[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 82 (Friday, June 24, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 24, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZA- TION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, will the Chair advise the Senator from 
Nebraska as to what is the pending matter before the Senate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is amendment No. 1852 in 
the second degree to amendment No. 1851.
  Mr. EXON. That is under the Defense authorization bill?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I welcome this opportunity to describe in 
more detail some of the programmatic decisions and guidance contained 
in S. 2182, which Chairman Nunn briefly highlighted earlier. The 
Subcommittee on Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control, and Defense 
Intelligence, which I chair, encompasses a number of important Defense 
programs. Our subcommittee held 10 separate hearings on various defense 
issues prior to markup, and, on countless occasions, both members of 
the committee and the committee staff met with, were briefed by, or 
requested written information from Defense officials during the weeks 
preceding the committee's markup.
  In the next few minutes, I want to outline for Members some of the 
major decisions taken by my subcommittee, decisions which have been 
ratified by the full committee, and are contained in the bill and 
report before the Senate today. Let me begin by covering the 
committee's action in two areas that have traditionally attracted 
considerable attention from Members--ballistic missile defenses, and 
heavy bombers.
  In the areas of ballistic missile defenses [BMD], the subcommittee 
and full committee continued the new directions established during last 
year's conference. Chief among them were the need for the National 
Missile Defense Program to demonstrate a plan that would reduce the 
lead time to deployment of a thin, limited defense of the continental 
United States. The Congress mandated this because of the concern that 
we might suddenly discover that we do not have 10 or 12 years to 
develop a mational missile defense [NMD]. The intelligence community's 
record for providing warning of developments a decade or more in 
advance is spotty, to say the least.
  We also wanted to ensure that most of the BMD funding was directly 
concentrated on the half-dozen or so Theater Missile Defense [TMD] 
systems and components that comprise our near-term defense against the 
existing, relatively short-range missile threat--mostly Scuds and 
derivatives of Scuds. We have been telling the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization [BMDO] and the Secretary of Defense for several 
years to move the remnants of the old star wars--namely, research on 
high energy lasers, particle beams, and schemes like Brilliant 
Pebbles--out of BMDO and back into the tech base.
  Let me now describe how the committee bill emphasizes this guidance. 
BMDO asked for $3.25 billion in funding, of which only $2.18 billion 
was allocated to the mainstream NMD and TMD programs. That meant that 
over $1 billion of the request was still programmed for technology 
explorations, management, and supporting research activities. The 
committee properly regarded that as an unacceptable reflection of its 
guidance. Therefore, the committee transferred $170 million in specific 
programs from BMDO to other service or agency managers, and reduced the 
overall BMDO request by an additional $251 million. This results in 
total BMD funding of $2.8 billion, a reduction of $421 million from the 
request. However, of the $2.8 billion, no less than $2.1 billion is 
directed to the high-priority NMD and TMD programs--the real defenses 
that Congress is seeking. The committee reduced the follow-on 
technologies request by $139 million, cut BMDO's management request by 
$70 million, and cut the research and support activities by $100 
million.
  The NMD program was reoriented, by directing BMDO to abandon its 
proposed technology readiness program in favor of an effort to build 
upon the successful technology demonstrations already achieved in the 
ERIS and LEAP programs. The objective is to build on this base, and to 
demonstrate on end-to-end intercept capability against strategic 
reentry vehicles at the earliest possible date consistent with an NDM 
funding level of $400-$500 million per year, which appears to be about 
all that will be made available during the future year defense program 
[FYDP].

  In the TMD area, the committee bill fully funds all the mainstream 
TMD programs--patriot PAC-3, including ERINT; THAAD; the Navy Lower-
Tier program; the GBR-T radar from PAC-3 and THAAD; the necessary 
battle management and C-CUBED; and the ongoing Hawk upgrades. The 
committee also fully funded the request for the three candidates TMD 
follow-ons--the Army's Corps SAM, the Navy's Upper Tier program, and 
the Air Force's Boost Phase Intercept program. Finally, the committee 
bill provides an additional $75 mill in risk-reduction funds, which can 
be used either within the PAC-3 program, or to accelerate progress on 
the three TMD follow-ons, which appear collectively to be somewhat 
underfunded.
  The committee bill also requires the Department of Defense [DOD] to 
do the brilliant eyes compliance report again, as their first effort is 
unsatisfactory, and the committee provides its views on the urgency it 
attaches to early THAAD flight tests.
  I believe the results of the committee's actions are to produce a 
lean and mean Ballistic Missile Defense program one keenly focused on 
early deployment of effective missile defenses.
  Mr. President, in the bomber area, the committee found the 
administration's message confused and inconsistent, as Senator Nunn has 
already noted. DOD's budget plan, to maintain only 100 nonstealthy 
bombers in fiscal year 1995 and eventually reduce that further down to 
80 nonstealthy bombers in the outyears, is at variance with no less 
than their own Bottom-Up Review, the Air Force's earlier bomber roadmap 
plan, and at least four other independent studies confirmed our 
concerns. A classified briefing to the committee by DOD and Joint 
Chiefs of Staff [JCS] witnesses on the Bottom-Up Review analysis was 
painfully inept. It provided no quantitative analysis of bomber 
requirements, and the only reason this Senator could find for its 
classification appeared to be to avoid embarrassing its authors.

  The committee has great skepticism about the proposed DOD bomber 
plan, which, frankly, appears to be budget-driven rather than 
requirement-driven. Since there are several important activities like 
the administration's nuclear posture review and the independent roles 
and missions commission deliberations that are currently under way, the 
committee determined that it was not in a position to resolve future 
bomber force structure and bomber weapons issues in this bill. 
Accordingly, and because of that dilemma, the committee has acted to 
keep all options open for at least a year--by prohibiting DOD from 
sending any bombers to the scrapyard, by directing them to plan to 
install conventional weapons upgrades on all bombers to be retained, by 
preserving the bomber industrial base for a year, and by acquiring 
interim precision weapons over the next 2 years for whatever mix of 
bombers emerges as the preferred force structure. The committee bill 
also sets in motion several new analyses on various aspects of the 
bomber issue, to ensure that the committee and the Congress, and 
hopefully DOD itself, will have adequate information by this time next 
year to take definitive actions. Mr. President, now let me turn to some 
other highlights in the strategic area. I recommended strongly, and 
recommended in the committee, and I recommend strongly today on the 
floor of the Senate that the Milstar satellite program be continued but 
that it be transferred from the Air Force to the Navy. Three years ago, 
the Armed Services Committee decided to terminate the Milstar program 
unless the Department of Defense drastically restructured the program 
to: First, remove unneeded features designed for fighting a prolonged 
nuclear war; second, increase the satellite's capabilities to support 
our tactical, conventional forces; and third, reduce total program 
costs substantially.

  The Secretary of Defense accepted the committee's position and 
restructured the Milstar program accordingly. While meeting the need 
for assured communications to our strategic forces, Milstar is now 
primarily a tactical program, providing high-volume communications to 
our tactical field commanders that cannot be jammed and that are 
difficult to intercept.
  One outcome of the restructure of Milstar was to drop plans to place 
Milstar terminals on all our strategic bombers. At that point, the Air 
Force began to lose interest in the program. The Air Force operates 
from bases that are generally far removed from the front lines of 
battle. Air Force bases from which our tactical fighters would operate 
in wartime therefore enjoy a kind of sanctuary and do not face a 
jamming threat to their communications. The Air Force has, therefore, 
concluded that it does not need the capabilities that Milstar now 
provides.
  It is very different for our ground and naval forces, which must 
operate right up against the enemy, and frequently do. These are the 
tactical forces that will benefit from the Milstar Program the most. 
All the regional combatant commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
the Secretary of Defense, and others similarly situated, all firmly 
support the Milstar Program strongly because of this support for ground 
and naval forces which I emphasize once again has been the welcome 
change at the suggestion of the committee that has been instituted by 
the Department of Defense. The Air Force, however, would prefer to see 
the money spent on more Air Force fighter aircraft, and I would simply 
say from the Air Force point of view I fully understand what they are 
trying to do because they, like all of the other members of our great 
Armed Forces, are being extremely pinched under the reduced budget. The 
committee believes, however, that there is an important roles and 
missions issue involved in this decision to transfer the Milstar 
Program. The Air Force has always been the lead service for space 
programs. Now, however, the Air Force is proposing in the major roles 
and missions review that the committee required in last year's bill, to 
become the sole acquirer, the one and only part of our armed services 
intricately involved in these operations, and the Air Force also wish 
to become the operator of space systems. Yet, here we have a space 
program that is needed by the Department of Defense as a whole, and the 
Air Force is advocating that it be terminated and let down--that is the 
Milstar Program. The Armed Services Committee does not believe that 
this Air Force position will inspire confidence that the Air Force can 
be solely trusted with a monopoly on space programs that support the 
other military services.
  On other space issues, the committee supported the administration's 
emerging strategy to eliminate excess capacity in the space launch 
industrial base and to develop a family of space boosters by upgrading 
an existing system. The committee hopes that by reducing the number of 
different booster types, we can achieve more efficient production and 
launch rates. If this is successful, the costs of space access should 
decline and our industry should be more competitive in the 
international market. The committee also increased funds for technology 
development.


                chemical agent and munitions destruction

  The committee included a provision in the fiscal year 1993 Defense 
bill requiring the Army to submit a report to Congress on the potential 
alternatives to the baseline technology for the disposal of the 
chemical stockpile. In April, the Army submitted its report to the 
Congress endorsing many of the recommendations by the National Research 
Council.
  Based on these recommendations and testimony before the committee, 
the committee recommended the obligation of $25 million of fiscal year 
1994 funds for research and development of alternative technologies for 
the destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile.

  In support of Army recommendations to implement updated risk 
assessments for storage, handling, and disposal activities at each 
site, enhancement of the stockpile surveillance program and a public 
outreach program, the committee recommended an $8 million increase to 
the operation and maintenance account.
  The committee also recommended $22.5 million for procurement of 
carbon filtration systems and ancillary equipment for the pollution 
abatement system at Tooele Army Depot and for equipment modification 
design for all sites.
  Lastly, in response to concerns raised by civilians in the 
communities surrounding the chemical storage depots, the committee 
recommended that up to $2 million in funds available in the research 
and development account be used to demonstrate programs for the 
detection of low-level exposure to chemical agent and for other 
pollution abatement technologies associated with chemical weapons 
destruction, such as reusable aerogels for toxic gas collection and 
stack emissions reduction.


                               NUNN-Lugar

  On the very important matter of Nunn-Lugar that was basically an 
initiative of the Armed Services Committee, the committee approved the 
budget request of $400 million for the cooperative threat reduction 
programs, also known as Nunn-Lugar programs, for the states of the 
former Soviet Union, subject to the program categories and notification 
and report requirements specified in last year's Defense Authorization 
Act. While expressing confidence that these programs will promote U.S. 
national security interests, the committee directed that subsequent 
budget requests for cooperative threat reduction be made as part of a 
comprehensive, multiyear strategy for assisting the states of the 
former Soviet Union to denuclearize and demilitarize.


                          department of energy

  With regard to the many programs that we administer in the Armed 
Services Committee, and particularly my subcommittee, in the Department 
of Energy, I think it is worthy to point out a few and the direction we 
are going and initiative that we are taking.
  The overall funding for the national security program at the 
Department of Energy, including environmental restoration and waste 
management, infrastructure maintenance, and weapons dismantlement, is 
$10.3 billion, a reduction of $220 million below the request.
  As the Department of Energy dismantles nuclear weapons retired from 
the inventory, it recovers plutonium that must be stored and ultimately 
disposed. Management and storage of weapons-grade plutonium and 
disposition of the excess weapons grade material is a difficult 
challenge facing DOE. To assist the Department, we have created a 
separate line item for fissile materials disposition and have provided 
$50 million for this effort. In addition, the bill contains a provision 
that would make statutory the Office of Fissile Materials disposition 
recently established by the Department of Energy.

  The bill contains a provision that would transfer responsibility for 
new sources of tritium that might be required in the years beyond 2008, 
from the Department of Energy to the Defense Nuclear Agency. Fiscal 
year 1995 would become a transition year to ensure that the transition 
from DOE to DNA was smooth.
  The bill includes a provision that would strengthen the role of the 
Nuclear Weapons Council, the joint DOD-DOE body responsible for nuclear 
weapons policy, to ensure that work undertaken by the DOE and direction 
provided by DOD is fully coordinated through the council.
  To ensure improved financial management at the DOE, the bill contains 
a provision that would require the DOE to track spending on a fiscal 
year basis. In addition, the bill contains a provision that would 
require DOE to submit a conceptual design report for each construction 
project before DOE submits a request for funding for the construction 
project. This would improve the long-term planning for DOE construction 
projects and force a more complete understanding of the nature and 
scope of the project before it is begun.

  The bill contains a third provision designed to improve financial 
management and accounting at DOE. This provision would restrict the DOE 
from spending 10 percent of the funds authorized and appropriated to 
the DOE until the DOE complies with existing law and prepares a 5-year 
budget plan. This would bring the DOE more in line with the financial 
management at the DOD. The DOD prepares an annual spending plan for the 
out years. This would help ensure that the DOE long-term spending 
decisions are sound.
  The bill provides authorization for environmental restoration at the 
funding level requested, $5.235 billion. This level of funding 
represents a very slight increase over the fiscal year 1994 level of 
$5.182 billion. To keep the funding at this level, DOE has committed to 
find $900 million in savings during 1995.
  Mr. President, this is but a summary of some of the highlights of the 
actions of the subcommittee and the Armed Services Committee as a 
whole. I hope other members of the committee will be able to address 
this later on. I hope that our colleagues on both sides of the aisle 
will realize and recognize the extraordinary work that has gone into 
the preparation of these budget recommendations in the bill before us 
and approve the actions that we have taken, with great pain and with a 
lot of scrutiny, to present the defense authorization bill to the 
Congress for its approval.
  I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from the State of Alaska [Mr. Stevens], is recognized.
  Mr. STEVENS. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Stevens pertaining to the introduction of S. 2243 
are located in today's Record under ``Statements on Introduced Bills 
and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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