[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 85 (Wednesday, June 29, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 29, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
      FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED AGENCIES 
                        APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1995

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  Mr. LAUTENBERG addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from New 
Jersey [Mr. Lautenberg].
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, some time ago, I offered an amendment 
that I understood was accepted by both sides on this bill.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. I will be happy to yield.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I specifically said it had not yet been cleared on the 
Republican side.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. I thought in fairness to the distinguished ranking 
member of the subcommittee that that was kind of an afterthought and 
that it had been cleared because it was my understanding through the 
staffs that the amendment----
  Mr. McCONNELL. I say to my friend from New Jersey, it has not yet 
been cleared. We are working on that and hope to get back to him 
shortly.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Then I stand corrected.
  Mr. President, I ask what the pending business is, please?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is the amendment offered 
by the Senator from New Jersey to the first committee amendment.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Have the yeas and nays been ordered?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. They have not.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The vote, when taken, will be by the yeas and 
nays.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, in deference to the bill managers, I 
will wait now and relinquish the floor. I relinquish the floor at the 
moment to come back to perhaps a vote a while later.
  Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Vermont 
[Mr. Leahy].
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, just so everybody will understand my 
position on this amendment, I raised some points that I may raise again 
either in conference or later in working with the administration. I 
support the amendment of the Senator from New Jersey, and I will vote 
for the amendment by the Senator from New Jersey. I share his 
frustration and the frustration of the Senator from California [Mrs. 
Feinstein], at the enormous cost being borne by many of our States, and 
by the Federal Government in some instances, for people who are in this 
country illegally, who have been prosecuted, convicted, sent to jail 
for violent crimes, who should be sent back to their countries, and we 
are unable to get the countries to take them back. So the taxpayers get 
stuck with the bill. If I recall the debate earlier today, the Senator 
from New Jersey said about 45,000.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Fifty-eight.
  Mr. LEAHY. Fifty-eight thousand.
  Fifty-eight thousand people is larger than all but one county in my 
State, just to put it in perspective. These are foreign citizens. We 
know it can mean tens of thousands of dollars for one person 
incarcerated. So we are talking about hundreds of millions of dollars 
or more being paid for by the State of New Jersey and the State of 
California, and, I suspect, the States of many other Senators 
represented here are paying this bill.
  So I hope that we will vote on it soon, and I will vote for it.
  Mr. PRESSLER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from South 
Dakota [Mr. Pressler].
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I have three amendments that have been 
agreed to. I could do them very quickly if we could lay aside the 
pending amendment and do these three amendments, and I do not plan to 
take more than a minute or two on each one.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I do not 
expect I will, but I am not sure I know which are the amendments the 
Senator from----
  Mr. PRESSLER. If the Senator will talk with staff, he has all three 
of them. I will explain what they are.
  Mr. LEAHY. If the Senator will withhold just a minute and let me 
finish.
  Mr. PRESSLER. The Senator's staff has all of them, and they have been 
cleared. I will send them over.
  Mr. LEAHY. If the Senator will just let me finish my sentence. I know 
he wants to be helpful. Could he just tell me briefly what the three 
amendments are he is talking about because we are going to have to ask 
the Senator from New Jersey if he will be willing to set aside his 
amendment to do this.
  Mr. PRESSLER. I have two amendments actually.
  Mr. LEAHY. I am sorry. I misunderstood. I thought the Senator said 
three.
  Mr. PRESSLER. I have two.
  Mr. LEAHY. And what are they about?
  Mr. PRESSLER. The first of the two amendments is a Buy America 
amendment. It declares a U.S. firm should be given equal opportunity to 
bid for U.N. acquisition needs, both peacekeeping and other 
acquisitions.
  Additionally, this amendment says no funds appropriated by the 
foreign operations appropriations bill should be obligated or expended 
to pay U.S. voluntary contributions to U.N. peacekeeping activities 
unless the Secretary of State can certify that U.S. companies are being 
given a fair shake.
  Mr. President, as you know, the United States currently pays 30.4 
percent of U.N. peacekeeping costs. U.S. manufacturers need to be 
assured of the same opportunities to provide equipment, services and 
material that foreign manufacturers have.
  My second amendment specifically addresses procurement problems 
associated with the telecommunications industry. This sense-of-the-
Congress amendment calls on the administration--it does not require 
it--to use a reciprocal standard when considering awarding 
telecommunications contracts or when buying products from primary 
foreign telecommunications firms.
  Additionally, if a foreign-owned firm discriminates against U.S. 
firms in awarding contracts or making Government-financed purchases, 
the amendment says that the administration should review critically 
such contracts and purchases.
  This amendment expresses the sentiment that the United States should 
expect other countries to allow U.S. firms equal access to 
telecommunications contracts and procurement if foreign firms are 
expected to be able to participate in projects financed by U.S. foreign 
aid.
  I urge my colleagues to support these two probusiness amendments.
  Mr. LEAHY. The Senator's staff has given us three amendments. He has 
given us two amendments.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Yes, there is a third amendment. It relates to the----
  Mr. LEAHY. Is the Senator speaking of three amendments or two 
amendments?
  Mr. PRESSLER. Three amendments.
  Mr. LEAHY. We are back to three.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Back to three.
  Mr. LEAHY. We started at three, went to two, and are back to three.
  Mr. PRESSLER. That is right. That is exactly correct. And there was 
no sleight of hand.
  My third amendment is a sense-of-the-Congress amendment. It would 
allow U.S. payments in kind for U.N. peacekeeping assessments.
  In other words, this amendment would encourage the contribution of 
U.S. goods and services in payment of our U.N. peacekeeping assessed 
costs. The United States could contribute excess defense equipment or 
other articles to peacekeeping operations and these contributions would 
be credited to the U.S. assessed costs. With the lion's share of the 
peacekeeping assessments--30.4 percent--the United States should be 
able to count goods and services against overall peacekeeping assessed 
costs.


       Amendment No. 2104 to Committee Amendment Page 2, line 12

  Mr. LEAHY. Now that I understand what the amendments are, I will 
object to going forward with those because I think we are about to 
dispose of the Lautenberg amendment. And while the Senator from New 
Jersey is still in the Chamber, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the yeas and nays be withdrawn on the Lautenberg amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and 
it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEAHY. I ask, Mr. President, for the adoption of the Lautenberg 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate then on amendment No. 
2104 offered by the Senator from New Jersey?
  Hearing none, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  So the amendment (No. 2104) was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont [Mr. Leahy].
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, it is now, of course, open for the Senator 
from South Dakota to send forward the amendments that he wishes. I 
would note, though, on discussions he had on Buy America, I would not 
object to that because I have already been advised that we are getting 
a fairly significant share of the peacekeeping equipment in America 
anyway. In fact, considering how much in arrears we are in a lot of our 
payments, as much in arrears as the United States is in its payments to 
the peacekeeping funds, we should probably be happy that other 
countries have not argued that they buy only the amount of American 
goods as we are in our payments because I suspect that, if other 
nations took that attitude, we would find the U.N. buying a lot less 
American equipment.
  I am not going to object to that particular amendment. I just hope 
that it does not become of high profile to other countries because they 
might start calling up and asking just how much in arrears we are and 
start suggesting they buy a lot less.
  Now, I would object very much to taking money out of our 
appropriations and our allocation, as the Senator from South Dakota 
does in another one of his amendments, to pay for the allocations and 
the appropriations in another appropriation, that is, State-Justice-
Commerce, which it appears to be.
  But I mention this, and, of course, the Senator can send any one of 
his amendments to the desk and we can debate them and decide where to 
go with them.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair inquires of the Senator from South 
Dakota whether the Senator intends to amend the pending first committee 
amendment or whether the Senator wishes to set aside that amendment and 
introduce this amendment.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Parliamentary inquiry. Would it be simpler--I think I 
will offer two of my amendments en bloc. We have two of them agreed on 
for sure.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I do not want to be difficult on this, but 
we started with three amendments, came to two amendments, went back to 
three amendments. And before I start agreeing to anything, I would want 
to know which amendment we are talking about.
  I think maybe it would be a lot quicker just to send the amendments 
one by one, debate them, and dispose of them.


                           Amendment No. 2115

    (Purpose: To express the sense of Congress that funds should be 
restricted unless United States firms are given opportunities equal to 
    foreign firms for supplying goods and services for peacekeeping 
                              activities).

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, the pending 
committee amendments will be set aside, and the clerk will report the 
first amendment sent to the desk by the Senator from South Dakota.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Pressler] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2115.

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 112, between lines 9 and 10, insert the following 
     new section:


                              buy america

       Sec.   . (a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise 
     made available by this Act may be obligated or expended to 
     pay any United States voluntary contribution for United 
     Nations peacekeeping activities unless the Secretary of State 
     determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional 
     committees that United States manufacturers and suppliers are 
     being given opportunities to provide equipment, services, and 
     material for such activities equal to those being given to 
     foreign manufacturers and suppliers for such activities and 
     for other United Nations acquisition needs.
       (b) For purpose of this section, the term ``appropriate 
     congressional committees'' means the Committees on 
     Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of 
     Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations and 
     Foreign Relations of the Senate.

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I have already explained this amendment.
  Mr. LEAHY. To make life easier, Mr. President, for the Senator from 
South Dakota, we are willing to accept this. In fact, I would hope we 
might do as little fanfare as possible. Other countries that are 
concerned about us being in arrears in our payments know what we are 
doing. They will not be losing sales to America, not the other way 
around.
  Mr. PRESSLER. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment? If 
not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from 
South Dakota.
  The amendment (No. 2115) was agreed to.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the amendment was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the motion to lay on the 
table is agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 2116

       (Purpose: To express the sense of the Congress regarding 
     telecommunications procurement)

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Pressler], proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2116.

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 112, between lines 9 and 10, insert the following 
     new section:


                     telecommunications procurement

       Sec.   . It is the sense of the Congress that the Agency 
     for International Development, and other agencies as 
     appropriate, should take steps to ensure that United States 
     firms are not unfairly disadvantaged in procurement 
     opportunities related to promoting development through 
     telecommunications enhancement. The Congress expects that 
     high technology firms primarily owned by nationals of 
     countries which deny procurement opportunities to United 
     States firms will not be eligible to bid on procurement 
     opportunities funded by programs in this Act. In particular, 
     the Congress would oppose such purchases if the government of 
     that country restricts American manufacturers of the same 
     high technology products from government procurement or 
     government-financed programs.

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, this amendment calls on the 
administration--it does not require them--to use a reciprocal standard 
in considering awarding telecommunications contracts when buying 
products from primary foreign-owned telecommunications firms. If a 
foreign owned firm discriminates against U.S. firms in awarding 
contracts or making Government-financed purchases, the administration 
should review critically such contract purchases.
  This amendment expresses the sentiment that the U.S. should expect 
other countries to allow U.S. firms equal access to telecommunications 
products and procurement if foreign firms are expected to be able to 
participate in projects financed by U.S. foreign aid.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  Mr. PRESSLER. I urge adoption of the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from South Dakota.
  The amendment (No. 2116) was agreed to.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the amendment was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the motion to lay on the 
table is agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I would suggest that, regarding the third 
amendment of the Senator from South Dakota which he is considering to 
offer, payments in kind, insofar as that is not something within the 
jurisdiction of this appropriations bill or this subcommittee, at least 
for the time being he may want to withhold that, and find out whether 
there is any way within the jurisdiction of it. Because I do not want 
to have other chairmen and ranking members down here, as well as the 
chairman, and the distinguished ranking member of the full committee, 
who is on the floor, getting involved in this debate. This does not 
appear, at least at first blush, to be within the jurisdiction of our 
committee of appropriations.
  I would suggest to the Senator from South Dakota that he may want to 
withhold this one while we at least check out the jurisdictional issue.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  Mr. LEAHY. I do not think it has been sent to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota has apparently 
decided to withhold sending the amendment to the desk.
  Mr. HATFIELD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield].
  Mr. HATFIELD. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, I would like to offer an amendment to this bill. I 
understand under the procedure we are in that this would be ruled as 
out of order. But I would like to make a few comments about the 
amendment and the content of that amendment.
  I know that a number on this floor share my concern about the 
proliferation of conventional weaponry in the world today. The United 
States has the dubious title of being the largest arms merchant, arms 
peddler, in the world today, now that the Soviet Union has shifted its 
structure.
  Let me indicate that this bill that we have before us today 
appropriates over $3 billion in security assistance to U.S. allies. As 
many of you know, I am a longtime critic of our military assistance 
program because I believe that it undermines our development efforts in 
poorer countries. Our policy of encouraging nations to become 
militarized all too often encourages them to become aggressive, 
repressive, and impoverished.

  I appreciate the committee's notations in the report accompanying 
this bill which calls upon the administration to show some leadership 
in curbing the global flow of weapons. Unfortunately, it is not enough.
  It is time for reform of our weapons transfer policy. Let me remind 
us that since the end of World War II, 40 million men, women, and 
children have lost their lives in wars fought with conventional 
weapons.
  These wars are fueled by weapons transfers and the United States is 
the world's arms dealer.
  Our so-called nonproliferation policy has a gaping hole created by 
our desire to peddle arms worldwide. I would track that back to our own 
addiction for arms development in this country. Nevertheless, we have 
spread the virus all over the world.
  The United States now sells over one-half of all weapons transferred 
to the Third World. Let us focus on the Third World. During fiscal year 
1993 we set a record, with the United States entering into agreements 
for the sale of over 31 billion dollars' worth of conventional arms to 
140 nations. It is almost a characteristic of wanting to somehow fuel 
our own budget by the sale of arms to the rest of the world.
  This role as the leading arms peddler is a dangerous one: Promoting 
the sale of arms abroad weakens our own national security, undermines 
our non-proliferation efforts and sends a message of false hope to 
workers who are employed in the declining defense industry in this 
Nation.
  Arms sales especially threaten stability in the Third World, as 
governments acquire U.S.-built weapons while at the same time failing 
to meet the basic needs of their people.
  In their eagerness to acquire the latest conventional technology 
poorer countries ignore the human needs of their people and expend, on 
average, 38 percent of their scarce resources on their military 
weapons. Their choice to arm themselves leaves men, women, and children 
without adequate health care, education and employment opportunities 
all of which sow the seeds of war. At a cost of less than half their 
military expenditures, developing countries could have health care 
services which could save as many as 10 million lives a year, according 
to some studies.
  The administration pledged to review conventional weapons transfers 
but has not delivered on its promise. Instead, it has adopted an 
aggressive promotion strategy which shops U.S. arms abroad. it is clear 
to me that only Congress can curb the war trade.

  (Mr. MATHEWS assumed the chair.)
  Mr. HATFIELD. I believe that Congress should not only review the kind 
of weapons allowed to be sold abroad, but also to whom those weapons 
are provided. The American public does not believe that U.S. arms 
should be provided to dictators. Current law in this country prohibits 
the transfer of weapons to gross violators of human rights. Yet, we 
ignore this law routinely in the administrative branch of Government, 
and in the legislative branch of Government we continue to fund and 
subsidize arms transfer.

  It is time for a new policy and the code of conduct on arms 
transfers, which I have offered as freestanding legislation. I believe 
it is time for this to be approved by Congress. I was prepared today to 
offer this bill as an amendment to the foreign operations 
appropriations bill, and I have the support of over 100 grassroots 
organizations, including human rights, arms control, religious, and 
development groups that have already endorsed the code of conduct. 
These people have rejected the flimsy arguments that arms sales are 
relatively inexpensive and low-risk and that selling U.S. weapons 
abroad is good economic policy.
  We sent our Secretary of Commerce to the Paris air show to peddle our 
arms, as one example of a policy of promoting the arms sales as an 
economic advantage to ourselves. Conventional arms transfers are none 
of the above. Arms transfers are heavily subsidized by the taxpayers of 
this country. Millions in taxpayer money are spent underwriting the 
cost of U.S. participation of arms trade fairs. The total Federal 
taxpayer cost of conventional arms transfers is estimated at $7 billion 
per year.
  Even more disturbing are the security implications arms sales create 
for ourselves. As research has shown, American arms transfers fuel 
regional arms races, which in turn increase our own security 
requirements. Most startling, though, is the realization that our arms 
financing and transfer policy has resulted in United States soldiers in 
Panama, Somalia, and Iraq, facing weapons provided by their own 
Government. One researcher found that of the 48 conflicts underway as 
of 8 months ago, more than 36 of them involve parties which receive 
some U.S. weapons and training during the period leading up to the war. 
Our Nation is in the business of selling death and selling and 
promoting war with this kind of policy of arms transfer.
  Since the toppling of the Soviet Union, we have been in a state of 
weapons sales free-for-all, with Cabinet Secretaries of the previous 
and the present administrations leading the way. Even as the 
administration claims concern, our bureaucracy is being streamlined in 
order to make arms transfer easier. I recall the change a few years ago 
wherein the Office of Munitions Control was renamed to a friendly 
name--the Center for Defense Trade. That tells me that our emphasis is 
no longer the restraint of arms trade, but rather the promotion of arms 
transfer.
  By adopting the code of conduct on arms transfers, the Congress can 
turn this around. The United States would lead by example a worldwide 
ban on arms transfers to governments. My proposal would prohibit the 
transfer of any weapons to a nation which abuses the rights of its own 
people, which denies democratic rights to its people, which attacks its 
neighbor or its own people, and which fails to prohibit in the U.N. 
registry of arms their signing and registry.
  My proposal does allow the President to ask Congress for a national 
security waiver if there is a compelling reason to provide military 
supplies to a country which does not meet all of the criteria of the 
code. In other words, we have to face the world as it is, and this is 
reality. There might be a special circumstance, and we have that kind 
of flexibility in this code.
  Having spoken with many about my proposal, I know many Americans 
consider the code of conduct on arms transfers to be common sense. It 
is time for Congress to turn aside the short-term economic gains 
created by arms sales--economic gains which are lost to taxpayer 
subsidies and increased defense spending, as well as offsets in which 
U.S. arms suppliers agree to promote foreign domestic products as a 
trade for the weapons sales.
  Mr. President, if we are going to debate again that issue that 
confronted this Congress on a number of occasions, whether to send arms 
to Bosnia because of the attack by the Serbs, have we ever thought or 
considered the possibility about cutting off arms, choking off the 
supply of arms that flow to the Danube freely by our allies and 
friends, as well as our own infusion of arms into all parts of the 
world? No. The profit--the almighty dollar--is of much higher value 
than human life under this policy. What is the difference if we kill a 
few people in some war somewhere else as long as we are making a buck 
on it? That is at the heart of this kind of addiction we have for arms 
selling all over the world.
  There is only one supply of arms in the Yugoslavia area, and that is 
the Serbs that have an old arms equipment manufacturer. But they still 
need oil to move their instruments of war. At one time, West Germany, 
Greece, and other countries, such as France and Italy, were supplying 
arms in there, which are now being utilized to create these atrocities. 
Let us go back to the source of these atrocities. By sending more arms 
or by bombing other people, in that sense we do not solve the issue.
  The amendment I planned to offer to this bill deals comprehensively 
with the crisis of the global arms glut, and I realize that it is 
therefore not in order procedurally. But this issue is too important to 
ignore. I believe that as we consider the pending legislation--which is 
the backbone of our arms transfer policy--the Senate should spend at 
least a few minutes discussing the critical need for change in our 
conventional weapons promotion policy.
  Mr. President, this is not the first and only speech, and it will not 
be the last one. We must pursue this and persevere until we can get the 
attention of enough people in this body and in the administration to 
bring a halt to this merchant-of-death role that we have played all too 
effectively, all too efficiently, and all too profitably, in the world 
today, particularly in the Third World.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, let me follow up on something Senator 
Hatfield said that is enormously important. I have joined Senator 
Hatfield in support of a bill, S. 1677, the code of conduct for arms 
transfers. He was going to offer it as an amendment to this bill, but 
there is a point of order against the amendment, so he did not.
  However, I want to stress the importance of the issue that he raises. 
There is $3 billion in this bill for arms transfers to other nations. 
Not many people realize that the United States is the arms exporter of 
the world. The cause for concern is summarized in a recent newspaper 
headline: ``Arms Control? U.S. Is The Worst Offender.''
  We have become conventional arms merchant to the world. We sell more 
conventional arms to more countries all over the world than anybody 
else by far. We continue to do this even though the last three times 
that American fighting forces faced hostile fire, they faced either 
American weapons or American-made technology.
  In Iraq, for example, our forces faced U.S.-designed howitzers, 
cluster bombs, and ballistic missiles. Our own technology was used 
against us. American technology had found its way to Saddam Hussein's 
army.
  Somalia? The soldiers that we sent to Somalia faced American-made 
recoilless rifles and landmines.
  I understand it is difficult for the leading arms merchant in the 
world to shut off these transfers. This trade is done in the name of 
profit. But this trade isn't even levelling off--it's increasing. It is 
not just that we are leading the world, it is that these arms transfers 
are going up and up and up after the cold war is over. I am not talking 
about nuclear arms. I am talking about fighter planes and rifles and 
mines and flamethrowers and tanks that we sell throughout the world.
  I full well understand, as does Senator Hatfield, that it is 
difficult to put a stop to this because this is done in the name of 
profit. And if we don't supply these weapons, some other nation 
probably will. But these transfers are wrong for all of us.
  The proposal that Senator Hatfield discussed is the code of conduct 
on arms transfers. It provides that this country could not transfer 
arms to foreign governments that one, are undemocratic; two, abuse 
human rights; three, engage in armed aggression; or four, fail to 
register their own arms trades with the United Nations registry of 
conventional arms.
  This is not a very sexy issue. Not many people are interested, partly 
because a lot of commercial interests in this country want to keep 
selling arms. I understand that.
  But the United States has an obligation to lead the world. Our 
country should lead. We must work to make our allies and the rest of 
the world understand that selling more and more arms all around the 
world to various forms of governments to be used in all sorts of 
regional conflicts produces a less stable world, not a more stable 
world. These transfers cause regional tensions and instability, and 
make regional conflicts more deadly.
  But these arms transfers don't just cause instability. They also suck 
up money from higher priorities. Literally hundreds of millions of 
people in some of the poorest countries of the world watch their 
governments use growing shares of their budgets to buy arms, often from 
us.
  Lots of governments around the world have badly misplaced priorities. 
Some of the examples are absolutely astounding. Ethiopia, in 1990, 
spent 15 percent of its national output on its military. Ethiopia--a 
country with a tragic record of drought, disease, and famine.
  Angola is even worse. How would you like to live in a country that 
devotes one-fifth of its annual output to military spending?
  As I said, it is nice, for some, to be able to sell arms for profit. 
But we ought to provide leadership. The United States ought to be a 
country that leads. We ought to tell countries around the world: ``Let 
us try to put a stop to the arms race in conventional weapons, let us 
stop saturating this world with arms.'' Hungry people need food. Sick 
people need medicine. All too often their governments are off in the 
arms bazaar and we are the merchants. And--most strikingly--when 
American fighting men and women go into harm's way, they usually face 
weapons that were manufactured or developed here at home.
  We ought to learn from that. Senator Hatfield is absolutely correct. 
I respect enormously his leadership on this issue and I am very pleased 
to speak in support of what he is trying to do.
  I hope one day soon the Senate will debate this bill and pass it and 
make some progress in limiting the arms sales that so destabilize our 
world.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. GREGG addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Gregg] is 
recognized.


                           Amendment No. 2117

(Purpose: Sense of the Senate relative to military operations in Haiti 
                   unless certain conditions are met)

  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Gregg] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 2117.

  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       At the appropriate place insert the following:

     SEC.   . SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES MILITARY 
                   OPERATIONS IN HAITI.

       (a) Reaffirmation of Policy.--It is the sense of the 
     Congress that the policy stated in section 8147 of Public Law 
     103-139 (107 Stat. 1474) regarding Haiti should be 
     reaffirmed.
       (b) Limitation.--It is the Sense of the Congress that none 
     of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the 
     Department of Defense for fiscal year 1995 under this or any 
     other Act may be obligated or expended for any United States 
     military operations in Haiti unless--
       (1) such operations are authorized in advance by the 
     Congress;
       (2) the temporary deployment of forces of the Armed Forces 
     of the United States into Haiti is necessary in order to 
     protect or evacuate United States citizens from a situation 
     of imminent danger and the President reports as soon as 
     practicable to Congress after the initiation of the temporary 
     deployment, but in no case later than 48 hours after the 
     initiation of the temporary deployment;
       (3) the deployment of forces of the Armed Forces of the 
     United States into Haiti is vital to the national security 
     interests of the United States (including the protection of 
     American citizens in Haiti), there is not sufficient time to 
     seek and receive congressional authorization, and the 
     President reports as soon as practicable to Congress after 
     the initiation of the deployment, but in no case later than 
     48 hours after the initiation of the deployment; or
       (4) the President transmits to the Congress a written 
     report pursuant to subsection (c).
       (c) Report.--The limitation in subsection (b) does not 
     apply if the President reports in advance to Congress that 
     the intended deployment of forces of the Armed Forces of the 
     United States into Haiti--
       (1) is justified by United States national security 
     interests;
       (2) will be undertaken only after necessary steps have been 
     taken to ensure the safety and security of such forces, 
     including steps to ensure that such forces will not become 
     targets due to the nature of the applicable rules of 
     engagement;
       (3) will be undertaken only after an assessment that--
       (A) the proposed mission and objectives are most 
     appropriate for the Armed Forces of the United States rather 
     than civilian personnel or armed forces from other nations; 
     and
       (B) the United States forces proposed for deployment are 
     necessary and sufficient to accomplish the objectives of the 
     proposed mission;
       (4) will be undertaken only after clear objectives for the 
     deployment are established;
       (5) will be undertaken only after the exit strategy for 
     ending the deployment has been identified; and
       (6) will be undertaken only after the financial costs of 
     the deployment are estimated.
       (d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``United 
     States military operations in Haiti'' means the continued 
     deployment, introduction or reintroduction of forces of the 
     Armed Forces of the United States into the land territory of 
     Haiti, irrespective of whether those forces are under United 
     States or United Nations command, but does not include 
     activities for the collection of foreign intelligence, 
     activities directly related to the operations of United 
     States diplomatic or other United States Government 
     facilities, or operations to counter emigration from Haiti.

  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, this amendment is a sense-of-the-Senate 
relative to the situation in Haiti. I believe the matter in Haiti is 
clearly on the front burner of the agenda of this country right now 
relative to foreign policy, and it would be inappropriate to pass a 
bill of this nature without Congress in a sense specifically expressing 
its views as to how the matter in Haiti should be managed.
  We are seeing, obviously, a significant human tragedy in Haiti, which 
has been going on and expanding for the last few years.
  But in the last few days, it has even become more significant in its 
relationship to the United States in the rather large increase in 
people fleeing that country and seeking the high seas and the American 
Coast Guard vessels having been put in the position of having to pick 
these people up and evaluate their opportunities to seek political 
asylum in this country.
  But the issue goes well beyond those individuals who are fleeing 
Haiti. It goes to the matter of how this country relates to another 
nation, especially a nation which has been our neighbor in this 
hemisphere and whether or not our Nation is going to define our role in 
a coherent and precise manner or whether we are simply going to evolve 
in a hopscotch and herky-jerky pattern into a policy.
  The purpose of the sense-of-the Senate resolution is to make it clear 
that before the President can take military action in Haiti, and there 
has been a tremendous amount of discussion of that being an option 
which this Presidency is considering, that before the President pursues 
military action in Haiti he must come to this Congress and explain why 
and receive the approval of this Congress, we would hope, but at the 
minimum explain why he has pursued that course.
  There is, of course, talk specifically that this administration is 
considering invading the nation of Haiti. That is a rather dramatic act 
for any nation to take vis-a-vis another nation.
  And we recognize that the problems of Haiti are dramatic and 
significant and that the Government of Haiti hardly qualifies for that 
term. But still a decision to invade that country demands an open and 
honest debate on the floor of this Senate before it is pursued if it is 
a premeditated act and something that is done for the purposes purely 
of executing public policy rather than for the purposes of protecting 
American lives or addressing an imminent disaster.
  So this sense of the Senate makes it clear that we as a body expect 
the President, pursuant to the terms of the Constitution and the War 
Powers Act, to come to us in advance and explain whether or not and why 
that is the decision he wishes to pursue military operations in Haiti.
  Why is this important? Well, it is, first, important for 
constitutional reasons and very significant constitutional reasons. 
Yes, the President is the Commander in Chief and as the Commander in 
Chief he should have considerable latitude in his role to execute 
military operations around the globe. But as Commander in Chief he also 
has, under the Constitution, the responsibility to come to the Congress 
if he decides to pursue an act of war, and under the War Powers Act 
equally has an obligation to come to the Congress should he decide to 
pursue an action that involves an act of war, and clearly the invasion 
of Haiti is an act of war if that is a decision that is made and if 
that action is taken for political purposes or to accomplish a foreign 
policy goal.
  Therefore, from a constitutional standpoint, it is very important 
that this Senate make it clear that we have a role on a decision of 
that magnitude as it impacts a sister nation in our hemisphere.
  Equally important is the fact that before an invasion is to occur, if 
that is the decision and the policy this administration moves to, and 
it appears to be the decision unfortunately that they are pursuing, 
that before an invasion occurs of a neighboring nation, we, the 
Congress, and more importantly, the American people need an explanation 
of why and need to have a public debate as to why we would take such an 
act, why we would we put American lives at risk, why would we use 
American power to possibly take the lives of our fellow citizens in 
this hemisphere.
  And this administration to date has not given us a definition of 
policy on the issue of Haiti. In fact, it has not given us a definition 
of policy on a number of international issues. But clearly on the issue 
of Haiti it has not defined its policy.
  I would submit to you there are three tests which must be addressed 
and passed before we pursue military action in another part of the 
world, before we put American lives at risk, and those tests involve 
the following:
  First, we have to have an explanation from the administration as to 
what the nature of the conflict is. Is it a conflict that is resolvable 
through military force? Or is it a conflict that has been going on for 
a great deal of time and which has generational roots and ethnic roots 
and religious roots and, therefore, may well not be resolvable.
  Second, we need to know what our national interests are, and they 
have to be defined very clearly. When you ask an American soldier to 
put his or her life on the line, you need to be able to tell that 
American soldier why, you need to be able to tell the loved one of that 
American soldier why, you especially need to be able to explain that 
should the unfortunate occur and that soldier loses his or her life.
  And third, there must be an explanation as to once American force is 
used how it will be disengaged, what is the plan for ending the use of 
the American force, for bringing the soldiers home.
  On all three of those counts, this administration has been incoherent 
relative to the issue of Haiti. We do not have an explanation of the 
terms of the political situation in Haiti that makes any sense to 
anyone. One day we hear that we are supporting Mr. Aristide because he 
was elected. The next day we hear that, well, maybe he is not such a 
nice fellow and, therefore, we really should not be supporting him. And 
the next day we hear we are supporting the Governor's Island agreement. 
Then we hear maybe the Governor's Island agreement has been abrogated 
and no longer effective and, therefore, we do not want to pursue that 
either. It has been a back-and-forth manner of discussion, 
unfortunately.
  In the public arena that has no definition to it at all as to the 
terms of what this conflict involves--should we engage in it and what 
do we expect the political consequences to be for the nation of Haiti 
and whether or not we can settle it?
  We do know from history, however, that the last time we said we were 
going to go into Haiti with military force and try to resolve the 
Haitian political situation through the use of a military action and we 
expected to spend a few months doing it we ended up there for 19 years, 
and the overtones from that invasion and that occupation are still 
fairly significant in not only the Caribbean but throughout South 
America and especially Central America.
  The second issue, of course, is what is our national interest in 
Haiti. In the arguments made I guess most often our national interest 
in Haiti and the one that has the most legitimacy is to keep Haitian 
refugees from coming to the United States. In addition, of course, we 
have the national interest of seeing the horrible situation Haitian 
people are confronting resolved in some manner so that they can go on 
with reasonably organized or orderly lifestyles and not be subject to a 
government that is basically one of violence and vigilante law.
  Those are the two arguments that are made for our national interest, 
but I think we need to look at them in some depth because they have not 
been made substantively to the American people in the way the American 
people can say, yes, that legitimizes our putting an American life at 
risk.
  On the first issue, the issue of immigration, that to a large degree 
has been created by ourselves through our use of sanctions. We are the 
ones who have put sanctions on this nation to a point where the only 
people benefiting from the sanctions are the political thugs who are 
running the country and the people on the streets are the ones who are 
suffering those sanctions to the degree where their only option appears 
to be to sail in small boats and hope wherever they come ashore will be 
better than where they left. And that was our doing in large part by 
the use of sanctions which may have been put on with good intention but 
clearly have not worked and have had, in fact, unintended consequences 
that have significantly deteriorated the situation and generated, in 
fact, the immigration, the outpouring of people from Haiti.
  And so I do not think we have many excuses in the area of the 
excessive outflow of people, the immigration into the United States of 
Haitians. We do not need to look much farther than ourselves to find a 
cause for that action that presently is occurring, and it is occurring 
in this case because we changed our policy relative to dealing with the 
people once we met them on the high seas. At least for a while we were 
saying to these people, ``I'm sorry. You are simply not going to be 
allowed into the United States. Therefore, turn back and go home.''
  Now we are saying to those people, we are holding out that light of 
hope that says: Some of you we are going to be let in; some of you we 
are going to be send back. We are going to put you on a ship, this 
hostile ship, to evaluate you. Maybe we will send a few back, maybe we 
will keep some of you here.
  Obviously, we have held out hope that, if you get in a boat and you 
take off from the coast of Haiti, you have an opportunity to maybe get 
into the United States and get political asylum. It was a foolish and 
stupid decision which has been totally counterproductive, as has the 
tightening down of the sanctions on Haiti, leading to basically the 
only people benefiting from that being the hoodlums who are running the 
country who are now able to earn more profits from the black market 
which they control.
  The administration has fostered, for all intents and purposes, 
because of this policy, because of the sanctions policy and because of 
its policy of holding out hope of political asylum to a few, has 
fostered, in large degree, the outpouring of people in boats from 
Haiti.
  Had we, and we should have, actually, in my opinion, taken the 
position which we were taking, which was to say, ``I'm sorry; we will 
not accept you; you must go back,'' then you would not have had people 
setting sail in such large numbers as they have been over the last few 
days.
  And so I do not think that you can justify, and I do not think this 
administration can justify, invading Haiti because of a problem of 
people leaving Haiti which was created by this administration's policy, 
unless, of course, that was the intention. And I shall not attribute 
such cynicism to this administration, because I do not think it is 
there. But clearly that appears to be the primary reason for justifying 
invasion--the outpouring of people from Haiti who may end up in the 
United States.
  I can understand the concerns of States along the gulf, especially 
Florida, which are having to bear the great burden of this foolish 
policy. But I do not think that we should further aggravate an already 
poor policy with a dramatically worse policy of putting American lives 
at risk and invading a neighboring country in order to try to correct 
the initiatives which have been taken by this administration which have 
failed.
  And, second, there is the issue of, well, we should go into Haiti to 
restore the elected government of Aristide and replace the recognized 
thugs who are running the country.
  Well, I do not know about you, and I do not know about other Senators 
in this Chamber, but I would find it extremely difficult to go to a 
wife or to a mother or to a father of an American service person who 
might die in such an invasion should the administration pursue it and 
say that they died to put in power Mr. Aristide.
  There are too many questions about this gentleman. Yes, he was 
elected, we recognize that, and we wish to support democracy. But we do 
not support all people who have been elected to all offices around this 
globe. And when the type of questions which have been raised about Mr. 
Aristide exist, I find it very difficult to say that we are going to 
use American force to support his reinstitution into position.
  But if the administration feels that way, if they feel that their 
failed policy relative to immigration, with the Haiti nation people 
leaving as boat people, needs military response, and if they feel that 
they must use a military response in order to put Mr. Aristide back in 
power, then that is the right of the President of the United States to 
make that decision.
  But it is also his obligation, before he uses American troops to do 
that, to come to this Congress and this Senate and tell us he is going 
to do it, so that we may raise that issue to the proper level of debate 
that a democracy requires and especially so that the American people 
will have a chance to hear the debate in an open and viable forum and 
be able to make their own decision.
  Because I think what we learned in the Desert Storm experience--as I 
recall, at the beginning of Desert Storm, there was not a whole lot of 
public support for that--but what we learned in the Desert Storm 
experience was that the American people, when educated on an issue of 
American military force, will act responsibly and that this Congress 
will act responsibly and that decisions will be made that are 
consistent with our constitutional framework, and that will actually 
enhance the power of the President to use military force if that is his 
decision.
  That is true in a democracy. If you tell the people and you get their 
support, the power of the leadership on the issue becomes much 
stronger.
  And so this sense of the Senate is a follow-on to a sense-of-the-
Senate that was passed by this legislative body last year. It says that 
before a military operation can occur in Haiti, such operation should 
be authorized in advance by the Congress, unless the military operation 
is for the purpose of, one, saving American lives, or, two, confronting 
a catastrophe that is of a military nature that requires immediate 
response.
  That is the purpose of this amendment, this sense of the Senate.
  I do feel, considering the time and the nature of the present events 
that are occurring and the way that the movement now appears to be 
going within our foreign policy, that it is very important that this 
body reaffirm its right to that type of advanced authorization and 
warning from the President. Because it appears to be fairly clear that 
this administration, as a result of the failure of its policies on 
Haiti, is moving up to a higher level of action and maybe moving 
towards an invasion. Before that occurs, I think this Congress has a 
right to address the issue.
  I yield to the Senator from Kentucky.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, on general principle, I feel very strongly 
that we should have congressional votes before we move our troops into 
any type of an invasion, absent the kind of emergency situation that 
has been discussed on the floor.
  I know that a somewhat similar amendment or similar resolution to the 
one proposed by the Senator from New Hampshire passed this body, I 
believe, 98 to 2 here within the past year.
  At the time of Desert Storm, I had urged President Bush and the 
congressional leadership, because of the deep divisions on that issue 
in the Congress, that there should be a vote. With some misgiving, I 
believe, the President and others tended to finally agree. We had a 
vote. It was a closely divided vote in this body.
  But, having had the vote, we then gave strong support to the munition 
and manpower needs and financing and even some foreign aid issues 
necessary to support Desert Storm. Those who had opposed the action, 
like myself, and those who supported the action joined together after a 
congressional vote in favor of it to give President Bush and our allies 
the tools they needed.
  I would note just one thing, while the Senator from New Hampshire is 
on the floor, because much of what he says I agree with. But there is 
one area where I would express some concern. When you say that, albeit 
the fact that President Aristide was elected, we are not about to 
support every elected official, he was elected rather overwhelmingly in 
Haiti. If we are going to stand up for the idea of Democratic 
elections, we do not have quite that luxury to pick and choose.

  I would contrast this with our administration's strong support of the 
Emir of Kuwait. The Emir of Kuwait, if one can believe the independent 
news stories about him, has a lifestyle that would bring about an 
indictment in any one of our 50 States on everything from morals to 
drug usage. The Emir of Kuwait did not have enough concern about his 
own country, that--I mean, not only at the first sign of invasion he 
was out of there, living in great luxury in Saudi Arabia, but even 
after his country had been liberated it was beneath his dignity to 
return to his own country until the American taxpayers had footed the 
bill for the Corps of Engineers to outfit a palace for him, if news 
stories are to be understood or to be believed--and they were not 
disputed--with gold plated bathroom and toilet fixtures. Then, when 
that was set up, and only then, and only after many of his own people 
died, and only after Americans had died, and only after allies had died 
to protect this kingdom, then he finally saw fit to come back.
  This is a man who leads a lifestyle that would make Nero blush with 
shame, even though he is one generation away from living in a tent in 
the desert, keeping warm by fires from whatever might be available. He 
was not elected by anybody. We were willing to add tens of billions of 
dollars to our deficit, put in harm's way hundreds of thousands of 
Americans, spend down our munitions and so forth, to go to save him and 
his country.
  There are a couple of differences. He was not elected, as I said. In 
fact he did not even care enough for his country to come back until all 
his creature comforts were restored. I am trying to think what other 
difference.
  One does occur. One does occur. Haiti is the poorest country in the 
hemisphere. Kuwait has huge oil reserves. I suspect somewhere, 
somewhere that might have allowed us to overlook the immorality of the 
Emir of Kuwait, drug usage by him, what appeared at least on the 
surface to be less than any bravery and attachment to his country, huge 
human rights violations within his own regime, an antipathy toward the 
United States demonstrated in vote after vote in the United Nations, 
risk to our own people, huge cost to our Treasury, deaths of so many 
brave Americans and our allies, veterans who still suffer from that 
combat. But there was that little matter of oil. I just mention that 
for what it is worth.
  I know the Senator from North Dakota was seeking recognition. I 
apologize but I did want to make that point.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I will be happy to relinquish the floor 
with the understanding I be recognized at the end of the time the 
distinguished Senator from North Dakota is about to use.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I thank the managers of the bill for their 
courtesy.
  Let me say in comment that Haiti is an extraordinarily complicated 
problem. I have been in Haiti. I have stood in the neonatal clinic 
there and held in my arms babies who are dying. This is a desperate, 
desperate situation in Haiti. I do not know the answer to it, but I 
hope we have a long and productive debate on what our Haiti policy 
ought to be.
  Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. It is my understanding the Senator from New Hampshire 
would like to have the floor just very briefly. So I will yield the 
floor.


                    amendment no. 2117, as modified

  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, I send a modification of my amendment to 
the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has that right, and the amendment 
is so modified.
  The amendment, as modified, is as follows:

       At the appropriate place insert the following:

     Sec.   . UNITED STATES MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI.

       (A) Reaffirmation of Policy.--Congress reaffirms the policy 
     stated in section 8147 of Public Law 103-139 (107 Stat. 1474) 
     regarding Haiti.
       (b) Limitation.--None of the funds appropriated or 
     otherwise made available to the Department of Defense for 
     fiscal year 1995 under this or any other act may be obligated 
     or expended for any United States military operations in 
     Haiti unless--
       (1) such operations are authorized in advance by the 
     Congress;
       (2) the temporary deployment of forces of the Armed Forces 
     of the United States into Haiti is necessary in order to 
     protect or evacuate United States citizens from a situation 
     of imminent danger and the President reports as soon as 
     practicable to Congress after the initiation of the temporary 
     deployment, but in no case later than 48 hours after the 
     initiation of the temporary deployment;
       (3) the deployment of forces of the Armed Forces of the 
     United States into Haiti is vital to the national security 
     interests of the United States (including the protection of 
     American citizens in Haiti), there is not sufficient time to 
     seek and receive congressional authorization, and the 
     President reports as soon as practicable to Congress after 
     the initiation of the deployment, but in no case later than 
     48 hours after the initiation of the deployment; or
       (4) the President transmits to the Congress a written 
     report pursuant to subsection (c).
       (c) Report.--The limitation in subsection (b) does not 
     apply if the President reports in advance to Congress that 
     the intended deployment of forces of the Armed Forces of 
     the United States into Haiti--
       (1) is justified by United States national security 
     interests;
       (2) will be undertaken only after necessary steps have been 
     taken to ensure the safety and security of such forces, 
     including steps to ensure that such forces will not become 
     targets due to the nature of the applicable rules of 
     engagement;
       (3) will be undertaken only after an assessment that--
       (A) the proposed mission and objectives are most 
     appropriate for the Armed Forces of the United States rather 
     than civilian personnel or armed forces from other nations; 
     and
       (B) the United States forces proposed for deployment are 
     necessary and sufficient to accomplish the objectives of the 
     proposed mission;
       (4) will be undertaken only after clear objectives for the 
     deployment are established;
       (5) will be undertaken only after an exit strategy for 
     ending the deployment has been identified; and
       (6) will be undertaken only after the financial costs of 
     the deployment are estimated.
       (d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``United 
     States military operations in Haiti'' means the continued 
     deployment, introduction or reintroduction of forces of the 
     Armed Forces of the United States into the land territory of 
     Haiti, irrespective of whether those forces are under United 
     States or United Nations command, but does not include 
     activities for the collection of foreign intelligence, 
     activities directly related to the operations of United 
     States diplomatic or other United States Government 
     facilities, or operations to counter emigration from Haiti.

  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, let me quickly explain. My modification 
makes this, rather than a sense-of-the-Senate, a rule of law, making it 
a condition of funding that the President first contact and advise us 
in advance before he uses military force in an invasion of Haiti.
  So rather than being a sense-of-the-Senate, this makes it a statement 
of law. I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I want to commend the distinguished 
Senator from New Hampshire for his amendment, particularly as now 
modified. And I also want to make some observations about the use of 
American force.
  My good friend and colleague from Vermont was discussing a moment ago 
the morality of the royal family in Kuwait and what their human rights 
record might be as somehow relevant to the Persian Gulf war. I submit, 
Mr. President, the Persian Gulf war did not have anything to do with 
human rights in Kuwait, did not have anything to do with the morality 
of the royal family. It had to do with American national security 
interests. That is what the Persian Gulf war was all about.
  Certainly, the fact that Saddam Hussein, if he had been allowed to go 
into Saudi Arabia, would have controlled 50 percent of the world's oil 
supply was a very relevant issue. I do not think we should make any 
apologies about that. Why should we feel in any way embarrassed about 
the fact that control of 50 percent of the world's oil supply was a 
major factor in the fighting of the Persian Gulf war?
  So the morality of the royal family or the human rights record of 
Kuwait was largely irrelevant. It had nothing to do with why the 
Persian Gulf war was fought. We fight wars when it is in our national 
security interests to fight wars.
  The point the Senator from New Hampshire is making is there is a very 
legitimate concern among many of us as to whether or not an invasion of 
Haiti is a good idea or in our national security interest. Maybe the 
President can make that case and, as I understand the amendment of the 
Senator from New Hampshire, what he is saying is come to us and make 
the case in advance. Make the case.
  The reason this is an appropriate amendment is because of the 
waffling of this administration on the Haiti issue. I will just cite 
for my colleagues some examples.
  First, with regard to the sanctions issue. In November 1993, the 
President said:

       Sanctions were a bad idea because they would hurt the poor 
     and would not guarantee the military government's surrender 
     of power.

  In November 1993, the President said:

       Sanctions are a bad idea because they would hurt the poor 
     and would not guarantee the military government's surrender 
     of power.

  In February 1994, the administration encouraged Aristide to 
compromise with Haiti's military and ignored Aristide's calls for 
sanctions.
  In April 1994, the President called for a global embargo and changed 
his mind about compromising with the military. One position in 
November, a different position in February, a different position in 
April.
  In May 1994, the embargo is enforced. Clinton shows he is not as 
concerned about the embargo's effect on innocent Haitians at that 
point. Then in June 1994, the administration forms new, tougher 
sanctions that, in effect, hurt Haiti's rich and spare the poor, 
because now we are not allowing flights to the United States. Of 
course, that is only going to impact the people in Haiti who have the 
money for an airline ticket.
  So the reason for the amendment of the Senator from New Hampshire is 
that we cannot seem to get a steady hand here at the tiller when it 
comes to Haitian policy.
  Look at the issue of military use. Before May, the President 
apparently did not consider using military force--before May.
  May 3, the administration said it was reconsidering using force.
  May 20, the administration lists reasons to use the military.
  And on June 9, the administration shifts emphasis to sanctions 
because of criticism of potential military use.
  So one issue 1 week, another position 2 weeks later, and another 
position 3 weeks later.
  With regard to refugees, during the election we all recall--I see the 
Senator from Georgia on the floor, the Senator from New Hampshire of 
course offered the amendment. They were running in 1992. We remember 
candidate Clinton criticized the Bush policy for taking fleeing 
Haitians back to Haiti. That was candidate Clinton in 1992. After the 
election, the new administration adopted the policy of the old 
administration, a 180-degree flip.
  Then on May 7, 1994, with regard to the refugee issue, the President 
rethinks the U.S. position on refugees.
  May 9, he shifts his positionmaking processing available for refugees 
on ships.
  May 17, Haitians are still being sent back.
  I just cite these as examples of constant shifting of position by 
this administration on Haiti, leading the Senate not to have a whole 
lot of confidence in the administration's policy, thus, the amendment 
of the Senator from New Hampshire suggesting, now in binding form, that 
the President come here and make his case in advance as President Bush 
made his case in advance with regard to the Persian Gulf war, that that 
same approach ought to be used with regard to any kind of military 
invasion of Haiti.
  There has been some concern around here that as soon as the Senate 
and the House left town, the invasion would occur. I hope that is not 
what the administration has in mind. But I think we want to send a 
message here that we would like to know something about it in advance. 
We are here this week. We are debating foreign policy. There are a 
number of Senators on the floor concerned about it.
  I see the Senator from Georgia who has been extremely interested in 
this issue and will speak momentarily. We need to have this debate now 
in advance.
  So, Mr. President, I see the Senator from Georgia is here, and I know 
he is anxious to speak on this. I yield the floor at this point and 
will resume the debate later.
  Mr. COVERDELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment 
offered by the Senator from New Hampshire, and others. We had an 
opportunity to hear from former Congressman Gray, special adviser to 
the President, on the question of Haiti yesterday. I advised Mr. Gray 
that I could be counted among those who very much opposed the concept 
of an invasion of Haiti. I pointed out at that time that I would not 
want to be the messenger to any American family of the death of their 
son or daughter engaged in the resolution of a significant domestic 
crisis in Haiti.
  Everything we do now is definitional as we approach a new century. 
Are we saying or contemplating saying to this hemisphere that every 
time there is a significant domestic internal crisis that the U.S. 
Marines are going to show up? Is that what we are contemplating saying, 
because certainly that would be what the hemisphere would see.
  We would be saying, because there is an interruption in democracy in 
a country in our hemisphere, that that is grounds for invasion. My 
heavens, in the last 15 years, we have had similar incidents in 
Ecuador, Honduras, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Grenada, and Suriname.
  Are we saying that the message to the hemisphere is going to be that 
each and every time there is an interruption of this sort that the 
United States will be the resolver, will pick the solution? This sounds 
an awful lot like nation-building, a new term that we talk about often. 
It reminds me of Somalia where the outside force is dictating what the 
internal resolution should be.
  My remarks in no way suggest that I am not sympathetic with the grave 
concerns that are occurring there. It is a most serious problem. There 
is great human suffering. Clearly, the junta has no moral standing. But 
I suggest that we should consider very, very seriously whether or not 
we want to say to the hemisphere, the United States is the resolver of 
every democratic interruption in our hemisphere; that American lives 
are going to impose the outcome of domestic crisis in every country in 
our hemisphere.
  The Senator from Vermont was a moment ago talking about distinction. 
There are distinctions, very pragmatic ones, indeed.
  Are there any Americans being held hostage in Haiti? Not to my 
knowledge. Are there Americans under immediate threat of harm in Haiti? 
Not to my knowledge. The United States has asked all Americans to 
leave, and the only ones remaining there have chosen to do so, wisely 
or unwisely.
  Are there any strategic interests in Haiti that threaten the vital 
national security of the United States? Is there a passageway? Are 
there oil or strategic materials produced there in this poorest country 
in the hemisphere? No, no, and no.
  That leaves us with only the theory that it is the responsibility of 
the United States to resolve internal domestic crises. For me, that 
answer is also no. We should be engaged in international pressure. We 
can debate the degree of these sanctions and who is affected or not. We 
can encourage other member states of the hemisphere to exact pressure. 
We can engage in international negotiation. We can involve the United 
Nations. But I cannot, for the life of me, see how we could turn to one 
family, one parent and say we decided to put your son or daughter at 
the threat of death or bodily harm over this domestic crisis. Nor do I 
believe we can say to this hemisphere, in good faith, that we are 
establishing a doctrine by which the United States is the ultimate 
resolver and judge over every domestic crisis.
  So an amendment such as offered by the Senator from New Hampshire, 
which says there must be grave consultations on a matter of this 
nature, is absolutely correct. We are not only talking about Haiti; we 
are talking about American policy in our hemisphere and beyond. He does 
not deny the President his options. He ensures America an open dialog 
on the question that affects her sons and her daughters.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. NICKLES addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, first I wish to compliment my friend and 
colleague, Senator Gregg, from New Hampshire for this amendment.
  I wish that this amendment was not necessary, but I think, 
unfortunately, it probably is. We keep reading things, we keep hearing 
things; that the administration is tightening down on the economic 
embargo in Haiti. And now we see more and more refugees leaving Haiti, 
creating somewhat of a crisis atmosphere, and more and more people 
talking about military intervention as a real possibility, reports in 
papers that the military is preparing for such an event.
  Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the amendment introduced 
by the Senator from New Hampshire. The Clinton administration's policy 
on Haiti has been one of one failure after another. To cap off this 
failure, this administration, by all accounts, is seriously considering 
an invasion and occupation of that country for the purpose of returning 
the deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. I think such a 
move would be a terrible mistake.
  I would like to draw to my colleagues' attention a series of 
editorials that appeared on the Wall Street Journal editorial pages on 
June 16, 1994. Mr. President, I will ask unanimous consent that these 
all be inserted in the Record at the conclusion of my statement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. NICKLES. Perhaps the most disturbing thing is that the Clinton 
administration's plan to invade Haiti is an open secret up at the 
United Nations in New York. On May 24, there was a high-level meeting 
of nervous U.N. officials who fear they may get stuck with the baby 
after a United States invasion of Haiti. Another article, ``From Port-
au-Prince to Gucci Gulch,'' by Christopher Caldwell, is an abridgement 
of a much longer article that appeared in the July 1994 issue of the 
American Spectator. Mr. Caldwell chronicles the behind-the-scenes 
political machinations in Washington that are closely tied to the 
administration's determination to put the highly unstable, violence-
prone, and anti-American Mr. Aristide, back in power no matter what.
  It appears the Clinton administration is planning to return Aristide 
to power with American military force. The administration is itself 
creating the very conditions it points to as justification of an 
invasion, with its sanctions policies and stepped-up processing of 
asylum claims. Both of these policies, working together, encourage more 
and more Haitians to risk their lives trying to get to the United 
States.
  For ordinary Haitians, it is a carrot-and-stick policy. The tightened 
sanctions are the stick deepening the misery of what is already the 
poorest county in the hemisphere. The stepped-up processing of claims--
some one-third of Haitian migrants intercepted on the high seas have 
been receiving asylum status in recent days, much higher than the usual 
rates--are the carrot. And now, because these policies mean more 
Haitian boat people, we supposedly have no choice but to send in our 
troops.
  Mr. President, I would like to review for a moment the 
administration's policy, and look at how we got to this point. As some 
might remember, candidate Clinton talked big on Haiti in 1992:

       I am appalled by the decision of the Bush administration to 
     pick up fleeing Haitians on the high seas and forcibly return 
     them to Haiti before considering their claim of political 
     asylum. * * * This policy must not stand. * * * If I were 
     president, I would * * * give them temporary asylum until we 
     restored the elected government of Haiti.

  That was May 27, 1992. You did not need a crystal ball to figure out 
what followed: an unprecedented frenzy of boat-building activity in 
Haiti, with launch dates set for Inauguration Day, 1993. Most 
Presidents at least wait until they get into office before they start 
breaking campaign promises. But on January 14, 1993--1 week before 
taking the oath of office--President-elect Clinton reversed himself and 
reinstated the same Bush policy he had trashed during the campaign.
  This episode pretty much set the tone of the Clinton policy on Haiti. 
To take another example: in their 1992 campaign manifesto, Putting 
People First, the Clinton-Gore team pledged to insist that our European 
allies observe the embargo on Haiti, especially with regard to oil. It 
then turns out, in April of this year, that the United States has been 
buying black market oil for our Embassy in Haiti, not only undercutting 
the sanctions but putting money in the pockets of the government we are 
trying to get rid of.
  We should also remember the S.S. Harlan County episode of October 11, 
1993.
  Keep in mind, this happened not too long after 18 American servicemen 
were killed and 78 wounded in Somalia, in large part thanks to the 
refusal by Clinton appointees at the Pentagon to agree to requests from 
the military to give our troops the right kind of equipment, such as 
armored personnel carriers, to defend themselves.
  As we all remember, American troops were sent to Haiti as part of a 
U.N. peacekeeping force to help implement a negotiated settlement that 
would put Aristide back in power. But the military men now running 
Haiti watch CNN too. They figured that the United States has been so 
easily humiliated in Somalia, they could probably get away with the 
same thing. It turns out they were right. A demonstration by some 
lightly armed thugs was enough to send us steaming back toward home.
  So now we are faced with the possibility that the administration will 
seek to vindicate its failed policy with the ultimate folly: sending in 
U.S. troops. No less than Boutros Boutros-Ghali said at that May 24 
meeting in New York described in the Wall Street Journal that the 
United States will repeat the Somalian experience.
  I think that's right--this will be Somali all over again. It will be 
another impossible exercise in nation building, with maybe some 
warlord-chasing on the side. Except maybe we will not get out of it as 
easily as we did from Somalia. Last time we were in Haiti it was for 19 
years.
  Mr. President, this administration has not explained how, if we go 
into Haiti, this will further United States national interests. The 
Clinton administration has failed to set out any reasonable criteria 
for the use of United States troops in Haiti. The Clinton 
administration policy toward Haiti is obviously and disproportionately 
motivated not by a sober assessment of American national interests but 
by an inappropriate and misguided deference to United States domestic 
political considerations. It is obvious that the Clinton policy is very 
closely, and unwisely, tied to the personal political fortunes of 
Aristide, whose own commitment to democracy and human rights, respect 
for his political opponents, and propensity to violence has been the 
subject to controversy. At the same time, no one can claim that the 
solutions to Haiti's persistent social, economic, and political 
problems can be successfully resolved by direct military intervention 
of even the most well-intentioned foreign countries or international 
organizations.
  In my opinion, there should be no deployment of United States Armed 
Forces into Haiti for the purpose of reinstating Jean Bertrand Aristide 
as president of Haiti.
  Finally, we cannot forget that the Clinton administration has 
demonstrated a clear lack of strategic vision with regard to not only 
United States policy toward Haiti but in other trouble spots around the 
world such as Bosnia, North Korea, and Somalia. In short, Mr. 
President, military intervention in Haiti is a bad idea.
  I strongly support the amendment of my colleague, and in my opinion 
there should not be deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti 
for the purpose of reinstating Mr. Aristide as President of Haiti. I am 
afraid, if we start this venture, the United States will be stuck in 
nation-building in Haiti for a long, long time.
  Again, I wish to compliment my colleague from New Hampshire.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to be added as a cosponsor to 
the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Akaka). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

                               Exhibit 1

             [From the Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1994]

                              Real Voodoo

       A lot of people are wondering whether the United States is 
     going to wake up some morning to discover that Bill Clinton's 
     foreign policy has invaded Haiti. The usual take on invading 
     runs something like this: Yes, it would be a drop kick for a 
     big U.S. invasion force to drive the army out of Port-au-
     Prince, but then. . . .
       But then what? The questions and issues that lie beyond 
     that ``but then  . . .'' are more than a little intriguing. 
     Problem is, hardly anyone seems to want to ask them, 
     defaulting the decision about invading a place no serious 
     person wants to invade to Bill Clinton's impulses and the 
     political interests of the congressional Black Caucus.
       One group that appears to be worrying alot about this issue 
     is the people who set policy at the United Nations in New 
     York. In the columns alongside, we publish excerpts from a 
     rapporteur's notes on a meeting about Haiti that took place 
     on May 24 among U.N officials.
       In the aftermath of any invasion, ``The Americans will be 
     applauded and the dirty work will come back to the U.N.,'' 
     Dante Caputo was quoted as saying at the May 24 meeting. 
     ``With Aristide as president, during two or three years, it 
     will be hell,'' said Dante Caputo, the U.N.'s special rep for 
     Haiti.
       Then there's the voodoo issue, likely to make the U.N.'s 
     ``dirty work'' even dirtier than usual. An AP dispatch out of 
     Port-au-Prince Sunday reported a speech by interim Haitian 
     ``president'' Emile Jonassaint, who cited ``protectors they 
     don't know about'' and ended by invoking Agawou, the voodoo 
     god of strength. President Clinton's special adviser on 
     Haiti, William Gray, minimized the speech, noting that it was 
     given at 2 a.m. Haitians understand that as the hour when 
     secret societies meet.
    
    
       Voudoun is an ancient African religion, known by other 
     names in other Latin nations. But it takes a special meaning 
     from Haiti's history. Since the successful slave revolt 
     against the French in 1804, there has been a clandestine 
     power of societies, sometimes called bizango and led by 
     hougan. They are expert at poisons, used with great effect 
     against the French. In 1986, ethnobotanist Wade Davis 
     identified the chief ingredient of ``zombie power'' as 
     tetrodotoxin, drawn from puffer fish and indeed capable of 
     producing a deathlike trance. We suggest that any 
     peacekeepers could reasonably demand that anything they 
     ingest be shipped in from Guantanamo Bay.
       Yet the congressional Black Caucus finds it in its 
     interests to order up a large U.S. commitment to solving the 
     disarray of a country that is organized around ruthless, 
     clandestine factions driven by religious and nationalist 
     crosscurrents. The caucus's champion is ousted President Jean 
     Bertrand Aristide, an unpriestly priest whose followers, when 
     he was in power, burned down the 250-year-old Catholic 
     cathedral and stripped that papal nuncio to his underwear and 
     paraded him. And recall that Commerce Secretary Ron Brown's 
     interests in Haiti originated with being a paid lobbyist for 
     the Duvalier government. Our only conclusion here is that the 
     political world of Father Aristide, in Haiti and in 
     Washington, is a mishmash that we wish we knew a lot more 
     about. (Christopher Caldwell attempts elucidation in the 
     columns nearby.)
       In checking out the U.N. documents we've reprinted, we 
     spoke with Alvaro de Soto, senior political adviser to the 
     secretary-general, who neither denied nor confirmed their 
     accuracy. However, Mr. de Soto did want to tell us that 
     institution building in any country emerging from deep-rooted 
     fratricidal conflicts requires patience and the cooperation 
     and ability of former enemies to compromise. As the chief 
     architect of the postwar accords in El Salvador, Mr. de Soto 
     knows something about rebuilding civic institutions in torn 
     countries. ``You can't impose nation building,'' Mr. de Soto 
     told us. ``If these institutions are imposed on them, it just 
     won't be durable.'' To date, though, we don't see a shred of 
     evidence that the Clinton administration has thought about 
     institution building in Haiti.
       There is certainly a real concern about an unmanageable 
     influx of refugees onto U.S. shores. But the best way to keep 
     Haitians home would be to help create an environment in Haiti 
     less hostile to survival. So far, the Clinton embargo has 
     succeeded only in making nasty Haitians richer, the majority 
     poorer and life on the island nation even more intolerable.
       Incidentally, during Haiti's troubles in 1987, we looked 
     into the history of successfully ridding a place of thugs. To 
     rid India of its religious ``thug'' cults, Lord William 
     Bentinck and Sir William Sleeman between 1831 and 1837 
     captured some 3,200 thugs, of which 412 were hanged. Such 
     peacekeeping methods have passed into history. Highly 
     motivated thugs in our time, alas, have not.
                                  ____


             [From the Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1994]

                   From Port-au-Prince to Gucci Gulch

                       (By Christopher Caldwell)

       President Clinton appears to be seriously considering using 
     U.S. troops to return exiled Haitian President Jean-Bertrand 
     Aristide to power. Taken on their face, the stated reasons 
     for his pro-Aristide policy--stemming the flow of refugees 
     and drugs and improving human rights--are absurd. The refugee 
     flow is due to U.S. economic sanctions; Haiti's role in drug 
     shipments is dwarfed by its neighbors; and Mr. Aristide 
     flagrantly violated human rights during his brief reign.
       The administration policy amounts to blind subservience to 
     Mr. Aristide's agenda. It's a warning of what can happen when 
     virtually the entire budget of a sovereign nation is funneled 
     into a massive Washington lobbying and public relations 
     campaign.
       After the September 1961 coup that ousted Mr. Aristide, 
     President Bush issued an executive order that Haitian 
     government funds frozen in the U.S. be delivered to Mr. 
     Aristide. While the U.S. Treasury and State Departments have 
     imposed no oversight requirements, the rough amounts of the 
     money Mr. Aristide can tap are known. According to State and 
     Treasury sources, the funds contain upwards of $50 million, 
     and Mr. Aristide's forces have spent more than $30 million so 
     far. Disbursals from the U.S. Treasury started at $500,000 a 
     month and have risen steadily, to their current point of $5.6 
     million to $5.9 million per quarter.
       What is happening to all that money is unclear: During the 
     brief premiership of Robert Malval last autumn, the U.S.-
     based newspaper Haiti Observateur was leaked a copy of the 
     Aristide government's fourth-quarter budget for 1993, which 
     showed $740,000 per month budgeted for Mr. Malval's 
     ministerial cabinet. The scrupulous Mr. Malval, who was a 
     major Aristide supporter, claims he never received a penny. 
     That $2.2 million has never been accounted for.
       The democratically elected Haitian Chamber of Deputies in 
     April asked Secretary of State Warren Christopher for a 
     thorough accounting of Mr. Aristide's expenditures. The 
     request has not even been acknowledged. While it's true that 
     Mr. Aristide is spending Haitian, not U.S. funds, his 
     finances should be of concern to U.S. taxpayers. The handover 
     of Haitian assets to Mr. Aristide violates the Haitian 
     constitution and possibly international law. ``When this is 
     all over,'' says one American consultant to Haitian 
     interests, ``the Haitians are going to sue us for the money 
     Aristide has spent, and we're going to have to pay it all 
     back.''
       Since his arrival in the U.S., Mr. Aristide has used those 
     funds for a public relations blitz. Miami attorney Ira 
     Kurzban gets a six-figure salary as Mr. Aristide's lawyer. 
     Another lawyer, Haitian-American Mildred Trouillot, is paid 
     $6,000 a month, plus rent, expenses and office space. Mr. 
     Aristide also engaged the services of Rabinowitz, Boudin, 
     Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman to defend him against a $10 
     million suit filed in Brooklyn by the widow of Roger 
     Lafontant, a Haitian coup leader slain in prison in 1991, 
     allegedly by Aristide supporters. The law firm was paid tens 
     of thousands of dollars out of the Haitian treasury before 
     the suit was finally thrown out.
       Mr. Aristide's PR is coordinated by the firm of McKinney & 
     McDowell, which charges $175-per-hour of its services. 
     However, the Aristide budget printed by the Haiti Observateur 
     has no money earmarked for public relations. That led the 
     newspaper's editor, Raymond Joseph, to speculate that the 
     Aristide government has been fabricating its outlays to dupe 
     the U.S. into releasing frozen funds.
       But Mr. Aristide's most effective representative in the 
     U.S. has been former Rep. Michael Barnes (D., Md.). As 
     chairman of a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee in the 
     1980s, Mr. Barnes was among the most outspoken leaders of the 
     congressional effort to thwart supply of the Nicaraguan 
     Contras. Today, Mr. Barnes is all for U.S. intervention--in 
     Haiti.
       Mr. Barnes has used his connections to give the Aristide 
     government a beachhead inside U.S. foreign policy, and earn 
     his current firm, Hogan & Hartson, compensation that started 
     at $55,000 a month. (In March, perhaps reacting to the 
     Aristide government's straitened circumstances, the firm cut 
     its retainer in half.) Mr. Barnes has claimed to charge Mr. 
     Aristide half his going rate, but that still adds up to big 
     money: $303,237.60 for billings between Sept. 29 and Dec. 7, 
     1993, to take the last period for which records are 
     available. (Mr. Barnes did not return repeated calls seeking 
     comment.)
       According to an Aristide source, when associates of the 
     exiled president expressed unhappiness with Mr. Barnes's work 
     in late 1992, Mr. Barnes was able to play his trump card--his 
     access to the incoming administration. He had run the Clinton 
     campaign in Maryland. What's more, deputy national security 
     adviser Samuel R. ``Sandy'' Berger, who is in charge of Haiti 
     policy at the National Security Council, is by all accounts a 
     close friend of Mr. Barnes. Just four months after Mr. Berger 
     left his partnership at Hogan & Hartson to take up his 
     administration post, Mr. Barnes pulled up stakes at Arent, 
     Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn and took his account to Hogan & 
     Hartson. This potentially brings millions into a firm that 
     Mr. Berger will have every right to rejoin after his White 
     House stint.
       Dealing with Haiti at all may have become a serious ethical 
     violation on Mr. Berger's part. The issue was first broached 
     by Rep. Frank Wolf (R., Va.), after an article in the 
     National Journal raised questions about Mr. Berger's 
     negotiating most-favored-nation status for China after having 
     lobbied for Payless Shoes, a major Chinese trading partner. 
     Then-White House counsel Bernard Nussbaum found no conflict. 
     Nonetheless, he said in a May 12, 1993, letter, Mr. Berger 
     ``has a `covered relationship' with Hogan & Hartson for a 
     year after severing his relationship with that firm, and [we] 
     would be required to undertake the same inquiry if Hogan & 
     Hartson represented a party in a particular matter.''
       Five days after that letter was written, Michael Barnes 
     brought the Haiti account to Hogan & Hartson. Since Mr. 
     Berger's ``covered'' status with Hogan & Hartson didn't 
     expire until Jan. 19, 1994, an inquiry should have been 
     opened into his Haiti role, and Mr. Berger should have 
     recused himself from Haiti policy until his covered period 
     expired. It is unlikely that any such inquiry was ever 
     launched, for by Nov. 14, 1994, the Washington Post was 
     describing Mr. Berger as the ``principal driver of the U.S. 
     policy of supporting Aristide's return.''
       According to Justice Department records, Hogan & Hartson 
     had direct phone contact with Mr. Berger during this period 
     to discuss the ``restoration of democratically elected 
     government in Haiti.'' (White House counsel Lloyd Cutler 
     later wrote me that Mr. Berger did consult both the White 
     House counsel and the NSC's legal adviser, and that both 
     approved his participation.)
       All of these questionable dealings should, at the very 
     least, give Americans pause as President Clinton continues 
     his campaign to return Mr. Aristide to power.


                    u.n. view of haiti intervention

       On May 24, officers of the United Nations gathered in New 
     York to discuss the possibility of a U.S. invasion of Haiti 
     and the role the U.N. might play in the aftermath. In 
     attendance at the meeting were: Dante Caputo, special U.N. 
     representative for Haiti; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, secretary-
     general of the U.N.; Rosario Green, assistant secretary-
     general; Alvaro de Soto, senior political adviser to the 
     secretary-general; Chinmaya Gharekhan, special political 
     adviser to the secretary-general; and Fabienne Sequin-Horton, 
     rapporteur.
       The Wall Street Journal obtained a copy of the rapporteur's 
     notes on the meeting (prepared a day later), excerpts of 
     which we publish below.
       Mr. Caputo explains that . . . the Americans will not be 
     able to stand for much longer, until August at the latest, 
     the criticism of their foreign policy on the domestic front. 
     They want to do something; they are going to try to intervene 
     militarily.
       The secretary-general wonders if President Aristide could 
     invoke Article 51 of the [U.N.] Charter in order to call for 
     a military intervention.
       Mr. de Soto says that the [Haitian] constitution prevents 
     him from doing so.
       Mr. Caputo thinks that after having asked for the 
     intervention, Mr. Aristide will condemn it. Moreover, the 
     U.S., that wants to obtain the Security Council's blessing, 
     is now actively studying the means to accord a legal 
     protection to this affair.
       Mr. de Soto recalls that this idea recently provoked a 
     general protest among the OAS [Organization of American 
     States].
       What can the U.N. Secretariat do, either to avoid or to 
     encourage this intervention? asks the secretary-general.
       Mr. Caputo predicts a disaster. The U.S. will make the U.N. 
     bear the responsibility to manage the occupation of Haiti. 
     ``With Aristide as president during two or three years, it 
     will be hell!'' It is not so much the armed intervention 
     itself that we have to avoid. What we do not want is to 
     inherit a ``baby.'' For the Americans are fixing to leave 
     quickly. They would not intervene if they had to remain.
       Mr. Gharekhan asks Mr. Caputo what he understands by 
     leaving ``quickly.'' One month, replies Mr. Caputo. Who is 
     going to replace the Americans? asks the secretary-general.
       ``Us,'' replies Mr. de Soto. The Americans will be 
     applauded and the dirty work will come back to the U.N. The 
     only thing that could discourage the U.S. would be to not 
     obtain any contributing countries for mounting a 
     multinational operation. . . .
       The secretary-general recalls that in the past, the U.S. 
     was able to show that it could mount a multinational force, 
     if only in appearance. ``Must we say that we think that a 
     military intervention in Haiti would be negative?''
       Mr. de Soto thinks that insinuating the possibility of an 
     armed intervention is working to produce a certain effect in 
     Haiti. The [Haitian] military leaders are nervous. . . . It 
     would thus be politically dangerous to publicly discourage 
     this menance. . . .
       The Secretary-general fears that the U.S. will take a 
     unilateral decision and that it will repeat the Somalian 
     experience. The main question remains knowing what to do to 
     avoid this unpleasant role for the U.N.

  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms], 
is recognized.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, thank you very much.
  Mr. President, have the yeas and nays be obtained on this amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. No.
  Mr. HELMS. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is not a sufficient second.
  The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I am amazed at the speculation around this town that 
the President is preparing to order United States forces to invade 
Haiti while the Congress is in recess. I cannot believe that. Surely 
they have not gone out of their minds entirely down on Pennsylvania 
Avenue, because if the President in fact does do that I suspect it will 
be a decision he will long regret. The American people will hold him 
accountable, particularly when and if the first body bag comes back 
because the American people are opposed to this. The Congress has made 
clear on a number of occasions that both Houses of Congress, the House 
and the Senate, are opposed to it.
  The President, of course, has constitutional authority to order such 
an invasion. Nobody questions that. But I cannot believe that he will 
do it without consulting Congress. Consultation will not consist of a 
last-minute call to the chairmen and the ranking members of the Foreign 
Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee, et cetera. He had 
better sit down with leaders on both sides of the Capitol, and both 
sides of the aisle on both sides of the Capitol, and talk this thing 
out.
  Furthermore, I have been assured as ranking member of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee by both the White House and the State 
Department that this is not going to happen.
  So I am so pleased with my friend's amendment because it will remind 
the White House and the State Department, if they need reminding, that 
they had better consult the Congress.
  On October 21 of last year the Senate voted 98 to 2 in opposition to 
using United States troops to invade Haiti. Then on May 3 of this year, 
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott assured the Foreign Relations 
Committee that an invasion was not imminent. On June 15, the 
President's special adviser on Haiti, William Gray, gave the same 
assurance at a House Foreign Affairs Committee meeting.
  I say again to the President of the United States that Congress is 
opposed to an invasion and has said so repeatedly. My advice, for 
whatever it is worth, to the President of the United States is do not 
do it, Mr. President. Do not do it.
  Regional experts at the State Department are opposed to the invasion, 
and I am amazed that they have not put an end to the speculation. The 
Pentagon is opposed to such an invasion. Most importantly, the mothers 
and fathers out there of servicemen and women are strongly opposed to 
an invasion of Haiti. Such an invasion is not an answer to Haiti's 
problems.
  So I say again to the President, with all due respect, do not do it. 
Do not do it. Do not order the United States troops to invade Haiti in 
July when the Congress is in recess, or at any other time.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I would like to speak on the proposition 
that is before the Senate at the present time, which is an amendment to 
the Foreign Operations Act, which would establish some conditions prior 
to the President's ability to commit military force in Haiti.
  Let me first put this in some context. One of the contexts is what 
the U.S. Senate did last year in considering this same subject. On 
October 21, 1993, the Senate, by a vote of 98-2, approved a sense of 
the Congress amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 
which appears to be virtually verbatim to the proposal that is before 
us today--with this major exception: The October 21 proposal offered by 
Senators Dole and Mitchell was a sense of the Congress. That was the 
format of this proposal when it was originally offered. It has now been 
modified to be a rule of law. So we are about to pass--if we were to 
follow the advice of the advocates of this amendment--a rule of law to 
the President relative to the specific country of Haiti, a standard 
that I do not believe we have adopted for any other site-specific 
country around the world.
  I am a strong believer that foreign policy should be both bipartisan 
and presidentially led. The best period of American foreign policy in 
this century was the period that occurred immediately after the end of 
World War II, at a time when there was a Republican Congress and a 
Democratic President, under circumstances that might have led to 
gridlock and stalemate in American foreign policy. It was a period of 
tremendous creativity in foreign policy. It was during that time that 
the United States adopted the Marshall plan, the basic structure of 
NATO, the policy of containment of communism. It was the period in 
which the basic architecture of free world foreign policy--not only 
United States foreign policy--lasted 45 years and eventually led to the 
demise of the Soviet Union, and the Warsaw Pact was put in place. It 
was done, Mr. President, largely because there was a cooperative 
relationship and understanding of our common national interests between 
Republicans in the Congress, such as Senator Arthur Vandenberg of 
Michigan, and President Harry S. Truman. I believe that is the 
tradition of bipartisanship that we in the 1990's should seek to 
emulate.
  I am concerned that proposals such as the one before us today will 
take us in an opposite direction at the very time when we have the need 
for sensitivity, for very great awareness of not giving comfort to 
those who are in opposition to United States and international 
interests in Haiti, at the very time when we want to give the strongest 
message of resolve behind our current policies, exactly so that we will 
not be placed in the position of having to consider armed force. To 
have a proposal which will be interpreted by the military leadership in 
Haiti as a signal of division in our country is a disservice to the 
accomplishment of important United States national objectives.
  There are other contexts in which this debate should take place, Mr. 
President. The United States has had a long, special interest in the 
Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine was a statement of the United 
States special concern for its relations with the nations of the 
Caribbean and Latin America. The Marine Corps hymn starts ``From the 
halls of Montezuma,'' which is reflective of our early interest in what 
was occurring in Mexico.
  Within the last few years, we have twice committed U.S. military 
force to action within this hemisphere--in 1983 in Grenada, and in 1989 
in Panama. I was not a Member of the U.S. Senate in 1983, so I cannot 
speak from personal knowledge as to the circumstances that surrounded 
the relationship between the Congress and President Reagan in 1983 when 
the decision was made to commit U.S. force to that island nation. I was 
a Member of the U.S. Senate in December 1989 when President Bush 
committed force in Panama. And I can say, Mr. President, with great 
certitude that that occurred in the last days of December 1989, just 
prior to Christmas. It was a time when Congress was not in session. 
There had been no debate on the Senate floor to formally authorize 
President Bush to take the action that he did in Panama. But, Mr. 
President, I believe that President Bush exercised appropriate 
responsibility as United States Commander in Chief, protecting United 
States interests in Panama and protecting the principle of democracy 
which had been thwarted when General Noriega overthrew a free and fair 
election that occurred in Panama earlier in 1989 and denied the 
democratically elected President the opportunity to accept his position 
of responsibility.
  I supported President Bush in 1989. I believe that he used American 
power appropriately to advance American national interests. I believe 
the interests of the United States would have been disserved if a 
Democratic Congress in 1989 had attempted to deny the Commander in 
Chief the ability to use that kind of authority in the maintenance and 
advancement of U.S. interests.
  Our policy in Haiti has been the policy through two Presidential 
administrations. When President Aristide was removed from power at the 
end of a rifle in September 1991, President Bush immediately committed 
the United States to a policy of restoration of President Aristide. And 
throughout the balance of his term, he used various measures, including 
sanctions, as a means of accomplishing that objective. President 
Clinton has also had as the touchstone of United States policy in Haiti 
the restoration of the democratically elected President Aristide.
  It has been suggested that rather than a bipartisan position of two 
U.S. Presidents, we are engaged in some precipitous act, that we are 
flailing away and about to act in a reckless manner. I point out that 
when we talk about our relations with Haiti, we are not talking about a 
country that is halfway around the world; we are talking about a 
country that is in our neighborhood; we are talking about a country 
with a long history of relationships with the United States.
  In fact, Mr. President, as one brief historical aside, but for the 
fact that the Haitian military in the early part of the 19th century 
defeated an army of Napoleon, the United States would not have been in 
a position to have persuaded the French to sell the Louisiana Purchase 
to this country.
  So almost from the beginning of our American history there have been 
interrelationships between Haiti, the second republic in the Western 
Hemisphere, and the United States of America, the first republic in the 
Western Hemisphere.
  In December 1990, after a long period, three decades of dictatorial 
and tyrannical rule, the people of Haiti voted in what was acclaimed by 
international observers to be a free and fair election. The result of 
that free and fair election was that Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected 
President of Haiti. He assumed office in February 1991. He served in 
that office for 7 months, and then in September 1991, in an old-style 
military coup, was banished and has been in exile from that date.
  It has now been 2 years and 8 months that President Aristide has been 
denied his lawful position as President of Haiti.
  Both President Bush and President Clinton have committed the United 
States of America as part of the international community support for 
democracy to the restoration of President Aristide.
  We are not here debating the personality of President Aristide. We 
are debating whether the United States has a sufficient interest in the 
protection of the principle of democracy within our own hemisphere to 
warrant the President of the United States in 1994 having the same 
Commander in Chief responsibility that President Reagan exercised in 
1983 and President Bush exercised in 1989.
  I believe, Mr. President, that if we are going to have a credible, 
sustained policy in foreign policy, that while it is good that we have 
an active debate, it is critical that we speak to the world with a 
single voice. I supported President Reagan, I supported President Bush, 
and I will support President Clinton because they are the persons who 
have the legitimacy of the election of the people of the United States 
to be that voice to the world.
  The Senator from New Hampshire in his earlier remarks laid out what I 
think is a fair method of analysis of when the United States should 
consider the use of armed force. He suggested a three-part test.
  First, can the conflict be resolved by military means, or is it a 
situation which requires some methods other than military means?
  Second, are there U.S. national interests that warrant the use of 
U.S. military force and the inevitable danger into which that will 
place American fighting men and women?
  And third, how do we disengage what is our exit strategy?
  Let me discuss those three items as they relate to Haiti:
  First, can the United States accomplish its objective through the use 
of military means?
  The answer to that question is clearly yes. Haiti has a small, ill-
trained, ill-equipped, incompetent military force. There is no question 
that the United States in a very short use of combat capability would 
quickly overwhelm the Haitian military.
  When I was in Haiti 10 days ago, it was the expectation of most of 
the observers that if there were, in fact, conflict, the Haitian 
military would fade into the population, would not stand and fight. In 
fact, it was even suggested that some Haitian military personnel wore 
civilian clothes beneath their uniform so that in the event that they 
should be called upon to fight during their particular station time, 
they could remove their uniform, lose their identity as a military 
personnel, and flee.
  The second question is, I think, the heart of the debate, and that 
is, are their sufficient U.S. national interests to warrant the 
President of the United States having the authority to exercise his 
role as Commander in Chief?
  I would start by saying that I think there was sufficient United 
States national interests to warrant President Reagan's action in 
Grenada and President Bush's action in Panama, and I would defy those 
who would impose a different standard on President Clinton as it 
relates to Haiti to explain why we have a lesser interest in a country 
which is substantially larger, closer, and has at least as many 
economic, political, and historic relationships to the United States 
and potential to inflict adverse consequences on the United States as 
does Grenada or Panama?
  What are the United States interests in Haiti? Let me suggest some of 
these--and these are not original.
  It has been stated that President Clinton has been in some way 
silent, inarticulate relative to United States interests in Haiti. In 
fact, I think quite to the contrary. He has been precise and he has 
been repetitive in stating what those U.S. interests are.
  Among others, he has underscored the following:
  First, the United States is a signatory to the San Diego Accord to 
the Organization of American States to which we committed ourselves 
with the other countries of the OAS to defend the principle of 
democracy within our hemisphere.
  That was not a position taken by President Clinton but rather a 
position taken by President Bush, and that was one of the reasons that 
President Bush cited when he stated immediately after the coup that the 
U.S. position would be the restoration of President Aristide
  I believe that if we were to retreat, to surrender, to accept the 
military overthrow of the democratically elected government in Haiti, 
we would be sending a horrendous signal to the barracks of the 
Caribbean and Latin America.
  Just 25 years ago, Mr. President, you could count on the fingers of 
your hand with several left over the number of democracies in the 
Western Hemisphere. Today, Mr. President, all but two of the nations of 
the Western Hemisphere, Cuba and Haiti, are democracies. Many of those 
democracies are fragile, almost all are new, almost all are potentially 
vulnerable to the same type of military coup that occurred in Haiti in 
September 1991.
  The signal that we would be sending to the barracks, barracks often 
occupied by the sons and grandsons of the former military presidents of 
these nations, would be that if they attempt a military takeover of 
their country, there will be no resolve, no sustained commitment to the 
protection of their democracies as there had been none to the 
protection of the democracy in Haiti.
  It is very much in our interest, in the interest of the United States 
of America, that the Western Hemisphere be a hemisphere of stable 
democracies. It would be very debilitating to our relationships within 
our own neighborhood if again we had to deal with a series of 
dictatorships.
  Second, Haiti is a neighbor and, therefore, when we see Haiti bleed, 
as Haiti is bleeding today, it evokes a special sense of empathy.
  From February 1 to June 1 of this year, Mr. President, in Haiti there 
were 295 political murders according to the United Nations human rights 
observers. From February 1 to June 1, 1994, in Haiti, Mr. President, 
there were 66 political rapes according to the United Nations human 
rights observers. Between February 1 and June 1, 1994, in Haiti there 
were 91 political abductions according to the United Nations human 
rights observers.
  Mr. President, those are descriptive of the conditions under which 
the 7 million Haitian citizens are now living. Those are conditions 
which now are coming into the living room of Americans as they are 
being communicated on a daily basis by the American press.
  We have been moved by human rights abuses in Bosnia. We have been 
moved by human rights abuses in Southeast Asia. We have been moved by 
human rights abuses in Africa. This is an example of the abuse of our 
own neighbors.
  Mr. President, we are not immune from the impact of these human 
rights and other political and economic denials.
  Admittedly, horrendous things happen around the world. But when 
horrendous things happen in Haiti, we receive a significant part of the 
negative aftereffects.
  Some of those negative effects are being seen as clearly as on the 
front page of today's newspapers--hundreds and now thousands of people 
seeking to flee Haiti, with the United States being the principal 
destination of those refugees, Haiti having been taken over as a 
significant new transshipment point for drugs from the production 
countries of South America to the United States. We are seeing the 
results of the Haitian dictatorship in our streets and with our 
children who are increasingly the targets of the drugs that are coming 
through Haiti.
  I believe, Mr. President, that the United States has substantial 
interests in what is occurring in Haiti. Those interests extend beyond 
the 8,000-plus American citizens who are living in Haiti and who are at 
special jeopardy during this period.
  A third question that the Senator from New Hampshire asked was: How 
do we disengage; what is our exit route?
  I believe that President Clinton has been following a prudent, 
sequential policy in terms of our attempts to resolve the crisis in 
Haiti. We have been following a policy in the past several months of 
gradually increasing the economic sanctions and the political isolation 
of Haiti. In the last few days, we have cut off bank accounts for those 
Haitians wealthy enough to have accounts in the United States. We have 
terminated commercial air flights into Haiti. We are being joined 
increasingly by other nations around the world in seeing that those 
sanctions have the widest possible reach.
  Now, I want to be candid, Mr. President, as I attempted to be 
yesterday in some testimony before the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee 
of the Foreign Relations Committee. That is, that I personally am not 
optimistic that those economic sanctions alone will be sufficient to 
cause this current military leadership in Haiti to voluntarily transfer 
power back to President Aristide. The unfortunate fact is that during 
this period, the Haitian military has been using their theft of the 
sovereignty of Haiti to become enormously wealthy--wealthy by the drug 
trade, wealthy by the great profits they are taking from contraband 
through other countries into Haiti.
  I believe that we should continue to allow these sanctions, and 
possibly further increased sanctions, to run for a period of time to 
test whether they can accomplish that objective. But we may well reach 
the point where we are faced with an unhappy set of alternatives.
  This debate has led one to believe that there is some silver bullet 
for the situation in Haiti that will come without pain and without 
consequences and without effect on the United States ability to protect 
its own interests and to be a credible voice in the international 
community.
  I do not think there are going to be such easy answers. I think that 
we are going to be faced with the alternative of essentially surrender; 
accepting the fact that the Haitian military has won; that they have 
been able to face down the international community, face down the 
United States; that we would have to begin to accommodate to them to 
reach some form of working relationship. There would probably be a fig 
leaf offered in the form of new elections--new elections under the 
control of this illegitimate government; new elections which would give 
no sense of legitimacy of that government to the people of Haiti or to 
the international community. That is one option that we have before us.
  Another is to fulfill the commitment that two Presidents of the 
United States, that the Organization of the American States, and that 
the United Nations have made collectively, and that is that the 
democratically elected President of Haiti will be restored to power. 
And, in my judgment, to achieve that end, if these current economic 
sanctions and political isolation do not do so, will require the 
credible threat and willingness to use military force.
  I believe that the President of the United States is proceeding in a 
prudent manner in terms of developing that option should it be 
necessary. He has been clear that he is not going to take that option 
off the table. He is not going to give the thugs in Port-au-Prince the 
peace of mind that they are secure from military force. He is working 
with other nations and, I might say, in a particularly effective manner 
with our former colleague, Congressman Bill Gray, to develop a 
multinational support for future U.S. action; and a multinational 
direct participation, first, in a force that would be used to carry out 
that credible threat and a peacekeeping force which would be our exit 
strategy that would come in after the President had been restored to 
power in order to assure an ongoing international presence during the 
transition back to a democratic regime.
  It will be that U.N. presence in Haiti, much like the U.N. presence 
in El Salvador, that will avoid a repetition of the necessity of a long 
period of United States involvement in Haiti, such as that which 
occurred from 1915 to 1934.
  But there will be other forms of United States involvement in Haiti 
during this period of transition. There will be tremendous needs for 
economic assistance--economic assistance in terms of public sector 
involvement, assistance in rebuilding a shattered infrastructure for 
the country, and in creating a climate that will bring back private 
sector employment which has largely fled the country.
  A week ago Sunday, I visited what had been a bustling industrial area 
near the airport in Port-au-Prince. On that day, it was a skeleton of 
empty, abandoned buildings, because the assembly industry had fled to 
other locations.
  We are going to have to have an economic plan--``we'' being the 
international community--with the international financial institutions 
playing a major role, that will be ready to be implemented as soon as 
President Aristide is restored to power.
  We are also going to have to have a role in democratic reform. One of 
the most immediate will be to separate the police function from the 
military function so that there will be a professional police force to 
guarantee the security of the people of Haiti and to assure that human 
rights are being protected rather than abused by those who have the 
gun. I am very pleased that Canada is already in the process of 
training a corps of Haitian exiles who will form the base of a newly 
professionalized police force that can provide that kind of quality 
security to the people of Haiti.
  Mr. President, this is a very serious debate we are having this 
afternoon. I would hope that, at a minimum, we would act in 1994 
consistent with the manner in which we acted in October of 1993. I hope 
that, on a larger stage, we would act consistent with the manner which 
we did almost 50 years ago. With a spirit of bipartisanship, Congress 
and the President joined hands to develop new approaches to a new 
challenge to American freedom and democracy, the emergence of a Soviet 
Union with very acquisitive aspirations around the world.
  Bipartisanship served the United States and served the world 
community well 50 years ago. That same spirit of bipartisanship can do 
the same in a more complex situation in which we are not facing a 
single enemy, but a whole series of challenges around the world as we 
reach the end of the 20th century.
  I hope it would be in that spirit of building an American foreign 
policy to respond to American interests and opportunities around the 
world in this post-cold-war era that we would begin to evolve in this 
and other debates on America's position in the world.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me just preface my comments by saying I 
rise in opposition to the amendment, in its current form, of the 
Senator from New Hampshire. I would like to see if there is room for 
some discussion with him, with respect to that form.
  Obviously the language of the amendment is very similar to an 
amendment that we passed in the Senate, I think last year it was, as a 
sense-of-the-Senate resolution. As every one of us knows, there is a 
huge difference between a sense of the Senate and a resolution which as 
a matter of law seeks to do more than just express the opinion of the 
Senate with respect to certain prescriptions on Presidential behavior.
  If we are to discuss this issue as a matter of law binding as part of 
the ops appropriations, then we have a serious problem in terms of 
finishing the ops appropriations bill, because it would be as equally 
unacceptable, I might say, on the Republican side of the aisle--as it 
ought to be on the Democrat side of the aisle--that that kind of 
curbing of Presidential prerogative, or even this kind of expression of 
opinion in a binding form, is, in effect, a War Powers Act, a mini-War 
Powers Act applying specifically to Haiti. If we are going to pass some 
sort of mini-War Powers Act with respect to Haiti, then we ought to do 
it in the proper fashion.
  I do not think anybody is going to come in here and start applying 
mini-war powers acts country by country. But that is precisely what 
binding language seeks to do.
  There is a serious constitutional issue and, I might add, there is a 
very serious diplomatic issue in the context of what is at stake in our 
current efforts with Haiti. I have been here not long compared to some 
colleagues, like the Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Georgia 
[Mr. Nunn] the ranking member and the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee, whom I know would feel very strongly on the merits that a 
binding statement with respect to this has serious implications with 
respect to Presidential power and prerogatives and the separation of 
powers. If we want to debate that, just as we have debated for ages, 
the issues of the War Powers Act, then let the debate begin and let it 
run on into the Fourth of July weekend.
  I might also say to my friends on the other side of the aisle that 
there is a duplicity of standard here, a serious duplicity of standard. 
In the few years I have been here, I can remember coming to this floor 
and we had debates. I think, by and large, with the exception of major 
confrontations where forces might have already been in the field, or 
covert, unauthorized activities were taking place, as in Central 
America, there was debate on Presidential action. But I cannot think of 
an instance of prior restraint before any kind of activities had taken 
place that the Congress saw fit to engage in that forum for restraint. 
It was restraint on action already taken, not a prior restraint.
  I can remember supporting President Bush and supporting President 
Reagan with respect to Panama, Grenada, where people felt there was a 
justification and certainly Presidential prerogative to immediately 
take action for reasons that the President saw fit at that time.
  I think it is fair for the U.S. Senate to express the reservations 
that we did express. I voted for it. So I am not opposed to the 
substance of suggesting to the President that we ought to approach this 
carefully and for national security interests and the other reasons 
that are expressed.
  But I think you have to look hard at what is really going on here, 
Mr. President, and question at least whether or not there is more than 
is really happening.
  If you measure the responses that we have heard in the course of the 
foreign policy debates of the last months on almost every single issue, 
we hear people complaining about the choices made by the 
administration, but no offer of an alternative. Or if there is an offer 
of an alternative, it is an alternative that is kind of casually and 
cavalierly tossed off without real respect for the consequences of the 
alternative being offered.
  You can look at Bosnia and find examples of this. You can look at 
Korea and find examples of this. You can certainly look at Haiti and 
find examples of this where we have heard colleagues recently say, 
``You have to lift the embargo, that's the solution.'' For the life of 
me, I cannot understand how lifting the embargo on Haiti does anything 
except award to a bunch of thugs the victory that they are already 
claiming.
  Mr. President, this is not good diplomacy, it is not good timing. The 
administration has appointed----
  Mr. McCONNELL. Will the Senator yield?
  (Mr. FEINGOLD assumed the chair.)
  Mr. KERRY. I yield for a question.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Just for a question. I am having a hard time figuring 
out what the Senator from Massachusetts objects to.
  He has, of course, read the amendment of the Senator from New 
Hampshire, and these stipulations have the word ``or'' between them. In 
other words, if the President meets any of these conditions, he would 
be free to go forward, as I understand it. So I was curious if the 
Senator from Massachusetts had a problem with subsection 1 which says:

       ``Such operations are authorized in advance by the 
     Congress.''

  Is that not the Persian Gulf example?
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me say to my friend, as I just said a 
few moments ago, the substance does not bother me. I voted for this. I 
have read every line of it now. I have compared it to the original law 
that is referenced, and I do not disagree with that. That is not the 
problem.
  Mr. McCONNELL. What is the problem?
  Mr. KERRY. The problem is severalfold. No. 1, as the Senator knows, 
there is an enormous distinction between a sense-of-the-Senate 
resolution and something that we make into binding law. No. 1.
  No. 2, I think the President can make a decision, he can even explain 
under any of the circumstances that may arise, he can find a 
justification in this. That is not the issue.
  The issue is whether the U.S. Senate has a real need and reason at 
this moment in time to either curb the President or send this message 
and, second, precedentially, does the U.S. Senate want to do to this 
President what this Senator who asks the question would not have done 
and, in fact, argued against with respect to Presidents Bush and 
Reagan?
  Mr. McCONNELL. I say to the Senator from Massachusetts that I 
specifically would not support restricting the President's options in 
advance by saying under no circumstances could the administration 
invade Haiti. That is not what I understand this says.
  I am looking at my friend from New Hampshire. He is shaking his head 
no. No, that is not what this says. We are not ruling out the 
possibility of a Haitian invasion in advance. We are simply saying 
consistent with the Persian Gulf experience that you ought to come to 
Congress and get it authorized.
  And I say to my friend from Massachusetts, the reason for this is all 
the flip-flopping--back and forth, back and forth--leaving Congress, at 
least some of us, not to have a lot of confidence and to fear--and it 
has been mentioned by several people on the floor, including this 
Senator--that this invasion is likely to occur when we are not around.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me answer my friend's question and 
correct him politely at the same time.
  This is not like the Persian Gulf resolution, and my friend should 
remember back to the Persian Gulf resolution where the President of the 
United States put the troops in and then talked to us. There was no 
prior approval; there was no prior request for approval. The President 
put the troops in and explained to the American people why he chose to 
do it.
  The first notice most Americans had was on television when they saw a 
bunch of grease-painted Seals arriving on the beach in full combat 
regalia. And they asked themselves, ``What the hell's going on?''
  So I say to my friend, he would not have done this to President Bush, 
and there is no rationale for doing this, except to try to come to the 
floor now and talk about flip-flops, et cetera.
  I say to my friend, there are no flip-flops with respect to Haiti. It 
is nice to be able to make these arguments and it has become the 
current political game in Washington to try to make them. But the fact 
is that the President has had to balance a whole set of interests. 
People in Washington say, ``Well, we don't want the refugees coming 
here.'' But, on the other hand, they are not willing to do something to 
end the process of refugees coming.
  That touches our shores. What is astonishing to me is that if you 
really examine what is happening in Haiti where you have thugs involved 
in drug trafficking, which our own DEA and State Department 
acknowledge--they may dispute the amount, but they do not dispute the 
fact.
  The fact is these guys are running drugs into your cities, my cities, 
and the cities in New Hampshire, and I wonder why my friends on the 
other side of the aisle are not more concerned about that.
  They are engaged in the most horrific human rights abuses not far 
from the shores of the United States, where people are killed, left out 
in the street to rot. The people go out to try to collect the bodies, 
and the people who go out to collect the bodies are killed and left to 
rot as an example to the rest of the people in the community.
  Prior Presidents of the United States saw fit to send American 
warships into the region some 27 times prior to the 1915 occupation. 
Then we saw fit to be there for 19 years. We have seen fit to be in 
other parts of the Americas. And here we are for once not asked to go 
down there in the interests of United Sugar or United Fruit but to go 
down there in the interests of the majority of the people who elected a 
President, supposedly in support of democracy, which is one of the 
major hallmarks of American foreign policy, and what happens? The 
Republican Party says lift the embargo and give a victory to these 
thugs.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Could I just ask one more question?
  Mr. KERRY. I wish to say something about this, and then I will come 
back to it because this is what is at stake. Not only do you have 
humanitarian abuses, you have widespread hunger; $150 is the annual 
income of a farmer in Haiti and only one-third of the land is arable. 
And what happens? Hunger is a solution to send troops to Somalia but 
hunger alone is meaningless in Haiti to my friends on the other side of 
the aisle.
  So you not only have hunger, you not only have human rights abuses, 
you not only have drug running, but you have the theft of democracy 
right off our shores. And what happens? The Republican Party says award 
them the victory. Lift the embargo. That is the policy.
  So I say to my friends you have in Haiti more rationale to kick these 
guys out than you had in Grenada or than you had in Panama, and you 
have all of the reasons that were present in Panama and in Grenada and 
in Somalia present in this one location, but there is a contrary policy 
that has been chosen by our friends on the other side of the aisle.
  Why is there a double standard? Why is it OK for President Reagan to 
suggest that--let me use his words. I wish to use his words. Here are 
the words of President Reagan and President Bush. President Reagan told 
us he was sending American troops to Grenada to ``protect innocent 
lives, including up to 1,000 Americans, to forestall further chaos and 
to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order and of 
governmental institutions.'' There is not a word there with respect to 
Grenada that could not apply to Haiti.
  Mr. McCONNELL. That is covered in the Senator's amendment.
  Mr. KERRY. President Bush told us that the United States was invading 
Panama to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy and to 
protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty.
  And when he sent American forces to Somalia, President Bush said:
       Some crises in the world cannot be resolved without 
     American involvement. American action is often necessary as a 
     catalyst for broader involvement of the community of nations. 
     Only the United States has the global reach to place a large 
     security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly 
     and efficiently and thus save thousands of innocents from 
     death.

  So there is a difference in the saving of innocents from death in 
Haiti and innocents from death in Somalia. I would respectfully suggest 
in our hemisphere and given our history there are 100 times more 
reasons, and I would suggest that for African-Americans in America who 
are asking themselves about this double standard, if we want to keep 
faith with what this country is about and hold together, we ought to 
apply the same standard.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. KERRY. I yield for a question.
  Mr. McCONNELL. The Senator makes a very compelling argument. What is 
wrong with asking the President to make that argument to the Congress, 
which is all that the Senator from New Hampshire, as I read the 
resolution, is asking here, that the President simply come make the 
argument. There are a number of different options in the amendment 
which could justify an invasion if that is what the President had in 
mind. All we are saying here is, ask for permission, if you will.
  Mr. KERRY. Let me say to my friend----
  Mr. McCONNELL. I think the Congress might well be willing to have 
forceful leadership, conviction expressed by the President of the 
United States that this is what he feels we ought to do and asks for 
our support.
  Mr. KERRY. Let me say to my friend from Kentucky that I think the 
President of the United States is offering forceful and clear policy 
with respect to Haiti. He has appointed a special negotiator, a special 
envoy. The President has made clear that the military option is not off 
the table, and the President has made clear that we are obviously 
tightening the sanctions and proceeding down a fixed course of action.
  Now, he is on that course of action. Along comes the Senate at this 
very instant and merely replicates what it has already said. Now, how 
can one not believe there is not mischief in the effort to simply 
replicate what we are already on record 98 to 2 in doing, but we want 
to do it suddenly in binding fashion. We want to change the terms.
  Now, we all understand what binding is around here. And we all 
understand the message that is trying to be sent. I just respectfully 
submit to my colleagues, if you read the language, in fact, because it 
is binding, I personally have serious concerns about some of the 
conditions as they are defined, and I would assert those concerns 
differently where it is binding than I might have asserted them when it 
is simply a sense of the Senate.
  I might also add there are prerogatives expressed with respect to 
intervention that do not particularly apply to Haiti in the language, 
and therefore you find that you have a binding statement about 
reservation of powers of the President of the United States which 
might, in fact, be used as precedents for other situations and go 
beyond. We do not do this. This is not what the Senate does in its 
relationship with the President unless it is being asked to play 
politics.
  Now, we were not asked to do that with the prior Presidents. And so 
the question has to be asked why it is happening now? I just 
respectfully submit to my colleagues if we want to debate this for a 
great, great period of time--if he wants to send his message as a sense 
of the Senate, I know that Democrats will join in that. But if he wants 
to create a War Powers Act that specifically curbs the power of the 
President, this Senator--and I am confident others, I would think the 
Senator from Georgia and other Senators will not be sanguine with that 
approach.
  Now, it is very simple. It seems to me it is also horrendous timing 
for the Senate at this moment to send a message which is an expressed 
reservation about the conditions under which the President could make a 
choice, is in effect to send a message to the thugs that there are 
friends here in the Senate, that we are not really looking out for the 
interests of the country. Arthur Vandenburg would be ashamed of what is 
happening here right now. This is not bipartisan foreign policy, and it 
certainly is not an effort to try to find a consensus. So I 
respectfully suggest we can deal with it.

  I ask my colleague whether he would be willing to try to send what is 
a reasonable statement, as we did previously, or whether the Senator 
feels compelled to force this confrontation on Presidential power.
  Mr. GREGG. Is the Senator yielding?
  Mr. KERRY. I am asking the question of the Senator. I yield to him to 
answer the question. I am not yielding the floor.
  Mr. GREGG. Mr. President, prior to answering that question, let me 
make a couple of responses in relation to the question because the 
Senator made a lot of points here. I think some of them have been well 
said.
  I honestly agree with the Senator from Kentucky. I wish the President 
were speaking as effectively as the Senator has spoken so the American 
people would have a sense of direction of where the Senate is going. I 
do not believe the President has done that. Basically this amendment 
gives the President that opportunity before putting American lives at 
risk, because that is needed to be done.
  The Senator said the President has not flip-flopped. Read the 
President's words. On October 13, 1993, he said, ``I have no intentions 
of asking our young people in uniform to go in there to do anything 
other than implement a peace agreement.'' Then in May 1994, he said, 
``I think that we cannot afford to discount the prospect of a military 
operation in Haiti.''
  That is just one example of the innumerable statements. The record 
reflects that inconsistency.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I believe I asked a question and yielded 
the floor for an answer, not a speech.
  I would be happy to answer the Senator and say that it is not 
inconsistent. There is no inconsistency in that statement. The 
implementing of the agreement was the implementing of the agreement of 
Governors Island. That agreement had a very specific set of 
requirements that the thugs were supposed to live up to. They did not 
live up to it. That is one thing. And the President has tried to act, I 
think with great patience, as a President of the United States ought to 
act where lives are concerned and the potential use of American service 
people are concerned. He ought to proceed with caution and care. That 
is what he is elected to do. The President has done that in a way, I 
think, that asserts the interests of trying to get back with the 
Governors Island accord. But at the same time he has made it very clear 
that if that cannot be implemented, he reserves other options that are 
available to him.
  Mr. GREGG. If I may reply--
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. GREGG. Is your definition of a peace agreement--
  Mr. SPECTER. Does the Senator from Massachusetts retain his right to 
the floor when he asks a question? I do not intend to assert that he 
does not, although I think that is the rule. But there are quite a few 
of us who have been waiting to make statements on the issue.
  So my parliamentary inquiry is, does the Senator from Massachusetts 
retain the floor when he asks a question of the Senator from New 
Hampshire?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator retaining the floor may only 
answer a question of another Senator by unanimous consent.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, parliamentary statement. I believe the 
Senator said--we can go back to the record--I will only ask the 
question and yield to him if I retain my right to the floor in the 
asking of a question. So, in effect, I asked unanimous consent and 
noted no objection if the Senator answered the question. I believe 
under those circumstances, while the general rule may be you would 
yield, I asked not to yield the right to the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has the floor.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Massachusetts yield 
for a question?
  Mr. KERRY. Without yielding my right to the floor, I will yield for a 
question.
  Mr. GREGG. May I ask a parliamentary inquiry? Is that the proper form 
of the request for yielding, or does the Senator from Massachusetts 
have to ask unanimous consent to ask the right to yield for the purpose 
of taking a question?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator who has the floor has a right to 
respond to the question without yielding the floor.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I ask the Senator from Massachusetts if 
he would refer to the Gregg amendment, the second portion of which 
reads that the deployment is temporary and necessary to protect United 
States citizens from imminent danger, and tell me whether or not in his 
opinion had this had the force of law it would have prohibited 
President Reagan from going into Grenada? Because, under my 
understanding of this language, President Reagan could have gone into 
Granada if this had had the force of law.
  I ask the Senator for his reaction.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, that is a very legitimate question. The 
answer is very simply no. He would not have, nor do I assert that it 
might preclude him from any situations in Haiti. But it also might not 
apply to situations in Haiti. We cannot envision what specific 
situations might be. Certainly, there are some that are not 
contemplated in this. But I guarantee the Senator that he would not 
have voted, nor would the Senator from New Hampshire, nor the Senator 
from Kentucky, to try to restrain President Bush or President Reagan in 
the way that this amendment seeks to. They simply would not have done 
so. I know it from the arguments we have had on the floor in the last 
10 years regarding this issue. No matter what reservations you may have 
or may not have about the way in which decisions are being made, let us 
just call it fair and directly and honestly here among Senators.
  Mr. DODD. Will my colleague yield?
  Mr. KERRY. No other Senator would have voted to restrain the 
President.
  I yield for the purpose of answering a question and ask unanimous 
consent not to lose the floor.
  Mr. DODD. I think the Senator raises a very legitimate point. Just 
look first at the title of this amendment. I ask this in a form of a 
question, Mr. President. The United States military operations in 
Haiti, ``comma'', North Korea, and Cuba.
  Now let us pose the question whether or not we in this body would 
want to restrict this President, or any President, from the ability to 
respond in a way that he may feel necessary in situations that 
jeopardize the interests of the country by a binding, legal document.
  I would suggest--and I raise this in the form of a question to my 
colleague from Massachusetts--that you would not find this amendment 
being offered were those other countries to have been added here.
  Let us be very candid. What we are talking about here is a small, 
desperate, poor, black country in Haiti. It does not have any friends 
in the world, not much of a constituency here in this country. People 
do not care about it much; 7 million people, the poorest country in 
this hemisphere; one of the poorest in the world. So it is an easy 
target.
  Frankly, we do a great disservice, in my view. My colleague from 
Massachusetts has accurately pointed out this is going to send a 
dreadful signal right now. I do not see a great number of people 
pounding for some military invasion here. We have a broad-based 
sanctions policy in effect now. We have put restraints on visas and 
commercial flights.
  Let us try to come together if we can for just a few weeks to see if 
this new policy can work. Let us try, at least on this one issue, to 
see if we cannot find some common ground. No one is advocating at this 
particular juncture that the military option ought to be exercised. 
Yet, by voting in this body tonight we make that the issue. In one way 
or another we send signals that we ought not to be sending.
  This is irresponsible. We are in the middle of a crisis right now. We 
ought to be able to come together as Americans on an issue like this. A 
nation stands a few short miles from our shores where people are being 
terrorized like no other nation in this hemisphere right now, with 
serious problems. And as U.S. Senators, we owe an obligation to our 
constituencies, to the executive branch in this country, and to this 
institution to act with a far higher degree of responsibility than this 
amendment suggests.
  I urge the author of the amendment to withdraw this amendment. Debate 
Haiti if we want to, but do not place this body in the situation of 
trying to complicate and confuse the conduct of foreign policy at a 
critical moment. It is the height of irresponsibility, I would suggest, 
to put this institution in that position and to complicate the conduct 
of foreign policy at this critical moment in our relationships with 
this nation.
  Mr. GREGG. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, could I answer the question?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I would answer whether or not--
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator from Massachusetts withhold?
  Mr. GREGG. I withdraw the parliamentary inquiry and simply ask 
whether that was a question.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thought it was an excellent question.
  Mr. President, if I could simply say to my colleague who asks about 
the title of the bill and the impact of it, obviously, I agree 
completely. I think that he has pointed out a tremendous inconsistency, 
that if this did say ``Cuba,'' we would probably not be debating this 
right now. I am not sure where we would wind up with respect to some 
other countries, but certainly you can come up with a list that this 
obviously would not be before us in this form.
  Mr. President, I know my colleagues want to speak to this. I do not 
intend to hold the floor interminably. But I do want to say that this 
is much larger than a political issue in Washington. Whatever one's 
perceptions of the President's choices with respect to Haiti or 
elsewhere, we have a responsibility to look out for the larger 
interests of our country.
  I am not saying the Senator from New Hampshire is not doing that, or 
does not want to do that. I think his perception may be that this is 
the way he protects that interest. But I am suggesting that in the 
process of dialog here on the floor, maybe we can come to a joint 
agreement or assessment that in fact that judgment might be misplaced 
or mistaken in this particular circumstance; that if we can avoid 
sending the kind of message that the Senator from Connecticut has just 
talked about, we ought to try to. It is our responsibility to.
  Obviously, if you go back to the succession of events leading up to 
Haiti, you can look at Somalia. What happened in Somalia? A group of 
Rangers were ambushed, and I would agree that--and some of us said it 
at the time--the policy somehow rambled out into this broader reach. We 
suddenly were chasing Aideed, and suddenly it was more than any of us 
thought.
  But what was the reaction? The reaction--if you will recall that 
briefing we went to--was the most incredible stampede and hue and cry 
for cut-and-run that I have ever seen in my life. In point of fact, 
this President of the United States resisted the enormous political 
pressure being put on him by the cut-and-run folks to create an 
orderly, sensible, withdrawal which left something in place of both our 
original intent and our honor.
  In effect, we wound up with a President making a tough political 
decision to get people out, but doing so in a way that was totally 
contrary to most of the folks who said, ``You have to get out of there 
immediately.'' That sent a message. And do not mistake it for one 
instant, the thugs down in Haiti read that message, because it was 1 
week later that those thugs were on the dock building on the syndrome 
of Somalia to threaten the Harlan County.
  What was the reaction? Harlan County turned because they were not 
equipped to fight, folks. That was not the mission. Nobody approved it. 
If they had, there would have been a hue and cry saying, ``What the 
hell are you doing in Haiti?''
  So they made a decision to respect what the original Governors Island 
meeting was about and did not engage in the threats of the loss of 
American life. But believe you me, the Haitian thugs read that message, 
too.
  Then you turn around and you have the situation with respect to 
Bosnia, where everybody knows there is not one person--maybe 10 in this 
institution, who would vote to put American troops on the ground.
  So here you are negotiating a hand where you have little leverage 
without American troops, and that sends a message. And every leader in 
the world, including Kim Il-song in Korea, has read that message.
  So if you want to add to that message here on the floor of the Senate 
today and say to the thugs in Haiti, ``Boy, you guys have a free hand 
because they have tied the President's hands in a way that he has to 
jump through hoops,'' and they are making it a clear message, no matter 
what the language says--the language of this amendment that you may 
understand and others may understand for the way it can be legally 
interpreted--to give him the right to make x decision or y decision, 
the truth is that it is not the legalities that the thugs will look at; 
it is the broader perception of what is happening here and what people 
are really trying to say. And you will have stripped out, once again, 
from this President whatever leverage may or may not exist to try to 
bring to a close this sorry chapter next to our shores.
  So I hope we are not going to do that. I am certainly going to resist 
an effort to try to tie the hands of this President in a way that this 
same institution denied and resisted, and I think appropriately so, on 
other occasions efforts to do so for prior Presidents.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, when I raised a parliamentary inquiry 
before, my own view--and subject, obviously, to the determination of 
the Chair--was that the Senator from Massachusetts had lost the floor. 
I did not hear him ask unanimous consent when asking a question of 
another Senator. I did not raise that matter but only sought to suggest 
that others had been waiting for an opportunity to debate the issue. 
The Senator may yield for a question to another Senator without 
yielding the floor and does not need to ask unanimous consent. But when 
he asks questions, he loses the right to the floor in the absence of 
unanimous consent.
  I have sought recognition here to make a relatively brief statement. 
I disagree with the Senator from Massachusetts when he says that this 
is a political issue. My view is that it is a constitutional issue as 
to who has the authority to authorize the use of military force.
  My very strong view is that, when time permits, it is the Congress 
which has the authority to authorize the use of force. I did not like 
what I saw in the course of the Korean conflict, where the United 
States was engaged in war without appropriate congressional 
authorization. And I did not like what I saw in Vietnam when the United 
States engaged in war without appropriate congressional authorization. 
When the issue arose in Iraq, there was a specific congressional 
authorization to have that use of force.
  I think that the situation in Grenada and Panama are fundamentally 
different from what is involved in Haiti. But perhaps we ought to 
revisit Grenada and Panama if there is a suggestion that when the 
Congress has the opportunity to deliberate and to make a decision on 
the use of force, the Congress should abdicate that and allow the 
President to act without congressional authorization.
  When the Senator from Connecticut says that what the Senator from New 
Hampshire has proposed here today is irresponsible--and we have the 
Senator from Massachusetts agreeing with the Senator from Connecticut--
I disagree with that. If the Senator from Connecticut wants to pursue 
the argument that there ought to be intervention because of the fact 
that Haitians are being terrorized, then let the Senator from 
Connecticut suggest a resolution to authorize the President to use 
force under that circumstance. And where the Senator from Massachusetts 
goes through a sequence saying that the thugs are running drugs; there 
are human rights violations; there is widespread hunger; there is theft 
of democracy, and then he says, ``Why are people on the other side of 
the aisle not concerned with that?'' Well, we are concerned with that.
  What ought to be done here, if the Senator from Massachusetts and the 
Senator from Connecticut think that the President ought to have leeway 
to use military force, is to let them offer a resolution that 
authorizes the President to do that. When the Senate had a sense-of-
the-Senate resolution back on October 21, 1993, which is identical in 
substance, limiting the President to use force without the 
authorization of Congress unless there is an emergency to protect U.S. 
citizens, or unless there is an emergency on national security 
interests, and the President continues to talk about the use of force, 
then I think it is entirely appropriate for the Senator from New 
Hampshire to come back and say, ``Let us have it in the effect of 
law.'' It is highly unlikely that it will become law, because even if 
it passes the Congress, subject to a Presidential veto, then you have 
to have a two-thirds override. But I think what the Senator from New 
Hampshire is saying here is that he really means business, and that the 
President ought not to act unilaterally.
  We went through this in a very measured way on the resolution for the 
use of force in Iraq. I remember very well back on January 3, 1991 when 
it was the Senator from Iowa, Senator Harkin, who raised a procedural 
issue which forced the hands of the leadership to bring up the issue 
for debate on January 10. We had a debate on the floor of the Senate on 
the 10th, 11th, and 12th and authorized the use of force where the 
President had set a deadline, or the United Nations did, for January 
15.
  There is no doubt that if we had voted down that resolution the 
implication would have been plain, that the President could not have 
used force because he did not have the authorization of Congress to do 
so, notwithstanding the fact that there was no resolution saying no 
funds may be used by the President unilaterally to use force.
  We know what the situation is in Haiti, and there is plenty of notice 
about what is going on in Haiti.
  If that warrants the authorization of the President to use military 
action, then let us say so. But if it does not, then let us not 
criticize the Senator from New Hampshire for coming forward and 
offering a resolution which expresses the determination of the Senate 
and the Congress that force ought not to be used on the current state 
of the record without the authorization of Congress and unless there is 
a specific emergency and a specific way.
  I do not believe that this is a political issue. I believe it is a 
constitutional issue, and I believe it is a matter of the authority of 
the Congress.
  That is why I think the amendment is a good one and I intend to 
support it.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the 
Gregg amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is not a sufficient second.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, what would constitute a sufficient second 
with a number of Senators on the floor?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the rules the sufficient second requires 
one-fifth of the seated Senators.
  The majority leader.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, this is a very important matter, one on 
which the Senate has previously acted. A few months ago, the Senate 
voted on precisely this language in a sense-of-the-Senate resolution. 
My hope is that the Members of the Senate will act in a manner 
consistent with their previous vote in that regard.
  But there are a number of Senators who wish to address this subject, 
as I do myself at a later time. And so, because this was offered in a 
form that is a second-degree amendment, it is not now subject to 
amendment, although it is likely that there will be an alternative 
presented in some form after a vote occurs on this.
  I will myself have more to say on the subject before we get to a vote 
on it. I know Senator McCain has requested an opportunity to speak.
  So I will now yield the floor.
  Mr. LEAHY. Will the Senator yield to me before that for an 
observation?
  Mr. MITCHELL. I will yield and the Senator can get recognition.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I will note the matter before us was 
originally presented, as was in that form last year, as a sense of the 
Senate. I should note, as a sense of the Senate, it passed, I believe, 
98 to 2. In any event, I know of only two votes against it on the last 
rollcall vote as a sense of the Senate.
  Had it remained as a sense of the Senate, as the majority manager of 
the bill, I would have been prepared to accept it. Others, of course, 
could have taken a different position, but I would have been prepared 
to accept it.
  My objection and concern is setting an unprecedented mandatory 
position, one that has never been presented certainly in a country-
specific fashion as this one is, something that no Member, to my 
knowledge, in either party, has ever presented in opposition to action 
of any President.
  Certainly no Democrat or no Republican has ever presented as binding 
law legislation of this nature during the time of President Bush. No 
Senator, Republican or Democrat, ever presented a piece of legislation 
this specific as binding law during the Presidency of President Reagan. 
No Senator, Republican or Democrat, ever presented a piece of 
legislation this specific as binding law during the Presidency of Jimmy 
Carter, nor during the Presidency of Gerald Ford.
  I use those Presidents because I have served here with five 
Presidents and never has any Senator, Republican or Democrat, sought 
legislation, binding legislation of this nature, of this specificity, 
binding the hands of any President.
  And there is no question in my mind that, should there be action 
anticipated by the United States, President Clinton would consult with 
the bipartisan leadership of the Congress, as President Bush did, as 
President Reagan did, as President Carter and President Ford did.
  But, I have basically concluded that, if legislation of this nature 
on a foreign aid bill in the final form were to go to the President, I 
would recommend the President to veto the bill. I hope we would not 
reach that point. But it would not be responsible for us to pass 
legislation this specific.
  I would be happy to see us go back to what we had last year. There is 
legitimate debate about our policy in Haiti. It is a debate where 
Senators on both sides of the aisle and within both parties could 
differ and disagree. And that is perfectly legitimate. I have expressed 
my own concerns at times on that and as I know there is within the 
administration itself.
  But to put this kind of binding legislation on would be 
unprecedented, unprecedented, in the annals of this country and 
something, in my 20 years here, with both Republican and Democratic 
Presidents, I have never known a Senator to bring forward or seek, in 
the U.S. Senate, to do anything with this specificity.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. SIMON. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. LEAHY. I yield for a question.
  Mr. SIMON. I thank him for yielding.
  Mr. McCAIN. Does the Senator yield the floor?
  Mr. LEAHY. I yielded for a question. I will yield the floor.
  Mr. SIMON. My question is this: I happen to oppose military action in 
Haiti. But I also do not want to weaken the President's hand in terms 
of the present situation.
  In the kind of situation I am in, should I vote against the proposed 
amendment? What would the Senator from Vermont recommend?
  Mr. LEAHY. I would recommend voting against it. Frankly, if I had my 
druthers--and of course the Senator who has proposed it can do whatever 
he wishes--but it would make more sense, in my estimation, to go back 
to what it was, a sense-of-the-Senate resolution, vote as we did last 
year on that. It would express the real concern and legitimate concern 
of all Senators, Republican and Democrat alike, on the Haiti policy.
  But, should it be in this form, I would strongly urge one to vote 
against it. And we can express our opinion in another form, and either 
I will make that available or another Senator will in a sense of the 
Senate. But not in this form.
  Mr. SIMON. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. I will be relatively brief. My friend from Utah has been 
waiting for some time, he informs me.
  It is with great reluctance that I oppose this amendment. I do so on 
strict constitutional grounds. I do not believe it is constitutional 
even with the significant caveats contained in this amendment, to 
prospectively limit the powers of the President of the United States.
  Someday we should have a debate and either reaffirm of reject the War 
Powers Act. It is long overdue. It is an act of cowardice that we have 
not. But for us to prospectively tell the President of the United 
States that he cannot enter into military action anyplace in the world, 
in my view is a clear violation of his powers as Commander in Chief 
under the Constitution of the United States.
  Mr. President, let me say I think the views and the concerns raised 
here by the Senator from New Hampshire are valid. I, too, am afraid we 
are on a slippery slope toward a military intervention.
  There is no doubt that if you impose an embargo, you harm the lives 
of the very people you are trying to help, especially when the embargo 
is imposed on a poor, unfortunate island like Haiti. A flow of refugees 
is virtually assured by our policy toward Haiti. And we are seeing that 
tide increase as the embargo squeezes the very life out of these poor 
people. The effects of this policy will then give the administration a 
very invalid, in my view, rationale for invading and replacing this 
oppressive and dictatorial regime.
  My prescription is to lift the embargo, offer the generals a way out, 
and stop insisting upon the reinstatement of Aristide. Call for free 
elections and see if that will work.
  Sanctions are affecting the poorest people in Haiti. You cannot deny 
it. You cannot get around it. Preventing people from going shopping in 
Miami is one thing. There are people in Haiti who are for the first 
time starving to death, and we should not allow that to go on.
  I believe that we could effectively send the right message to the 
President of the United States with a sense-of-the-Senate resolution 
stating that we should not undertake military action in Haiti. I 
believe it would pass overwhelmingly.
  Mr. President, we should not get militarily involved because there is 
no way out. If the United States in a very brief military operation--it 
would be less than 6 hours--takes over the country of Haiti, my 
question is, who will run the country? I will tell you who would be 
running the country? It would be the United States of America. The 
people of Haiti would resent it, and you would find the kind of 
resistance and eventual armed warfare that we saw the last time we were 
there, where we went for a few months and stayed for 19 years. Before 
anyone supports invading Haiti, read the history of our last invasion 
of that country. If you read it, you cannot support an invasion of that 
country.
  At the same time, I cannot support any resolution which prospectively 
limits the powers of the President as Commander in Chief. And I ask my 
colleagues, what if the Senate of the United States had passed a 
resolution prohibiting President Reagan from the invasion of Grenada, 
which might have happened, given the situation in Grenada at that time? 
What would have happened? What would have happened if this body had 
passed a prospective resolution prohibiting the President of the United 
States from invading Panama? Both were operations which, by the way, I 
supported, because I thought they were in our national security 
interests. I do not believe Haiti is. I am saying if you do this, you 
will set a very dangerous precedent.
  I now yield for a question from my friend.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I was going to ask my friend from 
Arizona in what way the Gregg amendment would have restricted President 
Reagan's actions in Grenada?
  Mr. McCAIN. Obviously there are caveats in the Gregg amendment which 
give the President of the United States some wiggle room. But the fact 
remains, I tell my friend from Kentucky, that you are telling the 
President of the United States that he cannot expend funds to invade 
except under certain circumstances. It is the wrong thing to do. You 
can express the will of the Senate with a sense-of-the-Senate 
resolution and you can do it with great ease. If we pass this 
amendment, it will be a small step to further restrict the powers of 
the President of the United States.
  The Senator from Kentucky is entitled to his view of what the 
amendment says. I know the Senator from New Hampshire has his view and 
the Senator from Utah has his view. I am saying it is dangerous to 
begin any amendment by saying that no funds will be spent for 
operations of this nature, even if you add a list of caveats that is 2 
miles long.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I say to my friend from Arizona, not to belabor this 
too long, seven times last year--seven times last fall I voted to 
support Presidential flexibility in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti. I think 
on a couple of those amendments I may have been the only one on our 
side of the aisle. Maybe Senator Warner and I were the only two. So I 
share my colleague's concern, I say to my good friend. I just do not 
see how the Gregg amendment unduly restricts the President's hand. 
Basically, in a sense, the Constitution does that as well with the 
requirement of a declaration of war, if you wanted to carry it to that 
point.
  But it seems to me that this is pretty sensibly addressed to reflect 
recent military experiences. Also, it is not without precedent for us 
to put some restrictions. I think of the Clark amendment with regard to 
Angola when President Ford was around; the Boland amendment--various 
mutations of that; the Cooper-Church amendment during the Vietnam 
period.
  Anyway, I do not want to prolong it, I say to my friend from Arizona. 
I am sorry he will not be able to support this amendment. I think it is 
excellent.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank my colleague. I would be glad to respond to that 
comment. Early in our history, I would say to my friend from Kentucky, 
when we had Barbary Coast pirates who were interfering with United 
States trade, we sent a task force of naval vessels to punish those 
people. And some of the greatest names in our naval history went there. 
That was done without a declaration of war. That set a precedent for 
operations like Grenada, Panama, et cetera.
  If the Senator from Kentucky supported the Boland amendment, I would 
say that he was in a very different position than I was because I 
believe the Boland amendment was unconstitutional. And I wish that the 
Reagan administration, by the way, had had the guts to fight that all 
the way up to the U.S. Supreme Court.
  Mr. DODD. Will the Senator yield on that?
  Mr. McCAIN. I will.
  Mr. DODD. I just point out the Barbary pirates is a good historical 
example, because in that particular case--consider the day and age, it 
was in the early part of the 19th century--the forces there, in the 
Mediterranean, sent a boat back seeking permission of the President of 
the United States as to whether or not they could engage them. It took 
several months to get an answer. But they did not dare engage them 
without that permission, I point out to my colleague.
  Let me just add as well, on the debate of the war powers resolution, 
Presidents, beginning with President Nixon, he--and for good 
arguments--objected. And there the law says in the absence of a 
declaration of war--the last time we did that was on December 8, 1941--
that Presidents are allowed. The President shall submit within 48 hours 
to the Speaker of the House of the House of Representatives, 48 hours 
after the engagement begins, a report in writing setting forth the 
circumstances, and so forth. That has been the subject of significant 
debate as to whether or not a President, even after there has been an 
engagement militarily, should be required to report back to the 
Congress. This goes the extraordinary step----
  Mr. McCAIN. That is what I would also address. I hope my friend from 
Connecticut would agree--we need to debate the War Powers Act and 
clearly define what a President can and cannot do. We would not be 
engaged in this debate if we did. Be that as it may, my friend from 
Kentucky asked me what the problem was with the amendment. The first 
sentence, part (b):

       ``None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made 
     available to the Department of Defense * * * may be obligated 
     or expended for any United States military operations in 
     Haiti unless * * *.''

  Now, those caveats are excellent. I am glad that they are in there. 
But it does not change the fact we are telling the President of the 
United States that he cannot spend any money to invade Haiti, even 
though there are caveats to it. If those caveats, I would say to the 
Senator from Kentucky, are that great, then let us make it a sense-of-
the-Senate resolution, which the distinguished manager of the bill and 
the majority of us--not all, I see the Senator from Florida there and 
others--would support overwhelmingly. And then we would send a simple 
message.
  As it is, we are now getting embroiled into interpretations of the 
Constitution of the United States. My interpretation is clear that we 
cannot prospectively limit the powers of the Commander in Chief.
  Mr. DODD. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. McCAIN. Could I just finish this thought? I tell my friend from 
Kentucky, hopefully--hopefully--some day there will be a different 
party in power in the White House. And I would hate to be standing on 
this floor arguing with one of my colleagues on the other side of the 
aisle who wants to prospectively limit action by the President of the 
United States when I supported such a thing when my party was not in 
power. We could be setting a very dangerous precedent for those of us 
on this side of the aisle.
  Mr. DODD. My colleague may know better, but I cannot think of a 
single example, even during the 12 years of the Reagan and Bush 
administrations, when any such amendment like this on any part of the 
world was ever offered or adopted. Does my colleague know of any 
example I may be forgetting?
  Mr. McCAIN. I know of none, except for the Boland amendment, and the 
Boland amendment, in my view, was something that, frankly, poisoned the 
entire issue of our policy towards Nicaragua.
  In retrospect, whether the Senator from Kentucky agreed with the 
Boland amendment or opposed it, we would have been better off if it had 
been judged constitutional or unconstitutional. There were people in 
the White House, as the Senator from Connecticut knows, who said it was 
unconstitutional and, therefore, violated it.
  Mr. KERRY. Will my colleague yield for a point?
  Mr. McCAIN. Yes, I yield.
  Mr. KERRY. I point out with the respect to the Boland amendment, the 
Boland amendment reflected the desire to cut off aid to other people's 
forces, aiding other people's forces and effort, not directly to our 
forces being engaged in a particular conflict of a country.
  Mr. McCAIN. I think the Senator from Massachusetts makes a good 
point.
  I want to apologize to the Senator from Utah for taking so much time.
  I want to briefly suggest to my friend of New Hampshire that we make 
his amendment a sense of the Senate, sending an overwhelming message to 
the President of the United States. If there is a significant vote--
which I think there is going to be--then clearly the President cannot 
ignore that message from the Senate of the United States.
  I hope we could do that. I deeply fear we are on a slippery slope to 
an invasion which cannot be of any benefit to the people of Haiti or 
the men and women of the Armed Forces of the United States. If we did 
make it a sense of the Senate, I think we would avoid a lot of this 
debate.
  I understand and appreciate the goals of the Senator from New 
Hampshire. I regrettably cannot support the amendment.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah is recognized.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I yield to no one in my respect for the 
Constitution, for my concern for the maintenance of the proper role of 
the Constitution and the separation of powers. I would be persuaded by 
the arguments of the Senator from Arizona and the Senator from 
Massachusetts, and others, who raised the constitutional issue if I 
were not satisfied that the language of the Gregg amendment reflects 
proper constitutional procedure.
  I asked the Senator from Massachusetts earlier when he was talking 
about this issue if the Gregg amendment would, in fact, have prevented 
President Reagan from proceeding in Grenada? I am satisfied that the 
language of the Gregg amendment makes it clear that President Reagan 
could easily have proceeded in Grenada had this amendment been in place 
because it says:

       The President can proceed if he finds that the deployment 
     is temporary and necessary to protect U.S. citizens from 
     imminent danger.

  President Reagan found that to be the case in Grenada and proceeded. 
This amendment would not in any way have diminished his powers as 
Commander in Chief.
  I was prepared to ask the Senator from Massachusetts a second 
question, which I will now review, with respect to Panama. If this 
amendment had been law, could President Bush have proceeded in Panama? 
In my view, he could have because No. 3 in the Gregg amendment says 
that he could proceed if he finds that the deployment, and I am 
quoting, ``is vital to U.S. national security interests and 
insufficient time exists for the receipt of prior congressional 
authorization.''
  President Bush, obviously, believed that that was the case, and he 
proceeded.
  I share with my friend from Pennsylvania, who has a legal background 
that I do not have, having never been to law school, the concern that 
Congress may well be losing its rights under the Constitution to 
declare war; that we may be in a position where the executive, under 
the powers of the Commander in Chief, gets us into a war situation and 
does not come to Congress for the proper authorization.
  I find that this amendment strikes an appropriate balance in that 
concern. I do not want to tie the hands of the Commander in Chief when 
there is a necessary deployment needed to protect American citizens.
  I do not want the Commander in Chief to have to come to Congress to 
ask for permission, to have to come to Congress to ask for a 
declaration of war when U.S. citizens are in danger. This amendment 
does not say that would be the case.
  I do not want the President to have to come to Congress to ask for 
permission to use his powers as Commander in Chief when vital national 
security interests are at stake and there is not appropriate time.
  But I do get concerned on a constitutional basis when I hear people 
talking about the United States planning an invasion in a leisurely 
fashion of a sovereign country with the President feeling he has no 
requirement to discuss that with the Congress. That gives me 
constitutional pain.
  This is not an emergency. There is no one threatening American 
students in Grenada who may be carried off momentarily if the Marines 
do not land. This is not a surprise operation where national security 
interests are vitally affected if we do not go in under the cover of 
some kind of stealth operation and surprise a warlord, as was the case 
in Panama.
  This, at least as I understand it in the press, is a considered, 
formal invasion of a sovereign country by the United States of America 
military. I think it is appropriate under the Constitution that the 
Congress be asked to declare war if that is what we are going to do. 
But if the President says, no, I cannot ask the Congress to declare war 
because the deployment was temporary and it was necessary to protect 
U.S. interests, I cannot ask the Congress to declare war because it is 
vital to our national security interests and there is insufficient 
time, this amendment says, fine, we will take your word for that, we 
will not change it. All we are asking you to do is do that much.
  So I find myself in somewhat--not somewhat--in disagreement with my 
friend from Massachusetts on the legal issue and in agreement with my 
friend from Pennsylvania on the legal issue here. I feel that the 
amendment is not a violation of our constitutional circumstances.
  I wish to make a few other comments because of the statements that 
were made by the Senator from Massachusetts, in all good motive and 
intention on his part. This is an issue, obviously, about which 
reasonable men and women can disagree, I would hope, in reasonable 
fashion.
  He said to lift the embargo would be to award the thugs the victory. 
That is the interpretation he would put on that matter. I view it 
differently. The people of Haiti are suffering. They are hurting across 
a wide spectrum of economic deprivation. That economic deprivation is 
made intolerably worse, in my opinion, by the embargo.
  The thugs who run Haiti, on the other hand, are prospering, and their 
prosperity is made considerably better by the embargo. They are not 
bothered by the lack of food. They are not bothered by the lack of 
economic support for the economy. They are taking it off the top and, I 
suspect--cannot prove it --that they are putting it in Swiss bank 
accounts preparing for the time when they decide to leave Port-au-
Prince and enter into retirement on the Riviera in the time-honored 
fashion of other dictators in that part of the world who have gone that 
route.
  The embargo, in my view, is furthering that kind of corruption and 
that kind of devastation of the economy. I believe honestly that 
lifting the embargo will be good for the economy of Haiti, be good for 
the ordinary people of Haiti and, ultimately, therefore, reduce the 
desire of the people of Haiti to physically get out because they will 
at least have some degree of economic hope where they are. The embargo 
is cutting down that economic hope.

  So I say to my friend from Massachusetts, when I stand up here with 
the idea of supporting the lifting of the embargo, it is not out of all 
of the motives that he attributed to some on this issue.
  Mr. KERRY. Will my friend yield for a question?
  Mr. BENNETT. I will be happy to yield for a question.
  Mr. KERRY. If my friend does not want to award them victory and my 
friend does not believe that they ought to be simply paid off and 
shipped out to the Riviera, then what is his leverage if you lift the 
embargo? What is it that says to them there is any reason to leave? 
What would compel them?
  Mr. BENNETT. I respond to the Senator from Massachusetts in this 
fashion.
  In order for a lever to work, it must have a fulcrum on which it is 
placed. The embargo has no fulcrum. The embargo is no leverage at all. 
That is my point.
  Now, the question: How do we get them to leave? is a separate issue, 
in my view, from the embargo. It is unrelated to the embargo. The 
Senator from Arizona has referred to one suggestion that has been made, 
to which I would subscribe, at least to the degree I understand it so 
far; that is, that America says to people in power in Haiti, all right, 
you are in power; we do not like your being in power; we will give up 
our insistence that Aristide be returned to power--recognizing the only 
way that can happen is with American military might behind him--if you 
will give up your control on the present government, both step down 
from that circumstance and we have internationally monitored elections.
  Now, you say you want them in jail for war crimes. You want them 
punished in some fashion. I might like to see that happen, too. But I 
frankly do not see a lever anywhere short of invasion that can produce 
that, and I do not believe that invasion would indeed produce that.
  If I might go to----
  Mr. KERRY. Would my colleague be willing just to yield for a comment?
  Mr. BENNETT. I will yield for a comment providing I do not lose the 
floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank my friend for his courtesy.
  I just say to the Senator from Utah, the plan he has offered might 
work, but it really ignores a larger sense in the history of Haiti and 
what is really at stake in this situation. It is pretty easy for any 
Senator or anybody in America to cavalierly, or however one phrases it, 
stand there and say abandon Aristide and have another election. But the 
fact is that this is the first free election the people of Haiti have 
had in 200 years. They did vote. They did have a free election. We 
invested in it, as did the rest of the world. The United Nations 
invested in it. And by 67 percent of their vote they elected this man.
  Now, who are we to simply say abandon him? Who are we to turn around 
from the Haitian people and discard their own democracy? I cannot 
understand how it is that we have the arrogance to make a judgment 
about somebody else's free and fair election.
  Mr. BENNETT. I thank the Senator for his comment. I respond in this 
fashion. If, indeed, Mr. Aristide still controls the hearts and support 
of 67 percent of the people in Haiti, he will have no problem 
whatsoever in gaining his position as President legitimately in an 
election of the kind I have described.
  Mr. KERRY. Can I say to my friend, and I will not interrupt him 
further, but I just want to say to my friend that would be fine if you 
have the ability to write the constitution of Haiti. But the 
constitution of Haiti does not permit him to succeed himself. So if you 
think Aristide is a problem, the Aristide problem is gone as of a year 
from this December because they are going to have elections a year from 
this December and he cannot run to succeed himself.
  Now, if you want to change the constitution somehow or have some 
declaration that he can go down there and run again, fine. But he 
cannot. I am not sure he wants to. But it still begs the question. The 
Haitian people would sense an extraordinary abandonment of their own 
investment in democracy if you just discard what they have already 
achieved.
  Mr. BENNETT. I thank the Senator for informing me as to the details 
of the Haitian constitution. He made reference to Haitian history. As I 
understand Haitian history, it is not one that gives me a lot of 
confidence in any kind of democratic institution, including the 
elections, prospective elections, to which he refers.
  The history of this island is wretched. The circumstances that have 
been going on there for over a century have been wretched from our 
point of view. And we do not have any good solutions facing us. We do 
not have any clear----
  Mr. KERRY. Is the solution to render it more wretched? Is the 
solution to render it more wretched?
  Mr. BENNETT. In response, Mr. President, as I have said before, in my 
opinion, this is a matter on which we can disagree, the embargo is 
making it more wretched. In my opinion, the position of this 
administration has contributed to the misery and difficulty of the 
people of Haiti.
  Let me go on, Mr. President, with respect to what in my opinion would 
happen if, indeed, the United States were to invade Haiti. There 
appeared in the Washington Post within the last 2 weeks--I cannot put 
my hand on the exact date, but if it is important, we can find it--a 
report by an American journalist, Robert Novak, who went to Haiti and 
spent several days driving around the country, talking to people, 
observing circumstances for himself. He came back with a report that 
may or may not be accurate but which is, at least on its face, 
plausible.
  He came back and reported to his readers that the present military 
and police establishment in Haiti are expecting an invasion, and they 
have prepared themselves as to how they will respond. This is his 
report.
  (Mr. LEAHY assumed the chair.)
  Mr. BENNETT. He quotes them as saying if the United States invades 
Haiti, we will take off our uniforms, hang them in the closet and go 
home, which means that there will be no police on the streets to 
prevent looting or enforce normal law, which means there will be no 
military presence of any kind to try to keep the peace, which means 
that if there is any degree of police activity or normal law 
enforcement activity on the island, it will have to be performed by the 
American military or the island will be reduced to absolute chaos with 
no form of law and order of any kind.
  If Mr. Novak is correct in reporting that plan, and if the people who 
currently control Haiti have, indeed, adopted that plan, what are we 
looking at if there is an invasion? We are looking at an American 
protectorate that will require American troops in Haiti for months and 
years and decades to come in a society that is ruled by circumstances 
that are tremendously foreign to most Americans.
  I know of these only by hearsay. I have friends who have lived in 
Haiti who have reported them to me. I admit the evidence is anecdotal. 
I do not pretend to have any kind of major study of this issue.
  But voodoo and the secret societies that are woven throughout the 
Haitian culture, who go underground and who exert enormous amounts of 
control over what is done and what is not done, in ways that the 
American mind simply cannot comprehend, these things are reported to be 
very powerful in Haiti. They are reported to be a tremendous part of 
the power that was exercised by the former President for life, that he 
maintained his position not just by military power and terror but by a 
religious network of practices of the kind, as I say, with which 
Americans are completely unfamiliar.
  This is not the kind of circumstance that leads me to believe a 
series of American police forces and American troops can in any logical 
or short-term fashion restore order to the island, to the society, and 
establish democratic procedures and institutions there.
  What would I do if I were President of the United States faced with 
the Haitian thing? I guess my first reaction would be to ask myself, 
why I have run for the office to be faced with this? Because, as I say, 
there are no good options in my view. But I believe that we are 
responding to emotions that are very, very American, emotions that are 
admirable, but not necessarily connected with the facts.
  If I were President of the United States, I would pick up the phone 
and call Colin Powell, and say, ``Mr. Powell, could you come out of 
retirement long enough to go to Haiti on a factfinding mission, not as 
an envoy? You are not down there to negotiate. You are not down there 
to try to tell anybody to do anything. But you at least understand the 
military as well or better than anyone else on the planet. You 
understand what would be involved if we were to put military troops 
there. You have the sympathy for the people that comes out of your own 
experience. Will you form a factfinding commission and go to Haiti and 
find out exactly what is going to happen there, and come back and give 
us your advice?''
  I would feel a lot more comfortable debating this thing if the facts 
we had before us came from that kind of an official factfinding group 
rather than newspaper reports and reactions on the part of individual 
Senators, myself included, every one of whom is reacting out of his or 
her own experience.
  That is why I think we would be very precipitous to consider invading 
Haiti under the present circumstances. That is ultimately why, as I 
said in the beginning, I find myself in support of the Gregg amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Thank you very much, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment, and especially 
disagree with my friend and colleague from Utah with regard to this 
amendment.
  I want to also to associate myself with the remarks of the previous 
speaker, the Senator from Arizona, when he talks to discuss 
constitutional issues. This amendment, in my opinion--and I agree with 
him--is a regrettable, unprecedented constitutional assault. Therefore, 
I think on those grounds alone it should be defeated.
  Mr. President, I would like to make an inquiry and ask three 
questions--actually, a plea and three questions. The plea that I would 
make to my colleagues is, do not make up new rules for Haiti. Do not 
change the constitutional order. Do not hamstring the President. Do not 
do anything new for Haiti. Allow our policy to work. Allow us to stand 
for those values that we say undergird our foreign relations.
  I will make three questions or observations in keeping with my plea 
that we not make up new rules for Haiti.
  The first is whose side are we on? The contradiction in this 
amendment is that it simultaneously hamstrings the President, empowers 
the thugs that are now in power in Haiti--having taken it--and at the 
same time turns our back and is a rejection of the democratic values 
that were expressed by the people of Haiti in electing President 
Aristide.
  So the question is, whose side are we on? Are we on the side of the 
thugs? I cannot imagine it. Are we on the side of the people who would 
throw out any attempts of a budding democracy there? I cannot imagine 
it.
  So the first question then is whose side are we on here?
  The second question that I would raise has to do with how we define 
what is in our national security interests. The amendment, after it 
says that no money shall be used, speaks to the issue of what our 
national security interests are in Haiti. I think those interests are 
pretty straightforward and pretty unavoidable.
  In the first instance, this democracy or a budding democracy, is in 
our own backyard, if you will. These are our closest neighbors. How can 
we therefore stand for the protection and promotion of democracies in 
places halfway around the world when we cannot even protect it in our 
own backyard?
  The second issue is human rights. We have all been appalled at the 
privations. But at the same time to give something to those who have 
caused that privation, who are exacerbating that privation, seems to me 
to fly directly in the face of our national interests.
  The drug lords probably have been mentioned. Are we going to give 
some promotion and help out the people who have themselves been able to 
take power because of their involvement with funneling poison into our 
country? Are we going to support that?
  The immigration issue: We have seen the boatloads of refugees, and 
all the frantic efforts to come up with ways to process and deal with 
and otherwise stem the avalanche of immigration from that land.
  Are we going to say that it is OK; the people who have given rise to 
that will benefit from the action of this U.S. Senate? I do not think 
so. Not to mention cooperation with our allies in this part of the 
hemisphere. These are our most immediate neighbors. It seems to me that 
we are hard put to talk about affairs on the other side of the world 
and we cannot have clarity about what happens here at home.
  My colleague, one of the speakers earlier, made the point about, 
well, we have to work out some way to work through this process, and 
would not General Powell be a good person? Well, I think General Powell 
is terrific. But I would point out that we already have Bill Gray, 
former Congressman, working on this issue. We are doing exactly that. 
We are trying to find ways to make the sanctions, to make the embargo, 
to make the approach the President has taken, work.
  The question has been raised; well, do sanctions do any good or do 
they not just hurt the poorest and the weakest and the most helpless of 
the people in Haiti?
  I want to make this point. It is not a digression because I have 
talked about affairs on the other side of the world and how relevant 
they are to what has happened in Haiti. When Nelson Mandela came out of 
prison, one of the first things that he said was to thank the people of 
the world community for supporting sanctions in South Africa. His view 
was that sanctions had given rise to the end of apartheid in South 
Africa.
  I was not here in the Senate when the debate around sanctions 
happened with regard to South Africa. But I daresay if you pulled out 
the memoranda and the records of those debates, the same arguments were 
made; well, you are going to hurt the poor. I do not think the poor are 
helped by empowering these thugs that have reduced them to the worst 
level of poverty, privation and fear that they have suffered in this 
century. That is why sanctions will work.
  My colleague, my friend, talked about having what is the fulcrum for 
this effort. You have to have a fulcrum to have some leverage. He is 
right. Let me suggest to you that the fulcrum here is the might and 
power of the greatest nation on this planet. If the United States 
cannot stand for democracy, if the United States does not have the 
wherewithal to clean up foreign affairs in its own backyard, how then 
can we expect anybody else to rise to that challenge?
  We have the fulcrum, we have the power, we have the money, we have 
the capacity, we have the ability; all we have to have is the will. All 
we have to have is the will to stand up for democratic values that we 
say every day on this floor we believe in.
  It seems to me that it is fair to have those values apply to Haiti. I 
go back to my original plea: Do not make up new rules for Haiti. Let us 
have the same rules apply for Haiti that we say we believe in in this 
country. Is there a different history? Yes, there are always 
differences; of course, there are. Democracy is new to Haiti. We have 
had democracy here for over 200 years. This is new for them. But I 
think if we have an opportunity to export the thing that made this 
country great, we ought to take that opportunity. And we ought to use 
every tool at our disposal.
  In this instance, we have not yet given sanctions a chance. We have 
not given peace a chance. We have not given democracy a chance in 
Haiti, and that is why this amendment--and that is part of the problem, 
that it is an amendment--has to be rejected.
  Finally, in closing, Mr. President, I ask one final question, and 
that is: If you do not like the policies of the President, then what 
are you for? What is the positive? Yes, this is being debated, but I 
daresay we do not make new constitutional law or foreign policy based 
on rumor, based on unsubstantiated reports, based on conversations over 
dinner tables, or cocktail parties, or clips that we get in the beltway 
circle of what is being said today. Our foreign policy has to have a 
firmer foundation than that, Mr. President. And this amendment 
undermines that foundation.
  This amendment really sets our foreign policy--even in our ``near 
abroad,'' to use that word in terms of the United States, and I know it 
is kind of a different concept, but that is really what it is; this is 
our ``near abroad.'' If we are going to have a policy, the President 
has set out on a course. I have not always agreed with that course and, 
frankly, I was very critical at the beginning, that we were not more 
forceful and did not have a foreign embargo, that we did not turn the 
screws on the sanctions and really mean it and put some ``umph'' behind 
our policy in Haiti. I was very critical, and vocally so, and I said as 
much. But I have to tell you that, at the present time, there are real 
signs of movement. There are real signs that this President has taken 
the decisive moves, has taken a decisive approach to begin to give us 
an opportunity to prevail in that part of the world.
  So I say to those who say, ``Well, we are going to make him come to 
us, and we are going to make him report to us, and we are not going to 
spend any money, and we are not going to do this or that,'' there was a 
former Vice President who used the term ``nattering nabobs of 
negativism.'' Mr. President, I think if there is going to be a 
``nattering nabob'' in this situation, they are obligated to say: Fine, 
here is our plan. This is how we are going to do it--not next year, not 
next month, but today. And, no, this is not a purely political 
exercise; this is based on what we believe to be the appropriate course 
in our foreign policy. This is not just a chance to embarrass Bill 
Clinton. This is not just a chance to throw some marbles in the road so 
the foreign policy looks more confused than it is. This is not partisan 
politics. This is policy, and we believe in this course of action.
  Let us see that first before we say to the President that he cannot 
do this, that, or the other. I close by saying: Please, I implore my 
colleagues, let us not make up new rules for Haiti and change the rules 
in the middle of the game. Let us go forward with the President's 
course. I believe it can be a productive course, and it can work if 
given the chance. The people of Haiti deserve as much, and the people 
of the United States deserve as much.
  Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn] is 
recognized.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise and urge my colleagues to defeat the 
pending amendment. I do so not because I agree with everything the 
administration policy seems to represent on Haiti, because I do not. I 
really question the embargo as it is applying to the ordinary and 
particularly low-income Haitian people. I am afraid that the wrong 
people are being squeezed, and I think that has something to do with 
the exodus we are seeing in the last several days that may very well 
intensify.
  I think embargoes have their place. But in certain circumstances they 
can be counterproductive. I think it is very important that the United 
States set clearly its goals on what we are trying to accomplish in 
Haiti. I am not sure I have seen that kind of expression--at least not 
in terms that I agree with--from the administration, or from anyone 
else. In my own view, the goals ought to be to first alleviate the very 
severe suffering of the Haitian people, which is very apparent. The 
second goal that is connected to the first should be to prevent a very 
large exodus of people from Haiti to the United States in a way that 
causes tremendous difficulties for us in absorbing it.
  I think the third goal is a very important goal, but the one talked 
about as if it is the only goal, and that is to have some kind of 
democracy there that, in the long run, can serve the interests of the 
Haitian people. But where I suppose I differ with some of my colleagues 
and the administration is I do not think returning one man--even though 
an elected president--is the equivalent of restoring democracy. I 
believe restoring democracy in Haiti, where they have not had that kind 
of experience over the years, requires building a coalition. I think it 
requires having a foundation there that is enabling in terms of 
allowing President Aristide, or whoever is elected President in the 
next election, to govern.
  I do not think that condition exists in Haiti today. It would be my 
view that that coalition needs to be built as a condition precedent to 
the return of Aristide. Otherwise, however he is returned, it will take 
a very substantial outside security force to protect him. I am not sure 
how you have a democracy when you have an outside security force, 
whether it is the U.S. military or whether it is a coalition of 
countries, that basically is having to protect the President of the 
country from his own people. I think that is the difficulty.
  Having said that, Mr. President, I think it would be a fundamental 
mistake to pass this amendment. Let us just take a look at where we are 
now. I think some of the people sponsoring this amendment probably are 
very dubious about the embargo. But what kind of one-two punch are we 
going to be demonstrating toward Haiti if we have a combination of the 
embargo, which may very well be causing the kind of exodus we are now 
seeing, and then we passed an amendment in the Congress saying that we 
are not going to have any military option unless all of Congress 
agrees, or unless the President can meet certain conditions, which 
would be somewhat difficult--not impossible to meet, but somewhat 
difficult to meet--and might require some strained definitions.
  So, Mr. President, when we find a policy that we do not agree with or 
that we have some reservations about--and I have reservations; some 
people fundamentally oppose it--I think we ought to always consider the 
possibility that we can make it worse. The one-two punch I see coming 
if we pass this kind of amendment is, No. 1, this does not do anything 
about the embargo or anything about the goals, does not do anything for 
the restoration of some kind of coalition there that can help President 
Aristide when he returns to govern that country successfully as a 
democracy, respecting human rights, without having to have outside 
military forces basically not only protect him but police the streets 
for months and perhaps even years to come. But what we will also be 
doing is saying that we are not going to put any pressure whatsoever on 
those in charge now who have basically abused democracy and who have 
abused human rights and who continue to abuse their positions of power; 
that we are going to say to them, breathe easy, General Cedras, breathe 
easy Police Chief Francois, because we are not going to let that option 
even be discovered.
  What kind of one-two punch is that? To me, it is the worst of both 
worlds. We have an embargo that is basically causing an exodus, and we 
will then have the military option the table, at least psychologically 
and symbolically which is enormously important now.

  (Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN assumed the chair.)
  Mr. NUNN. So it is my view, Madam President, that as a very practical 
matter, passing this kind of an amendment would be the worst of all 
worlds.
  Then we turn to the constitutional question. This amendment goes 
further than the War Powers Act, which we debated for a long, long time 
before we passed it. Then it was vetoed. Then the veto was overriden. 
And there are a lot of problems with the War Powers Act. But if you are 
going to change it, you have to do so in a very thoughtful way.
  This amendment basically changes the War Powers Act as to one 
country. It says one country is different from all the others in the 
world.
  The President tomorrow morning, if this passed and was law, or let us 
say it passes in a week and becomes law, the President of the United 
States could invade China and send us a notice within 30 days. He could 
invade Russia and basically start a major conflict. He could send 
forces to Bosnia. As far as this resolution is concerned, he could 
basically take military action against North Korea.
  But there would be one country that he would have to jump through 
hoop after hoop after hoop, and that would be Haiti.
  Madam President, no matter what anyone thinks of the present policy, 
and there are probably people all over the lot on that--I certainly do 
not represent my views are the majority here. I do not know. But no 
matter what anyone thinks of our present policy, can we conceive of 
anything more ridiculous than saying Haiti is in a box all by itself 
and that nowhere else in the world is going to be like Haiti? It is a 
separate place, and, by golly, the President has got to do A, B, C, D, 
E, and F by law or he cannot have any flexibility.
  Madam President, this amendment needs defeating. The majority leader 
will have a substitute. The substitute will convey some of the same 
concerns that the authors of this amendment have expressed, but it will 
be a sense of the Senate. It will not be a matter of law. It will not 
conflict with the War Powers Act. It will not be unconstitutional or 
even have the implication of being unconstitutional. And most 
importantly, it will not take a very difficult situation, where the 
President needs some flexibility, where he needs counsel but not 
binding restrictions, and make his situation even more difficult than 
it is now.
  So, Madam President, I would urge the defeat of this amendment. It is 
in the second degree, and I understand that we will need to vote on it 
first. There will not be a substitute possible at this stage. But I can 
assure everyone, based on what the majority leader told me, and I am 
sure he told the same thing to the Senator from Vermont, there will be 
an opportunity for everyone who decides they want to vote against this 
amendment to express their own views through, I think, a more 
responsible vehicle that leaves the President of the United States, 
President Clinton, and his whole team of national security people a 
more broad range set of options than this one.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. NUNN. Yes.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, just before the Senator from Georgia came 
on the floor, I had said that in my 20th year here in the Senate, 
having served here during the time when President Ford, President 
Carter, President Reagan, President Bush, and now President Clinton, I 
could not recall one instance where anybody, either Democrat Senator or 
Republican Senator, had ever proposed in this body a piece of 
legislation so country specific that would so tie the hands of a 
President before the fact as this piece of legislation.
  The distinguished Senator from Georgia has been on the Armed Services 
Committee throughout his career here in the Senate. He has been here 
longer than I. Can the Senator from Georgia ever recall that we 
considered such an amendment with either Republican or Democratic 
Presidents--during the time the Senate majority was Democratic or 
during the time the majority of the Senate was Republican--such an 
amendment that would so specifically tie the hands of a President and 
be so country specific?
  Mr. NUNN. I cannot think of an example. I would not pretend that I 
have gone back and researched the whole record.
  We have passed a good many sense-of-the-Senate type resolutions 
giving the President the benefit of our thoughts on a particular 
situation.
  Mr. LEAHY. I am speaking of binding.
  Mr. NUNN. A binding one in law? The only thing I can think of, I say 
to my friend from Vermont, is the War Powers Act. That was generic and 
applied to everybody. It did not single out one country.
  I cannot think of anything that would cause the leaders in Haiti, who 
have abused their people there and who caused tremendous hardship 
there, to rejoice more than passing this amendment tonight.
  Mr. LEAHY. I might say to my friend from Georgia I think not only are 
the points he makes so accurate but he has spoken of the practical 
effect it will have in Haiti, certainly an effect that I do not think 
anybody here would want to see happen.
  I agree with him. That is exactly what would happen if we passed it.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, will my colleague yield on that?
  Mr. LEAHY. If I could finish on this one thought. Think of what we 
are doing, Madam President.
  This is a matter of enormous constitutional impact, because we have 
disagreements in this body on a Haitian policy, just as apparently 
there are disagreements within the administration on the Haitian policy 
and there is disagreements among the public. Then let us debate Haitian 
policy. Let us set aside a day and everybody step up here and address 
the Senate. Give the President the value of our advice and the American 
public. But think of what we are doing.
  On an appropriations bill that everyone knows we are going to have to 
pass at some point certainly before we leave this week, we want to take 
a step of enormous constitutional import to totally change the rules to 
do something that probably has never ever been attempted in the 200-
year history of our country, and we are going to do it after 2 or 3 
hours of debate and toss it on to an appropriations bill.
  This is not a responsible way of setting policy. It is a back-door 
way almost of trying to change the Constitution, and it is certainly a 
precedent that I would guarantee, if we were to pass it every single 
one of us at some time in the future would see that as a precedent that 
we would rue when faced with a different set of circumstances later on.
  We should not legislate in this nature for the passing moment. We 
should legislate for what is in the best interest of the country, what 
is in the best interest of our constitutional checks and balances. And 
each one of us should stop and think for a moment that we are the most 
powerful nation on Earth. We have enormous power residing in the 
Presidency and in the judiciary and in the Congress, and it works 
because we have this constitutional checks and balances.
  And here we are attempting to eliminate part of that checks and 
balances and do it in a way with very little thought. It is a step that 
we should not leap forward on. We are going over a constitutional 
precipice that I guarantee you, if we were to pass this everyone of us 
would rue it, and I guarantee historians would write, why did the 
Senate lose its sense?
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, do I have the floor?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia retains the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. Would the Senator from Vermont put a question mark after 
that erudite statement? That was a question I am attempting to answer.
  Mr. LEAHY. I agree.
  Mr. DODD. I agree there should be a question mark.
  Mr. NUNN. I generally agree with the thrust of the Senator's remarks.
  I am glad to yield to my friend from Connecticut, but first let me 
plead one thought.
  I hope we do not have to use a military option. In my view the 
military option would be not very difficult militarily. You never want 
to put people at risk unless America has a vital stake involved and 
unless we have tried all other alternatives.
  But the military scenario in Haiti would not be very difficult, to 
say the least, but what would be difficult, and the Senator from Utah 
mentioned this a little while ago, is we would basically become law 
enforcement officials. We would basically have to provide the police 
function, and we would be doing it with military forces.
  As we have seen from difficulty in the Middle East and other places, 
that is a very difficult job for the military, who have a different 
mission. They are not taught to arrest and detect and prosecute. They 
are taught to basically search and destroy. That is a different 
mission.
  So I hope that the military option is not required or necessary. But 
let us do not take it off the table. Let us do not take it away from 
the President as an option. Let us do not remove this psychological 
pressure that I hope will be successful in bringing about some 
resolution of the tragedy in Haiti.
  I yield to my friend.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I just want to subscribe to the thoughts 
being expressed by our colleague from Georgia. We held 4 hours of 
hearings yesterday on Haiti.
  I want to come back to the underlying question here, putting aside 
the debate on Haiti for a minute, whether you agree or disagree with 
what is present policy.
  There is a more fundamental issue that is being addressed as a result 
of our colleague from New Hampshire raising this binding amendment.
  It goes far beyond the issue of this particular fact situation that I 
have been reading over the War Powers Resolution, and my colleague from 
Georgia is far better acquainted with this than I. And I see the 
arrival of our colleague from Virginia who is well acquainted with it, 
as well.
  There has been a 22-year debate on the War Powers Resolution and the 
debate has not focused on whether or not the Congress has the authority 
to restrain a President's decision to initiate hostilities prior to 
congressional approval. The debate has been, one, whether or not he 
should have to consult with Congress before he engages in those 
activities and, second, whether, within 48 hours after engaging in 
those hostilities, he needs to come to the Congress and get some 
permission. And Presidents going back to President Nixon, if I am not 
incorrect, have strongly objected to even that restriction on executive 
power.
  Now, that is the question I guess I would ask. But that has been a 
significant debate.
  This amendment goes far beyond that, in that it is a precondition and 
sets a standard with which no other President has ever been asked to 
comply in any case specific or even in the generic situation.
  Is that the opinion of the Senator from Georgia, as well?
  Mr. NUNN. I think that is correct.
  I would have to add, on the Iraq situation I think that there was a 
very strong view in the Congress because of the time element involved, 
the fact that there were 6 or 7 months of buildup and consideration and 
sanctions before there was any kind of formal debate in the Congress in 
terms of Congress' responsibility under the war provisions of the 
Constitution, that in that case there were a number of people that 
urged the President of the United States--then President Bush--to come 
to the Congress before taking military action.
  I would have to go back and research it, but I do not believe there 
was any law that was passed. I am not sure there was even any attempt.
  Mr. DODD. If my colleague would yield, President Bush actually 
requested of us to raise that issue.
  Mr. NUNN. Correct.
  Mr. DODD. And it was a significant debate. But to the contrary, it 
was not Congress insisting, it was not a legislatively initiated 
activity.
  Mr. NUNN. But there were a lot of people in Congress, I would say a 
majority of Congress, that felt pretty strongly that he should ask that 
permission, given the circumstances and given the Constitution's clear 
role of Congress in declaring war, because that indeed would be an 
action anyone would define as a war.
  I am not sure what we would call an actual military incursion in 
Haiti, but it is certainly not comparable to that.
  Yet, I think the President ought to maximize his consultations with 
Congress before taking military action, anyway. But that is a different 
thing altogether than binding him in law and basically demonstrating to 
whoever would be your possible adversaries in advance that it is a 
binding action in law. And that is what we have here before us.
  Mr. DODD. I thank my colleague.
  Mr. NUNN. I yield the floor.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I would like to take a minute or so, if I 
can, on a general proposition.
  First of all, I thank our colleague from Georgia and our colleague 
from Arizona. Their observations were on the constitutionality of this 
proposal rather than engaging in debate specifically on Haiti.
  But I think it is important to note, with regard to the debate on 
Haiti itself, that I think the present course of action that the 
administration is following is a good one. It is a difficult one. It is 
cumbersome and awkward, but there are several things present here that 
have not been present in other situations.
  One, there is tremendous international cooperation. The United 
Nations has voted unanimously to impose sanctions. There is the 
Organization of American States. We are not going it alone in this 
particular case.
  I point out that we have had now, for basically four decades, an 
imposition of sanctions on Cuba. We have even now put a secondary 
boycott on Cuba. And people have argued over the years whether or not 
sanctions, economically, politically, and diplomatically have any 
affect at all.
  As I listened to some of the comments about these sanctions, I am 
left with the impression by some of my colleagues that somehow it is 
this administration's fault for the condition under which Haitians are 
living.
  Madam President, I lived on the border of Haiti for 2\1/2\ years. It 
goes back 3 decades ago, but I know this country very, very well. I 
have been there numerous times.
  I would say to my colleagues, sanctions are tough. But these are 
desperately poor people who live outside of the mainstream of the 
normal economy of a country.
  I would like to think--I would wish in some cases--that the people of 
Haiti would be affected. But frankly, they are so desperately poor that 
the issue of commercial flights coming in and out of Haiti, visas, and 
the like have no impact whatsoever on the average Haitian; even the 
normal export-import. These are people who live hand-to-mouth. This is 
not a case where the poor are being adversely affected to the extent 
that some of our colleagues have suggested.
  Now there is an impact. But, Madam President, if we cannot make 
sanctions work here, then I do not know where we can make them work. If 
we cannot use sanctions to have some impact on the decisionmakers of 
that country, the economic elite and the military, I do not know where 
they could ever possibly work.
  Here we have everybody joining us. I gather that Air France, the only 
airline left, is going to make a decision in the next 24 or 48 hours 
that will exclude all commercial traffic. Rarely has this country had 
the kind of cooperation and unanimity of support on an action that we 
do in this particular case.
  Now will it produce the desired results? I do not know that. I am not 
enthusiastic about a military option here at all, for the very reason 
the Senator from Georgia and others have outlined. But I do think we 
ought to give these sanctions an opportunity to try to do the job that 
we would all like to see done.
  Let us remember what happened here. Seventy percent of the people of 
this country for the first time in their history chose a leader--
whether we like him or not is irrelevant--in the freest and fairest 
election in the history of that country. Jean-Bertrand Aristide was 
elected by the people of that nation to be their President. And then a 
handful of colonels and generals threw him out in a coup.
  Now there are only two nations left in this hemisphere that do not 
have democratic governments--Cuba and Haiti.
  All we are saying here is, we believe the people of Haiti have a 
right to be able to have their democratic leader back and the 
restoration of democracy, and that we are not going to subsidize these 
colonels and generals as if nothing happened.
  You are not going to fly into Florida on American Airlines; you are 
not going to get a visa to come to the United States.
  Is that really that outrageous for us to say we believe in democracy; 
we think it is important; we think it is in our interest to have 
democratic countries in this hemisphere?
  Now, I am not enthusiastic, as I say, about a military invasion. I 
would quickly point out that no one I know of is suggesting we have the 
military stay around and run the country. There is a discussion, if a 
military invasion occurred, to have an international force go in that 
would do exactly what the Senator from Georgia has talked about, and 
that is training to do a policing kind of job, not a search and destroy 
mission.
  I would inform my colleague that has been discussed in the aftermath 
of a successful military operation.
  Again, I emphasize I do not like the idea of us even suggesting at 
this juncture a military operation. I think we can be successful with 
sanctions. At least, I think we ought to give them a try, and not just 
a few hours. That is all we have had, some of the sanctions have not 
even been imposed yet.
  Last, I would just say, and I think this is true everywhere, you do 
not ever take off the military option. Again, the Senator from Georgia 
is absolutely correct in this. You never say what you are not 
absolutely ever going to do. That is a tremendously crippling 
disadvantage to place any chief executive of this country in.
  Again, you ought to draw that arrow from your quiver very 
reluctantly, very cautiously, know how to draw it and know how to put 
it back. And you ought to do that with some thought. But do not ever 
say, I am never, ever going to do it or I am only going to do it under 
the following conditions, and let your potential adversary know what 
those conditions are.
  So, again, I emphasize the point here: The condition of Haitians was 
not imposed by these sanctions. The political condition in that country 
was not imposed by this administration. These conditions have existed 
as a result of the political leadership of Haiti for too many years.
  There is an opportunity here for some change. It is in our interest, 
I believe, as a Nation, in this hemisphere and elsewhere to promote 
democratic governments and to stand up for them where they exist, to 
try to defend them when they are in trouble, and not to subsidize those 
who destroy them.
  The military leaders in that country destroyed it. And I do not think 
they ought to be able to send their kids to prep schools in New England 
and I do not think they ought to go school in Miami and I do not think 
they should have the rights that other citizens do in other nations 
that support democracy. That is basically what these sanctions are 
about.
  So, Madam President, I hope, for the reasons more fundamental than 
the debate regarding Haiti, that this amendment will be defeated.
  But, beyond that, I think the Senate ought to look and think 
carefully about how we are conducting our foreign policy here in Haiti; 
whether or not there is an intelligent way to go here, so we can try to 
achieve the desired results that President Bush articulated when 
President Aristide was ousted and that President Clinton has tried to 
pursue during his Presidency. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I have followed this debate, as have 
other Senators, I hope, with great interest. I share the concerns of 
the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire. I, too, have serious 
misgivings about the policy of this country with respect to Haiti. But 
I am of a very clear, unequivocal mind that this amendment transcends 
the constitutional balance between the executive and legislative 
branches. And for that reason I will oppose it.
  Madam President, I went back and did some research. I would like to 
refer my colleagues to the Congressional Record of October 21, 1993, at 
which time this body had before it an amendment by the distinguished 
majority leader and the Republican leader. And the body approved that 
amendment with the exception, I think, of all but two votes. I urge 
Senators to take some time, if they so desire, to look at the debate 
which thoroughly aired many of the issues that are before us as a 
consequence of this amendment at this time.
  I took the opportunity to include in the Record as a part of the 
debate, Madam President, two very detailed memoranda--one written by an 
Assistant Attorney General on February 12, 1980, during the 
administration of Ronald Reagan, and a second by the Office of Legal 
Counsel, dated October 26, 1983.
  Both of these detailed memoranda describe this delicate balance 
between the executive and legislative branches and address the War 
Powers Act. It is very clear from a long series of well thought out and 
carefully constructed opinions by the executive branch as well as 
within our own discussions on this--and I suppose in my 16 years this 
is probably the 10th or 12th time that I and Senator Cohen and Senator 
Nunn and others have dealt with this war powers issue--there is a 
certain clear consistency that this body has followed throughout all of 
these debates. Regrettably, I say to my colleague from New Hampshire, 
he has crossed the line. It is for that reason I cannot support the 
amendment.
  I find in these two opinions all the authority to oppose the 
amendment. If the Senators so desire, look at the memoranda. I wish to 
associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished Senator from 
Arizona, the Senator from Georgia, the Senator from Connecticut and, 
indeed, others who have spoken against the amendment.
  I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an article by 
James D. Hittle from the June 13, 1994, Navy Times, and I yield the 
floor.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                  [From the Navy Times, June 13, 1994]

            Invading Haiti is a U.S. Invitation to Disaster

                          (By James D. Hittle)

       Of all the misguided proposals considered by the Clinton 
     administration foreign policy, the idea of a U.S. invasion of 
     Haiti tops the list.
       What's the objective? So far only the wispy ideas about 
     human rights and restoring the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide to 
     power have been the leading reasons to risk U.S. lives and 
     pay for the huge dollar cost of such a wild try. Sooner or 
     later, U.S. troops would get killed.
       Over a long period of time the casualties could go into the 
     hundreds, perhaps thousands, and the euphoria of our landing 
     and takeover in Haiti would wear down quickly as the body 
     bags pile up at the shipping points. The public demand would 
     be to ``bring the boys home'' And body bags there would be, 
     as Haitian regulars and irregulars wage a guerrilla was in 
     the bush against the occupying troops.
       I've been in Haiti several times. About the only chances I 
     saw in the countryside over the cities were a slight increase 
     in the number of autos, deterioration of the road system and 
     a worsening of the already abject poverty. It's the poorest 
     country in the Caribbean. U.S. money isn't going to change 
     much of it for the better.
       As we look back on our previous effort to bring law and 
     order to Haiti, there isn't much in terms of long-range 
     results to brag about. Then-President Woodrow Wilson sent the 
     Marines into Haiti to straighten it out in 1915. They came 
     out in 1934. While there, the Marines brought a semblance of 
     law and order to the cities. The countryside was largely 
     disputed territory as the guerrillas waged at almost 
     incessant welfare against the occupying Marines.
       The 19-year stay of the Marines in Haiti shows how a well-
     intentioned intervention can stretch into a decade and even 
     longer. Because of the need for pacification of the rural 
     areas, combined with opposing guerrilla warfare, the Marine 
     job, as the years went by, was never quite done.
       One of the leading figures early on during the guerrilla 
     warfare was Charlemagne Peralte, a clever jungle fighter and 
     a constant threat to the Marines. In October 1919, an 
     informer said there would be a jungle meeting of the 
     guerrillas, and that Charlemagne would be there. Then-Marine 
     Corps Capt. Herman Hannekden (later a brigadier general), who 
     had been after Charlemagne for months, decided he'd attend 
     the meeting and kill his adversary.
       For assistance, Hannekden chose Marine Cpl. William R. 
     Button. Obviously, these two couldn't simply show up at the 
     jungle meeting in U.S Marine Corps uniforms and place 
     Charlemagne under arrest. So Hannekden used old-fashioned 
     imagination. Both he and Button disguised themselves in long 
     native dresses and shawls. This, together with the darkness, 
     gave them the camouflage to gather with the irregulars and 
     their women in the murky fire-lighted jungle clearing. With 
     their weapons tucked out of sight, Hannekden and Button 
     gradually worked their way near Charlemagne.
       Without any warning, the two Marines pulled out their guns 
     and Hannekden, with a cool aim, put two .45-caliber slugs 
     into Charlemagne's chest at 15 feet, killing him. Button, 
     meanwhile, dropped nine of Charlemagne's bodyguards. Then the 
     two Marines disappeared into the darkness.
       Killing Charlemagne deprived the guerillas of their most 
     able leader and, as a result, saved Marine lives. But the 
     Marines didn't leave Haiti for another 15 years. For their 
     heroism both Hannekden and Button were awarded the U.S. Medal 
     of Honor.
       It's questionable if such a bold strike at any enemy leader 
     could be duplicated these days. Even irregulars often have 
     detection and illumination devices, as well as the training, 
     to keep all but the proven faithful away from their leader. 
     But improvisation will continue to be their specialty.
       The 1915-34 Marine Corps occupation of Haiti required the 
     commitment of a large portion of the Marine Corps, which in 
     those days was much smaller than today's troop level. Peak 
     strength of the Corps in Haiti in the years 1925-26 was 
     2,750. Total Marine levels in 1925 were about 19,000.
       During the occupation, 10 Marines were killed in action and 
     172 died of other causes including tropical diseases. It may 
     not seem a big total, but multiply it by the much larger 
     force the United States would need today to occupy the 
     country. With land mines and deadly automatic weapons, the 
     casualties could go much higher.
       But with so much Latin American opposition to U.S. military 
     intervention in Haiti, we could be stirring up more trouble 
     for the United States than Aristide is worth. And with the 
     United States and North Korea on the brink of a shooting war, 
     this is certainly no time for a U.S. military misadventure in 
     Haiti.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Mr. COHEN. Madam President, when the amendment was initially offered 
as a sense of the Senate, I frankly was tempted to lend my support to 
it. My understanding now is it has been changed into a proposed 
statutory cutoff of any funds that could be used for a military 
operation in Haiti.
  I would like to say just a couple of words by way of preface to these 
remarks, about why we are here. I recall many years ago reading a book 
Stewart Alsop wrote shortly before he died. I believe it was called 
``Stay of Execution.'' In it, he recounted an anecdote about Winston 
Churchill. A waiter set before Churchill a large and tasteless pudding. 
``Waiter,'' Churchill said, ``pray remove this pudding. It has no 
theme.''
  I believe that is precisely why we are seeing the reaction to the 
present administration, as far as its foreign policy is concerned. It 
has no theme. There is a distinct perception in this Chamber, I believe 
on both sides of the aisle, whether one would admit that or not--if not 
in this Chamber then certainly in the country--there is great doubt 
about the present administration as far as its foreign policy is 
concerned.
  We saw that, I think, with respect to Somalia. I heard the issue of 
Somalia raised earlier this evening, that we were fortunate to reject 
those on this side who wanted to ``cut and run.'' I would like to take 
specific issue with the notion that we were in favor of cutting and 
running. What we were concerned about at that time was that we did not 
have a concrete theme. We did not have a consistent policy. We did not 
have, in fact, a well-reasoned, well-structured plan of operation. And 
when we suffered the 18 lives that were lost, there did not seem to be 
much of a plan as to how we were going to continue in that then hostile 
environment.
  I, for one, am not prepared ever to put the lives of our sons and 
daughters on the line, in danger, in jeopardy, unless it is not only 
for a good cause but unless we have a good plan of operation. And we 
clearly did not have one at that time.
  So it was not cut and run but rather we no longer had confidence in 
the policy that was being pursued. If the policy was right, then we no 
longer had the military force to accomplish that policy. And that was 
the reason why there was such concern over here and, I suspect, over 
there as well.
  Madam President, I think you raised the issue, let us not have new 
rules for Haiti. I have not had time to refresh my memory on this, but 
I recall there was a Church or a Cooper amendment, back in 1973, that 
dealt with bombing in Indochina, cutting off the funds. I believe there 
was a Clark amendment back in 1974 prohibiting any military or 
paramilitary operations in Angola. Again, I have not had time to go 
back and thoroughly research that. So I think there has been some 
precedent in the use of this particular procedure. I do not think it 
was wise in the past, but there has been some precedent.
  I would also like to address the issue of the Constitution. I 
disagree with my colleague from Virginia. I do not believe it is a 
constitutional issue. I do not believe the Senator from New Hampshire 
has walked across the threshold of constitutional powers here. I would 
like to repeat what I have said time and time again on this Senate 
floor. While the President may be the executor of foreign policy, he is 
not the sole architect of foreign policy. And if at times he has been, 
it has been a matter of practice and not a matter of law that he has 
exercised that power. Congress is a coequal partner in the formulation 
of foreign policy. He carries it out. He or she is a coequal partner. 
But no President can be said to be the sole architect of foreign 
policy.
  I have heard my colleague from Maine, the majority leader, say on 
many, many occasions: We have had many Presidents in our history. We 
have never had a king, not once. And we do not have one now.
  So it is Congress that has the power, at least a coequal power, in 
the field of formulating foreign policy.
  The President is the Commander in Chief. And the Commander in Chief 
carries out the policy of the Government. Before he can ever carry out 
the policy wearing his military hat, a policy must be adopted and in 
formulating the policy, the President of the United States, as a 
civilian, acts in conjunction with the U.S. Congress. He then, as 
Commander in Chief, can carry out that policy. And it is important to 
recognize that distinction. The President cannot act alone unless it is 
on an emergency basis, unless he does so to protect the lives of 
Americans who might be in danger, are in danger, or unless there is an 
absolute emergency requiring him to act to protect the national 
security interests of this country. That is when the President can act 
alone, unilaterally. But he does not raise the armies and he does not 
support the armies. We do. For that notion to be set as a matter of 
policy or constitutional law--I think it is a mistake for us to 
articulate that. He is a coequal formulator of foreign policy and so 
are we.
  I raised this issue in the past dealing with covert action when we 
had the Iran-Contra hearings. We found out that the President had 
initiated a covert action without properly notifying the Congress of 
the United States. When we found out what happened as a result of that 
covert action, we decided --we thought we were going to take some 
action right here on the Senate floor to force the President of the 
United States to notify Congress in advance. And that is what we 
thought the law was--notification in advance, unless that is not 
possible because of the exigencies of the moment, in which case 
notification is required within a reasonable timeframe.
  Under the Reagan administration, the Justice Department issued an 
opinion that said a reasonable time period is whatever the President 
says is reasonable. It could be 2 days, it could be 2 weeks, it could 
be 2 months, it could be 6 months, it could be never. It is only when 
the President said it was time to notify Congress.
  I mention that tonight because we have always believed in our society 
that we must have open debate about our foreign policy. That is why we 
have the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, 
to ventilate the conflicting and competing views of this Nation and 
then to help, by that debate, to set the policy, to send the signal to 
the administration, to tell the President this is what we believe is a 
right course of action. You cannot do that if you are acting covertly.
  We recognize that sometimes the President has to act covertly. 
Sometimes it is imperative that he do so, but on very narrow, limited 
bases and then--and only then--provided he notifies the select 
intelligence committees of Congress, the leadership of these two 
committees, or at least the leadership of the Congress, to let us know 
what that covert action is designed to carry out, what foreign policy 
are we seeking to achieve with this covert action.
  Absent Congress being notified, we have no participation, we have no 
role to play. All we can do is react. So many Members on both sides of 
this Chamber said that is not what we want to do; we want to have an 
active role in the formulation of policy, be it overt and certainly be 
it covert.
  Presidents have resisted that. They say, no, we are the Commanders in 
Chief and we have to have the discretion to carry this out, as a matter 
of constitutional law. I disagree with that. Only under very narrow 
circumstances.
  I think that is the case here. We are talking about debating foreign 
policy openly on something that may or may not affect our national 
security interests.
  So I think it is entirely proper that the issue be raised. I think 
the Senator from New Hampshire has done a great service because he has 
raised the fundamental fears on the part of this country that we do not 
know what we are doing, we have not thought out carefully what we 
intend to do and what the consequences are. If you took an overnight 
poll--I hope we do not do that--but if you took one, how many people 
would be willing to, say, send their son or daughter to fight in Haiti?
  I remember sitting in my office with ``mothers against the war in the 
Persian Gulf.'' We had all the reasons we could marshal about why it 
was important to take on Saddam Hussein. We went through the whole list 
of what he was doing in Kuwait: the raping, the pillaging, the 
destruction of the entire country of Kuwait, the threat to blow up the 
oil wells, chemical warfare, biological warfare, the fact that he could 
straddle the oil fields of the Middle East, and what a threat that 
would mean to the national security interests of this country and many 
of our allies, the potential that he would even go to nuclear weapons, 
and the intelligence community could not tell us when he might acquire 
nuclear weapons--it could be a year, it could be 10 years; the fact he 
was developing a long-range missile capability.
  None of that individually was enough to persuade the American people, 
at least if you looked at the polls, to go to war, and I had mothers 
against the war sitting in my office saying the blood of our children 
are going to be on your hands if you vote to go to war tomorrow. That 
is how reluctant the people of this country are to commit their 
treasure to another country, be it a neighbor or across the Atlantic 
Ocean or Somalia or anywhere else.
  So I think it is very, very important that this issue be raised and 
debated here and that we not fall into the argument that the President, 
as a Commander in Chief, has the sole authority to commit our sons and 
daughters to a military action. That is not the case, and we ought not 
to endorse that concept tonight.
  I am reluctant to support the amendment the way in which it is 
structured because I believe that we ought to send messages to the 
President, we ought to tell him we think it would be a mistake to act 
militarily. As a matter of fact, I believe the Senator from Connecticut 
indicated last fall:

       We cannot support indefinitely, or in perpetuity, 
     governments, no matter how much we want to. We cannot send 
     troops into Haiti and expect to become the police force and 
     army of Haiti.

  I think he still agrees with that. Most in this Chamber would.
  I do not know what the President intends to do. I have heard many 
rumors. I must say that I think he has to listen very carefully to what 
is going on in this Chamber this evening. Many of us are reluctant to 
impose restraints--prior restraints--upon his conduct. We want to give 
him some flexibility. But that flexibility should not be interpreted as 
a license.
  I recall during our buildup prior to the Persian Gulf war, for almost 
6 months I went to President Bush and I said, ``Mr. President, I 
believe you have an obligation to come before the Congress and get our 
consent before you go to war in the Persian Gulf.'' That was resisted. 
There was great difference of opinion. The President reacted rather 
negatively at the time.
  I said, ``Forget about the War Powers Act. Let's not debate the War 
Powers Act.''
  I think the War Powers Act is constitutional. Every President since 
its adoption has indicated it is unconstitutional.
  ``As a matter of practical policy, whether you agree or disagree 
about its constitutionality, if you commit troops to the Persian Gulf 
without our consent, I can guarantee you, once we start suffering 
casualties, the public opinion which you desperately need to solidify 
the support to maintain a presence in the Persian Gulf will evaporate. 
Once the bodies start coming home, public opinion will go in precisely 
the opposite direction, and you know what? Congress will be right 
behind them, right behind them. What you have to do is you must get our 
consent up front, you must put us to a vote up front to say we support 
what you are doing and, absent that support, you will find yourself 
hanging out there completely alone. You will find yourself in the same 
situation we found in the loss of public support for what we were doing 
in Vietnam.''
  That was a tragedy of immense proportion. The President was involved 
in a conflict for which the public had long since given up its support. 
I think if we learned anything from that, it was that if you are going 
to commit the sons and daughters of this country, to ask them to die 
for somebody else, you better have public support on your side. You 
better have Members of Congress on your side. In the absence of that, 
you will find yourself beating a retreat and the people who will lose 
their lives will feel and their families will feel, as some of those 
feel now about what we did in Somalia, that their sons' and daughters' 
lives were wasted.
  I do not believe that is the case, but, nonetheless, that is the 
deep-seated feeling on the part of some and that will be the feeling 
any time we take a military operation which is not something that has 
to be taken overnight but is planned in advance. If you do not have 
public support for that operation, you run the risk of being forced at 
some time to back out, to get the troops out. And nothing is more fatal 
to our foreign policy, to the respect that we need.
  Frankly, we do not have it right now. One of the really sad 
commentaries of today is that many countries--our allies included--do 
not hold us with very much respect. They see a loss of credibility in 
our policy. They see a lack of expertise in the field. They see a lack 
of any kind of sustainable policy that is supported by Congress. So 
they are reluctant to follow our lead. And that is one of the reasons 
why we are having so much difficulty getting allies, and others, to 
listen to what we would like to do, to support our efforts. They simply 
do not have confidence that we know what we are about.
  So, Madam President, I suggest respectfully that whether or not this 
amendment is adopted, and I do not intend to support it, but the 
message ought to be very clear: Do not commit our forces to a military 
operation in Haiti unless you have support, unless you are convinced 
that the Congress will back you up over the long term.
  If anything is more fatal to what we are doing in foreign policy, it 
is for us to send our troops in and then be forced to pull them out. It 
signifies weakness, vacillation, inconsistency, a muddled policy and a 
lack of leadership--all of that--which will undermine our national 
security interests perhaps more than the reduction of our military 
capability. If we lose the sense, the perception that we are in command 
of our policy, we will lose the Nation's respect, we will lose respect 
internationally, and that will be more damaging to our national 
security than anything else.
  So I commend the Senator from New Hampshire for raising the issue. I 
think there are legitimate concerns about whether or not this is 
hamstringing the President, whether or not we ought to take preemptive 
action to preclude him from taking any action.
  I might say the debate on Bosnia is not without some relevance here. 
Many of us said under no circumstances put ground troops in Bosnia. So 
we have gone on record, with a sense of the Senate perhaps but we have 
gone on record, saying no ground troops in Bosnia certainly at this 
time and perhaps not even if any kind of peaceful accord has been 
reached.
  So that is the function of the Senate, to debate the issues, to 
ventilate our views, to give the President at least some guidance, in 
this case not a positive recommendation but one that says we are not 
satisfied yet that you have persuaded the American people it is 
imperative under any circumstances to intervene militarily. That may 
come about at some time, but we have not been persuaded yet. And we 
would urge you not to take such action until such time as you make the 
case and you come to us and seek our consent. Without that, I am afraid 
the policy would be doomed to failure if it were ever initiated.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, the only reason I sought the floor, and I 
will not hold it for more than a moment--I see the distinguished 
majority leader in the Chamber now--I would assume most Senators have 
expressed themselves. The Senators I have talked to know exactly how 
they are going to vote on this issue. I would urge Senators we may be 
able to try to find a time to vote relatively soon on this. There are 
other matters that will come up. I would hope that we could dispose of 
a number of amendments if, indeed, they need rollcall votes this 
evening.
  I yield to the Senator from Maine.
  Mr. MITCHELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
  Mr. MITCHELL. We have been trying for some time to get an agreement 
to get a vote on this amendment and have been unsuccessful so far. But 
I hope that we will be able to do so.
  I therefore now ask unanimous consent that at 8:50 p.m. this evening 
the Senate vote on or in relation to Senator Gregg's amendment No. 
2117, as modified; that upon the disposition of his amendment, I be 
recognized to offer an amendment on behalf of myself and others; that 
the Senate vote on or in relation to my amendment after it has been 
reported, and that the preceding all occur without any intervening 
action or debate, and the time between now and 8:50 p.m. be divided 
equally between Senator Leahy and Senator Gregg or their designees.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I object.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Madam President, may I inquire of the Senator as to 
what he is objecting and the reasons therefore?
  Mr. McCONNELL. All I can say to the leader is that there is an 
objection lodged on this side to having the back-to-back votes.
  Mr. MITCHELL. The Senator does not agree to having a vote on this 
amendment at 8:50 or he just does not want a vote on the subsequent 
amendment immediately thereafter?
  Mr. McCONNELL. Might I say, I assume the objection might go away with 
if we go ahead and have the vote on the Gregg amendment and the leader 
would lay down his amendment and discuss that. That is the only 
suggestion I have. All I can tell the leader is that I have to object 
to this particular request.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Madam President, just so Senators can understand the 
situation, the amendment that I will offer is identical in form and 
substance to an amendment which the Senate previously approved a few 
months ago by a vote of 98 to 2. We have now debated this subject on 
several occasions including most recently this evening, and we are all 
trying hard to make progress on this bill and other matters so that we 
could complete action and meet our target for the recess.
  I do not know what there is left to debate. We have debated this 
subject several times and the amendment we are going to offer is 
absolutely identical, word for word, in form and substance to that 
which was previously debated and voted on by the Senate 98 to 2.
  Will our colleagues agree to a vote on that 30 minutes after the vote 
on this amendment?
  Mr. McCONNELL. Madam President, at the risk of being redundant, let 
me just repeat to the leader, I am constrained to object to the UC 
request as it is currently constructed.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Would the Senator be constrained to object if I asked 
for a vote on the second amendment, which everybody has already voted 
on and 98 out of 100 voted for, 30 minutes after the first vote or 40 
minutes after?
  Mr. McCONNELL. I would have to check with this side.
  Mr. MITCHELL. I will just say, Madam President, that when we get to 
the point when Senators start saying why can we not go home, these are 
some of the reasons why we cannot go home.
  If that is the case, then would the Senator agree to permit a vote on 
the pending amendment without a time for the vote on the subsequent 
amendment? The Senator from New Hampshire is here. This will permit him 
to have a vote on his amendment. We will offer the other one. Then if 
the Senators want to delay or keep debating on the same subject 
repeatedly, why, I suppose we could stay and do that.
  Mr. GREGG. If the Senator from Maine will yield, I am perfectly happy 
to vote on both amendments. I have no problem with the sequential vote. 
Somebody obviously does on our side. But as a practical matter all the 
time we need--I need to reserve time; the leader wishes to speak on 
this, and I would like to have 10 minutes to speak on it and therefore 
the time of 8:40, or 8:50 I guess it was, is fine with me as long as we 
have 15 minutes on our side and the rest to the opposition.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Madam President, in an effort to be accommodating, I 
will renew the request without a time or a vote on the subsequent 
amendment. But I will simply say to the Senators that we simply stay 
here until we vote on that amendment, no matter how long it takes, or 
if we are not able to vote on that we will just have to stay in until 
we do.
  I just do not see any reason why we cannot vote on an amendment that 
is identical to that which Senators have already debated at great 
length. It seems to me that there does not appear, or at least no 
reason has been advanced or suggested for that.
  So I will renew my request that at 8:50--I guess we better make it 
8:55 now, if the Senator from New Hampshire wants that much time this 
evening, the Senate vote on or in relation to Senator Gregg's amendment 
No. 2117, as modified; that upon the disposition of his amendment, I be 
recognized to offer an amendment on behalf of myself and others; that 
the time between now and 8:55 p.m. be equally divided between Senators 
Leahy and Gregg or their designees.
  Mr. GREGG. 8:50 is fine with me.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Reserving the right to object, does the Senator have 2 
minutes in that for me or if not could I ask----
  Mr. MITCHELL. I made it 8:55 because the Senator from New Hampshire 
said he wanted 15 minutes.
  Mr. GREGG. I will yield the Senator 2 minutes.
  Mr. MITCHELL. I renew my request, Madam President, with the vote at 
8:55.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, on my time, I would be very brief while 
the majority leader is here. I would assume, and I would hope people 
understand, the majority leader wishes to bring up his amendment, which 
he will be able to do after this. With or without unanimous consent, he 
will be able to bring it up. Obviously, some could stop us from having 
a vote on that. Would it be fair to say, I ask my good friend from 
Maine, that if action is taken to forestall the vote on the majority 
leader's resolution, we will have further votes this evening? I do not 
want people to assume we will have this one vote on the Gregg amendment 
and that is it.
  Mr. MITCHELL. To the extent that it is within my power to do so, yes.
  Mr. LEAHY. I reserve the remainder of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader.
  Mr. GREGG. Is the Senator from Kentucky controlling the time or the 
Senator from New Hampshire?
  Mr. McCONNELL. I believe the Senator from New Hampshire controls the 
time.
  Mr. GREGG. I yield such time as he may need to the minority leader.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
  Mr. DOLE. Madam President, I thank the Senator from New Hampshire.
  As I have looked at the amendment, it looks familiar. It is 
essentially the same amendment that was offered, as the majority leader 
has pointed out, a couple months ago--a restriction on funds to invade 
Haiti because concerns were raised over the diplomatic sensitivity and 
executive branch privilege. At that time we modified the amendment to 
make it a sense-of-the-Senate amendment. I assume that is what will 
follow this amendment.
  Since that time, the war drums have been beating for an invasion of 
Haiti. Many commentators who were not in the forefront of support for 
the liberation of Grenada now advocate invading Haiti. And many who did 
not support the invasion of Panama now want to invade Haiti.
  But Haiti is not Grenada, and Haiti is not Panama. American citizens 
are not in immediate danger in Haiti--as they were in Panama and 
Grenada. In Grenada, a Communist revolution was underway with the clear 
goal of expansion. Grenada's neighbors asked for American intervention. 
In Haiti, Americans are not at risk. Haiti's regime does not threaten 
its neighbors.
  In 1989 an indicted drug trafficker ran Panama, American service 
persons were beaten and even killed, and the safety of the Panama Canal 
was at risk. Decisive military action was undertaken to defend American 
interests.
  In both Panama and Grenada, other options were not available. Grenada 
was an emergency which required immediate action. In Panama, all 
avenues for a political solution were exhausted, In Haiti, however, the 
administration has rejected political negotiations. I am informed the 
U.S. Ambassador in Haiti is not allowed to meet Haitian military 
leaders. I am informed that Congressman Bill Gray, the President's 
special representative has not traveled to Haiti, and has not met with 
democratically elected Haitian parliamentarians.
  I do not know why he has not.
  So it seems to me that the administration relies on the views of 
President-elect Aristide and his paid advisers--who get paid pretty 
well, if you look at the records--and who reject negotiations. Maybe we 
should send President Carter to explore negotiated options in Haiti. I 
agree with the assessment of Larry Pezzullo, the last special 
representative for Haiti:

       By abandoning the track of multilateral negotiations, we 
     have taken on full responsibility for Haiti's future. This is 
     no favor to Aristide, the Haitian people or the Americans who 
     will be sacrificed in the attempt.

  As many of us predicted, what the administration has done now is 
tighten sanctions, which has driven people into boats, driven them out 
to sea, and forced the people in this hemisphere. It is not going to 
work. It in no way is going to work, and in my view they are punishing 
the wrong people.
  Yes, there are human rights violations in Haiti--as there are in many 
countries in the hemisphere. But the boats are clearly free to leave 
Haiti--and leaving they are at a record rate particularly in the last 
few days. Unlike Cuba, emigrants from Haiti are not shot by pursuing 
military forces. Haitians are leaving because the United States-led 
economic embargo leaves them with no options. And the constant changes 
in U.S. immigration policy leave the hope that the way to get into 
America is to set sail.
  The United States cannot declare a new foreign policy doctrine: That 
we will invade if democracy is interrupted. We ignored antidemocratic 
events in Algeria and in Georgia. We cannot invade every country where 
human rights abuses occur. We must only use military force where 
American interests are threatened.

  Madam President, I am going to support the amendment by the 
distinguished Senator from New Hamphire. It seems to me that we have 
spent a lot of time on this particular issue.
  Future historians will question the time and energy spent on Haiti 
while North Korea's nuclear ambitions are receiving limited attention.
  Some have argued that this is a partisan effort. There have been many 
nonpartisan proposals for Haiti. Some in the Congress have supported 
establishing a safe haven. I have repeatedly proposed naming an 
independent commission to look at the real facts in Haiti. The 
administration has rejected these options. That is not the way to forge 
a bipartisan policy.
  Some have said that the Congress has not put these geographic 
restrictions on U.S. Armed Forces. Let me remind my colleagues we spent 
many hours in the 1960's and 1970's on this floor debating amendments 
on funding limits for United States forces in Cambodia, in Laos and in 
Vietnam. The Cooper-Church amendment of September 17, 1969, for 
example, was prior restraint on United States military forces operating 
in Laos and Thailand. The Clark amendment of the former Senator from 
Iowa, of the 1970's was prior restraint on United States options in 
Angola. The Congress has been more than willing to restrain Presidents 
on foreign policy actions with which it disagrees. So let us not muddy 
the waters with constitutional arguments or partisan allegations. Let 
us vote on the issue--do you think Congress should be put in the loop 
before United States forces are committed to Haiti. That is precisely 
what it is.
  I do not think invading Haiti makes sense. I do not think giving 
President Aristide veto power over U.S. actions makes sense. And I do 
not think public opinion polls ought to drive our invasion policy. We 
all read the news article this morning about a slight increase of 
support for military action in Haiti. But there was far more support 
for military action to halt North Korea's nuclear programs. But foreign 
policy is about more than polls. It is about leadership and it is about 
tough choices. We should make our own choice tonight--should Congress 
be involved before we go to war in Haiti?
  I urge my colleagues to support Senator Gregg's amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from New 
Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, I rise first for the purpose of saying 
to my good friend from Maine, Senator Cohen, that I was privileged to 
be on the floor and to listen to his remarks. I compliment him for 
them. I think anybody that wants a history of what it really means for 
the U.S. Congress to be part of the foreign policy should either have 
listened or should read what he has to say.
  Whether this proposal passes or not, it is quite obvious that there 
is kind of a pervasive, prevailing issue. And if the President does not 
see it, then he is blind. Clearly, that is, you do not commit American 
military without informing the Congress, at least--and probably history 
tells us--without getting their consent. We have been successful where 
Congress is a part because Congress speaks for the people and can take 
home to their States and their districts the concerns that a President 
has. If the President does this without Congress, then clearly the 
people will join on the opposite side almost automatically. It is not 
because we support something and that they will be with us. But it does 
indicate that it makes sense, that it is not something that a Chief 
Executive is doing without the concurrence of Congress and without 
asking Congress for advice.
  So whether it passes or not, the Senator has made the point. If the 
point is not heard down at Pennsylvania Avenue by this President, then 
he is going to have another foreign policy failure. This is not a giant 
country. But for the United States, without Congress being informed or 
being part of this, to take on the idea of sending American men and 
women with military equipment in a military approach to that country, 
if Americans get killed, the President has to say, ``I did not even ask 
Congress. I did not even inform Congress.'' Today we are saying that, 
if I read the Senator right. I think the Senator is absolutely 
consistent with good policy and consistent with what the Constitution 
really means.
  I thank the Senator for his discussion today.
  Mr. DODD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be allowed 
to proceed for 1 minute on the time of the Senator from Vermont.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DODD. Madam President, just to address the last point, obviously 
the ideal situation is to have support of the American public and 
Congress. But we should be careful, though, in suggesting that the only 
time a President could exercise the option of military force ought to 
be when there is absolute congressional approval or popularity for the 
decision. That is always a convenient perspective. But in most cases, 
the people of this country have been reluctant about our foreign 
involvement. If Franklin Roosevelt had run in 1940 on the proposition 
that we were going to enter World War II, he might have been in serious 
political difficulty even though lend-lease and other things were 
involved.
  We have been historically an isolationist country, because, by and 
large, our parents and great grandparents left the nations they were in 
because of the turmoil in the countries in which they resided. So there 
is a historic reluctance about foreign policy.
  I have listened very carefully to the comments of my colleague from 
Maine, and I have great respect for him in this area. But as to this 
notion of always having congressional approval, I would remind him that 
we did not in Grenada. We did not in Panama. By the way, I supported 
both of those actions.
  But had the President come and asked for permission in Panama and 
Grenada, you might have had a different perception for United States 
forces.
  So I think you have to be selective in how you approach the issue of 
prior congressional approval or even consultation, in a broad sense.
  Second, the notion of popular support on these issues, again, ideally 
you ought to have it. Hopefully, you will. But we cannot conduct our 
foreign policy on the basis of whether or not the American public from 
day to day are going to necessarily agree with the actions that are 
taken.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire.
  Mr. GREGG. How much time do we have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 5 minutes and 26 seconds remaining 
for the proponents of the amendment; 10 minutes and 13 seconds for the 
opponents of the amendment.
  Mr. GREGG. I ask the Senator from Vermont, will he use all of the 
time?
  Mr. LEAHY. The majority leader has requested 5 or 6 minutes of the 
time that I might have.
  Mr. GREGG. To speak last?
  Mr. LEAHY. Yes.
  Mr. GREGG. Madam President, I yield myself the remainder of my time.
  I think it is important to recognize what we are voting on here and 
what we are not voting on. There has been much representation that has 
been inaccurate. The contention that in the Grenada situation and the 
Panama situation just reflected, that prior approval would be required, 
is inaccurate under this amendment. The statement that the President 
must come to Congress and get approval is inaccurate. Under this 
amendment, he must just send a report to the Congress outlining what he 
intends to do, and then he is qualified. One of the elements of this 
amendment could require prior approval, but it is not the only manner 
in which he can proceed if there is an emergency, where citizens are at 
risk, or when there is a vital national interest. And where it requires 
immediate action, he can just submit a report telling us what he is up 
to and why he intends to do it. So there is a lot of flexibility here 
for the President.
  Second, it is important to understand that much more restrictive 
actions have been taken relative to the power of the President by this 
body and by the House of Representatives, and the representation that 
that is not true is inaccurate. I refer this body to the Boland 
amendment and the Clark amendment.
  I will read from the Clark amendment:

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no assistance 
     of any kind shall be provided for the purposes or which would 
     have the effect of promoting or augmenting directly or 
     indirectly the capacity of any nation,--

  Which I presume includes us--

     group, organization, movement, or individual to conduct 
     military or paramilitary operations in Angola.

  That was the Clark amendment. This amendment I have offered here, 
compared to that amendment, is a dam with innumerable holes in it with 
the water flooding through. The simple fact is that this amendment does 
not tie the hands of the President. What this amendment does do is 
require that the President tell the American people what he is up to in 
Haiti, what is his policy in Haiti, which is something we have not 
heard. If he intends to invade Haiti, why?
  Why should he tell the American people that? Because it is American 
lives that are going to be at risk. When that son or daughter hits the 
beach in Haiti or finds himself or herself on a street in Port-au-
Prince fighting for his or her life, that person needs to know why. It 
is the obligation of this President to tell us, to tell this Congress 
and, in that way, tell the people of the United States. That is all we 
ask for in this amendment. Give us a report and tell us why you are 
going in there. There is clear movement by the administration to move 
toward the avenue of invasion. Their policy of sanctions have failed; 
there has been discussion of that. It failed because it was 
inappropriately designed. But there is no justification, in my opinion, 
for invasion.
  If refugees are the issue, we should be invading Mexico, because the 
Mexican refugees that come up here multiply by a factor of about 2,000 
compared to the number coming from Haiti. If the issue is drugs, we 
should be invading the Bahamas, because their problem with drugs 
passing through them is dramatically more significant than Haiti.
  The fact is that this administration has not come to the American 
people and told us what the national interest is, and that requires us 
putting at risk American lives. They have an obligation to do that 
before they risk American lives. That is all this amendment says.
  As a final comment, I make this point: I guess I come from a region 
of the Nation where--and I suspect most regions of the Nation are like 
this--when you say something, they expect you to mean it. Well, this 
Senate passed this exact language, and we may pass it again tonight in 
an act of what would have to be called ``ultimate inconsistency,'' but 
we passed this exact language as a sense-of-the-Senate in October. Now 
we are told that we cannot do it as a force of law. Well, I think the 
American people may have a jaundiced view of the Congress and what it 
stands for, and possibly that type of an exercise in obfuscation is an 
example of why. If we passed it as a sense-of-the-Senate, we ought to 
have the wherewithal and the desire and the willingness and the 
Constitution to back it up as an act of law.
  So I think it has been misrepresented as more than it is, as some 
sort of constitutional impairment of the Presidency. It is not. In 
fact, it is significantly less than what Congress has done many times 
under the Boland amendment and Clark amendment. It has been represented 
that the President must come to us and get prior approval. That is not 
accurate. He must just tell us what he is up to. It is a chance for the 
President to tell the American people when he decides, if he should 
decide.
  One Senator basically said he had decided for all intents and 
purposes--or that Senator felt he should decide--to invade. This 
amendment provides that if he decides to invade another nation, tell us 
why, so that when our American soldiers go into that nation, the 
American people will be behind him because they will understand the 
reasons why. That is the purpose of this amendment.
  I yield whatever time I have remaining.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from 
Delaware.
  Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I will be necessarily brief. I am going 
to vote against this amendment, but not for some of the reasons stated. 
I think it is an axiomatic under the war clause of the Constitution 
that the President cannot use forces abroad in hostilities, except in 
certain limited circumstances, without the consent of Congress.
  This is an incredibly poorly drafted amendment that is essentially a 
case-specific attempt at rewriting the War Powers Resolution. We have 
never, to the best of my knowledge, in an anticipatory way, suggested 
that a President of the United States must go to the U.S. Congress in 
anticipation of the probability that he or she might invade a 
particular country. By implication, this says that the President only 
has to get approval with regard to Haiti. But if he wants to go into 
Ukraine or Jordan, or if he wants to go into wherever, he can do it 
without bothering to obtain the consent of Congress.
  This is, quite frankly, the most confusing and, I believe, damaging 
debate that has taken place on the question of what are the 
constitutional limitations on Presidential power.
  I end by saying that we have been trying now--some of us--for the 
better part of 4 years to rewrite the War Powers Resolution. I have a 
proposal, as do others, called the Use of Force Act. But to attempt to 
do this piecemeal, in anticipation of the possibility that the 
President may take an action, which under the Constitution, most 
constitutional scholars would tell you he does not have the right to 
take anyway, seems to me to be, by implication, suggesting that if we 
do not approve this amendment, the President has the inherent authority 
to do what you are worried about being done in Haiti.
  I respectfully suggest that this is the wrong way to go about this, 
and I will not ascribe any political motivation, except an intellectual 
inconsistency. This is, in a fundamental sense, the wrong way to deal 
with a serious problem. We should revisit the War Powers Resolution and 
rewrite the War Powers Resolution. But this does not do it and does not 
do it well.
  Therefore, I shall vote against this amendment.
  Mr. LEAHY. How much time is remaining for the Senator from Vermont?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 7 minutes 35 seconds 
remaining.
  Mr. LEAHY. Madam President, one, I concur with the words of the 
Senator from Delaware. Again, I say that we are raising an issue of 
great constitutional magnitude, tossing it on as though it is some 
little earmark on a foreign aid bill. It is not. It is an issue that 
should be debated. Let us debate the War Powers Act as a standing item, 
but not on this. It diminishes the Senate, diminishes our own sense of 
the Constitution. It is flatout wrong.
  Madam President, I yield the remainder of my time to the 
distinguished Senator from Maine, the majority leader.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Madam President, this is a subject which has been 
debated on many occasions in the Senate. The Senate has already voted 
on the same issue which is being presented here this evening.
  It is not uncommon for the Senate to debate and vote on the same 
thing on many occasions.
  But I think it is appropriate to understand that a few months ago the 
Senate voted 81 to 19 in opposition to an amendment which is similar, 
indeed I believe identical in effect, although similar language, to the 
amendment which is now being offered.
  Thereafter, the Senate voted 98 to 2 in favor of an amendment in the 
form of a sense-of-the-Congress resolution that is identical both in 
effect and words to that which I will offer immediately after the vote 
on this amendment.
  It is my hope that we can vote promptly thereafter. There will be no 
need for debate. And I will ask, as soon as I am recognized and offer 
my amendment, that we proceed to vote on that amendment then.
  Everything has been said that need be said on this subject. In fact, 
I think it has been said several times over on both sides of the 
debate, and there really is not much more that I can add to shed any 
light on the subject.
  Nothing has happened, in my judgment, that justifies a reversal of 
position by the Senate or by any Senator. Those 19 Senators who voted 
for this amendment a few months ago would be perfectly justified in 
voting for it again. Those 81 who voted against it should, in fact, 
vote against it again, because it is the same thing. Then, when the 
sense of the Congress is offered after, it, too, is the same thing, and 
the 98 Senators who voted for that should, if consistent, vote for it; 
and the 2 who voted against it are, of course, free to do so.
  So, Madam President, just so there is no misunderstanding in this 
respect, so there will be spread upon the Record for every Senator to 
see what it is we are doing, I ask unanimous consent that there be 
printed in the Record, first, the amendment offered at that time by the 
distinguished Senator from North Carolina, which is identical in effect 
and intention, although not in word, to that now being offered, to be 
followed by a record of the vote on that amendment, and then a copy of 
the sense-of-the-Congress resolution which we voted on, and then a 
record of the vote on that resolution be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


                  HELMS (AND BROWN) AMENDMENT NO. 1072

       Mr. HELMS (for himself and Mr. Brown) proposed an amendment 
     to the bill H.R. 3116, supra; as follows:
       ``At the end of the committee amendment on page 154, insert 
     the following:
       ``Sec. 8142. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise 
     made available by this Act may be obligated or expended for 
     the Armed Forces of the United States to conduct operations 
     in Haiti unless (1) operations of the Armed Forces of the 
     United States in Haiti are specifically authorized in a law 
     enacted in advance of the operations, or (2) the President 
     certifies in writing to Congress that United States citizens 
     in Haiti are in imminent danger and that a temporary 
     deployment of the Armed Forces of the United States into 
     Haiti is necessary in order to protect and evacuate United 
     States citizens in Haiti. In the event of a certification 
     under clause (2) of the preceding sentence, funds referred to 
     in that sentence may be obligated and expended for the Armed 
     Forces of the United States to conduct operations in Haiti 
     only to the extent necessary for the Armed Forces to provide 
     the protection and complete the evacuation certified as 
     necessary.''
                                  ____


                        [Rollcall No. 321 Leg.]

                                YEAS--19

     Brown
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Dole
     Domenici
     Faircloth
     Grassley
     Hatfield
     Helms
     Kempthorne
     Lott
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Pressler
     Roth
     Smith
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Wallop

                                NAYS--81

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boren
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Conrad
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Johnston
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Mathews
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nunn
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Wellstone
     Wofford
     Bennett
     Bond
     Burns
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Danforth
     Durenberger
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Hutchison
     Jeffords
     Kassebaum
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Packwood
     Simpson
     Specter
     Warner
                                  ____

                                  ____



                  dole (and others) amendment no. 1074

       Mr. MITCHELL (for Mr. Dole for himself, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. 
     Graham, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Warner, Mrs. 
     Hutchison, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Murkowski, Mr. Dodd and Mr. 
     Domenici) proposed an amendment to the bill H.R. 3116, supra; 
     as follows:
       ``At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the 
     following:

     ``SEC.  . SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE USE OF FUNDS FOR UNITED 
                   STATES MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI

       ``(a) Statement of Policy.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that--
       ``(1) all parties should honor their obligations under the 
     Governors Island Accord of July 3, 1993 and the New York Pact 
     of July 16, 1993;
       ``(2) the United States has a national interest in 
     preventing uncontrolled emigration from Haiti; and
       ``(3) the United States should remain engaged in Haiti to 
     support national reconciliation and further its interest in 
     preventing uncontrolled emigration.
       ``(b) Limitation.--It is the sense of Congress that funds 
     appropriated by this Act should not be obligated or expended 
     for United States military operations in Haiti unless--
       ``(1) authorized in advance by the Congress; or
       ``(2) the temporary deployment of United States Armed 
     Forces into Haiti is necessary in order to protect or 
     evacuate United States citizens from a situation of imminent 
     danger and the President reports as soon as practicable to 
     Congress after the initiation of the temporary deployment, 
     but in no case later than forty-eight hours after the 
     initiation of the temporary deployment; or
       ``(3) the deployment of United States Armed Forces into 
     Haiti is vital to the national security interests of the 
     United States, including but not limited to the protection of 
     American citizens in Haiti, there is not sufficient time to 
     seek and receive congressional authorization, and the 
     President reports as soon as practicable to Congress after 
     the initiation of the deployment, but in no case later than 
     forty-eight hours after the initiation of the deployment; or
       ``(4) the President transmits to the Congress a written 
     report pursuant to subsection (c).
       ``(c) Report.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
     limitation in subsection (b) should not apply if the 
     President reports in advance to Congress that the intended 
     deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti--
       ``(1) is justified by United States national security 
     interests;
       ``(2) will be undertaken only after necessary steps have 
     been taken to ensure the safety and security of United States 
     Armed Forces, including steps to ensure that U.S. Armed 
     Forces will not become targets due to the nature of their 
     rules of engagement;
       ``(3) will be undertaken only after an assessment that--
       ``(A) the proposed mission and objectives are most 
     appropriate for the United States Armed Forces rather than 
     civilian personnel or armed forces from other nations, and
       ``(B) that the United States Armed Forces proposed for 
     deployment are necessary and sufficient to accomplish the 
     objectives of the proposed mission;
       ``(4) will be undertaken only after clear objectives for 
     the deployment are established;
       ``(5) will be undertaken only after an exit strategy for 
     ending the deployment has been identified; and
       ``(6) will be undertaken only after the financial costs of 
     the deployment are established.
       ``(d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term 
     ``United States military operations in Haiti'' means the 
     continued deployment, introduction or reintroduction of 
     United States Armed Forces into the land territory of Haiti, 
     irrespective of whether those Armed Forces are under United 
     States or United Nations command, but does not include 
     activities for the collection of foreign intelligence, 
     activities directly related to the operations of United 
     States diplomatic or other United States Government 
     facilities, or operations to counter emigration from Haiti.''
                                  ____


                        [Rollcall No. 322 Leg.]

                                YEAS--98

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boren
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Campbell
     Conrad
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Harkin
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Johnston
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Mathews
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nunn
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Wellstone
     Wofford
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brown
     Burns
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Danforth
     Dole
     Domenici
     Durenberger
     Faircloth
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Jeffords
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Roth
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Wallop
     Warner

                                NAYS--2

     Byrd
     Hatfield
  Mr. MITCHELL. Madam President, every Senator will be able to see 
exactly what it is he or she voted on just a few months ago. Then, of 
course, we will have the vote now on the same two issues, and we can 
have it all spread out on the Record so everyone can understand the 
identical nature of what it is we are doing.
  I recognize that every Senator has a right to offer any amendment he 
or she wants and to say whatever he or she wants, and I guess it is 
fortunate for the Senate there is no rule of redundancy in the Senate.
  But I repeat, in conclusion, as the vote will occur now in just a 
couple minutes, we are debating and voting on a subject that we have 
already debated and voted on. In fact, rarely do we have a debate that 
is almost verbatim of what was said in the previous debate. And rarely 
do we vote on amendments that are almost identical in one case here 
word for word what we voted on.
  I do not know what is going to happen, but it would not surprise me 
if we go through this exercise yet another time in a few weeks. So I 
thought it would be useful for every Senator to have it all spread 
right out so they could see the past amendments, the past votes, the 
present amendments, the present votes. I hope there will be no further 
amendments and further votes.
  Madam President, I urge my colleagues to be consistent with their 
previous position, reject this amendment, and then also being 
consistent with their previous position, vote for the resolution which 
I will, under the order, offer immediately following the vote on this 
amendment.
  Madam President, I yield the floor and yield back the remainder of 
our time.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I will oppose the Gregg amendment. This 
amendment is not a constructive means to address the complex issue of 
war powers. Moreover, the adoption of this amendment would be 
misinterpreted in Haiti and would weaken the President's hand in 
dealing with the situation and embolden Haiti's military rulers.
  I believe that speakers have made it clear that this is not, in 
reality, a vote on the War Powers Act. We already have a War Powers 
Act. Adopting an amendment which singles out Haiti, would set an 
unfortunate precedent. Furthermore, it implies that absent the Gregg 
amendment the President is free to act as he pleases without the 
authorization of Congress.


                vote on amendment no. 2117, as modified

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the question occurs 
on amendment No. 2117, as modified, offered by the Senator from New 
Hampshire. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the 
roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Nevada [Mr. Bryan] is 
absent because of attending funeral.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Campbell). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 34, nays 65, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 172 Leg.]

                                YEAS--34

     Bennett
     Bond
     Brown
     Coats
     Cochran
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Danforth
     Dole
     Domenici
     Faircloth
     Gorton
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Kempthorne
     Lott
     Lugar
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Roth
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Wallop

                                NAYS--65

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boren
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Gramm
     Harkin
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Mack
     Mathews
     McCain
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nunn
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Bryan
       
  So the amendment (No. 2117), as modified, was rejected.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. MITCHELL. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 2118

 (Purpose: Expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to Haiti)

  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, Senator Leahy, 
Senator Warner, and Senator Biden, I send an amendment to the desk and 
ask that it be stated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Maine [Mr. Mitchell] for himself, Mr. 
     Leahy, Mr. Warner, and Mr. Biden, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 2118.

  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the appropriate place in the amendment add the 
     following:

     SEC.   . SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON THE USE OF FUNDS FOR UNITED 
                   STATES MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HAITI

       (a) Statement of Policy.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that--
       (1) all parties should honor their obligations under the 
     Governor's Island Accord of July 3, 1993 and the New York 
     Pact of July 16, 1993;
       (2) the United States has a national interest in preventing 
     uncontrolled emigration from Haiti; and
       (3) the United States should remain engaged in Haiti to 
     support national reconciliation and further its interest in 
     preventing uncontrolled emigration.
       (b) Limitation.--It is the sense of the Congress that funds 
     appropriated by this Act or any other Act should not be 
     obligated or expended in Haiti unless--
       (1) authorized in advanced by the Congress; or
       (2) the temporary deployment of United States Armed Forces 
     into Haiti is necessary in order to protect or evacuate 
     United States citizens from a situation of imminent danger 
     and the President reports as soon as practicable to Congress 
     after the initiation of the temporary deployment; or
       (3) the deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti 
     is vital to the national security interests of the United 
     States, including but not limited to the protection of 
     American citizens in Haiti, there is not sufficient time to 
     seek and receive Congressional authorization, and the 
     President reports as soon as is practicable to Congress after 
     the initiation of the deployment, but in no case later than 
     forty eight hours after the initiation of the deployment; or
       (4) the president transmits to the Congress a written 
     report pursuant to subsection (c).
       (c) Report.--It is the sense of the Congress that the 
     limitation in subsection (b) should not apply if the 
     President reports in advance to Congress that the intended 
     deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti--
       (1) is justified by U.S. national security interests;
       (2) will be undertaken only after necessary steps have been 
     taken to ensure the safety and security of U.S. Armed Forces, 
     including steps to ensure that U.S. Armed Forces will not 
     become targets due to the nature of their rules of 
     engagement;
       (3) will be undertaken only after an assessment that--
       (A) the proposed mission and objectives are most 
     appropriate for the U.S. Armed Forces rather than civilian 
     personnel or armed forces from other nations, and
       (B) that the U.S. Armed Forces proposed for deployment are 
     necessary and sufficient to accomplish the objectives of the 
     proposed mission;
       (4) will be undertaken only after clear objectives for the 
     deployment are established;
       (5) will be undertaken only after an exit strategy for 
     ending the deployment has been identified; and
       (6) will be undertaken only after the financial costs of 
     the deployment are estimated.
       (d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``United 
     States military operations in Haiti'' means the continued 
     deployment, introduction or reintroduction of United States 
     Armed Forces into the land territory of Haiti, irrespective 
     of whether those Armed Forces are under United States or 
     United Nations command, but does not include activities for 
     the collection of foreign intelligence, activities directly 
     related to the operations of U.S. diplomatic or other U.S. 
     government facilities, or operations to counter emigration 
     from Haiti.

  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, this amendment is identical in form and 
substance to an amendment adopted by the Senate by a vote of 98 to 2 a 
few months ago. We have debated the subject, in my judgment, far more 
than is necessary. I believe there is nothing more to add.
  I, therefore, request the yeas and nays and am prepared to vote on 
the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell].
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I am told that there are some on this 
side who would like to speak briefly to the sense-of-the-Senate 
amendment. We had suggested to the leader--actually asked the leader if 
this was going to be the last vote of the evening. I was wondering what 
his plans were subsequent to the vote on this next amendment.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Our plans are to proceed on the bill. A large number of 
Senators have said we want to be sure and get out of here by Friday 
evening. Of course, if we do not vote on Friday and we do not vote on 
Monday and we quit now, then we will be here Friday evening. So I think 
the best way to accomplish that is to proceed.
  I hope we are not going to get into a situation where Senators are 
going to delay a vote on this simply because there are going to be 
other votes.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


          restoration of funding for the world food programme

  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the State 
Department requested $5 million as the U.S. contribution to the 
administrative budget of the World Food Programme, the Food Aid Agency 
of the United Nations system. The Office of Management and Budget 
reduced this figure to $2 million in the President's budget. I would 
like to see this figure restored to $3 million, the amount in the 
current budget. I believe this addition is important to support the 
critical work the organization is undertaking throughout the world, 
often in very trying and dangerous situations.
  Mr. LEAHY. I appreciate the distinguished Senator from Mississippi 
bringing this to the Senate's attention. The vital work of the World 
Food Programme requires a continuation of funding by the State 
Department at the current $3 million level. I assure the Senator we 
will make that clear in conference.
  Mr. McCONNELL. If the Senator will yield, I agree with the 
distinguished Senators from Vermont and Mississippi on the importance 
of the World Food Programme and the need to maintain the existing level 
of funding.
  Mr. COCHRAN. I thank the managers.


                    nis secondary school initiative

  Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, I rise to express my enthusiastic support 
for the NIS Secondary School Initiative, which was created by the 
Freedom Support Act in 1992 and is administered by the U.S. Information 
Agency. I believe this exchange program is a valuable investment in 
people and one of the most successful components of our assistance to 
the former Soviet Union. Since January 1993, over 5,500 students have 
participated in the program, forming the foundation for relations 
between our nations in the coming years. The academic-year component of 
the program has given over 1,200 high school students from the former 
Soviet Union the opportunity to spend the past year living with host 
families and attending schools in communities across America. This past 
month I met with nearly 500 of these students, and I was struck by 
their spirit, energy, and openness. These young people--so dedicated to 
their own countries--return to the former Soviet Union with a firsthand 
understanding of America's democracy, pluralism, and free market 
economy, as well as with personal bonds with American friends and 
families that will last a lifetime. I want to applaud Senator Leahy's 
leadership in developing this program and in ensuring that it continues 
to give thousands more of these young people from Russia, Ukraine, and 
the other former Republics the opportunity to visit America. Does the 
chairman agree that this program has demonstrated its importance and 
merits continuation?
  Mr. LEAHY. I agree with the Senator from New Jersey that this program 
has been a great success. By giving these students the opportunity to 
experience firsthand the possibilities, challenges, and privileges of 
living in a democracy with a free market economy, these exchanges form 
the foundation for building democracy throughout the former Soviet 
Union. I strongly support the continuation and expansion of this 
program, and I look forward to welcoming the next group of participants 
to the United States next fall.
  Mr. BRADLEY. And is it the intention of the chairman to work in 
conference to ensure that the conferees recommend that the NIS high 
school exchange program receives $25 million of the NIS assistance 
funds appropriated in the fiscal year 1995 Foreign Operations bill?
  Mr. LEAHY. Yes, I will propose language in conference recommending 
that this program receives $25 million from the fiscal year 1995 NIS 
appropriation, to go toward its expansion in the 1995-96 school year. 
It is my hope that USIA will send upward of 8,500 students on NIS 
secondary school exchanges in 1995-96.


                             food for peace

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, the distinguished manager of the bill 
and I have worked together in past couple of years to see if foods that 
we ship overseas in the Public Law 480 Food for Peace Program, 
administered by AID, could be fortified with vitamin C. In my view, 
fortification of these grains would make the food we ship overseas more 
nutritious and would prevent illness.
  However, despite our interest in this issue, AID has not yet 
determined whether or not fortified food remains intact during the 
shipment process and also has not told Congress how much it would cost 
to fortify grains to 100 mg per gram ration for the Public Law 480 Food 
and Peace Program.
  Therefore, I would like to ask the distinguished floor manager, 
Senator Leahy, if he would seek to include report language in 
conference that would direct the President to do the following:
  First, provide an estimate on how much it would cost to fortify 
grains shipped in the Public Law 480 Program to 100 mg per 100 gram 
ration.
  Second, report on whether or not the fortification of these grains is 
stable through the shipping process.
  Third, submit a report to Congress before the next appropriations 
cycle on these issues so that the appropriations committees may make an 
informed decision on this issue.
  I understand that the Senator from Vermont cannot guarantee anything 
in a conference with the House, thus I would simply ask if he would 
work with me to develop appropriate report language on this issue that 
would achieve our shared goals.
  Mr. LEAHY. I would be happy to work with the Senator from New Jersey 
to resolve this issue in conference.


                                cdp/cdr

  Mr. WOFFORD. Mr. President, I would like to enter into a colloquy 
with the distinguished manager of the bill, the chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Operations Subcommittee.
  I am a strong supporter of a program funded in this bill--Cooperative 
Development Project and Cooperative Development Research. CDP/CDR 
promotes joint projects among the United States, Israel, Eastern 
Europe, and the Central Asian Republics--and among the United States, 
Israel and the developing world. CDP/CDR serve to boost these regions' 
science and technology infrastructure, and solve problems in the fields 
of agriculture, environment, energy, and health.
  For the past 2 years, these programs have been earmarked. CDP/CDR is 
an excellent example of a creative foreign aid program that maximizes 
our foreign assistance efforts in key regions of the world. Israeli 
expertise in the fields of drip irrigation, malaria--combatting 
bacterium, environmental cleanup, and energy efficiency have all been 
brought to these countries through the CDP/CDR. What this program could 
bring the United States is increased stability and self-sufficiency in 
parts of the world where the United States has been asked to intervene 
in times of crisis.
  Although CDP/CDR is not earmarked in the fiscal year 1995 Senate 
Foreign Operations bill, it is important to note that this program 
enjoys strong, bipartisan support in both Houses, and that the Congress 
does expect the administration to use funds appropriated by this act to 
fully fund the CDP/CDR program.
  Mr. LEAHY. I share the Senator's support for this worthy program. 
CDP/CDR has made a valuable contribution to our development efforts in 
many parts of the world. I, too, expect the administration will fully 
fund CDP/CDR in fiscal year 1995, and that it will continue to play an 
important role in the former Soviet Union, Eastern and developing 
countries. Last year the administration clearly committed in writing at 
the time of the conference on this bill that they would fully fund this 
valuable program. I will seek the same commitment from them this year.
  Mr. WOFFORD. I thank the chairman for his statement on CDP/CDR. I am 
pleased that we agree on this outstanding program, and would look 
forward to working with him to secure a commitment from the 
administration on the program.
  Mr. LEAHY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold? Will the 
Senator yield for a question?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont has the floor.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I will just tell the distinguished Senator 
from Louisiana that I had told the distinguished Senator from Kentucky 
that I would reinstate the call of the quorum when I finished those 
items.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. I wonder if this would be an appropriate time to make a 
statement on another subject?
  Are we ready to vote?
  Mr. MITCHELL. I might inquire of the Senator from Kentucky, through 
the Chair, can we have any indication of how long the Senator intends 
to keep us in a quorum call, or knows when the vote may occur?
  Mr. McCONNELL. I thought he had learned through his staff that I am 
checking with the Republican leader and I should be able to report 
back.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Does the Senator have any objection during that time if 
the Senator from Louisiana proceeds?
  Mr. LEAHY. I yield to the Senator from Louisiana.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana is recognized.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I rise to voice serious objection to 
language in this bill on page 34 which, in effect, puts an embargo on 
foreign military sales to Indonesia.
  I think this is a very serious mistake for the United States to be 
doing this. The House has language continuing a ban on what we call 
IMET funds; that is, the military training funds. And this is, in 
effect, a sanction against Indonesia for the policy in East Timor.
  What the Senate has done is to substitute for the ban on IMET funds, 
in effect, a ban on foreign military sales if those foreign military 
sales would be used in East Timor.
  The problem is that any of these sales can be used anywhere in 
Indonesia. For example, the C-130, which is made in, I think, over 40 
States in the United States and sold in fairly large quantity to 
Indonesia, flies all over Indonesia. If you cannot fly to East Timor, 
then you probably will not be able to sell the C-130 or spare parts for 
the F-16. The F-16 lands all over Indonesia. There are all kinds of 
spare parts, there are all kinds of weapons which are sold to 
Indonesia. So that we have in this language the start of what is, in 
effect, an arms embargo on foreign military sales.
  I can tell you, Mr. President, the Indonesians are outraged about 
this language. It is much worse than the House language.
  We could debate all night about East Timor and about human rights in 
Indonesia, which I believe are greatly improving. It is an emerging 
country. We could debate for a long time, and I think we ought to 
debate the question of Indonesia, their record on human rights and the 
situation in East Timor.
  I believe Indonesia deserves the support of the United States. They 
are the fourth largest country in the world. They are the largest 
Moslem country in the world, and we keep poking them in the eye. They 
are one of the world's leading emerging countries in terms of economy. 
They will be buying $130 billion in infrastructure imports over the 
next decade. They are a key player in ASEAN and in APEC. Indeed, the 
President is going to APEC this fall, and while he is doing that, we 
are putting, in effect, an embargo on foreign military sales.
  Mr. President, what is the policy of the State Department on this? I 
will be frank to tell you, I do not know. They tell me they are opposed 
to it, but a letter from them is not forthcoming, so I do not know what 
the policy is.
  I have a letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John M. Deutch, 
who says:

       I am writing to express the views of the Defense Department 
     on a matter of some concern. A provision in the Foreign 
     Operations Appropriations bill as reported by the Senate 
     Appropriations Committee would place significant restrictions 
     on the use of defense equipment that Indonesia purchases from 
     the United States. Specifically, this provision would bar 
     Indonesia from using defense items purchased through the 
     Foreign Military Sales Program in East Timor.
       We oppose this provision, and in coordination with the 
     State Department, are working with concerned Senators such as 
     yourself to see if it can be revised. We are concerned that 
     passage of this provision would disrupt our modest yet 
     important security relationship with this strategic country 
     and would drive the Indonesian defense establishment away 
     from U.S. sources of equipment.
       As you certainly know, we have many important interests in 
     Indonesia; improved human rights, as well as solid defense 
     ties are among the many objectives we pursue. We strongly 
     believe that active engagement with the Indonesian military 
     through training and FMS programs and other defense 
     cooperation better positions us to positively influence the 
     development of improved human rights conditions. Through our 
     interaction with the Indonesian military at all levels, we 
     play a role in the candid dialog the administration conducts 
     on human rights and the issue of East Timor.
       The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the 
     standpoint of the administration's program, there is no 
     objection to the presentation of this letter for the 
     consideration of Congress.

  Signed John M. Deutch, Deputy Secretary of Defense.
  I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                              The Deputy Secretary of Defense,

                                    Washington, DC, June 29, 1994.
     Hon. Bennett Johnston,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Johnston: I am writing to express the views of 
     the Defense Department on a matter of some concern. A 
     provision in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill as 
     reported by the Senate Appropriation Committee would place 
     significant restrictions on the use of defense equipment that 
     Indonesia purchases from the United States. Specifically, 
     this provision would bar Indonesia from using defense items 
     purchased through the Foreign Military Sales program in East 
     Timor.
       We oppose this provision, and in coordination with the 
     State Department, are working with concerned Senators as 
     yourself to see if it can be revised. We are concerned that 
     passage of this provision would disrupt our modest yet 
     important security relationship with this strategy country 
     and would drive the Indonesian defense establishment away 
     from US sources of equipment.
       As you certainly know, we have many important interests in 
     Indonesia; improved human rights as well as solid defense 
     ties are among the many objectives we pursue. We strongly 
     believe that active engagement with the Indonesian military 
     through training and FMS programs and other defense 
     cooperation better positions us to positively influence the 
     development of improved human rights conditions. Through our 
     interaction with the Indonesian military at all levels, we 
     play a role in the candid dialogue the Administration 
     conducts on human rights and the issue of East Timor.
       The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the 
     standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no 
     objection to the presentation of this letter for the 
     consideration of Congress.
           Sincerely,
                                                   John M. Deutch.

  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I would have had an amendment on this 
issue, but I was led to believe that the State Department would take a 
position and would give us a letter. They will not give us a letter. 
They say we are opposed to it, we want you to work it out.
  What is our position from the State Department in East Timor and 
Indonesia, the fourth largest country in the world? We ought to have a 
position and we do not. Consequently, I do not have an amendment, but I 
think this is a huge mistake. I think it ought to be looked at in the 
conference committee. I hope they will look at it in the conference 
committee, and I hope the State Department will tell us one way or the 
other, do they want it, do they want to go back to the IMET ban, do 
they want to have foreign military sales bans? What do they want to do?
  This is not beanbag, Mr. President. This is important foreign policy 
with the largest Moslem country in the world, and fourth largest 
country in the world, and one of the fastest emerging countries, and a 
traditional friend of the United States. They stood by us all the while 
in Vietnam and everyplace else. They are a demonstrated friend of the 
United States. If we are going to poke them in the eye, it ought to be 
intentionally, it ought to be the foreign policy of this country and 
not makeshift policy where nobody knows exactly what is the policy of 
the country.
  I hope that we will look at this issue in the conference committee.
  Mr. PRESSLER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota, Mr. Pressler, 
is recognized.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, it is my strongest feeling in this 
debate on Haiti that we should not shed a single drop of American 
blood. I feel strongly that no troops should be sent there. I feel 
strongly that the problems in Haiti must be resolved by their people. 
The expectation is that we are going to solve their problems. America 
cannot do that. Even if we sent troops there, they could not restore 
democracy. That is a fallacious argument.
  Some say we have an obligation to send troops to restore democracy. 
But that would not restore democracy in Haiti. United States troops 
cannot restore democracy in Haiti.
  First, we should make clear there should be no United States troops 
sent to Haiti. Second, I feel strongly we should consider lifting the 
embargo. The embargo is hurting the poor people the most. I am very 
much in favor of an end to military rule. I am very much in favor of 
democracy in Haiti. Unfortunately, we are on the opposite course. We 
should implement a policy of not deploying United States troops to 
Haiti under the current circumstances, proceed with normal immigration 
procedures, and lift the embargo. That is just about the opposite of 
what the administration is doing.
  That would lead to democracy and an end to military rule much faster. 
The course we are on leads the Haitian people to believe that the 
United States is somehow going to miraculously restore democracy in 
Haiti, a country that has never known democracy. Aristide has said he 
will not go back to Haiti as a result of a military invasion. Almost 
all who have followed these events say Haiti could not sustain 
democracy.
  Almost all experts say the embargo is hurting the poor and the 
impoverished worst of all, and the people running the country, the 
military junta, are not going to give up or be hurt. We are pursuing 
the opposite policy we should with Haiti. We should reverse ourselves 
180 degrees and we should do it now.
  I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been suggested.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold.
  Is the Senator prepared to indicate whether we can vote on this 
matter at this time?
  Mr. McCONNELL. I would say to the leader I am happy to indicate as 
soon as I have an opportunity to talk to the Republican leader, who is 
expected momentarily.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. SIMON. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call 
be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I wonder if I could have the attention of 
the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Johnston]
  I heard the Senator's remarks about Indonesia, and I am not an expert 
in this area. I know our colleague, Senator Feingold, has paid a great 
deal of attention to that. There is concern about what Indonesia is 
doing in East Timor and their pressure on the Philippines and others 
and then the recent crackdown on freedom of the press in Indonesia.
  I have to say the conduct of Indonesia just recently in this regard 
has not encouraged me--and again I am a nonexpert in this field, but 
has not encouraged me to go with the Senator from Louisiana on his 
position. I would be curious as to his response on that.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. The Senator is correct, that not everything that takes 
place in Indonesia is encouraging. They do not have freedom of the 
press in Indonesia as we know it, and indeed there has been some 
arrests, a crackdown on some press who have been particularly critical 
of the government. No doubt about that.
  A lot of our friends around the world have adopted policies that are 
not consistent, do not comport with our Bill of Rights Government, and 
I think we should not retreat from doing what we can to be effective in 
trying to propagate democracy and freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion, et cetera, around the world.
  My problem is that to put a ban on foreign military sales and to do 
so without having it a considered judgment of foreign policy of the 
United States with one of our best traditional friends, with one of the 
largest countries in the world, just to do it haphazardly I think is an 
awful way to make foreign policy.
  We had debate earlier about whether the Congress should make it or 
whatever. It seems to me that the President and the State Department 
ought to be the ones to at least initiate and should not be bi-players, 
should not be wringing their hands on the sidelines while we make 
foreign policy in the Senate.
  A good indication of the kind of foreign policy we made was a couple 
of weeks ago when we adopted two sense-of-the-Senate amendments on 
Bosnia about lifting the embargo. One said by a 50-to-49 vote we should 
not lift the embargo unless the United Nations says so, and the other 
one said we ought to lift the embargo with or without the United 
States--both resolutions adopted 50 to 49.
  I just do not think we ought to make foreign policy in this way. I 
would also say that if we are going to take sanctions against every 
country in the world that is criticized by Amnesty International or 
somebody else, the list of our friends will be short indeed--short 
indeed. In fact, the United States itself has been criticized by 
Amnesty International on the death penalty and other things.
  Having said that, I would say I share the Senator's concern about 
some of the policies in Indonesia, although I think that Indonesia has 
made huge steps forward in human rights, in labor relations, and I 
think the State Department would tell us that if they would tell us 
something.
  Mr. SIMON. I simply say to my colleague from Louisiana that I agree 
we cannot expect carbon copies of the United States around the world. I 
think we have to be careful in micromanaging foreign policy in this 
Chamber. I think that is one of the dangers; when people sense a little 
bit of a vacuum in the executive branch, that we move in and move in 
sometimes when we should not.
  I hope before the Senator would maybe offer an amendment that he 
might discuss this with our colleague, Senator Feingold, who has spent 
a considerable amount of time in this area, who knows much more about 
it, frankly, than I do.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. It was offensive I think, or counterproductive to have 
a ban on the IMF funds, the military training funds because the 
military training funds keep the kind of incident in East Timor from 
occurring by having better trained people.
  The House had the ban on the IMF funds but for that we substituted 
something worse, which is the FMS ban. And one of the things that is so 
offensive to the Indonesians is that in mentioning East Timor it 
suggests that we do not recognize East Timor as a part of Indonesia, 
that somehow we are tipping our hat or genuflecting in the direction of 
those who say East Timor ought to be an independent state. There are 
some people who legitimately and sincerely believe that.
  To say that as part of a law adopted by this Senate is a very serious 
charge. It is as if the British Parliament adopted a resolution that 
said Puerto Rico should not be part of the United States. And we have 
been criticized by the United Nations for that.
  So I just say that this is a bad way to make foreign policy. I think 
it is a big mistake, and I hope the conferees will look at this when 
they get in the conference committee.
  Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to say a few 
words about two other issues which are funded by the Foreign Operations 
Appropriation bill. Earlier this year, I led a CODEL to the Far East. 
Several of my colleagues and I visited numerous Asian nations, 
including Thailand and China, and I would like to speak about some 
issues relating to those two nations at this time.
  As many of you know, in 1988, the legitimately elected government of 
Burma was blocked from assuming office by the military and leaders have 
been illegally detained. Since that time, in accordance with United 
States policy, our Government has denied Burma all foreign assistance 
with the exception of basic humanitarian assistance; the United States 
has had no bilateral assistance program for nonhumanitarian aid with 
Burma since 1988.
  Unfortunately, this well-intentioned policy of our Government 
resulted in the termination of a Drug Enforcement Administration 
bilateral counternarcotics assistance program with Burma, which sprayed 
pesticides on poppies in Burma. As you know, opium and heroin are 
derived from the poppy plant, which grows prolificly in Burma. The 
abundance of poppies has created a profitable underground drug 
processing industry in Burma, and when it comes to the world's supply 
of illegal drugs, it can be said that ``all roads lead to Burma.'' The 
DEA reports that Burma is the source of more than 70 percent of all 
heroin in the United States. Think about that--almost three-quarters of 
all heroin traded on American streets can be traced back to the poppy 
field in Burma.
  The heroin trade is a lucrative one both in Burma and in America; and 
heroin, whose use had been declining in this country, is increasingly 
becoming the drug of choice for many drug abusers in the United States. 
The reemergence of a market for heroin can be linked to the fact that a 
single kilo, or 2.2 pounds, of heroin can net $1 million in revenue.
  Production of heroin in Burma has only increased since termination of 
the DEA program there. It is estimated that about 2500 metric tons of 
opium were produced last year in Burma, yielding slightly less than 200 
million tons of heroin.
  Ending the DEA counternarcotics program in Burma harms the United 
States more than it does the Burmese. It is American children who are 
purchasing Burmese heroin and American drug dealers who are getting 
rich off this fatal export from Burma. While present United States 
policy harms us, it strengthens the power of drug lords and helps 
entrench their position in Burmese society.
  The United States has received a great deal of cooperation in the 
area of drug interdiction from Burma's neighbor, Thailand, and for that 
we should be most appreciative. However, it is impossible to stem the 
flow of heroin from Burma into America's streets without reducing the 
source. The source of that heroin is Burmese poppies, and to reduce 
that source we need the DEA's counternarcotics assistance program. I 
have a letter from the Drug Enforcement Administration giving their 
evaluation of current U.S. antidrug policy in Burma and would like to 
ask that it be inserted into the appropriate place in the Record.
  Mr. President, I am not offering an amendment on this issue, and I do 
not in any way support the reestablishment of relations with Burma 
until a legitimate democratic government is installed there. However, 
the bill now under consideration appropriates $100 million to 
antinarcotic initiatives, with not one dollar of that money going to 
the largest source of narcotics. This policy just does not make sense. 
I believe the State Department should reconsider its definition of 
nonhumanitarian aid to evaluate whether the DEA's counternarcotics 
program should perhaps be reinstated. I believe the present U.S. policy 
in this regard is foolish and that, to restate a common expression, we 
are only shooting ourselves up the arm by allowing the world's largest 
exporter of heroin to continue to grow poppies at will.
  The second issue I wish to discuss is that of fossil fuel use in the 
world's most populous state, the People's Republic of China. The 
magnitude of this problem was discussed in a hearing I chaired for the 
Energy and Natural Resources Committee in March. Since 1989, several 
bilateral aid programs have been prohibited from operating in China, 
first by administrative action and later by statute (Public Law 101-
246), in an attempt to place pressure on central authorities to respect 
internationally recognized human rights. Restricted programs include 
sanctions against bilateral aid for environmental programs in China.
  In addition to being the world's most populated nation, China is also 
the world's largest source of fossil fuel emissions. Unfortunately, air 
pollution does not recognize international boundaries, and what China's 
factories spew into the atmosphere eventually affects the air that we 
all breathe. This problem will only get worse in the future, as China's 
rapid economic expansion is expected to result in a doubling or 
tripling of industrial emissions that contribute to global climate 
change. This dramatic increase more than offsets reductions in air 
pollution anticipated by the United States. The United States can never 
reach its worldwide environmental goals unless we assist China with an 
aggressive pollution control and prevention program.
  I have a letter that I sent to President Clinton in February, after I 
returned from the CODEL to China, and would like to ask that it be 
included in the Record. It explains in great detail why the United 
States should encourage, rather than discourage, our companies to share 
their environmental technology with China. I would like to share with 
you just a few of the statistics from that letter. The World Bank 
reports that Asia's contribution of greenhouse gases to the environment 
will increase from approximately 20 percent in 1985 to almost 30 
percent by the year 2000. Half of all sulfur dioxide emissions by the 
year 2000 will originate in China, which relies on fossil fuels for 
domestic cooking, heating, and power generation.
  Current United States policy of linking the human rights issue in 
China to trade and environmental issues contributes to global economic 
problems, hurting America's economic interests and undermining the well 
being of Chinese citizens. American companies should be allowed to 
compete for trade opportunities and help China mitigate its 
environmental problems, but are frustrated by U.S. trade policies. 
Restrictions on programs such as the U.S. Agency for International 
Development [USAID], Overseas Private Investment Corporation [OPIC], 
the Trade and Development Association [TDA], and the Export-Import Bank 
prevent U.S. Companies from investing in China and helping to improve 
their environmental technology. By decreasing trade restrictions on 
American corporations in China, we can have a lasting impact on the 
global environment, reducing acid rain and protecting the ozone layer.
  The Foreign Operations Appropriations bill recommends the allocation 
of $55 million to combat the effects of global warming; however, 
allowing United States companies to share their clean air technologies 
with China could augment this investment considerably.
  Not only are United States companies hurting because of current 
administration policy, but the Chinese people are suffering as well. 
Lung cancer associated with industrial air pollutants is now the 
leading cause of death in China. We can prevent the pain and suffering 
of millions of Chinese afflicted with pollution-induced lung cancer by 
providing incentives for our corporations to share their knowledge and 
expertise with Chinese factories and allowing them to compete on a 
level playing field. The primary fuel in China is coal, and it is 
burned inefficiently and without pollution controls. The resulting 
damage affects crops, buildings, and human health.
  I am not going to offer an amendment to change United States policy 
toward China in this regard; however, I would again urge the State 
Department to reconsider their position on this issue and to consider 
the environmental consequences of China's rapid growth as a separate 
focus from other aspects of United States-China relations. It is my 
hope that we can find a way to address this problem that has such a 
major global environmental impact by developing a coordinated 
international environmental policy. Restoring USAID, OPIC, and TDA 
programs and involving the private sector in this area would be a 
positive step in developing a constructive relationship with China on 
an issue of global importance, and an issue which must be addressed to 
improve the health and safety of the Chinese people.
  Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, I note the majority leader standing. I 
yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I am advised that our colleagues now 
will permit a vote to occur, and therefore I ask that the Chair put the 
question.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment?
  If not, the question is on agreeing to amendment No. 2118 offered by 
the majority leader.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Riegle] is 
necessarily absent.
  I also announce that the Senator from Nevada [Mr. Bryan] is absent 
because of attending funeral.
  Mr. SIMPSON. I announce the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Cochran] is 
necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 93, nays 4, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 173 Leg.]

                                YEAS--93

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boren
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Danforth
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mathews
     McCain
     McConnell
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                                NAYS--4

     Byrd
     Faircloth
     Hatfield
     Wallop

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Bryan
     Cochran
     Riegle
  So the amendment (No. 2118) was agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. MITCHELL. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                    overhaul the foreign aid jalopy

  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the time is long overdue for a major 
overhaul of the foreign aid jalopy. This bill, the annual foreign aid 
bill, is a bill similar to dozens which have come before this body in 
previous years, and is, once again, to a large extent a product of old 
thinking. It represents holdover philosophy from the cold war, and 
responds to political problems and priorities which are outdated and 
gathering mold.
  In saying this, I certainly do not fault the chairman of the 
subcommittee, the able Senator from the State of Vermont, Mr. Leahy, 
who has done his best given the budget request submitted by the 
President and the constraints of the budget. I commend him for his 
frugality, and note that the bill is below last year's appropriated 
amount by about $700 million and below the President's request for 
fiscal year 1995 by $340.3 million.
  Nor do I fault the ranking manager of the bill, the able junior 
Senator from Kentucky [Mr. McConnell]. This is a thankless task. Other 
than the appropriations subcommittee on the District of Columbia--which 
I chaired for 7 long years, just as Jacob worked for Rachel 7 years and 
then had Leah palmed off on him by Rachel's father--and perhaps the 
Legislative Appropriations Subcommittee, I do not know of any 
subcommittee that constitutes a more thankless job than the Foreign 
Relations Subcommittee. But somebody has to do the work. It is an 
important job. It is an important assignment and somebody has to do the 
work. It does not reward one with very good headlines back home.
  The Administration has promised major foreign aid reform in light of 
the end of the cold war and in response to new priorities. While the 
Administration did submit a foreign aid reform bill, as is pointed out 
in the report accompanying this measure, it ``falls far short of the 
reforms that are needed.'' Thus, foreign aid reform on a magnitude to 
reflect changed realities has not been executed and is, therefore, not 
reflected in this measure. I suggest that if further initiatives are 
not taken by the Administration in preparation for the fiscal year 1996 
bill next year, that the subcommittee, working with the House 
Appropriations Subcommittee, and with the legislative committee--
Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, Foreign Affairs Committee of 
the House--take the bull by the horns themselves and put into place a 
far-reaching program of reform befitting the new era which our economy 
and the world reflect. In the absence of this, I cannot support the 
bill as it has been presented do the Senate, nor could I support 
similar legislation in the future.
  Our major emphasis under a reformed foreign assistance measure should 
be to enhance American competitiveness abroad. Many of my colleagues 
and I have attempted to shift the direction of foreign aid to help our 
ability to export more American products abroad, to create new markets 
for our goods and services, and fashion our foreign aid programs so as 
to promote U.S. economic goals--much in the way our major international 
economic competitors, particularly Japan and the aggressive economies 
of the Far East, and the countries of the European Economic Community 
have done. In my view, a more tightly woven connection between our 
economic health and strength with our foreign assistance programs is 
still sorely needed.
  Second, there is entirely too much arms giving and arms sales 
promotion in our foreign aid program. Much of this was in vogue during 
the Cold War, and no one has yet to seriously question whether we are 
fueling regional tensions and conflicts by selling American arms. The 
grant program alone this year consumes nearly 25 percent of the whole 
bill, over $3.1 billion.
  An American arming the world in the guise of foreign assistance does 
an increasing disservice regarding the real and urgent needs of the 
emerging nations in the third world and the nations of the defunct 
Soviet bloc and its proxies. The committee report states that 
``regrettably, the evidence clearly indicates that the administration 
has sought to promote arms sales, rather than to reduce them. The 
committee deplores ``the administration's apparent lack of interest in 
doing anything significant about the problem * * * of excessive levels 
of military spending by developing countries.'' So, Mr. President, we 
are concerned, on the one hand, about stopping the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction, including not only nuclear, but also chemical and 
biological weapons, and we have invented a new term to stop the spread 
and use of these weapons called ``counterproliferation.'' On the other 
hand, we are still peddling weapons and components, a practice that 
speaks loudly of our inconsistency on the matter.
  The distinguished Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Lautenberg, suggested 
on this floor earlier in the debate that foreign countries which do not 
cooperate with our efforts to reduce illegal immigration, and which 
will not agree to accept their nationals who are illegal aliens here in 
the United States, and are incarcerated felons, should not be 
recipients of foreign aid. That is a very worthwhile goal, and an idea 
that should be seriously explored. Other ties to foreign aid which 
reflect U.S. concerns and interests should be allowed a forum in coming 
years.
  I do not intend to engage in an extensive dissection of the details 
of the Administration's foreign aid program on this floor today. But it 
is high time we get this antique car off the road and into either the 
overhaul shop or the junkyard. The point is that our foreign aid 
program should cease being mainly a one-way transfer of resources, but 
should be used as a lever to accomplish our Nation's priorities not 
only in the economic area, but in terms as well of promoting our goals 
in other priority areas such as immigration reform, and benefits to 
U.S. business. It should be a clear carrot for nations that play ball 
with us, and a stick for those that do not.
  As I have said before, our foreign aid budget is not an entitlement 
program.
  Mr. President, we have not been hard-headed nor tight-fisted enough 
in focusing our attention more directly on our Nation's best interest 
when it comes to foreign aid. Until we do a better job, I cannot vote 
for these examples of wrong-headed American generosity.
  After all, it is our money, the taxpayers' money, that is being 
squandered if we fail to vigorously promote our own national interests. 
As with Timon of Athens:

     When Fortune in her shift and change of mood
     Spurns down her late beloved, all his dependents
     Which labour'd after him to the mountain's top
     Even on their knees and hands, let him slip down,
     Not one accompanying his declining foot.

  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk on 
behalf of myself, Mr. McConnell, Mr. Nunn, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Hollings and 
Mr. Heflin, and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator that there are 
pending committee amendments.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to temporarily 
lay the amendments aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, does that mean that the Johnston amendment 
is now the pending question?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana intends to lay the 
committee amendment aside?
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, if I may inquire of the floor manager, I 
would like to bring this up at a time convenient with both floor 
managers, and I understand the Dole amendment had been scheduled and I 
thought this was an appropriate time.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the Johnston amendment, which he has 
introduced, is now pending. I certainly do not want to cut him off or 
the Senator from Kentucky--if we could have order, Mr. President--
because I think for some of those who may be planning to leave this may 
be of importance to them, because I suspect we are going to vote on 
this.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Lautenberg). The Senator is right. If we 
could have order in the Chamber. Please cease conversations.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, so people will understand, I do not want to 
cut off any amount of time for the Senator from Louisiana or the 
Senator from Kentucky to speak on the amendment of the Senator from 
Louisiana, but at some appropriate time they will get a chance to say 
what they want. I will go to a few items, and I will then move to 
table, asking for the yeas and nays.
  I mention that because it would then require a vote. I will either 
win or lose, either way. If I lose the motion to table, of course, I 
will not ask for a second rollcall on the amendment, naturally.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LEAHY. Of course.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I just would like to say to my friend from Louisiana 
that I am supporting the amendment along with him, but I myself 
understood that we were going to go with it right now. I was hoping we 
might be able to lay that aside and move to the Bosnia amendment. I 
wonder if there is any chance of that from the Senator from Louisiana.


                      Unanimous Consent Agreement

  Mr. JOHNSTON. Of course, I would be willing to enter into a unanimous 
consent agreement to have a short time limit for anybody who would like 
a time limit tomorrow or tonight.
  Mr. LEAHY. Later tonight.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Or when anybody would like. I certainly will go along 
with the floor managers, whatever they wish.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I do not want to delay. There is nobody 
more willing to enter into a short time agreement than I. I have 
demonstrated that time and time again. I am happy to enter into 
whatever time agreement the proponent of the amendment feels protects 
his interest. I would want 10 or 15 minutes on my own at the most to 
state my point, but I would want to vote on this tonight.
  We spent a lot of time in quorum calls and a lot of time talking 
about issues that were voted on a lopsided vote. We have had four 
votes. We have been on this bill for about 12 hours now. None of these 
votes were close votes. A number of them were items that we have 
already debated at length at other times.
  And I told my colleagues that I have canceled plans to fly anywhere 
on Saturday, but I do not want to cancel plans to fly on Sunday, too.
  I would like to get this bill done. So I would be very reluctant to 
agree to anything that would not allow us to vote, and I know the 
Senator from Louisiana would want a rollcall on this to vote on his 
matter tonight.
  If we want to set it aside and do other things and come back to it, 
if that kind of agreement were entered into and vote on it, I do not 
know, midnight, 1 o'clock, whatever, so we can keep this bill moving.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. What is the desire? Would it be agreeable, Mr. 
President, if I may ask the managers, if we had a 30-minute time limit 
equally divided on our amendment?
  Mr. McCONNELL. To be taken up subsequent to the Dole amendment?
  Mr. DOLE. Right now.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Now, fine.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. All right.
  Then, Mr. President, if there is no objection, I ask unanimous 
consent that on the Johnston-McConnell-Nunn amendment there be a 30-
minute time agreement equally divided with no second-degree amendment 
in order, the time to be under my control and that of the distinguished 
floor manager.
  Mr. LEAHY. I do not believe a second-degree amendment would be in 
order anyway because of the parliamentary situation, and the Senator 
does not preclude motions to table?
  Mr. JOHNSTON. No.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I am advised that the proper way to get 
to this amendment, since we have not reached this committee amendment 
in proper form now is by unanimous consent. I guess my unanimous 
consent might have covered the amendment in order to move to strike at 
this time in accordance with the amendment at the desk, and I ask the 
Chair if that is the correct parliamentary situation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has a right to make that request.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, this gets a 
little bit confusing. I realize we can do anything by unanimous 
consent. But is the Senator saying he wishes to move to amend an 
amendment that is not before us because it has not yet been adopted? 
Would it not be better to adopt the amendment that he wishes to amend?
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I am advised 
that the proper motion would be a motion to table the committee 
amendment which is contained on page 34, line 15, beginning with the 
word ``provided'' and ending with the word ``Timor" on line 25.
  I ask unanimous consent that there be a 30-minute time agreement on 
the motion to table that amendment and that it be in order to consider 
it at this time.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, that 
amendment has not been adopted. I make a parliamentary inquiry.
  Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.
  Mr. LEAHY. Can the Senator from Louisiana--and I want to help him 
find a way to do this--move to strike an amendment which has not yet 
been adopted?
  Mr. JOHNSTON. The Chair just advised me that the proper motion is the 
motion to table since it has not been adopted, and I have asked 
unanimous consent so to do with a 30-minute time agreement.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. LEAHY. I do not mean to be difficult. But would the Senator tell 
me which lines he is talking about?
  Mr. JOHNSTON. It is on page 34, beginning with line 15 beginning with 
the word ``provided'' and ending on line 25, page 34 with the word 
``Timor.''
  Mr. LEAHY. So he would take out the money for the demining 
activities? That has nothing to do with Timor. It is talking about 
demining in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Africa, and everywhere else.
  Might the Senator want to start down on line 19?
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me correct that motion, Mr. President. It is page 
34, line 19, beginning with the word ``provided'' and ending on line 25 
with the word ``East Timor.'' I think my written amendment so states.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I will not object provided I have the right 
to offer a perfecting amendment on line 21 between the words ``any'' 
and ``equipment'' to be able to offer the amendment to say ``lethal.''
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the Senator can do so by unanimous 
consent, as far as I am concerned.
  If the matter is tabled, then there will be nothing to put ``lethal'' 
between. If it is not tabled, then you can announce to Senators that it 
is your intention, and I would have no objection.
  Mr. LEAHY. If the amendment of the Senator from Louisiana is tabled, 
the motion to strike, we are back to ``provided further, that any 
agreement for the sale,'' and so on. We would be back to the 
legislation, is that not correct?
  Mr. JOHNSTON. If my motion to table is granted, then that matter will 
be stricken and there will be no language in which to insert the word 
``lethal.''
  Mr. LEAHY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. President. Would it be in order 
at the appropriate time to move to table the motion to table of the 
Senator from Louisiana?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It would be incorrect. A motion to table 
cannot follow a previous motion to table.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. What is the parliamentary situation, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana has made a 
unanimous consent request. Is there objection?
  Mr. LEAHY. Reserving the right to object.
  Would the Senator from Louisiana permit me, by unanimous consent, to 
amend the provision on line 21 with the word ``lethal'' ahead of the 
word ``equipment''?
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I would restate my unanimous consent 
request.
  I ask unanimous-consent that it be in order to move to table the 
language on page 34, line 19, beginning with the word ``provided'' and 
ending with line 25 with the words ``East Timor''; and further request 
that the amendment to be stricken be modified by adding the word 
``lethal'' in front of the word ``equipment'' on line 21.
  Mr. LEAHY. And would you further modify that that at the expiration 
of 30 minutes we would vote on or in relation to your motion?
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes; it is a motion to table.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Hearing none, it is so 
ordered.
  The committee amendment is so modified.
  The modification reads as follows:
       The committee amendment on page 34, beginning with 
     ``Provided'' on line 19, is modified by inserting ``lethal'' 
     before the word ``equipment'' on line 21.

  Mr. JOHNSTON. And we now have a time agreement of 30 minutes?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. LEAHY. I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. JOHNSTON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.
  Mr. President, since I made my statement on this matter, I am advised 
that the State Department has, in fact, as of 7:35 p.m. tonight, taken 
a position on this provision and that they do find this provision 
unnecessary and inconsistent with our policy.
  If I may now read the letter from Warren Christopher. It is a letter 
to Mr. Leahy. It reads as follows:

       Dear Mr. Chairman: As you work on the FY 1995 Foreign 
     Operations Appropriations bill, we would like to provide you 
     with a clear statement of the Administration's policy towards 
     Indonesia and reiterate our objections to language which 
     would place restrictions on arms sales or transfers to that 
     country.
       This Administration is steadfastly pursuing the objective, 
     shared with Congress, of promoting an improved human rights 
     environment in East Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia. We are 
     trying to pursue our agenda aggressively, working with 
     Indonesians both inside and outside the Government, using our 
     assistance, information, and exchange programs to achieve 
     results. At the same time, we have raised our human rights 
     concerns at the highest levels in meetings with Indonesian 
     officials. As a direct expression of our concerns, our 
     current policy is to deny license requests for sales of small 
     and light arms and lethal crowd control items to Indonesia. 
     In accordance with U.S. law, we make these decisions on a 
     case-by-case basis, applying this general guidance.
       East Timor remains a high priority for our human rights 
     efforts in Indonesia. In 1993-94, there was considerably 
     greater access to East Timor on the part of international 
     groups such as the International Commission of Jurists, Human 
     Rights Watch, foreign and domestic journalists, 
     parliamentarians, and diplomats. We understand that the 
     International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] is expanding 
     its on-the-ground presence in East Timor and has, with the 
     cooperation of government authorities, worked out 
     satisfactory access arrangements for visits to detainees. The 
     expanded USAID program includes projects designed to 
     strengthen indigenous NGOs active in agriculture, health, 
     vocational training, and microenterprise. On the security 
     front, the Indonesian Government has reduced its troop levels 
     in East Timor by two battalions. In East Timor, as well as 
     elsewhere in Indonesia, we have seen evidence of improved 
     military accountability and self-restraint under new military 
     leadership.
       We clearly recognize that more needs to be done. We 
     continue to push for a full accounting for those missing from 
     the 1991 shootings in Bast Timor and for reductions or 
     commutations of sentences given to civilian demonstrators. We 
     have also urged further reductions in troop levels and 
     efforts at reconciliation which take into account East 
     Timor's unique culture and history. But we do not see new 
     restrictions on sales of defense equipment warranted by any 
     deterioration in conditions; indeed we believe efforts to 
     support military reform and promote military professionalism, 
     discipline and accountability should be encouraged.
       IMET restoration would be an important tool to this end. We 
     therefore welcome the fact that the Senate Appropriations 
     Committee language for the Foreign Operations Bill for FY 
     1995 would remove the existing legislative prohibition 
     regarding IMET for Indonesia.
       The United States has important economic, commercial, 
     security, human rights, and political interests in Indonesia. 
     Our challenge is to develop a policy that advances all our 
     interests, that obtains positive results and reduces, to the 
     extent possible, unintended negative effects. In this regard, 
     the provision restricting military sales or transfers to 
     Indonesia in the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill is 
     unnecessary and inconsistent with our policy objectives in 
     Indonesia.
       Please be assured that we will continue to work 
     aggressively to promote better human rights observance 
     throughout Indonesia. We are committed to doing so in what we 
     believe is a comprehensive, effective, and results-oriented 
     manner, and will continue to keep in close contact with you 
     and other Members interested in these matters.
           Sincerely,
                                               Warren Christopher.

  Mr. President, in fairness to the chairman, neither of these letters, 
either from the Deputy Secretary of Defense or from the Secretary of 
State, were available to any of us on the Foreign Operations 
subcommittee at the time this amendment was adopted.
  I hope, therefore, that this language could be stricken, keeping in 
mind that the matter will be in conference as regards IMET.
  I yield the floor at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. JOHNSTON. I yield the Senator 5 minutes.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent Senator Dole be 
added as a cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment by 
the Senator from Louisiana. Indonesia is a large, thriving market. In 
fact, it has been identified as one of the prime trade investment 
opportunities for U.S. companies. The language in the bill is 
sufficiently vague to cause both the United States and the Indonesian 
Government a considerable concern.
  The language asks that we reach an agreement with Indonesia that 
equipment we sell may not be used in East Timor.
  Frankly, I do not see how we could possibly monitor that. If we sell 
equipment to Indonesia to use with their armed forces, we do not sell 
it to a particular place in Indonesia. What happens, for example, if a 
unit is using United States equipment in one part of Indonesia and gets 
transferred to East Timor? There is no practical way to endorse this 
particular provision.
  In effect, our inability to monitor the terms of any understanding 
could turn it into an embargo of all sales. I repeat, it could turn it 
into an embargo of all sales, and that is certainly not in our best 
interests.
  This would be a serious mistake. Indonesia has been a valuable ally 
in regional politics and has provided support to our naval forces in 
the region over the years. The effect of the amendment would be 
damaging to our trade, political and security relationship with a 
country of over 190 million people. I think we can press the human 
rights case in a constructive fashion without damaging this important 
relationship.
  So I commend the Senator from Louisiana for this proposal. We have 
been working with him to try to minimize the restrictions on Indonesia 
in this bill. We obviously did not get quite far enough to satisfy the 
Senator from Louisiana. I think his concerns are valid. I support them, 
and I hope the Senate will approve the Johnston amendment.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may need.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont is recognized.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, basically my good friends from Louisiana 
and Kentucky are saying we should have no restrictions or no say at all 
on what the equipment we send to Indonesia is used for. I am not sure 
if there are other countries that we are willing to give that kind of 
carte blanche to. I know of none in this bill that we give that to. I 
know of no countries where we give them such an open-ended use of our 
equipment.
  It is not a case where we have ignored Indonesia. We have given them 
$4 billion of taxpayer-paid-for economic and military aid over the past 
30 years--$4 billion. We are going to give Indonesia another $60 
million in aid next year. We have not turned our back on them.
  In the committee amendments we have removed the prohibitions on IMET 
placed in the other body. We have tried to do things to show Indonesia 
our continuing support. After all, $4 billion, and $60 million next 
year, is more than just a Valentine card.
  The Indonesian army occupied East Timor over 20 years ago. Since 1976 
we passed half a dozen nonbinding resolutions in this Congress. Most of 
the Members of this body voted on them--asking them to stop abusing the 
rights of the people of East Timor.
  Three years ago--one of the things that really brought this to a 
head--Indonesian soldiers fired on peaceful demonstrators in East 
Timor. They killed between 200 and 300 people. At first they said only 
19 people died but then, when the truth came out, they said we have to 
do something about it. And what did they do? They arrested some of the 
demonstrators, sentenced some of them up to life imprisonment, and the 
soldiers went to jail for a few months. Even that would not have 
happened if the press had not become aware of what happened. Even the 
officers in charge were never charged with a crime. People are still 
not accounted for.
  We cut off military assistance for 2 years and then we ended up 
selling it to the Indonesians anyway. We deleted the House language 
cutting off sale of military training. I moved to delete the ban on 
military training assistance. I believe the ban outlived its usefulness 
and I moved to make sure that could still go to Indonesia. But having 
given them $60 million in aid, having lifted the bans on training and 
assistance, let us not totally turn our backs on the people of East 
Timor and say the resolutions we passed time and time again in the 
Senate were merely that. We never meant it.
  We have even amended this provision so it covers only lethal 
equipment.
  Could we, insofar as we are using America's taxpayers' money, just 
have a little teensy-weensy bit of control? Even a little teensy-weensy 
bit of American taxpayers' say of where this money is going to be used? 
Even a little itsy-bitsy bit of say when we tap the pockets of 
Americans for $60 billion more to say what it is going to be used for?
  There are 8,000 Indonesian troops in East Timor. We do not affect the 
$28 million sales of commercial equipment to Indonesia in 1995. That 
goes forward. But we can say when we are sending $60 million of your 
tax dollars, my tax dollars, everybody else's tax dollars to Indonesia, 
we also support people who were persecuted for peacefully expressing 
their human rights, even if they happen to live halfway around the 
world and we do not see them daily.
  I agree Indonesia is an important country. I joined with the Senator 
from Louisiana in making that statement, as he knows, on a number of 
occasions. But that is why we provide this money. That is why I deleted 
the prohibition of IMET training. That is why I supported $60 million 
to them.
  But I have to tell you, this is one Vermonter who does not like to 
give out a blank check of the taxpayers' money, and I say this action 
of the Senators from Louisiana and Kentucky would do that, as we put on 
no controls whatsoever.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article by Philip 
Shenon in the New York Times on June 29, 1994, be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

      Indonesia Moves to Stifle Criticism, Both at Home and Abroad

                           (By PHILIP SHENON)

       Singapore, June 27.--The Indonesian Government, which bans 
     most public debate among its own people over the disputed 
     territory of East Timor, is pressing its smaller Asian 
     neighbors to keep quiet, too.
       Last month the Philippines gave in to threats from 
     Indonesia and barred foreign visitors, including Danielle 
     Mitterrand, the wife of the French President, from attending 
     a conference in Manila on human rights abuses in East Timor, 
     a former Portuguese colony that was invaded and annexed by 
     Indonesia in 1976.
       Now the Indonesians have turned their diplomatic guns on 
     Malaysia, warning that ties between the two countries could 
     be damaged by a planned East Timor forum to be held this year 
     in Kuala Lumpur, the Malaysian capital.
       Brig. Gen. Syarwan Hamid, a spokesman for the Indonesian 
     military, was quoted by the Indonesian press agency as saying 
     the Malaysia conference ``is clearly not an ordinary 
     meeting'' because some of the participants ``wish to tarnish 
     the image of the Indonesian Government and the military.'' A 
     spokesman for President Suharto's Government said the 
     conference could ``upset the solidarity and good relations'' 
     between Indonesia and Malaysia.
       So far the Malaysian Government has responded to the 
     Indonesian protests by pleading ignorance. Government 
     spokesmen in Kuala Lumpur say they have no information about 
     the East Timor conference, which is being organized by 
     Malaysian public interest and religious groups. The date of 
     the conference has not been announced.
       Diplomats in Kuala Lumpur say that if the Indonesian 
     protests continue, Malaysia will almost certainly heed the 
     warnings from its neighbor and cancel the conference. With 
     more than 190 million people spread across the world's 
     largest archipelago, Indonesia dwarfs surrounding nations.
       International attention to human rights abuses in East 
     Timor, where as many as 200,000 people have died since the 
     Indonesian invasion, has hindered plans by the Suharto 
     Government to secure a far greater role for Indonesia on the 
     world stage.
       In recent months the Government has ushered groups of 
     foreign journalists and United Nations officials into East 
     Timor in hopes of proving that the situation is better than 
     is usually reported.
       The decision last month by President Fidel V. Ramos of the 
     Philippines to appease Indonesia by barring dozens of 
     foreigners from taking part in the five-day Manila conference 
     created a furor in the Philippines, which otherwise promotes 
     itself as a bastion of democracy and free speech in Southeast 
     Asia.
       Mr. Ramos described the forum as ``inimical to the national 
     interest'' and conceded that he had given in to the Suharto 
     Government because of concerns that the conference could 
     affect Indonesian investment in the Philippines. Despite the 
     ban, many foreigners managed to attend on tourist visas. Mrs. 
     Mitterrand, president of a French human rights group, stayed 
     home, telling reporters in Paris that Indonesia had applied 
     ``tyrannical pressure on us and on the Philippine Government 
     to keep me from going to that meeting.''
       As it tries to stifle foreign criticism about East Timor, 
     the Indonesian Government continues to deal harshly with its 
     critics at home, as was clear again on Monday as police 
     officers in Jakarta, the Indonesian capital, used rattan 
     sticks to break up a street protest over a Government ban on 
     three of the country's most influential magazines.
       Witnesses said dozens of people had been detained as they 
     joined a crowd of about 150 people marching on the offices of 
     the Information Ministry, which issued the order last week to 
     shut down the magazines, including Tempo, a national 
     newsweekly.
       Diplomats and human rights groups said the three magazines 
     had been banned because of their reporting on corruption in 
     President Suharto's Cabinet.
  Mr. LEAHY. I see the Senator from Wisconsin on the floor. How much 
time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont has 9 minutes 40 
seconds.
  Mr. LEAHY. How much time would the Senator from Wisconsin like?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. May I have 5 minutes?
  Mr. LEAHY. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Wisconsin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Senator from Vermont.
  Mr. President, this is a heck of a time to be giving a seal of 
approval to the conduct of the Indonesian Government with regard to 
human rights and, in particular, treatment of East Timor. The Congress 
suspended IMET to Indonesia in response to a brutal massacre by the 
Indonesia forces against peaceful demonstrators in 1991, and the 
Indonesians have shown really very little remorse since then. Last year 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted an amendment to the 
foreign assistance bill that would require the administration to 
consult with Congress on human rights before approving the sale or 
transfer of arms under the Arms Export Control Act.
  Among those conditions the Indonesian Government has significantly 
failed to respond. There are six areas. To the first three, there has 
been no response. One of the conditions was whether the civilians 
convicted in connection with the November 1991 East Timor incident have 
been treated in accordance with international standards of fairness, 
including whether the Indonesian Government has reviewed the sentences 
of these individuals for the purpose of their commutation, reduction or 
remission. No response from the Indonesian Government on this item.
  A second item, whether the Indonesian Government is taking steps to 
curb human rights violations by its security forces, including all 
military personnel who were responsible for ordering, authorizing or 
initiating the use of lethal force against demonstrators in East Timor 
in 1991 are being brought to justice. No response from the Indonesian 
Government.
  Finally, whether there has been a full public accounting of the 
individuals missing after the November 1991 incident. No response.
  That was the position which the administration agreed to, and the 
administration now certainly does not believe we should give a blank 
check to Indonesia.
  The administration has adopted a ban on light arms sales to Indonesia 
after a thorough review of policy which concluded that Indonesia is an 
important ally but, at the same time, the administration wanted to send 
a strong message that Indonesia has not done enough.
  So this is the worst possible approach we can take to simply strike 
the language in the bill. I cannot think of a worse time. In this very 
week, the Indonesians have cracked down on press freedoms by revoking 
the licenses of three major journals for ``sowing discontent.'' This is 
the kind of conduct we are going to reward on this night after that 
conduct in Indonesia this week. I think that is very troubling.
  Fifty people who were peacefully protesting the restriction were 
beaten by Indonesian security forces this past week, and this comes, 
Mr. President, on the heels of bullying tactics by the Indonesian 
Government against the Philippines just recently for holding a 
conference of foreigners who are going to simply talk about what was 
going on in East Timor. I understand that they are also now trying to 
keep the Malaysians from holding a similar conference as well.
  Of course, the Indonesians are our allies, and I hope their country 
is trying to make progress in this regard and we want to have a strong 
friendship. But the conduct of just these past couple of weeks indicate 
just the opposite.
  I think it would be a very serious mistake for us to remove a 
provision that says American arms should not be used to kill and 
torture the people of East Timor. And I ask the Senate to oppose this 
effort to table the committee language because it could not come at a 
more inappropriate time with regard to the human rights of the people 
of this world and, in particular, the human rights of the people of 
Indonesia and the people of East Timor.
  Mr. WELLSTONE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I promised to yield 2 minutes to the 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I ask the distinguished chairman for 2 minutes.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont has 5 minutes and 15 
seconds available.
  Mr. LEAHY. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island, and 
then I will yield to the Senator from Minnesota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 2 minutes.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from 
Vermont.
  I wish to state general and specific reasons why the position 
regarding East Timor, in my view, of the Senator from Vermont is 
correct, and, thus, that the language in the bill, as reported by the 
committee, is correct.
  I think we all agree that there should be some control of weapons, 
whether they are lethal or nonlethal, when they are turned over to 
other countries. We used this argument when the Turks took American 
weapons and misused them in the occupation of Cypress. The argument 
that the United States should exercise some control over its military 
assistance and sales to foreign countries is widely accepted.
  In addition, there is the argument of human rights. It is generally 
recognized that Indonesia is a little slow in its march down the road 
toward human rights, although more and more countries throughout the 
world and particularly in the Far East are improving the human rights 
conditions of its citizens.
  From a specific viewpoint, I cannot help but recall a couple of years 
ago when I was in Indonesia, I asked President Soeharto if I could go 
to East Timor. He told me emphatically, ``No, that it might have an 
unsettling effect.'' He was afraid at that time that a visit by this 
U.S. Senator would draw too much attention to the plight of the East 
Timorese people.
  As Senator Leahy mentioned, I too was deeply distressed by the 
treatment accorded the shooters and the shootees at a riot in Dili, 
East Timor, in 1991 when the Indonesian military fired upon a group of 
peaceful demonstrators. The punishment meted out to the ones who 
murdered or shot the shooters was far less than the punishment handed 
out to the shootees, the people shot at. Clearly, Indonesian security 
forces continue to repress the East Timorese.
  I urge my colleagues to support the committee language as written.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, one thing, this does not affect licenses of 
commercial sales, which is the overwhelming majority of our military 
sales, and having given billions of dollars to Indonesia, another $60 
million, the language sought to be stricken is simply any agreement for 
the sale or provision of any lethal equipment on the United States 
munitions list to Indonesia that is entered into by the United States 
during fiscal year 1995 to expressly state the understanding the 
equipment may not be used in East Timor.
  It does not affect commercial sales, which is the overwhelming 
majority of military sales. It is a tiny, itsy-bitsy restraint on the 
money we are going to give them.
  I yield, first, 1 minute to Senator Harkin and 1 minute to Senator 
Wellstone.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized for 1 
minute.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I just learned of this amendment, and I 
noticed there was a time limit on it. I wish there was not. Had I been 
here, I would have objected to a time limit on this amendment.
  I kept hearing all this talk on my monitor before I left to come over 
here that somehow because Indonesia is big and powerful and they are a 
market and that somehow we have to excuse their conduct in East Timor.
  Look at the history. In 1975 with the use of United States arms, 
which we prohibited in a treaty with Indonesia in 1958, they invaded 
tiny East Timor, killed 200,000 people, one-third of their population 
and have kept them in severe repression ever since.
  And now we are going to let them walk and say, ``Oh, that's just 
fine.''
  It has been condemned by the United Nations and by about every human 
rights organization around the world. The East Timorese have pleaded 
with us year after year to help them out. Just last week, the 
Indonesian Government banned three of the top newspapers in East Timor. 
They will not let them publish. Three of their top newspapers they just 
shut down so they could not publish anymore.
  Is this the kind of activity that we want to reward? They broke the 
treaty we had with them dating back to 1958 in using our arms to invade 
East Timor. I agree with the distinguished chairman we ought to have at 
least some control.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask that my minute be given to the 
Senator from Iowa.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized for the 
remaining minute.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, the East Timorese over the years, the 
Catholic population there have pleaded with us to help them out, to 
take their cause to the world community. Just because they are small 
and because they are defenseless means that we have to put up with what 
the Indonesians have done to them? I do not think so.
  We have not banned all aid to Indonesia. We have not stopped trade 
with them. But at least I think we ought to do what the chairman has 
said, to hold them to some small standard.
  The implication I think given earlier that I heard on my monitor that 
somehow the State Department is against all forms of control on the 
military equipment that we give them is wrong. They may be opposed to 
this amendment, or they may be opposed to one provision in the bill, 
but the implication that they are opposed to any restrictions at all is 
wrong and the amendment offered by the Senator from Louisiana strips 
all controls--everything--strips everything off.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Will the Senator yield at that point?
  Mr. HARKIN. I will if I have made a mistake.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired. Six minutes 
remain for the proponents of the amendment.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I yield myself 30 seconds simply to say 
that my amendment strips only that part of the bill to which the State 
Department and the Department of Defense both object.
  Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Wyoming.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming is recognized for 3 
minutes.
  Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I am aware of the time limitation. I just 
want the Senate to be very clear what we are voting on here. This is 
not a vote about whether or not we are concerned about human rights 
violations or transgression in the region of East Timor. We are rather 
voting about whether or not to place an explicit prohibition on the use 
by the Indonesian Government of any defense items which we send to them 
in East Timor.
  The language in the underlying bill is very troubling. I appreciate 
that we have been able to successfully work at the committee level to 
remove the restrictions on IMET, that training which is in the House 
version. But there is a clear and disturbing indication that results 
from military sales language in the underlying bill. I think all of us 
would agree it would be inappropriate for us to restrict how other 
governments are able to use their defense weaponry to deal with 
insurgent activity within their borders. Arrogant intrusion.
  I agree with Senator Johnston that by drawing the line on East Timor, 
we are giving a kind of implicit endorsement to the principle that East 
Timor is not a part of Indonesia.
  I fully recognize that many Members of this Senate believe in good 
conscience that East Timor is not and should not be a part of 
Indonesia. This is going much further than simply saying, as we should, 
that basic human rights ought to be respected there.
  By including this language, we place the Senate on record on one side 
of a very fractious debate, and that is on a side in direct opposition 
to the Indonesian Government. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to be 
mindful of this while casting their votes.
  I further echo the arguments of my colleague, Senator Johnston, in 
noting that the language in the underlying bill contradicts the 
evolving administration policy toward Indonesia which is in the 
direction of more exchange, more involvement and more influence on 
human rights by the consequence of increased military and trade 
contacts.
  I urge, if you can, go to Indonesia. See the changes made. Hear their 
leaders. Look at our own history, where in 1860 we had a civil war that 
makes that one, if it comes about, look like nothing. A country that 
has 300 languages--not dialects, but languages--and hundreds of ethnic 
groups. They know what will happen to their country when the breakup 
takes place. I think it is very important we not judge Indonesia by our 
own standards and try to let Indonesia judge itself and know that our 
best influence on their human rights is exchange and openness and trade 
and communication.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 2 minutes 50 seconds 
remaining.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, did the Senator from Kentucky want 1\1/
2\ minutes?
  Mr. McCONNELL. I will just take a minute, I say to my friend.
  There is no doubt that there is a human rights problem in East Timor. 
We are not here arguing about that. But the control the chairman is 
insisting on will not necessarily achieve the goal of improving that 
situation, and it may punish American companies seeking contracts and 
business opportunities.
  Like China, I think it is a mistake to try to use commercial levers 
to fulfill human rights goals. While strict commercial sales are 
excluded, American defense contractors would be penalized under this 
proposal.
  So I hope that the amendment of the Senator from Louisiana will be 
approved.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the Senator from Wyoming stated it 
properly. There are human rights concerns in Indonesia. By adopting the 
language that is contained in the bill, we are not endorsing the human 
rights violations in Indonesia. What we are doing by adopting the 
Johnston motion to strike is recognizing that the Secretary of State 
believes there has been a lot of progress in Indonesia, by recognizing 
that the Department of Defense thinks this is a very unworkable 
amendment that may restrict the sales of spare parts to C-130's, of 
which we sell many, many to Indonesia, spare parts to F-16's, spare 
parts to other things, and thereby render ourselves to be unreliable as 
the supplier to Indonesia.
  Mr. President, the President of the United States is going to 
Indonesia this fall. This would be a matter of severe embarrassment to 
him, a major blow in our relationship with Indonesia. I say follow the 
Secretary of State, follow the Deputy Secretary of Defense, both of 
whom say this would be a big mistake and we ought to strike this 
language.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following be added as 
cosponsors: The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner]; the Senator from 
Kansas [Mr. Dole]; the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Robb]; the Senator 
from California [Mrs. Feinstein]; the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. 
Simpson]; the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Mathews]; the Senator from 
Alaska [Mr. Stevens]; the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Thurmond]; 
and the Senator from Florida [Mr. Graham].
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise to speak about the pending 
Johnston amendment to the foreign operations appropriations bill, which 
strikes language prohibiting the Indonesian Government from using 
United States military equipment in East Timor. This is a very complex 
issue that I have reviewed carefully.
  On the one hand, there is no question that there are serious and 
continuing human rights abuses in Indonesia. While we now see the 
Indonesian Government opening up to visits by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and withdrawing troops from East Timor, it 
has simultaneously moved to crack down on freedom of the press and 
labor activists.
  On the other hand, Indonesia is an important ally of the United 
States in a strategic location. It is also a large and populous country 
that provides significant trade and investment opportunities for 
American companies. The entire Pacific rim is particularly important to 
California business and industry.
  With regard to the Johnston amendment, the pertinent question to ask 
is whether keeping the language restricting military sales to Indonesia 
would accomplish the goal of improving human rights in that country and 
in particular in East Timor. I believe that the answer to that question 
has to be ``no.''
  There are also logistical concerns about whether it is practical to 
try to condition military sales on where the equipment will be used.
  Secretary of State Christopher has stated that the administration is 
concerned about human rights in East Timor and will continue to engage 
the Indonesian Government aggressively on this important issue. I 
support Secretary Christopher's and the administration's efforts in 
this regard. In addition, as Secretary Christopher has explained, it is 
the State Department's current policy to deny license requests for 
sales of small and light arms and lethal crowd control items to 
Indonesia. This decision was made on the basis of concerns over 
Indonesia's past record in human rights, especially in East Timor.
  With this in mind, I will vote for the Johnston amendment. As a 
general rule, I believe that trade is a force for economic 
liberalization and that it leads to democratization. Trade is a tool, 
but it must not be used as a blunt instrument to cudgel those nations 
that we wish to influence.
  I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Secretary Christopher be 
printed in the Record.

                                       The Secretary of State,

                                        Washington, June 29, 1994.
     Hon. Patrick J. Leahy,
     Committee on Appropriations,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: As you work on the FY 1995 Foreign 
     Operations Appropriations bill, we would like to provide you 
     with a clear statement of the Administration's policy towards 
     Indonesia and reiterate our objections to language which 
     would place restrictions on arms sales or transfers to that 
     country.
       This Administration is steadfastly pursuing the objective, 
     shared with Congress, of promoting an improved human rights 
     environment in East Timor and elsewhere in Indonesia. We are 
     trying to pursue our agenda aggressively, working with 
     Indonesians both inside and outside the Government, using our 
     assistance, information, and exchange programs to achieve 
     results. At the same time, we have raised our human rights 
     concerns at the highest levels in meetings with Indonesia 
     officials. As a direct expression of our concerns, our 
     current policy is to deny license requests for sales of small 
     and light arms and lethal crowd control items to Indonesia. 
     In accordance with U.S. law, we make these decisions on a 
     case-by-case basis, applying this general guidance.
       East Timor remains a high priority for our human rights 
     efforts in Indonesia. In 1993-94, there was considerably 
     greater access to East Timor on the part of international 
     groups such as the International Commission of Jurists, Human 
     Rights Watch, foreign and domestic journalists, 
     parliamentarians, and diplomats. We understand that the 
     International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] is expanding 
     its on-the-ground presence in East Timor and has, with the 
     cooperation of government authorities, worked out 
     satisfactory access arrangements for visits to detainees. The 
     expanded USAID program includes projects designed to 
     strengthen indigenous NGOs active in agriculture, health, 
     vocational training, and microenterprise. On the security 
     front, the Indonesian Government has reduced its troop levels 
     in East Timor by two battalions. In East Timor, as well as 
     elsewhere in Indonesia, we have seen evidence of improved 
     military accountability and self-restraint under new military 
     leadership.
       We clearly recognize that more needs to be done. We 
     continue to push for a full accounting for those missing from 
     the 1991 shootings in East Timor and for reductions or 
     commutations of sentences given to civilian demonstrators. We 
     have also urged further reductions in troop levels and 
     efforts at reconciliation which take into account East 
     Timor's unique culture and history. But we do not see new 
     restrictions on sales of defense equipment warranted by any 
     deterioration in conditions; indeed we believe efforts to 
     support military reform and promote military professionalism, 
     discipline and accountability should be encouraged.
       IMET restoration would be an important tool to this end. We 
     therefore welcome the fact that the Senate Appropriations 
     Committee language for the Foreign Operations Bill for FY 
     1995 would remove the existing legislative prohibition 
     regarding IMET for Indonesia.
       The United States has important economic, commercial, 
     security, human rights, and political interests in Indonesia. 
     Our challenge is to develop a policy that advances all our 
     interests, that obtains positive results and reduces, to the 
     extent possible, unintended negative effects. In this regard, 
     the provision restricting military sales or transfers to 
     Indonesia in the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill is 
     unnecessary and inconsistent with our policy objectives in 
     Indonesia.
       Please be assured that we will continue to work 
     aggressively to promote better human rights observance 
     throughout Indonesia. We are committed to doing so in what we 
     believe is a comprehensive, effective, and results-oriented 
     manner, and will continue to keep in close contact with you 
     and other Members interested in these matters.
           Sincerely,
                                               Warren Christopher.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired. The question is on 
agreeing to the motion to table the committee amendment on page 34, 
line 19, beginning with the word ``provided'' through the words ``East 
Timor'' on line 25. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will 
call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Pryor] and the 
Senator from Michigan [Mr. Riegle] are necessarily absent.
  I also announce that the Senator from Nevada [Mr. Bryan] is absent 
because of attending a funeral.
  Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. 
Chafee] the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. Cochran] and the Senator from 
Wyoming [Mr. Wallop] are necessarily absent.
  THe PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 59, nays 35, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 174 Leg.]

                                YEAS--59

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Bond
     Boren
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Coats
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     Danforth
     Dole
     Domenici
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Gregg
     Hatch
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kerrey
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mathews
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pressler
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Warner

                                NAYS--35

     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boxer
     Bradley
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Feingold
     Ford
     Grassley
     Harkin
     Hatfield
     Kennedy
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Metzenbaum
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Pell
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Simon
     Specter
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                             NOT VOTING--6

     Bryan
     Chafee
     Cochran
     Pryor
     Riegle
     Wallop
  So the motion to table was agreed to.


               Amendment Nos. 2119 through 2126, en bloc

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I send a group of amendments to the desk, 
en bloc, and ask for their immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Levin). Does the Senator request that the 
pending committee amendments be set aside?
  Mr. LEAHY. Yes, I ask unanimous consent that they be laid aside so 
that these amendments may be considered.
  I also ask unanimous consent that any statements relative to these 
amendments be placed appropriately in the Record.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The pending committee amendments will be laid aside.
  The clerk will report the amendments, en bloc.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Vermont [Mr. Leahy] proposes amendments, 
     en bloc, numbered 2119 through 2126.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendments be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments, en bloc, are as follows:


                           amendment no. 2119

     (Purpose: To require a report on country development policies)

       At the appropriate place, insert the following:


                  COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT POLICIES REPORT

       Sec.  . (a) Reporting Requirement.--The Secretary of State 
     shall, by March 31, 1995, submit to the Committees on 
     Appropriations a report providing a concise overview of the 
     prospects for economic growth on a broad, equitable, and 
     sustainable basis in the countries receiving economic 
     assistance under title II of this Act. For each country, the 
     report shall discuss the laws, policies, and practices of 
     that country that most contribute to or detract from the 
     achievement of this kind of growth. The report should address 
     relevant macroeconomic, microeconomic, social, legal, 
     environmental, and political factors.
       (b) Countries.--The countries referred to in subsection (a) 
     are countries--
       (1) for which in excess of a total of $5,000,000 has been 
     obligated during the previous fiscal year for assistance 
     under sections 103 through 106, chapters 10 and 11 of part I, 
     and chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961, and under the Support for East European Democracy Act 
     of 1989; or
       (2) for which in excess of $1,000,000 has been obligated 
     during the previous fiscal year for assistance administered 
     by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
       (c) Consultation.--The Secretary of State shall submit the 
     report required by subsection (a) in consultation with the 
     Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the Agency 
     for International Development, and the President of the 
     Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

  Mr. MACK. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment that requires 
the administration to send a report to the Congress on the policies of 
foreign aid recipients that most affect economic growth.
  The reason for this amendment is simple. There is no way to address 
the tremendous poverty in much of this world without economic growth. 
That is the undeniable truth, and the World Bank and the IMF are saying 
it loudly and clearly.
  There is a growing consensus in the developing world today that 
poverty cannot be addressed without economic growth, and that sound 
economic policies are the most important factor in achieving that 
growth.
  I would cite just one fact to illustrate the dramatic need for 
growth, particular in Africa. The New York Times points out that the 
1991 gross national product of all subSaharan nations combined, except 
for South Africa, is about the same as the GNP of Belgium. Those 
African nations have a population of 600 million people, compared to 10 
million people in Belgium.
  That is an astounding and tragic fact. If we do not address the need 
for economic growth in Africa, we are in effect saying we do not really 
care about poverty in Africa. Yes, we are willing to send billions and 
billions of dollars in aid to Africa, but that is not the same as 
caring. If we really cared about the people of Africa we would be doing 
everything we could to encourage progrowth economic policies. Without 
sound economic policies, no amount of foreign aid will address the 
poverty that exists in these nations.
  As I said, both the World Bank and the IMF have come to this 
conclusion. A 1994 World Bank report on Africa states:

       A broad-based pattern of rapid economic growth is vital to 
     reducing poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . The importance 
     of reforms for Africa's economic future cannot be overstated. 
     With today's poor policies, it will be 40 years before the 
     region returns to its per capita income of the mid 1970s.

  In a recent speech on the developing world, the Director of the 
International Monetary Fund said:

       The aim must be economic growth, because that is the only 
     means of obtaining rising living standards on a sustainable 
     basis. Growth is the key to reducing poverty.

  The purpose of this amendment is to require the administration to 
produce a comprehensive but concise report that assesses the economic 
policies of the countries we aid with an eye toward whether they 
contribute to or retard economic growth. The principle here is similar 
to the principle behind the existing State Department report on human 
rights. If we wish to encourage certain policies, we should have a 
clear idea about which countries are pursuing good policies and which 
are not.
  The World Bank has found that good policies matter. Their African 
study found that countries with largely improved macroeconomic policies 
grew almost 2 percent faster than they did before policy reforms. And 
that the growth rate in countries with the worst policy records 
actually fell by 2.6 percent.
  This is a modest amendment. It is not as comprehensive as I 
originally intended to offer, but it is a reasonable compromise. We 
worked closely with the staff of the chairman and ranking member who is 
a cosponsor in drafting it, and appreciate their assistance.


                           amendment no. 2120

   (Purpose: To allow for Department of Defense Expenditure for the 
    transportation of Nonlethal Excess Defense Articles to Albania.)

       On page 112, after line 12 of the Committee reported bill, 
     insert:


                   Nonlethal Excess Defense Articles

       Sec.   . Notwithstanding section 519(f) of the Foreign 
     Assistance Act of 1961, during fiscal year 1995, funds 
     available to the Department of Defense may be expended for 
     crating, packing, handling and transportation of nonlethal 
     excess defense articles transferred under the authority of 
     section 519 to Albania.

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, as the poorest nation in Europe, Albania 
faces tremendous difficulties. Having been totally isolated behind the 
Iron Curtain, Albania spent nearly half a century in the grip of a 
paranoid tyranny. Last year the United Nations classified Albania as a 
least-developed nation, the first time ever a European nation was thus 
classified.
  I traveled to Albania last year, and met with the President and many 
of the officials of the Albanian armed services. I have also met with 
the Defense Minister here in Washington, as have many of my colleagues. 
I understand and admire the great distance Albania has come in a short 
time, but I also understand what an evern greater distance it still has 
to go.
  Albania is striving to establish a free market and democratic 
society. The path will be long, and the journey difficult. For example, 
there have been recent problems with civil liberties and press 
freedoms. It is proper that the United States help the Albanian people 
to help establish a firm and solid foundation for free institutions in 
Albania, especially since the Balkans is in such turmoil.
  Mr. President, one way to enhance stability is to assist the 
Albanians in establishing strong civilian control over its own 
military. The United States has been advising them on this, and they 
are open and receptive. The amendment I have offered will authorize the 
granting of a waiver for Albania, if desired, of the statutory 
requirement that any nation receiving nonlethal excess defense articles 
pay for the handling and transportation of those items.

  In the case of Albania, a little help will go along way. They have 
signed the Partnership for Peace agreement with NATO, and they are 
looking to the United States for assistance and guidance. This 
amendment will enable Albania to receive relatively small amounts of 
non-lethal Department of Defense items even though they do not now have 
the resources to pay for the handling and transportation of those 
stocks.
  Albania is a struggling nation in a crucial part of the world that is 
in crisis. They want to be our friend and ally, and this is one small 
way for us to assist them in this.
  I express my appreciation to Representative Eliot Engel for his work 
on this issue, and I thank the managers of the bill for accepting this 
amendment. It will help solidify the foundation for the emerging 
democracy in Albania, and that may be an important step to help 
stabilize the region.


                           AMENDMENT NO. 2121

  (Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate regarding a volunteer 
     United Tech Corps to provide technical assistance to the new 
             independent states of the former Soviet Union)

       On page 23, after line 25, insert the following new 
     subsection:
       (n) Of the program funded under this heading, it is the 
     sense of the Senate that a volunteer United States Tech Corps 
     should be funded for the purpose of providing technical 
     assistance to the new independent states of the former Soviet 
     Union, particularly in the refrigeration of perishable 
     commodities.


                           amendment no. 2122

       At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following:
       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, demining 
     equipment available to any department or agency and used in 
     support of the clearing of landmines for humanitarian 
     purposes may be disposed of on a grant basis in foreign 
     countries, subject to such terms and conditions as the 
     President may prescribe.


                           amendment no. 2123

       At the end of the section entitled Assistance to the New 
     Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, add the 
     following new section:
       Not less than $50,000,000 of the funds appropriated under 
     this heading shall be made available for programs and 
     activities which match U.S. private sector resources with 
     federal funds.


                           amendment no. 2124

       At the end of section entitled ``Assistance to the New 
     Independent States of the Former Soviet Union'' add the 
     following:
       Within sixty days of enactment of this Act, the 
     Administrator of the Agency for International Development 
     shall report to the Committees on Appropriations concerning 
     the feasibility of developing an outreach program which would 
     make grants to partnerships between American communities and 
     organizations with cultural and ethnic ties to the new 
     independent states and their counterparts in the new 
     independent states.


                           amendment no. 2125

   (Purpose: To prohibit the availability of military education and 
   training funds and foreign military financing funds for alcoholic 
         beverages and certain food and entertainment expenses)

       On page 112, between lines 9 and 10, insert the following 
     new section:


               prohibition on payment of certain expenses

       Sec.   . None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made 
     available by this Act under the heading ``international 
     military education and training'' or ``foreign military 
     financing program'' may be obligated or expended to pay for--
       (1) alcoholic beverages;
       (2) food (other than food provided at a military 
     installation); or
       (3) entertainment expenses for activities that are 
     substantially of a recreational character, including entrance 
     fees and food at sporting events and amusement parks.

  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I wish to discuss two programs that I 
believe deserve our close scrutiny. The International Military 
Education and Training Program, or IMET, and the Foreign Military 
Financing Program, or FMF, provide funds to foreign countries to enable 
foreign soldiers to come to the United States to attend military 
schools. These programs further these soldier's professional knowledge 
as well as expose them to American culture and traditions. In the last 
year we have had approximately 4,000 officers and enlisted men from a 
variety of countries from Botswana to Venezuela.
  These foreign military students attend many of the same courses that 
American soldiers and officers attend, such as the Command and General 
Staff course. In addition, many of the students also learn valuable 
skills tailored to their region. For example, students from Latin 
American countries learn about U.S. antidrug operations. However this 
program provides certain benefits to these foreign military students 
that our American students can only hope for.
  The Informational Program, which is part of IMET, provides funding to 
all the military departments to acquaint foreign military personnel 
with our Nation's society, institutions, ideals, and priorities. This 
is the official DOD definition. However, while these goals are 
admirable, I am forced to question many of the expenditures.
  I recently asked the Department of the Army to provide a list of all 
Informational Program expenditures at the U.S. Army School of the 
Americas. While this request focused only on the School of the 
Americas, I am also reviewing spending throughout the Department of 
Defense on Informational Program items. I received some appalling 
results.
  Mr. President, the U.S. Army routinely buys cases of Chivas Regal 
scotch and Miller Lite beer with program funds. The Army also routinely 
paid for hot dogs and other refreshments for the students at events 
such as the Six Flags over Georgia amusement park and Atlanta Braves 
baseball games. The Army also paid for countless trips to a local 
steakhouse. These are only a few examples. The list goes on.
  Let me read some other examples: over $2,600 worth of baseball hats, 
$1,140 worth of lapel pins, $700 worth of coffee mugs, $2,500 for a 
picnic, and over $1,000 at the Kick-N-Chicken liquor store. In fact, in 
fiscal year 1992, the School of the Americas spent $7,000 on such 
questionable expenses. One year later, they spent $23,000. Finally, in 
fiscal year 1994, the School spent $19,000. It should be noted that the 
School's Informational Program budget for fiscal year 1994 was $62,000. 
Mr. President, what is the Department of Defense guidance on these 
matters? Army Regulation 12-15 clearly states that:

       The entertainment and social aspects of activities should 
     not be a predominant element of the Informational Program . . 
     . Activities that could be interpreted as being lavish are to 
     be avoided.

  While I realize these are not staggering sums of money, when in the 
Senate we often talk about millions of dollars without batting an eye, 
I do not believe this is an appropriate use of taxpayer dollars. This 
type of spending is not consistent without our own military traditions 
and most importantly, we certainly do not give our own soldiers these 
kinds of perks.
  Mr. President, there appears to be a culture of spending in IMET that 
must be addressed and remedied. Again, although we are not talking 
about huge sums of money, we must send a message that our soldiers come 
first. Mr. President, the U.S. Government does not purchase hot dogs 
and other items for soldiers in the U.S. Army. How can we ask our own 
soldiers to do more with less, when we are treating foreign officers 
like kings? The amendment which I am offering will eliminate these 
types of expenditures. Very simply, the amendment states that no IMET 
or FMF funds will be spent on alcohol or recreational trips. In 
addition, the amendment also states that the primary focus of IMET must 
be cultural or educational in nature. These extravagant types of 
expenditures are not consistent with the intent of the Informational 
Program and are an insult to the uniformed members of the U.S. Armed 
Forces.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I am pleased to offer this amendment 
along with Senator Pryor.
  We have heard a lot about waste fraud and abuse in government 
spending. Well, Senator Pryor and I have found some. And we intend to 
eliminate it.
  Under the auspices of the Information Program budgets of the 
International Military Education and Training IMET and Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) programs, American taxpayers spend millions of dollars 
to give foreign soldiers military training and an education about 
American society. That may well be a good thing to do. But it turns out 
that we actually give them a lot more than training.
  We give these foreign soldiers free hot dogs, free popcorn, and 
probably free peanuts and crackerjacks when they attend baseball games 
and go to amusement parks. We pay the bill for dinners at fancy steak 
houses. We pick up the tab for entrance fees at parks and maybe even 
greens fees at golf courses. And we pay for extravagant parties where 
the liquor flows freely.
  Now, Mr. President, none of this is supposed to happen. Under 
guidelines developed by the Department of Defense, Information Programs 
like IMET and FMF are designed ``to introduce foreign military 
personnel to and acquaint them with this nation's society, 
institutions, ideals, and priorities.'' DoD regulations explicitly say 
that, when it comes to the Information Program ``Entertainment and 
social events should not be a major element of the program.''
  That is the theory.
  But here is the reality.
  Over the past 5 years, the United States has spent $24.3 million on 
visiting foreign soldiers through the various Information Programs 
within the Department of Defense. Too much of that money is spent on 
food, fun, and entertainment.
  Let me give some examples drawn from the expense accounts we examined 
at the School of the Americas--an institution which, like all IMET and 
FMF programs, has an Information Program.
  Over a 3-year period from 1991 through 1993, the School spent nearly 
eight times as much on food and entertainment for foreign students as 
it did to take them to see American historical and cultural sites.
  In 1991, the School spent less than $3,000 on entrance fees and 
admission to historical and cultural sites such as Historic Columbus, 
the Little White House, and CNN. In that same year, however, the School 
spent nearly five times that amount wining and dining foreign soldiers 
with U.S. taxpayers' money in local restaurants. Foreign soldiers were 
regularly treated to lunch and dinner 48 times, including multiple 
visits to such favorite restaurants as Ryan's Steak House.

  That same year, visiting foreign soldiers were taken to Atlanta 
Stadium to watch the Braves play. Although the foreign soldiers 
apparently bought their own tickets, we bought the food they ate 
there--all $280.50 worth. The next year, students were taken to 6 Flags 
over Georgia, and again, we bought the food they ate at the amusement 
park. On another trip to 6 Flags, our guests were still hungry when 
they left the amusement park--which may explain the nearly $700 worth 
of steak dinners at Western Sizzlin restaurant, presumably bought for 
foreign soldiers on their way home.
  It is not only food and entertainment that are given a higher 
priority than historical and educational activities. The American 
people are being asked to spend tens of thousands of dollars on gifts 
and trinkets for foreign soldiers. In fact, in 1991, the School spent 
almost three times as much on gifts and trinkets for foreign soldiers 
as it did taking them to museums and historical sites.
  What kind of gifts and trinkets? Well, there were $2,640 worth of 
baseball hats with a special insignia. There were $2,250 worth of 
pewter boxes with stars and stripes, $737 dollars worth of School of 
the Americas pins, $1,512 worth of School of the Americas ties, and 
$700 worth of School mugs.
  Let us look at 1992.
  That year, the School spent nearly 7 times as much on food, 
entertainment, and alcohol for visiting foreign soldiers as it did 
taking those soldiers to American historical sites. The school spent 
nearly $2,500 on just one picnic. Now that's a lot of potato salad!
  And, in just a few stops to the Kick-N-Chicken Liquor store, the 
school spent thousands of dollars on expensive alcohol. Maybe American 
soldiers drink alcohol--which they pay for themselves--but we spent 
thousands of dollars to buy our foreign guests Chivas Regal, Johnnie 
Walker, Jack Daniels, Tangueray, Bacardi, Stolichnaya Vodka, Courvasier 
Cognac, and Gallo wine.
  Nineteen hundred and ninety-three expenditures look very similar. 
There were trips to the Steak & Ale Restaurant, Shogun Japanese Steak 
House, Ryan's Steak House, the Bonanza Family Restaurant, Tortilla 
Flats, the Sundial Room, the Westin Peachtree, Shoney's the Sizzler, 
Sonny's BBQ, and LePetit Bistro. Tens of thousands of dollars were 
spent on food. Because the priority was food and fun, only a few 
historical outings were thrown in for good measure. In fact, that year, 
the School spent 18 times as much on food and fun as it did taking 
students to cultural and historical sites.
  And that, Mr. President, is just the obvious misuse of taxpayer 
dollars. There are some less obvious examples as well. For example, 
when we reviewed the expenses at the School, we found several trips to, 
and entrance fees paid for, Callaway Gardens. That, I thought, might be 
some historic site that I hadn't heard about; some cultural center that 
I had never visited; some Civil War battlefield I did not know about. 
So I got a copy of a brochure about Callaway Gardens. And guess what? 
Callaway Gardens isn't a museum or a battle ground at all. It's a 
resort.

  Callaway Gardens, according to its own literature, offers visitors 
``63 Holes of Golf--magnificently designed''. The resort's advertising 
boasts that its ``18 hole and executive 9-hole golf courses are rated 
among the nation's best,'' and that its ``Mountain View course is the 
site for the PGA Tour's Buick Southern Open held each fall.'' But wait! 
That is not all. Callaway Gardens Resort has a 7\1/2\ mile bike trail. 
It has a beach where there is ``swimming, sunbathing, paddleboating, 
miniature golf''--and a circus.
  It has a tennis center with ``clay and hard surface tennis courts, 
racquetball courts, and a complete pro shop.'' Also, ``sailboats, 
canoes, and motorized suncats are available for boating enthusiasts.''
  I would like to take a vacation there. But the American taxpayers 
ought not be asked to pay for it. But they are paying for foreign 
soldiers to go to Callaway Gardens. Now, Mr. President, I am sure it is 
a nice resort--but going there is probably not going to improve 
anyone's understanding of American society.
  I tell you, Mr. President, I have been through these expense accounts 
fairly carefully. I uncovered the real nature of Callaway Gardens but 
there were some items I could not figure out. There was the $719 for 
``double elephant ears'' which I still am puzzled by. And a ``custom 
vinyl link mat'' for $654.72 which confuses me. I have asked the 
Department of Defense to clarify these expenditures for me.
  There are plenty of examples of unnecessary spending in these 
Information Program accounts. But beneath the temptation to make fun of 
these examples, there are at least three serious points that need to be 
made.
  First, picking up these bills is inconsistent with the mission of 
schools that train foreign soldiers. Those programs are designed to 
instill in foreign soldiers an appreciation of the appropriate role of 
military leaders in a democratic society. Giving them special treatment 
is not consistent with at least my vision of how the military should 
operate in a democracy.
  When foreign soldiers receive free alcohol, they are being taught 
that they are different than other people. When the U.S. Government 
gives them free lunches and steak dinners, it teaches them that they 
deserve privileges merely because they are in the military. And when 
foreign soldiers receive free tickets, it teaches them to expect free 
access to activities that other people must pay for.
  We should be training the foreign soldiers who attend such programs 
something about the nature of leadership and the role of the military 
in a democratic society. Picking up the bill for food and entertainment 
is not the way to do that. Which may explain why the School of the 
Americas boasts such graduates as Manuel Noriega.

  Second, we do not need to pay for these special favors. Foreign 
soldiers are paid by their own governments. They receive a basic 
allowance. They are not poor. They came here to learn something. In 
that process, we should expose them to American culture. But steak 
dinners and resort outings are not the essence of American culture. 
Maybe we should make sure they are exposed to those experiences; but 
they can and should pay for them rather than asking the American 
taxpayer to pick up the bill.
  Third, it is unjust to pay for entertainment for foreign soldiers 
when we do not pay our own soldiers enough to meet their basic needs. A 
lot of American soldiers might want to go to Ryan's Steak House or 
Callaway Gardens a a ballgame or an amusement park. But if they go, 
they pay their own way. And that often is not very easy.
  An article in the New York Times from June 12, discusses the growing 
financial worries of American soldiers, and it quotes the wife of a 
soldier whose family recently began drawing $228 each month in food 
stamps to get by. In an attempt to explain just how tight the family 
budget is, the soldier's wife said, ``We haven't bought any steaks 
since we've been here, and whenever I want to cook something with ham, 
I substitute Spam for it.''
  While American soldiers struggle to make ends meet, they see foreign 
soldiers getting free meals at fancy restaurants paid by U.S. 
taxpayers. They hear stories about foreign soldiers getting free 
alcohol paid by U.S. taxpayers. And they know that foreign soldiers get 
special treatment at ball games and amusement parks at taxpayer 
expense.
  For all those reasons, Mr. President, we need to correct this 
problem. And our amendment does that.
  Mr. President, our amendment will take excessive and wasteful 
spending out of the Information Program for foreign soldiers throughout 
the IMET and FMF programs. It will prohibit tax dollars from being 
spent on food, other than that provided at a military installation. It 
will prohibit entertainment expenses for activities that are largely 
recreational, including entrance fees and food at sporting events and 
amusement parks. It will prohibit tax dollars from being spent on 
alcohol. Importantly, it makes the point that wining and dining foreign 
soldiers and officers does not serve the public interest and should be 
cut out of the budget.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.


                           Amendment no. 2126

       The Senate finds that:
       A) The Burmese people overwhelmingly voted in 1990 to begin 
     a process of political and economic reform based on a 
     fundamental respect to human rights and freedom of political 
     expression by resoundingly rejecting the military-led 
     government of the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
     (SLORC), and electing a coalition government headed by the 
     National League for Democracy;
       B) SLORC refused to recognize the will of the Burmese 
     people and in the wake of the election launched a bloody 
     crackdown against the prodemocracy movement killing some 
     activists through torture; others were imprisoned or forced 
     to flee Burma;
       C) Since that time, all political dissent has been banned 
     with violators arrested, jailed often beaten and sometimes 
     executed for attempting to express political beliefs. The 
     United States and United Nations have repeatedly identified 
     SLORC as one of the worst offenders of human rights in the 
     world;
       D) SLORC and military officials have a long history of 
     complicity in drug trafficking and production;
       E) The forced conscription of rural villagers including the 
     elderly, pregnant women, and children as slave labor to carry 
     arms and ammunition for the military, and build roads and 
     bridges for government projects continues. Slave porters are 
     routinely malnourished, beaten, often raped and sometimes 
     executed if they fail to perform work ordered by military 
     officials;
       F) The massive infusion of new arms into Burma poses a 
     direct threat to regional stability; and
       G) The actions of the government of Thailand in harassing 
     an forcibly repatriating Burmese refugees is of deep concern 
     to the United States.
       The Senate of the United States of America calls for:
       A) SLORC to immediately and unconditionally release the 
     leader of the National League for Democracy, Aung San Suu 
     Kyi, from house arrest and install the legitimate government 
     of Burma;
       B) Immediate access to political detainees or convicted 
     prisoners of any kind by representatives of the International 
     Committee of the Red Cross.
       C) The regime in Rangoon to take real and meaningful action 
     against drug smugglers and corrupt government officials to 
     combat the flood of opium and heroin coming from Burma;
       D) International corporations investing or seeking business 
     opportunities in Burma to recognize SLORC's policy of 
     political repression, abuse of human rights, use of slave 
     labor, and complicity in drug trafficking and refrain from 
     investing in Burma;
       E) The international community to ban selling weapons to 
     SLORC;
       F) The international community to recognize the plight of 
     Burmese refugees and take whatever steps may be necessary to 
     guarantee their safety and human rights.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, in 1990, the military-run junta in 
Burma, known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC] 
held parliamentary elections with the notion that they could manipulate 
the electoral process, win the elections, and legitimize their brutal 
rule with the international community. Well, the people had different 
ideas.
  When the votes were counted after the election, the people handed the 
military dictators a crushing blow. The Burmese overwhelmingly rejected 
SLORC, and clearly signaled their intention to build a new Burma based 
on respect for human rights and political freedoms. The opposition, 
prode- mocracy movement led by Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League 
for Democracy [NLD] party swept the vast majority of parliamentary 
seats, but before the new government could be seated, the military 
dictators led by General Ne Win struck. They arrested the new 
parliamentarians, cracked down on the opposition parties, and denied 
the Burmese people their right to self-determination.
  Today, the situation in Burma continues to deteriorate. The human 
rights record of SLORC has the odious distinction of being one of the 
worst in the world. All political dissent is banned, in fact, anyone 
caught reading The New Era, an underground, prodemocracy newspaper, is 
automatically sentenced to 3 years in jail where beatings and torture 
are common occurrences.
  SLORC is rapidly expanding its military and has purchased more than a 
billion dollars' worth of new weapons and hardware from China. This 
buildup is a direct threat to regional stability. In addition, the arms 
are being used to coerce ethnic groups living in the mountainous border 
areas into signing cease-fire or peace accords with SLORC. The military 
has an especially brutal record of human-rights abuses with rural 
villagers subject to executions, rape, and forced slave labor. For 
example, it is standard operating procedure for SLORC forces to use 
villagers--including women and children--as human minesweepers marching 
them at gunpoint down unsecured roads. Villages are also forced to 
``donate'' people who work as slaves carrying arms and ammunition as 
well as in road construction. Anyone who resists is beaten or shot.
  Mr. President, SLORC is not the legitimate government of Burma. In 
fact, they are nothing more than drug-dealing thugs. My amendment is 
designed to convey a strong message to SLORC: there is nothing they can 
do to legitimize themselves to the United States, and hopefully to the 
rest of the international community. SLORC has been hard at work trying 
to write a new constitution and they have scheduled a September session 
to try and finish this document. Despite their best efforts, we will 
not be duped by this carefully choreographed sham portrayal of peace 
and national reconciliation.
  This amendment calls for the restoration of the democratically 
elected government of Burma, the immediate, unconditional release of 
Aung San Suu Kyi, a heroine of democracy, and for this government and 
the international community to provide assistance to the Burmese 
refugees living on the border areas.
  I hope my colleagues will join me in approving this amendment 
denouncing SLORC, and at the same time reminding the Burmese people who 
hold out the hope that they can once again play a part in bringing 
democracy to Burma that they have not been forgotten by the United 
States.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  The question is on agreeing to the amendments, en bloc.
  The amendments (Nos. 2119 through 2126), en bloc, were agreed to.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. MITCHELL. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                  agency for international development

  Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to 
draw attention to two important Wisconsin-based programs which play a 
vital role in promoting democracy and understanding. Both of these 
programs are funded through the Agency for International Development 
[AID].
  The Milwaukee International Health Training Center [MIHTC] is a 
consortium of schools, community-based clinics, private industries, 
universities, and social service agencies whose mission is to help 
developing countries improve the skills of their health care personnel, 
the use of their resources, and their service delivery systems.
  This year, the House included report language urging AID to make 
every effort to provide $150,000 in fiscal year 1995 for an 
institutional development grant. While the Senate Committee on 
Appropriations did not include a recommendation for a specific funding 
level, it did include language stating that health training ``can be 
effectively delivered by an alliance of schools and universities, 
community-based clinics, private industry, and social service 
agencies.'' The committee ``encourages AID to support initiatives which 
incorporate this integrated approach to providing health care systems 
training.'' I want to clarify that the Senate committee's decision not 
to include the House language is in no way indicative of its level of 
support for the program. AID should know that the Milwaukee training 
program is supported by both congressional committees.
  I would also like to make clear that there is strong support within 
Congress for the Milwaukee County Training Center for Local Democracy. 
This center, which is administered by Milwaukee County, trains Polish 
public administrators in economic development, urban planning, and 
communal services. During the 6-week program, participants live with 
Milwaukee area families, and work under the mentorship of Milwaukee 
metro area public administrators. The participants also work with 
faculty members of the University of Wisconsin--Milwaukee developing 
case studies, which may be used to train colleagues in Poland.
  The House included report language recognizing the ``impressive 
accomplishments'' of the Milwaukee County project and recommending that 
``a best effort be made to fund the Milwaukee County Training Center 
for Local Democracy in the amount of $300,000 for fiscal year 1995.'' 
While the Senate Committee on Appropriations did not recommend a 
specific funding level for the project, the committee ``is aware of 
existing exchange programs which have successfully provided training in 
local governance and public administration under the mentorship of 
public administrators in U.S. cities'' and ``encourages AID to continue 
supporting exchanges which bring central and Eastern European public 
officials to the United States for training.'' Once again, AID should 
understand that the Senate committee's decision not to include the 
House's language in no way indicates a lack of support for the project.
  Mr. President, I strongly support both of these programs and hope AID 
will carefully consider the House and Senate report language in 
evaluating funding requests for these two training programs.


                   support for antiabortion amendment

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, the Clinton administration has announced 
that it wishes to withhold foreign aid to countries that do not provide 
State-funded abortions. I always have opposed the use of Federal funds 
for any type of abortion-related activity, either domestically or 
through assistance to other countries. By granting or withholding 
assistance based upon this Clinton criterion, we would be imposing the 
Clinton administration's will on many cultures in which abortion is 
considered reprehensible.
  I support the Helms amendment, which would not allow Federal funds to 
support indirectly proabortion policies in various countries. For 
instance, the majority of nations in Latin America and Africa view 
proabortion policies with great disfavor, as such policies are 
inconsistent with their mainstream cultural and religious values.
  Many countries have strong sentiments against abortion. The final 
Preparatory Committee meeting prior to the Third U.N. International 
Conference on Population and Development to be held in Cairo, ended in 
dissension over reproductive rights. Roman Catholic and other 
antiabortion proponents from various countries signaled their strong 
disagreement with proabortion proposals.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in support of the Helms amendment.


                   aid to turkey--amendment no. 2113

  Mr. Leahy. Mr. President, the amendment I offered with the support of 
the Senator from Mississippi regarding Turkey requires that in any 
agreement to sell or provide military equipment to Turkey by the United 
States, there must be an express statement that the equipment will not 
be used in violation of international law. This requirement is intended 
to ensure that U.S. military equipment is not used against 
noncombatants, or otherwise in violation of the Geneva Conventions or 
any other international law. It is intended to ensure that, at the very 
least, any military equipment that we provide to Turkey is not used in 
violation of human rights.
  Year after year in hearings and in the committee report, we have 
raised concerns about human rights violations in Turkey. We have asked 
for a strategy from the administration on how they are going to pursue 
these human rights problems. We never received one.
  During the past few years when the administration said it was urging 
the Turkish Government to deal with the human rights problems, the 
situation got worse, not better.
  Let me describe what is going on today in Turkey, according to the 
State Department and human rights monitors.
  Torture is used routinely on people in custody. I will spare you the 
gory details of the practices that are used.
  There are repeated reports that the Turkish armed forces have fired 
on the homes of Kurdish villagers in southeastern Turkey. Whole 
villages have been burned and forcibly evacuated.
  More than 800 villages are said to have been evacuated under 
government pressure since 1990--70 since March of this year. Scorched-
earth tactics are reportedly being used, resulting in some areas in a 
landscape of burnt villages.
  The security forces continue to be charged with using deadly force 
against unarmed Kurdish civilians.
  Nobody questions the Turkish Government's right to fight the PKK 
guerrillas, who themselves are guilty of atrocities. But that is no 
excuse for tactics that target civilian populations.
  We cannot permit our helicopters and our military aid to be used in 
the strafing and bombing and burning of Kurdish villages.
  This provision does not deny one dime of aid to Turkey. It simply 
says that before we sell or give them military aid, the Turkish 
Government must agree that it will only be used in accordance with 
international law.
  If the Turkish Government wants to use our aid to fight their war 
against the Kurds inside Turkey, they are going to have to show that 
they can tell the difference between noncombatant women and children 
who happen to be Kurdish, and terrorists.
   Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I have consulted with the distinguished 
manager, Senator Leahy, and I have also engaged in negotiations with 
our colleagues on the best way to proceed with respect to this bill and 
the remaining measures which must be completed prior to the Senate's 
departure this weekend for the Independence Day recess.
  It is apparent that we will not be permitted to complete action on 
this bill prior to that time. I regret that, but that is a reality, and 
it is within the power of Senators to prevent legislation from passing 
by a stated time.
  Therefore, I have decided, following the consultations and 
discussions which I mentioned earlier, to enter into an agreement on 
which we have reached an understanding, although it has not yet been 
placed into a formal agreement, that will be done tomorrow, but the 
understanding will be entered as an agreement tomorrow that we will get 
a finite list of the remaining amendments to this bill, and we will put 
the bill over until after the recess, with the further understanding 
that there will be a specific date and time certain by which those 
amendments will have to be offered.
  Therefore, we will be able to complete action on the measure within 
what I hope will be a reasonable period of time when we return from the 
recess.
  The two remaining measures on which we must complete action this week 
are the energy and water appropriations bill and the Department of 
Defense authorization bill. We had, of course, spent some considerable 
time on the Department of Defense authorization bill last week.
  There now exists a finite list of amendments to that bill. Although 
it is very long, the managers have been working diligently to pare down 
the list and obtain agreements on those amendments which will require 
votes.
  So, Mr. President, we will proceed to the energy and water 
appropriations bill at 9 a.m. tomorrow with the expectation that we 
will be able to complete action on that bill within a relatively short 
period of time and then be able to get to the Department of Defense 
authorization bill by early tomorrow afternoon.
  We will then remain in session for as long as it takes to complete 
action on the Department of Defense authorization bill. When we 
complete action on that, the Senate will then conclude for this 
legislative period and will begin the Independence Day recess.
  I will also either on tomorrow or on Friday set forth for the Senate 
in as much detail as is possible the schedule for the first week of the 
Senate session following the Independence Day recess.
  So for now we have made some progress on this bill, but it is obvious 
that we are not going to be able to complete it, and, therefore, we 
will enter the agreement which will permit its completion shortly after 
returning from recess by a time is certain and within a reasonable 
period of time, and we will take up and complete action on the energy 
and water appropriations bill tomorrow, then begin the DOD 
authorization bill, and then once we get on that we will simply stay in 
session until such time as the DOD bill is completed.
  I hope that can be done by the close of business on Friday, but I 
want to make clear that we will stay in session for however long it 
takes to complete action on the DOD authorization bill.
  Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their patience, and I thank 
the Senator from Vermont for his diligence and perseverance on this 
matter.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I will just note 
I know the frustration he must feel in trying to move matters forward. 
On this bill I think we have had only a couple votes that really 
pertained directly to the appropriations items in the bill. They were 
disposed of in about an hour or less of debate. We spent 13 hours on 
this discussing items that have either been discussed at great length 
in the Senate before and voted on or really bear no relationship to an 
appropriations bill. I note, therefore, those who are concerned about 
what happens in the foreign operations bill, those who have countries 
that they are particularly concerned about and will be made new items, 
I point out that, one, we have not even been allowed to do as we 
normally do and that is adopt the committee amendments en bloc, and 95 
percent of the time the debate so far has been on issues that have been 
covered before. They are non-appropriations issues, and we have yet to 
be able to consider those items that traditionally been part of the 
foreign operations bill. We have yet to adopt the provisions related to 
the Camp David countries, yet to debate provisions related to NIS even 
though these are all provisions voted unanimously by both the 
subcommittee and full Committee of Appropriations. So I share the 
frustration of the Senator from Maine, and I must say that he has the 
patience of the mountains of Maine to be able to put up with this. I 
thank him for his help.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, we all know that the Senate's rulings 
permit delay for those who wish to engage in delay. Unfortunately, it 
is a common practice here. Ultimately, we will get this bill done and 
the others done. We will just proceed.
  I want to repeat so there is no misunderstanding we will go to the 
energy and water appropriations bill at 9 a.m. tomorrow. Our efforts 
will be to complete action on that bill in a relatively short period of 
time and then immediately thereafter return to the DOD authorization 
bill and then remain in session until such time as that bill is 
completed.
  If we can finish action on it tomorrow night, then we will break for 
recess tomorrow night. If we cannot and take until Friday, then we 
proceed on Friday and finish it. If we do not finish on Friday, we come 
back on Saturday. We will simply stay as long as it takes to act on the 
DOD authorization bill.
  Mr. President, I thank my colleagues.
  I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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