[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 82 (Friday, June 24, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 24, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                              QUORUM CALL

  Mr. MITCHELL. Madam President, accordingly, I now suggest the absence 
of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll, and the following 
Senators entered the Chamber and answered to their names.
     Coats
     Cohen
     Domenici
     Exon
     Johnston
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Leahy
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Nunn
     Sasser
     Specter
     Thurmond
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is not present. The clerk will call 
the names of the absent Senators.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Madam President, I move that the Sergeant at Arms be 
instructed to request the presence of absent Senators, and I ask for 
the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.


                       vote on motion to instruct

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question occurs on agreeing to the motion 
to instruct the Sergeant at Arms to request the presence of absent 
Senators.
  The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman], 
the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. Boren], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. 
DeConcini], the Senator from California [Mrs. Feinstein], the Senator 
from Pennsylvania [Mr. Wofford], and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Glenn] 
are necessarily absent.
  Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from Idaho [Mr. Craig], the 
Senator from Texas [Mr. Gramm], the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. 
Nickles], and the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. Wallop] are necessarily 
absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 76, nays 14, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 167 Leg.]

                                YEAS--76

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Danforth
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Feingold
     Ford
     Gorton
     Graham
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mathews
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Simpson
     Specter
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--14

     Bennett
     Bond
     Breaux
     Coverdell
     D'Amato
     Faircloth
     Helms
     Kempthorne
     Lott
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Smith
     Stevens

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Bingaman
     Boren
     Craig
     DeConcini
     Feinstein
     Glenn
     Gramm
     Nickles
     Wallop
     Wofford
  So the motion was agreed to.
  Mr. METZENBAUM addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized.
  Mr. METZENBAUM. Madam President, my colleagues in the Senate, I rise 
to indicate my concern about what is happening on the floor of the 
Senate at the moment. All of us are elected to this body. We come here 
to vote, to stand up and be counted on whatever the issue may be. Some 
Members of this body are not here today, and apparently they have asked 
other Members of this body to protect their positions, to see to it 
that no votes can occur. That is shameful. To me, it is a shameful way 
to conduct this body.
  I think we ought to move forward. It is my understanding that the 
manager of the bill and ranking member of the committee are ready to 
move forward. Others are saying, no, we cannot vote because somebody is 
absent. So they are absent and they will miss the vote. But to prohibit 
or preclude this body from going forward and voting today is, in my 
opinion, demeaning to the U.S. Senate and those who are involved in the 
process. It is no credit to them.
  I say to my colleagues, let us go on and do the business that we are 
elected to do. Is there some rule that says we cannot vote on Monday or 
we cannot vote on Friday? There is no reason for Members of this body 
to leave early. The leader of the Senate told all of us earlier that we 
would be in session, and there would be votes up until 3 o'clock today. 
I know that the manager of the bill and the ranking member of the 
committee are ready to move forward. The B-2 is an issue that is ready 
to be voted on. The Bosnia issue is ready to be voted on. I do not 
doubt that other issues are ready to be voted on. But some are saying, 
``no votes today.''
  I urge, as strongly as I can, those standing in the way of progress, 
those standing in the way of permitting this body to meet its 
responsibilities: I think it is time for you to change your position; I 
think it is time for you to vote any way you want on the issues. That 
is your concern. But to keep us from voting today on issues that are 
important to the United States and to the people of this country, in my 
opinion, is a shameful way to conduct this body.
  I urge you to change your position.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina Mr. Thurmond 
is recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. Madam President, I have waited here all morning to get 
the floor to speak, and it seems impossible to do it. So I am going to 
wait and speak next week.
  Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, we have heard many reasons on both sides 
relative to the amendments before us. I start with the basic right that 
people have a right of self-defense. I am going to end there as well. 
It is the beginning, and it is the ending. It is the fundamental 
guarantee of the U.N. Charter that every nation has a right to self-
defense.
  There is not a footnote there that says: Unless some other country 
thinks that might lead to some other complication in Korea.
  There is no qualification in the U.N. Charter that says: Unless some 
other nation thinks that this might have a negative affect on NATO.
  It says that every nation has a basic right to self-defense. It is 
fundamental; it is unqualified.
  It does not say: Except Bosnia.
  It says that every nation has a basic fundamental right to self-
defense. Then we are told, yes, but there is a bigger picture--and I 
agree that we should look at the bigger picture. We start with the 
basic premise, a fundamental right to defend yourself when you are 
being slaughtered and raped and when genocide is going on. That is 
fundamental. That is what the U.N. is supposed to be all about.
  Then, yes, we should look at the bigger picture, the affect on NATO. 
Will it be worse off or better off if America finally takes some 
leadership to end the shameful genocide in NATO's backyard by 
permitting Bosnia to defend itself? I think NATO is going to be a lot 
better off if we finally at least allow a nation in Europe to defend 
itself. We are not willing to go to its defense, and I understand that. 
I am not advocating that American soldiers go to Bosnia to fight. But 
it is because we are not willing to do that, surely, that we ought to 
allow them to defend themselves.
  So I think NATO actually will become stronger. I know some NATO 
nations tell us, ``No, do not do it.'' But I believe American 
leadership to at least lift this embargo so people can exercise a 
fundamental human right to defend themselves against slaughter, 
genocide, and rape will make NATO stronger if we permit that nation, 
recognized by the United Nations, to exercise that fundamental right. I 
think NATO is weak right now when it does not permit that nation in 
Europe to exercise that fundamental right. I think the waffling and 
wobbling of NATO on this issue has weakened NATO. The way to strengthen 
NATO is to allow Bosnia to defend itself.
  We can argue back and forth what is going to make NATO stronger, and 
we can argue back and forth and ask: Will the Bosnians be better off if 
they are allowed to defend themselves? I have heard that argument, and 
that one really mystifies me, because the argument here goes that if we 
allow Bosnia to defend itself, if this embargo is lifted, then the U.N. 
troops are going to pull out; they are not going to be able to stay if 
this embargo is lifted. And then the argument goes: The Bosnians will 
be worse off because the protection force of the United Nations will 
probably leave.
  Well, the Bosnians have spoken out on this. They said: Look, we 
appreciate the humanitarian assistance, we really do. But if allowing 
us to defend ourselves means that the U.N. leaves, so be it. Let us 
defend ourselves. We are being killed day by day. We appreciate the 
U.N., we welcome the U.N., and we hope the U.N. will stay. But if 
nations decide to pull out those ground forces, we will accept that as 
the price of exercising a fundamental right to defend ourselves, our 
families, our cities.
  So the argument that the Bosnians will be worse off somehow if we 
lift the embargo, and we are doing them a favor, is an exercise in 
rationalization.
  The Bosnians have taken a clear position in writing year after year. 
Last year an official document from Bosnia says that, ``If the U.N. has 
to remove those troops in order to lift the embargo, it is our 
intention today to request the withdrawal of relief personnel to remove 
that final obstacle to the lifting of the arms embargo.''
  They have actually said: Leave, please, if that is the price. If that 
is what it is going to take to let us defend our country, leave with 
our best wishes, but do not use that excuse as the reason not to allow 
us to defend ourselves.
  Then we have the question of international law. Here the argument 
goes there was a U.N. resolution imposing this embargo and it was only 
supposed to be lifted with the vote of the Security Council. The 
trouble with that argument is that respected international lawyers, 
including Max Kampelman, who testified yesterday before us, says that 
that resolution has no effect whatsoever to Bosnia because Bosnia was 
not in existence at the time that resolution was passed. That 
resolution related to Yugoslavia before the breakup of Yugoslavia. 
Respected international lawyers say that the resolution which is cited 
by the opponents of the lifting of the embargo say that that resolution 
that is cited has no effect in this situation whatsoever.
  So, yes, look at the broader picture. We all have to do that. We have 
to look at that U.N. resolution and decide does it apply here or does 
it not. And there are legal arguments on both sides.
  We can go through argument by argument in the broader picture, and 
you can argue the broader picture pieces back and forth, and there are 
a lot of pros and cons. I happen to agree with that one going in. If 
you look at the broader picture, particularly, it was a very 
complicated picture, and that is why you are going to come back, I 
believe, ultimately to the fundamental principle that people should 
have a right of self-defense.
  That is the mother lode here. That is the fundamental issue with all 
of those other debates and rationalizations and justifications and 
arguments, as though we could know whether or not allowing Bosnia the 
right of self-defense will either help produce a peace settlement or 
hinder it. I do not know that for sure. My only feeling is the only way 
to get a fair and lasting peace there is if you have two parties that 
are relatively equal in strength. If you have one party that has all 
the strength that is slaughtering the other party, you will not get a 
just peace settlement. That is my own view.
  Am I sure I am right? No. I think I am. I think the best way to a 
fair and lasting peace is to lift this embargo and not to maintain it. 
As long as you maintain it, as long as the Serbs know there is no 
credible threat against the maintenance of their aggression and the 
fruits of their aggression being kept by them, as long as they know 
that I do not believe we are going to get an equitable settlement.
  So I think that not lifting the embargo is the recipe for continued 
battle and bloodshed in Bosnia.
  But that can be argued both ways. What cannot be argued both ways, it 
seems to me, is that fundamental issue of whether or not a nation, a 
people should be able to defend themselves.
  I am going to end my comments in a moment. I was hoping one of the 
sponsors of the amendment might be on the floor to answer a question, 
and I do not see either Senator Nunn or Senator Warner on the floor. I 
wanted to just ask a question, but since they are not here, I will make 
a statement relative to the issue that I see, and perhaps when they get 
back to the floor they can comment on it.
  Their amendment, it seems to me, is unclear on even the basic point 
of whether or not the sponsors of the Nunn-Warner amendment support the 
multilateral lifting of the embargo at this time. They insist that the 
only way this embargo should be lifted is if it is multilateral. That 
is the theme of this amendment.
  It is a point that I disagree with. I think as long as the only way 
in which the arms embargo can be lifted is if it is lifted 
multilaterally it will not be lifted, and the Serbs know it will not be 
lifted. If it is going to take the agreement of European nations and 
Russians, and everybody else, to lift this embargo, you can be darn 
sure that this embargo is not going to be lifted. And I think it is 
also very clear that the Serbs would know that it is not going to be 
lifted.
  But this amendment suggests that the United States should seek the 
multilateral lifting of this embargo under certain circumstances or at 
least the partial lifting of the arms embargo under certain 
circumstances.
  I think that the way the amendment is worded it is not at all clear 
as to what we would do if the conditions are met.
  Again, I do not see my friends from Georgia or Virginia on the floor. 
So I am not going to be able to press this at this point. So I will 
make a statement about it.
  What they have done in this amendment in saying that the only way 
this embargo will be lifted is if it is done multilaterally is to 
signal to the Serbs it will not be lifted. We know it is not going to 
be lifted from history. We know that the Europeans and Russians are not 
going to agree to the lifting of the embargo. If we tie that condition 
to the lifting of it, that it be multilateral, we are telling the Serbs 
and the world, hey, you do not have to worry about this embargo being 
lifted.
  But my point is that if you read subsection b. it is very unclear, 
even by the terms of the amendment as to whether or not the sponsors 
believe that it should be lifted multilaterally at this time, given the 
fact that the Senator from Georgia said that the condition set forth in 
b. has now been met. Subsection b. says that:

       * * * if the Bosnian Serbs, while the contact group's peace 
     proposal is being considered and discussed, attack the safe 
     areas designated by the United Nations Security Council, the 
     partial lifting of the arms embargo on the Government of 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina and the provision to that Government 
     of defensive weapons and equipment appropriate and necessary 
     to defend those safe areas.

  I see my friend is back. Given the fact that he has acknowledged in 
previous debate this morning that in fact those safe areas are under 
attack, I ask whether or not this amendment then means that the 
administration should now seek the multilateral partial lifting of that 
embargo.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Mikulski). The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, my answer to that, if I could say to the 
Senator from Michigan, is yes. I think we should. I think that is 
preferable to the threat of bombing, but it does not have to be in lieu 
of the threat of bombing. It can be in connection with.
  The first thing I would suggest is that the multinational group let 
the Bosnian Serbs know that this is something that they are planning on 
doing if they do not respect the safe areas.
  But, yes, I would think that this is an option that should be 
explored now with our allies. Again it is in the multinational context.
  Mr. LEVIN. I appreciate that and again I think the fundamental 
difference here is when you limit the prospect of lifting this embargo 
in the situation where it is not multinational, in other words, with 
all our allies and Russia, you are, therefore, saying it is not going 
to be lifted.
  I do not see any reasonable prospect that this embargo will be lifted 
multinationally and the Serbs know unless they realize there is a 
possibility of a multilateral lifting of the embargo it could happen 
and would happen regardless if they agree to it. I do not believe there 
is any equitable settlement. I am not attempting to persuade my friend 
of that because I think there is just a fundamental difference on that.
  But the key point that I am now making is that it is the sponsor's 
interpretation of this amendment, which he and others have proposed, 
that it is calling now for the administration to seek the multinational 
partial lifting of this embargo because under condition b. safe areas 
are being attacked, and if I could just complete my thought.
  Yesterday when I asked Strobe Talbott the question as to whether or 
not the administration favors now seeking multinational lifting of the 
embargo his answer was no.
  So, there is a difference between this amendment and the 
administration's position on that fundamental issue.
  At least Strobe Talbott's testimony yesterday reflected the 
administration position. What he was saying is that they want to keep 
that as a possible option to seek multinational lifting of the embargo, 
whereas this amendment appears to say, and I think that my friend from 
Georgia has now confirmed it, that because subsection b. is operative 
right now since the safe areas are under attack, that we should right 
now be seeking the multinational partial lifting of the embargo.
  I thank my friend for that clarification.
  Mr. NUNN. Madam President, if I could just respond briefly to my 
friend from Michigan, this amendment was not drafted by the 
administration. They have sent word that they can support this 
amendment.
  I am giving the Senator my personal view, and I have felt for several 
months that a threat to partially lift the embargo on threatened safe 
areas with defensive weapons would spread all over the whole country, 
based on a case-by-case examination of that was the way to go.
  I felt that that was a more credible threat than trying to believe 
that we can have precise bombing on mortar tubes sitting in churchyards 
in the mountains and terrain of Bosnia. My view of it is that this kind 
of move in the multinational group should be done and should have been 
done months ago. But I do not pretend to say I am speaking for the 
administration.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Georgia for the clarification.
  I do hope, between now and the time we vote on this resolution, that 
we can get the confirmation from the administration that Secretary 
Talbott's testimony yesterday in fact is their view, that they do not 
now favor seeking multinational lifting of the embargo. And if, in 
fact, they confirm that that is their position, we should all realize 
that, even if we adopt the Nunn-Warner sense-of-the-Senate amendment, 
we will then be urging the administration to do something which is not 
their current position, and we do not even have a prospect of that 
occurring if that resolution passes.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. I say to my friend from Michigan, if the Dole-Levin-
Lieberman amendment is adopted, there is no assurance that that is 
going to bring about a change in the administration's policy, either.
  The President has the right to veto a bill. Obviously, as one of the 
people trying to get a defense bill in place this year, I hope this 
bill is not vetoed. I will do everything I can to get the bill in a 
position where it will not be vetoed.
  But if this Dole amendment is adopted, that does not mean the 
administration is going to change its position, either. Both of these 
are basically, in a way, trying to move the administration. My 
amendment, I am not pretending it is the administration's policy. What 
I am saying is, I think it should be the policy of the United States.
  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I wish to associate myself with the 
remarks of the distinguished Senator from Georgia.
  I participated in the drafting of the amendment and indeed it is an 
independent effort of the Senator from Georgia and myself and others. I 
hope that, as we move forward in this debate, perhaps there may be some 
constructive suggestions with regard to the amendment which we could 
take into consideration.
  Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. PELL. Madam President, once again, the Senate is debating 
legislation regarding the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo 
against Bosnia and Herzegovina. We have been down this road twice 
before, and in my view, we need not and should not take up this issue 
again, particularly as our President heads to the Group of Seven summit 
early next month where he and his colleagues are expected to endorse a 
plan to end the Bosnia conflict. It appears I am swimming against the 
tide, and the Senate is indeed, going to address this issue once again. 
Accordingly, I would urge my colleagues to reject the Dole amendment, 
and instead support the amendment offered by Senators Nunn and Warner, 
of which I am a cosponsor, as a more sensible, realistic approach to 
this difficult issue.
  In January, the Senate voted overwhelmingly to adopt a sense-of-the-
Senate amendment to the State Department authorization bill calling 
on--but not directing--the President to lift the United States arms 
embargo against Bosnia. I was one of a few Members who voted against 
that provision.
  Last month, when the Senate took up and adopted a bill that had some 
teeth--that actually directed the President to lift the embargo, the 
results were less clear. When the Senate voted to direct the President 
to lift the embargo, it adopted a second, seemingly contradictory 
amendment on the very same day. The first, sponsored by Senator Dole, 
directed the President to lift the arms embargo unilaterally. The 
other, sponsored by Senator Mitchell, instructed the President to take 
a multilateral approach. I voted for Senator Mitchell's amendment, and 
against Senator Dole's amendment. Some Members, however, opposed both 
amendments, while others supported both amendments. The two amendments 
produced legislation that directed the President to pursue two 
apparently different courses of action. The result was utter confusion, 
both here and abroad, about the Senate's intent.
  Now Senator Dole is offering his amendment again. If we adopt this 
amendment, the outcome would be harmful. Since the House of 
Representatives has already passed an identical amendment to the 
Defense Department authorization bill, we would be forcing the 
President to take very damaging action. There would be no turning back, 
no margin of error. And it would be the Congress that bore the ultimate 
responsibility for implementing a new, ill-conceived policy.
  As we address this issue again today, I would like to review for my 
colleagues the points made previously in opposition to taking the 
reckless step of lifting the embargo unilaterally.
  Lifting the embargo would put the United States in the position of 
abrogating a U.N. Security Council Resolution, and in essence, breaking 
international law. It could begin a process of unilateral United States 
involvement in the Bosnia conflict--or as some Senators have put it--
start us down the slippery slope to greater engagement in the crisis. 
It could generate another cycle of violence and actually leave the 
Bosnian Government forces vulnerable to further Serbian obstruction of 
humanitarian assistance and brutal attack. Lifting the embargo at this 
time could upset the delicate peace process underway.
  Many of my colleagues have made the point that the international 
community may be contributing to the problem by denying the Bosnian 
Government the right to defend itself. We have heard many times that we 
owe it to the people of Bosnia to level the playing field. Some of my 
colleagues have made powerful arguments to that effect.
  Lifting the arms embargo seems like an easy, cost-free solution. It 
may make us feel better, but I believe it is bad policy that could 
yield disastrous results. Clearly, the Bosnian Government forces 
continue to be outgunned by the Bosnian Serb aggressors. There is a 
certain appeal to providing weapons in the hope of helping the victims 
gain back the land and fortune that the Serbian aggressors stole from 
them. I do not believe it is that easy, however.
  Proponents of lifting the embargo argue that with the right weapons 
and equipment, the Bosnian Government will be able to regain more on 
the battlefield than it can at the negotiating table. I would argue 
that much of what the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian people have 
lost cannot be recaptured with United States-supplied guns. The lives 
that have been lost cannot be reclaimed. Even regaining territory would 
require more than U.S.-supplied weapons.
  I would argue that the Nunn-Warner amendment takes a much more 
realistic approach than does the Dole amendment. It takes into account 
the reality--not only of the diplomatic situation--but of the 
circumstances on the ground. Yesterday, Senator Nunn chaired hearings 
on the implications of the lifting of the arms embargo. Witnesses 
included representatives of four defense ministries of countries with 
troops participating in the United Nations effort in Bosnia--Denmark, 
France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. All four opposed lifting the 
embargo. I must say that I was impressed to learn that, while each of 
them spoke of the danger that lifting the embargo would pose to their 
own troops, they focused to a much greater extent on the damage that 
would be dealt to the people of Bosnia.
  This war has dragged on for more than 3 years at great cost to the 
people of Bosnia. At this time, forces in Bosnia are finally observing 
a delicate cease-fire. While in some areas, cease-fire violations still 
occur, often with horrible impact, the situation on the ground is 
quieter than it has been since the war began. Introducing more weapons 
at this time would likely touch off a new round of fighting, bloodshed, 
and suffering. Supply weapons at this point is, in all likelihood, too 
little too late.

  That being said, if steps are to be taken, the United Nations, not 
the United States going it alone, should take them. The embargo is in 
place as a result of a binding U.N. Security Council resolution and can 
only be abrogated by a subsequent U.N. Security Council action. A 
unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would set a dangerous precedent. 
Other countries could choose to ignore Security Council resolutions 
that we consider important--such as the embargo against Iraq and 
sanctions against Libya.
  I would note that on May 13, the day after the Senate last acted on 
this issue, the Washington Post reported that Iran was engaging in 
embargo-busting by sending at least 60 tons of explosives and other raw 
materials for weapons production to Croatia. The Croatians were 
siphoning off one third of the cargo, and sending the remaining two 
thirds to Bosnia. The article suggested that this was the latest of a 
series of shipments. If the United States were to lift the embargo 
unilaterally, we too, would be engaging in embargo busting. We would be 
taking the same action as Iran. I would ask my colleagues: Do we want 
to be in that company? Is Iran a responsible player in the 
international community?
  The answer, of course, is no. If the United States were to break the 
embargo on its own, we would destroy our credibility as a trustworthy 
leader in international affairs. A unilateral lifting of the arms 
embargo would undoubtedly strain our relations with Britain, France, 
Russia, and other countries with troops on the ground in Bosnia--and 
would undermine our trustworthiness in other international negotiations 
completely unrelated to the Bosnian tragedy.
  A unilateral lifting of the arms embargo will inevitably be perceived 
as the beginning of a United States decision to go it alone in Bosnia. 
It is naive to think we can unilaterally lift the arms embargo, and 
then walk away. We instead would assume responsibility for Bosnia not 
only in terms of our moral obligation, but in practical terms as well. 
Delivering weapons to Bosnia would likely require sending in United 
States personnel. Granted, this legislation states that nothing should 
be construed as authorizing the deployment of United States forces to 
Bosnia and Hercegovina for any purpose. But I want to emphasize that 
this would be a U.S. decision to dismantle the embargo.
  Lifting the embargo without international support would increase 
American responsibility for the outcome of the conflict. If we take 
unilateral action, we will assume the lead international role in 
Bosnia. If we were to take the initiative and supply arms on our own, 
our allies, who I admit, have not always been the most cooperative, 
could step back even further and say, ``It may be our continent, but 
it's your job now to see this through; it's America's problem to 
solve.''
  Before we take any step that could lead to greater U.S. action--and I 
argue that unilaterally lifting the arms embargo would do just that--we 
need to answer some serious questions about where our interests lie. 
Regrettably, we still do not have a clear answer. Without a clear focus 
of where our interests lie, I cannot support any action that would 
launch us headlong into a military quagmire.
  I am concerned too, about the negative impact that lifting the arms 
embargo could have on the Bosnian people. If the United States were to 
lift the embargo on our own, our allies with troops on the ground would 
very likely pull out of portions of Bosnia, leaving the Moslem enclaves 
even more vulnerable to Bosnian Serb attacks and the obstruction of the 
delivery of humanitarian relief supplies.
  There would likely be a lag time too--anywhere from 6 weeks to 6 
months by many estimates--for weapons to be delivered to Bosnia. During 
that lag time, the Serbs will undoubtedly move swiftly to crush Bosnian 
Government forces. Moreover, the United States will receive the brunt 
of the blame when hundreds, if not thousands, of Bosnians die from lack 
of basic supplies or from a new round of slaughter.

  Finally, a unilateral lifting of the embargo could endanger progress 
on the international negotiations underway and jeopardize the gains 
made to date through diplomacy. Even pessimists agree that for the 
first time, there may be a breakthrough on the diplomatic front. The 
contact group, consisting of representatives of the United States, the 
European Community, and Russia have agreed on a map to present to the 
warring parties. The Nunn-Warner amendment acknowledges this reality, 
and tracks any decision on lifting the embargo with the work of the 
contract group.
  The foreign ministers of the United States, Russia, Britain, France, 
and Germany are set to meet on July 1 and 2 in Geneva to endorse a 
peace plan for Bosnia. The heads of states of the Group of Seven 
industrialized nations will meet on July 8, and are scheduled to take 
up the plan as well. Then, as a United front, the contract group will 
present the plan to the warring parties in Bosnia. Members of the 
contact group have at their disposal a wide range of options to 
encourage the parties to accept the plan. This includes the threat of 
lifting the arms embargo. If we were to lift the arms embargo on our 
own, the hard-won consensus among the contact group would unravel, and 
all parties to the negotiations would lose incentives to reach a 
negotiated settlement.
  Admittedly, the diplomatic process in the Balkans has not always been 
perfect. There continue to be setbacks, but there also have been some 
important accomplishments, including the breaking of the siege of 
Sarajevo, the signing of a peace agreement between Moslems and Croats 
in Bosnia, and most recently, agreement among the contact group on a 
Bosnian settlement. If we build upon these and other accomplishments, 
we have the hope of a comprehensive peace. I for now, believe it unwise 
to upset the sensitive negotiation process now underway.
  I acknowledge that I see merit in some of the arguments of the Dole 
amendments proponents. This is a difficult problem that cuts across 
partisan lines and that slices to the heart of issues related to United 
States influence and power abroad. We are, as public servants, called 
upon to exercise our best judgment on this very difficult issue. My 
conscience tells me that unilaterally lifting the arms embargo is the 
wrong thing to do, and I therefore must oppose this amendment, and 
support the Nunn-Warner alternative.
  Mr. COATS. Madam President, it is obvious we will not come to a final 
resolution and vote on the Bosnia amendments before us on lifting the 
embargo. That will be deferred until next week. In accordance with 
that, I will somewhat abbreviate what I was going to say and reserve 
some of my comments for when we once again take up that particular 
amendment.
  I am going to support the amendment being offered by Senator Dole. I 
did the last time it was on the floor, which was a shift in position 
for me from my earlier opinion on this. Former Secretary of Defense Les 
Aspin said, ``All the options in Bosnia are bad; some are worse.'' I 
could not agree more with that statement. There are few if any 
acceptable solutions which would give any of us assurance that it would 
successfully resolve or bring a peaceful resolution to the conflict 
that has now raged in that area of the world for 3 years.
  I support, however, Senator Dole's amendment with some real sincere 
reservations. I listened carefully to the arguments propounded by the 
Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Georgia, Senator Nunn and 
others. The points that they make have a lot of validity. There is no 
question that United States unilateral action in lifting the embargo 
has implications, many of them potentially serious implications for 
NATO and our current cooperative efforts with NATO countries and 
potential future efforts with NATO countries. I think that is a serious 
question that deserves examination and certainly has a bearing on our 
final decision regarding these two options before us on lifting the 
embargo.
  Clearly, the argument that it undermines our claim of credibility, in 
terms of asking others to enforce other embargoes--whether it be the 
embargo against Iraq or perhaps an embargo against North Korea or other 
nations--clearly it undermines the credibility we have and the 
authority we have to insist that other nations join with us in those 
efforts. Lifting the embargo unilaterally, or even multilaterally, may 
also bring Russia into the picture in a way that does not diminish 
attempts at resolving the conflict in Bosnia--but actually makes for a 
much more difficult situation, in terms of reaching agreement.
  Clearly, the Russians do not see the situation as it exists in that 
part of the world the way we see it. There are historical ties with the 
Serbs; their view of the present conflict is different from ours.
  If we lift that embargo, clearly they will be under a lot of pressure 
to supply the Serbians with arms. We discussed that with members of the 
Russian Parliament, the Duma, on the trip members of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee recently made. I think their response was quite 
clear in terms of their intention to do so. They do not speak 
necessarily for the Government, and what President Yeltsin might 
ultimately decide is not something that we were able to determine. 
However, members of the Duma clearly expressed the thought that they 
would proceed posthaste to attempt to address the question on the other 
side of the equation.
  I think the claim that our lifting the embargo will intensify the 
conflict and potentially prolong the conflict is a claim that has some 
validity, because clearly there is not a defined line between the 
parties in this conflict. There are three factions which have literally 
been at war with each other for most of the last 600 years. There are 
animosities and hatreds and retributions and retaliations that go back 
for centuries and through generations.
  It is not, as some have suggested, an easy conflict with which to say 
these are the good guys and these are the bad guys and we are on the 
side of the good guys, therefore, we need to do everything we can to 
prepare them to defend themselves against the bad guys. There is plenty 
of killing, plenty of rapes, plenty of aggression, plenty of atrocities 
to spread among all parties engaged in this conflict, and often what we 
see is the picture of that faction of the conflict which has the upper 
hand at the moment.
  Lifting the arms embargo may change that equation, particularly with 
the coalition effort between the Bosnians and the Moslems. There could 
clearly be a change from what many perceive to simply be a defensive 
effort, allowing them to defend themselves, to die with dignity, as 
some have said, to an aggressor situation.
  So prolonging the conflict and intensifying the conflict, and the 
consequence of more killing and more atrocities, is a very real 
question. I do not have all the answers to that. I am not an expert on 
the region. I have studied some of the history. My study of the history 
indicates to me that there is no simple, easy solution; that we are 
looking at a religious, ethnic, cultural, social, political conflict 
that goes back many, many centuries and throughout many, many 
generations.
  It leads me to the conclusion that outside imposition of a so-called 
peace agreement will be fragile at best, and probably not accepted by 
one or more of the parties and, if accepted, will probably be on a 
temporary basis. At some point, whether it is months or years, there 
will be a resumption of the conflict because there are scores that have 
not been settled, there are boundary lines that are an anathema to one 
party or another. There are retributions that still exist and will 
continue to exist, whatever is outlined in a peace agreement.
  So my conclusion several months ago, perhaps a year ago, is that this 
is a conflict which the United States is not going to be capable of 
resolving; that this is an area of the world and the type of conflict 
which does not directly fall within the category of vital U.S. 
interests.
  Is it important? Yes. Is it necessary that the United States attempt 
through diplomatic means and other means to bring about a resolution? 
Yes. But is it a conflict with which the United States can take a 
direct involvement, undergo a direct involvement with one side or the 
other, impose its agreement or solution to the problem and rest with 
the assurance that that will be successful? I think the answer has to 
be no.
  The reality is that over a tortured period of time over which we have 
had some tortured debate, I think it is quite clear that the U.S. 
Congress, and probably this administration, is not going to commit U.S. 
troops on the ground in the area that we know as the former Yugoslavia. 
We are not going to put those troops on the ground because we cannot 
define a specific mission; we cannot define a strategy which allows us 
to accomplish the goals we would like to accomplish without 
extraordinary risk to American lives. I do not believe this Congress 
nor the American people have made the commitment to risk those lives 
because they have not determined that this conflict is such a vital 
national necessity or interest to the United States that we will make 
that commitment.
  As such, we have tried to patch together some type of level of 
support for one side or the other in an attempt to bring the parties 
either to a stalemate or bring them to the peace table, and those 
attempts have not been successful. What we are seeing now is just the 
latest of a series of promised or at least hoped-for resolutions to the 
conflict.
  But the reality is that the United States will not commit ground 
troops to bring about this resolution. The reality is that we have 
entered into an extremely limited involvement in terms of air support, 
at least keeping the skies free of military air assets that one side 
might use against another. But even that is extraordinarily limited, 
and it is through a bifurcated decisionmaking and command-and-control-
making process that involves not only the United States and NATO but 
also involves the United Nations that we have seen how difficult that 
can be, and we have seen how ineffective that can be.
  I stated some time ago on the floor of the Senate that I think it is 
important that we at least be honest with the Moslems and with the 
Bosnians and state categorically that there is neither the commitment 
nor the will on the part of the Congress, probably the administration, 
and the American people for us to engage any more directly than we are 
currently engaged.
  As such, the Bosnian Moslems should not hold out the hope that either 
actions that we precipitate or actions that are precipitated by the 
Serbians is going to cause a change of heart and a change of will on 
the part of the Americans. As such, and because I do not believe we 
will make that commitment, I think the least we can do is state that up 
front, and then give the Moslems the means with which to defend 
themselves.
  While these other considerations that I mentioned are important--our 
relationship with NATO, future involvement and coordination with NATO 
on areas and issues that are in our vital interest, on the embargo 
question, on the Russian response question, on the intensifying of the 
conflict issue--all of those are important. But I think there is an 
issue of paramount importance, and that issue of paramount importance 
is a moral question, a question that has been raised and discussed this 
morning and at other times. And that is: Should a sovereign nation be 
allowed to have the wherewithal to defend itself against an outside 
aggressor? I think that is a paramount question. I think the moral 
issue is paramount to the other issues.
  Some would argue that it was a mistake to recognize the sovereignty 
of Croatia. Perhaps it was; maybe it was not. I do not know. It 
certainly did not accomplish the purposes we thought it would.
  But that is behind us. There is nothing we can do at this point to 
undo that. It is a sovereign nation. It does have rights, international 
rights, that I think ought to be guaranteed whether or not we agree 
that that nation should have been granted sovereignty and recognition 
in the first place. The fact is that it was, and the fact is that I 
believe we need to recognize rights that should enure to that 
sovereignty and to those people that are not only guaranteed under U.N. 
Charter but also ought to be just simply a matter of both international 
law and common respect and common decency.
  So I reluctantly, not believing that it offers a perfect solution or 
anything close to a perfect solution, but I reluctantly join with the 
minority leader, Senator Dole, in supporting an effort to unilaterally, 
if necessary, lift the arms embargo.
  Now, the argument that the alternative resolution also allows a 
lifting of the embargo but simply in coordination with our NATO allies 
to me is an argument for the status quo. I see no movement underway to 
either seek agreement with our NATO friends or for their compliance in 
any type of agreement even if we were seeking it. The status quo to me 
is not acceptable, given the aggression of the Serbians and given the 
situation as it exists. A 51 to 49 split for that country I do not 
believe will resolve the problem, and so I do not think the current 
agreement is going to come to fruition.
  As a consequence, I find I reluctantly conclude that the very best of 
a very bad series of options is the resolution offered by the Senator 
from Kansas [Mr. Dole].
  So for those reasons, Madam President, I will support that amendment. 
But I do not do so with any assurance it will resolve a tragic 
situation which has existed not for 3 years but 600 years in a part of 
the world which few of us fully understand and which we have not 
defined as in our vital national interests to commit our national 
assets and, more importantly, our own troops in uniform to attempt to 
resolve.
  Madam President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be 
permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes as if in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Chair.

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