[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 85 (Wednesday, June 29, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 29, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                       ENACT TRUE LINE-ITEM VETO

                                 ______


                        HON. GERALD B.H. SOLOMON

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, June 29, 1994

  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, yesterday the Rules Committee reported a 
modified closed rule for the consideration of H.R. 4600, the Expedited 
Rescissions Act of 1994. The rule makes in order an expedited 
rescissions substitute by Representative Stenholm, and my substitute to 
it that would put in place a true line-item veto for the President over 
rescissions and special tax breaks.
  The bill is now scheduled to come to the floor after the July 4 
recess. I urge my colleagues to vote for the true line-item veto 
substitute at that time. At this point in the Record, Mr. Speaker, I 
include my testimony before the Rules Committee yesterday and a summary 
of my substitute. I am placing the text of my substitute in the 
amendments portion of today's Record.

                               Testimony

       Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I appreciate 
     this opportunity to testify before you today to request that 
     you make in order my amendment in the nature of a substitute 
     to H.R. 4600 and waive appropriate points of order against it 
     as you did last year.
       I don't want to belabor the points I made last week at our 
     markup as to why I don't think we should even be taking-up a 
     bill identical to one we passed last year. But, as long as we 
     are, then we should provide for a reasonable and fair 
     amendment process. My amendment is nearly identical to the 
     one this committee made in order to H.R. 1578 last year with 
     two exceptions.
       First, my substitute last year provided for only a two-year 
     experiment with this enhanced rescission, line-item veto 
     authority. This substitute would make that permanent.
       Second, my substitute last year did not include targeted 
     tax provisions, though this Committee did allow our 
     Republican Leader to offer that provision to my substitute, 
     but denied his request to offer it to the base bill as well. 
     The substitute before you today includes the Michel tax veto 
     provisions.
       For your information, the Michel amendment to my substitute 
     last year was adopted on a vote of 257 to 157, but my 
     substitute as amended by Michel was then rejected, 198 to 
     219.
       But I think you can see from those votes that there is very 
     strong support for giving the President a real line-item veto 
     as opposed to just a souped-up version of the current 
     rescission process.
       What is the main difference between the expedited 
     rescission process of H.R. 4600 and the Michel-Solomon 
     enhanced rescission approach? Make no mistake about it, it is 
     a very fundamental and profound difference. The Spratt bills 
     says that both Houses must approve a president's rescission 
     to stop the spending.
       The Michel-Solomon approach says that the spending and tax 
     breaks unless both Houses, by majority vote, disapprove the 
     President's recommendations by legislative enactment. Since 
     the President is likely to veto any disapproval bill under 
     our approach, it would then take two-thirds of both Houses 
     under the Constitution to override that veto to force the 
     money to be spent or the special interest tax break to take 
     effect.
       Put another way, the Spratt bill allows for a majority of 
     either House to block the President's spending cuts; Michel-
     Solomon ultimately requires two-thirds of both Houses to 
     block the President's spending cuts and tax break vetoes.
       That is why we call this a true, legislative line-item 
     veto. It is similar to what the governors of some 43 States 
     now have--the ability to cut wasteful spending subject to 
     override only by a super-majority of the legislature.
       Without that super-majority requirement under the 
     Constitution, the legislature would likely engage in the same 
     old log-rolling it does when it first enacts an 
     appropriations measure--``you support my project and I'll 
     support yours.''
       We can't go on with that business-as-usual approach with 
     the tide of red ink that is engulfing us and our children and 
     grandchildren. We need a tough, real line-item veto with 
     teeth for the President's spending-cut proposals to stick.
       That's what Candidate Clinton said he would ask Congress 
     for back in 1992. I only regret that since he became 
     President Mr. Clinton has reneged on his campaign promise and 
     now supports instead this watered down rescission proposal 
     that won't change much from what it is today.
       Mr. Chairman, let me close by addressing two concerns 
     raised in a letter to you on June 23rd from the Chairman of 
     the Ways and Means Committee, Mr. Gibbons.
       First, he objects to our substitute on grounds that it 
     infringes on his committee's jurisdiction. He's dead wrong on 
     that! Mr. Michel's bill, H.R. 493, which is identical to our 
     substitute, and which gives the President veto authority over 
     special interest tax breaks, was only referred to the 
     Committees on Rules and Government Operations.
       It was not referred to Ways and Means because this does not 
     affect the tax code. It affects Title X of the Budget Act 
     instead because it provides an alternative to the current 
     impoundment process.
       Secondly, Mr. Gibbons suggests that the substitute is 
     unconstitutional because under the Constitution only the 
     House can originate revenue measures. He's correct about the 
     Constitution but wrong about our substitute.
       This does not give the President authority to originate a 
     revenue measure; it only gives him the right to selectively 
     veto certain special interest tax breaks in bills originated 
     by the House and passed by Congress.
       This is really no different from existing trade provisions 
     authored by Mr. Gibbons' Committee which delegate to the 
     President authority to alter the tariff treatment of certain 
     countries, subject to disapproval by legislative enactment.
       For instance, after the July recess the House will take up 
     my joint resolution to disapprove most favored nation status 
     for China. That is considered under our rules and precedents 
     as well as established law as affecting revenues. And yet, we 
     have delegated to the President our authority in that area, 
     subject to congressional disapproval by legislative 
     enactment.
       I do not hear Mr. Gibbons suggesting that the Trade Act is 
     unconstitutional. And yet, this is nearly identical to that 
     disapproval process of certain presidential actions affecting 
     revenues.
       It is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in 1982 
     in INS v. Chadha which said you can't have one- or two-House 
     vetoes of Executive actions where we have delegated our 
     powers. You can only withdraw that delegation by a new law 
     that is presented to the President.
       So, for instance, if my MFN resolution passes both the 
     House and Senate, and is then vetoed by the President, two-
     thirds of both Houses are required to override that veto, 
     according to the Constitution, in order to block special 
     tariff status for China.
       That is the same situation posed by the Michel-Solomon 
     resolution for rescissions and targeted tax vetoes in this 
     substitute.
       In summary, Mr. Chairman, I urge this Committee to make our 
     substitute in order once again.
       I think there is growing support in the Congress and the 
     country for enacting this kind of real line-item veto that 
     will enable the President and Congress to get a better handle 
     on wasteful spending. This is the way to do it.

                                Summary

       The President may submit to Congress a special message for 
     each appropriation bill or revenue bill within 20 days of 
     their enactment, proposing to rescind all or part of any 
     budget authority or veto any targeted tax benefit (defined as 
     a benefit for the differential treatment to a particular 
     taxpayer or limited class of taxpayers).
       The budget authority shall be rescinded or the tax benefit 
     vetoed unless a bill of disapproval is passed by Congress 
     within 20 days of session and enacted into law. The President 
     would have the constitutional 10 days to sign or veto a 
     disapproval bill and Congress would have 5 days of session to 
     override a veto.
       If the last session of Congress adjourns sine die before 
     the expiration of the 20 day period, the rescission or tax 
     veto will not take effect but will be considered to be 
     automatically retransmitted on the first day of the next 
     Congress.
       Each rescission or tax veto message shall be referred to 
     the appropriate committees of the House and Senate.
       Any disapproval bill introduced shall be referred to the 
     appropriate committees of the House and Senate.
       Disapproval bills in the Senate would be limited to not 
     more than 10 hours of debate equally divided between the 
     majority and minority leaders.
       It would not be in order in either House to consider a 
     disapproval bill that relates to any matter other than the 
     President's message; nor shall it be in order in either House 
     to consider an amendment to a disapproval bill; and these 
     requirements may not be waived or suspended in the Senate 
     except by a vote of three-fifths of the duly sworn Members of 
     that body.

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