following my remarks. A key commitment made in 
the letter, from my perspective, was an agreement to consult with 
Congress immediately regarding the unilateral termination of the 
embargo should the peace negotiations collapse due to continued Serb 
resistance. With that assurance, I agreed to vote for the Nunn-
Mitchell-Warner amendment, which included my changes, despite my 
serious doubts about the prospects for a peaceful solution. Even with 
those doubts, however, I do not believe we can afford to allow this 
last chance for peace to slip away. I have tried to responsibly weigh 
the risks for peace, and the profound consequences of our lifting the 
embargo unilaterally for the people of the Balkans and for the peace 
discussions as called for in the Dole amendment, and have concluded 
that it would severely undermine prospects for the negotiations.
  But as I have said before, if the international community is 
unwilling to act to lift the embargo, and is unwilling to intervene 
more forcefully by military and other means to protect humanitarian aid 
delivery and non-combatant populations in the enclaves, then we must 
act to lift the embargo unilaterally, and provide certain limited and 
defensive military materiel, in the form of the heavy artillery and 
mortars which they lack, to the Bosnian Muslims. It is unjust and 
immoral to allow them to continue to be pounded by Serb attacks without 
adequate means of protecting themselves.
  I will vote for the Nunn-Warner-Mitchell amendment, and against the 
Dole amendment, for the reasons I have described. Despite our 
differences, I know that my colleagues on both sides of this debate 
continue to share the same goal: to stop the killing and stabilize the 
situation in Bosnia so that a more just peace can be sought under the 
auspices of the international community. With the changes I have 
secured in the amendment, and the assurances I have received from the 
administration, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the Nunn-
Mitchell-Warner amendment and opposing the Dole amendment.


                                          Department of State,

                                     Washington, DC, July 1, 1994.
     Hon. George J. Mitchell,
     U.S. Senate.
       Dear Senator Mitchell: I am writing to reaffirm the 
     Administration's support for lifting the international arms 
     embargo on the former Yugoslavia imposed by United Nations 
     Security Council Resolution 713 of September 25, 1991. It has 
     been our long-held view that the arms embargo has unfairly 
     and unintentionally penalized the victim in this conflict and 
     that the Security Council should act to remedy this 
     injustice. At the same time, as you know, there has been no 
     international consensus to take this step and acting 
     unilaterally to lift the embargo would have grave policy 
     implications that we would all have to be prepared to live 
     with, were we to take this course.
       That said, in recent days the efforts of the Contact Group 
     have helped to move us significantly closer to an 
     international consensus for lifting the embargo in the event 
     the Bosnian Serbs remain the obstacle to a peace settlement. 
     While there are still some very minor refinements to be made, 
     they will be ironed out early next week, and the peace 
     proposal will be reviewed by foreign ministers in Geneva on 
     July 5 and presented to the parties very shortly afterward as 
     a reasonable basis for a peaceful settlement. Along with this 
     proposal, it is expected that the parties will be presented 
     with a package of incentives and disincentives designed to 
     maximize the chances of their accepting the proposed 
     compromise.
       This package embodies a phased approach that seeks to 
     steadily escalate pressure on the Serbs to agree to the major 
     territorial concessions required by the Contact Group 
     proposal. Due to our very strong insistence, this package 
     includes lifting the arms embargo as one of the possible 
     consequences of a Bosnian Serb rejection of the territorial 
     proposal. In this regard, if we determine after consulting 
     with our Allies and Russia that the Contact Group 
     negotiations have not produced the results we seek, you can 
     be sure that we will take the lead in pressing for 
     implementation of this part of the incentives package. To 
     this end, we would take immediate steps to propose or support 
     a resolution at the United Nations Security Council to 
     terminate the arms embargo on Bosnian and Herzegovine. 
     Further, if the Security Council for some reasons fails to 
     pass such a resolution, the Administration would consult with 
     Congress immediately thereafter regarding possible further 
     action, including unilateral termination of the arms embargo 
     as called for in the Mitchell amendment to S. 2042 of May 12, 
     1994.
       I hope this clarification of the Administration's 
     intentions regarding the arms embargo on the former 
     Yugoslavia is helpful to you as the Senate considers the 
     implications of unilateral action on the Bosnian arms 
     embargo. The Administration strongly prefers the alternative 
     you have introduced with Senators Nunn, Warner, Kassebaum and 
     Robb to that introduced by Senator Dole and others.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Strobe Talbott,
                                                 Acting Secretary.
  Mr. MITCHELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Madam President, I announced earlier that there would 
be no rollcall vote on final passage of this bill, and that will be the 
case. There will be no more rollcall votes this evening.
  The next rollcall vote will occur on Tuesday, July 12. I will have a 
more detailed announcement on it momentarily. In response to questions 
by some Senators during this vote, we will have a recorded vote on the 
conference report when this measure comes back from conference. So 
Senators will have an opportunity to vote on the conference report on 
this measure. I thank the chairman and ranking member for a truly 
outstanding job in pushing this very difficult bill through to this 
stage. I appreciate their efforts and the cooperation of all Senators.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, I thank the leader and, of course, I say, 
as I have said so many times, without the leader basically making his 
time available to arrange time agreements and to consult with Senators 
and to take all the steps that are necessary--not seen, but are 
absolutely essential--to make a bill like this one go through, we could 
not do it.
  So I say to the leader, my friend, Senator Mitchell from Maine, I 
thank him very much and all of his very capable staff and all of the 
floor staff. The floor staff is absolutely superb. We are blessed on 
both sides of the aisle with very capable people on the floor staff.
  We are not through yet, but I thank all of my staff. Arnold Punaro, 
David Lyles, Andy, John, the whole crowd in the back there, Dick, P.T., 
Monica, Danny, Frank, and Rick; they all do a terrific job, and we are 
very grateful to them. We are blessed with a professional, superb staff 
that are not only qualified in every respect, but have unquestioned 
integrity. I am thankful to all of them. I know Senator Thurmond feels 
the same as I do about the capable staff.

                          ____________________