[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 82 (Friday, June 24, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 24, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                  EXPEDITED RESCISSIONS: C-Y-A FOR A-Z

                                 ______


                        HON. GERALD B.H. SOLOMON

                              of new york

                    in the house of representatives

                         Friday, June 24, 1994

  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Speaker, next week the House is scheduled to take up 
H.R. 4600, the Expedited Rescissions Act, reported from the Rules 
Committee yesterday on a 5-3 party-line vote.
  The bill is identical to a bill passed by the House last year. Why 
then are we doing it again? Our chairman tells us it is to impress the 
Senate with the importance we attach to it and the need for action. 
However, it is no secret that this is part of a deal the Democratic 
leadership cut with some Democrats to keep them off the A-Z discharge 
petition.
  At this point in the Record, Mr. Speaker, I include my opening 
statement from yesterday's markup, our minority views, a summary of the 
reported bill, and a summary of the substitute we offered embodying the 
text of Republican leader Michel's true legislative line-item veto 
bill. The materials follow:

 Opening Statement on Expedited Rescission Markup, Committee on Rules, 
      Hon. Gerald B. Solomon of New York, Thursday, June 23, 1994

       Mr. Chairman, I have searched the draft committee report on 
     this expedited rescissions bill in vain for a rational 
     explanation as to why we are reporting a bill identical to 
     one we passed last year that is now pending in two Senate 
     committees.
       Instead of a rational explanation, all I could find were 
     these words, and I quote: ``Senate inaction on these bills 
     [referring to entitlement reform and expedited rescissions] 
     has prompted the House to reconsider these measures . . . The 
     House hopes to impress upon the Senate the importance of its 
     own support for and action on these budget process reforms.''
       Mr. Chairman, it seems to me if the House really wants to 
     impress upon the Senate the importance of its support for and 
     action on this bill, it would be much cheaper and more 
     compelling if the Speaker sent a strongly worded letter to 
     the Senate majority leader urging prompt action on the first 
     bill we passed.
       I don't think the Senate will be any more impressed by 
     House passage of a bill identical to one already referred to 
     it since, as far as I know, they don't operate under rule 
     requiring action when they reach a certain saturation point 
     with identical House bills.
       Mr. Chairman, I think we all know the real reason we are 
     here and that is that this is part of a publicly announced 
     deal between your leadership and a few ``deficit chicken 
     hawks'' to keep them off the A to Z discharge petition.
       Instead of A to Z, they have been bought-off by what I 
     would call C-Y-A that says, ``Let the House consider a number 
     of budget process reforms instead of being forced to consider 
     real spending cuts under an open amendment process.'' They 
     think that somehow these budget process reforms will give 
     them enough political cover to hide behind. But I think we 
     can all see through that transparent fig leaf: it offers no 
     real cover.
       Mr. Chairman, instead of wasting our time and that of the 
     House in recycling this warmed over piece of bad sausage--and 
     this is a tainted bill--we should be considering the 
     congressional reform bill that has been languishing in this 
     Committee since last February 3rd.
       And, if you really want to get the attention of the Senate 
     and the American people, we should be reporting a real 
     legislative line item veto like the Michel bill which would 
     ultimately require two-thirds of both Houses to block a 
     presidential rescission or veto of a targeted tax provision. 
     This bill instead permits just a simple majority of either 
     House to block a rescission.
       That's not the kind of line-item veto Candidate Clinton had 
     in mind when he promised during the campaign he would seek 
     line-item veto authority from Congress. I regret that he has 
     flip-flopped on that campaign pledge, as he has on so many 
     others. But at least you are helping to remind the American 
     people of that flip-flop by bringing-up again this non-line-
     item veto bill. At least for that we can thank you.
                                  ____


Minority Views of Hon. Gerald B. Solomon, Hon. David Dreier, Hon. James 
             H. Quillen, and Hon. Porter Goss On H.R. 4600

       Reasonable people might wonder why the Rules Committee 
     would take its time, and that of the House, to consider a 
     bill that is identical to one already passed by the House in 
     this same Congress while not finding time to consider a major 
     congressional reform bill that has been languishing in the 
     Rules Committee since last February 3rd (H.R. 3801, the 
     ``Legislative Reorganization Act of 1994'').
       The apparent answer is that we are never too busy to 
     recycle meaningless budget process reforms in an election 
     year to give certain Members political cover for not making 
     real spending cuts. But we are always too busy to get around 
     to making meaningful changes in the institution of the 
     Congress. In short, this bill is part of a political deal the 
     majority leadership has cut with a small coterie of ``deficit 
     chicken hawks'' to substitute C-Y-A for A-Z (the Andrews-
     Zeliff spending cut plan and discharge petition).
       While this may seem less than a small price to pay for 
     keeping a comprehensive spending-cut process off the floor, 
     what mystifies us is the willingness of the Democrat 
     Leadership to embarrass its own President by reminding 
     everyone of his flip-flop on the issue of the line item veto.
       Candidate Clinton, in his campaign book, ``Putting People 
     First,'' pledged that, ``To eliminate pork-barrel projects 
     and cut government waste, we will ask Congress to give the 
     line item veto'' (p. 25). But, shortly after becoming 
     President, Mr. Clinton caved-in on that campaign promise in 
     favor of this weak alternative known as the ``Expedited 
     Rescission Act.''
       Unlike a real line-item veto whereby a President can cancel 
     wasteful spending items, subject to override by two-thirds of 
     both Houses of Congress, this bill requires that a majority 
     of both Houses must approve any veto of appropriations items. 
     Put another way, instead of two-thirds of both Houses being 
     necessary to reverse an item veto, under H.R. 4600, a 
     majority of either House can block such a veto.
       We do credit the sponsors of the ``Expedited Rescission 
     Act'' for truth-in-labeling. They do not claim this is a true 
     line-item veto bill and have admitted in the past that they 
     oppose the line-item vote because they think it gives the 
     President too much power.
       Just as they have been consistent in opposing the true line 
     item veto under both Republican and Democratic Presidents, we 
     have consistently supported the true line item veto under 
     Presidents of both parties. During the markup of this bill, 
     for instance, we offered a substitute consisting of the text 
     of H.R. 493, ``The Enhanced Rescissions/Receipts Act of 
     1993,'' introduced by Representative Michel on January 20, 
     1993, and have even filed a discharge petition on it 
     (Discharge Motion #1).
       Under the Michel bill, any presidential rescission of 
     budget authority or veto of a targeted tax benefit (defined 
     as one which gives differential treatment to either a 
     particular taxpayer or limited class of taxpayers) would take 
     effect unless a majority of both Houses of Congress pass a 
     disapproval bill within 20 days of session. The President 
     would then have 10 calendar days to sign or veto the 
     disapproval bill, and Congress would have an additional five 
     days of session to override a veto.
       In short, this is a true legislative line-item veto in that 
     ultimately a two-thirds vote of both Houses would be 
     necessary to override a likely presidential veto of any bill 
     disapproving his rescissions or special tax benefit veto.
       Moreover, the Michel bill gives the President this new, 
     enhanced rescission and special tax veto authority on a 
     permanent basis, whereas H.R. 4600 gives the President 
     expedited rescission authority only with respect to 
     appropriations bills enacted during the 103rd Congress. Given 
     the fact that the 103rd Congress is rapidly drawing to a 
     close, and that the previously-passed identical House bill 
     (H.R. 1578) has yet to be reported from either of the two 
     Senate committees to which it was referred, the chances are 
     nil to none that the authority will ever take effect during 
     the limited period to which it applies.
       While the proponents of the expedited rescission approach 
     boast that it will force the Congress to act on these special 
     presidential rescission messages or the money cannot be 
     spent, the House Parliamentarian's Office issued a contrary 
     interpretation when the identical bill was pending last year 
     (see attached Memoranda of April 19 and 21, 1993, from Jerry 
     Solomon to House Members).
       First, the bill, by reference to section 904 of the Budget 
     Act, makes clear that it is enacted as part of the rulemaking 
     authority of Congress ``with full recognition of the right of 
     either House to change such rules . . . at any time.'' This 
     means that a majority of the House, by a special rule from 
     the Rules Committee, could change any of the rules contained 
     in the bill and thereby avoid the so-called action-forcing 
     mechanisms to either table consideration of the President's 
     bill or vote first (rather than second) on a substitute bill 
     reported by the Appropriations Committee.
       Second, in the view of the Parliamentarian, if the House 
     did not act within the required 10-legislative days, and a 
     special rule could block such action, the money would be 
     released. So there are no penalties or disincentives for 
     inaction.
       In summary, H.R. 4600 suffers from the same deficiencies as 
     the current rescission process. While it may expedite the 
     consideration of rescissions, it is still prone to either 
     blockage or substitution by alternative rescissions, thereby 
     thwarting the President's recommendations either way.
       Instead of addressing these obvious flaws, or confronting 
     the need for a real line-item veto, the Rules Committee has 
     chosen instead to report the same old toothless tiger that 
     was passed last session. This may be a sufficient sop to keep 
     some Members from signing the A-Z spending cut discharge 
     petition, but it does nothing to put in place a meaningful 
     spending cut process which spawned the need for such a 
     discharge petition in the first place. The American people 
     will not be fooled by such hollow gimmicks. The proof is in 
     the pudding. And this recipe for instant, expedited 
     rescission pudding is lacking in all the ingredients except 
     one--it just adds water to water.

                              [Memorandum]

                                                   April 19, 1993.
     To: House Republican Members
     From: Jerry Solomon, Rules Committee Ranking Member
     Subject: The Truth about H.R. 1578, the expedited Rescission 
       Bill
       Introduction: We have received several inquiries from 
     Members and staff as to whether the process established by 
     H.R. 1578, the ``Expedited Rescissions Act of 1993,'' could 
     easily be waived, suspended, altered or otherwise 
     circumvented without changing the law. The purpose of this 
     memo is to address those questions. The short answer is, 
     ``yes.''
       Provisions: H.R. 1578 (as proposed to be amended by the 
     modified Spratt substitute printed in the Rules Committee's 
     report on the rule) amends Title X of the Congressional 
     Budget and Impoundment Control Act by inserting a new section 
     providing for ``expedited consideration of certain proposed 
     rescissions.'' It permits the President, within 3-days after 
     the enactment of any appropriations bill during the 103rd 
     Congress, to submit to the House a rescission message 
     canceling budget authority in whole or in part for any items 
     contained in the bill, together with a draft bill that would 
     rescind the budget authority upon enactment.
       The House majority or minority leaders would be required to 
     introduce the rescission bill ``by request'' within two 
     legislative days of the receipt of the message, and, if they 
     do not, any other Member may do so on the third legislative 
     day.
       The rescission bill would be referred to the House 
     Appropriations Committee which would be required to report it 
     without change within seven legislative days after receipt of 
     the message. If it does not report, it is automatically 
     discharged of the bill which is then placed on the 
     appropriate calendar of the House.
       The Appropriations Committee may simultaneously report an 
     alternative rescission bill with respect to the same message 
     and appropriations bill, provided it contains the same or a 
     greater amount of rescissions as the President's proposal.
       A motion to proceed to the consideration of a proposed 
     rescission bill is highly privileged and not subject to 
     debate. If adopted, the House proceeds to consider the bill 
     subject to four hours of general debate divided between 
     proponents and opponents. The bill is not subject to 
     amendment in the House.
       The House must vote final passage of the rescission bill 
     not later than the tenth legislative day after receipt of the 
     message. If the bill is defeated, the alternative rescission 
     bill, if one is reported by the Appropriations Committee, is 
     subject to the same procedures and must be voted on by the 
     eleventh legislative day, provided the Appropriations 
     Committee calls it up.
       In the Senate, a bill received from the House shall be 
     referred to the Appropriations Committee which must report it 
     by the seventh legislative day after its receipt or it is 
     automatically discharged. The Senate Committee may report an 
     amendment in the nature of a substitute to the bill if it 
     goes to the same appropriations bill and is of the same or 
     greater amount in rescissions, or if it contains the text of 
     the President's bill.
                                  ____


                                 [MEMO]

                                                   April 21, 1993.
     Re the effect of non-action on rescissions under H.R. 1578.

     To: House Members.
     From: Jerry Solomon.
       Introduction: The question has been raised as to whether 
     the failure of Congress to act on a proposed rescission under 
     the new process established by H.R. 1578 would prevent the 
     money from being released. Notwithstanding an interpretation 
     to the contrary in an April 21st memo from Charlie Stenholm's 
     LA claiming the funds would continue to be impounded, our 
     reading from the Parliamentarian's Office is that at the 
     funds would be released if the House has not acted within 10 
     legislative days.
       Discussion: At first blush, it would seem there would be no 
     way to avoid a vote on a presidential rescission package 
     since:
       The majority or minority leader shall introduce the 
     President's bill by request within two legislative days of 
     its receipt, or, if they don't, any other Member may;
       The Appropriations Committee shall report the bill within 
     seven legislative days or it is automatically discharged;
       A motion to proceed to consideration is highly privileged 
     (and may be offered by any Member);
       There are no amendments and debate time is limited to four 
     hours; and
       The House must vote on final passage before the close of 
     the tenth legislative days.
       However, as was pointed out in our April 19th memo on the 
     ``Truth About H.R. 1578,'' the House may set aside all these 
     requirements by the adoption of a special rule.
       What may be confusing is the provision in section 1013(e) 
     of the Budget Act as amended by the bill that ``Any amount of 
     budget authority proposed to be rescinded . . . shall be made 
     available for obligation on the earlier of'' House rejection 
     of the President's bill and an Appropriations Committee 
     alternative, if any, or the Senate rejection of the 
     President's bill.
       However, this provision does not say that the budget 
     authority proposed to be rescinded shall only be made 
     available for obligation if the House rejects both bills or 
     the Senate rejects the President's. It simply allows for the 
     earlier release of funds than the 10-day House time frame for 
     consideration or the additional 10-day time frame for Senate 
     consideration.
       In discussing this with the Parliamentarian's Office, they 
     agree that if the House doesn't act on anything within the 
     10-day period, the money shall be made available for 
     obligation.
       The bill and any amendments are subject to not more than 
     ten hours of debate divided equally between the majority and 
     minority leaders. The Senate must vote on final passage not 
     later than the tenth legislative day after the bill has been 
     received from the House. It is not in order in the Senate to 
     consider an alternative rescission bill or amendment unless 
     it first rejects a substitute containing the President's 
     proposal.
       Subsection 1013(e), ``Amendments and Divisions Generally 
     Prohibited,'' prohibits any motion or unanimous consent 
     request to suspend the application of the subsection (which 
     prohibits amendments in the House, narrowly limits and 
     prescribes the amendment process in the Senate, and prohibits 
     a division of the question in either House). However, this 
     provision does not preclude consideration of a special rule 
     changing the amendment process as the discussion below will 
     demonstrate.
       The Procedural Escape Hatch: Section 2(b) of the bill makes 
     this new section 1013 rescission process under the Budget Act 
     subject to the provisions of Section 904 of the Budget Act. 
     That section indicates that the specified sections of the Act 
     are enacted as an exercise of the rule-making power of the 
     House and Senate, ``with full recognition of the 
     constitutional right of either House to change such rules (so 
     far as relating to such House) at any time, in the same 
     manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other 
     rule of such House.''
       The above paragraph makes it quite clear that any of the 
     procedural requirements for either House in section 1013 may 
     be changed by the adoption of a simple resolution of either 
     House, so long as they only change the procedures that apply 
     to that House alone.
       In the House of Representatives, this would take the form 
     of a special rule from the Rules Committee. That special rule 
     could alter any of the procedures contained in section 1013 
     including (but not limited to) any of the following 
     deviations:
       Permitting amendments to be offered to a rescission bill;
       Providing for the consideration of the alternative 
     rescission bill reported from the Appropriations Committee 
     before the President's rescission bill is considered and 
     voted on;
       Preventing the automatic discharge of a bill not reported 
     from the Appropriations Committee within seven days, thereby 
     blocking its consideration; or
       Suspending the application of all of the procedures with 
     respect to any individual presidential rescission message, or 
     for all such messages for the entire Congress.
       Conclusion: The so-called expedited and mandatory 
     consideration and voting procedures contained in H.R. 1578 
     can easily be waived, suspended, circumvented, ignored or 
     otherwise violated so long as either House passes a simple 
     resolution to do so. And this is exactly how the House 
     majority leadership and Rules Committee in the 102nd Congress 
     used the ``rule-making authority'' of the House under the 
     existing rescission process to avoid separate votes on 
     President Bush's rescissions and provided instead for the 
     consideration of an alternative rescission package reported 
     by the Appropriations Committee. In short, this bill has less 
     teeth than a commemorative bill since at least the latter 
     cannot be altered by a special rule of the House.
                                  ____


            Summary of H.R. 4600, Expedited Rescissions Act

       H.R. 4600 is identical to H.R. 1578 as passed by the House 
     last session. That bill is still pending in the Senate Budget 
     and Government Affairs Committees. The bill as introduced 
     amends the Budget Act to provide that:
       In addition to the existing rescission process, the 
     President may submit special rescission messages within 3 
     calendar days of the enactment of any appropriations bill 
     during the remainder of the 103rd Congress;
       Within two legislative days after the receipt of the 
     message by Congress, the majority or minority leader of the 
     House must introduce, by request, the draft rescission 
     approval bill submitted with the President's message, and if 
     the bill is not introduced, any Member may introduce the bill 
     on the following day;
       The bill would be referred to the Appropriations Committee 
     in the House which shall report it without substantive 
     revision, and with our without recommendation, within seven 
     legislative days after receipt of the message, and, if not 
     reported, the committee is automatically discharged and the 
     bill shall be placed on the appropriate calendar;
       The House Appropriations Committee may also report an 
     alternative rescission bill within the same seven day period 
     with respect to the same appropriations measure, containing 
     rescissions of the same or greater amount than the 
     President's bill. The alternative bill would be privileged 
     for consideration in the House only if the President's bill 
     is rejected by the House;
       A motion to proceed to the consideration of either 
     rescission bill in the House is highly privileged, the bill 
     is debatable for four hours divided between proponents and 
     opponents, no amendments are in order, a motion to recommit 
     is not in order, nor is a motion to reconsider the final 
     passage vote;
       The House must vote on final passage of the President's 
     bill no later than 10 legislative days after receipt of the 
     message, and, if rejected, the alternative bill must be voted 
     on no later than the 11th legislative day;
       In the Senate, the bill shall be referred to the Committee 
     on Appropriations which shall report it within seven 
     legislative days of its receipt, without substantive change, 
     or with an amendment in the nature of a substitute consisting 
     of equal or greater rescissions in the same appropriations 
     act; and if the bill is not reported, it shall be discharged 
     and placed on the appropriate calendar;
       The bill is debatable in the Senate for not more than 10-
     hours divided equally between the majority and minority 
     leaders, and no amendment are in order except an amendment in 
     the nature of a substitute reported by the Appropriations 
     Committee or an amendment in the nature of a substitute 
     consisting of the text of the President's bill, and the 
     latter shall have priority over a vote on any alternative;
       A vote on final passage in the Senate must take place no 
     later than 10 legislative days after the bill has been 
     transmitted to the Senate;
       The funds shall be available for expenditure on the day 
     after either House defeats the rescission approval bill;
       Any Member of Congress may file suit challenging the 
     constitutionality of the Act, and such suit shall be 
     considered under expedited judicial review procedures.
                                  ____


            Summary of Michel-Solomon Amendment to H.R. 4600

   (Text of H.R. 493, the Enhanced Rescissions/Receipts Act of 1994)

       The President may submit to Congress a special message for 
     each appropriation bill or revenue bill within 20-days of 
     their enactment, proposing to rescind all or part of any 
     budget authority or veto any targeted tax benefit (defined as 
     a benefit for the differential treatment to a particular 
     taxpayer or limited class of taxpayers).
       The budget authority shall be rescinded dor the tax benefit 
     vetoed unless a bill of disapproval is passed by Congress 
     within 20 days of session and enacted into law. The President 
     would have the constitutional 10 days to sign or veto a 
     disapproval bill and Congress would have 5 days of session to 
     override a veto.
       If the last session of Congress adjourns sine die before 
     the expiration of the 20 day period, the rescission of tax 
     veto will not take effect but will be considered to be 
     automatically retransmitted on the first day of the next 
     Congress.
       Each rescission or tax veto message shall be referred to 
     the appropriate committees of the House and Senate.
       Any disapproval bill introduced shall be referred to the 
     appropriate committees of the House and Senate.
       disapproval bills in the Senate would be limited to not 
     more than 10 hours of debate equally divided between the 
     majority and minority leaders.
       It would not be in order in either House to consider a 
     disapproval bill that relates to any matter other than the 
     President's message; nor shall it be in order in either House 
     to consider an amendment to a disapproval bill; and these 
     requirements may not be waived or suspended in the Senate 
     except by a vote of three-fifths of the duly sworn Members of 
     that body.

                          ____________________