[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 87 (Friday, July 1, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: July 1, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                          A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS

                                 ______


                       HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

                             of new jersey

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, June 30, 1994

  Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, over the past several months, 
the Knox child pornography case has taken on the characteristics of a 
landmark court battle. What began as a routine prosecution of a man for 
the possession of child pornography took on new life when the Clinton 
Justice Department reversed the DOJ's previous position in the case and 
sought to weaken child pornography laws.
  The Senate unanimously condemned the Department's attempt to 
substantially weaken Federal efforts to protect children from abuse and 
exploitation. The House overwhelmingly rejected this ludicrous position 
as well by a vote of 425-3. Furthermore, the courts--which consistently 
upheld the stronger standard in previous cases--strongly rebuffed the 
Clinton position as well on June 9 in its decision to uphold the prior 
conviction of Knox. Nearly half the full Congress participated as amici 
in the case in defense of children and in opposition to the DOJ 
position.
  The following article is an excellent and incisive analysis of the 
decision makers at the Clinton Department of Justice and their 
decisions throughout this policy fiasco. Tom Jipping, who is the vice 
president for policy and director for the Center for Law and Democracy 
at the Free Congress Research & Education Foundation, has closely 
watched this case unfold from its genesis. He holds a law degree from 
the State University of New York at Buffalo and is in the unique 
position of having clerked for one of the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals Judges who sat on the panel hearing the Knox case.
  Mr. Speaker, I find Mr. Jipping's analysis both clear and thorough 
and trust that my colleagues will as well.

 A Tragedy of Errors: The Reno Justice Department and Child Pornography

                  (By Thomas L. Jipping, M.A.,J.D.\1\)

       On February 11, 1993, President Bill Clinton announced his 
     nomination of Janet Reno to be Attorney General of the United 
     States. At the White House ceremony marking the event, Reno 
     said: ``I would like to use the law of this land to do 
     everything I possibly can to protect America's children from 
     abuse and violence.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Footnotes at end of article.
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       On the one hand, Reno's statement rang hollow because her 
     own record on obscenity and pornography during 15 years as 
     chief prosecutor in Florida's Dade County was so poor. She 
     was often criticized for failing to prosecute obscenity. The 
     American Family Association of Florida opposed her nomination 
     to be Attorney General, stating: ``Dade County has more 
     outlets for hardcore pornography than does the rest of the 
     State of Florida * * * Janet Reno has not seriously 
     prosecuted an obscenity case since she has taken office.'' 
     The Miami Herald reported that Reno refused to accept 
     petitions signed by hundreds of concerned Dade County 
     residents and child advocacy groups charging that ``too many 
     sex crimes go unprosecuted in Dade [County].''\2\
       On the other hand, Reno's statement sounded like it might 
     help fulfill a campaign promise. In 1992, the Clinton/Gore 
     campaign sent letters to concerned citizens stating that 
     ``aggressive enforcement of federal obscenity laws by the 
     Justice Department--particularly by the Child Exploitation 
     and Obscenity Section--will be a priority in a Clinton-Gore 
     administration.''
       Reno soon had an opportunity to demonstrate whether her own 
     record or Clinton's campaign promise would determine her 
     approach to this important issue. A child pornography case 
     titled United States versus Stephen Knox offered the Justice 
     Department the opportunity to either make arguments that 
     would aggressively enforce the federal child pornography laws 
     or create loopholes to let pedolhiles and pornographers off 
     the hook. The Reno Justice Department's approach to this case 
     demonstrates that she is doing for America what she did for 
     south Florida. Reality is sometimes starkly different from 
     rhetoric.


                                i. facts

       In March 1991, U.S. Customs officials intercepted a mailing 
     to France requesting pornographic videotapes depicting minor 
     girls and an envelope from the Netherlands with a catalog 
     advertising similar material. Police arrested Stephen Knox, a 
     man previously convicted of receiving child pornography 
     through the mail, and seized three videotapes produced by the 
     Nather Company in Las Vegas, Nevada. The tapes depicted minor 
     girls dressed in bikini bathing suits, leotards, or underwear 
     and striking provocative poses for the camera. The camera 
     frequently zoomed in on the children's genital area. As the 
     U.S. Court of Appeals would later put it, ``[t]he films 
     themselves * * * clearly were designed to pander to 
     pedophiles.''\3\


               ii. the federal child pornography statute

       The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act 
     of 1977, as amended by the Child Protection Act of 1984, 
     makes it a federal crime to knowingly receive through the 
     mail\4\ or to knowingly possess\5\ child pornography. Under 
     the statute, child pornography is: ``any visual depiction 
     [that] involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually 
     explicit conduct.''
       The statute defines ``sexually explicit conduct'' to 
     include: ``actual or simulated * * * lascivious exhibition of 
     the genitals or pubic area.''\6\
       Deciding whether the material at issue in a particular case 
     is covered by this statute, then, requires answering two 
     questions:
       1. Does the material constitute an ``exhibition of the 
     genitals or pubic area''?
       2. If so, is that exhibition ``lascivious''?
       The answers to these questions may to some appear to be 
     playing with words; they nonetheless literally determine 
     whether this federal law will be effective by producing 
     prosecutions and convictions of pedophiles and child 
     pornographers. Words such as ``exhibition'' and 
     ``lascivious'' can be given broad or narrow meaning. The 
     broader their meaning, the more prosecutions and convictions 
     can be obtained in child pornography cases. The narrower 
     their meaning, the fewer cases can be prosecuted and the 
     fewer pedophiles can be convicted.


                             iii. the trial

       Stephen Knox was indicted for both receiving and possessing 
     child pornography. He argued that the three Nather tapes did 
     not contain an exhibition--lascivious or otherwise--of the 
     genitals or pubic area because the minors depicted in them 
     were not nude. As such, he did not answer the question of 
     lasciviousness. U.S. District Judge James F. McClure, Jr., 
     conducted a pretrial hearing on September 6, 1991. He decided 
     that ``the pubic area would appear to be the region of the 
     human anatomy in close proximity to the genitals.'' Even 
     though the genitals themselves were covered with clothing, he 
     reasoned, ``the area in close proximity to the genitals * * * 
     was clearly exposed.
       This analysis appears to define the word ``exhibition'' 
     narrowly in terms of actual exposure rather than general 
     display. Even so, since he defined the term ``pubic area'' 
     broadly, Judge McClure was able to say that at least 
     something was being exhibited. As such, he concluded, Knox's 
     argument should be ignored and he should be tried.\7\ After a 
     non-jury trial, Judge McClure found Knox guilty on both 
     counts and, on February 13, 1992, sentenced him to the 
     mandatory minimum of five years in prison. Knox appealed.


                     iv. the u.s. court of appeals

       The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit\8\ first 
     decided that ``[t]he district court's novel definition of the 
     pubic area is anatomically and legally incorrect'' and relied 
     instead on the ``medically accepted meaning'' of the term. 
     Looking at ``the language of the statute itself,'' the court 
     concluded that ``Knox attempts to read a nudity requirement 
     into a statute which has none * * * [N]udity is not a 
     prerequisite for the occurrence of an exhibition.'' The court 
     defined the word ``exhibition'' more broadly than the 
     district court to mean ``put on display'' rather than actual 
     exposure. The court found that the statute's legislative 
     history and underlying rationale both supported its plain 
     language on this issue and affirmed Knox's conviction on 
     October 15, 1992.\9\


                       v. the u.s. supreme court

             A. Whether the Court Should Consider the Case

                       1. Stephen Knox's Position

       Knox filed his appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court on January 
     12, 1993. The central question he raised was ``[w]hether 
     there can be an `exhibition of the genitals or pubic area' 
     where the genitals and pubic area are fully covered by an 
     article of clothing.'' Again, he did not address the issue of 
     lasciviousness since he insisted there was no exhibition of 
     any kind in the material at issue.

                2. The Department of Justice's Position

       The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), now under the 
     direction of Attorney General Reno, filed a brief in March 
     1993 signed by Acting Solicitor General William Bryson urging 
     the Supreme Court not to accept the case for review for 
     several reasons:
       ``There is no conflict among the circuits on this 
     issue.''\10\
       The court of appeals was correct that the plain language of 
     the statute does not include a nudity requirement but defines 
     the term ``exhibition'' generally to mean ``put on 
     display.''\11\
       ``The court of appeals correctly found no indication of any 
     contrary intention in the legislative history.``\12\
       ``Subsequent legislative history also supports the court of 
     appeals' interpretation.''\13\

                       B. The Merits of the Case

                       1. Stephen Knox's Position

       On June 7, 1993, the Supreme Court accepted the case for 
     review and Knox filed his brief on the merits on August 4, 
     1993, arguing again that there can be no ``exhibition of the 
     genitals or pubic area'' if those body parts'' are fully 
     covered by an article of clothing.'' He again made no 
     argument about lasciviousness since he contended there was no 
     exhibition.

                2. The Department of Justice's Position

       The Department of Justice filed its brief on September 17, 
     1993. This time it was signed by Solicitor General Drew Days 
     and took a completely different position. While the DOJ brief 
     opposing the appeal six months earlier argued that the court 
     of appeals' interpretation of the statute was correct, the 
     brief on the merits argued that ``the court of appeals . . . 
     utilized an impermissibly broad standard.''\14\ In March 
     1993, DOJ argued that the statutory language and legislative 
     history supported the court of appeals' interpretation. In 
     September 1993, DOJ argued that ``neither the statutory 
     language nor the legislative history will bear such an 
     interpretation.''\15\ DOJ urged the Supreme Court to ``vacate 
     the judgment of conviction and remand for consideration under 
     the proper statutory standard.''\16\
       a. Definition of ``exhibition''.--In March 1993, DOJ argued 
     that ``exhibition'' means ``to put on display'' as the court 
     of appeals concluded. In September 1993, DOJ argued that 
     ``the plain language of the statute'' requires showing that, 
     in order for material to constitute an exhibition, it ``must 
     include a visible depiction of the genitals or pubic 
     area.''\17\
       b. Definition of ``lascivious''.--No one, including Stephen 
     Knox, had ever in this case offered a single argument about 
     the meaning of ``lascivious'' in the statute. Before the 
     Supreme Court, for the very first time, DOJ argued that, in 
     order for an exhibition to be lascivious, it ``must depict a 
     child lasciviously engaging in sexual conduct (as 
     distinguished from lasciviousness on the part of the 
     photographer or consumer).''\18\ That is whether a 
     pornographic product depicting a child is lascivious must be 
     determined, according to the Reno Justice Department, by 
     looking at the child victim rather than the pornography 
     itself.
       Without explicitly addressing the issue, the district court 
     clearly had assumed that the statute addressed the visual 
     depiction of the child--that is, the pornographic product 
     itself--rather than the conduct of the child. The court, for 
     example, discussed ``factors to be considered when 
     determining whether a visual depiction of a minor constitutes 
     a lascivious exhibition.''\19\
       Similarly, the court of appeals assumed that the statute's 
     use of the words ``lascivious exhibition'' relate to the 
     pornographic depiction of the child and not the conduct of 
     the child. The court discussed ``circumstances that made the 
     visual depiction lascivious or sexually provocative''\20\ by 
     referring to its own precedent on the subject. That case, 
     United States versus Villard,\21\ adopted the analysis 
     applied in United States versus Dost,\22\ which also had the 
     same focus. These factors include ``the focal point of the 
     visual depiction,'' the ``setting of the visual depiction,'' 
     or ``whether the visual depiction is intended or designed 
     to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.''\23\ 
     Lasciviousness is measured by examining the depiction of 
     the child, not the conduct of the child. The federal child 
     pornography law criminalizes the conduct of the 
     pornographer and the pedophile, not the child victim of 
     their abuse.
       DOJ's standard would create enormous loopholes for child 
     pornographers to avoid prosecution. For example, under DOJ's 
     interpretation, the statute would not cover material 
     containing close-up shots of a sleeping child's exposed 
     genitals. While such material would constitute an exhibition, 
     the child would not be acting lasciviously. Yet who would 
     argue that such material is child pornography and those who 
     receive or possess it should be prosecuted?

                    3. The Supreme Court's decision

       On November 1, 1993, the Supreme Court remanded the case 
     with the following instructions: ``The judgment is vacated 
     and the case is remanded to the United States Court of 
     Appeals for the Third Circuit for further consideration in 
     light of the position asserted by the Solicitor General in 
     his brief for the United States filed September 17, 
     1993.''\24\ The Supreme Court made no comment on whether the 
     new DOJ position was correct.


                  VI. THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS--AGAIN

                       A. Stephen Knox's Position

       Knox filed his brief with the court of appeals on January 
     25, 1994. He again insisted that ``there can be no 
     `exhibition of genitals or pubic area' * * * where the 
     genitals and pubic area are fully covered by an article of 
     clothing.'' He again made no argument about the meaning of 
     ``lascivious'' but, in a footnote, said he ``agrees with the 
     government's position.''\25\

                B. The Department of Justice's Position

                    1. Definition of ``Exhibition''

       The Department of Justice filed its brief in February 1994 
     and changed its position once again. While DOJ argued to the 
     Supreme Court that an exhibition requires a ``visible 
     depiction of the genitals or pubic area,'' DOJ now argued to 
     the court of appeals that the statute ``requires that the 
     depiction in question render those body parts visible or 
     discernible in some fashion.''\26\ DOJ's brief repeatedly 
     phrased its new standard in terms of ``some form of 
     visibility or discernibility''\27\ or ``some 
     discernibility.''\28\

                    2. Definition of ``Lascivious''

       Admitting that Knox ``never specifically raised the issue 
     in either the district court or the court of appeals,''\29\ 
     DOJ also changed its position on the standard for determining 
     whether a particular exhibition is ``lascivious.'' While DOJ 
     argued to the Supreme Court that an exhibition is lascivious 
     if the child depicted in it is acting lasciviously, DOJ 
     argued something different to the court of appeals. DOJ's new 
     position was that ``the conduct the minor was engaged in can 
     be judged to constitute a `lascivious exhibition' [if] the 
     conduct appeals to the lascivious interest of some potential 
     audience.''\30\ This standard is somewhere between the 
     definition assumed by the district court and court of appeals 
     and what DOJ had argued to the Supreme Court.

                      3. Remand to the Trial Court

       The Department of Justice argued to the Supreme Court that 
     ``[t]he judgment of the court of appeals should be vacated 
     and the case remanded to the court of appeals for further 
     proceedings.''\31\ The Supreme Court complied. DOJ then 
     argued to the court of appeals that ``the appropriate 
     course now is to send the case back to the district court 
     for a new trial.''\32\ DOJ argued to the Supreme Court 
     that even though the district court had applied ``an 
     erroneous legal theory * * * it cannot be assumed that the 
     district court's legal error * * * infected the general 
     verdict of conviction.''\33\ Therefore, the court of 
     appeals' job is ``simply to determine whether the evidence 
     was sufficient, under the correct legal standard, to 
     support a general verdict of guilty.''\34\ DOJ then argued 
     to the court of appeals that ``because appellant was never 
     tried under the interpretation of the statute now urged by 
     the government,''\35\ the entire prosecution should begin 
     again.

                        C. The Court's Decision

                    1. Definition of ``Exhibition''

       The same panel of three U.S. Court of Appeals judges heard 
     new arguments on April 27, 1994, and issued their decision on 
     June 9, 1994. Judge Cowen's opinion states the central 
     holding as follows: ``We hold that the federal child 
     pornography statute, on its face, contains no nudity or 
     discernibility requirement, that non-nude visual depictions, 
     such as the ones contained in this record, can qualify as 
     lascivious exhibitions, and that this construction does not 
     render the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. Finally, we 
     again conclude that the government presented sufficient 
     evidence at the bench trial * * *. We thus will affirm Knox's 
     conviction.''\36\
       The court denied DOJ's motion to remand the case to the 
     district court for a new trial and reaffirmed all of the 
     analysis and conclusions from its previous opinion with 
     one exception. ``In our prior opinion, we reviewed the 
     legislative history and concluded that it supported our 
     interpretation of the statutory language * * * After 
     further examining the relevant legislative history, 
     however, we conclude that it is wholly silent as to 
     whether Congress intended the statutory term `lascivious 
     exhibition of the genitals or pubic area' to encompass 
     non-nude depictions of these body parts.''\37\ This did 
     not, however, affect the court's conclusion. If, as the 
     court already found, the plain language of the statute is 
     sufficient to answer the necessary questions, the burden 
     was on Knox to demonstrate ``a clearly contrary 
     congressional intent''\38\ and silent legislative history 
     does not meet this burden.

                    2. Definition of ``Lascivious''

       The court also addressed the issue of lasciviousness--which 
     DOJ had not argued to the court of appeals before but raised 
     for the first time before the Supreme Court. Noting that DOJ 
     ``recedes somewhat'' from its position on this issue before 
     the Supreme Court, the court said: ``We did not specifically 
     address this aspect of the statute * * * because neither Knox 
     nor the government presented for review or argued this aspect 
     of the statute as something the court needed to address in 
     order to decide the case. Upon consideration of the meaning 
     of this statutory language, we reject any contention, whether 
     implied by the government or not, that the child subject must 
     be shown to have engaged in sexually explicit conduct with a 
     lascivious intent.''\39\
       The court agreed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
     Ninth Circuit that ``'[i]n the context of the statute applied 
     to the conduct of children, lasciviousness is not a 
     characteristic of the child photographed but of the 
     exhibition which the photographer sets up for an audience 
     that consists of himself or like-minded pedophiles.''\40\ As 
     such, whether material depicts ``sexually explicit conduct'' 
     is to be measured by the pornographer and the pedophile (or, 
     in DOJ's terms, the photographer and the consumer), not their 
     child victims.


                      vii. political developments

                           A. The U.S. Senate

       On November 4, 1993, the U.S. Senate voted 100-0 for an 
     amendment to the crime bill it was considering which stated 
     in part: ``It is the sense of Congress that in filing its 
     brief in United States versus Knox * * * the Justice 
     Department did not accurately reflect the intent of 
     Congress.'' That is, the existing statute is sufficient and 
     the problem is the Reno Justice Department, not Congress.

                     B. The Clinton Administration

       On November 10, 1993, President Clinton sent a letter to 
     Attorney General Reno stating that he agreed with the Senate 
     about what the proper scope of the child pornography law 
     should be'' and noting that ``the Justice Department recently 
     filed a brief in which the Department concluded that the 
     current child pornography law is not as broad as it could be. 
     Accordingly, the Justice Department should promptly prepare 
     and submit any necessary legislation to ensure that federal 
     law reaches all forms of child pornography, including the 
     kinds of child pornography at issue in the Senate 
     resolution.'' That is, the existing statute is insufficient 
     and the problem is Congress, not the Reno Justice Department.
       On November 16, 1993, the Justice Department sent to 
     Congress a proposed amendment to the Child Protection Act. 
     The Act already prohibits receipt or possession of depictions 
     of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct which, under 
     current law, includes ``lascivious exhibition of the genitals 
     or pubic area.'' The Reno Justice Department's proposal would 
     state that sexually explicit conduct includes: ``(E) 
     lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any 
     person, whether clothed or unclothed; an exhibition may be 
     deemed lascivious if the depiction of the minor is designed 
     for the purpose of eliciting or attempting to elicit a sexual 
     response in the intended viewer; there shall be no 
     requirement that the minor whose image is displayed in the 
     material intend or understand that the depiction is designed 
     for such a purpose.''
       Each of the three provisions of this proposed measure has a 
     fundamental flaw. One is unnecessary, one is dangerous, and 
     one is irrelevant. They add up to a hastily and very poorly 
     drafted legislative proposal that is, in the words of ACLU 
     legislative counsel Bob Peck, a ``political pander rather 
     than the result of any careful legal analysis.''\41\
       The first provision--that the statute applies whether the 
     person is ``clothed or unclothed''--is completely 
     unnecessary. The statute's application is already this broad. 
     This, of course, is one of the main issues in Knox and, as 
     explained above, the U.S. Court of Appeals unanimously 
     concluded that Congress considered, but rejected, a nudity 
     requirement. The Grassley resolution adopted unanimously by 
     the Senate and the Smith resolution already co-sponsored by a 
     majority of House members (discussed below) reject this 
     argument as inconsistent with Congress' intent as well.
       The second provision--that an exhibition is ``lascivious'' 
     if designed to elicit a sexual response--is dangerous. It 
     appears to be drawn from a common test used by courts to 
     determine whether an exhibition is lascivious within the 
     meaning of the statute. The actual test, which the U.S. Court 
     of Appeals cited in Knox, actually includes six different 
     factors. This provision could easily be construed as reducing 
     this multi-factor measure to a single factor. As such, this 
     proposal arguably narrows rather than broadens the 
     application of the child pornography statute, contradicting 
     President Clinton's instructions in his November 10 letter. 
     In a letter dated November 17, 1993, Pat Trueman, chief 
     pornography prosecutor during the Bush Administration, stated 
     that it could also lead to ``First Amendment violations in 
     enforcement, and ultimately render the law, at least this 
     portion of it, unconstitutional.''
       The third provision--that the minor depicted in the 
     pornography need not intend or understand that the depiction 
     is lascivious--is irrelevant. The intentions or understanding 
     of a minor are completely irrelevant in determining whether a 
     sexual depiction of that minor constitutes pornography. a 
     minor cannot give consent to be sexually exploited. The 
     argument that an exhibition can be ``lascivious'' only if the 
     child is actually behaving in a lascivious way (rather than 
     the pornographic product appearing in a lascivious way) is 
     the second major issue in Knox. This issue, however, was not 
     raised by the pedophile but was created out of thin air and 
     offered gratuitously to the Supreme Court by the Reno Justice 
     Department. The Department offered no legal authority, and no 
     legal authority exists, for its position.

                  C. The U.S. House of Representatives

       On April 20, 1994, the House voted 426-3 for an amendment 
     to the crime bill it was considering that mirrored the 
     position taken unanimously by the Senate five months earlier.


                            viii. conclusion

       Attorney General Reno promised when she was nominated to 
     ``use the law of this land to do everything [she] possibly 
     can to protect America's children from abuse and violence.'' 
     It is impossible to do so without aggressively attacking 
     obscenity and pornography, as the Clinton/Gore campaign had 
     promised to do. Instead, the Reno Justice Department has 
     attempted to change the law of this land to create loopholes 
     that will limit child pornography prosecutions and thus 
     expose America's children to abuse and violence. DOJ first 
     said the broad definition of child pornography applied by the 
     court of appeals was correct. DOJ then said that definition 
     should be narrowed. DOJ then said the proper definition was 
     somewhere in between.
       Both the legislative and judicial branches have told the 
     executive branch that its attempt to weaken enforcement of 
     the federal child pornography laws is politically and legally 
     indefensible. It remains to be seen whether the Reno Justice 
     Department will continue trying to defend it.


                               footnotes

     \1\Vice President for Policy and Director, Center for Law & 
     Democracy, Free Congress Research & Education Foundation. 
     B.A. with honors, Calvin College (1983); J.D. cum laude, 
     State University of New York (SUNY) at Buffalo (1987); M.A., 
     SUNY-Buffalo (1989). Law Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals (1988-
     89).
     \2\``Activists Demand Reno Investigation,'' Miami Herald, 
     September 7, 1990.
     \3\United States versus Knox, 977 F.2d 815,817 (3rd Cir. 
     1992).
     \4\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2252(a)(2).
     \5\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2252(a)(4).
     \6\18 U.S.C. Sec. 2256(2)(E).
     \7\See United States versus Knox, 776 F.Supp. 174 (M.D.Pa. 
     1991).
     \8\The Third Circuit includes the states of Pennsylvania, New 
     Jersey, and Delaware. Judges sit in randomly chosen panels of 
     three to consider cases. Judges William Hutchinson and Robert 
     Cowen and Senior Judge Joseph Weis, Jr., considered Knox's 
     appeal.
     \9\See United States versus Knox, 977 F.2d 815 (3rd Cir. 
     1992).
     \10\Brief for the United States in Opposition, Knox versus 
     United States, No. 92-1183, Supreme Court of the United 
     States, at 6.
     \11\Id.
     \12\Id. at 7.
     \13\Id.
     \14\Brief for the United States, Knox versus United States, 
     No. 92-1183, Supreme Court of the United States, at 8.
     \15\Id. at 9.
     \16\Id. at 9-10.
     \17\Id. (emphasis in original).
     \18\Id.
     \19\United States versus Knox, 776 F.Supp. at 180 (emphasis 
     added).
     \20\United States versus Knox, 977 F.2d at 822 (emphasis 
     added).
     \21\885 F.2d 117 (3rd Cir. 1989).
     \22\636 F.Supp. 828 (S.D.Cal. 1986).
     \23\United States versus Knox, 977 F.2d at 822, quoting 
     United States versus Villard, 885 F.2d at 122 (emphasis 
     added).
     \24\United States versus Knox, 114 S.Ct. 375 (1993).
     \25\Brief of Appellant Stephen A. Knox, United States versus 
     Knox, No.92-7089, United States Court of Appeals for the 
     Third Circuit, at 6 n.2.
     \26\Brief for the United States, United States versus Knox, 
     No.92-7089, United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
     Circuit, at 12.
     \27\Id. at 12-13.
     \28\Id. at 13.
     \29\Id. at 15.
     \30\Id. at 15.
     \31\Brief for the United States, Knox versus United States, 
     No.92-1183, Supreme Court of the United States, at 23.
     \32\Brief for the United States, Knox versus United States, 
     No.92-7089, United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
     Circuit, at 19.
     \33\Brief for the United States, Knox versus United States, 
     No.92-1183, Supreme Court of the United States, at 22-23.
     \34\Id. at 23.
     \35\Id. at 18.
     \36\United States versus Knox, No.92-7089 (June 9, 1994), 
     slip opinion at 5.
     \37\Id. at 26.
     \38\Id.
     \39\United States versus Knox, slip opinion at 24.
     \40\Id. at 25, quoting United States versus Wiegand, 812 F.2d 
     1239,1244 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987).
     \41\Quoted in Cohen, ``Clinton Approach to Child Porn Pleases 
     No One,'' Legal Times, November 22, 1993, at 2.

                          ____________________