[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 81 (Thursday, June 23, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 23, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                          THE CRISIS IN KOREA

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, if history teaches us anything about 
modifying the behavior of dictators, it is that the efficacy of 
incentives depends on the simultaneous employment of disincentives. To 
get a mule to move, you must show it the carrot and hit it with a stick 
at the same time.
  Throughout the confusion and sudden reverses that have plagued the 
Clinton administration's attempts to curb North Korea's nuclear 
ambitions, one quality of administration diplomacy has remained 
constant. The administration's approach to resolving this crisis has 
consistently reflected the mirror opposite of North Korea's efforts to 
realize their aspirations for membership in the nuclear power club. Our 
diplomacy employs only carrots; theirs, only sticks.
  On the many occasions when the administration's carrots have failed 
to prevent North Korea's violations of the Nuclear Non Proliferation 
Treaty, the Clinton administration has limited its choice of sticks to 
the withdrawal of the carrot. For instance, the administration 
responded to North Korea's discharge of the remaining fuel rods from 
the Yongbyon reactor by canceling their offer of a third round of high 
level talks.
  Yes, they also began consulting with U.N. Security Council members 
about the imposition of sanctions against North Korea. But their 
attempts were half-hearted at best; were limited to the consideration 
of symbolic sanctions; and were, in effect, dropped once former 
President Carter succumbed to the charms of that avuncular dictator, 
Kim Il-song.
  Using sticks such as their threatened withdrawal from the NPT and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, North Korea has consistently 
intimidated administration diplomacy. To divert the administration from 
taking punitive measures in response to North Korea's violations of the 
NPT, Kim Il-song has raised, then withdrawn his stick, masking his 
forbearance in the disguise of a carrot. That tactic was on full 
display during the Carter visit.
  Thanks to former President Carter's performance as an innocent abroad 
in North Korea, the administration now feels that it has no choice but 
to pursue the purported openings to resolve the crisis offered by Kim 
Il-song. The practical effect of President Carter's public embrace of 
the Great Leader is that the administration effort's to secure even a 
symbolic sanctions regime would fail at the present time. Thus, 
President Carter's effect on the international politics of this crisis 
requires President Clinton and the South Korean Government to spend the 
time necessary to call the North's bluff.
  I can understand why President Clinton might have wanted to make a 
virtue of necessity, by announcing that North Korea's offer was 
tempting enough to explore in a third round of high level talks. But I 
had hoped that a sense of humility and an appreciation for North 
Korea's long record of broken promises would have restrained 
administration exuberance when announcing their decision to resume 
negotiations. That announcement should have been understated, released 
on paper, and colored with great skepticism about the North's 
sincerity.
  Instead, President Clinton greeted North Korea's specific promise to 
freeze their nuclear weapons program and to refrain from expelling the 
last two IAEA inspectors as if North Korea had, at least, offered the 
United States a concession worth celebrating. The President publicly 
identified himself with the Carter initiative and all of the former 
President's overstated rhetoric about personally saving Korea from war.
  Mr. President, what, in fact, has North Korea given up in this offer? 
Nothing. The fuel rods which North Korea would use to make weapons 
grade plutonium cannot be used until they cooled down for at least 
another month. Neither can the reactor be refueled until the rods have 
cooled. In other words, North Korea's nuclear program is, of physical 
necessity, frozen.
  What North Korea has done is withdraw a threatened stick regarding 
the expulsion of the inspectors and offered to refrain from utilizing a 
capacity that it presently does not have. For this, they received a 
celebration in the White House press office, and President Clinton's 
enthusiastic embrace of President Carter's diplomacy. While the talks 
drag on, the North Koreans will be granted sufficient time to reach the 
point when they can convert the fuel into weapons grade plutonium. 
During this time they will not be constrained by economic sanctions or 
the buildup of United States military forces on the Korean peninsula. 
The most critical reinforcements necessary to diminish North Korea's 
ability to destroy Seoul with artillery fire will now be held in 
abeyance while the United States finds itself trapped in negotiations 
with the North, leaving Seoul a hostage to Pyongyang's future 
belligerence.
  I say we will be trapped because the Carter initiative is now the 
Clinton initiative. Had it failed before yesterday, the administration 
could have plausibly blamed the whole mess on President Carter's 
naivete. Now, the blame will be placed squarely on President Clinton--
as it should.
  This political reality, I suspect, will cause President Clinton to 
become a coconspirator with Kim Il-sung in dragging the talks out even 
if it becomes apparent that North Korea is only stalling until it can 
develop four to six additional nuclear weapons.
  After the President's overreaction to what is at best a dubious offer 
from North Korea, President Clinton's reputation as a world leader will 
be permanently injured in public opinion if the talks fail. He now has 
a rather significant personal political stake in preventing the 
perception that the talks have failed from taking hold in the public's 
mind. I greatly fear that the President will allow this political 
imperative to override national security concerns.
  Yet, it is at least an even money bet that the talks will fail, Mr. 
President. Although the administration will attempt to obscure a 
failure, we will reach a point when it is apparent to all. That point 
will be apparent when North Korea suddenly violates the last of its 
obligations under the NPT by resuming operations in its reprocessing 
plant and converting the fuel now in cooling ponds into weapons-grade 
plutonium.
  Should they begin reprocessing, our only means to deprive the North 
Koreans of an additional four to six nuclear weapons would be to 
immediately destroy the reprocessing plant with air strikes. President 
Clinton may have only hours to make that decision. Does anyone believe 
that he will choose air strikes?
  He will not choose that necessary option, Mr. President, because he 
has neglected to reinforce our counter battery defenses to a level 
sufficient to spare the city of Seoul from complete destruction by 
North Korean artillery. He has done so irrespective of the concerns of 
military commanders in Korea. Consequently, the United States will have 
to learn to live with North Korea's possession of as many as eight 
nuclear weapons, just as the President is apparently prepared to live 
with their possession of two nuclear weapons.
  Those who doubt the acuity of my speculation should know that we will 
have an early test of the administration's resolve. The first agenda 
item in the negotiations to begin the first week of July will be access 
to two nuclear waste sites where the IAEA might gain at least a partial 
understanding of how much plutonium was diverted to weapons production 
in 1989.
  You will remember, Mr. President, that it was North Korea's 
destruction of the means for an accurate measurement of that past 
diversion that caused the administration to drop its original offer of 
a third round of talks and to go to the Security Council for a 
sanctions resolution. Administration officials have assured me that the 
first order of business in the forthcoming negotiations will be North 
Korea's commitment to partially remedying their violation of the NPT by 
allowing challenge inspections of the two waste sites. They assured me 
that if North Korea does not satisfy their concerns on this issue that 
the talks will not go forward.
  As recently as last Friday, North Korea's Foreign Minister said that 
his government would never allow IAEA access to the waste sites. If the 
North Koreans stay true to form, they will reject the administration's 
first agenda item in Vienna. If the administration allows this priority 
to be set aside to discuss other items on the agenda, we will then know 
that President Clinton has abandoned his public commitment to a 
nonnuclear North Korea. North Korea will know that they have prevailed 
in the overmatched contest between Kim Il-song's and President 
Clinton's diplomacy. And the United States vital interests in Asia will 
have been almost irreparably damaged.
  Mr. President, there may yet be a way to prevent this nightmare 
scenario I have outlined from becoming reality. It will require from 
the administration a greater degree of resolve than it has heretofore 
shown during this crisis. It will require the President to employ 
simultaneously both the carrot and the stick.
  The United States should open the discussions with North Korea in 
Vienna by informing the North Koreans that while we welcome Kim Il-
song's commitment to former President Carter, we are not relying on 
their good faith to make these talks successful by abiding by their 
obligations under the NPT. Accordingly, we have taken a precautionary 
and purely defensive action aimed at denying Pyongyang the capital of 
South Korea as a hostage. We have deployed additional counter battery 
artillery to our defenses north of Seoul sufficient to greatly diminish 
North Korea's present ability to reduce that city to ashes should they 
choose to pursue their nuclear ambitions by further violating the NPT.
  This prudent and necessary approach should enlighten the North 
Koreans about our commitment to achieving a nonnuclear Korean peninsula 
by whatever means necessary. Should they suddenly commence the 
reprocessing of the fuel now in cooling ponds, the President's decision 
to exercise a military option will not be hindered by his concern over 
North Korea's present artillery advantage.
  Should we fail to follow such a sensible course I expect that the 
North Koreans will delay a resolution of this crisis until it becomes 
impossible to resolve. They will then have the means to achieve the 
only strategic objective we have ever been certain that North Korea 
wants--the reunification of the Korean peninsula under Kim Il-song's 
authority.
  To those who reject this dire prediction, I leave one historical 
anecdote. In the spring of 1950, Kim Il-song proposed that he and South 
Korean President Sygman Rhee hold summit talks in August 1950, just as 
he has now proposed to meet with the current South Korean President, 
Kim Young Sam in August.
  In June 1950, the North invaded South Korea, and the United States 
was dragged into a long and bloody war for which we were not prepared. 
Should President Clinton wish to avoid such a fate for our country, he 
would be wise to exercise a little more caution and a little more 
resolve in his future dealings with the great leader, Kim Il-song.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I wish to commend my distinguished colleague. That was 
a brilliant resume of the situation today, and a clear direction of 
what procedures should be followed.

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