[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 81 (Thursday, June 23, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 23, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZA- TION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending 
amendment be temporarily laid aside and we move to the Feingold 
amendment, the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Do I hear objection? The Chair hears none, and 
the amendment is laid aside. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 1841

     (Purpose: To delay procurement of the CVN-76 aircraft carrier)

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold], for himself, Mr. 
     Simon, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Bumpers, Mr. Sasser, and Mr. 
     Wellstone, proposes an amendment numbered 1841.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 22, between lines 9 and 10, insert the following:

     SEC. 122. CVN-76 AIRCRAFT CARRIER PROGRAM.

       No contract (including a contract for advance procurement 
     of long lead items) may be entered into for procurement of a 
     CVN-76 aircraft carrier on or after the date of the enactment 
     of this Act and before October 1, 1999. Any such contract 
     (other than a contract for procurement of long lead items) 
     that has been entered into before the date of the enactment 
     of this Act shall be terminated.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair. I thank the chairman of the 
committee for his courtesy in working with me to arrive at a time to 
bring up this amendment.
  I offer this amendment on behalf of myself, Senators Sasser, Simon, 
Bumpers, Harkin, and Wellstone. I rise again today to oppose the 
procurement of the Navy's CVN-76 nuclear aircraft carrier. Our 
amendment prohibits the expenditure of additional funds on the CVN-76 
aircraft carrier until after fiscal year 1999 and, by implication, what 
this amendment does is assumes that our carrier force will be reduced 
from its current level of 12 to 11 carriers.
  This amendment will reduce spending in this bill in this coming year 
by a total of $3.6 billion. This amendment alone will reduce this 
authorization bill by $3.6 billion.
  Mr. President, the CVN-76 is the largest single military procurement 
reported out by the Armed Services Committee this year. Obviously, the 
question with this amendment is, Should we do this? Should we go 
forward with it? I think it is time we face some hard facts. We simply 
do not have the resources to continue large program procurements 
indefinitely without having, out on this Senate floor, a serious and 
open debate on their value in the post-cold-war world.
  The often cited statistics that our defense expenditures have fallen 
consistently since the 1980's are true, but they tell only half of the 
story. That is because, Mr. President, we won the cold war. We are in a 
new era. It is an era that is, of course, dangerous in its own right, 
but it is in many ways profoundly less dangerous than was the cold war 
era.
  We should be able to expect defense expenditures to decline 
accordingly while the Pentagon adapts to the new threats of the post-
cold-war era.
  As my colleague from Iowa, Senator Harkin, has pointed out, this bill 
proposes to spend more on defense than all other major military powers 
combined and four times the amount of all potential adversaries 
combined, including Russia and China.
  Now, I do not think we need to tell anyone in this body that $3.6 
billion is real money even for the Federal Government, particularly as 
we face threatening Federal deficits. We, in Congress, should be held 
responsible for allocating that money wisely to combat any threats to 
our national security. And, of course, our national security does 
include protection from external military threats.
  Mr. President, it also includes threats to our economic health and 
well-being. It also includes, in my mind--
  Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator from Wisconsin yield for a brief question?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I will yield.
  Mr. NUNN. What I would like to propose is 45 minutes on each side on 
this amendment. I understand that has been generally acceptable to the 
Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. That is acceptable.
  Mr. NUNN. And I understand it is acceptable to the minority--90 
minutes equally divided.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be 90 minutes 
equally divided for debate on Senator Feingold's amendment with the 
time equally divided and controlled in the usual form, with no 
amendment in order thereto or to any language which may be stricken; 
that when the time is used or yielded back, the Senate, without 
intervening action, vote on or in relation to the amendment of the 
Senator from Wisconsin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Do I hear objection?
  Mr. LOTT. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President, and I do not 
intend to do so, I would like an opportunity to review the unanimous 
consent request.
  Mr. President, in the absence of the ranking member, who is attending 
a hearing that the Armed Services Committee is having at this time on 
Bosnia, it is my understanding that this is an acceptable unanimous-
consent request, and I will not object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair and the ranking member for working 
out the time agreement.
  Let me just return to my initial point. That is, of course, that 
national security includes external threats, but it also includes our 
own economic well-being in this country. And for me and for all the 
Members of this body, it has to include things like the ability to walk 
safely in the streets of Milwaukee, WI, without the fear of murder or 
assault.
  Mr. President, $3.6 billion could cover so many causes which also 
need funding. It could be used to increase the DOD's readiness account, 
which many feel is underfunded; for less than $1 billion we could cover 
our arrearages at the United Nations; for $45 million a year, it is 
estimated we could provide the disability payments to those veterans 
who are afflicted with Persian Gulf war syndrome, an issue that I know 
the Armed Services Committee is addressing. For just $413 million, Mr. 
President, of this $3.6 billion, we could endow the Byrne Grant 
Memorial Fund to send State and local law enforcement agencies to 
assist in antidrug operations and for prevention programs such as 
D.A.R.E., a drug awareness program for youth; $3.6 billion could fund 
the Ryan White AIDS fund, research on Alzheimer's, combating 
cryptosporidium, which is a parasite that has invaded our 
water supplies in our State of Wisconsin and Milwaukee. And yet that 
amount is still only one-fiftieth of the amount we are wasting on 
paying the interest on the Federal debt this year.
  Mr. President, we must carefully consider whether all of these causes 
are less of a priority than building a 12th carrier in the post-cold-
war era.
  This is the central question today. If we believe that a strong 
defense is essential for our country, and I do; if we believe that the 
Navy is an essential element in that defense, and I do; if we believe 
that this country deserves a strong shipbuilding industry, and I do; 
then when is the best time to build the next nuclear super carrier--not 
whether we will build one, but what is the best time? Some say it must 
be built in fiscal year 1995, claiming that delays in its construction 
will weaken the national defense and threaten the shipbuilding 
industry. But I do not agree with that.
  Of course, there are some of my colleagues who oppose other excesses 
in this bill who may still want to support the CVN-76. After all, they 
can say that the President of the United States made it very clear in 
the State of the Union that he supported no more defense cuts, and he 
got a standing ovation. I did not join in that ovation, but certainly 
there were many who agreed.
  Mr. President, I came to this body last year with a strong personal 
conviction that is really very simple. If the Government does not need 
to spend money on some project, then it should not spend the money. We 
cannot afford it, with a $4.5 trillion debt, that was $4.59190805316 
trillion as of last Friday, as we find out in the Chamber; every day we 
are in session we get the new report.
  Consequently, Mr. President, I do not believe that there can ever be 
a magic number, a dollar total etched in stone that shields any 
department or agency budget from the careful scrutiny of Congress. That 
is why I opposed firewalls in the budget debate and why I, frankly, 
believe that President Clinton was wrong to say ``no more defense 
cuts'' in his State of the Union Address.
  In that same vein, I am reminded of the views expressed by my 
colleague from Nebraska, Senator Exon, during our debate on defense 
firewalls in the budget resolution. He claimed that they would undercut 
the role of the authorizers and appropriators in this body. I would 
extend that Exon argument to conclude that this doctrine of no more 
defense cuts will undercut the entire congressional role in budgeting. 
It will impair our constitutional efforts to provide for a defense 
befitting our available resources, as well as all threats, foreign and 
domestic.
  So, Mr. President, today many say that we must build that CVN-76 and 
that we have to do it in fiscal year 1995. But I am not convinced that 
the case has been made strongly enough to warrant a huge $3.6 billion 
expenditure next year, in order to sustain a 12-carrier force, when it 
is very arguable that there are other more pressing demands on our very 
thin budget.
  Does this make me or the proponents of this proposal any less 
committed to national security? Certainly not. Nobody opposes the 
strongest defense America can afford. Nobody opposes strengthening our 
forces to gird against any kind of attack, and nobody supports exposing 
our troops to unnecessary threats or leaving them anything less than 
being fully prepared for any kind of conflict. Rather, these kinds of 
debates ask and should turn on how to define national security. How do 
we balance all the demand and priorities our Nation faces each year, 
and how do we best reach what are really our similar goals?
  Mr. President, the key to this is that less than a year ago, the then 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin released the results of a comprehensive 
review of post-cold-war military requirements to ensure the security of 
the Nation.
  That so-called Bottom-Up Review assumed that the United States might 
be faced with the requirement to fight two nearly simultaneous major 
regional conflicts or MRC's. And the assumption was that they would be 
fought without the help of our allies, although we had to have the help 
of our allies on many occasions. This whole report and analysis is 
based on the notion of the two MRC's without the help of allies.
  To quote from page 51 of that report.

       * * * the analysis confirmed that a force of 10 carriers 
     would be adequate to fight two nearly simultaneous MRC's. 
     That assessment was based on many factors, from potential 
     sortie generation capability and arrival periods on station 
     to the interdependence of carrier-based aviation and its 
     criticality if land-based air elements are delayed in 
     arriving in the theater.


  The Bottom-Up Review also states that, according to a different 
rationale, 12 carriers are needed--not 10 but 12--to maintain a 
peacetime presence in the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the 
Western Pacific. Even the Armed Services Committee this year criticized 
the Navy for dragging its feet on a mandated study of alternatives for 
providing this peacetime presence since we do not have information, 
although it should have been provided to the committee.
  But for the moment, let us focus on the number of 12 carriers as the 
Pentagon's requirement for peacetime operations.
  Repeating again, the Bottom-Up Review itself said that 10 was 
sufficient for two simultaneous MRC's without allies.
  Mr. President, the Navy will begin fiscal year 1995 with a force of 
12 carriers: 5 conventionally powered and 7 powered with nuclear 
reactors. The Navy plans to retire two of its conventional carriers 
before the year 2000. Two nuclear carriers, the Stennis and the United 
States, are currently under construction, and will both be in operation 
by 2000. Now, to replace the Kitty Hawk, which will be retired by 
2003,the Navy wants to begin building an additional nuclear-powered, 
Nimitz-class carrier, called CVN-76, next year. My amendment will 
terminate plans to procure the CVN-76 next year, and would, in effect, 
delay procurement of the next carrier until fiscal year 2000, when the 
Navy plans to procure still another nuclear carrier.

  The authors of the Bottom-Up Review considered options which closely 
parallel the provisions of my amendment. They recognized that delaying 
CVN-76 procurement until fiscal year 2000 would produce significant 
savings in the near term. Yet they rejected postponing procurement of 
the CVN-76 because of the excessive costs of building carriers 
frequently enough after fiscal year 2000 to sustain a 12-carrier force. 
They appropriately called these excessive costs a procurement ``bow 
wave.'' I agree, if we keep 12 carriers, that this bow wave could be 
excessive; it is also unnecessary. Under the provisions of my 
amendment, I would expect that the carrier force would drop from 12 to 
11 in the year 2003 when the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk is retired.

  Mr. President, my amendment would provide a carrier-force level equal 
to the 12 requested by the Pentagon for peacetime through the remainder 
of this century and 11 thereafter while saving $3.6 billion in fiscal 
year 1995. This amendment is a very moderate proposal which respects 
the Pentagon's own analysis of national security needs. Many outside 
experts challenge the 12-carrier requirement in today's post-cold-war 
world; after all, we had 12 carriers for much of the cold war and even 
through World War II. Alternative analyses from independent authorities 
like the Defense Budget Project, the Rand Corp., and the Brookings 
Institution conclude that post-cold-war requirements range between 6 
and 10 carriers--not 11 and not 12. The Rand study, for instance, 
determined that 4 to 5 carriers would be needed for each of the two 
MRC's for a total of 8 to 10 carriers. The Brookings study considered 
three alternative scenarios to the Bush-Cheney baseline scenario for 
which the Cheney Pentagon claimed it needed 12 carriers. One Brookings 
scenario posited the emergence of a post-Soviet Russia which, in 
retrospect, was overly optimistic. Another Brookings scenario posited 
the existence of a strong post-cold war arms control environment in 
which advanced weapons technologies would be tightly controlled. Under 
both of these scenarios, the authors of the study determined that six 
carriers would be sufficient. The third Brookings scenario assumed the 
evolution of a reformed Pentagon culture and an enlightened 
understanding of the role of moral authority, diplomatic skills, and 
economic assets alongside military assets. It also provided a larger 
measure of active-duty ground forces and air forces to ensure favorable 
MRC outcomes and to permit rotation and reinforcement of deployed 
forces. Under that scenario, the authors determined that nine carriers 
were needed. Mr. President, my colleagues need not embrace any of these 
alternative assessments in order to support my amendment because my 
amendment permits a carrier-force level which exceeds all of these 
alternatives even after the year 2003. We would go from 12 to 11 
carriers.

  The question here today is whether a 12th supercarrier after 2003 is 
worth $3.6 billion in the fiscal year 1995 budget. What exactly do we 
get for our $3.6 billion investment in a twelfth supercarrier?
  I have found the answers to those questions pretty hard to pin down. 
Let us begin with some hidden additional costs that we will know will 
happen if we build this 12th supercarrier. We know from the GAO 
analysis that we will get an additional bill each year after that 
supercarrier is in operation for about $1 billion; $1 billion per year 
as the operating costs for a 12th carrier battle group.
  The story that many CVN-76 supporters would prefer we ignore in this 
debate is that along with the procurement of CVN-76 goes substantial 
operating costs as well as procurement costs not just for the CVN-76 
itself but also for the aircraft in its airwing and the ships that have 
to escort this powerful and very valuable warship. And make no mistake 
about it, Mr. President, CVN-76 is a very powerful warship which would 
be coveted by any military commander in the world. By the way, which of 
the navies of the world have carriers on a par with U.S. supercarriers? 
Certainly there must be some potential opponent out there that shares 
our thirst for supercarriers and can threaten us. The answer, Mr. 
President, is none, no one. No country has that. There is no ship in 
the history of the world that has the kind of power of the U.S. 
supercarrier and, even without CVN-76, we will have 11 supercarriers.
  CVN-76's power comes from its airwing, the dozens of aircraft which 
make up the supercarrier's central mission--the projection of airpower. 
Buying yet another supercarrier will get us more airpower but let us be 
specific, Mr. President. Spending $3.6 billion on CVN-76 will provide 
approximately only 60-days per year during which a supercarrier will be 
operating in the world's critical ocean areas. Sixty additional 
peacetime days during which naval aircraft would be immediately 
available in case of the sudden and unexpected outbreak of hostilities. 
Without the CVN-76, its supporters would like to paint a picture of 
oceans devoid of Navy ships and an Oval Office photograph of the 
President powerless to respond to the aggression of dictators around 
the world.
  It is time to replace that imagery of a world without CVN-76 with 
some facts. By 2003, the Navy will have not only 11 supercarriers but 
11 other aircraft carriers as well. These additional 11 carriers are 
specialized for marine operations and described in Navy literature as 
multipurpose amphibious assault ships, capable of operating helicopters 
and aircraft like the Harrier, a light attack aircraft. These 
additional 11 carriers are not supercarriers; they are much smaller but 
they are as capable as any foreign aircraft carriers. According to the 
Center for Naval Analyses, advanced aircraft technologies soon will 
permit similar smaller carriers to generate as many long-range aircraft 
sorties as CVN-76 and twice as many shorter range sorties as CVN-76--
twice as many sorties.
  These important concepts foretell powerful and more economical ways 
to deploy 21st century naval airpower but they are not in the images 
that today's CVN-76 supporters paint. Indeed, we would do better to 
spend at least part of the $3.6 billion in researching and developing 
more appropriate vehicles for the future than countering today's 
threats with excess supercarriers.
  CVN-76 supporters also seem not to mention--and maybe even ignore--
other powerful ships which the Navy has described as suitable to 
operate jointly or independently as flagships of maritime action groups 
which would and can provide long-range antisurface and strike 
capabilities. In 2003, the Navy will have over 20 Aegis cruisers and 
even more Aegis DDG-51 destroyers. The Navy proudly reminds us that 
during Desert Storm, Aegis cruisers fired 105 Tomahawk cruise missiles 
at Iraqi land targets, controlled tens of thousands of aircraft 
sorties, and even detected and tracked Iraqi Scud missiles. Soon, we 
are told, these cruisers will have a theater ballistic missile defense 
capability. Yet somehow they are off the books when we consider ships 
to patrol peacetime waters for several weeks each year in order to fill 
the relatively minor gap created not to go forward with building the 
CVN-76 and decide to live with 11 rather than 12 carriers.
  So let us not be coaxed into believing that the nuclear supercarrier 
is the only response to every crisis in today's world. When we look at 
the danger of reducing our supercarrier force from 12 to 11 in 2003, to 
say that we must respond to every crisis with a supercarrier is to 
ignore our entire true record of the post-World War II experience. In 
1978, for instance, Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan of Brookings 
found that during the first three decades of the cold war, when 
effective crisis management was paramount to nuclear deterrence, that 
the Navy responded to 177 crisis. Of these responses, carriers were 
involved in only about 60 percent of the crises. A 1991 study by the 
Center for Naval Analyses revisited the same question but in more 
detail. They found that between 1946 and 1990 Navy responded to 207 
crises in which carriers were involved only 68 percent of the time.
  Let us look at the other 32 percent of the cases--the one out of 
three cases in which a supercarrier was not needed and often was not 
even the best-suited ship to the mission at hand. During Desert Storm, 
for instance, there were six supercarriers involved. Yet, the first 
naval strikes were not aircraft but cruise missiles launched from the 
battleship U.S.S. Wisconsin. Even after the end of the war, the later 
strikes on Iraq were cruise missile strikes, presumably because the 
mission did not justify risking the lives of American pilots. Another 
example was the daring rescue of United States and Soviet diplomats 
from Somalia in January 1991, coincidentally during the build up for 
Desert Storm. The marines were inserted by specialized helicopters from 
the U.S.S. Trenton, an amphibious ship, in spite of the fact that the 
region was bristling with supercarrier activity. Once again, the 
supercarrier was not the right ship for the mission. An amphibious ship 
was simply better suited to this operation than a mammoth supercarrier.
  Mr. President, the military utility of replacing the U.S.S. Kitty 
Hawk with CVN-76 is not worth $3.6 billion. But there is another image 
which CVN-76 supporters paint as well and it has to do with preserving 
shipbuilding industry. I recently received a strong and thoughtful 
letter from a consortium of nine Wisconsin companies who are vendors to 
the shipyard which builds our supercarriers, the Newport News Division 
of Tenneco. The Wisconsin consortium expressed what they called their 
profound disappointment on learning that I was opposed to the CVN-76 
this year. I appreciate their views on this matter and understand the 
special sensitivity that changes from Washington can further threaten 
Wisconsin shipbuilders and suppliers.
  Since 1981, Wisconsin shipbuilding has not been a growth industry. In 
spite of the navy buildup we have seen severe impacts on many 
suppliers, and the demise of one of our three shipyards, Bay 
Shipbuilding in Door County. Door County alone has experienced some of 
the highest unemployment rates in Wisconsin because of the loss of Bay 
Shipbuilding. Furthermore, one of the two remaining Wisconsin shipyards 
is also in Door County, where projected labor force decline accounts 
for 5 percent of that county's entire work force. So I am not 
insensitive to the shipbuilding industrial base argument.
  However, Mr. President, I would like to use the words from this 
letter to set the dire image portrayed by CVN-76 proponents.

       Any delay in funding would lead to the deterioration of the 
     nuclear-shipbuilding industrial base. The labor force 
     required for the construction of the carrier is both highly 
     specialized and highly skilled. If funding for the carrier is 
     delayed, this quality, specialized labor force will be 
     dispersed, making it difficult if not impossible to 
     reconstitute for future, high-technology shipbuilding 
     programs.

  Mr. President, let us assume for the moment how the assessments in 
the letter about the specific impacts on Wisconsin business are 
substantially accurate. I must say, however, that to conclude that the 
production of CVN-76 this year will alleviate these pressures misses 
perhaps the most important problem we face. The fact is that America's 
shipbuilding industry is gravely ill. So ill, in fact, that remedies 
like building another supercarrier are likely to be insufficient and, 
based upon past experience, might even do more harm than good to the 
industry.
  The American shipbuilding industry has struggled since the end of 
world War II. By the late 1970's, the industry was so uncompetitive in 
the world market that it received Government price subsidies 
approaching 50 percent of the U.S. ship construction sold overseas. 
President Reagan stopped those subsidies in 1981 but offered his naval 
buildup as an alternative market. That was an attractive temporary fix 
for the 1980's but did little to help the American industry adapt to 
the world market. Meanwhile Germany, Japan, and Korea have set the pace 
in international shipbuilding. Now the cold war is over. The Navy 
shipbuilding boom market of the 1980's is now a bear market. Did that 
Navy business make America's shipbuilding industry more competitive? 
Apparently not.
  Today this industry is in such bad shape that, even with CVN-76 
construction, the Pentagon recently forecasted that several shipyards 
may be on the verge of failing over the next 5 years. In other words, 
without strong actions by the private as well as public sections, the 
industry's only option will be to restructure and contract in response 
to reduced Navy business. Under those conditions, building CVN-76 in 
fiscal year 1995 is like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. We 
need, instead, to have a concerted effort that rationally and 
aggressively intervenes with a wide range of remedies. Unfortunately 
the Pentagon is giving us more confusion that coherence; more smoke 
than light.
  For instance, the Navy says that a delay in CVN-76 procurement would 
risk the loss of specialized shipyard skills along with critical 
vendors. Yet the GAO recently testified before the House Armed Services 
Committee that:

       DOD and the Navy have not provided information needed to 
     judge the overall to judge the overall cost/benefit 
     implications of moving to nuclear shipyard consolidation. DOD 
     has not identified which critical vendors and which skills 
     would be lost, the cost of reconstituting those vendors and 
     skills, or alternative ways of preserving them. Without these 
     industrial base assessments it is difficult to determine the 
     optimum approach to achieve the Navy's force and 
     modernization objectives in the most cost effective manner.
       We do not know what the impact of not building the CVN-76 
     would be on critical vendors. There is not even a consensus 
     within the Department of the Navy as to how you define 
     critical vendors.

  The Bottom-Up Review claimed that the loss of specialized shipyard 
skills could be reconstituted. Last fall, they speculated that a delay 
to the year 2000 would cost $2.1 billion to recoup. Last spring, a Navy 
shipbuilding expert privately admitted to my staff, though that the 
number was more like $1.5 billion. Last month, TENNECO lobbyists 
claimed the cost was $400 to $500 million for a 1-year dalay--yet this 
week some proponents of the CVN-76 are talking about an estimate of 
$300 million to delay CVN-76 to the year 2000--assuming that the force 
remains locked at 12. Suffice it to say, Mr. President, that the 
Pentagon is still searching for a serious assessment of the industrial 
base impact of delaying the procurement of CVN-76. Meanwhile, by simply 
pushing for the procurement of CVN-76 this year, the Navy shirks the 
gravity of the underlying industrial situation and prescribes a remedy 
which is too expensive and may not actually help.
  There are, however, many options which are cheaper and more promising 
than doling out a $3.6 billion jobs bill to Newport News. There is even 
cause for some cautious optimism about these options. To begin with, 
Mr. President, this is a defense conversion problem that is more 
promising than many we face in other American industries.
  There is a booming international commercial market of between 13,600 
and 17,800 ship orders in the 10-year period ending in 2001. Last year, 
President Clinton seized the moment by inaugurating the first 
comprehensive national plan for strengthening America's shipyards. His 
program seeks to end foreign subsidies, eliminate unnecessary domestic 
regulations, provide loan guarantees for overseas orders, assist in 
international marketing, and improve shipyard competitiveness through a 
program called Maritech. Newport News is an aggressive participant in 
this program. They were recently awarded a substantial contract to 
transform their operation into a world-class commercial shipbuilder by 
1996. This is a very promising step and the overseas markets have taken 
notice. The Greek shipping firm, Eletson, has announced intentions to 
buy up to four Double Eagle tankers contingent upon successful 
modernization at Newport News. There is also talk at Newport News of 
some promising leads on other international military orders.
  The Eletson-Newport News deal is very promising but not enough. 
Commercial business alone or along with CVN-76 will not redeem the 
situation. The nuclear shipbuilding industry probably will not survive 
without restructuring in order to adapt to the reduced Navy demand for 
nuclear ships. The Pentagon's own analysis in the Bottom-Up Review 
concluded that a consolidation into one facility at Newport News would 
save about $1.8 billion through the end of the decade and would permit 
the delay of CVN-76 construction. So if we need to restructure to 
survive and restructuring permits us to do without CVN-76, then why are 
we being asked to build CVN-76 in fiscal year 1995. The most obvious 
step, instead, is to immediately consolidate nuclear shipbuilding 
operations which currently take place in two separate and each 
underutilized shipyards. Yet the Bottom-Up Review and the Armed 
Services Committee avoid recommending that option. Consequently we will 
probably be asked this week to vote on Seawolf construction at one 
shipyard and then to vote on CVN-76 construction at the other shipyard 
as if the two issues were not part of the same underlying problem. Let 
me restate this critical point. Consolidation alone could solve the 
nuclear shipbuilding problem according to the Bottom-Up Review at 
substantial savings in the billions yet we are asked instead to buy 
CVN-76 in fiscal year 1995 and a third Seawolf in fiscal year 1996 in 
order to preserve our nuclear shipbuilding industrial base.

  Furthermore, even without consolidation, there are other options 
which will at least mitigate the impact of delays to CVN-76 
construction. To begin with, Mr. President, let me remind my colleagues 
that there are more than two shipyards involved in the critical Navy 
shipbuilding industrial base. The Pentagon counts a total of 16 
facilities: 12 private shipyards which do construction and repairs and 
4 public Navy yards which do repairs. The Pentagon lists a total of 97 
new construction orders currently on the books. Newport News is 
unquestionably the largest and most diversified shipyard in America. 
Again, I would remind my colleagues that the authors of the Bottom-Up 
Review believe that Newport News could survive, even if the CVN-76 were 
delayed, if all future carrier and submarine construction were 
consolidated there. But even if that were not the case, then let the 
other Navy orders for construction and overhauls be optimally allocated 
according to our total national security needs including the welfare of 
our shipbuilding industry and its supplier base. We need a thorough and 
rational review of these industrial base questions rather than simply 
continuing to build ships that we do not need at prices that we cannot 
afford.
  In conclusion, Mr. President, we do not need a 12th supercarrier. We 
do not need to buy CVN-76 next year. The shipbuilding industry is so 
gravely ill that another carrier may not be enough to save it without 
the consolidation of nuclear shipyards--a move which would make CVN-76 
unnecessary for industry survival.
  I have outlined three sources of relief to offset the impact of not 
building CVN-76, Mr. President. Let me summarize them in order to help 
clarify a very complex problem. First, we need to step out of the way 
of the private sector and do what we can to foster the prompt 
consolidation of the nuclear shipbuilding industry. The BUR claims this 
alone would mitigate the impact of a CVN-76 delay.
  Second, we need to set up a BRAC-style process for the reallocation 
of Navy work among private and public yards nationwide in a manner that 
best serves America's economic security--the foundation of our national 
security. Finally, we need to continue strong support for defense 
conversion projects like Maritech, including the ongoing work at 
Newport News to become a class-commercial shipyard by 1996 in order to 
compete in today's booming international commercial market. Otherwise, 
to quote one shipbuilding executive, ``We are just prolonging the 
misery.''
  This is a hard fact of the end of any war--even a cold one. I was 
recently in Angola, a country locked in 17 years of a vicious civil 
war. While there I visited a prosthetics factory for amputee victims of 
landmines. The factory is a wartime industry. When the war is over, the 
demand for prosthetics will hopefully decrease, and the workload in the 
factory will go down. The factory may even close, and some technicians 
will lose their jobs. Would we suggest a subsidy for the prosthetics 
factory in postwar Angola to keep the technicians employed? No. 
Similarly, the military-industrial-scientific complex in this country 
must right-size itself when its mission no longer fits our needs.

  When all is said and done, however, I do not believe that we can 
delay CVN-76 procurement for 5 years or consolidate the nuclear 
industry without significant nationwide economic impacts. Some of those 
impacts may even be a shifting of individual companies and workers from 
one sector of the industry to another. These could be significant 
disruptions which could affect Wisconsin among other States. I have 
often said that in our search for cuts in unnecessary Government 
Programs, no State should be immune. But in order to be true to that 
commitment, the people of Wisconsin as well as the rest of America know 
that some dislocations are part of a concerted plan to improve our 
economy as well as our national security. We must not settle for doling 
out Navy public works projects. We need to make a commitment to 
actually turn the industry around. That is exactly the goal stated by 
President Clinton--to provide a healthy shipbuilding industry in order 
to provide for our military and economic welfare. I am committed to 
that goal and opposed to building the CVN-76.
  Mr. President, I have more time, but I would like to use it later, 
after I listen to my colleagues speak. Let me simply say at this point 
that this is a modest proposal. It is not the 6 that some have 
suggested, it is not 6 supercarriers and not 7, it is not 9, and not 
even 10. It is just one less, and an opportunity in next year's budget 
to save $3.6 billion.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. ROBB addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Dorgan). The Senator from Virginia [Mr. 
Robb] is recognized.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may use.
  Mr. President, I applaud the Senator from Wisconsin for his 
commitment to fiscal responsibility. I share that concern and have 
worked with him on a number of projects to accomplish that particular 
end. I do not question his motives in this particular case, but I 
believe that in this particular instance, attempting to save money in 
this particular way would be a little bit like eating our seed corn.
  Mr. President, the Senator from Wisconsin has nonetheless raised a 
question on the floor that is important regarding when--if you accept 
the literal reading of the amendment, sometime after 1999--to build the 
next nuclear aircraft carrier--the CVN-76. This is obviously not an 
idle question or one of small import.
  As the Senator from Wisconsin has indicated, it is a significant item 
in the President's budget request for fiscal year 1995, no question 
about it. Construction of the carrier has been requested, delayed, 
restored, debated, authorized, appropriated, both with and without 
authorization, and discussed in such strategic and financial detail 
that even a keen observer might be confused as to where we stand.
  Where we stand is as the sole remaining superpower in the world.
  Where we stand is as a Nation dependent on sea power to protect 
American interests abroad and to reliably project military force where 
and when it is needed.
  Where we stand is at a point of decision, not solely on one ship but 
on the future of America's ability to ever build another nuclear 
aircraft carrier.
  Let one point be clear, Mr. President: To delay CVN-76 to the year 
2000 or beyond is to kill not only this carrier, but to cripple 
America's ability to ever build another one. I will not stand here and 
try to tell the Senate that CVN-76 is inexpensive. This is a big ticket 
item. But proper defense in this day and age is never inexpensive--
although, I add that I would rather pay in dollars to maintain our 
strength and to deter a war than to pay in lives because that 
deterrence failed.
  The facts are these: It will never be less expensive to build another 
carrier. America's interests and the threats to them are not shrinking, 
they are growing. A smaller Navy will require more capable ships, not 
less capable ships. They are going to have to be able to maintain the 
same levels of power projection that are needed to address those 
particular threats if we simply maintain the status quo. The endurance 
and flexibility of carriers has been proven time and again to be the 
most efficient and reliable way to meet those requirements.
  I contend, Mr. President, that few in this body are more 
conscientious of the value of the Federal dollar than I am. The 
question, before we spend any dollar, should be: What do we get for 
this? What is its value?
  Building CVN-76 on schedule yields sensible answers to those 
questions. First, America would get the finest ship possible, built 
with the best technology in the world and ready to meet any challenge. 
Challenges to America's interests did not evaporate with the end of the 
cold war. A look at the globe will show that instability and conflict 
are scattered as widely today as they ever have been.
  In a sense, our challenge today is even greater than 10 years ago 
when then Navy Secretary John Lehman laid down the maritime strategy 
for offensive operations against the Soviet Union--the strategy, I 
might add, which called for a Navy nearly twice the size envisioned in 
the Bottom-Up Review. Then we knew where the challenges lay; today, 
they could be literally anywhere.
  The world has not shrunk, so the patrol areas for aircraft carriers 
are every bit as large as they were 10 years ago or 50 years ago. To 
assert that the end of the cold war means the carrier force can be 
safely cut ignores that reality.

  Second, completion of CVN-76 on schedule would allow the Navy to 
maintain its carrier fleet at strength, avoiding the crises of 
overworked crews and very high operational tempo, which already affect 
the readiness of our deployed forces.
  A number of Navy captains and admirals have told the Armed Services 
Committee that current extended deployments are destroying morale and 
clobbering retention of skilled sailors and naval aviators.
  The lengthy maintenance required by older carriers are a real driver 
in that OPTEMPO.
  I urge my colleagues to remember that we are here today because the 
Bottom-Up Review found a need--not a desire, not a wish, but a military 
need--for 12 aircraft carriers.
  The Navy and the administration are not looking for places to spend 
money willy-nilly.
  The President requested this ship because the Navy needs it to 
maintain America's presence and deter aggression; if need be, to fight 
a war; and to train our sailors and naval aviators.
  Consider, Mr. President, where that 12-carrier fleet is.
  At any given time, one carrier is off the coast of Florida for 
training. That leaves 11. One carrier is in the Service Life Extension 
Program, being rebuilt so that the taxpayers can get an extra decade of 
service out of an existing hull. That is 10. Two carriers are in 
nuclear refueling or major overhaul. That leaves eight. Four are 
enroute to or from their patrol areas, or in their homeport building up 
for the next deployment and giving the crews some brief rotation 
ashore. That, in effect, at any given time, leaves four carriers to 
cover the world.
  If we start cutting the number in the fleet, what capability do we 
lose? Should we stop training? Obviously, we cannot do that. Should we 
cancel rotations home and just keep the men and women of the fleet at 
sea 12 months a year? That obviously would not fly either. Should we 
cancel maintenance and just run the carriers into the ground? In some 
instances we are getting pretty close to doing that already.
  In short, Mr. President, there is good reason to keep the fleet at 
12. Building CVN-76 on schedule does that.
  Third, completing CVN-76 on schedule keeps America's only facility 
capable of building these aircraft carriers open and operating 
efficiently. Whatever alternative opponents may have in mind can 
scarcely keep that vital, highly skilled work force anywhere near 
intact.
  In a recent letter to Senators, the Senator from Wisconsin suggested 
``combining'' nuclear submarine and surface ship construction in one 
yard might be the best way to preserve that unique work force.
  I have to confess that that idea is not without appeal because 
Virginia is home to the only shipyard capable of doing just that.
  But the same Bottom-Up Review the Senator cites so approvingly 
rejected this particular notion outright.
  Fourth, about half of the funding for the ship has already been 
appropriated; indeed, some construction has begun.
  I might suggest that to interrupt construction so that we can wait a 
few years, to pay more inflation-depleted dollars to rejuvenate the 
capability to build the ship and then to build the ship is simply not a 
fiscally responsible course.
  Our Nation abides between two great oceans, which have given our 
Nation protection from so many of the conflicts which affected other 
areas of the globe. But those same oceans insulate America from many of 
those places where American people and American national interests can 
be found.
  That is why, Mr. President, since the earliest days of our Republic, 
our Nation has maintained her maritime strength. And that is why, in 
these times of global upheaval and instability, we should not let that 
strength lapse.
  Delaying the completion of the CVN-76 to the next century would not 
only represent a lapse of strength, it would be a sign to the world 
that the United States is prepared to stand aside and let other nations 
determine the course of world events.
  It is my hope that those who might be tempted to strike the carrier 
authorization would look hard at four key issues: Military utility; 
operational tempo; maintenance of an industrial base recognized as 
vital by the Bottom-Up Review; and the financial consequences to the 
Government of such a delay.
  I know that if these factors are viewed objectively, completing CVN-
76 on schedule makes sense from every angle.
  With that, Mr. President, I suggest that the option that is presented 
by my friend, the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin, while appealing 
in terms of the dollars which appear to be saved in the near term, is 
not cost effective and puts our ability to respond to the challenges 
that we face around the world today at risk and a risk that I do not 
think that we ought to take under the circumstances.
  With that, Mr. President, I yield to my distinguished senior Senator 
and colleague from Virginia whatever time as he may take to address 
this same question.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner] is 
recognized.
  Mr. WARNER. Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague from Virginia. We 
worked on this since the very first day he joined the Armed Services 
Committee.
  I would like to reminisce a moment. In 1969 I was privileged to go to 
the Department of Defense as an Under Secretary of the Navy, and a 
great son of Wisconsin was the Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird.
  Few men or women in my lifetime have had a greater impact on my 
career and my thinking than Secretary Melvin Laird. He had served in 
the U.S. Navy in World War II, indeed, with distinction and bore the 
wounds of that war. He understood the full meaning of seapower.
  I recall so well sitting with him one day with John Stennis. I was 
sort of in the background. Senator Jackson had come into the room. 
Secretary Laird was here visiting in the Congress. He had been a Member 
of the House of Representatives for many years, and he had been the 
ranking member of the Defense Subcommittee on Appropriations in the 
House.
  They were talking about carriers. The story was along the lines that 
every President, when awakened in the middle of the night and has to 
reach for that telephone instinctively says, ``Where are the 
carriers?'' Where is that island of the United States from which we can 
project immediate response in the cause of freedom? Where are those 
carriers?
  Let me point out some testimony that was given to the Senate 
Committee on Intelligence earlier this week, Mr. President.
  This first chart represents global instability. I want to make 
certain my friend from Wisconsin can see this. There are charts used by 
the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Clapper, who 
testified this week to the Senate Intelligence Committee.
  He indicated in the clearest of terms the conflicts that were of 
security interest to our country and those of our allies in 1989. Using 
the following criteria, these marks on this world chart were 
established. The first were political instability with violence, 
significant political instability with violence but without sustained 
combat not regarded as a threat. Second were civil war insurgencies, 
sustained combat levels ranging from small guerrilla operations to 
major combat. The latter were in the yellowish categories. The ones 
with the tinge of red were in the secondary category.
  The point is there were roughly 30 conflicts in 1989 in which this 
Nation in varying levels had an interest.
  Then to my astonishment the second chart was raised showing 1994.
  These charts were not prepared for this debate on the aircraft 
carrier. These charts were prepared for a briefing to the Senate of the 
United States regarding the worldwide situation. The same criteria that 
I enumerated for 1989 were used for 1994. And it shows that today there 
has been roughly a doubling. This accounts for roughly 60 instances 
worldwide of some type of disturbance ranging from major combat to 
sustained internal civil war.
  So often we refer as a baseline to the cold war, which was in the 
late eighties and reflected by 1989 or shortly before, and how the 
world has changed.
  But it has changed, Mr. President, in that the threats are no longer 
centralized in terms of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. The 
threats now are fragmented. They are worldwide, but in many respects 
they are just as dangerous, if not more so, to the security of our 
country and that of our allies.
  I did not realize, as closely as I try to follow this situation, the 
quantum increase in that brief period of but 5 years.
  I say to my friend from Wisconsin, given the declining defense 
budgets, given in some respects the declining budgets in the field of 
intelligence, what is the justification that we could use in terms of a 
threat analysis--and indeed it is not that a budget analysis should 
ever determine the magnitude and the sizing of the Armed Forces of the 
United States; it is the threat to the security of this country and 
that of our allies.
  I ask most respectfully of my colleague from Wisconsin, do you have 
any analysis that indicates that the worldwide threat is different than 
the charts--and I can put them back up if you so desire--than that 
brought forth by the Defense Intelligence Agency, an agency totally 
independent of sea power, carriers, or industrial base, an agency 
within the overall umbrella of our central intelligence network which 
has the task, the sole purpose of which is keeping the President, the 
Congress, and other policymakers fully advised as to the threat poised 
against our country and that of our allies?
  I ask the question of my colleague.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, in response to the question of the 
Senator from Virginia, I first grant his premise.
  Mr. WARNER. I cannot hear the Senator.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I certainly grant, Mr. President, the notion that the 
world is a dangerous place; that the actual number of locations where 
there may be a conflict or crisis may be more than it was in 1989.
  I rely, as I am sure the Senator from Virginia does, at least in 
part, on the Bottom-Up Review itself, which was obviously aware of the 
world situation in recommending and saying that we could handle the 
international situation, including two major regional conflicts, with 
10 aircraft carriers in wartime and it suggested 12 in peacetime.
  I do not dispute the assumption that there are serious problems out 
there. But we are suggesting there are other ways to achieve that.
  Mr. WARNER. The problem is growing in number and not diminishing. Do 
you accept that?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. The number of problems, yes, but I am not ready to 
concede that we are in a situation yet where it is more dangerous than 
the cold war. But I do not think I would care to debate whether or not 
it is more dangerous or less.
  The question is, what is the best way, technologically and 
militarily, to deal with the threat that we face? My response is that, 
according to the Bottom-Up Review, they prefer and recommend 12 for 
peacetime but only 10 for wartime. And I believe that we could get the 
capacity of the additional carrier through the alternative means that I 
have suggested.
  And, of course, I also would like to point out, in response, that we 
do not even have complete coverage of all the major oceans, even with 
the 12. That is not even contemplated. I have not even heard my 
colleague propose that. There is a gap even under the current proposal. 
Currently, there are 4 months in each of the two major oceans when we 
have no carrier coverage, even with the 12 carriers.
  So I do not dispute your claim that the world is a troubled place, 
but I do not see what that has to do with whether we need 12 or 11 
aircraft carriers when there are alternatives.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if I may, I respectfully disagree with my 
distinguished colleague's analysis for the basis of cutting in his 
amendment such cuts as he directs. It is an unusual amendment in its 
language, but we will not bother to address that at this time.
  I would just like to add a few concluding remarks, Mr. President. I 
am prepared to yield the floor if there are other colleagues who seek 
recognition at any time, because I intend to remain here until this 
debate is completed.
  But the issue of aircraft carriers is vital because it gets to the 
very heart of our military power and how we use that power as a nation.
  The amendment before us seeks to reduce the size of our Navy in a 
substantial way. No one disputes that a nuclear-powered aircraft 
carrier represents an awesome military capability. Its power and its 
mobility make it an effective instrument, both as a diplomatic tool and 
as a military tool.
  No one disputes that the Navy's carrier construction program has been 
run efficiently over the past decade or more. There are not charges of 
cost overruns in this program. In fact, it is a model of efficiency.
  The challenge to the carrier is the age old question of how much is 
enough? Senator Feingold says we do not need it. The President of the 
United States, however, says, we do need it. And each of his principle 
advisers state we do need it. And now before us is a bill crafted very 
carefully by the Senate Armed Services Committee which likewise states 
unequivocally we do need it.
  The question before the Senate is, should we vote here to kill the 
carrier and challenge the fundamental defense strategy and defense 
structure of the United States? That is the question.
  I would argue such a fundamental shift is not called for and should 
not be undertaken, and there is nothing that has been presented--with 
all due respect to my colleague from Wisconsin --which would justify 
such a reversal of policy.
  However, that is what this amendment seeks to do. In one quick flash, 
the junior Senator from Wisconsin is seeking to alter a fundamental 
part of our overall national security.
  The Senator seeks to do this against the recommendations, as I said, 
of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the committee of 
jurisdiction in the Senate.
  Mr. President, for every academic study that can be quoted arguing 
for a smaller carrier force, there are other studies of at least equal 
merit, if not greater, that argue for a robust carrier force of at 
least 15 aircraft carriers.
  I do not intend to engage in a duel with those who oppose the 
aircraft carriers, throwing quotes back and forth from academic 
studies. I do, however, want to point out that the Department of 
Defense and the Department of the Navy have engaged in rigorous 
analyses on the carriers almost continuously since the 1970's. They 
have studies on all aspects of carrier operational questions, 
industrial base questions, and they are all available should anyone 
desire to take the time to study them.
  You could fill a small library with all the studies which support a 
defense strategy which relies on naval power and a larger carrier 
force. These are not all studies from cold war periods. They are 
studies which had as their purpose determining the best strategy for 
the so-called ``new world'' order.
  One of these studies was done recently by the Institute for Foreign 
Policy Analysis from Cambridge, MA. Dr. Davis, the author of the study, 
is a respected analyst on defense issues. The title of the study is 
Aircraft Carriers and the Role of Naval Power in the 21st Century.
  In the Executive summary, I find this quote.

       The cost to the Nation of reducing the number of carriers 
     below 12 will, in the long run, far outweigh any near term 
     defense saving that some think can be derived.

  The National Academy of Sciences completed a study in 1991 entitled 
``Carrier 21, Future Aircraft Carrier Technology,'' which analyzes the 
relevance of carriers in the future. The National Research Council 
completed a study in 1988 entitled ``Implications of Advancing 
Technology for Naval Operations in the 21st Century,'' and that study 
concluded, ``In the near future, carriers will be called upon 
continuously to fulfill this important national role and mission.''
  The mission referred to was `` * * * to exercise military power in 
instances when the President has needed such an instrument.''
  Mr. President, the opposition to carriers doesn't quote from these 
and other credible studies. They rely on the analysis of others who 
don't support robust naval power for the United States.
  In the interest of balance I believe Senators ought to be aware that 
there is a great deal of analysis which supports the important role of 
carriers and the need for 12 or more carriers.
  Dr. Davis' study is worth reading for every Senator interested in 
this issue and therefore I ask unanimous consent that a short five page 
executive summary of just one of those studies be interested in the 
Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Feingold amendment seeks to alter U.S. 
defense strategy and reject the recommendation of the President and the 
Senate Armed Services Committee. I urge its defeat.
  Mr. President, I see our colleague here, a distinguished carrier 
pilot himself in a former career. I hope he will at this time seek 
recognition and add to this debate.

                               Exhibit 1

                           Executive Summary

                       (By Dr. Jacqueline Davis)

       The defining events of the 1990s--the end of the Cold War, 
     the war in the Gulf, and the dismantling of the Soviet 
     empire--have had a profound effect upon U.S. security 
     planning. Reflected in the Defense Department's ``Bottom-Up 
     Review,'' the Clinton administration is undertaking a major 
     reassessment of defense force structure and logistical 
     support networks designed to meet the challenges of the post-
     Cold War world, while taking into account public sentiment 
     for greater defense economies now that the Soviet threat has 
     dissipated.


                               new risks

       But the breakup of the Soviet Union does not mean that U.S. 
     interests are free from risks. There have emerged new risks 
     in the global security environment--risks that may require 
     the employment of U.S. forces. As the one nation that remains 
     uniquely capable of projecting substantial power beyond its 
     shores--and, hence, having at least some impact on the shape 
     of the post-Cold War world--the United States may find it 
     necessary to deploy its forces to regions where vital U.S. 
     interests may not be at stake, but in which broader 
     humanitarian and democratic values are being challenged. 
     Indeed, the deployment of U.S. contingents to such widely 
     varied crisis settings as Somalia, Northern Iraq, Liberia, 
     and recently Macedonia, has already demonstrated the 
     importance of maintaining flexible forces able to respond to 
     a variety of requirements. As peacekeeping and peace-making 
     operations assume a greater priority in U.S. foreign policy 
     planning, and missions of humanitarian relief and disaster 
     assistance--both at home (as in the case of clean-up 
     operations after Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki) and overseas as 
     well--become the norm rather than the exception in the 
     employment of U.S. forces, civilian and military planners 
     will be compelled to find imaginative solutions to the 
     problem of developing a range of force packages for use in 
     multiple contingencies.


              the aircraft carriers' enabling capabilities

       Inevitably, the challenges of security in the 1990s will 
     place greater emphasis on ``jointness,'' both among the U.S. 
     Services and in connection with allied and coalition 
     planning. Because the aircraft carrier platform is large 
     enough to integrate a mix of Marine, Army and Air Force 
     assets with its own considerable striking power, it will be 
     central to U.S. joint planning in the future--both for 
     peacetime forward presence missions and wartime operations. 
     By virtue of its geography, the United States is a maritime 
     nation whose welfare and global role depends on unimpeded 
     access to the world's sea lines of communication (SLOCs). 
     Even though they may be relatively little direct threat to 
     U.S. navigation on the open seas (now that the Soviet Union 
     has been dismantled), the potential for conflict in key 
     regional theaters is very real--conflicts that could escalate 
     into open warfare either involving the engagement of U.S. 
     forces, or posing a threat to U.S. (and allied) commercial 
     and strategic interests, or both. With the proliferation of 
     weapons technologies and the growing lethality of the forces 
     of potential regional adversaries, the capability of the 
     aircraft carrier battle group will provide to a joint 
     commander or theater CINC an important enabling force to 
     facilitate crisis response, sustained military operations, 
     conflict escalation, and war termination.
       In future theater contingencies--the primary planning focus 
     of the new strategic guidance that is emerging from the 
     Pentagon--there is likely to be a premium placed on those 
     U.S. and allied forces that can: deploy to a theater of 
     operations in a timely fashion; prevent minefields from being 
     laid in the sea approaches to the area; protect sea-lift 
     assets en route and at the point of arrival and departure; 
     deliver firepower against an array of targets whose 
     interdiction would give the adversary's leadership pause to 
     reflect on the utility of proceeding further with its 
     warfare objectives; and, offer a range of flexible 
     options, in terms of strike planning, escalation control, 
     and war termination.
       Against any range of theater scenarios, the aircraft 
     carrier and its associated systems' assets (including its 
     battle-group combatants, but also its deployment of long-
     range precision-guided missiles and new generation sensor-
     fuzed munitions) contribute an unparalleled capability to 
     meet any of these objectives, while providing a tangible 
     demonstration of U.S. capability and will--thereby offering 
     U.S. policymakers a unique crisis management and deterrent 
     tool.
       Pressured by defense budget cuts, which would be even more 
     severe in the out years, the number of aircraft carrier 
     platforms in the active inventory of the Navy is likely to be 
     a subject of contentious debate. As a capability that could 
     aptly be described as a moveable piece of ``sovereign 
     America,'' the aircraft carrier can steam to a crisis 
     location without raising tensions in countries that are not 
     involved. Operationally, it would also not be encumbered by 
     the political debate that often accompanies requests for the 
     overflight of national territory, or that is inherent in 
     requests for access to local basing facilities. The aircraft 
     carrier platform, moreover, can bring to the scene of a 
     crisis tangible evidence of U.S. resolve, and provide the 
     basis for coordinating joint and combined operations if a 
     given situation warrants the use of military force.


                          Carrier Force Levels

       For all these reasons, it would be foolhardy for the United 
     States to reduce its carrier force to a level that could not 
     provide for a flexible forward presence policy. In view of 
     the political-psychological mindset that forms a central 
     aspect of national security decision-making, it may be more 
     difficult to commit (and mobilize) U.S.-based forces for 
     regional crisis deployment missions than it would be to put 
     carrier-based assets already near or on in the area in 
     question on alert status. Planning a force structure to fight 
     in two major regional contingencies ``nearly simultaneously'' 
     (to use Secretary Aspin's recent formulation) requires a 
     prudent planner to retain the Navy's preferred minimum number 
     of twelve carriers in the force structure. Reducing the 
     number of carriers in the U.S. fleet to ten would result 
     in significant deployment gaps, increased time at sea for 
     sailors, and an inability to react to crises with the 
     flexibility that is necessary to ensure a timely and 
     effective response. Even with a twelve-carrier force, key 
     regions--notably the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and the 
     Western Pacific--could only be covered about eighty 
     percent of the time.
       In its search to make prudent decisions about force 
     structure (while recognizing the need to achieve some, 
     reasonable defense economies), the Clinton administration 
     needs to appreciate the risks associated with a decision to 
     reduce the number of carrier platforms below twelve. The 
     costs to the nation of doing so will in the long run far 
     outweigh any near-term defense savings that some think can be 
     so derived. By themselves, the intangibles associated with 
     the deployment of a credible forward presence posture 
     centered around twelve carrier battle groups by far exceed 
     (in value) the hoped-for defense economies of cutting the 
     carrier program--and this includes the costs of building a 
     new carrier, CVN-76, to bring to nine the number of Nimitz-
     class carriers.


                     defense industries base issues

       CVN-76 construction carries profound and far-reaching 
     implications for the ability of the United States to sustain 
     a nuclear shipbuilding industry. Construction of a nuclear-
     powered aircraft carrier entails special skills and a 
     comprehensive base of second- and third-tier suppliers--all 
     of whom are not common to the construction of a nuclear-
     powered submarine. A decision not to fund the new carrier, or 
     to push off its funding until after fiscal year 1995, will 
     likely result in the disappearance of critical job skills 
     that are crucial to the nuclear carrier shipbuilding 
     industry. If new carrier construction were delayed, or 
     stretched-out--an alternative that is apparently being 
     considered--the result is likely to be a far more expensive 
     program, due to the need to accommodate the loss of key 
     suppliers and to recreate and qualify skilled teams to do the 
     work. Overhaul and refueling work on existing carriers simply 
     would not provide enough work for major component suppliers 
     in the industry to justify their staying in business. 
     Thus, any decision delaying or canceling the construction 
     of CVN-76 will have major implications for both the 
     domestic economy and the defense industrial skill base. 
     Moreover, such a step would affect adversely our ability 
     to reconstitute and mobilize forces if confronted with a 
     major global contingency or the need to fight in two 
     theaters simultaneously.
       One option that might be pursued is an incremental funding 
     strategy for CVN-76. Under such an arrangement, the critical 
     vendor base could be sustained through the authorization of 
     funding on three or four ``ship sets'' of highly specialized 
     equipment for the carrier (e.g., nuclear cores, special 
     reactor pumps, and hydraulic plants). Such funding, in the 
     form of another year of advanced procurement funding for CVN-
     76, would be a second-best means of preserving the vendor 
     base; yet it would maintain the option to build the tenth 
     nuclear carrier, and would moreover be consistent with the 
     administration's domestic and global priorities.


                         Bottom-Line Assessment

       Viewed in this context, the carrier emerges as central to 
     sustaining and adequate forward presence capability, and 
     assuring a flexible maritime instrument for responding to the 
     variety of potential local conflict and crisis situations--
     ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping, 
     conflict management, and war termination, Clearly, the 
     preferred option would be maintaining twelve carriers in the 
     Navy's force structure--with earlier rather than later 
     investment in CVN-76 production and development. At the very 
     least, it is necessary to secure and sustain a degree of 
     incremental funding sufficient to maintain the vendor base 
     critical to future U.S. carrier construction. If CVN-76 is 
     not funded, the United States may be forfeiting its future 
     ability to build aircraft carriers in a cost-effective and 
     timely manner. The operation implications of failing to move 
     ahead with CVN-76 will undermine the Navy's ability to 
     maintain adequate global presence, and could well hamper any 
     President's ability to respond to unfolding crises swiftly 
     and in an appropriate manner.

  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, may I inquire as to how much time is left on 
the side of the proponents of CVN-76?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will advise the Senator that the 
time controlled by the Senator from Wisconsin is 25 minutes remaining; 
the time controlled by the Senator from Virginia is 19.5 minutes.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of our time to give 
the Senator from Wisconsin an opportunity to respond, and then I am 
going to ask the Senator from Arizona, who has more than a little 
expertise in this particular area, to discuss the question.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold].
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I yield myself a bit of the remaining 
time to respond again to the questions posed about the world situation; 
whether that post-cold-war situation justifies maintaining a 12 
supercarrier force.
  I do not think it is accurate to suggest that simply because there 
are more locations of conflict, that necessarily means that the 
supercarriers are the right response. It ignores the comments that I 
had the chance to make earlier about alternatives. Before I mention 
those, let us just remember, though, that even in many conflicts in the 
past, carriers were not always used. As we mentioned, the report from 
the Center for Naval Analyses, ``The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-
Cold-War Era,'' pointed out that from 1986 to 1990, in 32 percent of 
the cases of crises just of the kind the Senator from Virginia was 
pointing out on the map, we did not even use a carrier.
  So the assumption that the carrier always has to be there whenever 
there is a problem--take, for example, Rwanda--it is not clear that is 
the way we are going to respond to the situation in Rwanda, even though 
you can tote it up as a number, another place in the world where there 
are problems.
  The issue here is not whether the world is a troubled place. It sure 
is. The issue is whether the supercarrier is the best way to handle 
situations, understanding that we have not even used the carriers in 
all situations in the past.
  I am curious to know what response my colleagues would have to the 
alternatives that have been suggested. Remember, what I am suggesting 
here, Mr. President, contrary to the statement of the Senator from 
Virginia, is not to get rid of all super carriers--certainly not to get 
rid of all carriers, certainly not to get rid of all supercarriers. 
This side is not opposed to supercarriers. We are suggesting 
eliminating 1 of 12. And that lost capacity of 60 days in each of two 
oceans can, according to credible sources, be made up for by the year 
2003 with alternates--11 amphibious carriers and dozens of Aegis 
cruisers and destroyers.
  It is my intention by this amendment to save us money, but also to 
achieve that capacity by other less expensive means that would in 
effect come from having the 12th carrier. That is my response to the 
chart. The world is a terribly difficult place, but that does not 
necessarily mean that 12 as opposed to 11 carriers is the right, most 
efficient, or most effective response to the problem.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I might make one response before I yield to 
the Senator from Arizona. I understand the proposition that has been 
stated by the Senator from Wisconsin. But if we use this criteria--
whether or not we actually use the specific weaponry or capability at 
any given context--I guess the ultimate would be we have not used 
nuclear weapons since the end of World War II. But having them has a 
very significant deterrent effect, and certainly maintains the peace in 
a way that I think all would agree accrues to our long-term benefit 
without actually using them.
  With that, Mr. President, I have actually been on board, at one time 
or another, just about all of the carriers, certainly the ones that are 
in commission today, and many of those that have been retired. But the 
only Member of this body who has flown combat missions off of those 
aircraft carriers is the Senator from Arizona, to whom I yield 5 
minutes at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I have a question for my friend from 
Wisconsin, and I ask it: Has he ever been on board an aircraft carrier?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. No, I have not.
  Mr. McCAIN. Let me suggest to the Senator from Wisconsin that, at 
minimum, before he recommends a fundamental change in the structure of 
our military establishment as envisioned by the Bottom-Up Review--which 
really was the best minds that we have available, including Gen. Colin 
Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Les Aspin, former 
chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense, 
and the best minds we could get together--came up with the belief with 
which, frankly, I do not totally agree--but that the United States 
would have to maintain an 11-plus-1 carrier force.
  In all due respect to the Senator from Wisconsin, I suggest at least 
he go out and visit an aircraft carrier and find out what they do from 
those people. Perhaps it might be useful, before recommending such a 
fundamental change in this Nation's defense strategy, that he go out to 
an aircraft carrier, that he meet with the men and women who are on 
board--and there are men and women now--find out what their mission is, 
find out from the people what they are expected to do and can do in a 
contingency. And I would strongly suggest he might find out they do not 
believe, and he would not believe after he was there, that Aegis 
cruisers can take the place of an aircraft carrier.
  An Aegis cruiser is a very valuable piece of military equipment. It 
is excellent for air defense. It really is superb. But its ability to 
project power over hostile shores is almost zero.
  I do not know where the Senator from Wisconsin is getting his 
information, but to suggest that Aegis cruisers and amphibious vessels 
somehow replace the fundamental capacity--and the reason why we spend 
so much money for these aircraft carriers is their ability not only to 
project power, but to project sizable power into very hostile 
environments, which is the unique aspect about the aircraft carrier.
  I know the argument has already been made the American empire is 
shrinking. We are withdrawing from Europe. Every day, we see more bases 
being closed. We even reduced our forces in Korea. Everywhere the 
empire is shrinking back, which leaves us with less and less ability to 
project this Nation's power in crises which we see pop up all over the 
world. There are 40 conflicts taking place in the world today as we 
speak.
  Does the United States have to be involved in them? Rwanda? No, I do 
not think so. But I think the United States, as the last remaining 
superpower, had better have the capability to do so.
  The amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin is going to lose. Let me 
recommend to the Senator, before he proposes another amendment next 
year on the same issue or perhaps on the appropriations bill, that he 
go out on an aircraft carrier. That might be a nice beginning. And that 
he go and visit the people that have been involved in this. Ask them 
what is the best for them--they are an all-volunteer force--the best 
way to carry out the protection of this Nation's vital national 
security interests. Then come back, maybe, and talk to people like Gen. 
Colin Powell--who is an army officer, I might inform my friend from 
Wisconsin--and others who have the experience, who have the knowledge, 
who have spent their very lives--and I am not speaking of this Senator, 
but others--in defense of this country. They will tell the Senator that 
11-plus-1 is the bare minimum of what we need for aircraft carriers.
  I believe my time is nearly expired, but I oppose this amendment. I 
think it is wrong. I think there are a whole lot of areas the Senator 
from Wisconsin and I would agree on that need to be cut back, that are 
not vital in the post-cold-war era. I ask him to get a briefing on the 
Bottom-Up Review that I mentioned earlier in my remarks. And I ask him 
to consider carefully that the alternatives he and others are 
suggesting clearly are not compatible with this Nation's vital national 
security interests and our strategic requirements.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Arizona has 
expired.
  The Chair recognizes the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Feingold].
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona for his 
comments, but I must say to the Senator from Arizona, I did not feel it 
was essential that I travel to Bosnia before I voted on the arms 
embargo. It would be nice if I had. I wish I had the opportunity to 
spend a lot of time in the California desert wilderness before we voted 
to protect that. But I think that is a bit of an unrealistic 
expectation.
  We, as Senators, have a few things to do, and if we cannot rely on 
documents produced by our Government, such as the Bottom-Up Review--
that is exactly the source of much of the information I am using here, 
and things like a GAO report on Navy carrier battle groups; it is this 
report that suggested that there are alternatives, that there are 
amphibious ships that can assist us in these situations.

  I think this is important because we try to have an argument here and 
we say, Can we get away with 11 rather than 12? What does the other 
side say? That the Senator from Wisconsin is proposing eliminating all 
aircraft carriers; that he is saying that the alternatives are the 
same; that they can do the same thing as any aircraft carrier.
  No statement we made has suggested that. It remains the case, though, 
that in many instances, supercarriers are not needed and are not used. 
The question is that difference between the 11 and 12 carriers and 
whether there are alternatives, as suggested by this GAO report, that 
can make up for that difference and save us some money.
  So it is very easy to exaggerate what this amendment is all about. It 
is not the elimination of the carrier. It is not the six. It is not the 
seven. It is not the 9 or the 10 or the other proposals that have been 
made by some. It is suggesting, very consistent with the Bottom-Up 
Review itself, that we have the 11, which is more than is needed, for 
two simultaneous war situations, and it is one less than the 12 
suggested by the Bottom-Up Review. But we have outlined some of the 
alternative ways that that difference can be made up with less cost to 
our country. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I yield 4 minutes to my distinguished senior 
colleague from Virginia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Warner is recognized for 4 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, what the amendment does do is to create a 
giant scrap heap of rusting steel in which the American taxpayers have 
invested close to a billion dollars. That is not an insignificant 
action in consequence. It will put roughly 120,000 people, not just in 
the Commonwealth of Virginia but spread over 42 States throughout the 
country. It will put them out of work, all in the name of--I am not 
sure what.
  It seems to me that that person who is the Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces of the United States should have a voice in this. I was 
privileged when I was aboard the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt on March 12, 
1993, when our President saw fit to visit a carrier. He said the 
following. I quote the President of the United States, President 
Clinton:

       They are operating on station in strategic locations around 
     the world protecting our interests and promoting stability, 
     ready to meet the call. They have been doing this for most of 
     the 20th century. When word of a crisis breaks out in 
     Washington, it is no accident that the first question that 
     comes to everyone's lips is: ``Where is the nearest 
     carrier?''

  He continues:

       This means building the next new Nimitz class carrier in 
     the mid-1990's as planned. But it also means retiring the 
     older, less capable carriers. The breakup of the Soviet Union 
     and the dramatically reduced possibility of this type of 
     conflict allows some reduction in carriers, although they 
     still play a vital role in meeting regional threats. With few 
     carriers, we will have to be more flexible on the deployment 
     schedule and operating tempo in order to ensure that sailors 
     are not required to endure longer tours of sea duty than now 
     expected.

  That was in an interview with Defense Week, July 13, 1992.
  One of my most vivid recollections of the war in Vietnam was in the 
fall of 1972, when as the Secretary, I was privileged to go out and 
visit our fleet. At that time, some of the carriers operating off 
station had been there for 7 months--7 months, Mr. President. It tested 
the mental endurance and the physical skill of those brave sailors, and 
particularly the airmen.
  We were coming to a point where we were going to go beyond the 
physical endurance of those sailors to operate. The rotation base, the 
ability to replace those carriers had been shrunk.
  This carrier comes to sea roughly in 2003, and this decision is 
trying to project ahead what is going to face the United States of 
America in that time period.
  The Bottom-Up Review carefully went over that under the direction of 
the President of the United States and with the subsequent approval of 
the President of the United States. The Bottom-Up Review said 11 
carriers plus 1 training carrier.
  So the analysis has been made, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. 
Armed Forces has made his decision, and I say, with all due respect to 
my colleague from Wisconsin, we have not heard a case to overturn the 
decision of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Armed Services 
Committee of this body.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute. I just might 
observe, in response to the remark made a few minutes ago by the 
Senator from Wisconsin, I understand and agree with his suggestion that 
we cannot always have participated actively or visited the sites or the 
activities that we are forming some judgment about. But in this 
particular case, and the way this body normally operates, we do yield 
to the committees of original jurisdiction a certain amount of 
responsibility to try to ferret out the most important questions and, 
in this particular case, this is not only the No. 1 priority for the 
Navy, it is not only done on the basis of the need through the Bottom-
Up Review for the 11-plus-1 that has already been suggested, it is not 
only a matter of preserving the industrial base, it is not only a 
matter of saving taxpayer money, but with all of the disagreements that 
we have in the Senate Armed Services Committee, this provoked no 
disagreement whatever.
  There was no dissent on this matter, even though there was 
considerable dissent with some of the things we will be discussing 
later on today, within the committee of original jurisdiction where 
extra time and staff expertise on a bipartisan basis was devoted to 
trying to make certain that this was appropriate as recommended by the 
President, by the Defense Department, by the Joint Chiefs and by the 
Navy.
  Mr. WARNER. Will the Senator yield 1 minute to me?
  Mr. ROBB. I yield 1 minute to the senior Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, in my statement, I referred to the impact 
of what this amendment would do. I want to emphasize that 42 States 
have subcontracts, and there are roughly 120,000 jobs that will be 
impacted directly by this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, how much time is remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has 19\1/2\ minutes 
remaining; the Senator from Virginia has 7 minutes remaining.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I need at 
this point.
  The senior Senator from Virginia asked why are we doing this? In the 
name of what? One answer is in the name of $3.6 billion. That is a 
pretty good answer to my constituents back home, at least as an opener, 
as an ante. That is money.
  I have had the experience in only a year and a half of meetings with 
the Navy on a number of occasions--they were excellent meetings; the 
competence and ability of the people I had the meetings with was really 
very impressive--I had trouble ferreting out what is the top priority.
  I had a very impressive group from the Navy in my office who told me 
the Trident II missile was the top priority when that was being 
discussed and questioned. That was the one they really cared about. 
That was No. 1.
  I said, ``Why can't we get rid of Project ELF in Wisconsin; nobody 
wants it there; it doesn't seem to have much to do with national 
security anymore?'' They said, ``No, we need that, too.''
  I understand their job is to protect this country. Now we are told 
that this additional carrier, 12 rather than 11, is the top priority. 
It is just a little difficult for me as a Member of this body. I might 
add to what the junior Senator from Virginia said, he may be on the 
committee but I still have to vote on it, I still have to discuss it. 
This is my opportunity to raise some questions and have a vote.
  The Senator is right; he is going to win this vote. He does not look 
very worried. I understand there is even a pool in my office as to 
whether I will get 10, 15 or 20 votes. But I still think we have to 
talk about it.
  The reason is that this is a very large expenditure, that every 
Senator should be involved in looking at it.
  This item alone, if we cut this $3.6 billion, would bring this bill 
before us under the level of fiscal year 1994. Right now it is ahead. I 
think it is $2.4 billion over the 1994 level.
  And I also know that sometimes you cannot get something done in the 
first attempt. I have already watched, over the years before I came 
here and since I have been here, the very difficult efforts to question 
the superconducting super collider, which have succeeded, the effort to 
question whether or not we need the whole space station program, which 
did not succeed last year but may well succeed now. And I know that 
this one is tougher because if we do not stop it now, basically next 
year a lot of it will be spent and it will be very hard to stop this 
program.
  But perhaps this process will lead to what I think is an achievement 
of a much greater scrutiny of these programs. There needs to be more of 
this discussion out in the Chamber. So I would very respectfully 
disagree with the junior Senator from Virginia; that the ultimate place 
to ask these questions after we review the hard work of the committee 
is out in the Chamber and to discuss them.
  I just want to remind my colleagues what kind of dollars we are 
talking about--$3.6 billion in 1995 alone. And the senior Senator from 
Virginia is correct; we have already spent almost $1 billion on this 
program. But when the argument then is we should keep going and spend 
the other $3.6 billion, I do not need to say that that is good money 
after bad.
  There is more money involved here, though. Once this is up and 
operating, once we have the 12 supercarriers in the year 2003, the 
operating costs are $1 billion a year. So we have already put together 
those billions each year--the $3.6 billion next year--and it does not 
even take into account the very significant associated costs of the air 
wing and the protective ships that have to go with such an important 
piece of machinery as a supercarrier.
  Mr. President, this is about something very real. In fact, I would 
even suggest to the Senators on the other side of this amendment that 
there are other military programs that could perhaps benefit from 
cutting this. I would prefer the money be used to reduce the deficit 
entirely. But perhaps there are chemical/biological defense programs, 
counter proliferation, base cleanup, chemical weapons destruction, 
other things that are underfunded in the military could obtain some of 
these funds that are going to be devoted to having 12 rather than 11 
supercarriers.
  In fact, in a meeting we had on this subject with some people who 
have analyzed this, the point was made there had been a cut in some 
recent development for antimine technology, minesweepers. We may be 
cutting spending on the very items that can protect the 11 carriers. Is 
it better to have 12 carriers that are vulnerable to mine attack or is 
it better to have 11 that are invulnerable?
  Those are the real choices here, not between the Defense Department 
and the rest of the issues but within the defense concept. Spending 
this much money now on this particular supercarrier means, as the 
chairman of the committee indicated earlier on another amendment, that 
there will simply be less money available for other critical items for 
research and development that may ultimately have far more to do with 
national security than one supercarrier could ever have.
  So, Mr. President, I recognize the partisan risks as well as the 
other risks of proposing an amendment like this, but I at this moment 
would like to appeal to my colleagues on the other side, some of whom I 
have worked with very closely, to try to find ways on a bipartisan 
basis to cut spending. We saw that happen in the Exon-Grassley 
amendment. I thought it was one of the best hours in the Senate, when 
we were able, on a bipartisan basis, to vote to say we can do better, 
we can cut $26 billion out of the budget.
  I think we can do the same thing that the senior Senator from New 
Hampshire was trying to do on the Treasury bill. I voted to recommit 
the Treasury bill with that Senator from the other party. One of the 
reasons was that it was $1 billion over last year. That is not reason 
enough, but it is an important reason. Another was that it appeared to 
me we were restoring positions that we had just cut last year. And 
there were also items on that appropriations bill that were off budget. 
So I supported Senator Smith on that item because he made an 
impassioned plea that we cannot just talk about across-the-board 
spending cuts, that we cannot just project a time in the future or say 
that all of the cuts have to come from entitlements or it will not mean 
anything. The real hard work is getting out here and having members of 
both parties vote, drop those party lines and say this one does not 
make sense; it is in the national interest to save the $3.6 billion and 
use it for other priorities.
  Mr. President, I wish to reiterate this is not an attack on the idea 
of having supercarriers. Obviously, they are very important to our 
country. I do not even want to sign on to those analyses based on that 
assumption that may not come true  that talk about six or seven. Our 
proposal does not even bring the number of supercarriers by the year 
2003 down to 10, the level that the Bottom-Up Review itself says is 
sufficient for two virtually simultaneous major regional conflicts 
where we do not even have allies. I am not even trying to do that. We 
are just trying to see if we can go from 12 to 11.

  I would like to take this opportunity to read the rest of what 
President Clinton said on the Roosevelt. He did make the statement that 
the senior Senator from Virginia pointed out. I might add before 
reading the rest of his comments, President Clinton during the campaign 
proposed we have only 10 supercarriers. Some of my friends here in this 
body are always criticizing him for breaking his promises. He is not 
doing that here, but I am doing better than he did in the campaign. I 
am only saying 11. But what did he say? He did say that, ``when word of 
a crisis breaks out in Washington, it is no accident that the first 
question that comes to everyone's lips is: Where is the nearest 
carrier?'' I do not dispute that that is what the President said. But 
in the same speech he also said this:

       A changed security environment demands not less security 
     but a change in our security arrangements * * *. You have 
     changed your crew and your equipment to reflect the new 
     challenges of the post-cold-war era * * *. That enables you 
     to operate perhaps with fewer ships and personnel but with 
     greater efficiency and effectiveness. This isn't 
     downsizing for its own sake; it's right-sizing for 
     security's sake. The changes on board the Theodore Roosevelt 
     preview the changes I believe we must pursue throughout the 
     military.

  So said the President--not downsizing for its own sake, 
not downsizing because the carriers are not important, but right-sizing 
in combination with other technologies, other military capability to 
still achieve the peacetime capacity that the Bottom-Up Review has 
recommended.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
Senator from Maine.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen] is 
recognized for 2 minutes.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, first let me state that I have no parochial 
interest whatsoever in this particular ship. I do not know the 30 or 40 
States that my colleague from Virginia has mentioned. I have no such 
interest in this particular aircraft carrier, but I do have an interest 
in the security it provides for this Nation.
  I was interested to hear the Senator from Wisconsin say that 
candidate Clinton campaigned on the basis of having 10 carriers. I 
might point out that candidate Jimmy Carter campaigned on the basis of 
pulling 5,000 troops out of South Korea. And only when he became 
President and found that would have destabilized the region did he 
respond to the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], Senator Hart, Senator 
Glenn, myself, and others who urged him not to take that action which 
would have been precipitous and dangerous at that time, too.
  President Clinton campaigned on no MFN for China. He found out after 
his year and a half in the White House that it was important to have 
MFN for China.
  So we should not hark back to what candidates campaigned on and try 
to hold us to that particular standard. The fact of the matter is that 
a candidate who then becomes a President finds that more information 
makes them wiser in their deliberations.
  I have heard it said in the past that ``ideals without technique is a 
menace,'' and ``technique without ideals is a menace.'' The same might 
be said about power: ``Power without diplomacy is a menace or can be a 
menace.'' But diplomacy without power is the equivalent of capitulation 
in most examples. We have to have both power and diplomacy. And the 
aircraft carrier is the single most important component of providing us 
with both power and diplomacy.
  We debated the issue of the C-17 yesterday at length, talking about 
the kind of airfields that we may be called upon to fly into in a 
hostile environment. These are our floating airfields. These are our 
fields that we have to fly off from and back to in a time of crisis. 
And if we have to err, we ought to err on the side of caution for the 
12-carrier battle groups rather than the 11 that is being suggested by 
our colleague from Wisconsin.
  So I urge the defeat of the amendment being offered.
  I thank the Senator for yielding.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I yield such time as remains to the senior 
Senator from South Carolina.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Four minutes.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 1 more 
minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise to oppose Senator Feingold's 
amendment to delay procurement of CVN-76 until fiscal year 2000.
  The Senator asserts that our Nation does not really need CVN-76. My 
observation is that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, every military 
secretary, former Secretary of Defense Aspin, and Secretary of Defense 
Perry, believe our Nation does need CVN-76. Further, the Congress has 
already expressed support for CVN-76 by approving $832 million in 
fiscal year 1993, and appropriating, subject to authorization, another 
$1.2 billion in fiscal year 1994 for this carrier.
  Senator Feingold asserts that the Bottom-Up Review confirmed that a 
force of 10 carriers would be adequate to fight two major regional 
conflicts, and that we can drop from 12 carriers to 11 or even 10 
without weakening our defenses.
  I would observe that the Bottom-Up Review rejected a force of 10 
carriers and recommended 12 because they serve not just as instruments 
of war but as instruments of deterrence and diplomacy as well.
  For the past 50 years, carriers have been used to preserve the peace. 
They have been called on more than 140 times since World War II to meet 
crises and protect our Nation's interests. As our overseas bases are 
reduced, the need for their mobility and power will become greater, not 
less. Witness the intense use in Bosnia and Somalia during the past 
year, not as relics of the cold war but as naval linchpins of its 
turbulent aftermath.
  Senator Feingold argues that the risk to our nuclear and shipbuilding 
industrial bases of delaying CVN-76 until fiscal year 2000 is 
acceptable. I do not agree. The Bottom-Up Review and other Navy 
assessments estimated that at least $2.1 billion and some 7 years would 
be required to restore the nuclear shipbuilding base if we let it 
lapse. Even a year's delay would cost $400 million or $500 million.
  Additionally, many thousands of jobs could be adversely affected. The 
possible damage to the Nation's economy is more than I care to risk 
when I know that a strong need for CVN-76 exists right now.
  Senator Feingold's proposed legislation can harm our Nation's 
defense, will damage the nuclear shipbuilding industrial base, will 
risk the possibility of losing the ability to build nuclear aircraft 
carriers, and will weaken our Nation's ability to carry out its primary 
mission.
  I urge my colleagues in the Senate to vote against it.
  I yield the floor, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, the Senator from Virginia reserves whatever 
time is remaining. I am prepared to yield back time depending upon the 
actions of the Senator from Wisconsin.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has 9\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, at the very end of the debate on this 
amendment, there have been very candid major arguments that the world 
is a very dangerous place--which I concede-- that it is best to serve 
on the Armed Services Committee to debate this amendment, to even 
debate this issue, and that it probably is a little better if you tour 
a carrier.
  But what I have not heard specifically are responses to the arguments 
that I have tried to make in support of the amendment, and virtually no 
recognition by the other side of just what $3.6 billion means to this 
country; what it means to kids in this country who have AIDS; what it 
means to cities that have their water virtually poisoned because we do 
not have the funds to clean up that water supply; what it means to 
families that have members who have Alzheimer's disease and cannot 
afford long-term care.
  These are situations that need help and that could really use some of 
that $3.6 billion. But I do not leave it at that. I have also not heard 
a serious response to the question of: Is there not within the military 
itself a better use for some of these funds than to stay at 12 rather 
than having 11 carriers?
  I repeatedly mentioned during the debate the fact that credible 
sources, including the GAO and others, have talked about real 
alternatives, Aegis cruisers, and others, that can provide the same 
kind of assistance that a carrier can in some situations.
  I concede to the Senators from Virginia, not in all situations, but 
that in many situations it is possible that a lighter, different type 
of carrier or different type of ship could help provide the help that 
is needed without having to have the 12 carriers.
  So we have not heard a single specific response other than saying the 
world is dangerous, and you have to have 12, you cannot have 11. It 
makes you wonder how we are going to survive without 15. Presumably 
there is no upper limit to how many carriers are needed to be 
absolutely secure.
  Finally, Mr. President, I really do not see how I can stand here on 
the Senate floor and rely entirely on the committee when we do not talk 
seriously about what $3.6 billion means in lost research and 
development in future military capability. The world has changed. The 
cold war is over and military technology and the dangers in the world 
have changed. The senior Senator from Virginia made that point very 
well. Many believe that it has changed so much that the carriers 
themselves may not be as relevant to crises situations as they have 
been in the past. I have not reached that conclusion. But there are 
those who say that.
  What we need to do here in the U.S. Senate is to start talking about 
what $3.6 billion means in terms of national security, including 
economic national security and the other issues which I have mentioned.
  Just take that $3.6 billion and ask yourself: Are we really going to 
save more lives in a military situation by spending it on an additional 
carrier, or should we be doing a whole number of other things for 
readiness that this country may desperately need as we try to deal with 
those multiplying situations that the senior Senator from Virginia has 
identified, many of which I will argue may not be needed and conducive 
to a supercarrier at all?
  Mr. President, $3.6 billion in one bill, in 1 year, will not even 
bring down the level of carriers from 12 to 11 until the year 2003. 
This is not an attack on the military. It is a strong suggestion that 
we can find another way to provide the same level of national security 
with less money and in a way that is more appropriate for the new era 
that we have entered since the end of the cold war.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I join in opposition to this amendment and 
express my support of the $2.4 billion funding authorization for the 
CVN-76. This funding was recommended by the Senate, approved by the 
House Armed Services Committee and the full House, as well as the 
Senate Armed Services Committee. It should also have the approval of 
the full Senate.
  The pending amendment is about our ability to project force, not just 
today but into the next century. Approval of the pending amendment 
would severely impede our ability to project force and pursue our 
interests around the world.
  American troops are leaving forward bases around the world and 
returning to the United States. We are giving up air and naval 
facilities around the world, further limiting our options in terms of 
projecting force. All of this is happening at a time when regional 
conflicts and threats to U.S. interests are multiplying at a staggering 
rate. One just has to read this morning's newspaper to see that we need 
to maintain the capability to get U.S. airpower to hotspots all over 
the globe.
  Just looking at the past few months, we now have ships enforcing the 
embargo off Haiti, we have a carrier on call to respond to developments 
on the Korean Peninsula, we have had carriers operating in support of 
the no-fly zones in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Iraq. And that is while 
we are in a peacetime situation. The carriers are the most-used tool of 
a President seeking to send a message to a foreign leader or to respond 
quickly to a foreign crisis.
  The importance of our carrier force is well-illustrated by looking at 
our experience in the gulf war. In that conflict, we had the good 
fortune of deploying our forces to a country with some of the best 
airfield facilities in the world, with the result that we were able to 
deploy a large amount of our land-based air forces. Despite that fact, 
we still sent six carriers to the gulf and all were heavily involved in 
the conflict.
  The Bottom-Up Review found that a 12-carrier-force is the smallest 
that this country can deploy. If we are to deploy a force that size, 
then we must buy CVN-76. Personally, I have been one who has expressed 
some concern about many of the recommendations for force levels in the 
BUR. I think that in many places it recommends force cuts that go too 
far. With regard to carriers, I am not convinced they have made 
realistic assumptions about how many carriers would be needed to 
respond to a major regional contingency. I believe that is an important 
point even though the recommendation for 12 carriers is based on 
peacetime needs to maintain U.S. presence around the world because we 
cannot afford to make a mistake in terms of equipping our forces for 
the two MRC contingency. It certainly would be a mistake for the Senate 
to go beyond the BUR cuts, especially with regard to a system as 
critical as the carrier fleet.
  It is also important to consider the impact of this amendment on the 
men and women who operate the ships in the carrier battle group. There 
is no question that our obligations around the world are not getting 
smaller. In fact, we are likely to see more conflicts in the coming 
years. That means we will have to continue to keep the carriers 
deployed. If we fail to replace aging carriers and allow the fleet to 
shrink, the result will be that the length of deployments will grow. We 
tried that in the seventies. It was bad for morale and it resulted in 
large numbers of qualified sailors leaving the Navy.
  Our aircraft carriers and the aircraft they carry are a central part 
of our overall military force. They are and will continue to be the 
first to fight in any conflict. And they remain one of our most 
powerful tools for diplomacy and avoiding conflict. The point is--we 
use them a lot. That means we must invest in recapitalization of the 
force--we must regularly buy new ships and new aircraft.
  When it comes into service in the year 2003, CVN-76 will replace the 
Kitty Hawk, which will have served for 43 years. I would say we got our 
money's worth out of Kitty Hawk and that it's time to replace her.
  I would like to turn for a moment to one of the arguments that has 
been made by the principal sponsor of this amendment--that no one else 
in the world has a supercarrier like that of the U.S. Navy, and that, 
by implication, we don't need another one. To that, my response is that 
I agree with the first part of his statement--I want our sailors and 
naval aviators to have the most capable systems in the world. I want 
them to have the best ship, the best airplane, and overwhelming power. 
I don't want them ever to have to be in a fair fight. I want them to 
have a bigger force, better weapons, and better training so that they 
have a better chance of winning and returning home safely.
  Mr. President, it is clear to me that we need CVN-76. It takes 7 
years to build a nuclear aircraft carrier. If we are to be able to 
deploy this ship when it is needed in the next century, we must get 
started now. For that reason and the other reasons stated above, I urge 
Senators to oppose the amendment before us and fund the new carrier.
  Mr. ROBB addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Robb] is 
recognized.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, let me just conclude by saying that I 
understand the appeal for an alternative means of spending. For almost 
any matter that we consider, there are attractive alternatives. But, in 
this case, the Department of Defense, the Navy, the President of the 
United States, and the Armed Services Committee considered a number of 
alternatives, considered options, and decided that this was the most 
important way that this particular money could be spent at this 
particular time.
  I recognize that this is an appeal for those who want to get their 
fiscal responsibility quotient up, as I frequently do in other areas, 
to vote against the authorization of the carrier. But in this 
particular case we will be responding to the needs of our Commander in 
Chief, the services, and the committee of original jurisdiction.
  With that, all time having been yielded back, I move to table the 
amendment offered by the Senator from Wisconsin and ask for the yeas 
and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays are ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Exon] is 
necessarily absent.
  I also announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Dodd] is 
absent because of illness in the family.
  Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. 
Domenici] and the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. Wallop] are necessarily 
absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Wyoming [Mr. Wallop] would vote ``yea.''
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 72, nays 24, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 164 Leg.]

                                YEAS--72

     Akaka
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boren
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Burns
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Danforth
     Daschle
     Dole
     Durenberger
     Faircloth
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mathews
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wofford

                                NAYS--24

     Baucus
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Brown
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Conrad
     DeConcini
     Dorgan
     Feingold
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Jeffords
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Metzenbaum
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Pryor
     Sasser
     Simon
     Specter
     Wellstone

                             NOT VOTING--4

     Dodd
     Domenici
     Exon
     Wallop
  So the motion to table the amendment (No. 1841) was agreed to.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which 
the motion was agreed to.
  Mr. ROBB. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                           Amendment No. 1840

  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, what is the regular order?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Amendment No. 1840.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, amendment No. 1840, that is the 
Johnston-Feinstein amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is the Johnston-Feinstein amendment.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President I understand that we are ready to go to a 
voice vote on that amendment.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask the distinguished Senator from 
Louisiana to yield at this point.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. For a question?
  Mr. LOTT. Yes; for a question.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes; I yield for a question.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I would like to say to the distinguished 
Senator from Louisiana that I understood from the Senator from Georgia 
that he was going to try to get up an amendment at this point right 
away.
  We are running some numbers and trying to get information from the 
Pentagon on a solution that we think might be acceptable on this 
problem. I had indicated to the Senator from Louisiana that I would 
like to go ahead and get this matter resolved, but I would like to get 
a colloquy before we go to a final vote from the Senator from Georgia, 
the chairman of the committee, and see if we could get these numbers 
before we get a recorded vote.
  In addition, my colleague from my State is not here at this point. I 
would like to get a chance to get him back to the floor before we would 
do that, if the Senator would be willing to give me just a few moments 
more.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I certainly want to accommodate my 
friend from Mississippi.
  Do I understand that, as far as this amendment, that is, the 
restoration of the money for the fast sealift, that that essentially 
will be agreeable and the Senator is trying to work out the funding for 
the LHD-7?
  Mr. LOTT. That is correct.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. So that we can safely breathe easier on the refunding 
of the fast sealift?
  Mr. LOTT. I think that the answer to that is yes, we want to get that 
done.
  But we are trying to see if we can come to some agreement on how to 
continue the opportunity for the LHD-7. So that is where we are right 
now.
  Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I am troubled by the vote which took place 
in the Armed Services Committee to divert more than $600 million in 
funds designated for sealift to build a seventh amphibious assault ship 
of the LHD-7 Wasp class.
  I am concerned about any further delay in awarding contracts for two 
large, medium roll-on and roll-off ships to preposition heavy equipment 
for the Army. The Army has made clear that this move will seriously 
hamper their efforts to meet longstanding lift requirements. The 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has weighed in noting that this 
diversion of funds to the LHD flies in the face of the conclusions of 
the mobility requirements study and that the committee's decision was 
based on erroneous information.
  We now have the ability to correct that error. Initially, the members 
of the Armed Services Committee were led to believe that the Navy would 
have another year to exercise its options to initiate the sealift 
contracts. That is not true. The contract option on these two sealift 
ships expires this year, possibly requiring a renegotiation of the 
contract.
  I understand that the LHD option is expiring as well, but we are 
designated to building the LHD-7 down the road. The Pentagon has made 
the difficult decision that exercising the sealift option at this time 
is the higher priority.
  Mr. President, funding the LHD the way we have in this bill is bad 
policy. I am deeply concerned about the bad precedent we have been 
setting by partially funding LHD ships. For some time now, we have 
operated under the rule that we will not partially fund big ticket 
items so we know up front what we're buying and how much we're paying 
for it. The LHD-6 was the first major departure from this practice. It 
was a mistake. By proceeding in this fashion, we are watering down the 
full funding provision even further.
  I have subcontractors in my State who suffer if these sealift ships 
are not built. But, frankly, there are Wisconsin winners and losers on 
both sides of this issue. There are LHD subcontractors in my State who 
have told me they will be hurt significantly if they do not begin work 
on the LHD this year.
  Thus, on the merits alone, supporting these Sealift ships is the 
right thing to do. It is in the best interests of our national defense 
and it is sound fiscal policy.
  I want to thank the Senators from California and from Louisiana for 
their work on the issue. I urge my colleagues to support this 
amendment.
  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
offered by the Senator from Louisiana. I take this action, not because 
I believe that the Fast Sealift Program is unnecessary, instead because 
the LHD Program is more necessary.
  The LHD is an amphibious assault ship that can perform functions 
similar to a carrier. It carries all types of Navy and Marine 
helicopters, Harrier jump jets, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, a 
fully staffed hospital, and landing craft. More importantly, it can 
carry 2,000 marines into harms way.
  The LHD's are already in the fleet with three more currently in 
production. Funding for the LHD-6 was provided in two stages. First, in 
fiscal year 1993 and then last year in fiscal year 1994. We are now at 
a point where an option exists that would save the Navy about $800 
million if the purchase is begun this year. We will also be able to 
provide the Marine Corps with the critical amphibious lift to support 
validated requirements for 12 amphibious ready groups.
  The LHD-7 is currently in the Navy shipbuilding plan for the year 
2000. I am afraid that there is no way that we can guarantee that this 
high priority will be funded at the turn of the century. That is why we 
are seeking funding for the LHD-7 this year.
  The House Armed Services Committee has funded the LHD-7 at a level of 
$100 million in its defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1995. It 
also fully funds the sealift fund at $600.8 million. Therefore, I 
believe that there is a chance to compromise here or in the conference 
with the House of Representatives.
  The committee, by a vote of 14-7, approved this initial step in 
funding the LHD-7. There has been much discussion in this Chamber that 
we gutted the Sealift Program. At the time the committee voted we were 
under the false impression that the options for the next two sealift 
ships would not expire until the end of next year. I do not believe 
that we can at this point determine that had we been provided correct 
information the vote would have been the same. What we do know, 
however, is that the committee was voting to begin funding the LHD-7 
now in order to save $800 million.
  Mr. President, I intend to vote against the Johnston-Feinstein 
amendment and urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I have a copy of a letter from the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch, to Senator Sam Nunn, the 
comport of which is to say we object to the committee's action because 
it would force the Department to buy a ship we currently do not need 
and defer funding for the very ships we do need.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of that letter be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the text of the letter was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                              The Deputy Secretary of Defense,

                                    Washington, DC, June 23, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Nunn: While we largely applaud the Defense 
     Authorization Bill your Committee has reported, the 
     Department strongly objects to the actions taken to 
     accelerate construction of the LHD-7 amphibious assault ship, 
     especially at the expense of the Department's ongoing program 
     for sealift modernization. The Committee's recommendation on 
     the LHD-7 is seriously flawed for two reasons.
       First, the Department is opposed to incremental funding for 
     major weapon systems. Full funding of investment programs is 
     a bedrock premise for the funding integrity of defense 
     programs. It was imposed by the Congress and embraced by the 
     last six administrations. Unfortunately, departures from this 
     principle have come from the legislative branch in recent 
     years. We supported Congress' actions on the CVN-76 last year 
     only because we had already been appropriated $800 million in 
     advance procurement and had budgeted the full amount for 
     construction in the very next year of our five year plan. The 
     LHD-7, however, is not included in our plan until the end of 
     the decade. We cannot accept this intentional erosion of the 
     full funding principle, especially at a critical time when 
     defense resources are stretched nearly to the breaking point.
       Second, the Committee is recommending we buy the wrong 
     amphibious ship at this time. The LHD is an impressive ship 
     and contributes directly to our lift capacity for helicopters 
     and landing craft. These are the two areas, however, where 
     current amphibious capacity exceeds requirements. Amphibious 
     shipping currently is deficient in capacity to carry 
     vehicles, but this is the one area where the LHD-7 makes only 
     a limited contribution. Instead, the Department is proposing 
     a new class of amphibious ships designed precisely to address 
     this shortfall. Buying an LHD at this point will likely 
     divert funds from the amphibious ship the Marine Corps truly 
     needs in the future and it diverts FY 1995 funds from the 
     acquisition of critically needed, surge, sealift ships that 
     will contribute to the force mobility so essential in today's 
     national security environment. We object to the Committee's 
     actions because it would force the Department to buy a ship 
     we currently do not need and defer funding for the very ships 
     we do need.
       For these two reasons, we must ask that the Committee 
     reconsider its actions, reverse the unwarranted cut to our 
     sealift program, and avoid a needless distortion of the 
     Department's amphibious modernization requirements.
           Sincerely,
                                                      John Deutch.

  Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, I rise today to convey my strongest 
personal support for funding of the LHD-7 amphibious assault ship as a 
fiscal year 1995 procurement. The ship is unquestionably needed, and 
the cost of delaying the construction of this next ship in the WASP 
class is unacceptably high.
  World events have demonstrated the need for flexible and responsive 
forward deployed forces capable of crisis response, peacekeeping, and 
humanitarian relief missions. The Navy/Marine Corps team of 
expeditionary naval forces, deployed as Amphibious Ready Groups aboard 
the LHD series of ships, is uniquely well qualified to perform these 
vital functions.
  Mr. President, there seems to be some confusion here as to what we 
are debating. Some say the debate is about what type of ship is needed. 
Others say the issue is the cost of letting existing contract options 
expire. Still others point to the impact of SASC action on the fielding 
schedule of the sealift ships. My point is that regardless of which 
question you ask, funding the LHD-7 as a fiscal year 1995 procurement 
is still the best answer.
  Let me begin by saying that the Department of Defense is clearly on 
record validating the need for the LHD-7, the regional CINC's testified 
to the Armed Services Committee that they need and want the LHD-7, and 
that the Marine Corps considers the ship to be critical to their 
ability to meet the Nation's naval forward presence needs. Amphibious 
lift is not the same as sealift. The issue is more than just lift; the 
issue is also an adequate number of the right types of ships with the 
right capabilities for flexibility and utility. The Marine Corps 
deploys its forces in Amphibious Ready Groups which use the big deck 
LHD-7 as their centerpiece. All of the relevant studies, the Roles and 
Missions Report, the Bottom-Up Review, and the Navy White Paper ``* * * 
From the Sea'' agree that 12 Amphibious Ready Groups are needed, and 
the LHD-7 is critical to that requirement.
  The next issue is cost. Much has been said with regard to the fact 
that the contract option will expire on the two sealift ships if we 
delay them. The fact is, we face the expiration of contract options on 
all three ships this year. The question ought to be, since we can't 
afford to exercise all three--which one is going to cost us the most to 
let go? Just remember, every time a Senator says that the option will 
expire if we don't purchase those two sealift ships next year, what he 
or she is saying is that we will be forced to spend approximately $100 
million more than planned to build these two ships a year later. That 
is what the contract option saves us, about $100 million.
  Exercising the LHD-7 contract option, however, will save us over $700 
million. Now, this is important--the savings to be achieved by 
purchasing the LHD-7 in 1995 are greater than the $600 million price 
tag of the two sealift ships. In fact, we could use those savings to 
purchase two more sealift ships than the Navy has planned.

  Let me say that again. Using the funds now within the Navy POM, the 
Congress has two choices:
  First, delay the LHD-7 and subsequently build only 20 sealift ships, 
or for the same amount of funding; and
  Second, accelerate the LHD-7 and build not 20, but 22 sealift ships.
  The financial choice is clear, the LHD-7 option should be exercised 
this year and the less costly sealift ship option should be allowed to 
expire.
  The last argument presented by the opponents of LHD-7 is schedule. 
They feel that the delay of these two sealift ships is unacceptable. 
Well frankly, this argument just doesn't hold water.
  First, the two sealift ships are already delayed approximately 5 
months due to schedule slippage in the initial two boats. Pushing back 
the funding for these two ships until next year, will only delay the 
two ships in question an additional 7 months.
  Second, the Navy's sealift program can hardly be described as 
schedule driven. It takes a shipyard approximately $350 million and 36 
months to build a new sealift ship. The other option, doing a 
conversion of an existing ship, costs only $225 million and takes only 
18 months. If the Navy really needed the ships as fast as they could be 
provided, they could have contracted for more conversions. This would 
have saved hundreds of millions in taxpayer money as well. But the Navy 
decided not to build the cheaper ships, and that an 18-month delay in 
the construction of each ship was acceptable.
  By delaying purchase of the two sealift ships until 1996, we push 
back their completion date until 1999, 7 months behind schedule. If the 
Navy feels that this is unacceptable, then instead of contracting for 
two new ships in 1996, they could buy two additional conversion ships 
which, as I've said, can be built much faster. In fact the Navy could 
actually accelerate its schedule for fielding sealift ships by buying 
the LHD-7 in 1995 and two conversion sealift ships in 1996.
  In conclusion, I ask my colleagues to remember these key points when 
making their decision.
  First, delaying the two sealift ships and acquiring the LHD-7 will 
save the Navy and the taxpayer hundreds of millions of dollars. This is 
because the cost of letting the LHD-7 option expire is seven times 
larger than the cost of letting the option on the two sealift ships 
expire.
  Second, delaying the two sealift ships will have a negligible impact 
on the Navy's schedule and the Navy has the option of getting back on 
schedule by purchasing two more conversion ships in 1996.
  Third, the requirement for the LHD-7 is just as valid as the 
requirement for the sealift ships.
  The choice is clear. I, therefore, encourage my fellow senators to 
join me in defeating this amendment.
  Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent we temporarily 
lay aside the pending amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Arizona.


                           amendment no. 1842

    (Purpose: To terminate certain Department of Defense reporting 
                             requirements)

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1842.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 223, beginning with line 14, strike out all through 
     page 227, line 11, and insert in lieu thereof the following:

     SEC. 1042. TERMINATION OF CERTAIN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
                   REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

       (a) Immediate Termination.--Except as provided in 
     subsection (c), notwithstanding the date set forth in 
     subsection (a) of section 1151 of the National Defense 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 
     107 Stat. 1758; 10 U.S.C. 113 note), the reporting 
     requirements referred to in subsection (b) are terminated 
     effective on the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (b) Applicability.--Subsection (a) applies to each 
     reporting requirement specified in enclosures 1 and 2 of the 
     letter, dated April 29, 1994, by which the Director for 
     Administration and Management, Office of the Secretary 
     Defense, citing the authority of the provision of law 
     referred to in subsection (a), submitted a list of reporting 
     requirements recommended for termination by the Department of 
     Defense.
       (c) Preservation of Requirements.--(1) The reporting 
     requirements set forth in the provisions of law referred to 
     in paragraph (2) shall not terminate under subsection (a) of 
     section 1151 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1758; 10 
     U.S.C. 113 note.)
       (2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following reports:
       (A) Reports required under the following provisions of 
     title 10, United States Code:
       (i) Section 2662, relating to reports on real property 
     transactions.
       (ii) Section 2672a(b), relating to reports on urgent 
     acquisitions of land.
       (iii) Section 2687(b)(1), relating to notifications of 
     certain base closures and realignments.
       (iv) Section 2690(b)(2), relating to notifications of 
     proposed conversions of heating facilities at United States 
     installations in Europe.
       (v) Section 2804(b), relating to reports on contingency 
     military construction projects.
       (vi) Section 2806(c)(2), relating to reports on 
     contributions for NATO infrastructure in excess of amounts 
     appropriated for such contributions.
       (vii) Subsections (b) and (c) of section 2807, relating to 
     notifications and reports on architectural and engineering 
     services and construction design.
       (viii) Section 2823(b), relating to notifications regarding 
     disagreements between certain officials on the availability 
     of locations for suitable alternative housing for the 
     Department of Defense.
       (ix) Subsections (b) and (c) of section 2825, relating to 
     notifications regarding improvements of family housing or 
     construction of replacement family housing.
       (x) Section 2827(b), relating to notifications regarding 
     relocation of military family housing units.
       (xi) Section 2835(g)(1), relating to economic analyses on 
     the cost effectiveness of leasing family housing to be 
     constructed or rehabilitated.
       (xii) Section 2861(a), relating to the annual report on 
     military construction activities and family housing 
     activities.
       (xiii) Subsections (e) and (f) of section 2865, relating to 
     notifications regarding unauthorized energy conservation 
     construction projects and an annual report regarding energy 
     conservation actions.
       (B) Reports required under the following provisions of 
     title 37, United States Code:
       (i) Section 406(i), relating to the annual report regarding 
     dependents accompanying members stationed outside the United 
     States in relation to the eligibility of such members to 
     receive travel and transportation allowances.
       (ii) Section 1008(a), relating to the annual report by the 
     President on adjustments of rates of pay and allowances for 
     members of the uniformed services.
       (C) Reports required under the following provisions of law:
       (i) Section 326(a)(5) of the National Defense Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Public Law 102-484; 106 Stat. 2368; 
     10 U.S.C. 2301 note), relating to reports on use of certain 
     ozone-depleting substances.
       (ii) Subsections (e) and (f) of section 2921 of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (10 
     U.S.C. 2687 note), relating to notifications regarding 
     negotiations for payments-in-kind for the release of 
     improvements at overseas military installations to host 
     countries and an annual report on the status and use of the 
     Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment 
     Recovery Account.
       (iii) Section 1505(f)(3) of the Military Child Care Act of 
     1989 (title XV of Public Law 101-189; 103 Stat. 1594; 10 
     U.S.C. 113 note), relating to reports on closures of military 
     child development centers.
       (iv) Subsections (a) and (d) of section 7 of the Organotin 
     Antifouling Paint Control Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-133; 
     102 Stat. 607; 33 U.S.C. 2406), relating to the annual report 
     on the monitoring of estuaries and near-coastal waters for 
     concentrations of organotin.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment that I believe is going to 
be accepted is a very simple one. This amendment calls for the 
immediate termination of reports that we require the Department of 
Defense to submit annually to Congress. The Department of Defense 
identified and reviewed approximately 549 congressionally-mandated 
reports and produced a list as required, and of that list there was 106 
reports that were presented by the Secretary of Defense for 
termination.
  The Senate Armed Services Committee determined that 20 of those 
reports are necessary and they have been taken out of this list that I 
am submitting.
  As I am sure my colleagues can tell, the focus of the amendment is to 
eliminate the excessive time and money that is spent on outdated, 
needless, reports.
  An example of some of these reports is we require a report on the 
debarment of persons convicted of fraudulent use of ``made in America'' 
labels. This report was found to be essentially moot since there is no 
law requiring conviction for the fraudulent use of these labels. We 
have mandated a report titled ``Collator Acquisition.'' Since all 
copying and duplicating equipment now come furnished with sorters, I do 
not think there is any doubt that this report is needless.
  The list of unnecessary reports is extensive, but the key criterion 
for justifying the termination of these reports is descriptions such as 
``project completed,'' ``redundant requirement,'' and ``obviously could 
be replaced by internal reports.''
  You know, I had the privilege and pleasure of getting to know former 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. Secretary Cheney mentioned to me 
there were a number of frustrations he experienced that he had very 
little appreciation for when he went from being a Member of Congress to 
be Secretary of Defense. One of the most wasteful in his view, and time 
consuming--and consuming of the taxpayers money--were these reports. 
There are presently now 549 mandated by the Congress to be submitted by 
the Department of Defense. We have literally hundreds of employees at 
the Secretary of Defense's office, in the Pentagon Building, whose only 
job is to generate these reports.
  I believe many of them are necessary and many of them are required in 
order to keep the Congress apprised of the progress of the Department 
of Defense in carrying out our requests, orders, authorization, et 
cetera. But there are many which have been identified--as I say 86 of 
them--that I think should be removed immediately.
  I mentioned a couple of them. Another one is Annual Plant Inventory 
Report; Jobs Which Exceed JCP Duplicating Limitations; Notice of Intent 
to Apply New Printing Processes; Collator Acquisition Report, et 
cetera--which just are not necessary.
  Mr. President, if any of my colleagues feel there are any of these 
that are necessary after the staff of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee has reviewed them, I would be more than happy, within the 
next 24 hours or 48 hours--however long before this bill is finished--
to put that report back in, eliminate it from this list. I have sent 
out a ``Dear Colleague'' to all my colleagues today, listing these 
reports that are in this amendment to be terminated. I would be more 
than happy to leave them in if there is any question whatsoever.
  So I ask the distinguished managers of the bill if this amendment is 
acceptable to them? That way I think we can dispense with it in short 
order.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the list of congressionally 
mandated reports recommended for termination, and a cover letter from 
D.O. Cooke, Director of Administration and Management at DOD, be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


                            Office of the Secretary of Defense

                                   Washington, DC, April 29, 1994.
     Hon. John McCain,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator McCain: Enclosure 1 is the list of recurring 
     Congressionally Mandated Reports recommended for termination 
     by the Department of Defense (DoD) as required by Public Law 
     103-160, Section F, ``Recordkeeping and Reporting 
     Requirements,'' Section 1151. Enclosure 2 is a list of 
     reports recommended for termination because we were unable to 
     find a DoD sponsor.
       Your staff was involved in the early planning stages of 
     this reports review and their participation was greatly 
     appreciated. Overall, 549 Congressionally Mandated Reports 
     were identified, loaded into a system, validated for 
     sponsorship, and sent to the DoD Components for review. As 
     you can see from the results, the Components put a lot of 
     thought and effort into the review, and have recommended 106 
     reports for termination.
       The systematic management of Congressionally Mandated 
     Reports was long overdue and steps have been taken to 
     institutionalize the management of these reports. This 
     includes quarterly updating of the data base using on-line 
     legal searches, validating sponsors, reviewing reporting 
     requirements periodically, and disseminating information 
     about the reports on a regular basis. Thus, in the future, 
     Congressionally Mandated Reports that have outlived their 
     usefulness can be eliminated in a timely manner.
       Please let us know if we can be of further assistance in 
     the regard. My point of contact on this effort is Mr. Robert 
     S. Drake, who may be reached at (703) 604-4569.
           Sincerely,
                                                       D.O. Cooke,
                                                         Director.
       Enclosures: As stated

      Congressionally Mandated Reports Recommended for Termination

       Title: Acquisition: Interests in Land When Need is Urgent.
       Brief: The Secretary of a military department may acquire 
     any interest in land that--(1) he or his designee determines 
     is needed in the interest of national defense, (2) is 
     required to maintain the operational integrity of a military 
     installation; and (3) considerations of urgency do not permit 
     delay necessary to include the required acquisition in an 
     annual Military Construction Authorization Act. The Secretary 
     of a military department contemplating action under this 
     section shall provide notice, in writing, to the Committees 
     on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives 
     at least 30 days in advance of any action being taken.
       Justification for Termination: ``Urgent'' land acquisition 
     report for ASCs; incompatible with efficient management (the 
     30-day defeats the statute's ``considerations of urgency 
     authority'').
       Title: Depot Level Reparables (DLR).
       Brief: Level of funding and types of spares.
       Justification for termination: The requirement for the OP-
     31 DLR display is found in the DOD financial management 
     regulation (7000.14-R). H.R. 2521 DOD appropriation bill, 
     1992, Senate appropriations required the Army budget to 
     identify these operating costs. There is no internal Army 
     requirement for this data. This data does not assist the Army 
     in the internal budget process. Therefore, having reviewed 
     this exhibit and the requirement to submit the data, the 
     requirement is unnecessary. If this were a one-time 
     requirement or no longer needed at OSD, OMB, CBO, or the 
     Congress, then the Army recommends termination.
       Title: Minority Group Participation in Construction of the 
     Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Project.
       Brief: The Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief 
     of Engineers, is directed to make a maximum effort to assure 
     the full participation of members of minority groups, living 
     in the states participating in the Tennessee-Tombigbee 
     Waterway Development Authority, in the construction of the 
     Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Project, including actions to 
     encourage the use, wherever possible, of minority owned 
     firms. The Chief of Engineers is directed to report on July 1 
     of each year to the Congress on the implementation of this 
     section, together with recommendations for any legislation 
     that may be needed to assure the fuller and more equitable 
     participation of members of minority groups in this project 
     or others under the direction of the Secretary.
       Justification for termination: This project has been 
     completed.
       Title: Real Property Transactions--Lease of Rental Property 
     by GSA for DOD in Excess of $200,000.
       Brief: No element of DOD shall occupy any general purpose 
     space leased for it by the General Services Administration at 
     an annual rental in excess of $200,000 (excluding the cost of 
     utilities and other operation and maintenance services), if 
     the effect of such occupancy is to increase the total amount 
     of such leased space occupied by all elements of DOD, until 
     the expiration of 30 days from the date upon which a report 
     of the facts concerning the proposed occupancy is submitted 
     to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
     House of Representatives.
       Justification for termination: Individual reports to ASCs 
     of land actions: Incompatible with efficient management 
     (threshold of $200,000 is .00001% of proposed FY 95 budget) 
     and unnecessary (statute is not an authority; any action must 
     meet another statute's requirements).
       Title: Real Property Transactions--Reports to Congressional 
     Committees.
       Brief: The Secretary of a military department, or his 
     designee, may not enter into any of the following listed 
     transactions by or for the use of that Department until after 
     the expiration of 30 days from the date upon which a report 
     of the facts concerning the proposed transaction is submitted 
     to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
     House of Representatives: (1) an acquisition of fee title to 
     any real property, if the estimated price is more than 
     $200,000; (2) a lease of any real property to the U.S., if 
     the estimated annual rental is more than $200,000; (3) a 
     lease or license of real property owned by the U.S., if the 
     estimated annual fair market rental value of the property is 
     more than $200,000; (4) a transfer of real property owned by 
     the U.S. to another Federal agency or another military 
     department or to a State, if the estimated value is more than 
     $200,000; (5) a report of excess real property owned by the 
     U.S. to a disposal agency, if the estimated value is more 
     than $200,000; and (6) any termination or modification by 
     either the grantor or grantee of an existing license or 
     permit of real property owned by the U.S. to a military 
     department, under which substantial investments have been or 
     are proposed to be made in connection with the use of the 
     property by the military department.
       Justification for termination: Individual reports to ASCs 
     of land actions: Incompatible with efficient management 
     (threshold of $200,000 or .00001% of proposed FY 95 budget) 
     and unnecessary (statute is not an authority; any action must 
     meet another statute's requirements).
       Title: Real Property Transactions--Reports to Congressional 
     Committees.
       Brief: The Secretary of each military department shall 
     report annually to the Committees on Armed Services of the 
     Senate and the House of Representatives on transactions 
     described in subsection (a) that involve an estimated value 
     of more than the small purchase threshold under section 
     2304(g) of this title but not more than $200,000.
       Justification for termination: Annual compilation for ASCs 
     of land actions: Incompatible with efficient management 
     (reports actions less than $200,000 or .00001% of proposed FY 
     95 budget) and unnecessary (statute is not an authority; any 
     action must meet another statute's requirements).
       Title: Written Agreement Requirement Regarding Water 
     Resources Projects.
       Brief: The Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief 
     of Engineers, shall maintain a continuing inventory of 
     agreements and the status of their performance, and shall 
     report thereon to Congress. This shall not apply to any 
     project the construction of which was commenced before 
     January 1, 1972, or to the assurances for future demands 
     required by the Water Supply Act of 1958, as amended. 
     Following the date of enactment, the construction of any 
     water resources project, or an acceptable separable element 
     thereof, by the Secretary of the Army, Chief of Engineers or 
     by a nonfederal interest where such interest will be 
     reimbursed for such construction under the provisions of the 
     Flood Control Act of 1968 or under any other provision of 
     law, shall not be commenced until each nonfederal interest 
     has entered into a written agreement with the Secretary of 
     the Army/COE to furnish its required cooperation for the 
     project. The agreement may reflect that it does not obligate 
     future State legislative appropriations for such performance 
     and payment when obligating future appropriations would be 
     inconsistent with State constitutional or statutory 
     limitations.
       Justification for termination: This annual report simply 
     provides the total number executed (according to six types of 
     agreements) and states whether maintenance of any projects 
     has been found to be deficient. However, the inventory 
     requires substantial effort to track agreements, and report 
     relevant data. When this requirement was new Congress was 
     curious as to its effectiveness. However, over 2,000 
     agreements have been executed since 1972, and Congress has 
     shown no interest in this report. This report has outlived 
     its usefulness.
       Title: Administration of Military Construction and Military 
     Family Housing Activities.
       Brief: The SECDEF shall submit a report to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress each year with respect to military 
     construction and military family housing activities. Each 
     report shall be submitted at the same time that the annual 
     request for military construction authorization is submitted 
     for that year. Otherwise, information to be provided in the 
     report shall be provided for the two most recent fiscal years 
     and for the fiscal year for which the budget request is made.
       Justification for termination: The report data is available 
     on an as needed basis from each of the services.
       Title: Architectural and Engineering Services and 
     Construction Design.
       Brief: Within amounts appropriated for military 
     construction and military family housing, the Secretary of 
     the service concerned may obtain architectural and 
     engineering services and may carry out construction design in 
     connection with military construction projects and family 
     housing projects. Amounts available for such purposes may be 
     used for construction management of projects that are funded 
     by foreign governments directly or through international 
     organizations and for which elements of the Armed Forces of 
     the United States are the primary user. In the case of 
     architectural and engineering services and construction 
     design to be undertaken for which the estimated cost exceeds 
     $300,000, the Secretary concerned shall notify the 
     appropriate committees of Congress of the scope of the 
     proposed project and the estimated cost of such services not 
     less than 21 days before the initial obligation of funds for 
     such services.
       Justification for termination: Design and project fees are 
     up since enactment of this requirement. Notification process 
     delays execution.
       Title: Biological Defense Research Program--RDT&E Conducted 
     by DOD During Previous Fiscal Year.
       Brief: The SECDEF shall submit to Congress an annual report 
     on research, development, test, and evaluation conducted by 
     DOD during the preceding fiscal year for the purposes of 
     biological defense. The report shall be submitted in both 
     classified and unclassified form and shall be submitted each 
     year in conjunction with the submission of the budget to 
     Congress for the next fiscal year.
       Justification for termination: Is now covered as a subset 
     to the title 50 report requirement for a comprehensive CB 
     defense report. The title 50 report is a comprehensive report 
     now called the Department of Defense annual report to 
     Congress on the research, development, test and evaluation of 
     the chemical/biological defense program. The information in 
     this report can now be integrated into the newly required CB 
     defense annual report to congress, required by Public Law 
     103-160, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal 
     year 1994, title XVII. Therefore, Atomic Energy recommends 
     integrating the information required by title 10 and title 
     50, into the new FY 1994 authorization act requirement for a 
     comprehensive annual CB defense report.
       Title: Construction--Contingency.
       Brief: The SECDEF may carry out a military construction 
     project not otherwise authorized by law, or may authorize the 
     Secretary of a military department to carry out a project, if 
     the SECDEF determines that deferral of the project for 
     inclusion in the next Military Construction Authorization Act 
     would be inconsistent with national security or national 
     interest. The SECDEF shall submit a report in writing to the 
     appropriate committees of Congress on that decision. Each 
     report shall include the justification for the project and 
     the current estimate of the cost of the project, and the 
     justification for carrying out the project. The project may 
     then be carried out only after the end of the 21-day period 
     beginning on the date the notification is received by the 
     committees.
       Justification for termination: This requirement is 
     redundant. The only difference is in justifying construction 
     and in a 21-day wait period.
       Title: Construction Projects for Environmental Response 
     Actions.
       Brief: The SECDEF may carry out a military construction 
     project not otherwise authorized by law (or may authorize the 
     Secretary of a military department of carry out such a 
     project) if the SECDEF determines that the project is 
     necessary to carry out a response action under the 
     comprehensive environmental response, compensation, and 
     liability act. When a decision is made to carry out a 
     military construction project, the SECDEF shall submit a 
     report, in writing, to the appropriate committees of Congress 
     on that decision. Each report shall include the justification 
     for the project and the current estimate of the cost of the 
     project; and the justification for carrying out the project.
       Justification for termination: Environmental cleanup 
     requirements are contained in the annual DOD budget 
     justification material provided with the DOD budget each 
     year. Cleanup requirements are identified in the DERP annual 
     report to Congress required by PL 103-160.
       Title: Contracts: Consideration of National Security 
     Objectives.
       Brief: If the SECDEF determines that entering into a 
     contract with a firm or a subsidiary of a firm is not 
     inconsistent with the national security objectives of the 
     U.S., the head of an agency may enter into a contract with 
     such firm or subsidiary after the date on which such head of 
     an agency submits to Congress a report on the contract. The 
     report shall include the following: (i) the identity of the 
     foreign government concerned; (ii) the nature of the 
     contract; (iii) the extent of ownership or control of the 
     firm or subsidiary concerned or, if appropriate in the case 
     of a subsidiary, by the foreign government concerned or the 
     agency or instrumentality of such foreign government; and 
     (iv) the reasons for entering into the contract.
       Justification for termination: Report was required when 
     SECDEF waived prohibition against awarding contract to firm 
     or controlled by country in support of national terrorism. 
     Report places unwarranted prior restraint on the procurement 
     prerogatives of executive branch of Government because it 
     must be submitted before a contract is awarded.
       Title: Core Logistics Functions Waiver.
       Brief: The SECDEF may waive in the case of such logistics 
     activity or function and provide that performance of such 
     activity or function shall be considered for conversion to 
     contractor performance in accordance with OMB circular A-76. 
     Any such waiver shall be made under regulations prescribed by 
     the SECDEF and shall be based on a determination by the 
     SECDEF that government performance of the activity or 
     function is no longer required for national defense reasons. 
     Such regulations shall include criteria for determining 
     whether government performance of any such activity or 
     function is no longer required for national defense reasons. 
     A waiver may not take effect until the SECDEF submits a 
     report on the waiver to the Committees on Armed Services and 
     the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
     Representatives.
       Justification for termination: This reporting requirement 
     is eight years old--is no longer required and should be 
     deleted. PL 100-320, OMB circular A-76 provides proper 
     safeguards for contract conversions.
       Title: Debarment of Persons Convicted of Fraudulent Use of 
     ``Made in America'' Labels.
       Brief: If the SECDEF determines that a person has been 
     convicted of intentionally affixing a label bearing a ``Made 
     in America'' inscription to any product sold in or shipped to 
     the United States that is not made in America, the SECDEF 
     shall determine, not later than 90 days after determining 
     that the person has been so convicted, whether the person 
     should be debarred from contracting with DOD. If the SECDEF 
     determines that the person should not be debarred, the SECDEF 
     shall submit to congress a report on such determination not 
     later than 30 days after the determination is made.
       Justification for termination: Recommend termination. 
     Provision is essentially moot since there is no specific law 
     requiring conviction for fraudulent use of ``Made in 
     America'' labels. DDP will accumulate any reports and make 
     them available when necessary.
       Title: Defense Enterprise Programs: Milestone 
     Authorization--Program Deviations.
       Brief: If the SECDEF receives a program deviation report 
     under 10 USC 2435(b) with respect to a defense enterprise 
     program for which funds are authorized the SECDEF shall 
     notify the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and 
     House of Representatives of the receipt of such report before 
     the end of the 15-day period beginning on the date on which 
     the secretary receives such report.
       Justification for termination: Defense enterprise programs 
     have not been an effective management tool for the 
     Department. The section 800 report recommends cancellation of 
     this legislation.
       Title: Defense Enterprise Programs: Milestone 
     Authorization--Submission of Baseline Descriptions.
       Brief: The SECDEF may designate defense enterprise programs 
     in each military department to be considered for milestone 
     authorization. Not later than the end of the 90-day period 
     beginning on the date that a defense enterprise program is 
     designated, submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the 
     Senate and House of Representatives the baseline description 
     and request, from Congress, authority to obligate funds in a 
     single amount sufficient to carry out the stage for which the 
     baseline description is submitted.
       Justification for termination: As stated above, all defense 
     enterprise programs should be cancelled. Current acquisition 
     reform activities include and subsume intent of this 
     legislation.
       Title: Determination of Availability of Suitable Housing 
     for Acquisition in Lieu of Construction of New Family 
     Housing.
       Brief: Before entering into a contract for the construction 
     of family housing units authorized by law to be constructed 
     at a location within the United States, the Secretary 
     concerned shall consult in writing with the Secretary of 
     Housing and Urban Development as to the availability of 
     suitable alternative housing at such location. The Secretary 
     of Housing and Urban Development shall advise the Secretary 
     concerned in writing as to the availability of such housing. 
     If the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development does not 
     advise the Secretary concerned as to the availability of 
     suitable housing within 21 days of the date on which the 
     request for such advice is made, the Secretary concerned may 
     enter into a contract for the proposed construction. If the 
     Secretary concerned and the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
     Development disagree with respect to the availability of 
     suitable alternative housing at any location, the Secretary 
     concerned shall notify the appropriate committees of 
     Congress, in writing, of the disagreement, of the Secretary's 
     decision to proceed with construction, and the justification 
     for proceeding with construction.
       Justification for termination: Unnecessary. Can be replaced 
     by internal reports, if needed by DOD.
       Title: Elimination of Use of Class I Ozone-Depleting 
     Substances in Certain Military Procurement Contracts.
       Brief: No DOD contract awarded after June 1, 1993, may 
     include a specification or standard that requires the use of 
     a class I ozone-depleting substance or that can be met only 
     through the use of such a substance unless the inclusion of 
     the specification or standard in the contract is approved by 
     the senior acquisition official (SAO) for the procurement 
     covered by the contract. The SAO may grant the approval only 
     if the SAO determines (based upon the certification of an 
     appropriate technical representative of the official) that a 
     suitable substitute for the class I ozone-depleting substance 
     is not currently available. Each official who grants an 
     approval shall submit to the SECDEF a report on that approval 
     or determination. The SECDEF shall promptly transmit to the 
     Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of 
     Representatives each report submitted to him by the SAO. The 
     SECDEF shall transmit the report in classified and 
     unclassified forms.

       Note: Beginning on October 1, 1993, and continuing for 8 
     calendar quarters thereafter, the report will be submitted to 
     the Armed Services Committees not later than 30 days after 
     the end of the quarter. Beginning on January 1, 1997, and 
     continuing for 4 years thereafter, the report will be 
     submitted not later than 30 days after the end of the year.
       Justification for termination: The production of halons was 
     phased out in January 1994. Only recycled/reclaimed products 
     may now be procured. Production of class I ozone depleting 
     substances, refrigerants, and solvents will be phased out on 
     January 1, 1996. Report uses a large quantity of DOD 
     resources and provides no useful management tool for DOD or 
     Congress.
       Title: Energy Savings at Military Installations.
       Brief: The SECDEF shall designate an energy performance 
     goal for DOS for the years 1991 through 2000. The achieve the 
     goal designated, the SECDEF shall develop a comprehensive 
     plan to identify and accomplish energy conservation measures 
     to achieve maximum cost-effective energy savings. The SECDEF 
     shall provide that the selection of energy conservation 
     measures under the plan shall be limited to those with a 
     positive net present value over a period of 10 years or less. 
     The SECDEF shall provide that \2/3\ of the portion of the 
     funds appropriated to DOD for a fiscal year (FY) that is 
     equal to the amount of energy cost savings realized by the 
     DOD, including financial benefits resulting from shared 
     energy savings contracts and financial incentives described 
     for any FY, beginning after FY90 shall remain available for 
     obligation through the end of FY following the FY for which 
     the funds were appropriated, with additional authorization or 
     appropriation. The SECDEF shall develop a simplified method 
     of contracting for shared energy savings contract services 
     that will accelerate the use of these contracts with respect 
     to military installations and will reduce the administrative 
     effort and cost on the part of DOD as well as the private 
     sector. The SECDEF shall permit and encourage each military 
     department, defense agency, and other instrumentality of DOD 
     to participate in programs conducted by any gas or electric 
     utility for the management of electricity demand or for 
     energy conservation. Not later than December 31 of each year, 
     the SECDEF shall transmit an annual report to congress 
     containing a description of the actions taken to carry out 
     energy savings at military installations and the savings 
     realized from such actions during the FY ending in the year 
     in which the report is made.
       Justification for termination: This reporting requirement 
     has been superseded by the Energy Policy Act of 1992 which 
     established conservation goals for the year 2000 and requires 
     annual agency reports to Congress through the Department of 
     Education.
       Title: Environmental Restoration Costs for Installation to 
     be closed under 1990 Base Closure Law.
       Brief: Each year, at the same time the President submits to 
     Congress the budget for a fiscal year, the SECDEF shall 
     submit to Congress a report on the funding needed for the 
     fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, and for each 
     of the following four fiscal years, for environmental 
     restoration activities at each military installation 
     separately by fiscal year for each military installation.
       Justification for termination: Already contained in the 
     Defense Annual Environmental Restoration Program report to 
     Congress required by PL 103-160.
       Title: Environmental Restoration Requirements at Military 
     Installations to be closed.
       Brief: The SECDEF, after consultation with the 
     Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, may 
     extend for a 6-month period of time in which the requirements 
     must be met with respect to a military installation, within 
     the scope of the Federal facility agreement governing cleanup 
     at the installation. The SECDEF submits to Congress a 
     notification containing a certification that, to the best of 
     the Secretary's knowledge and belief, the requirements cannot 
     be met with respect to the military installation by the 
     applicable deadline because one of the conditions set forth 
     exists; and a period of 30 calendar days after receipt by 
     Congress of such notice has elapsed.
       Justification for termination: Status of these 
     installations is contained in the DERP annual report to 
     Congress required by PL 103-160. EPA consultation is obtained 
     by detailed coordination and teamwork between the EPA, state 
     regulators, and DOD in the development of each closing 
     installation's BRAC cleanup plan.
       Title: General and Flag Officer Quarters--$25K annual 
     maintenance limit.
       Brief: Limit of total repair and maintenance to $25,000/
     year unless included in budget justification.
       Justification for termination: This report can be replaced 
     by an internal report if DOD so deems it necessary.
       Title: Improved National Defense Control of Technology 
     Diversions Overseas.
       Brief: The SECDEF and the Secretary of Energy shall each 
     collect and maintain a data base containing a list of, and 
     other pertinent information on, all contractors with DOD and 
     the Department of Energy, respectively, that are controlled 
     by foreign persons. The data base shall contain information 
     on such contractors for 1988 and thereafter in all cases 
     where they are awarded contracts exceeding $100,000 in any 
     single year by DOD or the Department of Energy. The SECDEF, 
     the Secretary of Energy, and the Secretary of Commerce shall 
     submit to Congress, by March 31 of each year, beginning in 
     1994, a report containing a summary and analysis of the 
     information collected for the year covered by the report. The 
     report shall include an analysis of accumulated foreign 
     ownership of U.S. firms engaged in the development of defense 
     critical technologies.
       Justification for termination: Recommend termination. Are 
     no existing data bases to identify which contractors are 
     foreign controlled. Will place additional burdens on 
     contractors and DOD.
       Title: Improvements to Military Family Housing Units.
       Brief: Funds may not be expended for the improvement of any 
     single family housing unit, or for the improvement of two or 
     more housing units that are to be converted into or are to be 
     used as a single family housing unit, if the cost per unit of 
     such improvement will exceed (A) $50,000 multiplied by the 
     area of construction cost index as developed by the DOD for 
     the location concerned at the time of contract award, or (B) 
     in the case of improvements necessary to make the unit 
     suitable for habitation by a handicapped person, $60,000 
     multiplied by such index. The Secretary concerned may waive 
     the limitations if such Secretary determines that, 
     considering the useful life of the structure to be improved 
     and the useful life of a newly constructed unit the 
     improvement will be cost effective, and a period of 21 days 
     elapses after the date on which the Committees on 
     Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of 
     Representatives receive a notice from the Secretary of the 
     proposed waiver together with the economic analysis 
     demonstrating that the improvement will be cost effective.
       Justification for termination: This report is unnecessary. 
     Can be replaced by an internal report and is not needed for 
     management purposes.
       Title: Improvements to Military Family Housing Units--
     Construction in Lieu of Improving.
       Brief: The Secretary concerned may construct replacement 
     military family housing units in lieu of improving existing 
     military family housing units if--(A) The improvement of the 
     existing housing units has been authorized by law; (B) The 
     Secretary determines that the improvement project is no 
     longer cost-effective after review of post-design or bid cost 
     estimates; (C) The Secretary submits to the Committees on 
     Armed Forces and Appropriations of the Senate and the House 
     of Representatives a notice containing (i) an economic 
     analysis demonstrating that the improvement project would 
     exceed 70 percent of the cost of constructing replacement 
     housing units intended for members of the Armed Forces in the 
     same paygrade or grades as the members who occupy the 
     existing housing units and (ii) the replacement housing units 
     are intended for members of the Armed Forces in a different 
     pay grade or grades, justification of the need for the 
     replacement housing units based upon the long-term 
     requirements of the Armed Forces in the location concerned.
       Justification for termination: This report is unnecessary. 
     Can be replaced by an internal report.
       Title: Kinds of Contracts: Multiyear Contract 
     Certification.
       Brief: A multiyear contract may not be entered into for any 
     fiscal year for a defense acquisition program that has been 
     specifically authorized by law to be carried out using 
     multiyear contract authority unless each of the following 
     conditions are satisfied: (1) The SECDEF certifies to 
     Congress that the current 5-year defense program fully funds 
     the support costs associated with the multiyear program; and 
     (2) the proposed multiyear contract provides for production 
     at not less than minimum economic rates given the existing 
     tooling and facilities.
       Justification for termination: Multiyear contracts are more 
     difficult to sustain in post-cold war defense environment 
     where emphasis is being placed on maintaining technology base 
     capabilities. Comptroller must provide a justification 
     package with the budget when any multiyear production 
     contracts are requested. Beyond this requirement, all other 
     reporting requirements associated with multiyear contracts 
     should be terminated.
       Title: Leasing--Foreign Leasing Cap Added to Semi-Annual 
     Report.
       Brief: Modifies semiannual reports on foreign leasing cap 
     to include a column indicating the prior year's reported cap 
     by location.
       Justification for termination: This report is unnecessary. 
     Can be replaced by DOD internal report, if needed for 
     management purposes.
       Title: Lobbying Activities Under the Byrd Amendment.
       Brief: This report involves lobbying activity, and is 
     provided by A&T.
       Justification for termination: Reports on lobbying are 
     currently running less than 10 a year. The reports are 
     forwarded from each activity to the Director of Defense 
     Procurement (DDP), consolidated, and sent to Congress. There 
     is no reason these reports cannot reside at DDP. In addition, 
     the reports being furnished are of little value, the main 
     deterrent to the law being the prohibition on the expenditure 
     of appropriated funds for lobbying. Over the past four years, 
     no questions or queries have been received from Congress on 
     the content of any of these reports.
       Title: Long-Term Leasing of Military Family Housing To Be 
     Constructed.
       Brief: The Secretary of a military department may enter 
     into a contract for the lease of family housing units to be 
     constructed or rehabilitated to residential use near a 
     military installation within the United States under the 
     Secretary's jurisdiction at which there is a shortage of 
     family housing. The budget material submitted to Congress by 
     the Secretary of Defense shall include materials that 
     identify the military housing projects for which lease 
     contracts are proposed to be entered in such fiscal year.
       Justification for termination: This report is unnecessary. 
     It can be replaced by a DOD report, if needed for management 
     purposes.
       Title: Low-Rate Initial Production of Naval Vessel and 
     Satellite Programs.
       Brief: With respect to naval vessel programs and military 
     satellite programs, low-rate initial production is production 
     of items at the minimum quantity and rate that (a) preserves 
     the mobilization production base for that system, and (b) is 
     feasible as determined pursuant to regulations prescribed by 
     the SECDEF. For each naval vessel program and military 
     satellite program, the SECDEF shall submit to Congress a 
     report providing (a) an explanation of the rate and quantity 
     prescribed for low-rate initial production and the 
     considerations in establishing that rate and quantity; (b) a 
     test and evaluation master plan for that program; and (c) an 
     acquisition strategy for that program approved by the SECDEF, 
     which includes the procurement objectives in terms of total 
     quantity of articles to be procured and annual production 
     rates.
       Justification for termination: In today's environment lower 
     rates are being established for many types of environments 
     besides naval vessels and satellites. Test and evaluation 
     master plans and other normal acquisition oversight 
     activities provide effective monitoring and oversight for all 
     major programs. Special treatment for naval vessels and 
     satellites is unnecessary. This reporting equipment should be 
     terminated.
       Title: Major Defense Acquisition Program Defined.
       Brief: The SECDEF may adjust the amounts (and the base 
     fiscal year) on the basis of Department of Defense escalation 
     rates. An adjustment under this subsection shall be effective 
     after the secretary transmits a written notification of the 
     adjustment to the committees on armed services of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives.
       Justification for termination: This provision was utilized 
     in the most recent update of DOD 5000.1 and DOD 5000.2. 
     Annual reports are unnecessary.
       Title: Management of Certain Defense Procurement Programs.
       Brief: The SECDEF shall submit to Congress, at the same 
     time as the budget for any fiscal year (FY), a statement of 
     what the effect would be during the FY for which the budget 
     is submitted on the stretchout of a major defense acquisition 
     program if either of the following applies with respect to 
     that program: (1) the final year of procurement scheduled for 
     the program at the time of the statement is submitted is more 
     than 2 years later than the final year of procurement for the 
     program as specified in the most recent annual selected 
     acquisition report for that program; and (2) the proposed 
     procurement quantity proposed for the same FY in the most 
     recent annual selected acquisition report for that program.
       Justification for termination: Any necessary information 
     should be included in the SAR (submitted under title 10 USC 
     2432). No additional report should be necessary.
       Title: Manufacturing Technology.
       Brief: National MANTECH plan. (class and unclass). SecDef 
     report.
       Justification for termination: Report recommended for 
     termination according to 1993 legislation.
       Title: Notification of Prime Contract Awards to Comply With 
     Cooperative Agreements.
       Brief: The SECDEF shall notify Congress each time he 
     requires that a prime contract be awarded to a particular 
     prime contractor or that a subcontract to be awarded to a 
     particular subcontractor to comply with a cooperative 
     agreement. The SECDEF shall include in each such notice the 
     reason for exercising his authority to designate a particular 
     contractor or subcontractor, as the case may be.
       Justification for termination: Recommend termination. Less 
     than a handful have been reported, and all but one part of 
     the Arms Export Control Act. DOD has no need for such 
     information and no one else is monitoring the reports.
       Title: Promotion of Energy Savings at Military 
     Installations.
       Brief: Decision to carry out a military construction 
     project for energy conservation. SecDef report.
       Justification for termination: This is a notification 
     requirement only and could be eliminated.
       Title: Relocation of Military Family Housing Units.
       Brief: The Secretary concerned may relocate existing 
     military family housing units from any location where the 
     number of such units exceeds requirements for military family 
     housing to any military installation where there is a 
     shortage. A contract to carry out a relocation of military 
     family housing units may not be awarded until (1) the 
     Secretary concerned notifies Congress of the proposed new 
     locations of the housing units to be relocated and the 
     estimated cost of and source of funds for the relocation, and 
     (2) a period of 21 days has elapsed after the notification 
     has been received by those committees.
       Justification for termination. This report is unnecessary. 
     Can be replaced by DOD report, if needed.
       Title: Reporting Requirement--Domestic Leases.
       Brief: Details of all new or renewed leases entered into 
     that exceed $12,000, including certification that less 
     expensive housing was not available.
       Justification for termination: This report is unnecessary. 
     It can be replaced by a DOD report, if needed.
       Title: Requirement for Authorization of Number of Family 
     Housing Units.
       Brief: The Secretary of an Armed Force may not construct or 
     acquire military family housing units unless the number of 
     units to be constructed or acquired has been specifically 
     authorized by law. The Secretary of the Armed Force must 
     provide to the appropriate committees of Congress written 
     notification of the facts concerning the proposed 
     acquisition; and a period of 21 days elapses after the 
     notification is received by those committees.
       Justification for termination: This report is unnecessary. 
     Can be replaced by a DOD internal report, if needed.
       Title: Reverse Engineering.
       Brief: Status on the program's progress.
       (The requirement for this report was originated by Congress 
     during the pilot reverse engineering program (1985-1988) to 
     measure its effectiveness and to determine whether a 
     permanent program should be established. The pilot program 
     was successfully concluded in April 1988. Since that time, 
     the services have been reverse engineering items on an as-
     needed basis, which is the intent. House Report 100-1002, 
     which applauded the results of the pilot program, asked the 
     department to maintain statistics and provide annual reports.
       Justification for termination: Reverse engineering has now 
     been recognized and the report has outlived its usefulness. 
     The services maintain statistics for their own use, and if 
     that information is ever required, it could be obtained. The 
     effort required to consolidate this information and process 
     the resultant report to Congress is not commensurate with the 
     value of the report).
       Title: Review of Contracts.
       Brief: All contracts entered into, amended, or modified 
     pursuant to authority contained in this act shall include a 
     clause to the effect that the comptroller general of the 
     United States or any of his duly authorized representatives 
     shall, until the expiration of three years after final 
     payment, have access to and the right to examine any directly 
     pertinent books, documents, papers, and records of the 
     contractor or any of his subcontractors engaged in the 
     performance of and involving transactions related to such 
     contracts or subcontracts. If the clause is omitted, after 
     taking into account the price and availability of the 
     property or services from United States sources, that the 
     public interest would be best served, by the omission of the 
     clause, the agency head will submit a report to Congress in 
     writing.
       Justification for termination: Recommend termination. This 
     report is required when agency head determines that public 
     interest would best be served by omitting the clause 
     permitting examination of functional and other records as 
     otherwise required for inclusion in contract where relief has 
     been granted.
       Title: Revisions to Contract Claims: Certification 
     Regulations.
       Brief: The SECDEF may propose, for inclusion in the Federal 
     acquisition regulation, regulations relating to certification 
     of contract claims, requests for equitable adjustment to 
     contract terms and request for relief under PL 85-804 that 
     exceed $100,000. If at any time the SECDEF proposes revisions 
     to the relations, the SECDEF shall ensure that the proposed 
     revisions are published in the Federal Register and, at the 
     time of publication of such revisions, shall submit to 
     Congress a report describing the proposed revisions and 
     explaining why the regulations should be revised.
       Justification for termination: Recommend termination. Any 
     revisions to regulations will be published in the ``Federal 
     Register.'' No value is added to the regulation writing 
     process.
       Title: Selected Acquisition Reports for Certain Programs.
       Brief: The SECDEF shall submit to the Committees on Armed 
     Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a 
     selected acquisition report for each of the following 
     programs: (1) the advanced technology bomber program; (2) the 
     advanced cruise missile program; and (3) the advanced 
     tactical aircraft program.
       Justification for termination: This report may be deleted. 
     The program was terminated by the SECDEF. Selected 
     acquisition report is no longer needed.
       Title: Support of Science, Mathematics and Engineering 
     Education--Master Plan.
       Brief: At the same time that the President submits to 
     Congress the budget for each of fiscal years 1993 through 
     1997, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a 
     master plan for activities by the Department of Defense 
     during the next fiscal year to support education in science, 
     mathematics, and engineering at all levels of education in 
     the United States. Each plan shall be developed in 
     consultation with the Secretary of Education. The activities 
     of the plan shall contribute to the achievement of the 
     national education goals. Each such plan shall (a) define the 
     programs of the military departments and defense agencies 
     and, (b) allocate resources for such programs.
       Justification for termination: Requirement for annual 
     report unnecessary because it is overly burdensome and adds 
     no value to DOD SME education efforts. DOD has always had an 
     inherent interest in the SME education of our Nation's 
     students and will continue to develop programs which will 
     enhance the training of our future scientists and engineers.
       Title: The Pacific Environmental Leadership Effort (PELE).
       Brief: Progress report on implementation of PELE. SECDEF 
     report.
       Justification for termination: Will be addressed in the 
     annual report to Congress on the status of the DOD legacy 
     resource management program (Senate Report 103-153, pages 83-
     84). Recommend deletion.
       Title: Waiver of 5-Year Prohibition on Persons Convicted of 
     Defense-Contract Related Felonies.
       Brief: A person who is convicted of fraud or any other 
     felony arising out of a contract with DOD shall be prohibited 
     from working in a management or supervisory capacity on any 
     defense contract, or serving on the board of directors of any 
     defense contractor, for a period as determined by the SECDEF, 
     of not less than 1 year from the date of the conviction. The 
     prohibition may apply with respect to a person for a period 
     of less than 5 years if the SECDEF determines that the 5-year 
     period should be waived in the interest of national security. 
     If the 5-year period is waived, the SECDEF shall submit to 
     Congress a report stating the reasons for the waiver.
       Justification for termination: Recommend termination. The 
     requirement is an unnecessary administrative burden. There 
     have not been any requests for waiver. In the event of 
     waiver, information will be maintained at the office of the 
     Director of Procurement.
       Title: Waiver on Prohibition on Contracting With Entities 
     That Comply With the Secondary Arab Boycott of Israel.
       Brief: It is the policy of the United States to oppose 
     restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or imposed 
     by foreign countries against other countries friendly to the 
     United States or against any other United States person 
     consistent with the policy, DOD may not award a contract for 
     an amount in excess of the small purchase threshold to a 
     foreign entity unless that entity certifies to the SECDEF 
     that it does not comply with the secondary Arab boycott of 
     Israel. The SECDEF may waive the prohibition in specific 
     instances when the SECDEF determines that the waiver is 
     necessary in the national security interests of the United 
     States. Within 15 days after the end of each fiscal year, the 
     SECDEF shall submit to Congress a report identifying each 
     contract for which a waiver was granted during that fiscal 
     year.
       Justification for termination: This reporting requirement 
     is an unnecessary administrative burden. Waivers and foreign 
     entity certifications of noncompliance with boycott become 
     part of permanent contract file and can be made available for 
     review at any time.
       Title: A-10s for the U.S. Forest Service--Reasons for 
     Dissatisfaction.
       Brief: Reasons for dissatisfaction with the Forest Service 
     plans to ensure A-10s will not be obtained by a foreign 
     government.
       Justification for termination: The U.S. Forest Service is 
     no longer interested in acquiring these aircraft.
       Title: A-10s to U.S. Forest Service--Excess to Air Force 
     needs.
       Brief: A-10 are excess to Air Force needs.
       Justification for termination: The U.S. Forest Service is 
     no longer interested in acquiring these aircraft.
       Title: Activation or Moving a Printing Plant.
       Brief: JCP requires their authorization before establishing 
     or moving printing plants.
       Justification for termination: Include in printing program 
     plan.
       Title: Annual Map and/or Chart Plant Report.
       Brief: JCP form 4 reports map and chart printing plant 
     operating costs and production.
       Justification for termination: Include in printing program 
     plan.
       Title: Annual Plant Inventory.
       Brief: JCP form 5 reports the inventory of printing 
     equipment in each printing plant.
       Justification for termination: Include in printing program 
     plan.
       Title: Coal--Kaiserslautern Military Community.
       Brief: Progress made toward agreements on the use of U.S. 
     anthracite coal.
       Justification for termination: This reporting requirement 
     was levied because of Congress' concern that the Air Force 
     would not actively pursue heating supply agreements with 
     local German authorities in Kaiserslautern. Since obtaining 
     sole source authority, we have pressed hard to complete 
     negotiations, as indicated in quarterly reports submitted to 
     date. We have demonstrated our willingness to complete cost 
     effective agreements and a quarterly progress report is no 
     longer necessary. Also, if negotiations are successful, we 
     are required to formally notify Congress prior to contract 
     award.
       Title: Collator Acquisition.
       Brief: JCP form 3 reports acquisition of power operated 
     collators for use in other than authorized printing plants.
       Justification for termination: Copying and duplicating 
     equipment now come furnished with sorters.
       Title: Commercial Printing.
       Brief: JCP form 2 reports printing procured from commercial 
     sources other than the Government Printing Office or its 
     contractors.
       Justification for termination: Include in printing program 
     plan.
       Title: Equipment Acquisition or Transfer.
       Brief: JCP requires their authorization before acquiring or 
     transferring printing equipment.
       Justification for termination: Set capacity and allow 
     managers to move or acquire equipment up to capacity.
       Title: Equipment Installation Notice.
       Brief: JCP requires notification before the installation of 
     new equipment.
       Justification for termination: Include in printing program 
     plan.
       Title: Excess Equipment.
       Brief: JCP form 7 reports the inventory of excess equipment 
     in each printing plant. (An annual submission of this report 
     also occurs).
       Justification for termination: Include in annual plant 
     inventory in printing program plan.
       Title: Jobs Which Exceed JCP Duplicating Limitations.
       Brief: Consolidated duplicating center and facilities 
     report jobs which exceed limitations imposed by the JCP.
       Justification for termination: Include in printing program 
     plan.
       Title: Notice of Intent to Apply New Printing Processes.
       Brief: JCP requires notification before utilizing newly 
     developed or improved processes.
       Justification for termination: Include in printing program 
     plan.
       Title: Notice of Intent to Contract Printing Services.
       Brief: JCP requires notification before including printing 
     in services contracts.
       Justification for termination: Include in printing program 
     plan.
       Title: Printing Plant Report.
       Brief: JCP form 1 reports printing plant operating costs 
     and production.
       Justification for termination: Include in printing program 
     plan.
       Title: Research and Development Plans.
       Brief: JCP requires advisement of plans to engage in 
     applied research or development affecting printing or related 
     fields.
       Justification for termination: Include in printing program 
     plan.
       Title: Stored Equipment.
       Brief: JCP form 6 reports the inventory of stored printing 
     equipment in each printing plant.
       Justification for termination: Include in annual plant 
     inventory in printing program plan.
       Title: Annual Authorization of Appropriations--O&M Funds 
     Restriction in Support of Democratic Resistance of Nicaragua.
       Brief: Notwithstanding title II of the Military 
     Construction Appropriations Act, 1987, or any other provision 
     of law, funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the 
     Department of Defense for any fiscal year for operation and 
     maintenance may not be used to provide assistance for the 
     democratic resistance forces of Nicaragua. Funds for such 
     purpose may only be derived from amounts appropriated or 
     otherwise made available to the Department for procurement 
     (other than ammunition). Before funds appropriated or 
     otherwise made available to the DOD are released to be used 
     for the purpose stated, the SECDEF shall submit a report to 
     Congress describing the specific source of such funds.
       Justification for termination: The Nicaraguan democratic 
     resistance is no longer in operation.
       Title: Burdensharing Contributions by Japan.
       Brief: Contributions accepted.
       Justification for termination: This report was modified in 
     the FY 1994 DOD Authorization Act, Section 1402.
       Title: Burdensharing Contributions by Japan and the 
     Republic of Korea.
       Brief: Amount of contributions accepted and expended. 
     SecDef report.
       Justification for termination: This report was modified in 
     the FY 1994 DOD Authorization Act, Section 1402.
       Title: Burdensharing Contributions by Korea.
       Brief: Contributions received. SecDef report.
       Justification for termination: This report was modified in 
     the FY 1994 DOD Authorization Act, Section 1402.
       Title: Burdensharing Contributions by Kuwait.
       Brief: Contributions made, and explanation of the 
     relationship between any ``out-of-country'' costs and ``in-
     country'' US military activities they support.
       Justification for termination: This report was modified in 
     the FY 1994 DOD Authorization Act, Section 1402.
       Title: Closing Accounts--Obligations and Adjustment to 
     Obligations.
       Brief: Certification by the SECDEF to the Congress (1) that 
     the limitations on expending and obligating amounts 
     established pursuant to 31 USC 1341 are being observed, (2) 
     that reports on any violations of such section, whether 
     intentional or inadvertent, are being submitted to the 
     President and Congress immediately and with all relevant 
     facts and a statement of actions taken as required by 31 USC 
     1351. If the SECDEF cannot make the certification within 60 
     days the SECDEF must alternatively certify to Congress in 
     writing that the SECDEF is unable to make the report setting 
     forth the actions that the Secretary will take in order to 
     make such certifications after the end of the period.
       Justification for termination: This report was completed on 
     January 1993.
       Title: Operations of DOD Overseas Military Facility 
     Investments Recovery Account.
       Brief: Not later than January 15 of each year, the SECDEF 
     shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report 
     on the operations of DOD overseas military facility 
     investment recovery account during the preceding fiscal year 
     and proposed uses of funds in the special account during the 
     next fiscal year.
       Justification for termination: Should be included in the 
     quarterly report to Congress on the status of residence value 
     negotiations prepared by ODUSD (ES). The comptroller would 
     have collateral action and coordinate on the report.
       Title: Preparation of Budget Requests for Operation of 
     Professional Military Education Schools.
       Brief: Separate budget request for operation of each 
     professional military education school.
       Justification for termination: Nobody has requested the 
     report in two years.
       Title: Industrial Fund Management Reports.
       Brief: The Department of Defense has five industrial funds. 
     They are as follows: Navy industrial fund, Marine Corps 
     Industrial Fund, Army Industrial Fund, Air Force Industrial 
     Fund, and Defense Industrial Fund. Combined reports are 
     required for each industrial fund accompanied by supporting 
     reports by activity group. The term ``activity group'' is 
     used herein to mean any number of activities financed under 
     an industrial fund having similar missions or operating 
     characteristics. It is required that annual reports be 
     submitted to the president and to the Congress on the 
     condition and operation of working-capital funds established 
     under 10 USC 2208. The reporting requirements prescribed 
     herein are designated as accounting report 1307.
       Justification for termination: These reports no longer 
     exist in DOD. Recommend termination.
       Title: Reports on Price and Availability Estimates.
       Brief: NLT fifteen days after the end of each calendar 
     quarter submit a report on price and availability; LOA 
     requests for $7M or more of MDE, $25M or more of defense 
     articles or services or for air-to-ground/ground-to-air 
     missiles.
       Justification for termination: This report is redundant. 
     The provision for this report requires reporting of potential 
     foreign military sales which may or may not result in actual 
     sales. Sales offers to foreign purchasers as well as actual 
     sales are being reported in a broader scope at the $1 million 
     threshold on a quarterly basis, as required by section 36(a) 
     of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 USC 2765.
       Title: Employees or Former Employees of Defense 
     Contractors.
       Brief: If a former or retired officer of the Army, Navy, 
     Air Force, or Marine Corps who (1) has at least 10 years of 
     active service, and (2) held for any period during that 
     service a grade above captain or, if Navy, above lieutenant; 
     and a former civilian official or employee (including a 
     consultant or part-time employee) of DOD whose pay rate (at 
     any time during the 3-year period before end of the last 
     service of the person with DOD) was at least equal to the 
     minimum rate at the time for GS-13, was employed by, or 
     served as a consultant or otherwise to, a defense contractor 
     at any time during a year at an annual pay rate of at least 
     $25,000 and the defense contractor was awarded contracts by 
     DOD during the preceding year that totaled at least 
     $10,000,000, and within the 2-year period ending on the day 
     before the person began the employment or consulting 
     relationship, the person served on active duty or was a 
     civilian employee for DOD, the person shall file or report 
     with the SECDEF in the manner and form prescribed by the 
     SECDEF. Before April 1 of each year, the SECDEF shall report 
     to Congress the names of persons who have filed reports for 
     the preceding year and the names shall be listed, by groups, 
     under the names of appropriate defense contractors.
       Justification for termination: Since the requirement for 
     this report was enacted in November of 1969, there have been 
     other laws passed which address the identical concerns. These 
     included the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (Public Law No. 
     95-521) and the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 (Public Law No. 
     101-194). These laws imposed stringent new ``revolving door'' 
     restrictions on the entire executive branch. In addition, new 
     post-government restrictions were imposed on departing DOD 
     officers and employees by section 2397b of Title 10 United 
     States Code in 1989. These additional restrictions have made 
     this report lose any value that it may have had.
       Title: Requirement Concerning Former DOD Officials.
       Brief: Any contractor, that was awarded one or more 
     contracts by DOD during the preceding fiscal year in an 
     aggregate amount of at least $10,000,000 that is subject 
     during a calendar year to contract provision shall submit to 
     the SECDEF, not later than April 1 of the next year, a 
     written report covering the preceding calendar years. Each 
     report shall list the name of each person (together with 
     other information adequate for the Government to identify the 
     person) Who: (1) is a former officer or employee of DOD or a 
     former or retired member of the Armed Forces; and (2) during 
     the preceding calendar year was provided compensation by that 
     contractor, if such compensation was provided within 2 years 
     after such officer, employee, or member left service in DOD. 
     The SECDEF shall make reports submitted under this 
     requirement available to any member of Congress upon request.
       Justification for termination: The report required of 
     defense contractors by this law was intended to identify 
     former DOD officers and employees who may be tempted to 
     misuse sensitive procurement information that they had 
     acquired while serving in DOD. This problem has been 
     completely resolved by the Procurement Integrity Act (Public 
     Law 100-679). In addition, implementation of the reporting 
     requirement obligates all major DOD contractors to set up 
     more complex personnel information systems than required for 
     their own management purposes. Inevitably, the added costs of 
     such internal systems must be born by the Department of 
     Defense in terms of higher costs for goods and services.
       Title: Health-Care Sharing Agreements Between Department of 
     Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense.
       Brief: For each of fiscal years (FYs) 1993 through 1996 the 
     SECDEF shall submit a report on opportunities for greater 
     sharing of the health care resources of the Veterans 
     Administration and DOD which would be beneficial to both 
     veterans and members of the Armed Forces and could result in 
     reduced costs to the Government by minimizing duplication and 
     under use of health care resources. The FY 1996 report will 
     also include--(1) an assessment of the effect of agreements 
     entered into on the delivery of health care to eligible 
     veterans, (2) an assessment of the cost savings, if any, 
     associated with provision of services under such agreements 
     to retired members of the Armed Forces, dependents of members 
     or former members, and beneficiaries, and (3) any plans for 
     administrative action, and any recommendations for 
     legislation, that the SECDEF considers appropriate.
       Justification for termination: P.L. 97-174 requires the 
     secretaries of the Departments of Veterans Affairs and 
     Defense to submit a joint annual report to Congress on the 
     status of health care resources sharing. After careful review 
     of the reporting requirements of Congress, recommend 
     combining this report wit the report entitled ``Sharing of 
     Department of Defense Health-Care Resources.'' Combining 
     these reports will avoid redundancy and allow for a succinct 
     review of health care resources sharing activity between the 
     departments.
       Title: Limitation on Reductions in Medical Personnel.
       Brief: The SECDEF may not reduce the number of medical 
     personnel of DOD below the baseline number unless the SECDEF 
     certifies to Congress that the number of such personnel being 
     reduced is excess to the current and projected needs of the 
     military departments; and such reduction will not result in 
     an increase in the cost of health care services provided 
     under the civilian health and medical program of the 
     uniformed services.
       Justification of termination: Alternative mechanisms are 
     being developed to backfill DOD needs. Manpower flexibility 
     to retain sufficient military personnel by specialty and 
     grade/experience to meet any wartime or contingency mission; 
     to retain, hire or recruit military or civilian service 
     personnel to meet peacetime health care needs, and to 
     contract, where appropriate, to provide beneficiaries with 
     needed health care services. Allowing DOD to tailor the force 
     based on the needs of the population served is the most 
     efficient and cost-effective method of providing health care.
       Title: Podiatrists and Dentists.
       Brief: Need for any reductions.
       Justification for termination: This report is not required 
     for force management purposes.
       Title: Psychologists Prescribing Drugs.
       Brief: Test program to train military psychologists to 
     prescribe psychoactive drugs.
       Justification for termination: The report on the first 
     fellows to complete the program will be submitted in May or 
     June 1994. This report will satisfy this requirement.
       Title: Public Health Service Hospitals.
       Brief: The SECDEF, in consultation with the Secretary of 
     Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of 
     Transportation when the Coast Guard is not operating as a 
     service in the Navy, shall submit annually to the Committees 
     on Appropriations and on Armed Services of the Senate and the 
     House of Representatives a written report on the results of 
     the studies and projects carried out. The first such report 
     shall be submitted not later than one year after the date of 
     enactment. The last report shall be submitted not later than 
     one year after the completion of all such studies and 
     projects.
       Justification for termination: Assessment reports completed 
     in the 1980s. No such studies and projects are underway or 
     planned.
       Title: Reductions in Army Reserve Component Medical Force 
     Structure.
       Brief: Reiterates FY91 requirement (101-923, p. 102, Sec. 
     711) that medical personnel are excess to current and 
     projected requirements and will not result in an increase in 
     CHAMPUS costs. SECDEF report.
       Justification for termination: This report is not required 
     for force management purposes.
       Title: Special Pay to Officers of the Armed Forces Who 
     Served in a Nursing Specialty.
       Brief: The SECDEF may extend the special pay authorized to 
     officers of the Armed Forces who serve in a nursing specialty 
     (other than as nurse anesthetists) that--(A) is designated by 
     the Secretary as critical to meet requirements (whether such 
     specialty is designated as critical to meet wartime or 
     peacetime requirements); and (B) requires postbaccalaureate 
     education and training. The SECDEF may not implement these 
     provisions unless the SECDEF submits to the Committees on 
     Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a 
     report--(1) justifying the need of the departments for the 
     authority provided; and (2) describing the manner in which 
     that authority will be implemented.
       Justification for termination: This report is not required 
     for force management purposes.
       Title: Special Pay: Nonphysician Health Care Providers.
       Brief: The Secretary of Defense may authorize the payment 
     of special pay at the rates specified to an officer who--(1) 
     is an officer in the Medical Services Corps of the Army or 
     Navy, a biomedical sciences officer in the Air Force, or an 
     officer in the Army Medical Specialist Corps; (2) is a health 
     care provider (other than a psychologist); (3) has a 
     postbaccalaureate degree; and (4) is certified by a 
     professional board in the officer's speciality. The SECDEF 
     may not implement these provisions unless the SECDEF submits 
     to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House 
     of Representatives a report--(1) justifying the need for the 
     military departments for the authority provided; and (2) 
     describing the manner in which that authority will be 
     implemented.
       Justification for termination: This report is not required 
     for force management purposes.
       Title: Contracts: Notice to Congress Required for Contracts 
     Performed Over period Exceeding 10 years.
       Brief: The Secretary of a military department shall submit 
     to Congress a notice with respect to a contract of that 
     military department for services for research or development 
     in any case in which--(1) the contract is awarded or 
     modified, and the contract is expected, at the time of award 
     or as a result of the modification to be performed over a 
     period exceeding 10 years or (2) the performance of the 
     contract continues for a period exceeding ten years and no 
     other notice has been provided to Congress.
       Justification for termination: There are few, if any, 
     contracts for services for research and development which 
     extend over 10 years.
       Title: Fuel Sources for Heating Systems; Prohibition on 
     Converting Certain Heating Facilities.
       Brief: The Secretary of the military department concerned 
     shall provide that the primary fuel source to be used in any 
     new heating system constructed on lands under the 
     jurisdiction of the military department is the most cost 
     effective fuel for that heating system over the life cycle of 
     that system. The Secretary of a military department may not 
     covert a heating facility at a United States military 
     installation in Europe from a coal-fired facility to an oil-
     fired facility, or to any other energy source facility, 
     unless the Secretary--(1) determines that the conversion is 
     required by the government of the country in which the 
     facility is located, or is cost effective over the life cycle 
     of the facility; and (2) submits to Congress notification of 
     the proposed conversion and a period of 30 days has elapsed 
     following the date on which Congress receives the notice.
       Justification for termination: The language directing the 
     use of the least life cycle cost fuel should be retained. 
     Since conversions from coal will be done only if they meet 
     the least life cycle cost requirement, congressional 
     notification should not be required.
       Title: Monitoring and Research of Ecological Effects.
       Brief: Regarding estuarine monitoring, the Secretary of the 
     Navy, in consultation with the under Secretary of Commerce 
     for Oceans and Atmosphere, shall monitor the concentrations 
     of organotin in the water column, sediments, and aquatic 
     organisms of representative estuaries and near-coastal waters 
     in the United States. This monitoring program shall remain in 
     effect until 10 years after the date of the enactment of this 
     act (enacted June 11, 1988). The administrator shall submit a 
     report annually to the Speaker of the House of 
     Representatives and to the President of the Senate detailing 
     the results of such a monitoring program for the preceding 
     year. As such, the Secretary shall submit a report annually 
     to the Secretary and to the Governor of each State in which a 
     home port for the Navy is monitored detailing the results of 
     such monitoring in the State. Regarding home port monitoring, 
     the Secretary shall provide for periodic monitoring, not less 
     than quarterly, of waters serving as the home port for any 
     Navy vessel coated with an antifouling paint containing 
     organotin to determine the concentration of organotin in the 
     water column, sediments, and aquatic organisms of such water.
       Justification for termination: The Navy currently has fewer 
     than six ships organotin coatings. By the end of FY 1994, 
     only two ships with organotin coatings will remain in the 
     fleet. Current Navy policy does not allow use of organotin 
     coatings. By FY 1998 no ships will have organotin coating. 
     With organotin use going to zero, this report can be 
     terminated.
       Title: Mississippi-Camp Shelby-Land Transfer
       Brief: Proposals concerning land acquisition at Camp 
     Shelby.
       Justification for termination: Proposed land exchange 
     between army and forest service has been abandoned.
       Title: Professional Military Education Center, TN.
       Brief: Outline why this project was left out of the FY93 
     request and provide a written commitment that the project 
     will be included in FY94 request.
       Justification for termination: This report has been 
     overtaken by events.
       Title: National Security Agency--Report on Executive 
     Personnel.
       Brief: The director of the National Security Agency (NSA) 
     shall each year submit to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, at the time the 
     budget is submitted by the President to Congress for the next 
     FY, a report on executive personnel in NSA. The report shall 
     include the following: The total number of positions added to 
     or deleted from the senior cryptologic executive service 
     during the preceding FY; the number of executive personnel 
     (including all members of the senior cryptologic executive 
     service) being paid at each grade level and pay rate in 
     effect at the end of the preceding FY; the number, 
     distribution, and amount of awards paid to members of the 
     senior cryptologic executive service during the preceding FY; 
     and the number of individuals removed from the senior 
     cryptologic executive service during the preceding FY for 
     less than fully successful performance.
       Justification for termination. This report duplicates the 
     report entitled ``National Security Personnel.''
       Justification for termination: This report entitled 
     ``National Security Personnel.''
       Title: Civilian Employment Master Plan.
       Brief: The Secretary will prepare an annual civilian 
     employment master plan to be submitted annually with budget 
     materials.
       Justification for termination: Title 10 requires that the 
     Department of Defense submit a report on civilian employment 
     annually along with budget materials. The report is to cover 
     the budget year, the prior two years and the two years 
     following the budget year (five year plan). The requirements 
     of the report, as specified in 10 USC, exceed the level of 
     detail used in DOD planning. The civilian work force is an 
     open personnel system and not rigidly structured like the 
     military personnel system. Also, civilians are a valued 
     ``resource'' used to support essential DOD missions, but 
     civilians are not a structured ``program'' managed in 
     divisions, carrier groups and wings. Overall projected levels 
     of employment, and other broad brush information, are 
     provided to Congress through other means (O&M Justification 
     Materials and the Defense Manpower Requirements Report).
       Title: Closure of Military Child Development Centers for 
     Uncorrected Inspection Violations.
       Brief: The SECDEF requires that each military child 
     development center be inspected not less than four times a 
     year. Each such inspection will be unannounced. At least one 
     inspection shall be carried out by an installation 
     representative and one inspection a year by a representative 
     of the major command. If a violation occurs and is not 
     corrected within 90 days the military child development 
     center shall be closed until the violation has been 
     corrected. If a military child development center is closed 
     the Secretary of the military department concerned shall 
     promptly submit to the Committees of the Armed Services of 
     the Senate and the House of Representative a report notifying 
     those committees of the closing. The report shall include--
     (A) notice of the violation that resulted in the closing and 
     the cost of remedying the violation; and, (B) a statement of 
     the reasons why the violation had not been remedied as of the 
     time of the report.
       Justification for termination: OSD and the military 
     departments have implemented a rigorous unannounced 
     inspection process that includes a checks and balance system 
     with inspections conducted at the installation, major 
     command, service and DOD levels. Each child development 
     center receives comprehensive inspections at least four times 
     each year. These are in addition to the local fire, health 
     and safety (HAS) inspections. Each installation is inspected 
     annually by service has experts in child development. 
     Additionally, a DOD multi-disciplinary team inspects random 
     installations each year to check the military services 
     inspection procedures. Although several centers were closed 
     during the implementation phase of the inspections, extensive 
     efforts to correct deficiencies have reduced the number of 
     serious violations dramatically. The DOD inspection 
     procedures are aggressive and a model for the country. These 
     procedures address serious deficiencies, and the report 
     requirement is no longer necessary.
       Title: Educational Assistance Program.
       Brief: Breakout of the costs associated with Montgomery GI 
     Bill.
       Justification for termination: Report 102-627 for the 
     fiscal year 1993 appropriations bill asked that the 
     Department of Defense report back to the committee with a 
     cost breakout of the benefit, so they could entertain any 
     reprogramming requests. However, the Department of Defense 
     education benefits board of actuaries decided to post-fund 
     that part of the benefit that was not paid for by the 
     Department of Veterans Affairs. In effect, this means that 
     funds would be borrowed from the Department of Defense 
     education benefit fund and later reimbursed as amortization 
     payments to the fund. The amortization payments would be 
     included in the budget. Consequently, no special 
     reprogramming or supplemental requests would be needed. As a 
     consequence, there is no ongoing reporting requirement other 
     than the normal budget process.
       Title: Exceptions to Guidelines for Reductions in Civilian 
     Positions.
       Brief: The SECDEF may permit a variation from the 
     guidelines established or a master plan prepared if the 
     Secretary determines that such variation is critical to the 
     national security. The Secretary shall notify Congress of any 
     such variation and the reasons for such variation.
       Justification for termination: Title 10 requires that the 
     Department of Defense submit a report on civilian employment 
     annually along with budget materials. The report is to cover 
     the budget year, the prior two years and the two years 
     following the budget year (five year plan). The requirements 
     of the report, as specified in 10 USC, exceed the level of 
     detail used in DOD planning. The civilian work force is an 
     open personnel system and not rigidly structured like the 
     military personnel system. Also, civilians are a valued 
     ``resource'' used to support essential DOD missions, but 
     civilians are not a structured ``program'' managed in 
     divisions--carrier groups and wings. Overall projected levels 
     of employment, and other board brush information, are 
     provided to Congress through other means (O&M justification 
     materials and the defense manpower requirements report).
       Title: Foreign National Employees Salary Increases.
       Brief: Notify Congress when salary increases of foreign 
     national employees exceed certain thresholds.
       Justification for termination: Section 1584 (b) of title 10 
     United States Code requires the report to Congress where we 
     exceed certain salary amounts for foreign national employees. 
     However, continuing annual appropriations acts have have 
     limited these payments. As a result, the report to Congress 
     has never been necessary. In practice, the reporting 
     requirement is and should continue to be academic.
       Title: Involuntary Reductions of Civilian Positions.
       Brief: The SECDEF may not implement any involuntary 
     reduction or furlough of civilian positions in a military 
     department, defense agency, or other component of DOD until 
     the expiration of the 45-day period beginning on the date on 
     which the Secretary submits to Congress a report setting 
     forth the reasons why such reductions or furloughs are 
     required and a description of any change in workload or 
     positions requirements that will result from such reductions 
     or furlough.
       Justification for termination: DOD already has in place 
     (DODD 5410.10) procedures to notify Congress of involuntary 
     reductions affecting 50 or more federal civilian employees or 
     100 or more contractor employees. This requirement to notify 
     Congress, no matter how few employees are affected, could 
     impose an administrative burden that would have a harsh 
     impact on each of the services.
       Title: Military Pay and Allowances.
       Brief: This is an annual report on how military pay and 
     allowances are doing relative to private wages and salaries.
       Justification for termination: The pay adequacy report, 
     required on an annual basis by 37 USC 1008(a), was mandated 
     in an era where there was no regular annual military pay 
     raise. The information in this report would provide 
     information on a number of indicators, and when it was 
     determined that an annual pay raise was needed it would be 
     requested. That has changed. Current law (P.L. 101-509) pegs 
     military pay raises to the employment cost index. Pay raises 
     are annual and are based upon changes in private sector wages 
     and salaries for the average worker. The information 
     contained in the pay adequacy report is no longer needed and 
     media coverage of the index itself is widespread.
       Title: Military Relocation Assistance Programs.
       Brief: Not later than March 1 each year, the Secretary of 
     Defense, acting through the Director of Military Relocation 
     Assistance programs, shall submit to Congress a report on the 
     Military Relocation Assistance program. The report shall 
     include the following: (1) an assessment of available, 
     affordable private-sector housing for members of the Armed 
     Forces and their families; (2) an assessment of the actual 
     nonreimbursed costs incurred by members of the Armed Forces 
     and their families who are ordered to make a change of 
     permanent station; (3) information on the types of locations 
     at which members of the Armed Forces assigned to duty at 
     military installations live, including the number of members 
     of the Armed Forces who live on a military installation and 
     the number of those who do not; and (4) information on the 
     effects of the relocation assistance programs established 
     under this program on the quality of life of members of the 
     Armed Forces and their families and on retention and 
     productivity of members of the Armed Forces.
       Justification for termination: The Department has met all 
     the requirements of 10 USC, section 1056(f) on relocation 
     assistance and specific information dealing with relocation 
     can be made available, as needed by the Congress or other 
     outside sources. Submitting specific responses as needed is 
     more efficient and cost-effective in terms of manpower 
     resources. For these reasons, recommend that the annual 
     relocation assistance report be terminated.
       Title: Pay Raise Allocations.
       Brief: Report owed with quadriennial review of military 
     compensation when president decides not to give equal 
     percentage pay raise to all military members.
       Justification for termination: This report is due from the 
     quadrennial review group only when there is a reallocation of 
     the basic pay raise. This rarely happens; when it does, it 
     would not appear useful to require that such a fact be 
     reviewed and reported by a quadrennial review group that 
     meets every fourth year.
       Title: Travel and Transportation Allowances; Dependents; 
     Baggage and Household Effects.
       Brief: The SECDEF shall submit to the Committees on Armed 
     Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a 
     report at the end of each fiscal year stating (1) the number 
     of dependents who during the preceding fiscal year were 
     accompanying members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 
     Corps who were stationed outside the United States and were 
     authorized by the Secretary concerned to receive allowances 
     or transportation for dependents; and (2) the number of 
     dependents who during the preceding fiscal year were 
     accompanying members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine 
     Corps who were stationed outside the United States and were 
     not authorized to receive allowances or transportation.
       Justification for termination: Neither OSD nor the services 
     have ever submitted such reports, insofar as we can 
     determine. We are skeptical of the interest this report holds 
     for Congress; therefore, this is a good candidate for 
     discontinuance.
       Title: U.S. Government Data Base on NATO and Warsaw Pact 
     Forces and Equipment.
       Brief: The Defense Authorization Act of 1989 required the 
     President to submit to Congress annually on December 1 both 
     classified and unclassified data bases of NATO and Warsaw 
     Pact forces and equipment. The task of preparing these 
     documents was assigned by the Secretary of Defense to the Net 
     Assessment Coordinating Committee (NACC), which the Under 
     Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) and the Director of 
     the Joint Staff co-chaired. PA&E took on the task of 
     assembling data and applying common counting rules. 
     Classified and unclassified documents entitled ``U.S. 
     Government Data Base of NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces and 
     Equipment'' were produced in 1988 and 1989 showing data at 
     the end of 1987 and 1988, respectively. (The 1988 versions 
     were not released by the President until June of 1990 when he 
     released the 1989 versions).
       In September 1990, PA&E initiated preparation of the 
     documents for 1990. Data on U.S. and non-U.S. NATO forces and 
     on Warsaw Pact air and naval forces were assembled fairly 
     promptly, but ground threat data were delayed due to the 
     demands of the CFE data exchange. Although PA&E continued to 
     work with the intelligence community throughout the early 
     summer of 1991, rapid changes within the former Soviet Union 
     precluded providing certain data at the level of detail of 
     earlier documents. At that point, PA&E put the project aside 
     for higher priority work.
       Justification for termination: The Defense Authorization 
     Act for 1989 required the President to submit to Congress 
     annually on 1 December classified and unclassified date bases 
     of NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces and Equipment. The Secretary 
     of Defense was asked to prepare the report.
       Documents entitled ``U.S. Government Data Base of NATO and 
     Warsaw Pact Forces and Equipment'' were submitted for 1988 
     and 1989. During preparation of the report for 1990, rapid 
     change within the former Warsaw Pact precluded acquisition of 
     meaningful data. Since that time, the Warsaw Pact has been 
     terminated; the Soviet Union has been dissolved; and NATO no 
     longer faces a threat of invasion. Data on forces and 
     equipment are now made available by all relevant nations 
     under the Conventional Forces Treaty (CFE) treaty.
       Title: DoD Offset Policy--Negotiations.
       Brief: Progress of negotiations.
       Justification for termination: This report is no longer 
     needed.
       Title: Panama Canal Administration.
       Brief: Report to Congress regarding the following: (1) The 
     condition on the Panama Canal and potential adverse effects 
     on United States shipping and commerce; (2) the effect on 
     canal operations of the military forces under General 
     Noriega; and (3) the commission's evaluation of the effect on 
     canal operations if the Panamanian Government continues to 
     withhold its consent to major factors in the United States 
     Senate's ratification of the Panama Canal treaties.
       Justification for termination: The report has been 
     overtaken by events and should be discontinued.
       Title: Source of Funds--Other Issues.
       Brief: Construction or engineering activity funded from any 
     DoD sources in Zaire or Central America.
       Justification for termination: Zaire is overtaken by 
     events. El Salvador is overtaken by events. Therefore, the 
     report should be terminated.
       Title: Special Operations Advanced Technology Development.
       Brief: Progress of the Mark-V.
       Justification for termination: Program well advanced. 
     Procurement Contract will be awarded this fiscal year. Staff 
     members concur in release from reporting requirements.
       Title: Special Operations Forces--Program Management.
       Brief: Status on ASDS and Mark V: Joint Mission Analysis.
       Justification for termination: This report is a duplicate 
     requirement cited in Public Law 102-408. (Mark V).


     congressionally mandated reports unidentified sponsor listing

       Title: Contributions for North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     Infrastructure.
       Brief: The SECDEF may make contributions for the U.S. share 
     of the cost of multilateral programs for the acquisition and 
     construction of military facilities and installations 
     (including international military headquarters and for 
     related expenses) for the collective defense of the North 
     Atlantic Treaty area. Funds may not be obligated or expended 
     in connection with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     infrastructure program in any year unless funds have been 
     authorized by law for the program. If the SECDEF determines 
     that the amount appropriated for contribution in any fiscal 
     year must be exceeded by more than the amount authorized, the 
     SECDEF may make contributions in excess of such amount, but 
     not in excess of 125 percent of the amount appropriated after 
     submitting a report, in writing, to the appropriate 
     committees of Congress on such increase, including a 
     statement of the reasons for the increase and a statement of 
     the source of the funds to be used for the increase, and 
     after a period of 21 days has elapsed from the date of 
     receipt of the report.
       Remarks: Not claimed by POL or A&T.
       Title: International Nonproliferation Initiative--Proposed 
     Obligations and Forms of Assistance.
       Brief: Proposed obligations and forms of assistance. SecDef 
     report.
       Remarks: Not Claimed by POL or COMP.
       Title: Participation of Developing Countries in Combined 
     Exercises: Payment of Incremental Expenses.
       Brief: The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a 
     report each year, not later than March 1, containing (1) a 
     list of the developing countries for which expenses have been 
     paid by the United States during the preceding year; and (2) 
     the amounts expended on behalf of each government.
       Remarks: Not claimed by POL or JS.
       Title: Requirement for Authorization by Law of Certain 
     Contracts Relating to Vessels and Aircraft.
       Brief: The Secretary of a military department make a 
     contract that is an agreement to lease or charter or an 
     agreement to provide services and that is (or will be) 
     accompanied by a contract for the actual lease, charter, or 
     provision of services if the contract for the actual lease, 
     charter, or provision of services is (or will be) a contract 
     which will be a long-term lease or charter; or the terms of 
     the contract provided for a substantial termination liability 
     on the part of the U.S. The Secretary has been specifically 
     authorized by law to make the contract; before a solicitation 
     for proposals for the contract was issued the Secretary 
     notified the Committees on Armed Services and on 
     Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the Secretary's intention to issue such a solicitation; and 
     the Secretary has notified the Committees on Armed Services 
     and on Appropriations of the Senate and House of 
     Representatives of the proposed contract and provided a 
     detailed description of the terms of the proposed contract 
     and a justification for entering into the proposed contract 
     rather than providing for the lease, charter, or services 
     involved through purchase of the vessel or aircraft to be 
     used under the contract, and a period of 30 days of 
     continuous session of Congress has expired following the date 
     on which notice was received by such committees.
       Remarks: Referral to the military departments recommended 
     by A&T.
       Title: SSBN Security Technology Program.
       Brief: Specific technologies which are to be assessed and 
     whether unresolved policy issues have been settled. SecDef 
     report.
       Remarks: Not addressed in any legislation, and not claimed 
     by POL or A&T.
       Title: Support for Peacekeeping Activities.
       Brief: Proposed obligation, forms of assistance, and 
     certification. SecDef report.
       Remarks: Not claimed by POL or COMP.
       Title: Training with Friendly Foreign Force.
       Brief: Not later than April 1 of each year, the SECDEF 
     shall submit to Congress a report regarding training during 
     the preceding fiscal year for which expenses were paid by the 
     U.S. Each report shall specify--(1) all countries in which 
     that training was conducted; (2) the type of training 
     conducted, including whether such training was related to 
     counter-narcotics or counter-terrorism activities, the 
     duration of that training, the number of the Armed Forces 
     involved, and expenses paid; (3) the extent of participation 
     by foreign military forces, including the number and service 
     affiliation of foreign military personnel involved and 
     physical and financial contribution of each host nation to 
     the training effort; and (4) the relationship of that 
     training to other overseas training programs conducted by the 
     Armed Forces.
       Remarks: Not claimed by P&R, SOLIC, or JS.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, this is an amendment we have worked on with 
the Senator from Arizona. As I understand it--correct me if I am in any 
way misinterpreting it--it would terminate certain Defense Department 
reporting requirements upon enactment of this authorization bill--that 
is by enactment rather than October 30, 1995. These are reports that 
are excess, not needed, that will reduce paperwork, reduce bureaucracy, 
and save money.
  If I am correct in my assumption on this amendment I certainly urge 
its adoption.
  THE PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 1842) was agreed to.
  Mr. McCAIN. I move to reconsider and I move to lay that motion on the 
table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.


                    Privilege Of The Floor--S. 2182

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Jack Kennedy, 
a legislative fellow on my staff, be granted the privilege of the floor 
during debate on S. 2182.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


     Amendments Nos. 1843, 1844, 1845, 1846, 1847, and 1848 En Bloc

  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, Senator Kerry of 
Massachusetts, Senator Dole, Senator McCain, Senator Conrad, Senator 
Wofford, Senator Lott, Senator Helms, Senator Grassley, and Senator 
Thurmond, I send to the desk six amendments and ask that they be 
considered en bloc. I ask for their immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Johnston-Feinstein amendment is set aside. 
The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Smith] for himself, Mr. 
     Kerry, Mr. Dole, Mr. McCain, Mr. Conrad, Mr. Wofford, Mr. 
     Lott, Mr. Helms, Mr. Grassley, and Mr. Thurmond, proposes en 
     bloc amendments numbered 1843-1848.

  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendments are as follows:

                           amendment no. 1843

 (Purpose: To require disclosure of information concerning unaccounted 
for United States personnel from the Korean conflict, the Vietnam era, 
                           and the cold war)

       On page 249, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:

     SEC. 1068. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING UNACCOUNTED 
                   FOR UNITED STATES PERSONNEL FROM THE KOREAN 
                   CONFLICT, AND THE COLD WAR.

       Section 1082 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190; 50 U.S.C. 401 
     note) is amended--
       (1) in subsection (a), by striking out paragraph (2) and 
     inserting in lieu thereof the following:
       ``(2) Paragraph (1) applies to any record, live-sighting 
     report, or other information in the custody of the official 
     custodian referred to in subsection (d)(3) that may pertain 
     to the location, treatment, or condition of (i) United States 
     personnel who remain not accounted for as a result of service 
     in the Armed Forces of the United States or other Federal 
     Government service during the Korean conflict, the Vietnam 
     era, or the Cold War, or (ii) their remains.'';
       (2) in subsection (c)--
       (A) by striking out the first sentence in paragraph (1) and 
     inserting in lieu thereof the following: ``In the case of 
     records or other information originated by the Department of 
     Defense, the official custodian shall make such records and 
     other information available to the public pursuant to this 
     section not later than September 30, 1995.'';
       (B) in paragraph (2), by striking out ``after March 1, 
     1992,''; and
       (C) in paragraph (3), by striking out ``a Vietnam-era POW/
     MIA who may still be alive in Southeast Asia,'' and inserting 
     in lieu thereof ``any United States personnel referred to in 
     subsection (a)(2) who remain not accounted for but who may 
     still be alive in captivity,'';
       (3) by striking out subsection (d) and inserting in lieu 
     thereof the following:
       ``(d) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
       ``(1) The terms `Korean conflict' and `Vietnam era' have 
     the meanings given those terms in section 101 of title 38, 
     United States Code.
       ``(2) The term `Cold War' shall have the meaning determined 
     by the Secretary of Defense.
       ``(3) The term `official custodian' means--
       ``(A) in the case of records, reports, and information 
     relating to the Korean conflict or the Cold War, the 
     Archivist of the United States; and
       ``(B) in the case of records, reports, and information 
     relating to the Vietnam era, the Secretary of Defense.''; and
       (4) by striking out the section heading and inserting in 
     lieu thereof the following new section heading:

     ``SEC. 1082. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING UNACCOUNTED 
                   FOR UNITED STATES PERSONNEL OF THE COLD WAR, 
                   THE KOREAN CONFLICT, AND THE VIETNAM ERA.''.

                                  ____



                           Amendment No. 1844

       In title X, insert the following new section:

     SEC.  . REQUIREMENT FOR CERTIFICATION BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
                   CONCERNING DECLASSIFICATION OF VIETNAM-ERA POW/
                   MIA RECORDS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Senate, by Senate Resolution 324, 102d Congress, 2d 
     session, agreed to on July 2, 1992, unanimously requested the 
     President to ``expeditiously issue an Executive Order 
     requiring all executive branch departments and agencies to 
     declassify and publicly release without compromising United 
     States national security all documents, files, and other 
     materials pertaining to POW's and MIA's.''.
       (2) The President, in an executive order dated July 22, 
     1992, ordered declassification of all United States 
     Government documents, files, and other materials pertaining 
     to American personnel who became prisoners of war or missing 
     in action in Southeast Asia.
       (3) The President stated on Memorial Day of 1993 that all 
     such documents, files, and other materials pertaining to the 
     personnel covered by that executive order should be 
     declassified by Veterans Day of 1993.
       (4) The President declared on Veterans Day of 1993 that all 
     such documents, files, and other materials had been 
     declassified.
       (5) Nonetheless, since that Veterans Day declaration in 
     1993, there have been found still classified more United 
     States Government documents, files, and other materials 
     pertaining to American personnel who became prisoners of war 
     or missing in action in Southeast Asia.
       (b) Review and Certification.--Not later than 60 days after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Defense shall--
       (1) conduct a review to determine whether there continue to 
     exist in classified form documents, files, or other materials 
     pertaining to American personnel who became prisoners of war 
     or missing in action in Southeast Asia that should be 
     declassified in accordance with Senate Resolution 324, 102d 
     Congress, 2d session, agreed to on July 2, 1992, and the 
     executive order of July 22, 1992; and
       (2) certify to Congress that all documents, files, and 
     other materials pertaining to such personnel have been 
     declassified and specify in the certification the date on 
     which the declassification was completed.
                                  ____



                           amendment no. 1845

       In title X, insert the following new section:

     SEC.   . REQUIREMENT FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO SUBMIT 
                   RECOMMENDATIONS ON CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF LAW 
                   CONCERNING MISSING PERSONS.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The families of American personnel who became prisoners 
     of war or missing in action while serving in the Armed Forces 
     of the United States and national veterans organizations have 
     expressed concern to Congress for several years regarding 
     provisions of chapter 10 of title 37, United States Code, 
     relating to missing persons, that authorize the Secretaries 
     of the military departments to declare missing Armed Forces 
     personnel dead based primarily on the passage of time.
       (2) Proposed legislation concerning revisions to those 
     provisions of law has been pending before Congress for 
     several years.
       (3) It is important for Congress to obtain the views of the 
     Secretary of Defense with respect to the appropriateness of 
     revising those provisions of law before acting further on 
     proposed amendments to such provisions.
       (b) Recommendations Required.--Not later than 180 days 
     after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
     Defense, in consultation with the Secretaries of the military 
     departments, the national POW/MIA family organizations, and 
     the national veterans organizations, shall--
       (1) conduct a review of the provisions of chapter 10 of 
     title 37, United States Code, relating to missing persons: 
     and
       (2) submit to Congress the Secretary's recommendations as 
     to whether those provisions of law should be amended.
                                  ____



                           amendment no. 1846

       In title X, insert the following new section:

     SEC.   . CONTACT BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE 
                   MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE OF CHINA ON POW/
                   MIA ISSUES.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs of the Senate 
     concluded in its final report, dated January 13, 1993, that 
     ``many American POW's had been held in China during the 
     Korean conflict and that foreign POW camps in both China and 
     North Korea were run by Chinese officials'' and, further, 
     that ``given the fact that only 26 Army and 15 Air Force 
     personnel returned from China following the war, the 
     committee can now firmly conclude that the People's Republic 
     of China surely has information on the fate of other 
     unaccounted for American POW's from the Korean conflict.''
       (2) The Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs recommended in 
     such report that ``the Department of State and Defense form a 
     POW/MIA task force on China similar to Task Force Russia.''.
       (3) Neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of 
     State has held substantive discussions with officials from 
     the People's Republic of China concerning unaccounted for 
     American prisoners of war of the Korean conflict.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
     the Secretary of Defense should establish contact with 
     officials of the Ministry of Defense of the People's Republic 
     of China regarding unresolved issues relating to American 
     prisoners of war and American personnel missing in action as 
     a result of the Korean conflict.
                                  ____



                           amendment no. 1847

  (Purpose: To require the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress 
certain information concerning unaccounted for United States personnel 
                        of the Vietnam conflict)

       On page 249, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:

     SEC. 1068. INFORMATION CONCERNING UNACCOUNTED FOR UNITED 
                   STATES PERSONNEL OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT.

       Not later than 45 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress 
     the following information pertaining to United States 
     personnel involved in the Vietnam conflict that remain not 
     accounted for:
       (1) A complete listing by name of all such personnel about 
     whom it is possible that officials of the Socialist Republic 
     of Vietnam can produce additional information or remains that 
     could lead to the maximum possible accounting for those 
     personnel, as determined on the basis of all information 
     available to the United States Government.
       (2) A complete listing by name of all such personnel about 
     whom it is possible that officials of the Lao People's 
     Democratic Republic can produce additional information or 
     remains that could lead to the maximum possible accounting 
     for those personnel, as determined on the basis of all 
     information available to the United States Government.
                                  ____



                           Amendment No. 1848

       In title X, insert the following new section:

     Sec.   . REPORT ON POW/MIA MATTERS CONCERNING NORTH KOREA.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs of the Senate 
     concluded in its final report, dated January 13, 1993, that 
     ``it is likely that a large number of possible MIA remains 
     can be repatriated and several records and documents on 
     unaccounted for POW's and MIA's can be provided from North 
     Korea once a joint working level commission is set up under 
     the leadership of the United States.''.
       (2) The Select Committee recommended in such report that 
     ``the Departments of State and Defense take immediate steps 
     to form this commission through the United Nations Command at 
     Panmunjom, Korea'' and that the ``commission should have a 
     strictly humanitarian mission and should not be tied to 
     political developments on the Korean peninsula''.
       (3) In August 1993, the United States and North Korea 
     entered into an agreement concerning the repatriation of 
     remains of United States personnel.
       (4) The establishment of a joint working level commission 
     with North Korea could enhance the prospects for results 
     under the August 1993 agreement.
       (b) Report.--The Secretary of Defense shall--
       (1) at the end of January, May, and September of 1995, 
     submit a report to Congress on the status of efforts to 
     obtain information from North Korea concerning United States 
     personnel involved in the Korean conflict who remain not 
     accounted for and to obtain from North Korea any remains of 
     such personnel; and
       (2) actively seek to establish a joint working level 
     commission with North Korea, consistent with the 
     recommendations of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs of 
     the Senate set forth in the final report of the committee, 
     dated January 13, 1993, to resolve the remaining issues 
     relating to United States personnel who became prisoners of 
     war or missing in action during the Korean conflict.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there any objection to the Senate handling 
these amendments en bloc?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, each of the six amendments that I have sent 
to the desk concerns the issue of American personnel still unaccounted 
for from past conflicts, to include the Korean war and the cold war, as 
well as Vietnam.
  As my colleagues will recall, in January 1993, the Senate Select 
Committee on POW-MIA Affairs published its final report which contained 
several recommendations for followup. We stated in our report that to 
the extent there remain matters to be pursued, that we would ensure 
that they, indeed, were pursued.
  This is really the basis of these six amendments. I want to say at 
the outset that I appreciate the cooperation of Senator John Kerry, who 
was the chairman of that committee, and Senator Nunn and staff, Senator 
Thurmond, Senator McCain, and others who have worked with me in a 
cooperative way to work these amendments out so that they could be 
approved.
  As the former vice chairman of that committee, I am today offering 
these amendments because I believe there are still some items that need 
to be pursued as we try to bring closure to this issue and, basically, 
to determine the fate of those who are still missing.
  I am pleased that Senators Kerry and McCain especially saw fit to 
join, as well as Senators Grassley and Helms, who were also on the 
select committee with me.
  I understand there are no objections to the amendments by the 
chairman or the ranking member. At least, that is my understanding. So 
I am going to make a few brief comments on each of the amendments and 
will not be asking for the yeas and nays on this side.
  For the benefit of my colleagues, I would like to start with the 
first amendment which amends section 1082 of the fiscal year 1992-93 
Defense Department Authorization Act mandating the declassification of 
Vietnam-era POW-MIA records to include the Korean war and cold war POW-
MIA records.
  This amendment applies only to Defense Department records, to include 
those at the National Archives for which DOD is the originating agency. 
The National Archives might be surprised to hear estimates that there 
are up to 20,000 classified documents--not pages, but classified 
documents--pertaining to Korean war POW-MIA's alone. Estimates on 
classified POW-MIA-related information on the cold war are not 
available, although there are 130 individuals unaccounted for as a 
result of cold war incidents.
  According to DOD, some 670,000 pages of Vietnam-era POW/MIA documents 
were declassified in 1992 and 1993 under the fiscal year 1992-93 DOD 
Authorization Act. This amendment requires DOD to declassify roughly 
20,000 pages of Korean war POW records during fiscal year 1995, in 
addition to any cold war POW-MIA records that are still classified.
  The Senate Armed Services Committee has already adopted language 
requiring DOD to assist any Korean war POW-MIA families trying to 
locate information on their loved ones, whether it is in classified or 
unclassified form.
  My amendment, No. 1, ensures that all DOD's POW-MIA records are 
processed for declassification under the same procedures set forth with 
the fiscal 1992-1993 DOD authorization language on the Vietnam-era 
records. I thank Senator McCain for his continuing efforts on these 
issues over the years as he has worked on this same subject.
  In amendment number two, this amendment requires the Secretary of 
Defense to certify to Congress within 60 days that a copy of all DOD 
Vietnam-era POW-MIA-related documents covered by Senate Resolution 324 
of July 2, 1992, and President Bush's Executive order of July 22, 1992, 
have been declassified as they were supposed to be and deposited in the 
Library of Congress. If there are documents found that have not been 
declassified, then they should be immediately declassified in 
accordance with the Executive order. It is just a check through the 
system to be sure that nothing was missed.
  In short, Mr. President, I have personally been involved with 
instances, including just last month, ironically, where a POW-MIA 
family learned that there was classified information in their file 
involving documents that they had never seen before. You can imagine 
the surprise and dismay, and whatever, at seeing documents that they 
did not know were there on a missing loved one. As a result of their 
persistent efforts, the documents, I am told, are now being 
declassified and provided to the family.
  Bear in mind, this is some 6 months after our current President 
stated on Veterans Day that all Vietnam-era documents on POW's had been 
declassified. This amendment will simply ensure that this is done; that 
is, the Secretary of Defense and the new Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for POW-MIA Affairs, Gen. Jim Wold, will conduct a review and 
certify to Congress that everything should be declassified that is 
supposed to be.
  I might also say that I have talked to General Wold, who has been 
extremely cooperative with me in every respect in attempting to comply 
with the declassification of documents.
  My colleagues will recall that the last time the Senate acted on this 
matter was in July 1992, when we unanimously requested that the POW-MIA 
documents be declassified. This amendment now will ensure that a report 
is provided back to the Congress certifying that this work has been 
completed.
  Amendment No. 3 requires the Secretary of Defense to provide a report 
to Congress within 180 days with recommendations from the military 
services as to the appropriateness of revising the Missing Persons Act 
of 1942. Legislation to amend the Missing Persons Act has been before 
Congress for several years. It is not new. But no hearings have been 
held in the Senate on this matter. The amendment simply requests that 
the Secretary of Defense formally provide the views of his Department 
to Congress on whether or not there should be changes in this law.
  The National League of Families supports a DOD study on this issue, 
and there are indications that the military services are prepared, even 
as we speak, to come forward with recommendations if asked by the 
Secretary. So I hope this amendment will move that process along.
  One of the central issues behind those pushing for change is whether 
a service member in a missing status should be declared dead by the 
military based primarily on the passage of a set period of time. This 
issue has been lingering since even my earlier days in the House of 
Representatives. Legislation addressing the issue is still pending in 
the House. But it is time that the Defense Department formally provide 
us its views on this matter. It is a very, very sensitive matter to the 
families, as you might expect. I think the Congress owes it to those 
families to get on with this report and resolve this matter.
  Amendment No. 4 expresses the sense of the Congress that the 
Secretary of Defense should establish contacts with defense officials 
from the People's Republic of China to discuss the fate of American 
POW's and MIA's from the Korean war. The amendment contains sense-of-
the-Congress language. The Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs 
made recommendations that the Chinese officials be approached about the 
Korean war POW-MIA issues in its final report in January 1993.
  However, according to the State Department and the Defense 
Department, no real substantive decisions or discussions have taken 
place on this matter. This amendment does not require but it simply 
urges the Secretary of Defense to initiate such discussions with his 
counterparts in the Chinese Ministry of Defense.
  I feel very strongly, based on my visits to North Korea and speaking 
to North Korean officials in December 1992, and earlier in 1991, that 
the Chinese have a great deal of information that they could provide on 
accounting for our missing military personnel from the Korean war. 
Frankly, the North Koreans indicated to me point blank that the Chinese 
would have such information.
  So what we are trying to do is call this to the attention of the 
Secretary of Defense in such a way that we could perhaps open up some 
contact with the Chinese to get a process going where we could get some 
accounting, some answers on our men, which we know they have. I think, 
if you do not talk about it, you are never going to get it done.

  So I hope that the Chinese will accept this in the spirit that it is 
offered and work with our Secretary of Defense to try to get some 
answers regarding our mission. We know they have them. It would be, I 
think, in the best interests of both of our countries' relations to see 
this happen.
  Amendment No. 5 requires the Secretary of Defense to provide the 
Congress within 45 days a listing of Vietnam-era POW/MIA cases where 
Vietnamese and Lao officials possibly have more information under their 
control that could lead to the fullest possible accounting of these 
POW/MIA's.
  There has been a lot of rhetoric concerning what Vietnam should still 
be expected to do unilaterally on the POW issue.
  This amendment No. 5 simply requests the Secretary of Defense to 
provide us with a listing of those cases, individual cases where the 
Vietnamese and the Lao should be expected to possibly have more 
information that can help us to account for those men--not that they 
do, but possibly. That is the key word.
  Amendment No. 6 and the final amendment requires the Secretary of 
Defense to provide regular reports to Congress on the status of efforts 
to obtain POW/MIA information or remains from North Korea.
  It also requires the Secretary to actively seek, via the U.N. command 
in Korea, the establishment of a joint working-level POW/MIA commission 
with North Korea consistent with the recommendations of the Senate 
Select Committee in January 1993.
  In my visit to North Korea, in discussions with the North Korean 
officials also in 1992 and in July 1991, this was a matter that was 
discussed with the North Koreans. I think they are interested in doing 
that. We need to get that process moving as well.
  In the last year, we have seen reports of more remains of United 
States soldiers being returned from North Korea. That is a positive 
step. It gets us talking to the North Koreans on something that might 
give us the opportunity to talk with them more on other issues of major 
consequence such as the nuclear issue.
  Just last week it is reported that North Korean President Kim Il-song 
told President Carter that he had authorized joint United States-North 
Korean search teams to recover soldier remains in North Korea. This is 
a very positive step on this issue. It is something that has been long 
overdue. For roughly almost 40 years all we have done really is 
exchange lists across the table in a very hostile way. I think this is 
very positive, and I think it is the type of thing that Kim Il-song is 
offering. I think we ought to take him up on his offer immediately.
  It is clear, very clear, based on my discussions and the documents 
that I have seen, that the North Koreans can provide us more 
information on and remains of our POW/MIA's from the Korean conflict 
and, coupled with the Chinese connection, can provide us a lot of 
answers on the some 8,000 missing from the Korean war--something that 
should have been done a long time ago. And I urge my colleagues to 
support me on this.
  Basically, also, it will ensure that Congress is fully informed on 
this issue. For so long, the information on the POW/MIA issue has 
pretty much remained only in the hands of those codels that go over, 
and there has been little formal structure other than the MIA Select 
Committee. This is an opportunity to get some reports back and let 
everybody in Congress know what is going on. Hopefully, it will lead to 
a better understanding with North Korea.
  Let me conclude, Mr. President, by taking this opportunity to say 
that the executive directors of the American Legion and the National 
League of Families and the Korean/Cold War Family Organization fully 
support these amendments and have sent me letters so indicating. I ask 
unanimous consent, Mr. President, to print those letters in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                          The American legion,

                                    Washington, DC, June 21, 1994.
     Hon. Robert C. Smith,
     U.S. Senate,
     Dirksen Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Smith: The American Legion continues to 
     support positive efforts that will achieve the fullest 
     possible accounting of American prisoners of war or missing 
     in action (POW/MIA) from past wartime conflicts and the cold 
     war. We were therefore, pleased to see your plan to introduce 
     six amendments proposed for inclusion in the FY 1995 Defense 
     Authorization Act which will soon be considered by the full 
     Senate. If approved, these amendments would not only show a 
     continuing national commitment to obtaining an accounting of 
     missing American service personnel, but also demonstrate 
     continued U.S. resolve to those nations who have information 
     on our missing, have been than forthcoming in releasing all 
     available data, and have diminishing incentive to do so.
       Your sponsorship of these amendments now is extremely 
     important. Since the trade embargo against Vietnam was lifted 
     in early February, the emphasis in U.S./Eurasian relations 
     has been motivated more by initiatives to increase because 
     and trade than in the plight of unaccounted for American and 
     the anguish of their families. Consequently, the Legion 
     believes the U.S. has little bargaining leverage to compel 
     foreign nations to disclose information on missing American 
     service personnel, or to encourage them to relentlessly 
     continue to pursue sighting reports or suspected burial 
     sites.
       The American Legion believes the best hope to obtain POW/
     MIA information is to allow U.S. contacts with these Eurasian 
     nations to be governed by rules of conduct which mandate 
     reports, release of formerly classified data and initiation 
     of dialogues with foreign nations. Senate support of your 
     amendments will revitalize the search for the remains of and 
     information about missing Americans and reemphasize that this 
     matter is the highest national priority.
           Sincerely,
                                              John F. Sommer, Jr.,
                                               Executive Director.
                                  ____

         National League of Families of American Prisoners and 
           Missing in Southeast Asia,
                                    Washington, DC, June 21, 1994.
       Dear Senator: The National League of POW/MIA Families urges 
     full support for the amendments Senator Robert Smith plans to 
     introduce for inclusion in the FY95 Defense Authorization 
     Act.
       Importantly, Senator Smith's amendments include provision 
     of unclassified material, as well as declassification and 
     release of classified information. It is our view that 
     passage of these measures will further reinforce the 
     bipartisan Congressional effort to ensure that all pertinent 
     information on the POW/MIA issue is made available publicly, 
     except that which would violate the privacy of the next of 
     kin.
       In our view, each of the proposed amendments enhance a 
     spirit of openness and fall within the intent of language 
     previously approved by the Congress and addressed in the 
     executive orders of Presidents Bush and Clinton concerning 
     declassification.
       We also strongly support language which ensures that the 
     Secretary of Defense will provide suggestions and 
     recommendations to alter the U.S. Code statutes, developed in 
     1942, governing missing persons. The time for addressing 
     these out-dated statutes is long overdue, and the League 
     believes the most responsible means is for the Congress to 
     obtain input directly from the Military Services before 
     taking any action which will have long-lasting consequences.
       Your support for Senator Smith's amendments will be 
     extremely helpful as we continue to seek answers still being 
     withheld, primarily in Hanoi, and not yet obtained on our 
     relative still missing from the Vietnam War. These amendments 
     will also ensure that thousands of American families who lost 
     loved ones during earlier wars have access to relevant 
     information.
           Sincerely,
                                              Ann Mills Griffiths,
                                               Executive Director.
                                  ____

                                            Korean/Cold War Family


                                    Association of the Missing

                                                      Coppell, TX,
                                                    June 21, 1994.
       Dear Senator Bob Smith: The purpose of the Korean/Cold War 
     Family Association of the Missing is ``to account for all 
     American personnel who are Prisoners of War or Missing in 
     Action as a result of action in the Korean War and the Cold 
     War.'' The Association genuinely thanks you for your six 
     amendments to the FY95 Defense Authorization Act concerning 
     the issue of unaccounted for U.S. personnel (POW/MIA) from 
     the Cold War and the Korean War.
       The Korean War/Cold War Family Association of the Missing 
     unequivocally supports and endorses these amendments. The 
     passage of these amendments would, for the first time ever, 
     afford our missing the honor and dignity they so rightfully 
     should expect from their country. These amendments make a 
     real priority of a national commitment to obtaining an 
     accounting for our POW/MIA's not only to our country but also 
     to those foreign nations who have withheld information.
       The passage of these amendments would set our nation on the 
     path of correcting Section 555 of the Public Law, Missing 
     Persons Act so misguidedly passed in 1942. Never did the 
     Families wish to be paid by our government in lieu of 
     searching for our loved ones, which was the result of this 
     law, and never would we even remotely support such an idea 
     much less a law. Many times this law has been challenged in 
     our court systems by the Families. We have learned the only 
     way to defeat it is to change it.
       Most importantly, the language of these amendments, 
     addresses the necessity of declassification and release of 
     documents crucial to the Families' accessing all information 
     regarding their loved ones; a right denied to us for far too 
     many years. We have constantly been placed in the situation 
     of educating our Senators and Congressmen to the fact the 
     Executive Orders for declassification of POW/MIA documents 
     did NOT include the Korean War or the Cold War. The Critical 
     issue of declassification ensures that all DOD's POW/MIA 
     records are processed for declassification for the purpose of 
     providing the fullest possible accounting for the missing 
     from the Korean War and the Cold War. It is important that 
     the same procedures set forth in the FY 92 DOD Authorization 
     language on Vietnam era records also be applied to those from 
     the Korean War and the Cold War. Further we believe the 
     declassification amendment enhances the accounting efforts of 
     the US/Russian Joint Commission and any future working level 
     negotiations with North Korea and China. In light of the cost 
     in tax dollars for any POW/MIA accounting efforts with a 
     foreign country, it seems only reasonable that accurate and 
     complete records on the missing must be available prior to 
     negotiations. Your amendments ensure this necessity will be 
     met in the future.
       Again, thank you Mr. Smith. You are an honorable and 
     courageous man. Be assured that the Korean/Cold War Family 
     Association of the Missing will do all in our power to make 
     the other Senators aware of how vital it is to pass these 
     amendments.
           Most sincerely,
                                           Patricia Wilson Dunton,
                                             Co-Founding Director.
                                  ____

         National League of Families of American Prisoners and 
           Missing in Southeast Asia,
                                      Washington DC, May 20, 1994.
     Hon. Robert C. Smith,
     Dirksen Senate Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Bob Smith: I am writing to convey the position of the 
     National League of Families regarding H.R. 291, ``to 
     establish procedures for determining whether members of the 
     Armed Forces in a missing status,'' etc.
       The league's board of directors met April 29-30th and 
     discussed the merits of this bill. The League opposes the 
     language in H.R. 291 however, we recognize the inadequacies 
     in the current statutes of the U.S. Code. For this reason, 
     the League supports Congressional action to require the 
     Department of Defense to conduct a study for the purpose of 
     recommending appropriate changes to the relevant statutes. It 
     is our view that such a study should be reported to Congress 
     no later than 180 days from its initiation.
       Our board of directors recognizes the effort that many, 
     including Top Holland, have dedicated to this issue, but 
     continues to have serious concern over the retroactive 
     provisions included in H.R. 291, as well as obvious, though 
     amended, interference with the prerogatives of the primary 
     next of kin.
       It is our hope that Congress will proceed with directing 
     the proposed study. I am confident that the Military Services 
     also recognize problem areas and will come forth with 
     recommendations to address them. In our view, the study 
     should occur as soon as possible.
       Should you deem it appropriate, we would appreciate your 
     efforts to include relevant provisions in the Defense 
     Authorization Bill during the upcoming conference.
           Sincerely,
                                              Ann Mills Griffiths,
                                               Executive Director.

  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I also at this point ask unanimous consent 
to add Senator Reid as an original cosponsor to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. SMITH. At this point I would simply call for a vote. I am not 
asking for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Baucus). Is there further debate? The 
Senator from Georgia.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, first, I wish to thank the Senator from New 
Hampshire for his leadership on this issue. He is a stalwart in trying 
to do everything that we can possibly do to gain access to information 
relating to the POW/MIA's both individually and collectively. He has 
not only been zealous in his efforts on Vietnam era POW/MIA's but also 
on Korea. I have been with him when he has spent numerous hours on the 
subject in Russia and other places.
  Each one of these amendments, as he has explained, I think can add to 
the knowledge that we have and that the families may have and give us 
the maximum amount of information.
  We have reviewed each one of these amendments, and all of them have 
been worked out. There are two or three minor changes that have been 
made in them, but they have been presented as changed and as worked 
out. So I urge their acceptance.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I thank the chairman of the committee. His 
cooperation in this matter has been outstanding. I am deeply grateful 
to him for his help in the recent Russian trips on some of the matters 
we discussed and also for his support and cooperation.
  I also ask unanimous consent to add Senator Kohl as a cosponsor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Without objection, the amendments en bloc are agreed to.
  So the amendments (Nos. 1843, 1844, 1845, 1846, 1847, and 1848) were 
agreed to.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator 
Lieberman be added as a cosponsor to the Smith amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the pending amendment is the Johnston 
amendment?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct, No. 1840.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, just so Senators will have some idea of the 
schedule. I know there are a lot of people who are inquiring, and the 
manager of this bill certainly cannot predict with certainty that 
Senators are going to come to the floor with amendments.
  We have a number of amendments, obviously, that are going to be 
presented here in the course of this bill. We are trying to get people 
over now to present amendments, and I encourage anyone who has an 
amendment to come over at this time certainly if it relates to the 
defense bill. We will take it up this afternoon or this evening.
  It is my hope that Senator Kempthorne will be able to come over in a 
few minutes. He has indicated he hopes to be able to present an 
amendment around 5:30 on U.N. peacekeeping. There is a provision in the 
bill on U.N. peacekeeping that I believe Senator Kempthorne will 
propose that we strike. So that will be a contested amendment. The 
committee will be in opposition to that amendment.
  It is my belief, having discussed it with Senator Kempthorne, that we 
can have a reasonable time limitation on that amendment. I would 
anticipate it would be about an hour. So assuming that we get started 
on that one about 5:30, it would be my view that we would vote 
somewhere in the neighborhood of 6:30 or 7.
  I have also been informed by the leadership and by other Senators 
that there will be an invitation for Members of Congress and their 
families to go to the White House this evening. For that reason, we 
will have a window where there will be no rollcall votes after the 
Kempthorne amendment is voted on. I cannot say precisely when that will 
be. It will be, hopefully, between 6:30 and 7 o'clock, and we would not 
have votes between that hour and 9 o'clock tonight.
  It would be my hope that during the period of time where some people 
may be attending the White House dinner that we would continue to have 
amendments presented. It would be my hope that we could then have the 
votes stacked until after that window, and that we would have some more 
rollcall votes after 9 o'clock tonight.
  We will be on this bill tomorrow. Senator Levin was tied up in a 
hearing this afternoon on a matter relating to this bill, which will 
probably come up next week, on Bosnia. He was in a hearing and helping 
to preside over the hearing. He will be on the floor tomorrow morning 
prepared to present an amendment on the B-2.
  It is my view that we would have a reasonable period of time for 
debate on that issue tomorrow, and that we would vote after a 
reasonable period of debate on the B-2.
  It is also my understanding that the minority leader, Senator Dole, 
will be making a presentation and laying down an amendment on Bosnia 
regarding lifting the arms embargo. But that amendment will not be 
actually voted on until next week.
  I would hope we would have a number of other amendments that can be 
dealt with tonight and tomorrow. The committee will be here tomorrow. 
We will be voting tomorrow.
  So I hope Senators will take that into account in making their plans, 
and that we can maximize the effectiveness of the time we spend here 
tomorrow.
  I will certainly be consulting with the majority leader, Senator 
Mitchell, on all of these matters. What I have said so far I think 
reflects the discussions that we have had and his instructions to me as 
far as managing this bill.
  So that gives people some idea. I will now make certain remarks that 
can be interrupted in the event someone comes over to the floor with an 
amendment, and certainly when Senator Kempthorne comes, I will complete 
my remarks on this particular subject at a later point in time.

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