[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 86 (Thursday, June 30, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 30, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself as much time as I might 
need.
  Mr. President, as I indicated, this amendment would strike the money 
which the committee added for the B-2 bombers, money which was not 
requested by the Pentagon, and the money would be used by the Pentagon, 
according to the committee add-on, to really open the door to future 
production of B-2 planes that we do not need and cannot afford. That 
was the purpose of the committee add-on. Although technically it does 
not fund the production of the plane, the purpose of it is to allow for 
future production of planes that again we cannot afford and we decided 
to terminate at 20.
  Congress has capped the B-2 program at 20 planes twice. In both 1992 
and 1993, Congress mandated in law that no more than 20 B-2 bombers 
could be produced. The Senate and the House supported that cap. 
Presidents Bush and Clinton both supported it. The House last month 
reaffirmed its support for the existing cap on B-2 bombers and on its 
total program cost and provided no unrequested funds for the B-2 
bomber.
  But, Mr. President, like that energizer bunny, this B-2 debate just 
keeps going and going and going. Now the committee wants to add $150 
million to keep it going, a warm production base for a bomber that we 
have twice decided to cap and terminate at 20 planes.
  If this amendment fails, Senators can expect to just keep getting a 
bigger and bigger bill for B-2 bombers each year for the foreseeable 
future, and we are going to be getting into a debate each year over the 
cost of that bill as well.
  Two years ago, we had an extensive floor debate on whether to stop 
the B-2 program after building 20 planes or 15 planes. That was the 
issue. The Senate voted to stop the program at 20. And as the 
distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, 
said during that debate:

       I therefore urge my colleagues to agree to conclude the B-2 
     program at 20 as requested and to put this divisive issue 
     finally behind us.

  ``Put this divisive issue finally behind us'' is what the chairman of 
the Armed Services Committee told us a couple years ago, cap it at 20 
and end it there.
  My good friend, another good friend, this time the Senator from 
Nebraska [Mr. Exon] who is chairman of the subcommittee of 
jurisdiction, said during that same debate 2 years ago:

       We should put the B-2 program to rest and give it a decent 
     burial as far as new procurement is concerned by cutting it 
     off at 20.

  The distinguished ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, 
Senator Thurmond, said at that time, we should: ``Complete the B-2 
bomber program at a total of 20 operational B-2 bombers.'' He said: 
``It is time to make a final commitment to the B-2 and cease this 
annual debate.''

  Well, following those pleas, the Senate, 2 years ago, agreed to build 
20 bombers and to cap it, to complete it at 20 bombers. The House 
agreed. President Bush signed that bill into law. President Bush and 
then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney decided to terminate the bomber 
program at 20. And then last year we reaffirmed that cap on the program 
at 20 planes, agreeing unanimously to an amendment by Senator Leahy. 
The House agreed. President Clinton signed that bill into law with its 
B-2 legislative cap.
  What has happened in the last 2 years that justifies the new fund 
that this bill would establish to reopen the option of buying more B-2 
bombers? What has happened to justify this down payment of $150 million 
to give ourselves the chance to spend untold billions of dollars on 
more B-2 bombers? Has the Soviet Union reestablished itself and begun a 
massive high-technology buildup? Have our national spending priorities 
changed, yielding new resources for the Defense Department? Have our 
military spending priorities changed, suggesting more B-2 bombers are 
more urgently needed now than the Bush administration determined that 
they were 2 years ago?
  The only thing that has changed is that certain members of the B-2 
bomber production team have finished producing their parts of the B-2 
bomber that we agreed to buy and have prevailed on some in Congress to 
establish what section 141 of this bill calls an ``industrial base 
preservation fund.'' This fund will provide $150 million, a good part 
of which is to pay subcontractors to stay on standby for another year 
awaiting orders for additional B-2 production, and next year the 
argument is going to be the same.
  But there is no justification for expanding the B-2 program beyond 
the 20 planes which this Congress twice, and this body twice, has said 
would be the cap on the B-2 bomber. And it is difficult to understand 
why, with so many Senators deeply concerned about defense budget 
shortages, that we should even contemplate spending $150 million just 
to keep the door remaining open for more B-2 bombers which we decided 2 
years ago we did not need.
  Senator after Senator speaks about shortfalls in defense spending, 
shortfalls which they allege threaten morale and readiness, and then 
suddenly $150 million is found to add to the Pentagon request. The 
Pentagon has not requested the $150 million. The Pentagon does not want 
the $150 million. But despite all the protestations about shortfalls in 
defense, boom, there it is and the B-2 debate now continues. Something 
which was supposed to be put to rest, which we were told would be put 
to rest 2 years ago, now suddenly again is with us.
  Mr. President, I was an original supporter of the B-2. I voted for 
the B-2 originally; cast a key vote for it; felt we should have gone 
directly to the B-2 bomber without building both a B-1 bomber and a B-2 
bomber.
  I supported it until the management of the program by the Air Force 
raised serious concerns the taxpayers would not be getting the plane 
that they paid for. Some other of the cosponsors on this amendment are 
long time B-2 opponents unlike me. But the vote on this amendment is 
not a repeat of previous votes on a 20-plane force. Senators who voted 
for 20 planes or against 20 planes should understand that we have 
already committed to buying 20 planes. The issue today, the issue 
tomorrow when we vote, is whether to start spending more money so that 
we can buy more than the 20 bombers that have been agreed to by 
Presidents Bush and Clinton, Defense Secretaries Cheney, Aspin, and 
Perry, and the Congress for the last 2 years.
  So this is a vote on whether to start down a new road that may lead 
to tens of billions of dollars for more B-2 bombers. This is a vote on 
whether to lift the tent and invite the camel in nose first.
  What our amendment would do, instead of spending the money for 
something the Pentagon says it does not need and cannot afford, is to 
spend the money on something the Pentagon says it does need and does 
not have the money for instead of spending it on an item which is not 
validated, there is no military requirement for more than 20 B-2 
bombers or this so-called B-2 industrial; no validated military 
requirement whatsoever. But there is a critically important validated 
program from which we took $500 million to pay for the emergency 
earthquake assistance. That is the base closing cleanup fund.
  So if what we do in this amendment is take the $150 million and apply 
it to restore some of the funding, I emphasize just some--because we 
took $500 million, this would just restore $150 million--it would 
restore some of the funding for military base reuse that was taken to 
pay for that emergency earthquake relief earlier this year.
  The swift cleanup and reuse of military bases that have been ordered 
closed through the base closure process is a top priority of this 
Congress, and it is a top priority of the administration.
  We made a commitment to the people of this country. We said we have 
to close some bases. But we will have the funds available for prompt 
reuse and prompt cleanup. That was a commitment which this Congress 
solemnly made, and which we have not been able to live up to because we 
borrowed that $500 million from that fund.
  The Pentagon, as I said, Mr. President, opposes the additional B-2 
funding as unnecessary and unaffordable. The Pentagon supports 
restoring this previously borrowed money from the base reuse fund. So 
we have a situation where the Pentagon does not support the $150 
million added by the committee but does support the restoration of 
funding to this base reuse and cleanup fund.
  The Defense Department and the Air Force officials have testified 
over and over again that the new B-2 funding would rob defense dollars 
from higher priority. The top Defense Department officials, Secretary 
of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense are on record saying 
they do not support the additional funds for the B-2, and they do 
support the restoration of funds to that account for base reuse.
  On June 22, Deputy Secretary John Deutch sent a letter which states 
in clear terms that the Department of Defense does not support funds 
added in the committee bill for a so-called defense industrial base and 
does not want the option of buying more B-2's. Here is what Deputy 
Secretary Deutch said.

       Based on a careful analysis of the industrial base, 
     warfighting, and budgetary implications of an enlarged B-2 
     fleet the Department cannot support further purchases of B-2 
     aircraft or actions that would contribute to that end.

  Deputy Secretary Deutch makes clear in this letter that this 
conclusion is based on a careful look at our security need for more B-
2's.
  This is what his letter goes on to say:

       The Department has taken the necessary steps to deal with 
     the B-2 industrial base and programmatic issue. The 
     Department has continuously examined the role of the B-2 from 
     a warfighting perspective within the context of our ongoing 
     analysis of the bomber force.

  And Secretary Deutch says finally:

       No requirement has emerged from this analysis that changes 
     the recommendation in the Bottom-Up Review for 20 B-2 
     aircraft.

  This letter from Dr. Deutch makes clear also that the Department has 
examined the budget environment and found that more B-2's are 
unaffordable. This is what he wrote:

       Finally, absent an unlikely budget windfall for Defense or 
     a radical shift in our budget priorities, we simply can't 
     afford additional B-2 aircraft. The billions of dollars that 
     would be needed to sustain such an effort are not affordable. 
     Funds for additional aircraft would have to be taken from 
     higher priority Defense needs that support the readiness and 
     modernization of our forces in a viable support 
     infrastructure.

  So I repeat, as recently as just a week ago, Dr. Deutch said that 
based on careful analysis of the industrial base, war fighting and 
budgetary implications of an enlarged B-2 fleet, the Department cannot 
support further purchases of B-2 aircraft or actions that would 
contribute to that end.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter of Deputy 
Secretary Deutch dated June 22 of this year be printed in the Record at 
this point.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                  Deputy Secretary of Defense,

                                    Washington, DC, June 22, 1994.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Levin: This is in response to your recent 
     inquiry about the Department's possible interest in 
     additional B-2 aircraft beyond the 20 currently authorized. 
     Based on a careful analysis of the industrial base, 
     warfighting, and budgetary implications of an enlarged B-2 
     fleet the Department cannot support further purchases of B-2 
     aircraft or actions that would contribute to that end.
       The Department has taken the necessary steps to deal with 
     B-2 industrial base and programmatic issues. As you know, the 
     Department is committed to completing successfully the 20 B-2 
     program agreed to in 1992 by the Congress and President Bush 
     and endorsed by President Clinton. Even in these difficult 
     budgetary times we have included nearly $900 million in our 
     fiscal year 1995 request to produce an aircraft with superior 
     military capabilities, as well as to provide us with a wealth 
     of manufacturing technology and experience that our defense 
     industry will draw on in our development and procurement of 
     other systems, even after the B-2 line closes down.
       Working with the Congress the Department has been making 
     every effort to stabilize the program from both a management 
     and financial perspective. The Department's certification of 
     the sound management of the program--as required by the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994--was 
     a major step in settling outstanding issues in this regard. 
     Therefore, the introduction of additional funding uncertainty 
     in the future of the B-2 program would be an unfortunate 
     return to a period that we have put behind us.
       The Department has continuously examined the role of the B-
     2 from a warfighting perspective within the context of our 
     ongoing analysis of the bomber force. No requirement has 
     emerged from this analysis to change the recommendation in 
     the Bottom Up Review for 20 B-2 aircraft.
       Finally, absent an unlikely budget windfall for Defense or 
     a radical shift in our budget priorities, we simply can't 
     afford additional B-2 aircraft. The billions of dollars that 
     would be needed to sustain such an effort are not affordable. 
     Funds for additional aircraft would have to be taken from 
     higher priority Defense needs that support the readiness and 
     modernization of our forces and a viable support 
     infrastructure.
       When fielded, the authorized force of 20 B-2s will make a 
     substantial contribution to our nation's defense. The 
     Department's careful stewardship of this program--working in 
     harmony with the Congress--ensures that essential industrial 
     base tasks will be completed.
       I trust this letter responds to your questions and stand 
     ready to provide further details if needed.
                                                   John M. Deutch.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, Dr. Deutch's comments do not represent a 
new position for the Department of Defense. The Pentagon has been 
telling us all year that we should not be buying more B-2's or 
preparing to buy more B-2's. Secretary of Defense Bill Perry on 
February 23 of this year in a letter to Senator Feinstein wrote the 
following:

       Since we don't have enough money to protect all our 
     traditional industrial base, we could jeopardize our more 
     critical assets unless we invest strategically. This means we 
     must carefully and freshly define the most essential and 
     fragile segments of our defense industry, and then find the 
     resolve to discipline our defense budgets accordingly. Last 
     year we took a major step--

  This is Dr. Perry's letter, continuing:

       Last year we took a major step toward an investment 
     strategy when we defined our post-cold-war military 
     requirements in the Bottom-Up Review. This effort produced a 
     solid basis for the investment choices we are proposing to 
     protect our industrial base over the next 5 years and 
     especially in the FY '95 budget.

  Secretary Perry continues:

       One of the most difficult questions we have thus far faced 
     in our strategic planning about our defense industrial base 
     is the one about our stealth bomber production capacity.

  Then he goes on to say something we should all focus on:

       Given my deep personal convictions about the military 
     importance of stealth for nearly two decades, you can well 
     imagine why I have wanted to make sure we get this one right, 
     and I believe we have.

  That is the father of stealth talking.
  He goes on to say:

       First, we have fully budgeted the funds necessary to 
     complete the $44 billion B-2 program agreed upon in 1992 by 
     the Congress and President Bush, and endorsed by President 
     Clinton. This year alone, we requested $891 million for the 
     B-2 Program, one of the largest requests in DOD's 1995 
     budget, even though the competition for funds is 
     extraordinarily fierce. The program we are fully funding will 
     not only produce the superior military capabilities of 20 
     operational B-2 bombers, but it will also provide us with a 
     wealth of manufacturing technology and experience that our 
     defense industries will draw on in our development and 
     procurement of other systems, even after the B-2 line closes 
     down.
       I have carefully considered your suggestion that we should 
     have also added money to support the B-2 production line 
     beyond what would be needed to complete the 20 authorized 
     planes. For several reasons, I still believe our decision not 
     to do so is still the right one. We should recognize now that 
     any additional money added next year to sustain the B-2 line 
     would only be the tip of a budget wedge.

  Again, I am quoting from Dr. Perry's letter:

       The large amounts required either to buy more B-2's or to 
     sustain the B-2 production line, without producing more 
     planes, would have to be taken from more pressing military 
     priorities. Our investment strategy over the next few years 
     quite deliberately protects military readiness by limiting 
     weapon modernization, and more B-2's, as desirable as they 
     might be, should not come into the cost of readiness. Among 
     defense modernization programs, we have placed more immediate 
     priority on airlift, rather than additional bombers.

  Secretary Perry went further in that letter, warning that to reopen 
the debate on the B-2 could actually damage the program.
  This is what he said later on in that letter:

       We should also be aware of the possible consequences of 
     reopening the debate on the B-2. One of the most devilish 
     threats to any weapons program is instability, financial and 
     political. For years, the B-2 program has been plagued by not 
     knowing how many planes we were going to build or how much 
     money would be available. Whatever one's personal views on 
     the substance of the 1992 B-2 agreement, it has given the 
     program an essential stability so that now we are able to get 
     the job done.

  Mr. President, what Secretary Perry warned against in that last 
paragraph I read is introducing instability into this program, and that 
is precisely what the proponents of the B-2 so-called ``industrial base 
fund'' are doing. With this huge funding wedge, it is a wedge for 
untold billions of dollars. It sounds like $150 million in the defense 
budget. Maybe that does not sound like such a big number to some, but 
it does to me.
  It is the wedge into the spending of billions of dollars for more B-2 
bombers that is the issue. Whether we are going to open that door that 
we closed twice, that two Presidents have closed, and three Secretaries 
of Defense have closed, and whether we are going to open that door 
based on no military requirement, with no idea of what should be cut 
out of future years' defense budgets to pay for more B-2's, Bill Perry, 
the Secretary of Defense, is one of the strongest proponents of stealth 
technology. He is one of the fathers of stealth technology. That is why 
his opposition to the B-2 add-on by the committee is so powerful.
  Mr. President, I would like to take a few more minutes at this time 
to look at the other purpose of the amendment, which is to restore part 
of the $508 million that were in effect borrowed from the base 
realignment and closure account last February to pay some emergency 
costs from the earthquake in California. The earthquake was a sudden 
tragedy, and it created immediate need for emergency assistance. We 
responded to it, as we should have. One of the sources for the funds 
used for that assistance was an account which pays for costs associated 
with preparing for the closure and the transfer of facilities that were 
ordered closed through the Base Closure Commission process, including 
environmental cleanup, which is a big part of the closure cost.
  Congress and the President have promised that the Department of 
Defense would complete environmental restoration of closing bases 
quickly and release property for reuse by local communities struggling 
to rebuild their economies and to attract new jobs. Mine is not the 
only State where communities that have been excellent neighbors to the 
military for generations are struggling to adjust to the loss of the 
military facility. As we downsize the military, we must make reductions 
in military facilities to save operating costs. But the impact on local 
communities, especially smaller communities where a military base has 
dominated the local economy, can be very great.
  The key to recovering from a base closure and to rebuilding new 
economic strength in a community is preparing a closing base for rapid 
reuse. That includes cleaning up environmental damage caused by the 
military while it was a tenant. We made that promise to help affected 
communities by completing environmental cleanup quickly, to speed reuse 
by local communities trying to rebuild their economies and to attract 
new jobs.
  The use of the base closing fund to pay for part of the earthquake 
emergency supplemental in February represented nearly half of the 
current year appropriated funds for the so-called BRAC account, and 
created a serious accounting shortfall in that account. That funding 
shortfall still exists, because the fiscal year 1994 rescission for 
earthquake relief became law after the Department of Defense had 
submitted its fiscal year 1995 budget. The Department of Defense took 
interim measures to cushion the most immediate shortfalls by 
reallocating 1994 funds for base closing and cleanup from the other 
services to the Navy, which had the most urgent projects at the time. 
Those interim measures do not solve the funding shortfall problem. They 
just defer the funding shortfall to fiscal year 1995.
  The Department and individual service officials have testified that 
the rescission of $508 million in fiscal year 1994 funds from that 
BRAC-3 account will have a negative impact on reuse of closing bases 
unless we redress it.
  That is why the Defense Department supports the second goal of this 
amendment, which is to restore some of the base closing and cleanup 
funds used for the emergency earthquake relief by adding to the BRAC-
III account the $150 million made available by striking the so-called 
B-2 industrial base fund that was added by the Armed Services 
Committee.
  As a matter of fact, the Department of Defense would like us to be 
able to restore all of the $508 million rescinded from that BRAC-III 
account as Deputy Defense Secretary Deutch says in this June 8, 1994, 
letter. And this is what he wrote, the key line being:

       Restoration of the amount rescinded would ensure that the 
     President's plan to speed economic recovery of closure 
     communities is achieved.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full June 8, 1994, 
letter supporting restoration of the amount rescinded from that BRAC 
account be printed in the Record at this point.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                     Washington, DC, June 8, 1994.
     Hon. Carl Levin,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Levin: This responds to your June 7, letter 
     expressing concern about funding shortfalls in the Base 
     Realignment and Closure (BRAC) accounts that pay for 
     environmental restoration and remediation at closing or 
     realigning bases.
       You asked whether the requirement to promptly clean closing 
     military bases requires additional funding beyond what is 
     currently appropriated? The recent FY 1994 rescission of $508 
     million could have had a serious impact on the FY 1994 BRAC 
     program; however, we have reallocated unobligated BRAC funds 
     to minimize the impact of the rescission on the FY 1994 
     realignment and closure schedule.
       In response to your question concerning the need for 
     additional BRAC funding above the amount requested in the FY 
     1995 President's Budget, it is essential that Congress 
     approve the $2.7 billion requested in FY 1995. Congress 
     should also restore the amount rescinded since the FY 1995 
     request was prepared assuming the unobligated funds used to 
     offset the rescission would be available in FY 1995. 
     Restoration of the amount rescinded would ensure that the 
     President's plan to speed economic recovery of closure 
     communities is achieved.
       I would appreciate your support and assistance in this 
     matter.
           Sincerely,
                                                      John Deutch,
                                      Deputy Secretary of Defense.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the Secretary of the Air Force in her March 
8, 1994, appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee summed 
it up this way.

       I cannot think of anything more shortsighted than to not 
     fund or to rescind environmental cleanup money for BRAC 
     bases.
       As you know, I have visited all the BRAC bases on the 1993 
     list. It is absolutely an impediment and stumbling block to 
     transitions of those properties to the community so I am very 
     concerned about it.

  The ``it'' being the rescission of those funds from that BRAC-III 
account.
  This amendment again would use that $150 million not requested for 
this new B-2 fund and add it to a base closure account which already is 
in existence from which we in effect borrow $500 million. It would 
thereby help to keep a solemn commitment which this Congress made to 
communities that have closing military facilities, help them to recover 
from those economic shocks quickly, and to be able to develop new uses 
for those facilities without prolonged delays for environmental 
cleanup.
  That is why, Mr. President, this amendment is strongly supported by 
the leading national environmental organizations.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent at this point to print in the 
Record a letter supporting this amendment signed by 10 national 
environmental organizations, including Friends of the Earth, National 
Wildlife Federation, and the League of Conservation Voters.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                    June 23, 1994.

  Support Levin Base Closure Cleanup/B-2 Amendment--Speed Cleanup of 
            Closing Military Bases, Redevelopment, and Jobs

       Dear Senator: When the Senate considers the fiscal 1995 
     Defense Authorization bill this week, we urge you to support 
     an amendment by Senators Levin, Cohen, Glenn, McCain and 
     Leahy that would transfer $150 million in Department of 
     Defense (DOD) funds from the B-2 Bomber program to the 
     cleanup of closing military bases. Base closure cleanup 
     funding was badly cut earlier this year, leaving a serious 
     shortfall.
       This is a reasonable amendment that protects both our 
     nation's defense capabilities and its environment. The 
     amendment is also important for jobs, because speeding 
     cleanup of closing military bases is the best way to ensure 
     that defense-dependent communities can quickly redevelop the 
     bases to attract new jobs.
       The additional funds for the base realignment and closure 
     (BRAC) account are badly needed. This account pays for the 
     costs of closing military bases, including the cleanup of 
     toxic contamination. Unfortunately, in a little-noticed 
     provision of the Earthquake Emergency Supplemental 
     Appropriations bill enacted in February, $508 million of 
     previously-appropriated BRAC funds (some of which were 
     intended for cleanup) were rescinded, and the legislative 
     ``floor'' for cleanup funding was lowered. DOD officials have 
     testified to Congress that the serious shortfall in the BRAC 
     account ``will delay the closure of some bases'' and that 
     funds ``will need to be restored to keep the BRAC process on 
     schedule and to realize full savings from infrastructure 
     reductions.'' Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch wrote 
     on June 7 in support of restoring rescinded BRAC funds to 
     ``ensure that the President's plan to speed economic recovery 
     of closure communities is achieved.''
       There is no military requirement for more B-2 Stealth 
     Bombers. President Bush terminated the B-2 bomber program, 
     and Congress passed a law capping the program at 20 planes. 
     Yet, the Committee-reported bill adds $150 million in funds 
     as a down payment on more B-2's beyond the maximum 20 already 
     funded. President Clinton did not request these extra funds 
     and the Pentagon explicitly opposes more B-2 funding as 
     unnecessary and unaffordable.
       The League of Conservation Voters may consider including 
     this vote on the Levin-Cohen amendment when compiling the 
     1994 ``National Environmental Scorecard.''
       Please vote for a strong defense, clean environment and 
     jobs. Support the Levin amendment.
           Sincerely,
         Ralph De Gennaro, Director, Appropriations Project, 
           Friends of the Earth; Margaret Morgan-Hubbard, 
           Executive Director, Environmental Action Foundation; 
           Sharon Newsome, Vice President, Resources Conservation, 
           National Wildlife Federation; Peter Tyler, Associate 
           Director of Policy, Physicians for Social 
           Responsibility; Lenny Siegel, Director, Pacific Studies 
           Center; Drew Caputo, Attorney, Natural Resources 
           Defense Council; Betsy Loyless, Political Director, 
           League of Conservation Voters; A. Blakeman Early, 
           Washington Director, Environmental Quality Program, 
           Sierra Club; Don Gray, Director, Water Program, 
           Environmental and Energy Study Institute; Lara Levison, 
           Field Coordinator, National Legislation, Union of 
           Concerned Scientists.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this amendment allows us to keep two 
commitments at one time, the commitment we made twice to terminate the 
B-2 line at 20 and a commitment that we made to fund the cleanup of 
closing bases. Both those commitments are commitments that were on 
record as having been made. They are both important. They both have a 
history in this body and they both should be kept.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield such time as the Senator from Hawaii 
may desire.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Hawaii.
  Mr. INOUYE. I thank my friend from Georgia.
  Mr. President, I rise to speak in opposition to the amendment just 
offered by my distinguished friend from Michigan.
  The Senator's amendment seeks to take $150 million which is in the 
bill for the expressed purpose for preserving the industrial base for 
the production of the modern bomber aircraft.
  Mr. President, his amendment would take that money, zero that line in 
the budget, dismantle the tools and assembly facilities on the last 
American line for bomber production and instead authorize an increase 
in funding for base closures.
  Mr. President, I have no quarrel with the Senator from Michigan on 
the need to fund base closure activities. I agree that the Congress 
needs to support funding for base closure. The Congress and the 
administration have agreed to close 100 bases in 3 rounds of the base 
closure process, and clearly we must provide funds to meet the cost of 
closure, and we are doing just that.
  In point of fact, if we should examine the bill before the Senate, we 
are struck by the fact that the bill already includes $2.676 billion 
for base closure activities.
  Mr. President, the Committee on Armed Services did not cut one penny 
from the amount requested for base closures. In fact, the amount the 
committee recommends for base closure funding is more than half the 
total that the committee recommends for all military construction 
programs worldwide.
  Base closure funding is fully authorized in the bill before us and 
increased authorization is not needed. On the other hand, if the 
amendment of the Senator from Michigan is adopted, it will terminate 
the Nation's industrial base for bombers by eliminating any funds to 
preserve the production of the B-2. I think that my colleagues need to 
consider the ramifications of this decision very, very carefully.
  Secretary of Defense Perry has been mentioned several times in this 
debate. The Secretary testified to the Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittee earlier this year on the bomber industrial base. He told 
us quite frankly that his budget did not address this need. He said the 
following:

       We do not have anything in our program to sustain a bomber 
     industrial base. That is a weakness of this program that we 
     are presenting to you and you may rightly challenge and 
     criticize that assumption.

  He went on to say:

       The most logical way of maintaining a bomber industrial 
     base was to continue to build more B-2's. That is not only 
     because that is the best, the most cost-effective bomber we 
     can describe for you right now, but because we could make a 
     very good use of the extra B-2's if we had them.

  Mr. President, that is the testimony of the Secretary of Defense, the 
man who most would agree knows more about the U.S. industrial base than 
anyone else. Because of him the budget provides funding to maintain the 
submarine industrial base. Because of Secretary Perry, the budget 
contains funding to maintain the tank industrial base, a matter I know 
to be of great importance to the Senator from Michigan.
  The testimony of the Secretary of Defense is that there is a weakness 
in the budget presented to the Congress because it fails to protect the 
bomber industrial base, and it is the Secretary who says that the best 
way to sustain the industrial base is to build more B-2 bombers because 
DOD could make very good use of extra B-2's.
  Mr. President, as my colleagues know, I am a strong supporter of the 
B-2. I recognize that the B-2 is the best bomber ever produced and, 
though it is expensive, I think we should purchase more.
  The country learned many lessons from Desert Storm, and one of the 
most significant lessons learned is that stealth works. The success of 
the F-117 in that war demonstrated to the entire world the advantages 
of stealth technology in military aircraft. And the B-2 is the next 
technological leap. It is the Stealth bomber.
  Mr. President, as we debate this issue, I would ask my colleagues to 
bear in mind that the American public is increasingly reluctant to 
support U.S. interests abroad, if that means intervention and the 
possible loss of American life.
  It is self-evident that the best way to protect those who must go 
into harm's way is to provide them with the best equipment to reduce 
casualties and deaths. Improved survivability is the term employed by 
the experts, and in my generation, it was known as returning home 
alive.
  Mr. President, the millennium has not arrived. From time to time we 
may find it necessary to project power in a hostile environment. If the 
Nation must project power, attack multiple targets in heavily defended 
areas, the best approach is to use the B-2. It will have the best 
chance of completing its mission and bringing the crews back safely.
  It is also clear that as we further reduce our forces it is 
absolutely essential that our personnel have the best equipment in the 
world. If we are to prevail in all future conflicts, it will be because 
we enabled our forces to outfight our opponents. We will not be able to 
achieve a decisive victory through numbers or the quantity of our 
forces. We are reducing and downsizing to about as half as many 
military personnel as we had during the cold war. So we must retain a 
clear and decisive capability through the quality of our forces.
  Mr. President, our forces should not be marginally better than those 
of our opponents--Americans die when they fight for a margin of 
victory--we must, in our constitutional responsibility to ``provide for 
the common defense'' ensure that our forces have a decisive capability. 
This means we must have the best trained and best equipped military in 
the world. One sure way to guarantee that our forces will be the best 
equipped is to continue to buy systems such as the B-2 bomber.
    
    
  This bomber is a marvel of American technology. It has the capability 
to take off from bases in the United States and fly anywhere in the 
world, penetrate virtually any airspace, deliver a devastating blow, 
and return to the United States without stopping. In this era, when the 
United States is deploying fewer troops overseas at fewer locations, 
the global reach of the B-2 is essential to deterrence and to war 
fighting.
  Mr. President, the B-2 is essential. No other system in the U.S. 
inventory can make the same claim; no other weapon can do the job. With 
mid-air refueling, the B-1B and B-52 can fly long ranges, but they 
cannot penetrate heavily defended airspace. Even the F-117 does not 
have the capability of the B-2 in that arena.
  There are many of my colleagues who recognize that the B-2 is a 
marvel of American technology. But, they say, they are concerned about 
the cost. They argue that the B-2 is simply too expensive. I ask my 
colleagues, where is the study, the documented evidence, to support 
this point? Who has done a comparison between the operational cost 
effectiveness of buying more B-2 bombers and the costs of maintaining 
the force structure to allow the B-1's and B-5's to provide the 
Nation's attack capability?

  No one. That is the answer. The Defense Department did a study on the 
cost effectiveness of the new attack submarine versus the Seawolf. It 
compared the value of the V-22 Osprey to that of conventional 
helicopters. It contracted for a study comparing the cost effectiveness 
of buying more C-17's or other airlift aircraft. The Department, 
however, has not done an analysis which compares the total life cycle 
costs and effectiveness of the B-2 and its required support, to that of 
the other bomber and support aircraft alternatives.
    
    
  The decision to curtail the B-2 bomber from 132--and we should remind 
ourselves that that is how many we ordered--to 75 to 40 all the way 
down to 20 bombers was done for purely political purposes. The force 
structure requirements for other aircraft types were determined after 
the decision was made to cut the B-2 program, and the cost 
effectiveness of this approach was never determined.
  Many of my colleagues are probably not aware that the Rand Corp. has 
been examining the war fighting effectiveness of the bomber force 
structure. Among its conclusions, Rand notes that a fleet of 38 B-2 
bombers and 40 B-52's would be as effective as a fleet of 20 B-2's, 40 
B-52's and 60 B-1 bombers. That means that 18 additional B-2's could do 
the job of 60 B-1's. Millions of dollars could be saved through reduced 
military personnel and operations and maintenance costs; hundreds of 
lives would no longer be put at risk.
  The Rand study also said the larger B-2 fleet would have more 
flexibility to meet the two MRC strategies and would be easier to 
employ operationally. The B-2 does not need the electronic warfare and 
fighter escort support required for conventional operations. This, too, 
can lower overall life-cycle costs.
  Does this, by itself, mean that we should rush out to buy more B-2's 
and retire the B-1's? Not necessarily, and that is not the position 
recommended in this authorization bill. The analysis which compares the 
life-cycle cost of 18 additional B-2's and 60 existing B-1B's has not 
been done. What the Rand results demonstrate, however, is that DOD 
should examine the cost effectiveness of each alternative, before it 
makes a decision to invest substantially more money into either. The 
amendment offered by the Senator from Michigan would preclude DOD from 
reviewing this matter, because it would eliminate the possibility of 
ever purchasing more B-2 bombers.
  The Institute for Defense Analyses is also conducting reviews on Air 
Force bombers; however, its focus is on the B-1. Among its results, it 
is likely to conclude that previous Air Force plans to fix the 
electronic countermeasures system on the B-1B were not the most cost-
effective solution. It is also likely to suggest other alternatives to 
the Air Force plan for ``fixing'' the B-1B might make more sense. Even 
in this study though, the Air Force and DOD will not get the complete 
analysis which would be required to determine the most cost-effective 
bomber force structure.
  Furthermore, the Roles and Missions Commission is reviewing DOD's 
needs for long-range bombing. It, too, could conclude that additional 
B-2 bombers might make sense. I think we should consider these points:
  It is far less expensive for a potential adversary to acquire the 
capability to shoot down a conventional bomber than to invest in any 
potential method to defeat a Stealthy platform;
    
    
  The number of Stealth aircraft in the U.S. inventory is minimal, 
because the navy has canceled its only Stealthy attack aircraft program 
and the Air Force is not buying any more F-117 Stealth fighters; and;
  Maintaining the force structure to ensure that conventional aircraft 
can attack heavily defended targets is both manpower and cost 
intensive.
  So it seems clear to me, Mr. President, that we should insist that we 
stop and get a complete accounting of the cost of each alternative 
before precluding the B-2 option.
  Mr. President, I do not make my argument on costs alone. In addition 
to not knowing which force structure would be the most cost effective, 
there is also great uncertainty over the total force structure that is 
required. The bottom up review concluded that 100 bombers are required 
to handle one major regional conflict. It also assumed a force 
structure of 184 bombers. However, the Air Force plans to retain only 
107 total bombers in its inventory, and of that number not more than 80 
will be ready for combat.
  And I think, as a matter of a footnote, of during the recent Desert 
Storm conflict. In that one conflict, we employed nearly 200 bombers.
  Exactly how this force structure will fulfill the requirements for 
fighting two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies has not 
been answered to my satisfaction by any DOD official. In any case, as 
is clear from the results of the Rand analysis, if a small force 
structure is to be agreed upon, it should include more B-2's.
  Considering the uncertainties of the force structure and its cost 
effectiveness, I believe all my colleagues should agree it makes great 
sense to maintain the capacity to build additional B-2 bombers.
  The Congress needs to know what option makes the most sense. It 
should not mandate the end of the B-2 or the retirement of the B-1 or 
B-52, until it knows the answers to these questions. The 
recommendations in this bill safeguard all three bombers until DOD and 
the Congress ascertain what is the best option.
  I am convinced the results of a comprehensive cost and operational 
effectiveness analysis will show that, in the long run, it would be 
more cost effective to purchase more B-2 bombers than to continue to 
fix and upgrade the existing conventional bombers and maintain the 
fighter escorts and electronic warfare capability which is required to 
support conventional bombers. But, we don't know the answer yet. The 
Levin amendment would force DOD to eliminate this option. It would do 
so before all the necessary information has been gathered.
  Mr. President, the Levin amendment presents us with clarity and 
confusion; with what we know and with what we do not know. We know 
that, if the amendment is adopted, the last bomber production line in 
the United States will be terminated--a key element of the Defense 
industrial base will be irretrievably lost. What we do not know is how 
much do alternative force structures cost and how do these costs 
compare--in life-cycle operations and maintenance costs--to the 
acquisition and operation of more B-2 bombers.
  On both of these counts, I urge my colleagues to defeat the Levin 
amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
    
    
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, before the Senator from Hawaii leaves, I 
want to say that I appreciate very much his remarks. He has listened to 
this testimony and he is an expert in defense. He has been a student of 
the experiences of Desert Storm and a student, of course, of other wars 
including the war in which he himself made great sacrifices. So he has 
great expertise in this area and I want to compliment him on his 
presentation.
  Before he leaves, I would like to have the Senator from Hawaii, if I 
can switch microphones here, take a look at this chart, because he 
talked about the tradeoffs and the cost effectiveness.
  Mr. President, one of the problems we have in debating the B-2, and I 
think it is going to be an increasing problem in the years ahead, is 
that we are thinking in terms of evolutions in warfare. We are thinking 
in terms of evolutions in weapons systems. We are not thinking in terms 
of revolutions in weapons systems and that is what the B-2 is. This is 
revolutionary technology. If people would follow this chart--
particularly those who talk so much about the cost of the B-2 and 
compare it to a normal aircraft--and take a look at an actual event, 
not a war game but actual event that happened in Iraq.
  This is basically the Air Force chart presented by Secretary of Air 
Force Don Rice. Right up to this line right here represents what 
happened in Iraq. This is, of course, a projection based on Air Force 
analysis of the capability of the B-2. During the Persian Gulf 
conflict, there was an Iraqi nuclear weapon research center that we 
wanted to target and destroy. That was one of the early targets.
  So what did we do? We sent this group of aircraft after that target. 
These were the bomb droppers. These were the F-16's. These were the air 
escort--that is 16 F-16's that actually were to deliver the package of 
bombs. The air escorts were the F-15's. These were the suppression 
vehicles, the F-15's. There were also 16. The suppression of air 
defenses, enemy air defenses--these are the Wild Weasel aircraft, the 
F-4's. There are a number of them, as we can see here. And these are 
the tankers, the K-135 tankers. This was the package of aircraft sent 
after that high priority target.
  It was a high priority defense for the Iraqis also. They put up 
everything they had, in terms of that area, to try to suppress this 
kind of attack. What happened in that actual experience? They did not 
hit the target. They did not get the target because they were so 
diverted by the enemy air defenses. They were not able to deliver the 
bombs on target and they could not destroy the target.
  Then what we did, instead of that, we said, let us try another way. 
And we came back. This tells us something about revolutionary warfare. 
We came back with the F-117's. These are the Stealth bombers that we 
have out there now, nowhere nearly as capable as the B-2. The 
technology was developed back under Secretary Perry when he was in the 
Carter administration. This is the F-117. There were eight of these 
aircraft, eight of them plus two tankers. That group of aircraft 
delivered the weapon to the target and destroyed the target.
  The first group did not. That does not mean that these aircraft are 
not good aircraft. It means that what we have is a revolution in 
stealth technology, and when people are trying to compare an older 
bomber with a B-2, in terms of cost, you are really making comparison 
between apples and oranges. There is no comparison in capability.
  Just to give an example, this package of aircraft, 55 aircraft --just 
the operational cost of those aircraft over 20 years is $3.4 billion. 
That does not count the procurement cost. We have already bought the 
aircraft so we are not talking about procurement. The procurement cost 
of this aircraft would be vast compared to this aircraft here, but just 
look at operational cost. Fifty-five aircraft. Here there are 10 
aircraft. This package cost $3.4 million to maintain and operate over 
20 years. This package cost $740 million. If you had two B-2's, the Air 
Force projects they could have done the same job. Of course, we did not 
have B-2's then during that conflict. Their 20-year cost for operation 
is $308 million. The difference in this package and this package is 
$3.1 billion--just in operational costs.
  The crew members at risk. This is the important thing. For everyone 
who cares about the military lives that we risk, for everyone who wants 
to minimize the life at risk in any kind of conflict, this is 
enormously important. The crew members at risk in this scenario with 
this group of aircraft were 116. The crew members at risk when they 
succeeded in hitting the target were 16. There were 100 fewer people at 
risk; 100 less American men--and increasingly women--would have been at 
risk in these two situations.
  If you have the B-2 aircraft, two of those, with the same kind of 
mission to be performed, you would have four people at risk; four 
people at risk. How much are lives worth? They are worth a great deal 
to us. They are worth a great deal to the American people. They are 
worth a great deal, in terms of the brave and courageous people who 
defend our country.
  When you look at the other comparison here, forward base support--
there is a huge difference in what is required for forward base 
support. There is a huge difference in what is required for consumed 
fuel--413,000 gallons here, 110,000 here, and 54,000 here.
  Look at the difference in the airlift required to be able to make 
this kind of attack. The Senator from Hawaii talked about the 
importance of getting the aircraft in the area. That is enormously 
important. It takes a long time to get these aircraft positioned 
because these are short-range aircraft. These aircraft, as the Senator 
from Hawaii made clear--the B-2 can fly from the United States. They 
can deliver a load. They have tankers that back them up. They have very 
few tankers that are even required in most situations, but they can be 
backed up by tankers. To deploy this load right here takes 30 loads of 
C-141's to get the equipment for these aircraft to be able to fly their 
mission. Eleven C-5's and 30 C-141's. In this actual situation there 
were eight C-141's, and three C-5's.
  Here, if you notice, there is zero airlift required for the Stealth. 
Zero airlift required for this situation here. And the total aircraft 
is two.
  So any way you look at this technology, it is revolutionary 
technology. The mistake that is made over and over again--and people do 
not listen to the debate and therefore when they think about a B-2 
aircraft they compare that to a B-1 or B-52--there is no comparison. 
This aircraft can fly to a mission without having protection because it 
is stealthy. It does not have to have the F-15's and the F-16's, and 
all the suppression of enemy aircraft. It does not have to have the 
Wild Weasels that have the ECM, the electronic countermeasures. These 
can fly by themselves. That is enormous in terms of difference in 
money. It is enormous in terms of savings.
  There is another thing I think people should concentrate on. We have 
B-52 aircraft. That is one of the best aircraft that has ever been 
built. Those aircraft have many years of life left. I am amazed at how 
many years they have left.
  Some of the B-52's will be flying until the year 2015; some people 
say even beyond that. But the B-52 aircraft is like the F-16. It cannot 
fly directly over a heavily defended target without being in an 
enormous risk situation.
  Therefore, what we are going to have to do in the future, if we have 
targets that are heavily defended--and we will face that--we are going 
to have to fly the B-2's in first. We have to use them wisely, go in at 
the beginning, take out the hard targets, take out the enemy air 
defenses, and then you can fly over the targets with the B-52's.
  It really extends the life of the B-52. It allows the B-52 to go over 
the target after the B-2 has destroyed the defenses.
  There is another way to approach this problem, and that way also has 
to be done. It is not either/or. That is, to put on standoff munitions, 
munitions that can be fired from a long distance from the B-52's. And 
those standoff munitions are going to be needed. We are developing 
them. Unfortunately, most of them will not be available until around 
the turn of the century.
  The other thing that we have to keep in mind, though, is we want to 
fire as few of those as we can, and we will have to have a number of 
them. But they are enormously expensive.
  What we have not done in the Department of Defense, the Department of 
Defense has not measured the cost of these standoff, precision-guided 
weapons versus the B-2. Later in my presentation, I am going to be 
showing that to suppress enemy air defenses from a long distance--and 
it would take in most situations 1 week to do that--if you use the 
conventional bombers without the B-2 going in first or the 117 going in 
first, if you do that, then you are going to spend enormous amounts of 
money in using up those precision guided, standoff munitions.
  They are not finished yet. They are being developed now. They are one 
of our most important developments. But we have to use those in an 
economical fashion. The rough calculations that my staff has done in 
connection with the Air Force is that 1 week of using those weapons, 1 
week of that kind of firing at the normal sortie rate for the Air 
Force, would cost about $15.2 billion--$15.2 billion. Is that the best 
way to spend the money? I do not think we ought to rely on that alone.
  But what we are doing if we kill the B-2 program is we are making it 
absolutely inevitable that we are going to spend far more money either 
in standoff munitions or in some new bomber down the road. At some 
point, this country will come to the realization that we have to 
develop a stealthy bomber. We will go out and have R&D, we will have 
procurement, we will have all sorts of money invested in a new bomber 
because we have given up on the B-2 when we have only 20 aircraft.
  Mr. President, I know the Senator from Hawaii has to leave, but I 
want to make one other point and ask him to make any comments he would 
like before he leaves, because he has followed this subject with a 
great deal of care; and that is the effectiveness of the money we have 
already spent.
  People read about how much the B-2 costs, and it does cost a lot of 
money. Actually, the cost from this point on is not very much more than 
what a C-17 cost. A C-17 is about $450 million from this point forward. 
Every B-2 we buy is about $550 million to $600 million. That is a lot 
of money. But it is not a lot of money when you consider it is 
revolutionary technology, and when you consider the tradeoffs in terms 
of procurement, as well as operational costs.
  I want to ask the Senator from Hawaii to comment on this: The B-2 
costs, when people read about it in the paper, they read $1.5 billion, 
$2 billion an aircraft. The reason for that is because you have a huge 
front end of research and development. That front end of research and 
development is spread through all of our Stealth technologies. We are 
going to use it in everything we do on Stealth, so it is not simply 
applicable to the B-2. But it is about $25 billion.
  So if you build more than the 20 which we have paid for, no matter 
what it costs you per aircraft from here on, which is about $600 
million, the writers all write it up by dividing 20 into $25 billion 
and you get approximately $1.5 billion apiece, just in allocating the 
research and development.
  But if you build another 10 aircraft or another 20 aircraft, it cuts 
down tremendously on that, and what it costs from this point forward is 
what we have to look at. If you build 20 more B-2 aircraft, we can do 
it for about $12 billion. The first 20 aircraft, amortized into that 
$25 billion, costs something like $1.5 billion apiece. We are looking 
at a false kind of analogy because we have already sunk that money. 
That $25 billion is now expended. It is now developed. It is already in 
place in terms of the results. We have a B-2 aircraft.
  The point is that we can build another 20 aircraft for about $10 
billion or $12 billion less than it would cost for standoff munitions 
if you do not have the Stealth aircraft in place to fire those 
munitions for about 1 week in a scenario where we would have to do so. 
And I am sure that scenario would apply in the Middle East, it would 
apply in North Korea, it would apply anywhere else.
  So people are beginning, I hope, to focus on the economics of this 
situation which means that they have to focus on the fact that this is 
not simply another aircraft, it is a revolutionary aircraft that saves 
lots of money, it saves lots of time, it enables us to move from this 
country to almost anywhere in the world, from these shores, and it does 
so risking about, in comparison, 116 lives under the present kind of 
scenario to four lives under the B-2.
  I will say to my friend--that is a lot for him to comment on --but 
before he leaves, I want to get his reaction particularly to the 
economics of that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Wofford). The Senator from Hawaii.
  Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the distinguished chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, I think, has more than adequately responded to that 
question. If I may, I would like to add a historical footnote to the 
debate that is going on.
  I think all of us should recall that Desert Shield began in August 
1991. That is 3 years ago. In January 1991, it was the consensus of the 
intelligence community of the United States that the Middle East was at 
peace. Some of my colleagues in this body visited Saddam Hussein and 
came home singing his praises, telling us that he is the future of the 
Middle East; that he has the secret to peace. That was earlier in 1991.
  In January 1991, I received a telephone call at the same time the 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee had a call, and the call was 
one of great surprise. General Schwarzkopf was about to be retired. The 
great hero of Desert Storm was about to be retired because we were at 
peace in the Middle East.
  The central command was to be dismantled because we were at peace in 
the Middle East, and all of us know what we had to go through.
  I bring this up just to respond to those of my colleagues who have 
been saying, ``Why are we still debating the B-2? Why are we insisting 
on spending money? Don't you know that the wall in Berlin is down? 
Don't you know that the Soviets have been dismantled?''
  January 1, 1991, our intelligence community said we have peace in the 
Middle East. That is the uncertainty that we face in this world today. 
And, Mr. President, I would rather spend a few more and sleep a bit 
more soundly, than save money and risk the lives of these men on the 
chart. That is the difference.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, if I could say one other point before my 
friend from Hawaii leaves, and I want to yield to the Senator from 
Virginia.
  Mr. President, the 116 people that are directly involved in the 
running of these aircraft, 1,124 labeled ``Forward Base Support,'' 
these are people who have to be in the theater, these are people who 
are in harm's way when you count theater ballistic missiles and Scud 
missiles, so forth. The biggest loss we had in the gulf war was from 
people in the rear areas, in the barracks hit by a Scud missile.
  So we have 116 and 1,124 people with this package of aircraft that 
are exposed and in harm's way, 16 and 179 people, in this package of 
aircraft, which we actually use; in this package of aircraft, which we 
are advocating to protect the option of building next year, we would 
have 4 people exposed--4 people in harm's way. Here you have a total of 
about 1,400 people in harm's way.
  I yield to my friend from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I just wish to associate myself with the 
remarks of our distinguished colleague from Hawaii, and indeed the 
chairman of the committee. Our colleague from Hawaii served with great 
distinction in World War II, and as I sat here listening to him I 
thought back to that period. I served for a very brief period, 
inconsequential compared to the Senator's distinguished record, in the 
war in some aviation units. Planes in World War II were $25,000, 
$30,000, $40,000, $50,000 apiece. At one time, Mr. President, the 
United States of America was turning out several thousand planes every 
month to meet the needs of that conflict. And here we are talking about 
but a few airplanes, projecting into a future which is most uncertain.
  A few days ago, when this bill was first put on the floor, I brought 
in the charts from the Defense Intelligence Agency which showed the 
trouble spots in the world today, June 1994--about 60 trouble spots 
where there is some type of armed conflict taking place, civil 
insurrection and otherwise. Just 6 years before, in another chart which 
I had prepared, there were but 32 trouble spots.
  So in a period of 6 years they have doubled throughout the world. 
This is not a safe world, as the Senator pointed out, and as has the 
chairman. I think this is a very prudent investment for our country, 
not for ourselves but for our children and our grandchildren into the 
year 2000, when we cannot predict the world in which we will live.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank my friend from Virginia.
  Mr. President, I yield such time as the Senator from California may 
require.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. I thank the Presiding Officer very much.
  I would like to thank the chairman of the Armed Services Committee 
for his remarks and also the distinguished Senator from Hawaii. I think 
they crystallized the arguments as well as I have heard.
  I also wish to thank my respected colleague from Michigan, who takes 
a dissenting view. I wish to share with the Senate how this California 
woman came really to believe in the Stealth technology of the B-2 
bomber. I first went to see the B-2 a few years ago, and I thought, 
well, this is pretty nice, very expensive, but I did not pay much 
attention to it.
  In August of 1991, as the Senator from Hawaii said, I watched on 
television as the Stealth fighter, the F-117, conducted 90 percent of 
the bombing missions in Baghdad, and I watched the laser-directed 
ordnance fly; I watched on my television set how very precise it was. I 
thought, my goodness, this is the technology of the future.
  Since that time, I went back twice to where the B-2 is being made. I 
had the privilege of naming No. 2 the ``Spirit of California.'' And I 
learned another fact which the chairman of the Armed Services Committee 
indicated. This plane is capable of taking off from Whiteman Air Force 
Base with two people aboard, refueling in midair, striking anywhere in 
the world, and returning home safely with very few people in harm's 
way, and with very little commitment of other aircraft or assets. And 
it can deliver a large payload, precision or carpet. It is truly a 
plane of the future.
  I spoke earlier with Secretary Perry in my office, prior to receiving 
the letter that Senator Levin read. Secretary Perry, in fact, indicated 
his commitment to Stealth technology and to the B-2. Of course, he had 
made an agreement with the Congress and in particular the House Armed 
Services Committee, an agreement of 20 total B-2's. Who would know how 
the world would change? As Senator Inouye said, who would have thought 
that we would be in a war with Iraq 3 years ago? Who knows what will 
happen with North Korea in the future?
  So I rise today to oppose the Levin amendment and in support of the 
Armed Services Committee's recommendation to preserve the bomber 
industrial base of the B-2. Let me say that I am not opposed to funding 
for base closure and reuse. My own State is the heaviest State hurt in 
the Nation by base closures, and BRAC funds are needed to ensure the 
timely and effective reuse and redevelopment of military bases.
  I understand, however, that there are large unobligated balances in 
the BRAC accounts that can be used to meet any near-term shortfall in 
funding and, moreover, that they roll over and are added to as the 
years go on. The Defense Department has yet to supply me or the 
Congress with a base-by-base plan with specific spending for BRAC-
related needs.
  Nevertheless, I strongly support BRAC funding. This bill fully 
authorizes the President's budget request of $2.7 billion for BRAC 
funding. Are additional funds necessary? Probably. And I would support 
other efforts to increase base closure and reuse funding if necessary. 
But, I can not support cutting funds to preserve the B-2 industrial 
base.
  As many of my colleagues know, the recent Bottom-Up Review, conducted 
by the Department of Defense to review United States military 
requirements and strategy in the post-cold-war world, endorsed a force 
of up to 184 long-range bombers with 100 bombers needed for a single 
major regional conflict.
  Some Pentagon officials are now planning on a force of only 100 total 
bombers. With a stated military requirement of fighting and winning two 
nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, a force of only 100 long-
range bombers could be inadequate to meet U.S. national security needs.
  In fact, in recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, General Loh, Commander of Air Combat Command, stated that 
the Nation needs to decide how many long-range bombers we need. He said 
that to complete the required mission, he needs 184. General Loh, the 
officer who must command our war-fighting aircraft in times of national 
emergency, has concluded that 100 bombers is not sufficient to meet our 
military needs. As he stated in congressional testimony, the United 
States, under current plans, has ``a gap in our bomber capabilities.''
  In addition, a recent Rand study that I hold here determined that 
Stealth bombers may be the only practical option for countering a 
sudden armored invasion in a distant part of the world during the 
critical early days of a future conventional conflict. The Rand study 
goes on to suggest that an increased B-2 force may be necessary.
  If additional B-2 aircraft are needed in the future, the prime 
contractor will be able to take advantage of the substantial investment 
in the program to date. The flyaway cost of each additional B-2 can be 
reduced to less than $600 million under a fixed-price contract. That is 
substantially less than the $2 billion figure that some people site as 
the cost of each B-2 bomber.
  But, this debate right now is not about authorizing additional B-2 
bombers. It is about preserving the option to purchase additional long-
range bombers in the future if the congressionally mandated Roles and 
Missions study, which is still ongoing, endorses a larger bomber force. 
This study will not be complete until next year and will carefully 
scrutinize this important issue.
  As the Pentagon's Roles and Missions study continues, one issue of 
immediate concern is the dissolution of the only bomber production 
facility in the United States. As many of my colleagues know, the first 
operational B-2 bomber was delivered to the Air Force on December 17, 
1993. By the end of this year, five B-2 aircraft, including the 
``Spirit of California'' will be operational and the last B-2 will be 
well into final fabrication at the assemble facility in Palmdale, CA.
  Unless action is taken now, in fiscal year 1995, to preserve the 
uniqueness of the B-2 industrial base, the only bomber production 
facility in the Nation will virtually evaporate within a few years. 
Once the B-2 industrial base disappears--including all the facilities, 
skilled work force, key suppliers and management capability--it is 
unlikely that the budget resources will be available in the future to 
recreate the more than $20 billion already invested in the program.
  Funding in fiscal year 1995 will halt further dismantling of the 
production infrastructure and preserve the ability to restart the B-2 
program at the lowest possible cost. Let me quote from the Senate Armed 
Services Committee report:

       Funds * * * are to preserve tooling in ready status, 
     preserve a production capability for spare parts within the 
     lower tier vendor structure, and develop detailed production 
     plans for conventional capability-only B-2 bombers.

  Here are some specific examples of what the funds will be used for:
  Halt the planned shutdown of key suppliers needed to build additional 
bombers. For example, the cathode ray tubes for multipurpose display 
units are going out of production unless action is taken soon; 
similarly, the ACES-2 ejection seat will soon be unavailable.
  Reestablish key suppliers who are already shut down, if they are on 
the critical path for first delivery of additional B-2s in the future.
  Begin requalification of hardware affected by obsolescence. For 
example, several replacement integrated circuit cards must be qualified 
for the Hughes radar; six parts of a ZSR item made by Loral Federal 
Systems are obsolescent and must be replaced.

  And, provide for inspection, repair and maintenance of tooling at 
Northrop, Boeing, and Vought facilities.
  The concept of preserving the industrial base is not new. Last year 
it was not new. This year it is not new. The Bottom-Up Review endorsed 
the concept of sustained low rate production of submarines, tanks, and 
aircraft carriers to ensure the industrial capability to meet future 
inventory requirements. The same logic would seem to apply to the 
unique capability to produce long-range stealth bombers as well.
  As General Loh said, ``the bomber industrial base provides this 
Nation with a unique capability''. The materials, processes, 
tolerances, and skill-mixes required for other fighter and commercial 
aircraft cannot sustain the B-2 industrial base. The very large 
composite structures, the manufacturing and materials processes that 
are used, and the special instruments used to measure low observable 
performance, are all unique to the B-2 bomber.
  $150 million is needed in fiscal year 1995 to maintain the unique 
capabilities of the B-2 industrial base until further consideration can 
be given to our long-range bomber force. This, in essence, is a holding 
pattern--it will preserve our options for the future.
  For this country to cut off like that the major stealth production 
our technology has created with no way in a cost-effective manner to 
recreate it, should the ``Roles and Missions'' study show that more are 
needed, I think is extraordinarily shortsighted and foolish.
  We have all talked about the world situation. Nobody should believe 
there is a safer world today. No one. As a matter of fact, it is a less 
safe world because more irresponsible people are obtaining 
sophisticated weapons and are willing to use them. And therefore, the 
use of a deep-penetrating, low-manpower, stealth, precision-guided 
delivery system bomber is truly the state of the art for the future.
  This Nation is now developing a strategy of conventional deterrence 
rather than the nuclear deterrence of the cold war. The Defense 
Department's recent review of military requirements concluded that 
stealth aircraft carrying precision guided munitions--so-called smart 
bombs--are the key to dealing with future contingencies anywhere in the 
world, whether in the Middle East, North Korea, or other international 
hot spots.
  And the B-2 bomber will play a key role in this new conventional 
deterrence mission.
  With the B-2 bomber, dictators like Saddam Hussein must worry about 
more than just what U.S. ships are off his coast or what NATO air bases 
are nearby. With a long-range Stealth bomber capable of striking any 
target anywhere in the world with precision guided bombs within hours, 
the Saddams of the future will now have to worry about the capacity of 
our Air Force to launch a strike from Whiteman Air Force Base and other 
domestic installations throughout the continental United States.
  Far from being a relic of the cold war, the B-2 bomber, with its 
enormous range, stealth technology, and ability to deliver large 
amounts of conventional smart bombs, stands in the vanguard of our 
ability to respond swiftly and effectively to any threat to our 
national security anywhere in the world.
  In fact, Secretary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall recently 
reaffirmed the importance of the B-2 bomber, saying that it will be the 
U.S. military's ``silver bullet'' capable of penetrating deep into 
enemy territory--unescorted and undetected--and dropping precision 
guided conventional weapons right on target.
  The B-2 is the most technological advanced aircraft in existence. Its 
long range and large payload project the power and weight of this 
Nation worldwide. In fact, the B-2 can strike any target anywhere in 
the world with just one mid-air refueling.
  I am absolutely confident that stealth technology makes military and 
fiscal sense.
  As the Senator from Georgia, the distinguished chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, pointed out, because you need fewer unescorted B-2 
bombers to do the job of scores of other bombers, fighters, and 
tankers, stealth technology puts fewer lives at risk and is, in the 
long run, cost effective.
  I make no bones about being a supporter of the B-2. It is important, 
first of all, to our national security. It is also important to the 
State of California--22,000 jobs in my State depend on the B-2 program. 
For California, the B-2 means $2.5 billion in contracts, and more than 
4,500 active subcontractors and suppliers.
  At a time when California is being so hard hit by defense downsizing 
and military base closure--250,000 jobs lost just in the last 2 years 
alone--the B-2 is extremely important to the well-being and economic 
health of our State and to the national security of our entire Nation.
  The debate on whether to continue B-2 production beyond the 20 
aircraft already authorized will occur sometime in the future. The B-52 
force--which, by the way, is fully authorized and protected in this 
bill--is aging. While I also support the B-1B program, its bomber force 
may not be sufficient in number to meet U.S. needs, and it confronts 
some developmental challenges before it can be fully operational for 
conventional missions.
  At some point in the future, the administration and Congress will 
need to address the requirements of the Air Force's long-range bomber 
force. However, sustainment of the bomber industrial base must be 
addressed in fiscal year 1995.
  A modest investment in fiscal year 1995--not requiring a commitment 
to new aircraft--would hold the B-2 industrial team together until the 
Roles and Missions study is complete and further consideration can be 
given to the future of our long-range bomber force.
  Hence, I fully support the Senate Armed Services Committee's action 
to recommend the authorization of $150 million in fiscal year 1995 to 
preserve the bomber industrial base. I urge my colleagues to oppose the 
Levin amendment.
  Thank you Mr. President, and I yield the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from California, because 
she has mastered this subject in a very short period of time. She has 
been very interested in the B-2 from the day she arrived here. She has 
been enormously helpful in our committee deliberations on the B-2, and 
she is enormously helpful on the floor.
  So I cannot think of a better ally in this important fight for our 
security than the Senator from California. I might also say that it is 
not always true, but in this case it is true, that what is in the best 
interest of jobs in the very important State of California is also very 
much in the best interest of our Nation's security. That is a happy 
merger between economic effect and also national security interests. I 
am not supporting this program because of the job effects in 
California. I welcome those effects, because I think it is important. 
But the value of this program is the national security of the United 
States. In years to come, people will recognize that, however this vote 
goes.
  I remember very well when the Department of Defense wanted to stop 
building F-117's, which were the first stealth aircraft we had. At that 
time, that program was a black program; it was not a program that was 
even out in the open. We had about 26 of those aircraft. Some of us, a 
few of us, insisted we go ahead and continue producing those aircraft. 
We produced up to 44 aircraft. Every single one of those aircraft they 
could get in the Persian Gulf was there. That was the most valuable 
asset they had in the Persian Gulf.
  So we now have a Department of Defense saying they do not want any 
more B-2's. But I can assure you, Mr. President, if they see the Senate 
of the United States standing up for B-2, I think we will have a little 
more courageous position from the Department of Defense on the B-2. 
This aircraft is enormously important, and there are plenty of people 
in the Department of Defense, including the Secretary of Defense 
himself, who understand that very well.
  I know the Senator from Nebraska, who is the chairman of the 
subcommittee and a leader on the Armed Services Committee, wishes to 
speak. I am delighted that he is here on the floor.
  I yield whatever time I have remaining to the Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I made a lengthy talk on the whole defense 
authorization bill last Friday, and I will try to not repeat too much 
of that tonight in my remarks.
  Let me start out by saying that the decision which was reached in the 
subcommittee I chair, which has jurisdiction over our whole strategic 
force program and nuclear defense, was not made on where jobs would be 
located or whether or not it would be a good investment to have jobs in 
a certain place. We did not make this decision, Mr. President, on the 
basis of how good the B-2 is, how stealthy it is, what it could do in a 
certain situation, although we were thoroughly familiar with that. I 
was, rather, interested in the debate tonight, to see a rehash and re-
explanation of the critical role that the B-2 bomber is going to play 
in the future national defense posture and in the defense of the United 
States of America.
  Mr. President, I find myself at odds with some of my closest friends 
and associates in the U.S. Senate. I have listened to their remarks in 
opposition to the very limited amount of money--considering the $270 
billion defense budget--to protect the interests of the United States 
of America should we be faced with a challenge in the immediate future 
and to give this administration and this Pentagon a chance to better 
explain what their bomber program is for now and in the future.
  My good friend, Senator Carl Levin, from Michigan, and I came to the 
Senate together. We sat side by side on the Armed Services Committee. 
He has made some very interesting points and, from his perspective, I 
think a good case as to why the limited amount of money that we are 
providing to buy the insurance policy for the future should be 
transferred to some worthy cause like helping out on the base closing 
expenses. As important as that help might be, I have been convinced 
that we are taking the right course of action, and I would like to 
briefly map, if I might, the scenario that we find ourselves in.
  It is true that we had previously agreed to not buy more than 20 B-
2's. It is true, as my friend and colleague from Michigan said and as I 
have said in debate, when we finally closed off the B-2 bomber program 
at 20--Senator Levin, I think, quoted me correctly when he said that 
the Senator from Nebraska said, ``We should put the B-2 bomber to rest, 
we should give it a decent burial.''
  I said that, Mr. President, because over the objections and best 
judgment of this Senator, the then Bush administration, in my opinion, 
caved in far too early and surrendered what I thought was an 
unfortunate, tragic decision: To limit the B-2 bomber purchase to only 
20. Originally, all we were talking about were 132 of those, and they 
cut that in half down to 75, and I was prepared at that particular 
time, if necessary, to come down to 50 or even 30 or 40. I objected.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Nebraska has 
expired.
  Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield to my friend some of the remaining 
time I have. How much time will the Senator need?
  Mr. EXON. I am sorry. May I have another 5 minutes?
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield the Senator another 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized for an 
additional 5 minutes.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I am trying to put this in perspective and 
not be too repetitious. I thought it was a bad move to cut it off at 
20. But then we had an argument on the floor of the Senate, whose words 
I have been quoted as using, even to get 20 bombers, and that is what I 
was talking about.
  I was simply saying, Mr. President, that at that time, however, I had 
no idea, I had no inclination that this administration and this 
Pentagon would come up with a Bottom-Up Review that makes absolutely no 
sense whatsoever with regard to the inventory of bombers to meet a two-
front war in the future.
  I simply point out, Mr. President, that the figures we should keep in 
mind when we decide which way we should vote on this is that we are 
spending $150 million in the next fiscal year if the recommendations of 
the committee follow--$150 million. But half of that, $75 million of 
it, is for an advanced purchase of parts for the B-2 bomber that we 
would be required to purchase at some later date whether or not we cut 
off the production at 20, which we still might do.
  So $75 million of the $150 million, or roughly half of it, is an 
expenditure that we are obligated to spend anyway. What about the other 
$75 million? The other $75 million for the B-2 program is an insurance 
policy. The insurance policy is simply this:
  Mr. President, I do not believe that my house is going to burn down 
next year, but that does not mean that I am going to cancel the policy 
and save the money and transfer it to a Base Closure Commission.
  I am simply saying that the $75 million that we have in this program, 
as I have outlined, is to keep that line warm so that if, within the 
next year, we should have a serious conflict or be threatened with a 
serious conflict in Korea, if things should turn around in the Soviet 
Union and the Soviet Union would become a real threat again, which they 
are not now, if either one or both of those things should happen, or if 
we would become involved in combat somewhere else, I can hear the cry 
across America, ``What are we going to do to arm ourselves?'' And the 
Members of the U.S. Senate on both sides of the aisle will be falling 
all over themselves to improve our bomber program.
  I do not know whether that is going to happen. I do not know whether 
we are going to build any more B-2's or not. I simply say with the 
inefficient Bottom-Up Review, with the fact that the administration did 
not make a case or an explanation of what they were doing, I do not 
happen to believe that 100 bombers is a sufficient force.
  Senator Nunn and others have shown clearly the capacity of the B-2. 
So I say this decision was made, Mr. President, after careful 
consideration, after this Senator rejected earlier plans and programs 
to spend up to $700 million and $750 million to keep that line open. We 
have come down to what I think is a bargain of an insurance policy for 
$75 million, to give this administration a chance to straighten out 
their thinking on what the bombers are and to explain that in terms 
that we can understand in the Armed Services Committee, which has 
jurisdiction.
  I hope we will not accept the amendment offered by Senator Levin, and 
I may have a little more to say on this in the morning.
  I thank my colleagues, and I thank my friend from Michigan for 
yielding me time from his side. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has 25 minutes and 
40 seconds.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, earlier tonight I quoted from some letters from the 
Defense Department. These are important letters because they come from 
people who are stealth supporters.
  These are important letters because the father of stealth is 
Secretary Perry. If anyone is aware of the use of stealth technology, 
it is the person who probably did more than any other single person to 
bring stealth technology to this country: The Secretary of Defense. The 
Secretary of Defense says we do not need more and we cannot afford 
more.
  There has to be an end to programs, and this end of 20 was with two 
Presidents and three Secretaries of Defense, and Congress twice has 
determined this is where it should end.
  Perhaps of all of the quotes from this lengthy letter of the 
Secretary of Defense, the most compelling is the following. He says:

       One of the most difficult questions we have thus far to 
     face in our strategic planning about our defense industrial 
     base is the one about our Stealth bomber production capacity.

  Then he says:

       Given my deep personal conviction about the military 
     importance of Stealth for nearly two decades, you can well 
     imagine why I have wanted to make sure we get this one right, 
     and I believe we have.

  Then he goes on for about 2 pages to explain why we should not be 
adding money for this so-called industrial base.
  Even more recently than that letter, which was dated in February, is 
a letter from the Deputy Secretary, John Deutch, who says that the 
Department has taken the necessary steps to deal with the B-2 
industrial base and programmatic issues. He said that based on a 
careful analysis of the industrial base, war fighting--the kind of 
chart we just saw--and budgetary implications of an enlarged B-2 fleet, 
the Department cannot support further purchases of B-2 aircraft or 
actions that would contribute to that end.
  Mr. President, in addition to the fact that the Defense Department, 
which is led by Stealth supporters, has said that it is right, that we 
have stability in the program, and that we end it, we have the fact 
that we have tremendous capability not reflected on the chart we just 
saw, which is important capability.
  It has to be added to the capability that we consider that goes into 
the decision that Congress made, three Secretaries of Defense, and two 
Presidents to terminate B-2 production.
  As the Bottom-Up Review stated, the Defense Department says that 
``theater air forces''--not the long-range bombers, but theater air 
forces--``will undoubtedly play an even greater role in any future 
conflict in which the United States is engaged.''
  Mr. President, these forces include the Navy forward-deployed 
aircraft carrier forces, which can respond quickly to crises around the 
world. The Navy and the Marine Corps today have some 1,600 strike 
aircraft, many of which carry highly accurate guided weapons that can 
attack critical ground targets early in a conflict.
  The Air Force has an even larger inventory of theater strike 
aircraft, some 2,300.
  So all told, the Defense Department today has about 3,900 theater 
aircraft with precision or very accurate weapons that can be used to 
attack critical ground targets.
  By the way, the 20 B-2 bombers that we have will not have 
conventional capability until the end of the decade. The 3,900 strike 
aircraft have precision capability now. And these 3,900 aircraft are in 
addition to our other long-range bombers and the other accurate ground 
attack weapons like the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile, which are 
not even counted in this figure.
  A few more details on the numbers: On the chart, Navy and Marine 
Corps now have 1,600 strike aircraft, most of which can deliver 
precision guided munitions. These include the following aircraft: The 
A-6E, FA-18A, FA-18C/D, the FA-14A/B, armed with a variety of precision 
weapons. These weapons include the stand-off land-attack missile, the 
SLAM, the Walleye I and Walleye II, LGB-10, LGB-12, LGB-16, GBU-24, the 
IR Maverick, and the Laser Maverick.
  And, by the way, after the turn of the decade, the Navy expects to 
have 1,300 strike aircraft, all with precision strike capability, 
including the FA-18E/F multiroll fighter and the new weapons now being 
developed.
  Future weapons: Future weapons that we are now paying for for these 
aircraft include the joint direct attack munition, the joint stand-off 
weapons, the triservice stand-off attack weapon, and the SLAM expanded 
response missile, in addition to all the weapons that are already in 
the inventory.
  So today, we have 1,600 Navy strike aircraft, with 10 types of highly 
accurate strike weapons. And, by the way, the green dots are the ones 
with stand-off capability, the ones with precision munitions that can 
stand away from the target and still hit the target. The Air Force has 
2,300 strike aircraft of 10 varieties that can carry precision or 
highly accurate weapons.
  And none of these capabilities include our bomber forces in the 
totals, and none of them include the long-range sea launch cruise 
missiles that can be fired from all of our attack submarines and many 
of our surface ships from hundreds of miles away from the target, as 
they did in Desert Storm.
  So we have to take all of our capability into account. Each one of 
these weapons systems has a capability that another weapons system does 
not have. The Tomahawk cruise missile has a capability that the B-2 
does not have; that is, to hit a target without any pilot and with 
greater accuracy than anything.
  Mr. President, we have to terminate some weapons systems. We have to 
make some choices in terms of dollars.
  At one point, we finally terminated the Stealth fighter, the F-117. 
We made a decision to terminate it. The same argument, I am sure, was 
made: How can we possibly terminate the F-117 at 50 when you compare 
the Stealth capability of the F-117 to all the other aircraft we have, 
the F-16, F-15?
  On that same chart we just saw, we saw that the Stealth fighters were 
the fighters we used the most in Iraq. We terminated that at 50, 
approximately.
  At some point you terminate a system, when you balance it with all 
the other systems that you have, even though the system may have a 
unique capability, such as the F-117 and the B-2. You have to terminate 
systems when simply a decision is made in the total overall balance of 
weaponry that you have enough as part of an overall inventory which, 
together with all the other capability that you have, gives you enough 
to meet potential threats.
  We cannot afford more B-2's. The Congress has decided it twice, as 
have two Presidents. That is why the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 
General McPeak, stated just this year: ``We are not asking for more B-
2's.'' This is the head of the Air Force.

       We are not asking for more B-2's. Quite frankly, the real 
     problem with the B-2 is the price, the cost. It is very 
     expensive. So on the forward financial planning assumptions 
     that we are making, we do not see the headroom to drive more 
     B-2's in there.

  Mr. President, the chart that we saw earlier is a chart that has been 
used many, many times before. It shows us the capability of the B-2, 
which we do not doubt. What it does not show is what else is in our 
inventory which has tremendous capability, standoff capability, 
capability with no pilots at risk whatsoever, capability which was 
used, by the way, in the war against Iraq with tremendous success.
  You have to look at the whole picture; not just one piece and compare 
it to two other pieces, at the whole picture. And when you look at the 
whole picture, I think you reach the conclusion that what Congress 
twice has voted to do, and what the Secretary of Defense urges us to 
stick with, is a program of 20 B-2 bombers.
  Now I said a little earlier tonight that I supported the B-2 bomber 
when we decided to produce the B-2. I did it because it provided a 
capability which other equipment, other bombers, other planes, did not 
have.
  But we also made, I believe, a decision which gave some stability to 
this program to terminate the B-2 at 20. And one of the things which I 
think is important to all of us that have to budget these defense 
dollars is the consequences of opening, reopening, terminating, 
reopening, keeping an option open, keeping a door open for programs. 
What does that do to the program?
  And this is where Secretary Perry again urges us to stick with the 
decision that we have made, when he writes: ``We should also be aware 
of the possible consequences of reopening the debate on the B-2.'' This 
is Secretary Perry speaking. ``One of the most devilish threats to any 
weapons program is instability, financial and political. For years, the 
B-2 program was plagued by not knowing how many planes we were going to 
build or how much money would be available. Whatever one's personal 
views on the substance of the 1992 B-2 agreement''--that is the one 
that says terminate it at 20 --``it has given the program an essential 
stability so that we are now able to get the job done.''
  Let us not destabilize this program again. As everybody said, just 
about--B-2 supporters and B-2 opponents--back in 1992, when the 
decision was made to terminate this at 20, let us agree to end this 
program at 20 and not keep opening, closing, opening, closing this 
program.
  It is a statement which John Deutch has also made to us in recent 
days. And that is that, ``The introduction of additional funding 
uncertainty in the future of the B-2 program would be an unfortunate 
return to a period that we have put behind us.''
  I believe we ought to listen Secretary Perry, Secretary Deutch, the 
Chief of Staff of Air Force, and listen to our own judgment that we 
have made twice when we looked at the same chart which we saw earlier 
tonight and decided that we would terminate this program--an important 
program--at 20.
  This is not an issue over whether or not the B-2 is an important part 
of our overall program. We already decided that. We decided to build 20 
B-2's at tremendous expense.
    
    
  The issue that we are going to decide is whether or not we are going 
to add $150 million, which the Defense Department did not ask for, to 
keep alive the possibility of building more of these, when we have 
previously made a decision based on the same arguments and balances 
that were shown on that chart we saw earlier tonight. The same chart 
was presented to us a year ago. Based on those arguments and those 
balances, Congress decided unanimously, I believe, in the Senate, by a 
vote on the Leahy amendment last year, to end this program at 20 B-2's.
  We should stick to that and use the money, instead of adding it to 
the budget in a way that the Defense Department is not requesting, 
instead of doing that, we should use it for something which the 
Department is requesting and which we need, which is to restore money 
to the base closing fund and the cleanup fund for bases that are being 
closed, which we, in effect, borrowed from that fund earlier this year 
when we had a California earthquake.
  We took $500 million from that cleanup and reuse fund. We are $500 
million short of carrying out a commitment that we have made to the 
American people that when we vote to close bases we are going to 
promptly provide for the reuse and the environmental cleanup.
  We can keep two commitments if we adopt this amendment. One that we 
made to cap the program, the B-2 program, at 20; the second commitment 
we can keep is to the American people relative to what we are going to 
do when we vote to close bases.
  We have voted to close those bases. We promised that we would have a 
prompt reuse and environmental cleanup. We have now not carried out 
that commitment when we effectively borrowed $500 million from the fund 
for that purpose.
  We should restore the $150 million to that fund instead of using it 
for a purpose that the Defense Department does not seek and which will 
again bring instability to a program which we stabilized twice in the 
Congress of the United States.
  I yield the floor and reserve the remainder of my time, if any. I do 
not know if there is any time remaining.
    
    
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Simon). The Senator has 9 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. LEVIN. I reserve the remainder of it.
  Mr. NUNN. If the Senator will yield to me about 5 minutes I think I 
can wrap up.
  Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield to my friend from Georgia, 5 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have to say any case the Senator from 
Michigan makes is always a strong case because he is a student of the 
defense programs. And any time I am on the different side of a question 
from him I know there is going to be a very good argument here. But I 
must say I was a little bit amused--if the Senator can move that chart 
so I can communicate with him? I think I have it memorized now.
  I was a little amused when the Senator from Michigan has an amendment 
which would basically bury this program and end it forever and he says 
this is bad for a program to be destabilized. He is saying, if we do 
not pass the Levin amendment this program is destabilized. I would view 
the program as dead if we do pass the Levin amendment. I think the 
choice between being destabilized and dead is a pretty interesting 
choice.
  I am reminded of the story about the man who had the heart attack and 
was being taken in for burial in a coffin--his wife was right behind--
and the pallbearers let the coffin slip and it hit the ground. As they 
were picking it up, all of a sudden they realized there was movement 
inside. They opened up the coffin and to their great shock the man was 
still alive. They rushed him to the hospital, he was revived and lived 
for another 3 years in a very healthy fashion. Then the same thing 
happened to him; he had another heart attack and died.
  The same wife was there the next time. She told the pallbearers, 
``Please be a little more careful with the coffin this time.''
  I say to the Senator, the choice between being buried and dead, and 
destabilized is an easy choice. So I say the amendment of the Senator 
would basically bury this program.
  Mr. President, this program may end up getting buried. We may do it 
tomorrow in a vote. We may do it by not having any renewal of the 
program, even if this amendment passes and goes through the conference 
and is funded. But what this effort is, is a good faith effort to tell 
the Congress of the United States and the American people it will be a 
mistake if we do not build more than 20 B-2's. It will be a fundamental 
national security mistake that this country will regret. I do not have 
any doubt about that. It is just a question of when we realize it.
  I hope we do not have to have a war to realize it. I hope we do not 
have to have a war in Korea or a war in the Middle East or anywhere 
else to realize it. But at some point it will become abundantly clear 
this Defense Department and this administration does not have a bomber 
program that can sustain the Bottom-Up Review scenarios in the future. 
It just cannot do it.
  Mr. President, one of my good friends in this town--I have known him 
for a long time--is Deputy Secretary John Deutch. He is a great guy and 
he is a great Deputy Secretary of Defense. I have been restrained in my 
criticism of the DOD leadership on the bomber question because I not 
only like both Secretary Perry and Secretary Deutch personally, but I 
think they are outstanding defense leaders. I would have to say, 
though, on the bomber question they have bombed. This is an area of the 
budget where they have not done a good job. I think they realize it. 
That is the reason we have three studies going on now. They have not 
done their analytical homework on the bomber question. They may come to 
the same conclusion, but it would be based on a real analysis. So far 
we do not have one.
  I had assumed with all four defense committees being critical of the 
bomber program that they would take an objective relook at that 
program. However, Secretary Deutch sent a letter out, which Senator 
Levin has already read. It looks like he is sticking by what anyone who 
has analyzed this program knows is a seriously flawed kind of bomber 
proposal put forward by the administration--not simply on the question 
of the B-2 but far beyond that. They were planning, before our bill, to 
retire a large number of B-52's and not to put any conventional 
capability really on a large number of B-1's, making the situation even 
more flawed.
  I think it needs to be pointed out that Mr. Deutch's letter is simply 
in contradiction to the Secretary of Defense himself, Secretary Perry. 
There is no way you can fully credit Secretary Perry's testimony before 
the Inouye committee and also believe that the Deutch letter is an 
accurate, sound letter. Mr. Deutch has been consistent on bombers but 
he has been consistently wrong on bombers this year. I hope he will 
take another look at his position. For example, in his letter to 
Senator Levin he writes, quoting from the Deutch letter: ``The 
Department has taken the necessary steps to deal with the B-2 
industrial base and programmatic issues.''
  ``The necessary steps,'' is what he says.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, may I have another 3 minutes?
  Mr. LEVIN. I would like to reserve at least 4 or 5 to myself to 
answer the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan yields how much 
time?
  Mr. LEVIN. How much time do I have left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. You have 3 minutes 10 seconds left.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, if I could get maybe 30 seconds here?
  Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to yield 30 seconds.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, Secretary Perry says, quoting him--this is 
his testimony, ``We don't have anything in our program to sustain a 
bomber industrial base.'' He goes on to say, without quoting his whole 
letter, ``* * * so I would say this is a weakness in the budget 
proposal.''
  He makes it very clear that he is unhappy with the Department of 
Defense's own proposal and they have a long way to go.
  I thank the Senator from Michigan. I will rest the case on the fact 
the Deutch letter is simply not a credible position based on the 
Secretary of Defense's own testimony.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I quoted at greater length from the 
Secretary of Defense's letter and I will repeat that since there has 
been a suggestion that Secretary Deutch's position is different from 
Secretary Perry's.
  Secretary Perry said in a letter earlier this year that one of the 
most difficult questions we have faced thus far in our strategic 
planning about our defense industrial base is the one about Stealth 
bomber production capacities.
  Given now-Secretary Perry's personal convictions about the military 
importance of Stealth for nearly two decades, ``You can imagine why I 
have wanted to make sure we get this one right. And I believe we 
have.'' That is Secretary Perry. And then he tells us how he has done 
it, in two paragraphs which I have already put into the Record. So 
there is no conflict whatsoever between Deputy Secretary Deutch and 
Secretary Perry. Quite the opposite. Secretary Perry's letter is a very 
lengthy statement as to why we should not be adding $150 million or any 
other sum to this program to keep alive the possibility that we are 
going to build more B-2 bombers that we cannot afford and do not need.
  As far as the question of keeping this program going, again raising 
the possibility that more B-2's will be built: We have already decided 
not to build more B-2's. It was Senator Nunn, a great chairman and a 
good friend, who said when we stopped the program at 20, ``I urge my 
colleagues to agree to conclude the B-2 program at 20 as requested, and 
to put this divisive issue finally behind us.''
  That is what Senator Nunn said when we thought we put the divisive 
issue finally behind us: Buried, done, finished at 20.
  Now the Armed Services Committee has added $150 million to now 
reraise this issue. It is a mistake for all the reasons that Secretary 
Perry and Secretary Deutch told us. It adds instability to the program. 
This amendment of mine does not kill the program. We capped the program 
at 20, twice--2 years ago and 1 year ago.
  I thank the Chair and again I thank my good friends from Georgia and 
Virginia, for the quality of this debate. We differ on it. I also do 
not like differing with either one of them but once in a while it 
happens. When it does, it happens. So be it. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time on this amendment tonight has 
expired.
  Under the previous order the amendment is set aside in order for the 
Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner] to offer an amendment regarding 
military COLA's.
  The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am going to ask unanimous consent at 
this time that the Senate lay aside the pending bill and proceed as in 
morning business for not to exceed 5 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Warner and Mr. Graham pertaining to the 
introduction of S. 2258 are located in today's Record under 
``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. WARNER. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate return to the 
bill for the Defense Department authorization.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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