[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 79 (Tuesday, June 21, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 21, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. LEAHY (for himself, Mr. Inouye, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Mitchell, 
        Mr. Moynihan, Mr. Robb, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Dodd, Mrs. Feinstein, 
        Mr. Metzenbaum, Mrs. Kassebaum, Mr. Sasser, Mr. Daschle, Mr. 
        Graham, Mr. Chafee, Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Simon, Ms. Mikulski, Mr. 
        Feingold, Mr. Specter, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. 
        Pell, Mr. Exon, Mr. Ford, Mr. Kohl, Mr. Wellstone, Mr. Bumpers, 
        Mr. Wofford, Mr. Mathews, Mr. Sarbanes, Mr. Jeffords, Mrs. 
        Boxer, Mr. Akaka, Mr. Hatfield, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Riegle, Mr. 
        Dorgan, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Lautenberg, Mrs. Murray, Ms. Moseley-
        Braun, Mr. Rockefeller, Mr. Bradley, Mr. Durenberger, Mr. Reid, 
        Mr. Biden, Mr. Conrad, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Pryor, Mr. Baucus, Mr. 
        Lieberman, and Mr. Bryan):
  S. 2216. A bill to state the sense of Congress on the production, 
possession, transfer, and use of antipersonnel landmines, to place a 
moratorium on United States production of antipersonnel landmines, and 
for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.


                   landmine production moratorium act

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I have spoken a number of times on the 
floor of the U.S. Senate about the scourge of landmines throughout the 
world.
  Last week I spoke about Ken Rutherford, an American from Colorado, 
who lost part of his leg from a landmine in Somalia. I also spoke of 
Fred Downs, an American veteran who lost his arm from an American 
landmine in Vietnam. They are two of the tens of thousands of 
Americans, mostly veterans from past wars including the Persian Gulf 
war, who have been either killed or maimed by landmines.
  They are also among the hundreds of thousands of people--over 1,200 
each month of each year, mostly innocent civilians, who lose their 
lives, or an arm, a leg or their eyesight from landmines.
  Last month, UNICEF--the United Nations Childrens Fund--issued a 
report entitled ``Anti-personnel Landmines: A Scourge on Children.'' 
That report describes, in horrifying detail, how landmines are 
shattering the lives of children in over 60 countries. Let me read just 
one entry in the UNICEF report:

       One 6 year old Somali boy had picked up an object that 
     looked like the plastic top of a thermos bottle on a road 
     near his home. The explosion blinded him in both eyes, 
     scarred his face, destroyed his right hand, which was later 
     amputated at the wrist, and left both knees crippled with 
     shrapnel injuries.

  That boy was one of tens of thousands like him who have been 
permanently maimed by landmines. They are considered the lucky ones. 
They survived. According to UNICEF, landmines are killing and maiming 
more children than soldiers.
  Mr. President, one would think we would do everything possible to 
stop this outrage. If American children walking to school were getting 
their arms and legs blown off, you can bet we would have all 100 
Senators doing everything possible to stop it. That is what is going on 
all over the world today in country after country after country.
  Last year, the United States enacted a moratorium on exports of 
antipersonnel landmines. In an extraordinary vote, all 100 Senators 
voted for that moratorium. That vote was noticed around the world, and 
at least 8 other countries have followed our example and announced 
their own moratoria on landmine exports.
  Our leadership led to U.N.-sponsored talks in Geneva to seek 
international limits on the production, use, and export of landmines. 
During the next year those talks will either produce real results that 
will begin to stop the landmine slaughter, or a piece of paper with a 
lot of signatures that make people feel good but accomplishes nothing.
  The fact that these negotiations are happening at all is because 
people everywhere want to see something done about landmines. They have 
seen too many photographs of children missing an arm or a leg, or both, 
like this one.
  Look at this young boy, Mr. President. A young boy who should be out 
playing and enjoying life and looking forward to a bright future. What 
kind of future does he have in a country like Nicaragua, with an arm 
and a leg missing? Think of this happening in over 60 countries, 1,200 
times a month. Mr. President, there is no doubt in my mind that the 
outcome of these international negotiations will depend upon what we do 
here. If we show leadership, if we set an example and challenge other 
countries, we may be able to begin to stop this.

  We are not going to see a ban on landmines any time soon, but we can 
make the difference between posturing and real progress. We can do that 
by making a bold gesture ourselves as Americans, by showing we are 
serious, and then pressuring other countries to join us.
  That is why today I am introducing legislation to impose a 
moratorium, for 12 months, on the production of antipersonnel landmines 
by the United States to show the rest of the world that it can be done. 
Its purpose is to challenge other countries, and it calls on the 
President to seek similar action from major landmine producers, like 
Italy, Pakistan, Russia, France, South Africa, and Great Britain.
  As with any arms control initiative, I can already hear some people 
across the Potomac saying that a 12-month moratorium on antipersonnel 
landmines is going to leave our troops defenseless, the troops of the 
most powerful Nation on Earth. So, before a lot of people run over from 
the Pentagon to say we are about to unilaterally disarm, let me tell 
you what this legislation does not do.
  It does not in any way limit the use of landmines by American troops.
  It does not in any way affect U.S. stockpiles of mines, and I would 
encourage each Senator to ask the Army how many landmines they have in 
warehouses today.
  It does not cover Claymore mines, which are command detonated and 
account for almost half of the antipersonnel mines we produce.
  It does not cover antitank mines, which were used so effectively 
against Saddam Hussein, but which do not trigger from the pressure of a 
child's footstep.
  Nor is it the slippery slope the Army is forever using as an excuse 
to oppose practically every arms control measure ever proposed. This is 
a crucial year. The U.N. negotiations will decide how these weapons are 
dealt with for years to come.
  Mr. President, every 15 minutes of every day of every week of every 
month of every year, a landmine explodes and kills or horribly maims 
some unsuspecting person.
  Maybe it is an Italian mine. Or a Russian mine. Or maybe it is an 
American mine. There are at least six types of American mines littering 
Cambodia, which has more amputees per capita than anywhere else. There 
are 6 or 8 million unexploded landmines in that small country.
  Mr. President, who needs antipersonnel landmines more--the United 
States, or Third World countries where they have become the cheap 
weapon of choice and where our troops will be sent either as U.N. 
peacekeepers or in combat and where Americans go as medical personnel 
facing the danger of these weapons. A $5 landmine, hidden by a layer of 
dust, can blow the leg off a well-trained American soldier equipped 
with the most sophisticated weaponry as easily as snapping your 
fingers.
  This legislation falls far short of the total ban many are calling 
for. But it is a step that we, by far the most powerful Nation in the 
world, can afford to take during this crucial year. A year from now I 
suspect we will know if we made any difference. If the negotiations 
fail, at least let them fail not because of the United States, not 
because we did not show moral leadership. But if they succeed, I have 
not the slightest doubt that it will be because the United States 
decided to do something meaningful about a scourge that the State 
Department says ``may be the most toxic and widespread pollution facing 
mankind.''
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my legislation, the 
Landmine Production Moratorium Act, and the names of the 53 original 
cosponsors, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 2216

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled.

     SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) There are approximately 100,000,000 unexploded anti-
     personnel landmines strewn in more than 60 countries around 
     the world, and tens of millions of anti-personnel landmines 
     are stored in stockpiles. The Department of State reports 
     that ``landmines may be the most toxic and widespread 
     pollution facing mankind''.
       (2) Like chemical and biological weapons, landmines kill 
     and maim indiscriminately.
       (3) After the United States adopted a unilateral moratorium 
     on the export of anti-personnel landmines, the United Nations 
     General Assembly unanimously called for an international 
     moratorium on such exports, and the Governments of France, 
     Germany, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, 
     and South Africa have announced export moratoria. The 
     Government of Cambodia has stated that it will no longer use 
     or purchase anti-personnel landmines.
       (4) Despite such actions, far more anti-personnel landmines 
     are being strewn than are being cleared. Each month, at least 
     1,200 persons, mostly innocent civilians, are killed or 
     injured by landmines. In some countries, more than one-third 
     of all casualties of anti-personnel landmines are women and 
     children.
       (5) With hundreds of types of anti-personnel landmines 
     being produced in at least 50 countries, only international 
     cooperation on limits on the production, possession, 
     transfer, and use of anti-personnel landmines will stop the 
     slaughter of innocent lives.
       (6) A United Nations conference to review the 1980 
     Conventional Weapons Convention, including Protocol II to the 
     Convention (otherwise known as the Landmine Protocol), is 
     planned for 1995. Meetings of governmental experts to prepare 
     for the conference have begun. This is a critical time for 
     United States leadership to help solve the landmine crisis.

     SEC. 2. POLICY.

       It is the sense of Congress that the President should--
       (1) actively seek an international agreement prohibiting 
     the production, possession, transfer, and use of anti-
     personnel landmines; and
       (2) as interim measures to be pursued during the seeking of 
     such prohibitions, actively seek international agreements, 
     modifications of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention, or 
     other agreements or arrangements to limit further the 
     production, possession, transfer, and use of anti-personnel 
     landmines.

     SEC. 3. MORATORIUM ON THE PRODUCTION AND PROCUREMENT OF ANTI-
                   PERSONNEL LANDMINES.

       (A) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that a 
     moratorium by the United States on the purchase and 
     production of anti-personel landmines would encourage other 
     nations to adopt similar measures.
       (b) Moratorium.--Effective 90 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the United States Government shall not 
     purchase or produce anti-personnel landmines.
       (c) Period of Moratorium.--The prohibition set forth in 
     subsection (b) shall continue until the end of the one-year 
     period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
       (d) Actions by Other Nations.--(1) The Congress urges the 
     President, during the period referred to in subsection (c), 
     to encourage each nation which is a major producer of anti-
     personnel landmines to adopt a moratorium similar to the 
     moratorium described in subsection (b).
       (2) If the President determines during the period referred 
     to in subsection (c) that nations that are major producers of 
     anti-personnel landmines have adopted moratoria similar to 
     the moratorium described in subsection (b), the President may 
     extend the moratorium for such additional time as the 
     President considers appropriate.
       (3) For the purposes of this subsection, the term ``major 
     producers of anti-personnel landmines'' shall include the 
     following:
       (A) Belgium
       (B) Bulgaria
       (C) The Peoples Republic of China
       (D) Egypt
       (E) France
       (F) Germany
       (G) Hungary
       (H) Italy
       (I) Pakistan
       (J) Russia
       (K) South Africa
       (L) The United Kingdom

     SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDS FOR DEMINING ACTIVITIES.

       Of the funds authorized by an Act authorizing 
     appropriations for military activities of the Department of 
     Defense, $10,000,000 are authorized to support humanitarian 
     activities relating to the clearing and disarming of 
     landmines and the protection of civilians from landmines 
     (including activities relating to the furnishing of 
     education, training, technical assistance, demining equipment 
     and technology and activities relating to research and 
     development on demining equipment and technology) and for 
     contributions to United Nations agencies and programs and to 
     nongovernmental organizations to support such activities, and 
     $10,000,000 are authorized for efforts to improve landmine 
     detection and neutralization.

     SEC. 5. ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF COSTS AND EFFECTS OF ANTI-
                   PERSONNEL LANDMINES.

       (a) Analysis.--(1) Not later than 180 days after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the Agency 
     for International Development and the Secretary of State 
     shall jointly submit to Congress a joint report containing a 
     quantitative and qualitative analysis of the social, 
     economic, and environmental costs and effects of the use of 
     anti-personnel landmines.
       (2) The analysis shall cover not less than three countries 
     (as jointly determined by the Administrator and the 
     Secretary) in which the presence of landmines presents 
     significant social, economic, and environmental problems.
       (3) In preparing the report, the Administrator and the 
     Secretary shall rely on any appropriate governmental and 
     nongovernmental materials and sources of information that are 
     available to them.
       (b) Assessment.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall submit 
     to Congress a report setting forth the total number of 
     members of the United States Armed Forces killed or wounded 
     by anti-personnel landmines during each of the following 
     periods:
       (A) World War II.
       (B) The Korean conflict.
       (C) The Vietnam era.
       (D) The Persian Gulf War.
       (2) The Secretary of Defense shall submit the report under 
     this subsection at the same time that the report required 
     under subsection (a) is submitted.

     SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

       For purposes of this Act:
       (1) The term ``anti-personnel landmine'' means any of the 
     following:
       (A) Any munition placed under, on, or near the ground or 
     other surface area, delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar, 
     or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft and which is 
     designed, constructed, adapted, or designed to be adapted to 
     be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity, or 
     contact of a person.
       (B) Any device or material which is designed, constructed, 
     adapted, or designed to be adapted to kill or injure and 
     which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or 
     approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an 
     apparently safe act.
       (2) The term ``1980 Conventional Weapons Convention'' means 
     the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention on Production or 
     Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
     May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have 
     Indiscriminate Effects, done at New York on April 10, 1981.
                                  ____


     Original Cosponsors of the Landmine Production Moratorium Act

       Senators Inouye, Lugar, Mitchell, Moynihan, Robb, Simpson, 
     Dodd, Feinstein, Metzenbaum, and Kassebaum.
       Senators Sasser, Daschle, Graham, Chafee, DeConcini, Simon, 
     Mikulski, Feingold, Specter, and Bingaman.
       Senators Kerry, Kerrey, Pell, Exon, Ford, Kohl, Wellstone, 
     Bumpers, Wofford, and Mathews.
       Senators Sarbanes, Jeffords, Boxer, Akaka, Hatfield, 
     Harkin, Riegle, Dorgan, Kennedy, and Lautenberg.
       Senators Murray, Moseley-Braun, Rockefeller, Bradley, 
     Durenberger, Reid, Biden, Conrad, Glenn, and Campbell.
       Senators Pryor, Baucus, Lieberman, and Bryan.
                                 ______

      By Mrs. FEINSTEIN (for herself and Mr. Feingold):
  S. 2217. A bill to restrict accompanied tours for the Armed Forces 
personnel assigned to Europe; to the Committee on Armed Services.


  legislation restricting accompanied tours for armed forces personnel

 Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, today, on behalf of myself and 
Senator Feingold, I am introducing legislation that would require the 
Department of Defense to adopt short, unaccompanied tours for the 
majority of U.S. troops stationed in Europe.
  Currently, most U.S. troops are deployed in Europe for 3-year tours 
and are usually accompanied by their families. As a result, the 
Pentagon--and U.S. taxpayers--must pay for dependents' moving expenses 
as well as other costs associated with their stay overseas.
  Most U.S. personnel abroad are stationed in Europe. Although the 
number of military personnel in Europe has decreased in the aftermath 
of the cold war, the costs of supporting dependents there remains high. 
With approximately the same number of dependents as there are enlisted 
personnel stationed in Europe, those costs total hundreds of millions 
of dollars each year. Taxpayers are footing the bill for--among other 
things--housing, schools, commissaries, hospitals, and family centers.
  A 1989 Rand study found there were many problems associated with 
dependents living abroad. Among them:
  Dealing with their safety in time of crisis;
  Helping spouses to find employment;
  Allocating sufficient funds to maintain quality-of-life services--
especially given that such services are used as much as 65 percent more 
overseas than at home; and
  Assisting families to care for their children while abroad.
  And almost as importantly, the Congressional Budget Office estimates 
that $1.5 billion could be saved by limiting tours in Europe to 1 year, 
rotating personnel more often and reducing the number of family members 
who accompany troops overseas. These savings could be used to help 
reduce the budget deficit or to fund other important Department of 
Defense priorities.
  Although this bill would require that the majority of troops be 
assigned to 1-year unaccompanied tours, the Secretary of Defense would 
have the discretion to allow some key personnel to be assigned for 
longer periods of time, and to be accompanied by their families.
  Short, unaccompanied tours for military personnel is not a new idea. 
In some places, like South Korea--where there are housing shortages and 
other factors to consider--U.S. troops have already been successfully 
limited to 1-year tours without dependents.
  Critics of shorter unaccompanied tours have argued that separating 
soldiers and officers from their families lowers morale and could have 
a negative impact on military units and retention.
  However, a survey of military personnel conducted by the Department 
of Defense last year found that although an individual officer's moral 
may be lowered by family separation, there was absolutely no impact on 
unit morale.
  I agree that unaccompanied tours could have an impact on retention. 
But with current reductions in the numbers of military personnel as a 
result of the post-cold-war drawdown, this should not have an impact on 
the readiness of our forces.
  Critics also have argued that shorter tours mean that soldiers will 
be reassigned more frequently, thus impacting readiness. However, the 
Congressional Budget Office has said that transferring whole units 
which are cohesive and have trained together--as opposed to only 
individual troops--offsets that problem.
  Also, it is clear that in South Korea--where shorter, unaccompanied 
tours are standard--readiness is not a problem. In fact there is no 
other area of the world where U.S. troops are on a higher state of 
alert. This is even more true now, with North Korea attempting to 
develop a nuclear bomb, and Kim Il-song saying he will turn Seoul into 
a ``sea of fire.''
  The Korean situation also offers a good illustration of one of the 
major benefits of unaccompanied tours--we will not have to worry about 
protecting or evacuating thousands of families if war suddenly engulfs 
the peninsula. Clearly fewer vulnerable dependents equates to greater 
military flexibility.
  With the end of the cold war and the number of U.S. troops being 
reduced to as few as 100,000 in Europe by 1995, adopting short, 
unaccompanied tours makes sense. It saves money while maintaining an 
adequate military presence overseas.
  I urge my colleagues to support this legislation. I now ask unanimous 
consent that the full text of this bill and a CBO report be printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 2217

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. ACCOMPANIED TOURS FOR ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL 
                   ASSIGNED TO EUROPE.

       (a) Payment for Dependents.--
       (1) Restriction.--Subject to paragraph (2)--
       (A) no travel and transportation expenses may be paid for 
     dependents to accompany members of the Armed Forces of the 
     United States assigned to permanent duty ashore in Europe; 
     and
       (B) no funds may be expended for support of dependents 
     accompanying members of the Armed Forces of the United States 
     assigned to permanent duty ashore in Europe.
       (2) Waiver authority.--
       (A) Essential personnel.--The Secretary of Defense may 
     waive the application of paragraph (1) to a member of the 
     Armed Forces if the Secretary determines that the assignment 
     of that member to permanent duty ashore in Europe for a 
     period of more than one year is necessary in order to ensure 
     the continuity of effective conduct of necessary activities 
     of the Armed Forces of the United States in Europe.
       (B) National security interests.--The Secretary of Defense 
     may waive the application of paragraph (1) when necessary in 
     the national security interests of the United States.
       (b) Short Tours.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
     period of assignment of a member of the Armed Forces to 
     permanent duty ashore in Europe should not exceed one year.
                                  ____


             Congressional Budget Office Report--March 1994

               ADOPT SHORT, UNACCOMPANIED TOURS FOR EUROPE              
                        [In millions of dollars]                        
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Annual savings\1\          Cumulative
                          -----------------------------------   5-year  
                            1995   1996   1997   1998   1999    savings 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Budget authority.........    240    240    240    400    410      1,530 
Outlays..................    220    220    210    370    400      1,420 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\Savings from CBO baseline and CBO estimate of administration's plan. 

       Under current policy, military personnel in Europe 
     generally remain for tours of three years and may be 
     accompanied by their families. The U.S. government pays for 
     the moving expenses of dependents (spouses and children) and 
     for other costs associated with their stay in Europe. In 
     1990, about 310,000 military personnel were located in Europe 
     along with some 317,000 dependents. By 1993, the number of 
     military personnel in Europe had decreased to 167,000 with a 
     similar number of dependents. Accompanied tours require that 
     DoD maintain a large support infrastructure in Europe, 
     including schools for dependents, commissaries, hospitals, 
     family centers, and family housing. In countries like South 
     Korea, where housing shortages and other factors make it 
     difficult to support families, most personnel are assigned 
     for only one year without their families.
       This option assumes adoption of one-year unaccompanied 
     tours in Europe for almost all U.S. military personnel 
     assigned there. Longer, accompanied tours would still be 
     permitted for a few key personnel who need to remain overseas 
     longer to ensure continuity in U.S. operations. This change 
     would be phased in over three years, starting in 1995. When 
     fully in effect, the new policy should permit elimination of 
     all overseas schools for dependents, family centers, family 
     housing, and some commissaries and other support facilities. 
     The added costs associated with moving military personnel 
     more often would be offset by savings in other areas. 
     Together, these actions would reduce overseas support costs 
     by $240 million in 1995 and by a total of $1.5 billion 
     through 1999, compared with costs under the CBO baseline. 
     This option is consistent with the Clinton Administration's 
     plans to limit U.S. troops in Europe to 100,000 by 1995 
     and to maintain the current troop level in Korea.
       Additional savings not reflected in these estimates might 
     eventually be realized if the number of hospitals and other 
     facilities that cater to dependents can be reduced. However, 
     there could be greater costs, also not reflected in the 
     estimates, for federal Impact Aid for schools in U.S. 
     localities where military dependents would increase in 
     number.
       This option would primarily affect personnel in the Army 
     and Air Force, who accounted for more than 90 percent of U.S. 
     military personnel in Europe at the end of 1993. Even though 
     many--perhaps as many as half--of the positions in Europe 
     could be filled by unmarried personnel, the shift to short, 
     unaccompanied tours would increase the portion of married 
     Army and Air Force personnel serving without their families. 
     By 1997, that share would rise from today's level of about 8 
     percent to about 12 percent, which is the current level for 
     Navy and Marine Corps personnel. However, the share of Army 
     personnel serving without their families would be almost 
     double current levels, but still only one-third higher than 
     the rates typical for Navy personnel.
       Coupled with the increased disruptions associated with the 
     ongoing drawdown of U.S. military forces, this increase in 
     time away from their families might cause some Army and Air 
     Force personnel to leave the military. Although such 
     departures would be unlikely to cause shortages of skilled 
     personnel during the current drawdown, lower retention could 
     be a problem in the future. Shorter tours would also 
     increase turnover among personnel in Europe, which could 
     adversely affect readiness by reducing the amount of time 
     units train together. Finally, some headquarters or 
     support positions could require the continuity provided by 
     longer tours.
       Some of the problems associated with shorter tours could be 
     minimized by the force drawdown or policy changes. The 
     Congress has mandated a reduction of troops in Europe of 
     about 65 percent between 1990 and 1995, compared with the 25 
     percent decrease in overall forces. As a result, fewer 
     military personnel will face the prospect of unaccompanied 
     tours, thus reducing any negative effects on retention. To 
     counter the effect of higher turnover on readiness, entire 
     units rather than individuals could be rotated; in this way, 
     individuals would already be accustomed to operating as a 
     unit. Finally, for those positions that require continuity, 
     longer accompanied tours could be permitted with special 
     provisions for educational and other support.
       Adverse effects of unaccompanied tours would be further 
     reduced if U.S. forces in Europe were cut even more. Some 
     military analysts and policy makers have suggested that 
     50,000 or 75,000 U.S. military personnel in Europe may be 
     adequate in view of the greatly diminished threat to European 
     security posed by the republics of the former Soviet Union. 
     Moreover, if only a small force was stationed in Europe, the 
     per capita cost of maintaining schools, commissaries, and 
     other support facilities would grow sharply, thereby 
     encouraging a shift to unaccompanied tours.
                                 ______

      By Mr. GLENN (for himself and Mr. AKAKA):
  S. 2218. A bill to provide authorization of appropriations for the 
Federal Emergency Food and Shelter Program for the fiscal years 1995 
and 1996; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.


   Emergency food and shelter national board program reauthorization

 Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation 
to reauthorize the Emergency Food and Shelter Board Program. This bill 
would reauthorize the Emergency Food and Shelter National Board Program 
at its current reauthorization level of $187,560,000 million 
for fiscal years 1995 and 1996.
  The Emergency Food and Shelter National Board Program was first 
created on March 24, 1983, through the jobs stimulus bill Public Law 
98-8. The bill initially provided $50 million for emergency food and 
shelter to FEMA for allocation by a National Board between March 1983 
and March 1984. Because the need for these emergency food and shelter 
services persisted and, in fact, grew, funds continued to be 
appropriated to the program through the mid-1980's. In July 1987, the 
Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act Public Law 100-77, 
authorized the Emergency Food and Shelter National Board Program for 
assistance to counties in every State.
  The Emergency Food and Shelter [EFS] National Board Program is 
chaired by the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] and includes 
representatives of various national nonprofits, such as the United Way 
of America, the Salvation Army, the National Council of Churches of 
Christ in the U.S.A., Catholic Charities, USA, the Council of Jewish 
Federations, Inc., and the American Red Cross. The National Board 
brings Federal agencies, State entities, and local nonprofit groups 
together in a unique and highly successful effort to assist those most 
in need. In addition to the dedication and experience of FEMA and these 
nonprofit, EFS has become a model McKinney program by adhering to five 
operation principles: speedy administration and funding, award to areas 
of greatest need, local decisionmaking, public/private sector 
cooperation, and minimum but accountable reporting.
  This program's funds are distributed on a formula basis, straight to 
emergency shelters, soup kitchens, and other nonprofit groups in every 
State. Because each locality has a local board mirroring the structure 
of the national board, EFS funds are allocated quickly. Last year, 
within three months, EFS has already paid out 95 percent of its funds. 
And, unlike what happens in most programs, a negligible percentage of 
the National Board's funds are spent on administrative costs. Because 
each nonprofit organization raises almost all of its own funds for 
administration, last year, EFS only spent 1.4 percent of its funds on 
administration.
  As chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I know the 
importance of this program. While this program was never intended per 
se to address or correct structural poverty or longstanding problems, 
EFS continues to assist many people through the emergency shelters and 
feeding programs and homeless prevention activities which it funds. 
While some may debate that the national housing and hunger emergency 
which spurned EFS no longer exists, this is not so. A housing and 
hunger emergency can strike a person at any time.
  On June 14, 1994, Dr. Dennis P. Culhane of the University of 
Pennsylvania testified before the Committee on Governmental Affairs 
regarding his recent study of the homeless population in New York and 
Philadelphia. Dr. Culhane found that contrary to popular belief, most 
homeless people are not chronically homeless. In fact, the large 
majority of homeless in this country became temporarily homeless due to 
temporary housing emergencies, usually caused by job loss and eviction. 
EFS is one of the few McKinney programs which helps this population 
before they lose their jobs and homes and become homeless. In addition 
to emergency shelters, EFS can help people remain in their homes 
through the aid of homeless prevention activities, such as emergency 
cash assistance and eviction prevention. By aiding individuals and 
families before they become homeless, EFS can save people from the 
disruption of family, work, and education that homelessness can impose.
  EFS addresses the needs of hunger, as well as shelter. In a recent 
study on hunger in the United States, Second Harvest found that a 
staggering 10.4 percent of the population--25,970,319 Americans, of 
which 11,141,267 were under age 18--rely on food pantries, soup 
kitchens, homeless shelters, and other emergency feeding programs for 
food. I would point out that almost half of these 26 million people did 
not expect to need assistance 3 months prior to visiting the food 
pantries, a fact which speaks to how quickly a food and housing 
emergency can strike American families. Studies such as those of Dr. 
Culhane and Second Harvest prove that the need for programs like EFS 
still exists.
  Mr. President, I believe that in light of the need for emergency 
services and the past success of the EFS program under FEMA, we must 
reauthorize this program. While I am not proposing any increase in the 
reauthorization level for fiscal years 1995 and 1996, I would hope that 
the appropriations for this program could be brought up to the 
authorization level. At a time when people continue to face crises 
unimagined in their own lives and when the very services we have 
provided so far are, in some cases, the only hope they see for 
survival, we cannot and must not turn our backs and do nothing. I urge 
my colleagues to join with me in cosponsoring and passing this vital 
legislation.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2218

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Section 322 of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance 
     Act (42 U.S.C. 11352) is amended to read as follows:

     ``SEC. 322. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       ``There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this 
     title $187,560,000 for each of fiscal years 1995 and 
     1996.''.
                                 ______

      By Mr. LAUTENBERG (for himself and Mr. Bradley):
  S. 2219. A bill to amend the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 
and the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 to improve natural 
gas and hazardous liquid pipeline safety, in response to the natural 
gas pipeline accident in Edison, NJ, and for other purposes; to the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.


          natural gas pipeline safety improvement act of 1994

 Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, today I am introducing the 
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 1994. This bill will 
dramatically decrease the chances of pipeline accidents and reduce the 
risks that those who live, work, or go to school in the vicinity of a 
pipeline are currently exposed to.
  This bill is designed to prevent disasters like the one which 
occurred on the evening of March 23 in Edison, NJ. The whole Nation 
witnessed the ball of fire over Edison in the wake of the explosion. 
Every American who saw that image on television shuddered.
  All too often, when a disaster happens, people focus on it for a few 
days and then shift their attention to other events. That has not 
happened in the wake of the Edison explosion and will not happen. We 
can't afford to let it. And neither Senator Bradley or Congressman 
Pallone, who represents Edison, or I will allow it to just fade away.
  I won't let it happen because I saw the destruction in Edison after 
the explosion. It was devastating to the families involved and 
traumatic to all residents of my State, which is crisscrossed with 
similar pipelines. I have also seen the psychological problems it 
created. I have talked to the families who lost everything but the 
clothes on their backs. I have seen the emotional fallout--the children 
and adults who replay the events of that evening each and every night 
before they drift into a fitful sleep.

  Edison is not an isolated event. Since that terrible night of March 
23, there have been other pipeline problems. And there were events that 
preceded it. My major concern is what happened in Edison, but we must 
make sure that it doesn't happen in any community, to any American.
  Senator Bradley and I believe that if this bill had been law before 
that fateful night in March things could have been very different.
  Let me briefly describe the five major elements of our legislation.
  First, we want to beef up compliance with existing laws by making 
sure that we conduct regular oversight inspections of corporations with 
pipeline operations around the country.
  Our bill authorizes the U.S. Department of Transportation to recoup 
the cost of accident investigations from pipeline companies so that 
these regular inspections are not interrupted when personnel and 
resources from the Office of Pipeline Safety are diverted to 
investigate a major pipeline failure.
  Second, we want to prevent accidents before they happen. Our 
legislation will increase funding to States to advertise one-call 
notification systems and expand the DOT role in pipeline safety to 
include pipeline safety awareness programs.
  One-call notification systems require contractors to learn the 
location of underground facilities before they dig.
  Third, we need to have an adequate data base so we can cope with the 
potential problems we face. Our bill directs the Secretary to establish 
an electronic data system on existing pipelines.
  This system will provide information on the nature, extent, and 
geographic location of pipeline facilities in order to facilitate risk 
assessment and safety planning with respect to such facilities.
  Fourth, we need to target attention to areas where the greatest 
potential threat exists. Our proposal will increase inspection and 
siting requirements for pipelines in high density population areas. It 
would also recruit residents in the vicinity of a pipeline to report 
suspicious dumping or digging on a pipeline right-of-way.
  Finally, we need to have stronger punishment to deter negligent or 
willful violations of law. Our bill would make it a Federal crime to 
illegally dump on pipeline rights-of-way and mandate the installation 
and use of remotely controlled shut-off valves.
  This legislation is an initial response to the pipeline problem. We 
need to explore other solutions and that process is ongoing.
  Secretary Pena has been enormously responsive in the wake of this 
disaster. Shortly after the explosion, when we toured the site, he 
pledged to develop a comprehensive response. Together, we laid out a 
series of steps the U.S. Department of Transportation could take 
immediately to prevent future disasters. The Secretary has been a man 
of his word.
  Already, Secretary Pena has requested more resources to provide 
better regulatory monitoring and oversight of our Nation's pipeline 
system. I intend to fund that effort in this year's transportation 
appropriations bills. He also approved a $1.2 million grant to the New 
Jersey Institute of Technology to advance research in pipeline safety, 
as well as, direct his Office of Pipeline Safety to undertake a 
complete assessment of potential safety risks of gas pipeline in our 
State.
  At that time, Secretary Pena also agreed to my request to bring 
experts on pipelines and pipeline safety together to discuss ways to 
improve the system. As a result of his commitment, and the hard work of 
the Department of Transportation's Office of Pipeline Safety, yesterday 
a pipeline safety summit was held in New Jersey.
  The summit was designed to develop a public/private agenda that 
establishes priorities for pipeline safety initiatives and identifies 
the next steps needed to make them a reality.
  The report developed from the suggestions at this summit will form a 
blueprint for action. Secretary Pena will submit them in legislative 
form to me for presentation to the Congress. I expect that report, 
including additional legislative proposals, in the next couple of 
months.
  In the meantime, I would like to remind my colleagues that no State 
in the union is exempt from the type of disaster that happened in 
Edison, N.J. I would encourage all of my colleagues to examine and 
cosponsor the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 1994.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Natural 
Gas Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 1994 be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2219

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Natural Gas Pipeline Safety 
     Improvement Act of 1994''.

     SEC. 2. RECOVERY BY SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION OF COSTS OF 
                   INVESTIGATION OF CERTAIN PIPELINE ACCIDENTS.

       (a) Natural Gas Pipeline Accidents.--Section 14 of the 
     Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (49 U.S.C. App. 1681) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following:
       ``(g)(1)(A) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the 
     Secretary may recover from any person who engages in the 
     transportation of gas, or who owns or operates pipeline 
     facilities, the costs incurred by the Secretary--
       ``(i) in investigating an accident with respect to such 
     transportation or facilities; and
       ``(ii) in overseeing the response of the person to the 
     accident.
       ``(B) For the purposes of this paragraph, the costs 
     incurred by the Secretary in an investigation of an accident 
     may include the cost of hiring additional personnel 
     (including personnel to support monitoring activities by the 
     Office of Pipeline Safety), the cost of tests or studies, and 
     travel and administrative costs associated with the 
     investigation.
       ``(2) The Secretary may not recover costs under this 
     subsection with respect to an accident unless the accident--
       ``(A) results in death or personal injury; or
       ``(B) results in property damage (including the cost of any 
     lost natural gas) and environmental damage (including the 
     cost of any environmental remediation) in an amount in excess 
     of $250,000.
       ``(3) The amount that the Secretary may recover under this 
     subsection with respect to an accident may not exceed 
     $500,000.
       ``(4)(A) Amounts recovered by the Secretary under this 
     subsection shall be available to the Secretary for purposes 
     of the payment of the costs of investigating and overseeing 
     responses to accidents under this subsection. Such funds 
     shall be available to the Secretary for such purposes without 
     fiscal year limitation.
       ``(B) Such amounts shall be used to supplement and not to 
     supplant other funds made available to the Secretary for such 
     purposes.''.
       (b) Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Accidents.--Section 211 of 
     the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 (title II of 
     Public Law 96-129; 49 U.S.C. App. 2010) is amended by adding 
     at the end the following:
       ``(g)(1)(A) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the 
     Secretary may recover from any person who engages in the 
     transportation of hazardous liquids, or who owns or operates 
     pipeline facilities, the costs incurred by the Secretary--
       ``(i) in investigating an accident with respect to such 
     transportation or facilities; and
       ``(ii) in overseeing the response of the person to the 
     accident.
       ``(B) For the purposes of this paragraph, the costs 
     incurred by the Secretary in an investigation of an accident 
     may include the cost of hiring additional personnel 
     (including personnel to support monitoring activities by the 
     Office of Pipeline Safety), the cost of tests or studies, and 
     travel and administrative costs associated with the 
     investigation.
       ``(2) The Secretary may not recover costs under this 
     subsection with respect to an accident unless the accident--
       ``(A) results in death or personal injury; or
       ``(B) results in property damage (including the cost of any 
     lost hazardous liquid) and environmental damage (including 
     the cost of any environmental remediation) in an amount in 
     excess of $250,000.
       ``(3) The amount that the Secretary may recover under this 
     subsection with respect to an accident may not exceed 
     $500,000.
       ``(4)(A) Amounts recovered by the Secretary under this 
     subsection shall be available to the Secretary for purposes 
     of the payment of the costs of investigating and overseeing 
     responses to accidents under this subsection. Such funds 
     shall be available to the Secretary for such purposes without 
     fiscal year limitation.
       ``(B) Such amounts shall be used to supplement and not to 
     supplant other funds made available to the Secretary for such 
     purposes.''.

     SEC. 3. GRANTS TO STATES AND ONE-CALL NOTIFICATION SYSTEMS TO 
                   PROMOTE USE OF SUCH SYSTEMS.

       (a) Grants to States.--Subsection (c) of section 20 of the 
     Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (49 U.S.C. App. 1687) 
     is amended by adding at the end the following: ``The 
     Secretary may make a grant to a State for development and 
     establishment of a one-call notification system only if the 
     State ensures that the cost of establishing and operating the 
     system are shared equitably by persons owning or operating 
     underground facilities.''.
       (b) Grants to Systems.--Such subsection is further 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``Grants to States.--'' and inserting 
     ``Grants to States and Systems.--(1)''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following:
       ``(2)(A) The Secretary may also make grants to one-call 
     notification systems for activities relating to the promotion 
     of the utilization of such systems.
       ``(B) The Secretary shall ensure that the Federal share of 
     the cost of the activities referred to in subparagraph (A) 
     under any grant made under this paragraph does not exceed 50 
     percent of the cost of such activities.''.
       (c) Sanctions.--Subsection (b)(9) of such section is 
     amended by inserting ``, or that would provide for effective 
     civil or criminal penalty sanctions or equitable relief 
     appropriate to the nature of the offense'' after ``12 of this 
     Act''.
       (d) Conforming Amendment.--Subsection (f) of such section 
     is amended by striking out ``subsection (c)'' and inserting 
     in lieu thereof ``subsection (c)(1)''.

     SEC. 4. PREVENTION OF DAMAGE TO PIPELINE FACILITIES.

       (a) Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities.--Section 14(a) of the 
     Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (49 U.S.C. App. 
     1681(a)) is amended by inserting after ``and training 
     activities'' the following: ``and promotional activities 
     relating to prevention of damage to pipeline facilities''.
       (b) Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Facilities.--Section 211(a) 
     of the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 (title II 
     of Public Law 96-129; 49 U.S.C. App. 2010(a)) is amended by 
     inserting after ``and training activities'' the following: 
     ``and promotional activities relating to prevention of damage 
     to pipeline facilities''.

     SEC. 5. ELECTRONIC DATA ON PIPELINE FACILITIES FOR RISK 
                   ASSESSMENT AND SAFETY PLANNING.

       (a) Authority To Develop.--The Secretary of Transportation 
     may develop an electronic data base containing uniform 
     information on the nature, extent, and geographic location of 
     pipeline facilities. The purpose of the data base shall be to 
     provide information on such facilities to the Secretary, 
     owners of pipeline facilities, as persons engaged in 
     transporting gas or hazardous liquids through pipeline 
     facilities, and for secured use by State agencies concerned 
     with land use planning, environmental regulation, and 
     pipeline regulatory oversight, in order to facilitate risk 
     assessment and safety planning with respect to such 
     facilities.
       (b) Contract and Grant Authority.--(1) Subject to paragraph 
     (2), the Secretary may develop the data base described under 
     subsection (a) by entering into contracts or cooperative 
     agreements with any entity that the Secretary determines 
     appropriate for that purpose and by making grants to States 
     or institutions of higher education for that purpose.
       (2) The Secretary shall ensure that the Federal share of 
     the cost of any activities carried out under a grant or 
     cooperative agreement made under this subsection does not 
     exceed 50 percent of the cost of such activities.
       (c) Use of Geographic Information System Technology.--In 
     developing the data base described in subsection (a), the 
     Secretary shall, to the maximum extent practicable, develop a 
     data base that--
       (1) utilizes Geographic Information System technology or 
     any similar technology providing data of an equivalent 
     quality and usefulness; and
       (2) permits ready incorporation of data and information 
     from a variety of sources.
       (d) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     ``pipeline facility'' has the meaning given such term in 
     section 20(e) of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 
     (49 U.S.C. App. 1687(e)).

     SEC. 6. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       (a) Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968.--(1) Section 
     17(a) of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (49 
     U.S.C. App. 1684(a)) is amended--
       (A) in paragraph (12), by striking ``and'';
       (B) by striking paragraph (13); and
       (C) by adding after paragraph (12) the following new 
     paragraphs:
       ``(13) $20,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 
     1995;
       ``(14) $30,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 
     1996; and
       ``(15) $35,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 
     1997.''.
       (2) Section 17(c) of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 
     1968 (49 U.S.C. App. 1684(c)) is amended by striking ``and 
     $10,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995'' 
     and inserting in lieu thereof ``$16,500,000 for the fiscal 
     year ending September 30, 1995, $19,000,000 for the fiscal 
     year ending September 30, 1996, and $21,500,000 for the 
     fiscal year ending September 30, 1997''.
       (b) Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979.--Section 
     214(a) of the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 
     (49 U.S.C. App. 2013(a)) is amended--
       (1) in paragraph (12), by striking ``and'';
       (2) by striking paragraph (13); and
       (3) by adding after paragraph (12) the following new 
     paragraphs:
       ``(13) $7,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 
     1995;
       ``(14) $10,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 
     1996; and
       ``(15) $11,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 
     1997.''.

     SEC. 7. SITING OF INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION FACILITIES.

       (a) Siting Guidelines.--Within 2 years after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
     Commission shall review its practices and guidelines for 
     siting natural gas interstate transmission facilities in 
     urban areas to determine whether changes are needed in the 
     areas of--
       (1) selecting routes for pipelines; and
       (2) determining the appropriate width of rights-of-way.
       (b) Educational Information for Local Jurisdictions.--
     (1)(A) Within 2 years after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the Secretary, in consultation with the Federal Energy 
     Regulatory Commission, shall make educational information 
     available, regarding natural gas interstate transmission 
     facilities permits and rights-of-way and issues with respect 
     to development in the vicinity of such interstate 
     transmission facilities, for distribution to appropriate 
     agencies of local governments with jurisdiction over the 
     lands through which natural gas interstate transmission 
     facilities pass.
       (B) For purposes of this section, the term ``interstate 
     transmission facilities'' has the meaning given such term in 
     section 2(8) of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 
     (49 U.S.C. App. 1671(8)).
       (2)(A) Within 2 years after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the Secretary shall make educational information 
     available, regarding hazardous liquid interstate pipeline 
     facilities rights-of-way and issues with respect to 
     development in the vicinity of such interstate pipeline 
     facilities, for distribution to appropriate agencies of local 
     governments with jurisdiction over the lands through which 
     hazardous liquid interstate pipeline facilities pass.
       (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``interstate 
     pipeline facilities'' has the meaning given such term in 
     section 202(5) of the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 
     1979 (49 U.S.C. App. 2001(5)).
       (3) There are authorized to be appropriated to the 
     Secretary of Energy for carrying out this subsection, 
     $2,000,000, to remain available until expended.

     SEC. 8. DUMPING WITHIN PIPELINE RIGHTS-OF-WAY.

       (a) Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968.--
       (1) Amendment.--The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 
     (49 U.S.C. App. 1671 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end 
     the following new section:

     ``SEC. 22. DUMPING WITHIN PIPELINE RIGHTS-OF-WAY.

       ``(a) Prohibition.--No person shall excavate within the 
     right-of-way of a natural gas interstate transmission 
     facility, or any other limited area in the vicinity of such 
     interstate transmission facility established by the 
     Secretary, and dispose solid waste therein.
       ``(b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     `solid waste' has the meaning given such term in section 
     1004(27) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 
     6903(27)).''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--Section 11(a)(1) of the Natural 
     Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (49 U.S.C. App. 1679a(a)(1)) 
     is amended by striking ``or section 20(h)'' and inserting in 
     lieu thereof ``, section 20(h), or section 22(a)''.
       (b) Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979.--
       (1) Amendment.--The Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 
     1979 (49 U.S.C. App. 2001 et seq.) is amended by adding at 
     the end the following new section:

     ``SEC. 221. DUMPING WITHIN PIPELINE RIGHTS-OF-WAY.

       ``(a) Prohibition.--No person shall excavate within the 
     right-of-way of a hazardous liquid interstate pipeline 
     facility, or any other limited area in the vicinity of such 
     interstate pipeline facility established by the Secretary, 
     and dispose solid waste therein.
       ``(b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     `solid waste' has the meaning given such term in section 
     1004(27) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 
     6903(27)).''.
       (2) Conforming amendment.--Section 208(a)(1) of the 
     Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 (49 U.S.C. App. 
     2007(a)(1)) is amended by inserting ``or section 221(a)'' 
     after ``section 207(a)''.

     SEC. 9. PERIODIC INSPECTION BY INSTRUMENTED INTERNAL 
                   INSPECTION DEVICES.

       (a) Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968.--Section 
     3(g)(2) of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (49 
     U.S.C. App. 1672(g)(2)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Not later than 3 years after the date of 
     the enactment of this paragraph'' and inserting in lieu 
     thereof ``Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Improvement Act 
     of 1994''; and
       (2) in the first sentence, by inserting ``and shall 
     prescribe a schedule or schedules for such inspections'' 
     after ``operator of the pipeline''.
       (b) Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979.--Section 
     203(k)(2) of the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 
     (49 U.S.C. App. 2002(k)(2)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``Not later than 3 years after the date of 
     the enactment of this paragraph'' and inserting in lieu 
     thereof ``Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
     enactment of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Improvement Act 
     of 1994''; and
       (2) in the first sentence, by inserting ``and shall 
     prescribe a schedule or schedules for such inspections'' 
     after ``operator of the pipeline''.

     SEC. 10. PROMOTING PUBLIC AWARENESS FOR NEIGHBORS OF 
                   PIPELINES.

       (a) Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968.--Section 18 of 
     the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (49 U.S.C. App. 
     1685) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subsections:
       ``(c) Promoting Public Awareness for Neighbors of 
     Pipelines.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment 
     of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the owner or 
     operator of each interstate transmission facility shall 
     notify all residents within 1000 yards, or such other 
     distance as the Secretary determines appropriate, of such 
     interstate transmission facility of--
       ``(1) the general location of the interstate transmission 
     facility;
       ``(2) a request for reporting of any instances of 
     excavation or dumping on or near the interstate transmission 
     facility;
       ``(3) a phone number to use to make such reports; and
       ``(4) appropriate procedures for such residents to follow 
     in response to accidents concerning interstate transmission 
     facilities.
       ``(d) Public Education.--The Secretary shall develop, in 
     conjunction with appropriate representatives of the natural 
     gas pipeline industry, public service announcements to be 
     broadcast or published to educate the public about pipeline 
     safety.''.
       (b) Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979.--Section 
     212 of the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 (49 
     U.S.C. App. 2011) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsections:
       ``(e) Promoting Public Awareness for Neighbors of 
     Pipelines.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment 
     of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the owner or 
     operator of each interstate pipeline facility shall notify 
     all residents within 1000 yards, or such other distance as 
     the Secretary determines appropriate, of such interstate 
     pipeline facility of--
       ``(1) the general location of the interstate pipeline 
     facility;
       ``(2) a request for reporting of any instances of 
     excavation or dumping on or near the interstate pipeline 
     facility;
       ``(3) a phone number to use to make such reports; and
       ``(4) appropriate procedures for such residents to follow 
     in response to accidents concerning interstate pipeline 
     facilities.
       ``(f) Public Education.--The Secretary shall develop, in 
     conjunction with appropriate representatives of the hazardous 
     liquid pipeline industry, public service announcements to be 
     broadcast or published to educate the public about pipeline 
     safety.''.

     SEC. 11. REMOTELY OR AUTOMATICALLY CONTROLLED VALVES.

       Section 3 of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 
     (49 U.S.C. App. 1672) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(l) Remotely or Automatically Controlled Valves.--Not 
     later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this 
     subsection, the Secretary shall issue regulations requiring 
     the installation and use, wherever technically and 
     economically feasible, of remotely or automatically 
     controlled valves that are reliable and capable of shutting 
     off the flow of gas in the event of an accident, including 
     accidents in which there is a loss of the primary power 
     source. In developing proposed regulations, the Secretary 
     shall consult with, and give special consideration to 
     recommendations of, appropriate groups from the gas pipeline 
     industry, such as the Gas Research Institute.''.

     SEC. 12. BASELINE INFORMATION.

       (a) Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968.--Section 3(g) 
     of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (49 U.S.C. 
     App. 1672(g)) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(3) Baseline information.--Before transporting natural 
     gas through a pipeline which, because of its design, 
     construction, or replacement, is required by regulations 
     issued under paragraph (1) to accommodate the passage of 
     instrumented internal inspection devices, the owner or 
     operator of such pipeline shall, using such a device, obtain 
     baseline information with respect to the safety of the 
     pipeline.''.
       (b) Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979.--Section 
     203(k) of the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 
     (49 U.S.C. App. 2002(k)) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new paragraph:
       ``(3) Baseline information.--Before transporting hazardous 
     liquids through a pipeline which, because of its design, 
     construction, or replacement, is required by regulations 
     issued under paragraph (1) to accommodate the passage of 
     instrumented internal inspection devices, the owner or 
     operator of such pipeline shall, using such a device, obtain 
     baseline information with respect to the safety of the 
     pipeline.''.
                                 ______

      By Mr. PELL (by request):
  S. 2220. A bill to provide for a United States contribution to the 
Inter-American Development Bank, and for other purposes; to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations.


        u.s. contribution to the inter-american development bank

 Mr. PELL. Mr. President, by request, I introduce for 
appropriate reference a bill to provide for a U.S. contribution to the 
Inter-American Development Bank, and for other purposes.
  This proposed legislation has been requested by the Department of the 
Treasury, and I am introducing it in order that there may be a specific 
bill to which Members of the Senate and the public may direct their 
attention and comments.
  I reserve my right to support or oppose this bill, as well as any 
suggested amendments to it, when the matter is considered by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations.
  I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record at 
this point, together with the letter from the general counsel of the 
Department of the Treasury, which was received on April 29, 1994.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 2220

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the 
     Inter-American Development Bank Act (22 U.S.C. 283 et seq.) 
     is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new 
     section:

     ``SEC. 37. CAPITAL INCREASE; INCREASE IN RESOURCES OF FUND 
                   FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

       ``(a) Authority To Vote for, and To Subscribe and 
     Contribute to, Increase in Authorized Capital Stock of Bank 
     and Increase in Resources of Fund for Special Operations
       ``(1) Vote authorized.--The United States Governor of the 
     Bank is authorized to vote for resolutions that--
       ``(A) were transmitted by the Board of Executive Directors 
     to the Governors of the Bank by resolution of [      ], 1994;
       ``(B) are pending before the Board of Governors of the 
     Bank; and
       ``(C) provide for--
       ``(i) an increase in the authorized capital stock of the 
     Bank and subscriptions to the Bank; and
       ``(ii) an increase in the resources of the Fund for Special 
     Operations and contributions to the Fund.
       ``(2) Subscription and contribution authority.--To the 
     extent and in the amounts provided in advance in 
     appropriations Acts, on adoption of the resolutions described 
     in paragraph (1), the United States Governor of the Bank may, 
     on behalf of the United States--
       ``(A) subscribe to 760,644 shares of the increase in the 
     authorized capital stock of the Bank; and
       ``(B) contribute $82,304,000 to the Fund for Special 
     Operations.
       ``(b) Limitation on Authorization of Appropriations.--To 
     pay for the subscription and contribution authorized under 
     subsection (a), there are authorized to be appropriated, 
     without fiscal year limitation, for payment by the Secretary 
     of the Treasury--
       ``(1) $9,175,977,459 for the United States subscription to 
     the capital stock of the Bank; and
       ``(2) $82,304,000 for the United States contribution to the 
     Fund for Special Operations.
       ``(c) Authority to Vote for Certain Resolutions.--The 
     United States Governor of the Bank is authorized to vote for 
     a proposed resolution of the Board of Governors entitled 
     `Amendments to the Agreement Establishing the Inter-American 
     Development Bank, the Regulations of the Board of Governors, 
     the General Rules Governing Admission of Nonregional 
     Countries to Membership in the Bank, and the Regulations for 
     the Election of Executive Directors,' which was submitted to 
     the Board of Governors pursuant to a resolution of the Board 
     of Executive Directors approved on [      ], 1994.''.


                                   Department of the Treasury,

                                   Washington, DC, April 26, 1994.
     Hon. Al Gore,
     President of the Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: I am pleased to transmit herewith a 
     draft bill, ``To authorize a United States contribution to 
     the Inter-American Development Bank, and for other 
     purposes.''
       This legislation would authorize the United States to 
     participate in the recently concluded eighth replenishment of 
     the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The replenishment 
     will support an increased lending program to Latin America, 
     establish new priorities in IDB lending, and recognize Latin 
     America and the Caribbean as our trusted partners. It also 
     significantly reduces the cost of U.S. participation in the 
     IDB.
       The size of the eighth replenishment is $40 billion for 
     Ordinary Capital and $1 billion for the Fund for Special 
     Operations (FSO). The U.S. will pay $25.6 million per year 
     for six years for paid-in shares of Ordinary Capital, and 
     $20.6 million per year for four years for the FSO. These 
     payments and contributions, of course, are subject to 
     obtaining necessary appropriations. The U.S. will also 
     purchase 747,906 shares of callable capital, which will 
     require program limitation in appropriations legislation.
       With this replenishment, the U.S. share in the IDB will be 
     lowered from 34.6 to 30 percent, thereby significantly 
     reducing the U.S. annual payment for Ordinary Capital. The 
     proposed legislation will also authorize the U.S. to agree to 
     IDB Charter amendments that will allow the U.S. to maintain 
     nearly all of its current rights and privileges. U.S. 
     approval would be required before the IDB could make new FSO 
     loans or adopt new FSO policies, and the U.S. presence or 
     vote will be a critical element in all future meetings or 
     mail votes of the IDB Board of Governors.
       The reduction in the U.S. share in the IDB also permits a 
     larger non-regional country presence in the IDB, which 
     leverages significant new concessional resources for the FSO 
     that will be used for the poorest countries of the region. 
     The U.S. share of the $1 billion FSO replenishment is only 
     8.2 percent, compared to 41 percent under the previous 
     replenishment.
       The eighth replenishment is a major achievement for the 
     United States and the IDB. The IDB's lending program will be 
     reoriented to ensure that positive economic gains made in 
     many Latin American and Caribbean countries are expanded to 
     include all strata of society. The IDB's objective is to 
     increase social sector lending to 40 percent of total lending 
     by volume, and 50 percent of total number of operations.
       In order to expand economic opportunity, operational 
     changes are being made, the type and scope of lending for the 
     social sectors will be expanded, and projects will be 
     targeted more narrowly at the poor and disenfranchised. 
     Lending in the social sectors will focus on primary and 
     preventative health care, with an emphasis on maternal and 
     child health care, inoculations and nutrition, family 
     planning, expanded support for the role of women and other 
     disenfranchised groups, basic education, vocational training 
     and adult education, support for good governance, and 
     improvements in water supply, sewage and sanitation.
       The eighth replenishment also places a premium on lending 
     to support the environment. The IDB will increase 
     environmentally beneficial lending and encourage borrowing 
     countries to improve protection of the environment, including 
     the global environment. The IDB will also encourage energy 
     efficiency and conservation, establish a water resources 
     policy and incorporate resettlement policies into its 
     environmental assessments. Further, the IDB will continue to 
     support the conservation, reforestation and rehabilitation of 
     forests and will not finance commercial logging in primary 
     tropical moist forests. The replenishment agreement also will 
     result in increased public participation by ensuring that 
     environmental information is available to the public in both 
     donor and borrowing countries throughout the project cycle.
       In connection with the eighth replenishment, the United 
     States has commitments from Bank management and other Bank 
     members to establish an independent inspection function, 
     which would include a panel of independent experts to 
     investigate allegations that the IDB had failed to adhere to 
     its own operational policies. IDB management is committed to 
     propose a comprehensive disclosure policy based on the 
     assumption that, in the absence of a reason for 
     confidentiality, information will be released.
       It would be appreciated if you would lay the draft bill 
     before the Senate. An identical draft bill has been 
     transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
       The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there 
     is no objection to the transmittal of the draft bill to the 
     Congress, and that its enactment would be in accord with the 
     program of the President.
           Sincerely,
                                                   Jean E. Hanson,
                                          General Counsel.
                                 ______

      By Mr. PELL (by request):
  S. 2221. A bill to implement the obligations of the United States 
under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 
known as ``the Chemical Weapons Convention'' and opened for signature 
and signed by the United States on January 13, 1993; to the Committee 
on Foreign Relations.


         chemical weapons convention implementation act of 1994

 Mr. PELL. Mr. President, by request, I introduce for 
appropriate reference a bill to implement the obligations of the United 
States under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, known as ``the Chemical Weapons Convention'' and opened 
for signature and signed by the United States on January 13, 1993. This 
act may be cited as the ``Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation 
Act of 1994.''
  This proposed legislation has been requested by the U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, and I am introducing it in order that there may 
be a specific bill to which Members of the Senate and the public may 
direct their attention and comments.
  I reserve my right to support or oppose this bill, as well as any 
suggested amendments to it, when the matter is considered by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations.
  I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed inthe Record at this 
point, together with the section-by-section analysis and the letter 
from the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
which was received on June 2, 1994.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 2221

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Chemical Weapons Convention 
     Implementation Act of 1994.''

     SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS

       The table of contents for this Act is as follows--

Sec. 1. Short title.
Sec. 2. Table of contents.
Sec. 3. Congressional findings.
Sec. 4. Congressional declarations.
Sec. 5. Definitions.
Sec. 6. Severablity.

                      TITLE I.--NATIONAL AUTHORITY

Sec. 101 Establishment.

TITLE II.--APPLICATION OF CONVENTION PROHIBITIONS TO NATURAL AND LEGAL 
                                PERSONS

Sec. 201. Criminal provisions.
Sec. 202. Effective date.
Sec. 203. Restrictions on scheduled chemicals.

             TITLE III.--DECLARATIONS BY CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

Sec. 301. Reporting of information.
Sec. 302. Disclosure of information or materials.
Sec. 303. Prohibited acts.

                         TITLE IV.--INSPECTIONS

Sec. 401. Inspections of chemical industry.
Sec. 402. Other inspections and lead agency.
Sec. 403. Prohibited acts.
Sec. 404. Penalties.
Sec. 405. Specific enforcement.
Sec. 406. Legal proceedings.
Sec. 407. Authority.

     SEC. 3. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings--
       (1) Chemical weapons pose a significant threat to the 
     national security of the United States and are a scourge to 
     humankind.
       (2) The Chemical Weapons Convention is the best means of 
     ensuring the nonproliferation of chemical weapons and their 
     eventual destruction and forswearing by all nations.
       (3) The verification procedures contained in the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention and the faithful adherence of nations to 
     them, including the United States, are crucial to the success 
     of the Convention.
       (4) The declarations and inspections required by the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention are essential for the 
     effectiveness of the verification regime.

     SEC. 4. CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATIONS.

       The Congress makes the following declarations--
       (1) It shall be the policy of the United States to 
     cooperate with other States Parties to the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention and afford the appropriate form of legal 
     assistance to facilitate the implementation of the 
     prohibitions contained in title II of this Act.
       (2) It shall be the policy of the United States, during the 
     implementation of its obligations under the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention, to assign the highest priority to ensuring the 
     safety of people and to protecting the environment, and to 
     cooperate as appropriate with other States Parties to the 
     Convention in this regard.
       (3) It shall be the policy of the United States to 
     minimize, to the greatest extent practicable, the 
     administrative burden and intrusiveness of measure to 
     implement the Chemical Weapons Convention placed on 
     commercial and other private entities, and to take into 
     account the possible competitive impact of regulatory 
     measures on industry, consistent with the obligations of the 
     United States under the Convention.

     SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

       (a) In General.--Except as otherwise provided in this Act, 
     the definitions of the terms used in this Act shall be those 
     contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
       (b) Other Definitions.--(1) The term ``Chemical Weapons 
     Convention'' means the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
     Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
     Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature on 
     January 13, 1993.
       (2) The term ``national of the United States'' has the same 
     meaning given such term in section 101(a)(22) of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
       (3) The term ``United States,'' when used in a geographical 
     sense, includes all places under the jurisdiction or control 
     of the United States, including (A) any of the places within 
     the provisions of section 101(41) of the Federal Aviation Act 
     of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. App. Sec. 1301(41)), (B) any 
     public aircraft or civil aircraft of the United States, as 
     such terms are defined in sections 101(36) and (18) of the 
     Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. App. 
     Secs. 1301(36) and 1301(18)), and (C) any vessel of the 
     United States, as such term is defined in section 3(b) of the 
     Maritime Drug Enforcement Act, as amended (46 U.S.C. App. 
     Sec. 1903(b)).
       (4) The term ``person,'' except as used in section 201 of 
     this Act and as set forth below, means (A) any individual, 
     corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, 
     public or private institution, any State or any political 
     subdivision thereof, or any political entity within a State, 
     any foreign government or nation or any agency, 
     instrumentality or political subdivision of any such 
     government or nation, or other entity located in the United 
     States; and (B) any legal successor, representative, agent or 
     agency of the foregoing located in the United States. The 
     phrase ``located in the United States'' in the term 
     ``person'' shall not apply to the term ``person'' as used in 
     the phrases ``person located outside the territory'' in 
     sections 203(b), 203(c) and 302(c) of this Act and ``person 
     located in the territory'' in section 203(b) of this Act.
       (5) The term ``Technical Secretariat'' means the Technical 
     Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of 
     Chemical Weapons established by the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention.

     SEC. 6. SEVERABILITY.

       If any provision of this Act, or the application of such 
     provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
     remainder of this Act, or the application of such provision 
     to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it 
     is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.

                      TITLE I--NATIONAL AUTHORITY

     SEC. 101. ESTABLISHMENT.

       Pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention, the President or the designee of the 
     President shall establish the ``United States National 
     Authority'' to, inter alia, serve as the national focal point 
     for effective liaison with the Organization for the 
     Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and other States Parties to 
     the Convention.

TITLE II.--APPLICATION OF CONVENTION PROHIBITIONS TO NATURAL AND LEGAL 
                                PERSONS

     SEC. 201. CRIMINAL PROVISIONS.

       (a) In General.--Part I of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by--
       (1) redesignating chapter 11A relating to child support as 
     chapter 11B; and
       (2) inserting after chapter 11 relating to bribery, graft 
     and conflicts of interest the following new chapter:

                    ``CHAPTER 11A--CHEMICAL WEAPONS

``Sec.
``227. Penalties and prohibitions with respect to chemical weapons.
``227A. Seizure, forfeiture, and destruction.
``227B. Injunctions.
``227C. Other prohibitions.
``227D. Definitions.

     ``SEC. 227. PENALTIES AND PROHIBITIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
                   CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

       ``(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
     whoever knowingly develops, produces, otherwise acquires, 
     stockpiles, retains, directly or indirectly transfers, uses, 
     owns or possesses any chemical weapon, or knowingly assists, 
     encourages or induces, in any way, any person to do so, or 
     attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this 
     title or imprisoned for life or any term of years, or both.
       ``(b) Exclusion.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to the 
     retention, ownership or possession of a chemical weapon, that 
     is permitted by the Chemical Weapons Convention pending the 
     weapon's destruction, by any agency or department of the 
     United States. This exclusion shall apply to any person, 
     including members of the Armed Forces of the United States, 
     who is authorized by any agency or department of the United 
     States to retain, own or possess a chemical weapon, unless 
     that person knows or would have known that such retention, 
     ownership or possession is not permitted by the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention.
       ``(c) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction by the United 
     States over the prohibited activity in subsection (a) if (1) 
     the prohibited activity takes place in the United States or 
     (2) the prohibited activity takes place outside of the United 
     States and is committed by a national of the United States.
       ``(d) Additional Penalty.--The court shall order that any 
     person convicted of any offense under this section pay to the 
     United States any expenses incurred incident to the seizure, 
     storage, handling, transportation and destruction or other 
     disposition of property seized for the violation of this 
     section.

     ``SEC. 227A SEIZURE, FORFEITURE, AND DESTRUCTION.

       ``(a) Seizure.--(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     the Attorney General may request the issuance, in the same 
     manner as provided for a search warrant, of a warrant 
     authorizing the seizure of any chemical weapon defined in 
     section 227D(2)(A) of this title that is of a type or 
     quantity that under the circumstances is inconsistent with 
     the purposes not prohibited under the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention.
       ``(2) In exigent circumstances, seizure and destruction of 
     any such chemical weapon described in paragraph (1) may be 
     made by the Attorney General upon probable cause without the 
     necessity for a warrant.
       ``(b) Procedure for Forfeiture and Destruction.--Property 
     seized pursuant to subsection (a) shall be forfeited to the 
     United States. Except as inconsistent herewith, the 
     provisions of chapter 46 of this title relating to civil 
     forfeitures shall extend to a seizure or forfeiture under 
     this section. The Attorney General shall provide for the 
     destruction or other appropriate disposition of any chemical 
     weapon seized and forfeited pursuant to this section.
       ``(c) Affirmative Defense.--It is an affirmative defense 
     against a forfeiture under subsection (b) that--
       ``(1) such alleged chemical weapon is for a purpose not 
     prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention; and
       ``(2) such alleged chemical weapon is of a type and 
     quantity that under the circumstances is consistent with that 
     purpose.
       ``(d) Other Seizure, Forfeiture, and Destruction.--
       ``(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the Attorney 
     General may request the issuance, in the same manner as 
     provided for a search warrant, of a warrant authorizing the 
     seizure of any chemical weapon defined in section 227D(2) (B) 
     or (C) of this title that exists by reason of conduct 
     prohibited under section 227 of this title.
       ``(2) In exigent circumstances, seizure and destruction of 
     any such chemical weapon described in paragraph (1) may be 
     made by the Attorney General upon probable cause without the 
     necessity for a warrant.
       ``(3) Property seized pursuant to this subsection shall be 
     summarily forfeited to the United States and destroyed.
       ``(e) Assistance.--The Attorney General may request 
     assistance from any agency or department in the handling, 
     storage, transportation or destruction of property seized 
     under this section.
       ``(f) Owner Liability.--The owner or possessor of any 
     property seized under this section shall be liable to the 
     United States for any expenses incurred incident to the 
     seizure, including any expenses relating to the handling, 
     storage, transportation and destruction or other disposition 
     of the seized property.

     ``SEC. 227B. INJUNCTIONS.

       ``(a) In General.--The United States may obtain in a civil 
     action an injunction against--
       ``(1) the conduct prohibited under section 227 of this 
     title;
       ``(2) the preparation or solicitation to engage in conduct 
     prohibited under section 227 of this title; or
       ``(3) the development, production, other acquisition, 
     stockpiling, retention, direct or indirect transfer, use, 
     ownership or possession, or the attempted development, 
     production, other acquisition, stockpiling, retention, direct 
     or indirect transfer, use, ownership or possession, of any 
     alleged chemical weapon defined in section 227D(2)(A) of this 
     title that is of a type or quantity that under the 
     circumstances is inconsistent with the purposes not 
     prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention, or the 
     assistance to any person to do so.
       ``(b) Affirmative Defense.--It is an affirmative defense 
     against any injunction under subsection (a)(3) that--
       ``(1) the conduct sought to be enjoined is for a purpose 
     not prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention; and
       ``(2) such alleged chemical weapon is of a type and 
     quantity that under the circumstances is consistent with that 
     purpose.

     ``SEC. 227C. OTHER PROHIBITIONS

       ``(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
     whoever knowingly uses riot control agents as a method of 
     warfare, or knowingly assists any person to do so, shall be 
     fined under this title or imprisoned for a term of not more 
     than ten years, or both.
       ``(B) Exclusion.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to members 
     of the Armed Forces of the United States. Members of the 
     Armed Forces of the United States who use riot control agents 
     as a method of warfare shall be subject to appropriate 
     military penalties.
       ``(c) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction by the United 
     States over the prohibited activity in subsection (a) if (1) 
     the prohibited activity takes place in the United States or 
     (2) the prohibited activity takes place outside of the United 
     States and is committed by a national of the United States.

     ``SEC. 227D. DEFINITIONS.

       ``As used in this chapter, the term--
       ``(1) `Chemical Weapons Convention' means the Convention on 
     the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
     and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened 
     for signature on January 13, 1993;
       ``(2) `chemical weapon' means the following, together or 
     separately:
       ``(A) a toxic chemical and its precursors, except where 
     intended for a purpose not prohibited under the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention, as long as the type and quantity is 
     consistent with such a purpose;
       ``(B) a munition or device, specifically designed to cause 
     death or other harm through the toxic properties of those 
     toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (A), which would be 
     released as a result of the employment of such munition or 
     device; or
       ``(C) any equipment specifically designed for use directly 
     in connection with the employment of munitions or devices 
     specified in subparagraph (B);
       ``(3) `toxic chemical' means any chemical which through its 
     chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary 
     incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This 
     includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of 
     their method of production, and regardless of whether they 
     are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere;
       ``(4) `precursor' means any chemical reactant which takes 
     part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a 
     toxic chemical. This includes any key component of a binary 
     or multicomponent chemical system;
       ``(5) `key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical 
     system' means the precursor which plays the most important 
     role in determining the toxic properties of the final product 
     and reacts rapidly with other chemicals in the binary or 
     multicomponent system;
       ``(6) `purpose not prohibited under the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention' means--
       ``(A) industrial, agricultural, research, medical, 
     pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes;
       ``(B) protective purposes, namely those purposes directly 
     related to protection against toxic chemicals and to 
     protection against chemical weapons;
       ``(C) military purposes not connected with the use of 
     chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic 
     properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; or
       ``(D) law enforcement purposes, including domestic riot 
     control purposes;
       ``(7) `national of the United States' has the same meaning 
     given such term in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and 
     Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22));
       ``(8) `United States,' when used in a geographical sense, 
     includes all places under the jurisdiction or control of the 
     United States, including (A) any of the places within the 
     provisions of section 101(41) of the Federal Aviation Act of 
     1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. App. Sec. 1301(41)), (B) any 
     public aircraft or civil aircraft of the United States, as 
     such terms are defined in sections 101(36) and (18) of the 
     Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. App. 
     Secs. 1301(36) and 1301(18)), and (C) any vessel of the 
     United States, as such term is defined in section 3(b) of the 
     Maritime Drug Enforcement Act, as amended (46 U.S.C. App. 
     Sec. 1903(b));
       ``(9) `person' means (A) any individual, corporation, 
     partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or 
     private institution, any State or any political subdivision 
     thereof, or any political entity within a State, any foreign 
     government or nation or any agency, instrumentality or 
     political subdivision of any such government or nation, or 
     other entity; and (B) any legal successor, representative, 
     agent or agency of the foregoing; and
       ``(10) `riot control agent' means any chemical not listed 
     in a Schedule in the Annex on Chemicals of the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention, which can produce rapidly in humans 
     sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which 
     disappear within a short time following termination of 
     exposure.''
       (b) Clerical Amendments.--The table of chapters for part I 
     of title 18, United States Code, is amended by--
       (1) in the item for chapter 11A relating to child support, 
     redesignating ``11A'' as ``11B''; and
       (2) inserting after the item for chapter 11 the following 
     new item:

``11A. CHEMICAL WEAPONS......................................227.''....

     SEC. 202. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       This title shall take effect on the date the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention enters into force for the United States.

     SEC. 203. RESTRICTIONS ON SCHEDULED CHEMICALS.

       (a) Schedule 1 Activities.--It shall be unlawful for any 
     person or any national of the United States located outside 
     the United States to produce, acquire, retain, transfer or 
     use a chemical listed on Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals 
     of the Chemical Weapons Convention, unless--
       (1) the chemicals are applied to research, medical, 
     pharmaceutical or protective purposes;
       (2) the types and quantities of chemicals are strictly 
     limited to those that can be justified for such purposes; and
       (3) the amount of such chemicals per person at any given 
     time for such purposes does not exceed a limit to be 
     determined by the United States National Authority, but in 
     any case, does not exceed one metric ton.
       (b) Extraterritorial Acts.--(1) It shall be unlawful for 
     any person or any national of the United States located 
     outside the United States to produce, acquire, retain or use 
     a chemical listed on Schedule 1 of the Annex on Chemicals of 
     the Chemical Weapons Convention outside the territories of 
     the States Parties to the Convention or to transfer such 
     chemicals to any person located outside the territory of the 
     United States, except as provided for in the Convention for 
     transfer to a person located in the territory of another 
     State Party to the Convention.
       (2) Beginning three years after the entry into force of the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention, it shall be unlawful for any 
     person or any national of the United States located outside 
     the United States to transfer a chemical listed on Schedule 2 
     of the Annex on Chemicals of the Convention to any person 
     located outside the territory of a State Party to the 
     Convention or to receive such a chemical from any person 
     located outside the territory of a State Party to the 
     Convention.
       (c) Jurisdiction.--There is jurisdiction by the United 
     States over the prohibited activity in subsections (a) and 
     (b) if (1) the prohibited activity takes place in the United 
     States or (2) the prohibited activity takes place outside of 
     the United States and is committed by a national of the 
     United States.

             TITLE III.--DECLARATIONS BY CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

     SEC. 301. REPORTING OF INFORMATION.

       (a) Reports.--The Department of Commerce shall promulgate 
     regulations under which each person who produces, processes, 
     consumes, exports or imports, or proposes to produce, 
     process, consume, export or import, a chemical substance 
     subject to the Chemical Weapons Convention shall maintain and 
     permit access to such records and shall submit to the 
     Department of Commerce such reports as the United States 
     National Authority may reasonably require pursuant to the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention. The Department of Commerce shall 
     promulgate regulations pursuant to this title expeditiously, 
     and may amend or change such regulations as necessary.
       (b) Coordination.--To the extent feasible, the United 
     States National Authority shall not require any reporting 
     that is unnecessary, or duplicative of reporting required 
     under any other Act. Agencies and departments shall 
     coordinate their actions with other agencies and departments 
     to avoid duplication of reporting by the affected persons 
     under this Act or any other Act.

     SEC. 302. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION OR MATERIALS.

       (a) In General.--Any information or materials reported to, 
     or otherwise obtained by, the United States National 
     Authority or the Department of Commerce, or any other agency 
     or department under this Act or the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention may be withheld from public disclosure or 
     provision only to the extent permitted by law. Information or 
     materials obtained from declarations or inspections required 
     by the Chemical Weapons Convention, that are not already in 
     the public domain, shall be withheld from public disclosure 
     or provision and shall not be required to be disclosed 
     pursuant to section 552 of title 5, United States Code, 
     except that such information or material--
       (1) shall be disclosed or otherwise provided to the 
     Technical Secretariat or other States Parties to the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention in accordance with the Convention, in 
     particular, the provisions of the Annex on the Protection of 
     Confidential Information;
       (2) shall be made available to any committee or 
     subcommittee of Congress of appropriate jurisdiction upon the 
     written request of the chairman or ranking minority member of 
     such committee or subcommittee, except that no such committee 
     or subcommittee, or member thereof, shall disclose such 
     information or material;
       (3) shall be disclosed to other agencies or departments for 
     law enforcement purposes with regard to this Act or any other 
     Act, and may be disclosed or otherwise provided when relevant 
     in any proceeding under this Act or any other Act, except 
     that disclosure or provision in such a proceeding shall be 
     made in such manner as to preserve confidentiality to the 
     extent practicable without impairing the proceeding; and
       (4) may be disclosed, including in the form of categories 
     of information, if the United States National Authority 
     determines that such disclosure is in the national interest.
       (b) Notice of Disclosure.--If the United States National 
     Authority, pursuant to subsection (a)(4), proposes to publish 
     or disclose or otherwise provide information or materials 
     exempted from disclosure in subsection (a), the United States 
     National Authority shall, where appropriate, notify the 
     person who submitted such information or materials of the 
     intent to release such information or materials. Where notice 
     has been provided, the United States National Authority may 
     not release such information or materials until the 
     expiration of 30 days after notice has been provided.
       (c) Criminal Penalty for Wrongful Disclosure.--Any officer 
     or employee of the United States or former officer or 
     employee of the United States, who by virtue of such 
     employment or official position has obtained possession of, 
     or has access to, information or materials the disclosure or 
     other provision of which is prohibited by subsection (a), and 
     who knowing that disclosure or provision of such information 
     or materials is prohibited by such subsection, willfully 
     discloses or otherwise provides the information or materials 
     in any manner to any person, including persons located 
     outside the territory of the United States, not entitled to 
     receive it, shall be fined under title 18, United States 
     Code, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
       (d) International Inspectors.--The provisions of this 
     section on disclosure or provision of information or 
     materials shall also apply to employees of the Technical 
     Secretariat.

     SEC. 303. PROHIBITED ACTS.

       It shall be unlawful for any person to fail or refuse to 
     (a) establish or maintain records, (b) submit reports, 
     notices, or other information to the Department of Commerce 
     or the United States National Authority, or (c) permit access 
     to or copying of records, as required by this Act or a 
     regulation thereunder.

                         TITLE IV.--INSPECTIONS

     SEC. 401. INSPECTIONS OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRY.

       (a) Authority.--For purposes of administering this Act--
       (1) any duly designated member of an inspection team of the 
     Technical Secretariat may inspect any plant, plant site, or 
     other facility or location in the United States subject to 
     inspection pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention; and
       (2) any duly designated representative of an agency or 
     department may accompany members of an inspection team of the 
     Technical Secretariat during the inspection specified in 
     paragraph (1).
       (b) Notice.--An inspection pursuant to subsection (a) may 
     be made only upon issuance of a written notice to the owner 
     and to the operator, occupant or agent in charge of the 
     premises to be inspected, except that failure to receive a 
     notice shall not be a bar to the conduct of an inspection. 
     The notice shall be submitted to the owner and to the 
     operator, occupant or agent in charge as soon as possible 
     after the United States National Authority receives it from 
     the Technical Secretariat. The notice shall include all 
     appropriate information supplied by the Technical Secretariat 
     to the United States National Authority regarding the basis 
     for the selection of the plant site, plant, or other facility 
     or location for the type of inspection sought, including, for 
     challenge inspections pursuant to Article IX of the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention, appropriate evidence or reasons provided 
     by the requesting State Party to the Convention with regard 
     to its concerns about compliance with the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention at the facility or location. A separate notice 
     shall be given for each such inspection, but a notice shall 
     not be required for each entry made during the period covered 
     by the inspection.
       (c) Credentials.--If the owner, operator, occupant or agent 
     in charge of the premises to be inspected is present, a 
     member of the inspection team of the Technical Secretariat, 
     as well as, if present, the representatives of agencies or 
     departments, shall present appropriate credentials before the 
     inspection is commenced.
       (d) Timeframe for Inspections.--Consistent with the 
     provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention, each 
     inspection shall be commenced and completed with reasonable 
     promptness and shall be conducted at reasonable times, within 
     reasonable limits, and in a reasonable manner. The Department 
     of Commerce shall endeavor to ensure that, to the extent 
     possible, each inspection is commenced, conducted and 
     concluded during ordinary working hours, but no inspection 
     shall be prohibited or otherwise disrupted for commencing, 
     continuing or concluding during other hours. However, nothing 
     in this subsection shall be interpreted as modifying the time 
     frames established in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
       (e) Scope.--(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this 
     subsection and subsection (f), an inspection conducted under 
     this title may extend to all things within the premises 
     inspected (including records, files, papers, processes, 
     controls, structures and entering and exiting vehicles) 
     related to whether the requirements of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention applicable to such premises have been complied 
     with.
       (2) To the extent possible consistent with the obligations 
     of the United States pursuant to the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention, no inspection under this title shall extend to--
       (A) financial date;
       (B) sales and marketing data (other than shipment data);
       (C) pricing data;
       (D) personnel data;
       (E) research data;
       (F) patent data; or
       (G) data maintained for compliance with environmental or 
     occupational health and safety regulations.
       (f) Facility Agreements.--(1) Inspections of plants, plant 
     sites, or other facilities or locations for which the United 
     States has a facility agreement with the Organization for the 
     Prohibition of Chemical Weapons shall be conducted in 
     accordance with the facility agreement.
       (2) Facility agreements shall be concluded for plants, 
     plant sites, or other facilities or locations that are 
     subject to inspection pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article VI 
     of the Chemical Weapons Convention unless the owner and the 
     operator, occupant or agent in charge of the facility and the 
     Technical Secretariat agree that such an agreement is not 
     necessary. Facility agreements should be concluded for 
     plants, plant sites, or other facilities or locations that 
     are subject to inspection pursuant to paragraphs 5 or 6 of 
     Article VI of the Chemical Weapons Convention if so requested 
     by the owner and the operator, occupant or agent in charge of 
     the facility.
       (3) The owner and the operator, occupant or agent in charge 
     shall, to the extent practicable consistent with the 
     obligations of the United States under the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention, participate in the negotiation of all facility 
     agreements concluded pursuant to the Convention.
       (g) Sampling and Safety.--(1) The Department of Commerce is 
     authorized to require the provision of samples to a member of 
     the inspection team of the Technical Secretariat in 
     accordance with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention. The owner or the operator, occupant or agent in 
     charge of the premises to the inspected shall determine 
     whether the sample shall be taken by representatives of the 
     premises or the inspection team or other individuals present.
       (2) In carrying out their activities, members of the 
     inspection team of the Technical Secretariat and 
     representatives of agencies or departments accompanying the 
     inspection team shall observe safety regulations established 
     at the premises to be inspected, including those for 
     protection of controlled environments within a facility and 
     for personal safety.
       (h) Coordination.--To the extent possible consistent with 
     the obligations of the United States pursuant to the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention, the representatives of the United States 
     National Authority, the Department of Commerce and any other 
     agency or department, if present, shall assist the owner and 
     the operator, occupant or agent in charge of the premises to 
     be inspected in interacting with the members of the 
     inspection team of the Technical Secretariat.

     SEC. 402. OTHER INSPECTIONS AND LEAD AGENCY.

       (a) Other Inspections.--The provisions of this title shall 
     apply, as appropriate, to all other inspections authorized by 
     the Chemical Weapons Convention. For all inspections other 
     than those conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4, 5, or 6 of 
     Article VI of the Convention, the term ``Department of 
     Commerce'' shall be replaced by the term ``Lead Agency'' in 
     section 401.
       (b) Lead Agency.--For the purposes of this title, the term 
     ``Lead Agency'' means the agency or department designated by 
     the President or the designee of the President to exercise 
     the functions and powers set forth in the specific provision, 
     based, inter alia, on the particular responsibilities of the 
     agency or department within the United States Government and 
     the relationship of the agency or department to the premises 
     to be inspected.

     SEC. 403. PROHIBITED ACTS.

       It shall be unlawful for any person to fail or refuse to 
     permit entry or inspection, or to disrupt, delay or otherwise 
     impede an inspection as required by this Act or the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention.

     SEC. 404. PENALTIES.

       (a) Civil.--(1) Any person who violates a provision of 
     section 203, 303, or 403 of this Act shall be liable to the 
     United States for a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed 
     $50,000 for each such violation. For purposes of this 
     subsection, each day such a violation of section 403 
     continues shall constitute a separate violation of section 
     403.
       (2)(A) A civil penalty for a violation of section 203, 303 
     or 403 of this Act shall be assessed by the Lead Agency by an 
     order made on the record after opportunity (provided in 
     accordance with this subparagraph) for a hearing in 
     accordance with section 554 of title 5, United States Code. 
     Before issuing such an order, the Lead Agency shall give 
     written notice to the person to be assessed a civil penalty 
     under such order of the Lead Agency's proposal to issue such 
     order and provide such person an opportunity to request, 
     within 15 days of the date the notice is received by such 
     person, such a hearing on the order.
       (B) In determining the amount of a civil penalty, the Lead 
     Agency shall take into account the nature, circumstances, 
     extent and gravity of the violation or violations and, with 
     respect to the violator, ability to pay, effect on ability to 
     continue to do business, any history of prior such 
     violations, the degree of culpability, and such other matters 
     as justice may require.
       (C) The Lead Agency may compromise, modify or remit, with 
     or without conditions, any civil penalty which may be imposed 
     under this subsection. The amount of such penalty, when 
     finally determined, or the amount agreed upon in compromise, 
     may be deducted from any sums owing by the United States to 
     the person charged.
       (3) Any person who requested in accordance with paragraph 
     (2)(A) a hearing respecting the assessment of a civil penalty 
     and who is aggrieved by an order assessing a civil penalty 
     may file a petition for judicial review of such order with 
     the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
     Columbia Circuit or for any other circuit in which such 
     person resides or transacts business. Such a petition may be 
     filed only within the 30-day period beginning on the date the 
     order making such assessment was issued.
       (4) If any person fails to pay an assessment of a civil 
     penalty--
       (A) after the order making the assessment has become a 
     final order and if such person does not file a petition for 
     judicial review of the order in accordance with paragraph 
     (3); or
       (B) after a court in an action brought under paragraph (3) 
     has entered a final judgment in favor of the Lead Agency;

     the Attorney General shall recover the amount assessed (plus 
     interest at currently prevailing rates from the date of the 
     expiration of the 30-day period referred to in paragraph (3) 
     or the date of such final judgment, as the case may be) in an 
     action brought in any appropriate district court of the 
     United States. In such an action, the validity, amount and 
     appropriateness of such penalty shall not be subject to 
     review.
       (b) Criminal.--Any person who knowingly violates any 
     provision of section 203, 303, or 403 of this Act, shall, in 
     addition to or in lieu of any civil penalty which may be 
     imposed under subsection (a) for such violation, be fined 
     under title 18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more 
     than two years, or both.

     SEC. 405. SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT.

       (a) Jurisdiction.--The district courts of the United States 
     shall have jurisdiction over civil actions to--
       (1) restrain any violation of section 203, 303 or 403 of 
     this Act; and
       (2) compel the taking of any action required by or under 
     this Act or the Chemical Weapons Convention.
       (b) Civil Actions.--A civil action described in subsection 
     (a) may be brought--
       (1) in the case of a civil action described in subsection 
     (a)(1), in the United States district court for the judicial 
     district wherein any act, omission, or transaction 
     constituting a violation of section 203, 303 or 403 of this 
     Act occurred or wherein the defendant is found or transacts 
     business; or
       (2) in the case of a civil action described in subsection 
     (a)(2), in the United States district court for the judicial 
     district wherein the defendant is found or transacts 
     business.

     In any such civil action process may be served on a defendant 
     wherever the defendant may reside or may be found, whether 
     the defendant resides or may be found within the United 
     States or elsewhere.

     SEC. 406. LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.

       (a) Warrants.--(1) The Lead Agency shall seek the consent 
     of the owner or the operator, occupant or agent in charge of 
     the premises to be inspected prior to the initiation of any 
     inspection. Before or after seeking such consent, the Lead 
     Agency may seek a search warrant from any official authorized 
     to issue search warrants. Proceedings regarding the issuance 
     of a search warrant shall be conducted ex parte, unless 
     otherwise requested by the Lead Agency. The Lead Agency shall 
     provide to the official authorized to issue search warrants 
     all appropriate information supplied by the Technical 
     Secretariat to the United States National Authority regarding 
     the basis for the selection of the plant site, plant, or 
     other facility or location for the type of inspection sought, 
     including, for challenge inspections pursuant to Article IX 
     of the Chemical Weapons Convention, appropriate evidence or 
     reasons provided by the requesting State Party to the 
     Convention with regard to its concerns about compliance with 
     the Chemical Weapons Convention at the facility or location. 
     The Lead Agency shall also provide any other appropriate 
     information available to it relating to the reasonableness of 
     the selection of the plant, plant site, or other facility or 
     location for the inspection.
       (2) The official authorized to issue search warrants shall 
     promptly issue a warrant authorizing the requested inspection 
     upon an affidavit submitted by the Lead Agency showing that--
       (A) the Chemical Weapons Convention is in force for the 
     United States;
       (B) the plant site, plant, or other facility or location 
     sought to be inspected is subject to the specific type of 
     inspection requested under the Chemical Weapons Convention;
       (C) the procedures established under the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention and this Act for initiating an inspection have 
     been complied with; and
       (D) the Lead Agency will ensure that the inspection is 
     conducted in a reasonable manner and will not exceed the 
     scope or duration set forth in or authorized by the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention or this Act.
       (3) The warrant shall specify the type of inspection 
     authorized; the purpose of the inspection; the type of plant 
     site, plant, or other facility or location to be inspected; 
     to the extent possible, the items, documents and areas that 
     may be inspected; the earliest commencement and latest 
     concluding dates and times of the inspection; and the 
     identities of the representatives of the Technical 
     Secretariat, if known, and, if applicable, the 
     representatives of agencies or departments.
       (b) Subpoenas.--In carrying out this Act, the Lead Agency 
     may by subpoena require the attendance and testimony of 
     witnesses and the production of reports, papers, documents, 
     answers to questions and other information that the Lead 
     Agency deems necessary. Witnesses shall be paid the same fees 
     and mileage that are paid witnesses in the courts of the 
     United States. In the event of contumacy, failure or refusal 
     of any person to obey any such subpoena, any district court 
     of the United States in which venue is proper shall have 
     jurisdiction to order any such person to comply with such 
     subpoena. Any failure to obey such an order of the court is 
     punishable by the court as a contempt thereof.
       (c) Injunctions and Other Orders.--No court shall issue an 
     injunction or other order that would limit the ability of the 
     Technical Secretariat to conduct, or the United States 
     National Authority or the Lead Agency to facilitate, 
     inspections as required or authorized by the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention.

     SEC. 407. AUTHORITY.

       The Lead Agency may issue such regulations as are necessary 
     to implement this title and the provisions of the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention, and amend or revise them as necessary. 
     The Lead Agency shall have the authority to appoint officials 
     to issue warrants pursuant to section 406(a) authorizing 
     inspections pursuant to this title.
                                  ____


Section-by-Section Analysis of the Proposed Chemical Weapons Convention 
                       Implementation Act of 1994


                                OVERVIEW

       The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) contains a number of 
     provisions that require implementing legislation to give them 
     effect within the United States. These include provisions on 
     international inspections, declarations by the chemical 
     industry, and the establishment of a ``National Authority'' 
     to serve as the liaison between the United States and the 
     international organization established by the CWC (the 
     Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons or OPCW) 
     and States Parties to the Convention. In addition, the CWC 
     requires the United States to prohibit all individuals and 
     legal entities within the United States, regardless of their 
     nationality, and all individuals outside the United States 
     possessing U.S. citizenship, from engaging in activities that 
     are prohibited to the United States under the Convention. As 
     part of this prohibition, the CWC requires the United States 
     to enact ``penal'' legislation implementing this prohibition 
     (i.e., enact legislation that penalizes conduct, either by 
     criminal, administrative, military or other sanctions).
       The proposed ``Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation 
     Act of 1994'' contains six miscellaneous sections and four 
     Titles. The six miscellaneous sections concern the short 
     title of the Act, the table of contents, Congressional 
     findings and declarations, definitions, and a severability 
     clause. Title I provides specific authority for the President 
     to establish the U.S. National Authority. Title II contains 
     criminal prohibitions with regard to activities relating to 
     chemical weapons (e.g., outlawing their possession, 
     development and use) and the use of riot control agents as a 
     method of warfare. This Title also implements the CWC's 
     restrictions on activities related to Schedule 1 and 2 
     chemicals (the chemicals and their precursors of most risk to 
     the object and purpose of the CWC), such as the prohibition 
     on transfers to non-States Parties.
       Title III contains provisions authorizing the United States 
     to collect information from members of the chemical industry 
     as required by the CWC, and outlaws the failure to provide 
     such information. This Title also prohibits the disclosure of 
     information or materials (e.g., samples) obtained under the 
     CWC except to the OPCW and States Parties, to appropriate 
     committees and subcommittees of the Congress, for law 
     enforcement purposes, and when disclosure is determined to be 
     in the national interest. Finally, this Title prohibits 
     authorized disclosure of information or materials obtained 
     pursuant to the Act.
       Title IV sets forth procedures for the initiation and 
     conduct of international inspections required by the CWC. 
     This includes provisions regarding notice, credentials, 
     inspection time frames and scope, facility agreements, 
     sampling and safety, and U.s. Government coordination. It 
     also contains legal mechanisms for ensuring that the United 
     States can fulfill its CWC obligation to allow inspections, 
     such as procedures for obtaining warrants. These also include 
     outlawing the refusal to allow, or interference with, 
     inspections. Finally, this Title sets forth the penalties for 
     violations of the requirements to provide access and 
     information and violations of the restrictions with regard to 
     Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals.
       The Act does not address the issues of privileges and 
     immunities for members of the international inspection teams, 
     export controls (other than the specific trade restrictions) 
     and liabilities. The Administration believes that U.S. 
     obligations under the CWC with regard to these issues are 
     already adequately provided for in current law.


                         miscellaneous sections

       The first part of the Act contains six sections that 
     provide for the short title of the Act, a table of contents, 
     Congressional findings and declarations, definitions, and a 
     severability clause. Sections 1 and 2 are standard provisions 
     regarding the short title of the Act and the table of 
     contents. Section 3 contains four findings by the Congress. 
     These findings were developed to demonstrate Congressional 
     recognition, in turn, of the importance of the problems 
     addressed by the Convention, the materiality of the 
     Convention in solving these problems, the significance of the 
     verification regime for the success of the Convention, and 
     the necessity of declarations and inspections for the 
     effectiveness of the verification regime. The intent is to 
     provide a clear legislative recognition of the rationale and 
     need for declarations and international inspections of 
     facilities and locations within the United States.
       Section 4 sets forth three declarations regarding U.S. 
     policy on the provision of legal assistance to other States 
     Parties to the Convention, on ensuring the safety of people 
     and protection of the environment during the implementation 
     of the Convention, and on minimizing the burden of the 
     Convention on the U.S. business community, consistent with 
     other U.S. obligations under the CWC. The first two 
     declarations reinforce the identical undertakings by the 
     United States contained in CWC Articles VII (2) and (3).
       Section 5 contains a general provision incorporating the 
     definitions set forth in the Convention and definitions of 
     the following terms used in the Act: ``Chemical Weapons 
     Convention;'' ``national of the United States;'' ``United 
     States;'' ``person;'' and ``Technical Secretariat.'' The 
     first term is simply shorthand for the full title of the 
     Convention. The term ``national of the United States'' 
     utilizes the definition contained in section 101(a)(22) of 
     the Immigration and Nationality Act.
       The term ``United States'' reflects the geographic scope of 
     the obligations of States Parties contained in the 
     Convention, i.e., any place under the jurisdiction or control 
     of a State Party (see, e.g., CWC Article I(2)). Places under 
     the jurisdiction or control of the United States include U.S. 
     territory and certain places outside the United States, such 
     as U.S. overseas military bases and offshore oil platforms on 
     the U.S. continental shelf. The definition specifies two such 
     places--U.S. aircraft and vessels--by incorporating 
     definitions for them contained in other existing law. This 
     inclusion does not mean that any exceptions contained in 
     these laws are also included. The overriding provision in the 
     definition of the term ``United States'' is that the term 
     includes ``all places under the jurisdiction or control of 
     the United States,'' not all places are defined in those 
     other laws.
       The term ``person'' is defined as broadly as possible to 
     ensure that all possible entities within the United States 
     that are covered by the provisions. Most uses of the term 
     ``person'' in the Act refer to entities located in the United 
     States. However, this definition also specifically sets forth 
     the uses of the term ``person'' that include entities outside 
     the United States, e.g., entities to whom Schedule 1 or 2 
     chemicals are transferred. Finally, the term ``Technical 
     Secretariat;'' refers to the body of the OPCW responsible for 
     conducting verification activities.
       Section 6 contains a severability clause ensuring that if a 
     section of the Act is later judged to be invalid, the other 
     sections will remain in effect. While the Administration 
     believes that the Convention and the Act are fully consistent 
     with the U.S. Constitution, because of the unique 
     constitutional considerations entailed in permitting 
     international inspections of private facilities and locations 
     within the United States, such a clause is prudent. Section 6 
     is modeled on nearly identical language contained in the 
     Nuclear Non-proliferation Act, Public Law 95-242.

                      Title I--National Authority

       Title I provides for the establishment of the ``United 
     States National Authority'' to, inter alia, serve as the 
     official liaison between the United States and the OPCW and 
     other States Parties to the Convention. This is required by 
     CWC Article VII(4), which states that ``[i]n order to fulfill 
     its obligations under [the CWC], each State Party shall 
     designate or establish a National authority to serve as the 
     national focal point for effective liaison with the [OPCW] 
     and other States Parties. . . .'' Section 101 requires the 
     President to establish such a National Authority, but leaves 
     it up to the Executive Branch to determine the appropriate 
     structure. This structure will be set forth in detail in a 
     forthcoming Executive Order.

 Title II--Application of Convention Prohibitions to Natural and Legal 
                                Persons

       Title II contains three sections. Specifically, it provides 
     for criminal prohibitions with regard to activities relating 
     to chemical weapons (e.g., outlawing their possession, 
     development and use), as well as provisions authorizing the 
     seizure, forfeiture and destruction of chemical weapons. In 
     addition, it outlaws the use of riot control agents as a 
     method of warfare. This Title also implements the CWC's 
     restrictions on activities related to Schedule 1 and 2 
     chemicals, such as the prohibition on transfers to non-State 
     Parties. Title II is intended to fulfill the obligation of 
     the United States under the CWC to give full domestic legal 
     effect to the Convention's prohibitions with regard to the 
     activities of natural and legal persons. In addition, this 
     Title is intended to provide law enforcement officials with 
     the lawful authority to act in the interest of national 
     security and public safety in all situations, including and 
     beyond official activities undertaken to implement the 
     Convention.
       Section 201 sets forth criminal prohibitions and penalties 
     with respect to chemical weapons, procedures for seizure, 
     forfeiture and destruction of chemical weapons, provisions 
     for injunctions on prohibited activities, prohibitions on the 
     use of riot control agents as a method of warfare, and 
     definitions pertaining to these provisions.
       This section is specifically required by the CWC. CWC 
     Article VII(1) provides that:
       Each State Party shall, in accordance with its 
     constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to 
     implement its obligations under [the] Convention. In 
     particular it shall:
       (a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its 
     territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as 
     recognized by international law from undertaking any activity 
     prohibited to a State Party under [the] Convention, including 
     enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity;
       (b) Not permit in any place under its control any activity 
     prohibited to a State Party under [the] Convention; and
       (c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph 
     (a) to any activity prohibited to a State Party under [the] 
     Convention undertaken anywhere by natural persons, possessing 
     its nationality, in conformity with international law.
       CWC Article VII(1) is designed to extend the prohibition on 
     activities by States Parties (primarily the CWC Article I 
     prohibitions on the development, production, other 
     acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of 
     chemical weapons) to activities by private individuals and 
     legal entities, such as corporations. This was done as a 
     means of ensuring that States Parties could not lawfully 
     conduct prohibited activities through intermediaries and to 
     place an affirmative obligation on States Parties to control 
     prohibited activities within their legal or actual reach. It 
     is understood that for a State Party to ``prohibit'' 
     activities it must enact and enforce penal legislation 
     governing the conduct of private individuals and legal 
     entities. The term ``penal'' was understood by the 
     negotiators to mean that the legislation can be of a 
     criminal, civil, administrative, military or other such 
     nature, so long as penalties are involved. According, the 
     penalties proscribed in Title II include criminal, civil and 
     military sanctions.
       Title II (in particular section 201) is designed to fulfill 
     the U.S. obligation contained in CWC Article VII(1). It 
     addresses all of the prohibited activities contained in the 
     CWC that the Administration believes require specific 
     implementing legislation. (Other prohibitions are already 
     covered by existing law or involve entirely governmental 
     action for which individuals can be penalized by appropriate 
     administrative or military sanctions.) Section 201 is modeled 
     after similar language contained in the Biological Weapons 
     Anti-Terrorism Act (BWATA), Public Law 101-298. That Act 
     implements a comparable obligation contained in Article IV of 
     the Biological Weapons Convention.
       Subsection 201(a) consists of a new chapter 11A of the 
     criminal code embodied in Title 18 of the U.S. Code and 
     contains five sections numbered ``227'' through ``227D.'' New 
     Title 18, section 227, implements the prohibited activities 
     contained in CWC Articles I(1) (a), (b), and (d). (Persons 
     violating the CWC Article I(1)(c) prohibition on engaging in 
     military preparations to use chemical weapons would be 
     subject to military sanctions or other laws prohibiting U.S. 
     persons from engaging in military activities.) Subsection 
     227(a) outlaws the knowing development, production, other 
     acquisition, stockpiling, retention, direct or indirect 
     transfer, use, ownership or possession of any chemical 
     weapon, the assistance, encouragement or inducement of any 
     person to do so, and the attempt or conspiracy to do so. 
     Violators can be fined or imprisoned for life or any term of 
     years, or both.
       The language of subsection 227(a) is modeled on similar 
     language in the BWATA, 18 U.S.C. 175(a). Subsection 227(a) 
     clearly sets out the elements of the offense and establishes 
     penalties that underscore the commitment of the United 
     States to the total abolition of chemical weapons. The 
     provision for imposing fines or confinement for life or 
     any term of years (which mirrors the same penalties with 
     regard to biological weapons) is intended to enable the 
     courts to exercise discretion in sentencing. This will 
     allow the punishment to be commensurate with the crime, 
     whether, e.g., it be the terrorist use of a chemical 
     weapon or a lesser offense adjudged under this subsection.
       The language of subsection 227(a) establishing liability 
     for one who ``encourages or induces'' prohibited activities 
     is intended to implement CWC Article I(1)(d). That provision 
     of Article I requires each State Party to undertake ``never 
     under any circumstances... [t]o assist, encourage or induce, 
     in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a 
     State Party. . . .'' Subsection 227(a) does not, however, 
     affect the legitimate right to freedom of speech contained in 
     the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
       Under the CWC the United States is permitted to retain at 
     least part of its chemical weapons stockpile for up to ten 
     years before all of it must be destroyed (or fifteen years if 
     the United States seeks and receives a five-year extension 
     from the OPCW). Chemical weapons also may be discovered at a 
     later time, including after the ten-year destruction deadline 
     has passed. Subsection 227(b) therefore acts to permit the 
     retention, ownership or possession of these chemical weapons 
     by any agency or department of the United States or any 
     person, including members of the U.S. armed forces, acting 
     with the authorization of any agency or department of the 
     United States pending the weapon's destruction. The exclusion 
     from the general prohibition for individuals is patterned 
     after the obedience to orders defense in military law, i.e., 
     authorization is presumed to be legal unless the individual 
     knows or should have known that it is not. The jurisdictional 
     reach of this section required by CWC Article VII(1) is set 
     forth in subsection 227(c). Finally, as discussed below, 
     subsection 227(d) contains additional penalties related to 
     chemical weapons.
       New Title 18, section 227A provides the Attorney General 
     the authority to seek the seizure, civil forfeiture, and 
     destruction or other appropriate disposition of chemical 
     weapons. Subsection 227A(a) describes the seizure process for 
     chemical weapons as defined under section 227D(2)(A) (i.e., 
     certain toxic chemicals and their precursors) that are ``of a 
     type or quantity that under the circumstances is inconsistent 
     with the purposes not prohibited under the Chemical Weapons 
     Convention.'' Chemical weapons fall into three categories--
     toxic chemicals and their precursors, chemical munitions and 
     devices, and chemical equipment. Subsection 227A(a) concerns 
     only the first category of chemical weapon.
       Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 
     Attorney General may apply for a judicial warrant authorizing 
     the seizure of such toxic chemicals and their precursors. The 
     phrase ``under the circumstances'' obligates the Attorney 
     General to look beneath surface appearances to ensure that 
     toxic chemicals and precursors that are intended for purposes 
     not prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention are not 
     mistakenly targeted for seizure and forfeiture.
       In exigent circumstances, seizure and destruction may be 
     carried out upon probable cause without a warrant. This 
     exception is intended to be used in rare instances, such as 
     where the danger to public health and safety or to the 
     environment or the danger of transfer to another country is 
     so extreme that applying for a warrant is impracticable.
       Subsection 227A(b) provides procedures for forfeiture and 
     authorizes the disposition by the Attorney General of 
     forfeited chemical weapons that are toxic chemicals or 
     precursors. The standard civil forfeiture procedures 
     applicable under chapter 46 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code to 
     forfeitures of property involved in other types of criminal 
     activity, including procedures for notice, opportunity for a 
     forfeiture hearing, and the allocation of the burden of proof 
     at such hearing, are incorporated into subsection 227A(b) by 
     reference. The chapter 46 procedures will apply to seizures 
     and forfeitures under section 227A to the extent that the 
     standard forfeiture procedures applicable under chapter 46 
     are not inconsistent with the warrant requirement, the 
     provisions for summary forfeiture of chemical weapons as 
     defined by sections 227D(2) (B) and (C), or the other 
     provisions of section 227A. Subsection 227A(b) also requires 
     that the Attorney General shall provide for the destruction 
     or other appropriate disposition of chemical weapons that are 
     seized and forfeited.
       Subsection 227A(c) gives claimants an affirmative defense 
     to aver, if they wish, in forfeitures under subsection 
     227A(b) of toxic chemical and precursors as defined in 
     section 227D(2)(A). As previously noted, chemical weapons 
     fall into three categories--toxic chemicals and their 
     precursors, chemical munitions and devices, and chemical 
     equipment. Subsection 227A(c) concerns only the first 
     category of chemical weapon.
       In this regard, it is important to note that section 
     227D(2)(A) defines ``chemical weapon'' to exclude chemicals 
     that are ``intended for a purpose not prohibited under the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention, as long as the type and quantity 
     is consistent with such a purpose.'' Such purposes are 
     defined in section 227D(6) and include, e.g., industrial, 
     agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other 
     peaceful purposes. Also, subsection 227A(a) seizures are 
     based upon the ``type or quantity that under the 
     circumstances is inconsistent with the purposes not 
     prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention.'' 
     Consequently, fairness requires that the claimants be 
     afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that the seized 
     chemicals are in fact intended for a purpose that is not 
     prohibited and that the chemicals are of a type and 
     quantity consistent with that purpose. Claimants may, of 
     course, decide to raise no defense or to put the 
     Government to its proof. The affirmative defense of 
     subsection 227A(c) is intended, therefore, to be an 
     additional protection for persons who use toxic chemicals 
     and their precursors for purposes not prohibited under the 
     Chemical Weapons Convention.
       Subsection 227A(d) provides for summary forfeiture without 
     a hearing and the destruction of the chemical weapons defined 
     by sections 227D(2) (B) and (C). In contrast to chemical 
     weapons that are toxic chemicals and precursors (section 
     227D(2)(A)), which are seized for forfeiture based on type, 
     quantity, and circumstances, seizures of chemical weapons 
     that are munitions and devices (section 227D(2)(B)) or 
     equipment (section 227D(2)(C)) are based upon their existence 
     ``by reason of conduct prohibited under section 227.'' There 
     is no affirmative defense provision for munitions and devices 
     that are ``specifically designed'' to cause death or other 
     harm and that exist by reason of criminal conduct. Similarly, 
     there is no affirmative defense provision for equipment that 
     is ``specifically designed for use directly in connection 
     with the employment of munitions and devices'' and that 
     exists by reason of criminal conduct. By definition, such 
     munitions, devices and equipment have a purpose inconsistent 
     with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Consequently, an 
     affirmative defense based upon establishing that such 
     property has a purpose that is not prohibited and that the 
     property is of a type and quantity consistent with that 
     purpose is inappropriate.
       Subsection 227A(d) provides for the seizure and summary 
     forfeiture of ``chemical weapons'' as defined under sections 
     227D(2) (B) and (C) (munitions, devices or equipment) if they 
     exist ``by reason of conduct prohibited under section 227.'' 
     Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the 
     Attorney General may apply for judicial warrants authorizing 
     the seizure of such munitions, devices or equipment. In 
     exigent circumstances, seizures and destruction may be 
     carried out upon probable cause without a warrant. As with 
     subsection 227A(a), this exception is intended to be used in 
     rare instances in which the danger to public health and 
     safety or to the environment or the danger of transfer to 
     another country is so extreme that applying for a warrant is 
     impracticable.
       It is important to note that the term ``directly'' in the 
     definitions of munitions, devices and equipment that are 
     considered to be chemical weapons is intended to mean 
     ``solely.'' Thus, dual-use munitions and their components are 
     not considered to be chemical weapons provided they do not 
     otherwise meet this definition. For example, dual-use 
     munitions may be used to disperse chemicals not prohibited by 
     the Convention, such as smoke, provided the munitions have 
     not been specifically designed to cause death through the 
     release of toxic chemicals. Also, dual-use weapons systems 
     such as artillery or aircraft that are capable of employing 
     chemical weapons are not covered by this definition, and so 
     are not subject to these provisions.
       Subsection 227A(e) authorizes the Attorney General to seek 
     the assistance of any federal agency in the handling, 
     storage, transportation, and destruction or other disposition 
     of any seized ``chemical weapon'' as defined under section 
     227D(2). This provision provides the Attorney General with 
     the ability to avoid unnecessary danger to law enforcement 
     personnel and the public by arranging for appropriate 
     assistance from any federal agency that has the necessary 
     resources and expertise to safely undertake the custody and 
     disposition of hazardous chemical weapons.
       Subsection 227A(f) provides for civil liability to the 
     United States on the part of the owner or possessor of 
     property seized as a chemical weapon under section 227A for 
     any expenses incurred incident to such seizure including, but 
     not limited to, expenses for handling, storage, 
     transportation and destruction or other disposition of the 
     seized property. Additionally, for seizures of chemical 
     weapons in which there is a related criminal prosecution and 
     conviction for a violation of section 227, subsection 227(d) 
     imposes an additional criminal penalty on the convicted 
     defendant to pay such expenses. Under the CWC, all chemical 
     weapons must be destroyed. Therefore, given that the sale of 
     forfeited chemical weapons in order to realize proceeds to 
     pay the expenses associated with their seizures and 
     forfeiture is not feasible, these provisions preserve the 
     Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund from depletion 
     that would otherwise result from disbursements for such 
     expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 524(c)(1)(A).
       New Title 18, section 227B authorizes the United States to 
     seek injunctions against, inter alia, the development, 
     production, other acquisition, stockpiling, retention, direct 
     or indirect transfer, use, ownership or possession of 
     chemical weapons, or the preparation or solicitation to do 
     so. As with section 227A, section 227B is intended to permit 
     Government action before a chemical weapon causes injury or 
     environmental harm. Mere speech is not actionable under 
     section 227B. Moreover, subsection 227B(b) provides an 
     affirmative defense analogous to the one in subsection 
     227A(c).
       New Title 18, section 227C, implements the prohibited 
     activity contained in CWC Article I(5). Subsection 227C(a) 
     outlaws the knowing use of riot control agents as a method of 
     warfare and the assistance of any person to do so. Violators 
     can be fined or imprisoned for up to ten years. Subsection 
     227C(b) excludes the members of the U.S. armed forces from 
     this criminal sanction. Instead, it prescribes appropriate 
     military penalties. This substitution is designed to 
     eliminate the possibility that military personnel will refuse 
     to use riot control agents in lawful situations for fear of 
     possible criminal sanctions if such use is later ruled to be 
     in violation of the CWC. Finally, the jurisdictional reach of 
     this section required by CWC Article VII(1) is set forth in 
     subsection 227C(c).
       New Title 18, section 227D, contains definitions pertinent 
     to the modifications to Title 18 of the U.S. Code. For ease 
     in the use of Title 18, this section repeats, essentially 
     verbatim, definitions contained in CWC Article II and, with 
     minor changes, the definitions contained in section 5 of the 
     Act. Specifically, this section adopts the CWC definitions 
     for the following terms used in the modifications to Title 
     18: ``chemical weapon'' (CWC Article II(1)); ``riot control 
     agent'' (CWC Article II(7)); and ``purpose not prohibited 
     under the Chemical Weapons Convention'' (CWC Article II(9)). 
     This section also repeats the following CWC terms used in the 
     CWC definitions: ``toxic chemical'' (CWC Article II(2)); 
     ``precursor'' (CWC Article II(3)); and ``key component of a 
     binary or multicomponent chemical system'' (CWC Article 
     II(4)). In addition, this section repeats the definitions for 
     the following terms contained in section 5(b) of the Act: 
     ``Chemical Weapons Convention;'' ``national of the United 
     States;'' and ``United States.'' Finally, this section 
     repeats the definition for ``person'' contained in section 
     5(b)(4) of the Act, but does not limit it to those entities 
     ``located in the United States.''
       Subsection 201(b) contains clerical amendments for 
     modifying chapter 11 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code.
       Section 202 makes the effective date of Title II the same 
     as the date the Convention enters into force for the United 
     States. This ensures that the prohibitions with regard to the 
     U.S. Government and with regard to individuals and legal 
     entities begin at the same time. The rest of the Act is 
     intended to become effective prior to this date in order to 
     provide sufficient time to establish the required legal 
     authority and procedures under the Convention. For example, 
     information will need to be obtained from the chemical 
     industry well in advance of the entry into force of the CWC 
     for the United States in order for the United States to make 
     the required declarations on chemicals listed in the CWC 
     within 30 days after the CWC enter into force for it.
       Section 203 requires individuals and legal entities to 
     comply with the CWC's restrictions pertaining to States 
     Parties' production, acquisition, retention, use and 
     transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals are chemicals that have 
     been used or produced for chemical weapons purposes, are 
     considered of greatest risk to the CWC, and have little or no 
     commercial utility. Schedule 2 chemicals are largely 
     precursors used in the production of Schedule 1 chemicals. 
     These restrictions are contained in Parts VI(1), VI(2) and 
     VII(31) of the CWC Annex on Implementation and Verification 
     (Verification Annex).
       CWC Verification Annex Part VI(1) states that:
       ``A State Party shall not produce, acquire, retain or use 
     Schedule 1 chemicals outside the territories of States 
     Parties and shall not transfer such chemicals outside its 
     territory except to another State Party.''
       The purpose of this paragraph is to ensure that these 
     chemicals of highest risk to the Convention do not spread to 
     non-States Parties.
       CWC Verification Annex Part VI(2), in turn, states that:
       ``A State Party shall not produce, acquire, retain, 
     transfer or use Schedule 1 chemicals unless:
       ``(a) The chemicals are applied to research, medical, 
     pharmaceutical or protective purposes; and
       ``(b) The types and quantities of chemicals are strictly 
     limited to those which can be justified for such purposes; 
     and
       ``(c) The aggregate amount of such chemicals at any given 
     time for such purposes is equal to or less than 1 [metric 
     ton]; and
       ``(d) The aggregate amount for such purposes acquired by a 
     State Party in any year throughout production, withdrawal 
     from chemical weapons stocks and transfer is equal to or less 
     than 1 [metric ton].''
       Finally, CWC Verification Annex Part VII(31) states that:
       ``Schedule 2 chemicals shall only be transferred to or 
     received from States Parties. This obligation shall take 
     effect three years after entry into force of [the] 
     Convention.'' The main purposes of these paragraphs are to 
     serve as a disincentive for countries to remain outside of 
     the Convention, to facilitate verification, and to deny 
     chemical weapons precursors to non-States Parties.
       Subsection 203(a) implements Part VI(2) of the CWC 
     Verification Annex by making it unlawful to produce, acquire, 
     retain, transfer or use Schedule 1 chemicals unless they are 
     used for permitted purposes, the types and quantities are 
     strictly limited to those that can be justified for such 
     purposes, and the amounts do not exceed limits to be 
     established by the U.S. Government. The aggregate amount of 
     Schedule 1 chemicals in the United States as a whole may not 
     exceed one metric ton. A portion of this quota will be needed 
     by the U.S. Government for protective purposes such as 
     determining the adequacy of defensive equipment and measures. 
     The remainder of the quota will be apportioned among private 
     individuals and legal entities doing permitted work with 
     Schedule 1 chemicals.
       Subsection 203(b) implements Parts VI(1) and VII(31) of the 
     CWC Verification Annex. Paragraph 1 of subjection 203(b) 
     makes it unlawful to produce, acquire, retain, transfer or 
     use Schedule 1 chemicals outside the territories of States 
     Parties. Paragraph 2 of subsection 203(b) makes it unlawful 
     to transfer to, or receive from, non-States Parties any 
     Schedule 2 chemicals. Note that this is intended as a 
     prohibition with regard to end-users. It does not prohibit 
     transshipments through the territories of non-States Parties.
       Subsection 203(c) sets forth the jurisdiction of the 
     prohibitions contained in this section. The jurisdictional 
     reach is the same as required in CWC Article VII(1)--all 
     activities within the United States and all activities 
     undertaken by individuals with U.S. citizenship outside the 
     United States. Accordingly, subsections 203(a) and (b) apply 
     to all persons (defined as all entities within the United 
     States) and all nationals of the United States (defined as 
     U.S. citizens) outside the United States.
       The civil and criminal procedures and penalties for 
     violations of section 203 are set forth in section 404. The 
     authority of U.S. district courts to enforce section 203 is 
     set forth in section 405.

              Title III--Declarations by Chemical Industry

       Title III contains three sections. It sets forth provisions 
     regarding reporting of information required by the 
     Convention, restrictions on disclosure of information and 
     material obtained under the Convention, and failure to 
     provide information. A number of these provisions are modeled 
     after similar provisions in the Toxic Substances Control Act 
     (TSCA), Public Law 94-469. The verification regime for 
     controlling emissions of the chemical industry under the TSCA 
     is the closest analogy in U.S. domestic law to the 
     verification regime created by the CWC.
       Section 301 pertains to chemical industry reporting 
     requirements and coordination among U.S. Government 
     departments and agencies in collecting required information. 
     Subsection 301(a) requires chemical industry to maintain, 
     permit access to, and provide to the Department of Commerce 
     the information necessary for the United States to make the 
     declarations required under the Convention. To help ensure 
     that the chemical industry is not producing chemical weapons, 
     the CWC requires declaration and inspection of the chemical 
     facilities most capable of conducting such activities. CWC 
     Article VI and Parts VI-IX of the CWC Verification Annex set 
     forth the various requirements for declarations of chemicals 
     and chemical facilities. These provisions require facility-
     specific declarations of specific chemicals of concern to the 
     Convention (which are listed in the CWC in Schedules 1 to 3) 
     that are produced (and in some cases processed or consumed) 
     above certain thresholds (which start as high as 200 metric 
     tons per year). In addition, certain chemical facilities that 
     produce unscheduled chemicals that could be used to produce 
     scheduled chemicals must be declared. Subsection 301(a) is 
     based on similar language contained in the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 
     2607(a)(1)(A).
       Subsection 301(b), in turn, requires agencies and 
     departments to avoid duplication of reporting required by 
     other laws (e.g., TSCA) by, inter alia, coordinating their 
     actions with other agencies and departments. This section is 
     based on similar language contained in the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 
     2607(a)(2)(G).
       Section 302 restricts the public disclosure of the 
     information and materials required by the CWC, provides 
     criminal penalties for wrongful disclosure, and applies these 
     provisions to the international inspectors. Subsection 302(a) 
     provides, with certain exceptions, for an extensive 
     prohibition on the public disclosure of information or 
     materials obtained from declarations or inspections required 
     under the CWC. (The term ``materials'' was included to 
     protect such things as samples of chemicals. The term 
     ``public disclosure'' is intended to make clear that the 
     exchange of information or materials among government 
     agencies and departments is not covered by this 
     provision.) This provision is designed to provide chemical 
     industry and any other persons affected by declarations 
     and inspections under the CWC with the greatest amount of 
     protection for their information and materials possible. 
     Specifically, this provision is intended to make clear 
     that information or materials obtained from declarations 
     or inspections shall not be required to be disclosed 
     pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552), 
     and may be disclosed only in accordance with the criteria 
     set forth in the provision. This will allow the U.S. 
     Government to protect all such information or materials 
     without requiring an inquiry into whether there are, e.g., 
     proprietary interests in such information or materials. 
     This provision is based, in part, on protections for 
     license applications under the Export Administration Act 
     (EAA), 50 App. U.S.C. 2411(c)(1).
       These protections are in addition to those already 
     contained in the CWC. The CWC verification regime provides 
     for a range of provisions intended to protect non-relevant or 
     sensitive information. This includes, e.g., the opportunity 
     for an inspected facility to have a facility agreement 
     specifying the nature of access and the information to be 
     collected in routine inspections, the right of the United 
     States to manage access in challenge inspections, the right 
     of the inspected facility to take the photographs or samples 
     requested by the inspection team, and the right of the United 
     States to inspect the inspection equipment brought in by the 
     inspection team. In addition, the CWC Annex on the Protection 
     of Confidential Information (Confidentiality Annex) contains 
     provisions that provide for the protection of information 
     designated confidential by States Parties that is provided to 
     the OPCW. Finally, the Confidentiality Annex establishes 
     procedures to address concerns or allegations of breaches of 
     such obligations and provides for punitive measures where 
     appropriate.
       There are four exceptions to the extensive prohibition on 
     disclosure--disclosures to the OPCW and other States Parties 
     to the Convention, disclosures to appropriate Congressional 
     committees and subcommittees, disclosures to agencies and 
     departments for law enforcement purposes, and disclosures 
     determined to be in the national interest.
       The first exception allows the United States to report the 
     information and materials to the OPCW as required by the CWC. 
     It also allows the United States to disclose information and 
     materials to other States Parties, which will assist the 
     United States, inter alia, in complying with the CWC Article 
     VII(2) obligation to afford other States Parties the 
     appropriate legal assistance in facilitating the 
     implementation of the Convention. The second exception is 
     designed to ensure that the appropriate Congressional 
     personnel have access to the information while providing as 
     much protection as possible. This exception is modeled on 
     similar language in the EAA, 50 App. U.S.C. 2411(c)(2). 
     The third exception is designed primarily for the 
     situation in which U.S. Government personnel accompanying 
     inspectors happen to witness evidence of a crime. In such 
     a case, the Government would not be precluded from using 
     such information in any subsequent prosecution. This 
     exception would, therefore, permit the Government to use 
     information or materials obtained during inspections in 
     regulatory, civil or criminal proceedings conducted for 
     the purpose of law enforcement, including those that are 
     not directly related to enforcement of the CWC. The final 
     exception is designed to provide the U.S. Government 
     discretion to release information or materials when to do 
     so would be in the national interest. For example, in 
     order to provide openness regarding U.S. chemical 
     activities, non-sensitive information such as lists of 
     facilities might be released. This exception is modeled on 
     similar language in the EAA, 50 App. U.S.C. 2411(c)(1).
       Subsection 302(b) provides for advance notice to the 
     supplier of information or materials in appropriate cases 
     when the U.S. Government intends to exercise the national 
     interest provision to release information or materials. This 
     provision is designed to provide affected persons with the 
     opportunity to prepare for, inter alia, the direct public 
     disclosure of information or materials. This subsection is 
     modeled, in part, on language contained in the TSCA, 15 
     U.S.C. 2613(c)(2)(a).
       Subsection 302(c) provides for criminal penalties for 
     unauthorized willful disclosures of information or materials 
     obtained pursuant to the CWC. This is designed to strengthen 
     the non-disclosure protections afforded chemical industry and 
     other persons affected by the CWC and is modeled after 
     nearly-identical language in the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 2613(d)(1).
       Subsection 302(d) provides for application of the 
     disclosure provisions to the members of the international 
     inspection teams. In general, members of OPCW inspection 
     teams and other Technical Secretariat personnel are immune 
     from domestic laws during their performance of official 
     duties within a State Party (CWC Article VIII, Section E, and 
     Part II, Section B, of the CWC Verification Annex). However, 
     the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat can waive 
     such immunity from suit in U.S. courts for their official 
     acts, as provided for in Part II(14) of the CWC Verification 
     Annex and paragraph 20 of the CWC Confidentiality Annex. 
     Accordingly, subsection 302(d) provides the legal authority 
     to prosecute members of the inspection team and other 
     Technical Secretariat personnel for unauthorized disclosure 
     when the Director-General has waived their immunity.
       Section 303 makes it unlawful for any person to fail or 
     refuse to establish, maintain, submit or permit access to 
     records that are required by the CWC. The civil and criminal 
     penalties for such violations are set forth in section 404 
     and the specific enforcement powers for violations are set 
     forth in section 405. Section 303 is modeled after similar 
     language in the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 2614(3).

                         Title IV--Inspections

       Title IV consists of seven sections. It contains procedures 
     for conducting international inspections of chemical 
     industry, as well as for conducting other types of 
     inspections under the CWC. It also contains penalties for 
     failure or refusal to allow such inspections in violation of 
     the Act (as well as for failure to provide information 
     required by the CWC and failure to abide by the restrictions 
     with regard to Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals). Finally, Title IV 
     establishes other legal mechanisms for compelling non-
     consensual inspections, such as search warrants, and the 
     authority to issue necessary regulations. As with Title III, 
     a number of these provisions are modeled after similar 
     provisions in the Toxic Substances Control Act.
       Section 401 provides the domestic legal framework for the 
     conduct of inspections of chemical industry by the 
     international inspectors of the Technical Secretariat. 
     Specifically, it sets forth procedures with regard to 
     authority to inspect, provision of notice and credentials, 
     time frames for inspections, scope of inspections, facility 
     agreements, sampling and safety, and coordination among U.S. 
     Government agencies and departments. While designed primarily 
     for routine inspections of chemical industry (which are 
     expected to constitute the vast majority of non-military 
     inspections within the United States), these procedures are 
     also designed to be used for any other inspections required 
     by the Convention, e.g., challenge inspections of private 
     facilities.
       CWC Article VI and Parts VI-IX of the CWC Verification 
     Annex set forth the various requirements for routine 
     inspections of chemical facilities. The chemical industry 
     facilities subject to routine inspections are those that 
     produce (and in some cases, process or consume) chemicals 
     listed in the CWC Schedules (provided this occurs above 
     certain thresholds). In addition, chemical industry 
     facilities that produce unscheduled discrete organic 
     chemicals above specified threshold levels will be subject to 
     inspection beginning three years after the CWC enters into 
     force, unless the OPCW Conference of the States Parties 
     decides otherwise. The Specific facilities to be inspected 
     will be chosen on the basis of neutral and objective criteria 
     and methods, including weighted random selection, equitable 
     geographic distribution of inspections, and the 
     characteristics of the facility and the nature of activities 
     carried out there. The rules for the conduct of routine 
     inspections, including scope, aim, time frames and protection 
     of proprietary and other sensitive information are set forth 
     in Parts VI-IX of the CWC Verification Annex, the CWC 
     Confidentiality Annex and the detailed implementing 
     provisions currently being developed by the Preparatory 
     Commission for the OPCW. For many facilities, the specific 
     implementation of these rules will be agreed a priori in 
     facility agreements between the United States and the 
     OPCW.
       In addition to routine inspections, chemical industry 
     facilities and all other facilities or locations in the 
     United States potentially may be subjected to challenge 
     inspections pursuant to CWC Article IX. Challenge inspections 
     are conducted by the CWC Technical Secretariat upon the 
     request of a State Party that has a concern about compliance 
     with the Convention. Access to the challenged site must be 
     granted by the inspected State Party, but all activities 
     within the site are subject to ``managed access,'' i.e., the 
     nature and extent of access by inspection team is subject to 
     negotiation. (To balance this, however, the CWC requires 
     States Parties to make every reasonable effort to provide 
     alternative methods of demonstrating compliance when full 
     access is not provided.) Under managed access, in addition to 
     the extent of access within the site, the particular 
     inspection team activities and the performance of activities 
     and provision of information by the inspected State Party are 
     also subject to negotiation.
       Subsection 401(a) authorizes the Technical Secretariat 
     inspection team to conduct inspections of U.S. facilities and 
     U.S. Government personnel to accompany these inspection 
     teams. This subsection is based, in part, on similar language 
     contained in the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 2610(a). It is important to 
     note that these are procedures for international inspections 
     that involve U.S. Government assistance. Title IV does not 
     provide for separate inspections by the U.S. Government to 
     enforce the CWC. Instead, for the purposes of U.S. law, the 
     CWC will be enforced by the normal civil and criminal 
     processes, although, as previously noted, information 
     gathered during international inspections is not precluded 
     from being used in these processes.
       Subsection 401(b) requires the U.S. Government to provide 
     notices of inspections and sets forth the required recipients 
     and contents of such notices. It is based, in part, on 
     similar language contained in the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 2610(a). 
     Separate notices are given to the owner of the facility and 
     to the operator, occupant or agent in charge of the facility. 
     While a notice is required to conduct an inspection, failure 
     to receive a notice cannot bar an inspection. This provision 
     is necessary in order to fulfill the U.S. CWC obligation to 
     allow inspections to proceed within 48 to 120 hours of the 
     receipt by the United States of notice from the Technical 
     Secretariat. Because of these short time frames, the written 
     notice required by this subsection could be made by 
     electronic means such as facsimiles. The notice provided by 
     the U.S. Government will contain all appropriate information 
     supplied by the Technical Secretariat. This means the 
     United States will provide as much information as possible 
     but is not required to provide all information since this 
     may involve classified or other sensitive foreign policy 
     or national security information. Finally, separate 
     notices are not required for each entry.
       Subsection 401(c) requires the Technical Secretariat and, 
     if present at the inspection, U.S. Government personnel to 
     present appropriate credentials. While it is anticipated 
     that, at least for the first few years of the Convention, 
     U.S. government escorts will be furnished for all inspection 
     teams, over time such escorts may not be required for all 
     inspections. This subsection is based, in part, on similar 
     language contained in the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 2610(a).
       Subsection 401(d) requires that, consistent with the 
     provisions of the SWC, all inspections must be commenced and 
     completed with reasonable promptness and conducted at 
     reasonable times, within reasonable limits, and in a 
     reasonable manner. In particular, the U.S. Government must 
     endeavor to ensure that, to the extent possible consistent 
     with the CWC, each inspection is commenced, conducted and 
     concluded during ordinary working hours. (However, the 
     inspectors are permitted by the CWC to work around-the-clock 
     since the duration of inspections under the CWC is set in 
     continuous hours.)
       The CWC itself sets forth the specific rules for conducting 
     inspections, including such things as duration, aim, and 
     rights of the inspectors and the inspected State Party. While 
     some of these are fixed, others are subject to negotiation. 
     Accordingly, the purpose of this subsection is to commit the 
     U.S. government to exercising its influence on behalf of 
     inspected facilities to ensure that inspections are conducted 
     in a reasonable manner. This complements the general 
     obligation of the U.S. Government to assist inspected 
     facilities in interacting with the inspection team, as set 
     forth in subsection 401(h). Subsection 401(d) is based, in 
     part, on similar language contained in the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 
     2610(a).
       Subsection 401(e) sets forth the permitted scope of 
     inspections conducted pursuant to the CWC. In general, an 
     inspection may extend to all things within the premises 
     inspected related to whether the CWC has been complied with. 
     However, to the extent possible consistent with the CWC, no 
     inspection can extend to financial, sales and marketing 
     (other than shipment), pricing, personnel, research, patent 
     or environmental/health regulations data. This data is 
     considered to be, in general, the most sensitive to 
     proprietary concerns and the least relevant to compliance 
     with the CWC. The United States cannot flatly prohibit 
     collection of this information by the Technical 
     Secretariat. Nevertheless, this subsection is intended to 
     commit the U.S. Government to exercising its influence on 
     behalf of inspected facilities to ensure that, to the 
     extent permitted by the CWC, information not relevant to 
     compliance with the CWC is protected from disclosure. As 
     with subsection 401(d), this complements the subsection 
     401(h) obligation of the U.S. Government to assist 
     inspected facilities in interacting with the inspection 
     team. Subsection 401(e) is based on similar language 
     contained in the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 2610(b)(1) and (2).
       Subsection 401(f) provides for the conclusion of facility 
     agreements and the participation of facilities in negotiating 
     such agreements. The CWC provides for facility agreements as 
     a means of agreeing with States Parties, in advance, on the 
     detailed procedures that will govern routine inspections of a 
     declared facility. (These detailed procedures will be based 
     on general procedures for inspections contained in the CWC 
     and developed by the OPCW Preparatory Commission and approved 
     by the OPCW.) While the CWC contemplates the participation of 
     the facility in agreeing on these details, the actual 
     facility agreement is between the State Party, i.e., the 
     United States, and the OPCW. Facility agreements are required 
     for all chemical weapons production, destruction and storage 
     facilities and for Schedule 1 facilities. Facility agreements 
     are to be concluded for Schedule 2 facilities unless the 
     State Party and the Technical Secretariat agree otherwise. 
     Facility agreements may be concluded for Schedule 3 
     facilities and ``other chemical production facilities'' if 
     the State Party requests them.
       To implement these provisions, subsection 401(f) provides 
     that for facilities that have facility agreements routine 
     inspections will be conducted in accordance with those 
     agreements. For Schedule 2 facilities, this subsection gives 
     owners and operators, occupants or agents in charge the right 
     to refuse a facility agreement, if the Technical Secretariat 
     concurs. For Schedule 3 facilities and other chemical 
     production facilities, subsection 401(f) establishes the 
     expectation that the U.S. Government will conclude facility 
     agreements with the OPCW for those facilities that request 
     them. Finally, subsection 401(f) makes clear that facility 
     owners and operators, occupants, or agents in charge of the 
     facilities are to be involved in the negotiations of all 
     required and requested facility agreements to the extent that 
     it is practicable, consistent with U.S. obligations under the 
     CWC.
       Subsection 401(g) authorizes the U.S. Government to require 
     the provision of samples as required by the Convention and 
     requires CWC inspectors and accompanying U.S. Government 
     personnel to observe the safety regulations of the inspected 
     facility. Since provision of the wide range of samples 
     contemplated by the CWC is not a common component of 
     domestic inspection regimes, this subsection is intended 
     to make clear that the U.S. Government is authorized to 
     take this action. The provision on safety regulations 
     expands to U.S. Government personnel the identical 
     obligation for CWC inspection teams contained in Part 
     II(43) of the CWC Verification Annex. Finally, this 
     subsection makes clear that inspected facilities will have 
     the right to choose who will take the samples.
       Subsection 401(h) requires the U.S. Government, to the 
     extent consistent with the CWC, to assist inspected 
     facilities in interacting with the inspection team. 
     Accordingly, this creates a general obligation for the U.S. 
     Government to use its discretionary power under the CWC in 
     support of inspected facilities. However, this does not 
     require the U.S. Government to disregard other CWC 
     obligations and policy considerations such as the obligation 
     to make every reasonable effort to resolve compliance 
     concerns where full access has not been provided for 
     challenge inspections.
       Section 402 provides for application of Title IV to all 
     inspections authorized by the CWC. The Administration has 
     proposed that the Department of Commerce be the agency 
     responsible for routine inspections of chemical industry. 
     Implementation of other types of inspections may require 
     different departments or agencies to be responsible for the 
     inspection, depending on the specific situation. Accordingly, 
     this section provides for a ``Lead Agency'' to assume the 
     responsibilities of the Department of Commerce for 
     inspections that do not involve routine inspections of the 
     chemical industry. (The Lead Agency could remain as the 
     Department of Commerce for some or all aspects of other 
     inspections, e.g., providing notice of challenge inspections 
     of chemical industry.)
       This is particularly important for legal proceedings with 
     regard to inspections. For example, application for an 
     administrative search warrant for a non-consensual routine 
     inspection may involve a particular agency or department 
     while application for a warrant for a non-consensual 
     challenge inspection might more appropriately be handled by 
     the Department of Justice.
       Section 403 makes it unlawful for any person to fail or 
     refuse to permit entry or inspection, or to disrupt, delay or 
     impede an inspection required by the Act and the CWC. The CWC 
     allows inspected facilities, particularly during challenge 
     inspections, to take actions to protect sensitive 
     information. Such actions would not be considered as 
     disrupting, delaying or impeding an inspection. This 
     provision is intended to cover only those actions not 
     permitted by the CWC.
       Section 403 serves as the basic legal cornerstone for 
     ensuring that the United States can fulfill its obligation 
     under the CWC to allow inspections by the Technical 
     Secretariat. The civil and criminal procedures and penalties 
     for violations of this section are set forth in section 404. 
     The authority of U.S. district courts to enforce section 403 
     is set forth in section 405. Section 403 is based on nearly 
     identical language contained in the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 2614(4).
       Section 404 sets forth civil and criminal penalties for 
     violations of section 403, as well as for violations of 
     sections 203 and 303. (Section 203 contains restrictions with 
     regard to Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals. Section 303 makes 
     unlawful any refusal to provide information or materials 
     required under the Act.) Subsection 404(a) provides for civil 
     penalties, hearings, consideration by the Lead Agency of the 
     circumstances of the violations, modifications to the 
     penalties, and recovery of penalties. It is modeled after 
     nearly identical language in the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 2615(a)(1), 
     (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(3) and (b).
       Subsection 404(a) provides for civil penalties of up to 
     $50,000 for violations of sections 203, 303 or 403. It 
     further provides that for violations involving refusal to 
     provide access (section 403), each day such a violation 
     continues will constitute a separate violation. The purpose 
     of this latter provision is to place additional pressure on 
     those who refuse access. This creates an important additional 
     legal mechanism for enabling the United States to meet its 
     treaty obligation to provide access to facilities and 
     locations that are subject to inspection under the CWC.
       Subsection 404(a) also requires notice and a hearing prior 
     to assessment of the penalty, requires the Lead Agency to 
     take into account factors such as the circumstances of the 
     violation and the violator's ability to pay, allows the Lead 
     Agency to modify and penalty, and provides for judicial 
     review of the penalty. This subsection also authorizes the 
     Attorney General to recover the amounts assessed, plus 
     interest, where the violator fails to pay the penalty.
       Subsection 404(b) provides that any person who knowingly 
     violates sections 203, 303 or 403 is also subject to criminal 
     fines or imprisonment up to two years or both.
       Section 405 pertains to specific enforcement. Subsection 
     405(a) authorizes U.S. district courts to restrain violations 
     of sections 203, 303 and 403 and to compel the taking of any 
     action required by the Act or the CWC. This provision is 
     modeled after nearly identical language in the TSCA, 15 
     U.S.C. 2616(a)(1)(A) and (C).
       Subsection 405(b) sets forth the venue for bringing the 
     civil action to restrain or compel activities and the 
     localities where process may be served. This provision is 
     modeled after similar language in the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 
     2616(a)(2) (A) and (B). Because the Act applies to the 
     activities of U.S. citizens outside of the United States, 
     service of process is allowed wherever the defendant may be 
     found. (Assistance by other States Parties in serving process 
     would be an example of the legal assistance required pursuant 
     to CWC Article VII(2).)
       Section 406 sets forth additional legal mechanisms for 
     ensuring that the U.S. can fulfill its CWC inspection 
     obligations within the time frames allowed in cases when 
     consent is not given for the inspection or the inspection is 
     otherwise illegally resisted. This section provides for the 
     issuance of search warrants and subpoenas and a prohibition 
     on the use of injunctions by U.S. courts to constrain the 
     conduct of inspections. These legal mechanisms, together with 
     the threat of penalties for violations of section 403, are 
     particularly important in the case of challenge inspections, 
     which may involve facilities or locations that have little or 
     no connection to the CWC. Even in these cases, Part X(38) of 
     the CWC Verification Annex requires the U.S. Government to 
     provide access within the challenged site. In turn, Part 
     X(41) provides that in meeting this requirement the inspected 
     State Party is under the obligation to provide ``the greatest 
     degree of access taking into account any constitutional 
     obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or 
     search and seizures.'' Accordingly, the provisions of Section 
     406 have been drafted to provide the U.S. Government with the 
     legal tools, consistent with the U.S. Constitution, to enable 
     it to fulfill these obligations.
       Subsection 506(a) provides procedures for requesting and 
     issuing a search warrant from any official authorized to 
     issue search warrants in accordance with the Fourth 
     Amendment. These procedures are designed to meet 
     constitutional requirements for the issuance of warrants on 
     the basis of ``administrative probable cause,'' i.e., the 
     standards for issuing warrants under administrative 
     inspections rather than the standards used for criminal 
     searches. (These procedures can also be used to obtain 
     criminal search warrants, however.)
       Under these procedures, the Government must provide to the 
     official authorized to issue search warrants all appropriate 
     information supplied by the Technical Secretariat regarding 
     the basis for the selection of the facility or location, 
     including, for challenge inspections, appropriate evidence or 
     reasons provided by the requesting State Party with regard to 
     its concerns about compliance with the Convention at the 
     facility or location. The Government would also be required 
     to provide any other appropriate information available to 
     it related to the reasonableness of the selection of the 
     location for the inspection.
       Under the procedures, the official authorized to issue 
     search warrants would then be required to promptly issue a 
     warrant authorizing the requested inspection if an affidavit 
     is submitted by the Government showing that the CWC is in 
     force for the United States; the facility sought to be 
     inspected is subject to the specific type of inspection 
     requested; the procedures established under the CWC and the 
     implementing legislation for initiating an inspection have 
     been complied with; and the Government undertakes to ensure 
     that the inspection is conducted in a reasonable manner and 
     will not exceed the scope or duration set forth in or 
     authorized by the CWC or the Act. Persons authorized to issue 
     warrants would include federal magistrates and judges. The 
     warrant must specify the type of inspection authorized; the 
     purpose of the inspection; the type of facility to be 
     inspected; to the extent possible, the items, documents and 
     areas that may be inspected; the earliest commencement and 
     latest concluding dates and times of the inspection; and the 
     identities of the inspection team, if known, and, if 
     applicable, the representatives of the U.S. Government.
       Subsection 406(b) authorizes subpoenas requiring the 
     attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of 
     information, and provides for compelling such action by U.S. 
     district courts. This subsection is intended to ensure that 
     the United States can fulfill its obligation under the CWC to 
     provide information regarding compliance, in particular, its 
     obligation pursuant to CWC Article IX(11)(a) to make every 
     reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with the 
     Convention. This section is based on nearly identical 
     language contained in the TSCA, 15 U.S.C. 2610(c).
       Subsection 406(c) prohibits courts from issuing injunctions 
     or other orders limiting the ability of the Technical 
     Secretariat to conduct inspections or the U.S. Government to 
     facilitate them. If such injunctions or other orders are 
     allowed the United States could be placed in the position of 
     having to violate its obligation to allow inspections. For 
     example, a temporary restraining order blocking an inspection 
     could be issued by a federal court even though a search 
     warrant had been validly authorized pursuant to the Act. Such 
     an action, even if later reversed, might easily keep the 
     United States from granting access to an inspected facility 
     within the two to five days allowed for most routine 
     inspections. A U.S. domestic law example of this provision is 
     the Anti-Injunction Law, 29 U.S.C. 101, which prohibits U.S. 
     courts from issuing injunctions with regard to certain labor 
     disputes.
       Section 407 provides the U.S. Government with the authority 
     to issue such regulations as are necessary to implement the 
     inspection regime created by the CWC and the Act. This 
     section also authorizes the appointment of officials to issue 
     search warrants.
                                  ____

                                                 U.S. Arms Control


                                       and Disarmament Agency,

                                     Washington, DC, May 27, 1994.
     Hon. Albert Gore, Jr.,
     President, U.S. Senate.
       Dear Mr. President: On behalf of the Administration, I 
     hereby submit for consideration the ``Chemical Weapons 
     Convention Implementation Act of 1994.'' The Chemical Weapons 
     Convention (CWC) was signed by the United States in Paris on 
     January 13, 1993, and was submitted by President Clinton to 
     the United States Senate on November 23, 1993, for its advice 
     and consent to ratification. The CWC prohibits, inter alia, 
     the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, 
     retention, and direct or indirect transfer of chemical 
     weapons.
       The President has urged the Senate to provide its advice 
     and consent to ratification as early as possible so that the 
     United States can continue to exercise its leadership role in 
     seeking the earliest possible entry into force of the 
     Convention in January 1995.
       The CWC contains a number of provisions that require 
     implementing legislation to give them effect within the 
     United States. These include: International inspections of 
     U.S. facilities; declarations by U.S. chemical and related 
     industry; and establishment of a ``National Authority'' to 
     serve as the liaison between the United States and the 
     international organization established by the CWC and States 
     Parties to the Convention.
       In addition, the CWC requires the United States to prohibit 
     all individuals and legal entities, such as corporations, 
     within the United States, as well as all individuals outside 
     the United States possessing U.S. citizenship, from engaging 
     in activities that are prohibited under the Convention. As 
     part of this obligation, the CWC requires the U.S. to enact 
     ``penal'' legislation implementing this prohibition (i.e., 
     legislation that penalizes conduct, either by criminal, 
     administrative, military or other sanctions.)
       The proposed ``Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation 
     Act of 1994'' reflects views expressed from representatives 
     of industry as well as from the staff of various 
     congressional committees.
       Expeditious enactment of implementing legislation is very 
     important to the ability of the United States to fulfill its 
     treaty obligations under the Convention. Enactment will 
     enable the United States to collect the required information 
     from industry, to allow the inspections called for in the 
     Convention, and to outlaw all activities related to chemical 
     weapons, except CWC permitted activities, such as chemical 
     defense programs.
       The Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act (OBRA) requires 
     that all revenue and direct spending legislation meet a pay-
     as-you-go requirement. That is, no such bill should result in 
     an increase in the deficit; and if it does, it must trigger a 
     sequester if not fully offset. This proposal would increase 
     receipts by less than $500,000 a year.
       As the President indicated in his transmittal letter of the 
     Convention: ``The CWC is in the best interests of the United 
     States, allied and international security, and enhanced 
     global and regional stability.'' Therefore, I urge the 
     Congress to enact the necessary implementing legislation as 
     soon as possible after the Senate has given its advice and 
     consent to ratification.
       The Office of Management and Budget advises that there is 
     no objection to the submission of this proposal and its 
     enactment is in accord with the President's program.
           Sincerely,
                                                    John D. Holum,
                                                         Director.
                                 ______

      By Mr. MITCHELL (for himself, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Leahy, and Mr. 
        Jeffords):
  S. 2222. A bill to grant the consent of Congress to the Texas Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact; to the Committee on the 
Judiciary.


     texas low-level radioactive waste disposal compact consent act

  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill as 
introduced be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2222

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Texas Low-Level Radioactive 
     Waste Disposal Compact Consent Act''.

     SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDING.

       Congress finds that the compact set forth in section 5 is 
     in furtherance of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act 
     (42 U.S.C. 2021b et seq.).

     SEC. 3. CONDITIONS OF CONSENT TO COMPACT.

       The consent of Congress to the compact set forth in section 
     5--
       (1) shall become effective on the date of the enactment of 
     this Act;
       (2) is granted subject to the provisions of the Low-Level 
     Radioactive Waste Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 2021b et seq.); and
       (3) is granted only for so long as the regional commission 
     established in the compact complies with all of the 
     provisions of such Act.

     SEC. 4. CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW.

       Congress may alter, amend, or repeal this Act with respect 
     to the compact set forth in section 5 after the expiration of 
     the 10-year period following the date of enactment of this 
     Act, and at such intervals thereafter as may be provided in 
     such compact.

     SEC. 5. TEXAS LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE COMPACT.

       (a) Consent of Congress.--In accordance with section 
     4(a)(2) of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act (42 
     U.S.C. 2021d(a)(2)), the consent of Congress is given to the 
     States of Texas, Maine, and Vermont to enter into such 
     compact.
       (b) Text of Compact.--Such compact reads substantially as 
     follows:


          ``TEXAS LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL COMPACT

                    ``ARTICLE I. POLICY AND PURPOSE

       ``Sec. 1.01. The party states recognize a responsibility 
     for each state to seek to manage low-level radioactive waste 
     generated within its boundaries, pursuant to the Low-Level 
     Radioactive Waste Policy Act, as amended by the Low-Level 
     Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (42 U.S.C. 
     2021b-2021j). They also recognize that the United States 
     Congress, by enacting the Act, has authorized and encouraged 
     states to enter into compacts for the efficient management 
     and disposal of low-level radioactive waste. It is the policy 
     of the party states to cooperate in the protection of the 
     health, safety, and welfare of their citizens and the 
     environment and to provide for and encourage the economical 
     management and disposal of low-level radioactive waste. It is 
     the purpose of this compact to provide the framework for such 
     a cooperative effort; to promote the health, safety, and 
     welfare of the citizens and the environment of the party 
     states; to limit the number of facilities needed to 
     effectively, efficiently, and economically manage low-level 
     radioactive waste and to encourage the reduction of the 
     generation thereof; and to distribute the costs, benefits, 
     and obligations among the party states; all in accordance 
     with the terms of this compact.


                       ``ARTICLE II. DEFINITIONS

       ``Sec. 2.01. As used in this compact, unless the context 
     clearly indicates otherwise, the following definitions apply:
       ``(1) `Act' means the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
     Act, as amended by the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
     Amendments Act of 1985 (42 U.S.C. 2021b-2021j).
       ``(2) `Commission' means the Texas Low-Level Radioactive 
     Waste Disposal Compact Commission established in Article III 
     of this compact.
       ``(3) `Compact facility' or `facility' means any site, 
     location, structure, or property located in and provided by 
     the host state for the purpose of management or disposal of 
     low-level radioactive waste for which the party states are 
     responsible.
       ``(4) `Disposal' means the permanent isolation of low-level 
     radioactive waste pursuant to requirements established by the 
     United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the United 
     States Environmental Protection Agency under applicable laws, 
     or by the host state.
       ``(5) `Generate,' when used in relation to low-level 
     radioactive waste, means to produce low-level radioactive 
     waste.
       ``(6) `Generator' means a person who produces or processes 
     low-level radioactive waste in the course of its activities, 
     excluding persons who arrange for the collection, 
     transportation, management, treatment, storage, or disposal 
     of waste generated outside the party states, unless approved 
     by the commission.
       ``(7) `Host county' means a county in the host state in 
     which a disposal facility is located or is being developed.
       ``(8) `Host state' means a party state in which a compact 
     facility is located or is being developed. The State of Texas 
     is the host state under this compact.
       ``(9) `Institutional control period' means that period of 
     time following closure of the facility and transfer of the 
     facility license from the operator to the custodial agency in 
     compliance with the appropriate regulations for long-term 
     observation and maintenance.
       ``(10) `Low-level radioactive waste' has the same meaning 
     as that term is defined in Section 2(9) of the Act (42 U.S.C. 
     2021b(9)), or in the host state statute so long as the waste 
     is not incompatible with management and disposal at the 
     compact facility.
       ``(11) `Management' means collection, consolidation, 
     storage, packaging, or treatment.
       ``(12) `Operator' means a person who operates a disposal 
     facility.
       ``(13) `Party state' means any state that has become a 
     party in accordance with Article VII of this compact. Texas, 
     Maine, and Vermont are initial party states under this 
     compact.
       ``(14) `Person' means an individual, corporation, 
     partnership or other legal entity, whether public or private.
       ``(15) `Transporter' means a person who transports low-
     level radioactive waste.


                     ``ARTICLE III. THE COMMISSION

       ``Sec. 3.01. There is hereby established the Texas Low-
     Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact Commission. The 
     commission shall consist of one voting member from each party 
     state except that the host state shall be entitled to six 
     voting members. Commission members shall be appointed by the 
     party state governors, as provided by the laws of each party 
     state. Each party state may provide alternates for each 
     appointed member.
       ``Sec. 3.02. A quorum of the commission consists of a 
     majority of the members. Except as otherwise provided in this 
     compact, an official act of the commission must receive the 
     affirmative vote of a majority of its members.
       ``Sec. 3.03. The commission is a legal entity separate and 
     distinct from the party states and has governmental immunity 
     to the same extent as an entity created under the authority 
     of Article XVI, Section 59, of the Texas Constitution. 
     Members of the commission shall not be personally liable for 
     actions taken in their official capacity. The liabilities of 
     the commission shall not be deemed liabilities of the party 
     states.
       ``Sec. 3.04. The commission shall:
       ``(1) Compensate its members according to the host state's 
     law.
       ``(2) Conduct its business, hold meetings, and maintain 
     public records pursuant to laws of the host state, except 
     that notice of public meetings shall be given in the non-host 
     party states in accordance with their respective statutes.
       ``(3) Be located in the capital city of the host state.
       ``(4) Meet at least once a year and upon the call of the 
     chair, or any member. The governor of the host state shall 
     appoint a chair and vice-chair.
       ``(5) Keep an accurate account of all receipts and 
     disbursements. An annual audit of the books of the commission 
     shall be conducted by an independent certified public 
     accountant, and the audit report shall be made a part of the 
     annual report of the commission.
       ``(6) Approve a budget each year and establish a fiscal 
     year that conforms to the fiscal year of the host state.
       ``(7) Prepare, adopt, and implement contingency plans for 
     the disposal and management of low-level radioactive waste in 
     the event that the compact facility should be closed. Any 
     plan which requires the host state to store or otherwise 
     manage the low-level radioactive waste from all the party 
     states must be approved by at least four host state members 
     of the commission. The commission, in a contingency plan or 
     otherwise, may not require a non-host party state to store 
     low-level radioactive waste generated outside of the state.
       ``(8) Submit communications to the governors and to the 
     presiding officers of the legislatures of the party states 
     regarding the activities of the commission, including an 
     annual report to be submitted on or before January 31 of each 
     year.
       ``(9) Assemble and make available to the party states, and 
     to the public, information concerning low-level radioactive 
     waste management needs, technologies, and problems.
       ``(10) Keep a current inventory of all generators within 
     the party states, based upon information provided by the 
     party states.
       ``(11) By no later than 180 days after all members of the 
     commission are appointed under Section 3.01 of this article, 
     establish by rule the total volume of low-level radioactive 
     waste that the host state will dispose of in the compact 
     facility in the years 1995-2045, including decommissioning 
     waste. The shipments of low-level radioactive waste from all 
     non-host party states shall not exceed 20 percent of the 
     volume estimated to be disposed of by the host state during 
     the 50-year period. When averaged over such 50-year period, 
     the total of all shipments from non-host party states shall 
     not exceed 20,000 cubic feet a year. The commission shall 
     coordinate the volumes, timing, and frequency of shipments 
     from generators in the non-host party states in order to 
     assure that over the life of this agreement shipments from 
     the non-host party states do not exceed 20 percent of the 
     volume projected by the commission under this paragraph.
       ``Sec. 3.05. The commission may:
       ``(1) Employ staff necessary to carry out its duties and 
     functions. The commission is authorized to use to the extent 
     practicable the services of existing employees of the party 
     states. Compensation shall be as determined by the 
     commission.
       ``(2) Accept any grants, equipment, supplies, materials, or 
     services, conditional or otherwise, from the federal or state 
     government. The nature, amount and condition, if any, of any 
     donation, grant or other resources accepted pursuant to this 
     paragraph and the identity of the donor or grantor shall be 
     detailed in the annual report of the commission.
       ``(3) Enter into contracts to carry out its duties and 
     authority, subject to projected resources. No contract made 
     by the commission shall bind a party state.
       ``(4) Adopt, by a majority vote, bylaws and rules necessary 
     to carry out the terms of this compact. Any rules promulgated 
     by the commission shall be adopted in accordance with the 
     Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act (Article 
     6252-13a, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes).
       ``(5) Sue and be sued and, when authorized by a majority 
     vote of the members, seek to intervene in administrative or 
     judicial proceedings related to this compact.
       ``(6) Enter into an agreement with any person, state, 
     regional body, or group of states for the importation of low-
     level radioactive waste into the compact for management or 
     disposal, provided that the agreement receives a majority 
     vote of the commission. The commission may adopt such 
     conditions and restrictions in the agreement as it deems 
     advisable.
       ``(7) Upon petition, allow an individual generator, a group 
     of generators, or the host state of the compact, to export 
     low-level waste to a low-level radioactive waste disposal 
     facility located outside the party states. The commission may 
     approve the petition only by a majority vote of its members. 
     The permission to export low-level radioactive waste shall be 
     effective for that period of time and for the specified 
     amount of low-level radioactive waste, and subject to any 
     other term or condition, as is determined by the commission.
       ``(8) Monitor the exportation outside of the party states 
     of material, which otherwise meets the criteria of low-level 
     radioactive waste, where the sole purpose of the exportation 
     is to manage or process the material for recycling or waste 
     reduction and return it to the party states for disposal in 
     the compact facility.
       ``Sec. 3.06. Jurisdiction and venue of any action 
     contesting any action of the commission shall be in the 
     United States District Court in the district where the 
     commission maintains its office.


``ARTICLE IV. RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND OBLIGATIONS OF PARTY STATES

       ``Sec. 4.01. The host state shall develop and have full 
     administrative control over the development, management and 
     operation of a facility for the disposal of low-level 
     radioactive waste generated within the party states. The host 
     state shall be entitled to unlimited use of the facility over 
     its operating life. Use of the facility by the non-host party 
     states for disposal of low-level radioactive waste, including 
     such waste resulting from decommissioning of any nuclear 
     electric generation facilities located in the party states, 
     is limited to the volume requirements of Section 3.04(11) of 
     Article III.
       ``Sec. 4.02. Low-level radioactive waste generated within 
     the party states shall be disposed of only at the compact 
     facility, except as provided in Section 3.05(7) of Article 
     III.
       ``Sec. 4.03. The initial states of this compact cannot be 
     members of another low-level radioactive waste compact 
     entered into pursuant to the Act.
       ``Sec. 4.04. The host state shall do the following:
       ``(1) Cause a facility to be developed in a timely manner 
     and operated and maintained through the institutional control 
     period.
       ``(2) Ensure, consistent with any applicable federal and 
     host state laws, the protection and preservation of the 
     environment and the public health and safety in the siting, 
     design, development, licensing, regulation, operation, 
     closure, decommissioning, and long-term care of the disposal 
     facilities within the host state.
       ``(3) Close the facility when reasonably necessary to 
     protect the public health and safety of its citizens or to 
     protect its natural resources from harm. However, the host 
     state shall notify the commission of the closure within three 
     days of its action and shall, within 30 working days of its 
     action, provide a written explanation to the commission of 
     the closure, and implement any adopted contingency plan.
       ``(4) Establish reasonable fees for disposal at the 
     facility of low-level radioactive waste generated in the 
     party states based on disposal fee criteria set out in 
     Sections 402.272 and 402.273, Texas Health and Safety Code. 
     The same fees shall be charged for the disposal of low-level 
     radioactive waste that was generated in the host state and in 
     the non-host party states. Fees shall also be sufficient to 
     reasonably support the activities of the commission.
       ``(5) Submit an annual report to the commission on the 
     status of the facility, including projections of the 
     facility's anticipated future capacity, and on the related 
     funds.
       ``(6) Notify the Commission immediately upon the occurrence 
     of any event which could cause a possible temporary or 
     permanent closure of the facility and identify all reasonable 
     options for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste at 
     alternate compact facilities or, by arrangement and 
     commission vote, at noncompact facilities.
       ``(7) Promptly notify the other party states of any legal 
     action involving the facility.
       ``(8) Identify and regulate, in accordance with federal and 
     host state law, the means and routes of transportation of 
     low-level radioactive waste in the host state.
       ``Sec. 4.05. Each party state shall do the following:
       ``(1) Develop and enforce procedures requiring low-level 
     radioactive waste shipments originating within its borders 
     and destined for the facility to conform to packaging, 
     processing, and waste form specifications of the host state.
       ``(2) Maintain a registry of all generators within the 
     state that may have low-level radioactive waste to be 
     disposed of at a facility, including, but not limited to, the 
     amount of low-level radioactive waste and the class of low-
     level radioactive waste generated by each generator.
       ``(3) Develop and enforce procedures requiring generators 
     within its borders to minimize the volume of low-level 
     radioactive waste requiring disposal. Nothing in this compact 
     shall prohibit the storage, treatment, or management of waste 
     by a generator.
       ``(4) Provide the commission with any data and information 
     necessary for the implementation of the commission's 
     responsibilities, including taking those actions necessary to 
     obtain this data or information.
       ``(5) Pay for community assistance projects designated by 
     the host county in an amount for each non-host party state 
     equal to 10 percent of the payment provided for in Article V 
     for each such state. One-half of the payment shall be due and 
     payable to the host county on the first day of the month 
     following ratification of this compact agreement by Congress 
     and one-half of the payment shall be due and payable on the 
     first day of the month following the approval of a facility 
     operating license by the host state's regulatory body.
       ``(6) Provide financial support for the commission's 
     activities prior to the date of facility operation and 
     subsequent to the date of congressional ratification of this 
     compact under Section 7.07 of Article VII. Each party state 
     will be responsible for annual payments equalling its pro-
     rata share of the commission's expenses, incurred for 
     administrative, legal, and other purposes of the commission.
       ``(7) If agreed by all parties to a dispute, submit the 
     dispute to arbitration or other alternate dispute resolution 
     process. If arbitration is agreed upon, the governor of each 
     party state shall appoint an arbitrator. If the number of 
     party states is an even number, the arbitrators so chosen 
     shall appoint an additional arbitrator. The determination of 
     a majority of the arbitrators shall be binding on the party 
     states. Arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in 
     accordance with the provisions of 9 U.S.C. Sections 1 to 16. 
     If all parties to a dispute do not agree to arbitration or 
     alternate dispute resolution process, the United States 
     District Court in the district where the commission maintains 
     its office shall have original jurisdiction over any action 
     between or among parties to this compact.
       ``(8) Provide on a regular basis to the commission and host 
     state:
       ``(A) an accounting of waste shipped and proposed to be 
     shipped to the compact facility, by volume and curies;
       ``(B) proposed transportation methods and routes; and
       ``(C) proposed shipment schedules.
       ``(9) Seek to join in any legal action by or against the 
     host state to prevent nonparty states or generators from 
     disposing of low-level radioactive waste at the facility.
       ``Sec. 4.06. Each party state shall act in good faith and 
     may rely on the good faith performance of the other party 
     states regarding requirements of this compact.


                 ``ARTICLE V. PARTY STATE CONTRIBUTIONS

       ``Sec. 5.01. Each party state, except the host state, shall 
     contribute a total of $25 million to the host state. Payments 
     shall be deposited in the host state treasury to the credit 
     of the low-level waste fund in the following manner except as 
     otherwise provided. Not later than the 60th day after the 
     date of congressional ratification of this compact, each non-
     host party state shall pay to the host state $12.5 million. 
     Not later than the 60th day after the date of the opening of 
     the compact facility, each non-host party state shall pay to 
     the host state an additional $12.5 million.
       ``Sec. 5.02. As an alternative, the host state and the non-
     host states may provide for payments in the same total amount 
     as stated above to be made to meet the principal and interest 
     expense associated with the bond indebtedness or other form 
     of indebtedness issued by the appropriate agency of the host 
     state for purposes associated with the development, 
     operation, and post-closure monitoring of the compact 
     facility. In the event the member states proceed in this 
     manner, the payment schedule shall be determined in 
     accordance with the schedule of debt repayment. This schedule 
     shall replace the payment schedule described in Section 5.01 
     of this article.


              ``ARTICLE VI. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PENALTIES

       ``Sec. 6.01. No person shall dispose of low-level 
     radioactive waste generated within the party states unless 
     the disposal is at the compact facility, except as otherwise 
     provided in Section 3.05(7) of Article III.
       ``Sec. 6.02. No person shall manage or dispose of any low-
     level radioactive waste within the party states unless the 
     low-level radioactive waste was generated within the party 
     states, except as provided in Section 3.05(6) of Article III. 
     Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the storage or 
     management of low-level radioactive waste by a generator, nor 
     its disposal pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Part 20.302.
       ``Sec. 6.03. Violations of this article may result in 
     prohibiting the violator from disposing of low-level 
     radioactive waste in the compact facility, or in the 
     imposition of penalty surcharges on shipments to the 
     facility, as determined by the commission.


 ``ARTICLE VII. ELIGIBILITY, ENTRY INTO EFFECT; CONGRESSIONAL CONSENT; 
                         WITHDRAWAL; EXCLUSION

       ``Sec. 7.01. The states of Texas, Maine, and Vermont are 
     party states to this compact. Any other state may be made 
     eligible for party status by a majority vote of the 
     commission and ratification by the legislature of the host 
     state, subject to fulfillment of the rights of the initial 
     non-host party states under Section 3.04(11) of Article III 
     and Section 4.01 of Article IV, and upon compliance with 
     those terms and conditions for eligibility that the host 
     state may establish. The host state may establish all terms 
     and conditions for the entry of any state, other than the 
     states named in this section, as a member of this compact; 
     provided, however, the specific provisions of this compact, 
     except for those pertaining to the composition of the 
     commission and those pertaining to Section 7.09 of this 
     article, may not be changed except upon ratification by the 
     legislatures of the party states.
       ``Sec. 7.02. Upon compliance with the other provisions of 
     this compact, a state made eligible under Section 7.01 of 
     this article may become a party state by legislative 
     enactment of this compact or by executive order of the 
     governor of the state adopting this compact. A state becoming 
     a party state by executive order shall cease to be a party 
     state upon adjournment of the first general session of its 
     legislature convened after the executive order is issued, 
     unless before the adjournment, the legislature enacts this 
     compact.
       ``Sec. 7.03. Any party state may withdraw from this compact 
     by repealing enactment of this compact subject to the 
     provisions herein. In the event the host state allows an 
     additional state or additional states to join the compact, 
     the host state's legislature, without the consent of the non-
     host party states, shall have the right to modify the 
     composition of the commission so that the host state shall 
     have a voting majority on the commission, provided, however, 
     that any modification maintains the right of each initial 
     party state to retain one voting member on the commission.
       ``Sec. 7.04. If the host state withdraws from the compact, 
     the withdrawal shall not become effective until five years 
     after enactment of the repealing legislation and the non-host 
     party states may continue to use the facility during that 
     time. The financial obligation of the non-host party states 
     under Article V shall cease immediately upon enactment of the 
     repealing legislation. If the host state withdraws from the 
     compact or abandons plans to operate a facility prior to the 
     date of any non-host party state payment under Sections 
     4.05(5) and (6) of Article IV or Article V, the non-host 
     party states are relieved of any obligations to make the 
     contributions. This section sets out the exclusive remedies 
     for the non-host party states if the host state withdraws 
     from the compact or is unable to develop and operate a 
     compact facility.
       ``Sec. 7.05. A party state, other than the host state, may 
     withdraw from the compact by repealing the enactment of this 
     compact, but this withdrawal shall not become effective until 
     two years after the effective date of the repealing 
     legislation. During this two-year period the party state will 
     continue to have access to the facility. The withdrawing 
     party shall remain liable for any payments under Sections 
     4.05(5) and (6) of Article IV that were due during the two-
     year period, and shall not be entitled to any refund of 
     payments previously made.
       ``Sec. 7.06. Any party state that substantially fails to 
     comply with the terms of the compact or to fulfill its 
     obligations hereunder may have its membership in the compact 
     revoked by a seven-eighths vote of the commission following 
     notice that a hearing will be scheduled not less than six 
     months from the date of the notice. In all other respects, 
     revocation proceedings undertaken by the commission will be 
     subject to the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register 
     Act (Article 6252-13a, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes), except 
     that a party state may appeal the commission's revocation 
     decision to the United States District Court in accordance 
     with Section 3.06 of Article III. Revocation shall take 
     effect one year from the date such party state receives 
     written notice from the commission of a final action. Written 
     notice of revocation shall be transmitted immediately 
     following the vote of the commission, by the chair, to the 
     governor of the affected party state, all other governors of 
     party states, and to the United States Congress.
       ``Sec. 7.07. This compact shall take effect following its 
     enactment under the laws of the host state and any other 
     party state and thereafter upon the consent of the United 
     States Congress and shall remain in effect until otherwise 
     provided by federal law. If Texas and either Maine or Vermont 
     ratify this compact, the compact shall be in full force and 
     effect as to Texas and the other ratifying state, and this 
     compact shall be interpreted as follows:
       ``(1) Texas and the other ratifying state are the initial 
     party states.
       ``(2) The commission shall consist of two voting members 
     from the other ratifying state and six from Texas.
       ``(3) Each party state is responsible for its pro-rata 
     share of the commission's expenses.
       ``Sec. 7.08. This compact is subject to review by the 
     United States Congress and the withdrawal of the consent of 
     Congress every five years after its effective date, pursuant 
     to federal law.
       ``Sec. 7.09. The host state legislature, with the approval 
     of the governor, shall have the right and authority, without 
     the consent of the non-host party states, to modify the 
     provisions contained in Section 3.04(11) of Article III to 
     comply with Section 402.219(c)(1), Texas Health & Safety 
     Code, as long as the modification does not impair the rights 
     of the initial non-host party states.


             ``ARTICLE VIII. CONSTRUCTION AND SEVERABILITY

       ``Sec. 8.01. The provisions of this compact shall be 
     broadly construed to carry out the purposes of the compact, 
     but the sovereign powers of a party shall not be infringed 
     upon unnecessarily.
       ``Sec. 8.02. This compact does not affect any judicial 
     proceeding pending on the effective date of this compact.
       ``Sec. 8.03. No party state acquires any liability, by 
     joining this compact, resulting from the siting, operation, 
     maintenance, long-term care or any other activity relating to 
     the compact facility. No non-host party state shall be liable 
     for any harm or damage from the siting, operation, 
     maintenance, or long-term care relating to the compact 
     facility. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this 
     compact, nothing in this compact shall be construed to alter 
     the incidence of liability of any kind for any act or failure 
     to act. Generators, transporters, owners and operators of 
     facility shall be liable for their acts, omissions, conduct 
     or relationships in accordance with applicable law. By 
     entering into this compact and securing the ratification by 
     Congress of its terms, no party state acquires a potential 
     liability under section 5(d)(2)(C) of the Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 
     2021e(d)(2)(C)) that did not exist prior to entering into 
     this compact.
       ``Sec. 8.04. If a party state withdraws from the compact 
     pursuant to Section 7.03 of Article VII or has its membership 
     in this compact revoked pursuant to section 7.06 of Article 
     VII, the withdrawal or revocation shall not affect any 
     liability already incurred by or chargeable to the affected 
     state under Section 8.03 of this article.
       ``Sec. 8.05. The provisions of this compact shall be 
     severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision 
     of this compact is declared by a court of competent 
     jurisdiction to be contrary to the constitution of any 
     participating state or of the United States or the 
     applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or 
     circumstances is held invalid, the validity of the remainder 
     of this compact and the applicability thereof to any 
     government, agency, person, or circumstance shall not be 
     affected thereby to the extent the remainder can in all 
     fairness be given effect. If any provision of this compact 
     shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state 
     participating therein, the compact shall remain in full force 
     and effect as to the state affected as to all severable 
     matters.
       ``Sec. 8.06. Nothing in this compact diminishes or 
     otherwise impairs the jurisdiction, authority, or discretion 
     of either of the following:
       ``(1) the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
     pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 
     U.S.C. Sec. 2011 et seq.); or
       ``(2) an agreement state under section 274 of the Atomic 
     Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2021).
       ``Sec. 8.07. Nothing in this compact confers any new 
     authority on the states or commission to do any of the 
     following:
       ``(1) Regulate the packaging or transportation of low-level 
     radioactive waste in a manner inconsistent with the 
     regulations of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 
     Commission or the United States Department of Transportation.
       ``(2) Regulate health, safety, or environmental hazards 
     from source, by-product, or special nuclear material.
       ``(3) Inspect the activities of licensees of the agreement 
     states or of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 
     Commission.''.

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I rise in support of S. 2222, the Texas 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compact, which establishes a 
formal waste agreement between the States of Vermont, Maine, and Texas.
  While I would prefer to be supporting a measure that represents a 
perfect solution for our Nation's low-level waste problem--something 
that gets rid of low-level waste permanently without affecting a single 
American--this alternative does not exist. Therefore, I rise to support 
the best solution available.
  This issue is not an easy one, and I am still looking for 
improvements to the established system. I have joined several of my 
colleagues in support of a Presidential blueribbon commission to look 
critically at the generation, classification, storage, and disposal of 
radioactive waste in this country. I hope that this effort will provide 
some improvements to the current way that we deal with this issue.
  However, given the current authority established by Congress in the 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, the Texas-
Vermont-Maine compact is a remarkably good one. The bill we are 
introducing today represents the 10th low-level waste trade compact to 
be considered by Congress. With the ratification of this compact, 45 
States will be members of multistate low-level waste storage agreements 
which nearly completes the process that Congress established in 1985.
  This bill also assures that Vermont's waste will be stored in one of 
the safest sites available. The planned storage facility is in a 
geologically stable area that receives less than 12 inches of rainfall 
per year and has an evapo-transpiration rate of 70 inches a year. Less 
than one inch of water runs off the land annually, and groundwater is 
more than 700 feet below the surface.
  The compact minimizes the impact of waste disposal on the American 
people. The planned site is on marginal range that supports about one 
head of cattle per 100 acres and has a population of less than 1 person 
per 1,000 acres. The State of Texas has ensured that the facility will 
comply with the strict terms of the President's Executive order on 
environmental equity. The facility will be built to the highest 
standard using the best technology available.
  In addition, the bill solves several financial, legal, and 
environmental problems for the State of Vermont. In ratifying this 
compact we protect Vermont from hostile influxes of waste that would be 
possible if Vermont built its own facility independently and we meet 
the intent of Federal law. The State of Vermont has avoided large 
capital costs by participating actively in this planning process. It is 
my understanding that another State, by comparison, offered Texas 
$100,000,000 to join the compact and was turned away. States that do 
not have a compact at this point find themselves on a difficult 
situation. Some of these States have passed up opportunities that may 
compromise their ability to deal safely with low-level radioactive 
waste.
  Finally, the compact represents the clear political will of all three 
States. Engineers, planners, community activists, geologists, State 
officials and many others have participated in a democratic process. 
These and other stakeholders will continue to be involved as the 
project progresses. The Vermont State Legislature passed this compact 
on April 20, 1994, and the Governor signed the bill the following day. 
The bill honors the hard work, commitment, and support that our States 
have demonstrated toward this compact.
  I want to thank the majority leader for introducing this legislation 
and I am willing to lend my support to this bill. I also want to thank 
the Senators from Texas for supporting their State in Congress on this 
issue. I hope the Judiciary Committee can review the bill expeditiously 
and return it to the floor for final passage in the 103d Congress.
                                 ______

      By Mr. KOHL (for himself and Mr. Feingold):
  S. 2223. A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize 
the Secretary of Defense to provide assistance to promote public 
participation in defense environmental restoration activities; to the 
Committee on Armed Services.


        defense environmental clean-up technical assistance act

  Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, Defense toxic waste sites are a lingering 
legacy threatening local communities across the country and in my State 
of Wisconsin. As the Defense Department downsizes or closes bases, 
there is a growing fear among citizens that environmental cleanup of 
toxic waste sites will be rushed and that, faced with tight budgets, 
the Defense Department may make decisions about the clean-up of these 
sites which are detrimental to the health and well-being of citizens 
living nearby. This fear has become even more acute with the 
realization that the cost of cleaning up the 15,000 plus Defense toxic 
waste sites across the country could cost as must as $25 billion.
  The legislation I am introducing today, along with Senator Feingold, 
attempts to protect the interests of local communities in the cleanup 
process and give them the means to participate in the difficult 
decisions about environmental cleanup which lie ahead.
  Two years ago, all the parties involved in the cleanup of Federal 
environmental contamination came together under the auspices of the 
Keystone Foundation. For the first time, Federal, State, local, and 
Indian tribal officials, and community, environmental, and labor 
organizations, came up with a series of recommendations acceptable to 
everyone to improve public participation in the cleanup of these 
hazardous sites. These recommendations can be found in the Interim 
Report of The Federal Facilities Environmental Restoration Dialogue 
Committee.
  The Defense Department endorsed the Keystone recommendations and has 
been working to implement them.
  The cornerstone of this effort is the creation of restoration 
advisory boards at each installation. These boards are made up of 
community members selected to give local input on cleanup issues to the 
Federal agency having jurisdiction over the site. In a pilot program 
the Defense Department has directed each of the services to assist 
communities in setting up restoration advisory boards at five 
installations with environmental contamination.
  In an effort to make these boards more independent and give them 
credibility in their communities, the Keystone participants recommended 
that the Federal agencies provide technical assistance grants to the 
boards, much like EPA does at Superfund sites, so the boards can hire 
experts to help them understand complex environmental impact statements 
and technical and engineering information provided to them by the 
Federal Government.
  Although the Defense Department has been committed to the Keystone 
process, it has refused to provide technical assistance grants. I 
believe this is a serious mistake which could undermine the 
independence and the credibility of these boards in their own 
communities.
  This legislation puts into statute the establishment of restoration 
advisory boards by the Defense Department and lays out criteria for the 
makeup of these boards. Most important, however, it requires that the 
Defense Department provide small grants to the restoration advisory 
boards of $100,000 or one-tenth of 1 percent of the total cost of 
cleaning up the facility, whichever works out to be less, to allow them 
to obtain technical assistance.

  By limiting the amount which would go to each community and setting a 
cap on overall spending for technical assistance grants, the bill does 
not direct significant funds away from cleanup itself.
  This bill will not delay cleanup of bases, rather it will facilitate 
environmental cleanup. By ensuring that the views of local citizens can 
be heard, we can prevent strained relations between civilians and the 
military and the delays that often arise because of these tensions.
  This bill is not designed to fund more studies. I think we all agree 
that there have been plenty of studies.
  Finally, this bill would not require new spending. Instead, it 
designates one-quarter of 1 percent from the Defense Environmental 
Restoration Account and the 1990 Base Realignment and Closure Account 
or $7.5 million, whichever works out to be less, for this purpose.
  Mr. President, this is a small price to pay for peace of mind. And, 
in the long run, investing the local community in the cleanup process 
will save millions of dollars that might have been spent in litigation 
down the road.
  This bill could have tremendous impact across the country. In my own 
State, there are 278 contaminated sites at 47 bases and formerly used 
Defense sites.
  Badger Army Ammunition Plant which is located in Baraboo, WI, is one 
of five installations designated by the Army to participate in the 
pilot program to implement the Keystone recommendations. Subsequent to 
its selection, a restoration advisory board made up of a cross-section 
of citizens who have been affected or could be affected by the 
environmental contamination at Badger was created to provide policy and 
technical advice on key cleanup decisions.
  The board at Badger has been frustrated by its inability to receive a 
technical assistance grant from the Department of Defense to hire 
independent technical advisors. Instead, the Army has encouraged the 
board to use the technical advisors employed by the Army. Yet, the 
environmental contractors working for the Army are not permitted to 
speak directly to members of the board when they have questions. All 
questions have to go through the Army.
  Although I have no doubt that the Army is operating in good faith, 
preventing the restoration advisory board from receiving independent 
guidance on technical matters violates the spirit of the Keystone 
process and puts the entire credibility of the board at stake. Our 
legislation would correct this problem.
  Similar legislation has been introduced in the House by 
Representative Underwood from Guam and I want to commend him for his 
work on this issue. He was successful in having a similar provision 
adopted in the House version of the Defense authorization bill.
  This bill is about empowering citizens who have taken on the 
difficult task of working side-by-side with the military to make sure 
that clean really means clean. Above all, this bill is about building 
trust between the Federal Government and our local communities.
  Mr. President, I want to alert my colleagues to my intention to offer 
this bill as an amendment to the Defense authorization bill. I urge my 
colleagues to support this effort so we can get on with the business of 
cleaning up our bases and making our communities, the water, the soil, 
and the air, safe for our children.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am very pleased to join with my friend 
and colleague Senator Kohl in introducing legislation to authorize the 
Secretary of Defense to provide assistance to promote public 
participation in defense environmental restoration activities.
  Mr. President, I believe legislation such as this will provide a 
greater opportunity for local community members to play an active and 
informed role in environmental restoration activities at nearby Defense 
installations.
  Currently, while the Department of Defense is participating in the 
Keystone Federal Facilities Environmental Restoration Committee which 
has been instrumental in opening the doors to greater local community 
involvement in restoration activities through the use of restoration 
advisory boards, one important piece is missing.
  Mr. President, I would like to use as an example a recent request to 
the Department of Defense made by members of the Site Specific Advisory 
Board at the Badger Army Ammunition Plant in Baraboo, WI.
  This board which has input into ongoing restoration activities at the 
plant is exclusively made up of community members. Given the technical 
nature of environmental remediation, monitoring, and planning, the 
board requested funds to employ an independent technical adviser to 
assist them in providing and explaining technical information. This 
request was denied.
  I wrote to the Department of Defense on the board's behalf asking 
that the Department reconsider this position. The Department again 
responded in the negative.
  Mr. President, given the technical nature of both on-site 
environmental restoration and of regulatory process, the Keystone 
report recommended that technical assistance funding be provided to 
nongovernmental advisory board members to help ensure more effective 
and meaningful participation, especially as it relates to SSAB [site 
specific advisory board] review and comment on technical reports and 
documents being developed by the Federal facility managers and their 
contractors.
  The EPA has authority to provide technical assistance grants to 
communities near national priorities list [NPL] sites under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. I 
believe this possibility of technical assistance funding is essential 
in assuring fully informed community involvement, and that advisory 
boards which are located near non-NPL Defense sites should have the 
same access to such funds through the Department of Defense.
  Mr. President, individuals should have a voice in cleanup activities 
which are taking place in their backyards. They are the most invested 
in seeing that remediation takes place in a responsible and efficient 
matter, because it is their health and the health of their children at 
stake if it is not. These individuals should not only have a voice, but 
the tools needed for an informed collective voice. I believe the 
legislation offered by Senator Kohl and myself today will help to make 
that more possible.
                                 ______

      By Mr. MOYNIHAN (for himself, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Breaux, Mr. 
        Daschle, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Kennedy, and Mr. Rockefeller) (by 
        request):
  S. 2224. A bill to amend the Social Security Act, the Food Stamp Act 
of 1977, and other relevant statutes to redesign the program of aid to 
families with dependent children to establish a program that provides 
time-limited, transitional assistance, prepares individuals for and 
requires employment, prevents dependency, and overhauls the child 
support enforcement mechanism at both the Federal and State levels, and 
for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.


                  work and responsibility act of 1994

  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, along with the Majority Leader Mitchell 
and Senators Breaux, Daschle, Dodd, and Kennedy, I am today introducing 
the Work and Responsibility Act of 1994 at the request of President 
Clinton.
  The President's proposal builds on the Family Support Act which this 
body passed 5 years ago. Governor Clinton, as head of the National 
Governors' Association, was a key supporter of that legislation. The 
early returns from States like California and Florida suggest that the 
program is working exactly as intended--earnings are up and welfare 
costs are down. The major disappointment is that the States have had 
trouble coming up with the funds to draw down all of the available 
Federal dollars. The new proposal increases Federal funding, and 
reduces the required State match, so that a much larger portion of the 
caseload should be able to enter school, or job training, or otherwise 
start down the road to self-sufficiency.
  The new plan emphasizes employment. ``Work is the best social program 
this country ever devised,'' President Clinton said last Thursday at 
the Commerce Bank in Kansas City in announcing his plan to submit this 
legislation. This Congress has already increased work incentives for 
welfare recipients with last year's expansion of the earned income tax 
credit, and the incentives will be even stronger when we pass universal 
health coverage. Under the President's welfare plan, most recipients 
will have to go to work after they have been on the rolls for 2 years. 
For job-ready individuals, job search will become the first priority. 
And states will be allowed to increase work incentives in their welfare 
programs.
  The President directly addresses the problem of out-of-wedlock 
births. In Kansas City last Thursday, he predicted that within 10 
years, unless current trends are reversed, ``more than half of our 
children will be born in homes where there has never been a marriage.'' 
Reversing these trends won't be easy, but nothing is as important. ``No 
nation'' said the President ``has ever found a substitute for the 
family.'' For a young woman who is thinking of having a baby and going 
on welfare, the new plan contains a simple message: you will have to 
live at home and stay in school, and after you graduate, you will have 
to go to work.
  There are also some bold changes to increase child support payments--
``the toughest child support enforcement measures in the history of 
this country,'' according to the President. The plan sets up a new 
system of paternity establishment to enforce the responsibility of both 
parents from the moment the child is born. It involves the IRS in 
tracking delinquent parents from the moment they start a new job. And 
it includes new provisions to ensure that parents don't avoid their 
responsibility by crossing State lines.
  No doubt there will be criticisms of the President's bill; complaints 
that he went too far, or that he did not go far enough. What matters is 
that, as in 1988, a broad consensus has developed around a few basic 
points--that all recipients should have access to the education and 
training they need, that after that they should go to work, preferably 
in the private sector but in a public job if necessary, and that we 
must redouble our efforts to stop the rise in teenage pregnancy which 
has done so much to increase welfare caseloads. If you look at the 
major bills that have been introduced in the House and the Senate, what 
stands out are the similarities, not the differences. If we can focus 
on the areas of agreement, I believe we can put together a bipartisan 
coalition in favor of the kind of work-oriented system that the great 
majority of Americans support.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, last week President Clinton announced a 
sweeping welfare reform plan that will make welfare receipt temporary. 
Ending the cycle of dependency will end welfare as we know it.
  Under the President's plan, from day one, welfare parents will be 
required to develop an employability plan. That plan will serve as a 
blueprint for self-sufficiency.
  Those parents who are job-ready will join a job search program. 
Anyone offered a job, will be required to take it. For those welfare 
parents not job-ready, they will be required to participate in the Job 
Opportunities and Basic Skills Program, known as JOBS, where they will 
receive the education and skill training necessary to become 
employable.
  Under current law, few AFDC parents of young children participate in 
the JOBS Program. Under the Clinton plan, AFDC parents of children age 
one or older will be required to participate in JOBS. For mothers who 
have additional children while receiving AFDC, they will be required to 
participate in JOBS once their new baby is 3 months of age.
  For AFDC parents who have not found employment within 2 years, they 
will be required to work for their benefits in a newly created WORK 
Program. While States will have flexibility in designing WORK Programs, 
the basic concept is that the WORK Program will be a work-for-wages 
plan, so that AFDC parents receive money only for hours actually 
worked.
  To ensure that parents can participate in the JOBS and WORK Programs, 
child care assistance will be provided.
  The Clinton plan focuses on young unwed mothers. Studies have long 
shown that young women who become mothers as teenagers are likely to 
remain on welfare for the longest period of time. They are more likely 
to drop out of high school, have no work training or job skills, and 
over their lifetime represent the bulk of the cost to the welfare 
system.
  Under the Clinton plan, AFDC parents under 20 years of age who do not 
have a high school degree will be required to participate in the JOBS 
Program once their baby is 3 months of age.
  States will have the flexibility to adopt sanctions or incentives to 
boost teen school attendance. For teen parents who attend high school 
regularly, States could provide a bonus payment. For teen parents who 
drop out of high school or who miss more than a few days, their AFDC 
benefit could be reduced.
  In addition, teen parents will be required to live at home or in a 
supervised group setting.
  The Clinton plan is tough on deadbeat parents. I think we all agree 
that raising a child is a financial responsibility for both the mother 
and the father. For too long, too many noncustodial parents have walked 
away from their financial responsibility.
  Under the Clinton plan, the child support enforcement system will be 
simplified and streamlined. For mothers applying for AFDC, they will be 
required to provide paternity information to the State in order to 
qualify for benefits.
  Those parents owing child support who don't make their payments will 
be subject to tough sanctions. States will be allowed to suspend 
occupational and professional licenses as well as drivers' licenses of 
deadbeat parents. Since this law was enacted in Maine last year, about 
8,700 delinquent parents have paid over $10 million in past-due 
support.
  Interstate child support enforcement is nearly impossible today. 
Under the Clinton plan, States will be required to adopt uniform rules 
to ensure that child support is paid regardless of the State in which 
parents decide to live.
  There has been criticism of the Clinton plan in the papers recently 
because the President has chosen to target initial resources in his 
bill to mothers born after 1971. This criticism is unfounded.
  Welfare reform is not a new objective. Every President since Dwight 
Eisenhower has made welfare reform a priority. But eliminating poverty 
in the United States has proven an elusive goal and welfare caseloads 
and costs have risen steadily.
  The Aid to Dependent Children Program that President Roosevelt 
created was designed primarily for widows with young children. Today, 
very few of these households are now headed by widows. Most are 
unmarried mothers or divorced or separated mothers.
  Women who gave birth as teenagers make up nearly half of the AFDC 
caseload. Because they lack education and job skills, they represent 
the long-term costs of the AFDC Program and they are the mothers who 
make welfare a way of life. By targeting mothers under 25, the Clinton 
plan seeks to end the cycle of dependency that young mothers create.
  At State option, a larger segment of the welfare population, in fact, 
all applicants, can be required to participate in the WORK Program and 
work for their benefits. I believe that this is fair. The Clinton plan 
targets the population most likely to represent the long-term cost of 
the welfare system. States are given the flexibility to enlarge the 
population affected by the new rules.
  With all the criticism from Governors about Congress enacting large 
unfunded mandates, I believe that the Clinton plan offers a realistic 
strategy. Requiring participation in the JOBS Program or the WORK 
Program, for those who haven't found employment, is not free. It will 
cost the Federal and State governments some money to provide child care 
to ensure that welfare parents can participate in these programs.
  It will cost the Federal and State governments some money to fund 
education or job training programs and ultimately the WORK Program to 
ensure that AFDC parents are either getting the skills that they need 
to become employable or are in a workfare type program. To ensure that 
Congress is not passing on a large unfunded mandate to the States, I 
believe that the Clinton bill is a sound plan.
  Welfare receipt ought to be temporary, given during times of 
financial crisis for a family, not a way of life as it has become for 
too many families. For those who can work, they ought to be required to 
work.
  But, one of the largest barriers that many women with children face 
as they seek to leave the welfare rolls is the absence of health care. 
A family on AFDC automatically qualifies for Medicaid, the health 
insurance program for the poor. But, many low paying jobs, the jobs 
that most welfare recipients may qualify for, don't carry health 
insurance.
  This means that the first time this family has a health problem, the 
likelihood that the family returns to the welfare rolls is quite good.
  Universal health care coverage is part of the President's health care 
plan. While there might be many changes in the President's health care 
plan before it's enacted, universal coverage is critical to making work 
pay and helping families become and stay self-sufficient.
  Health care coverage is a critical part of welfare reform. Poor women 
and children currently on welfare have little chance to make it on 
their own off welfare if they don't have health care coverage.
  During the next several months, there will be much debate about 
welfare reform in the Congress and in the States. There is no magic 
wand to turn welfare recipients into wage earning recipients. There is 
no panacea to fixing our Nation's welfare system.
  If we provide health insurance to all Americans, if we improve the 
child support system, and if we work to promote more personal 
responsibility among our Nation's youth, we can truly reform our 
Nation's welfare system. We can ``end welfare as we know it''.
  Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, the welfare system in this country is 
failing all of us. It is failing the working people whose tax dollars 
pay for it and it is failing the poor, who it was intended to help.
  Even worse, it has corrosive effects on individual self-sufficiency 
and family structure and traps them into an endless cycle. Too often 
welfare condemns families to a repeating cycle of poverty and 
hopelessness that is passed from one generation to the next.
  Poverty and long-term dependence on welfare are critical issues in 
this country. In 1992, the number of people living in poverty reached 
37 million Americans--it grew by 5.4 million people over just 3 years. 
At the same time, the number of out-of-wedlock births has increased to 
epidemic proportions.
  In my State of Louisiana, almost one-third of all children live in 
poverty. In Orleans Parish alone, nearly half of all children alive 
today--46 percent live in poverty. It's not hard to see that welfare 
reform is a pressing issue in Louisiana because the lives of so many 
Louisiana citizens are shaped by the broken welfare system and the 
poisonous culture that it creates.
  That is why I am an original cosponsor of the bill being introduced 
today. I am especially pleased to join with the chairman of the Senate 
Finance Committee, Senator Moynihan, who has long been a leader on this 
issue, and with Senate Majority Leader Mitchell.
  President Clinton promised to ``end welfare as we know it'' and this 
bill demonstrates that he is honoring that commitment. He has done 
something that is extremely difficult to do. He has sent us a plan that 
is truly dramatic in its reach--from the very beginning welfare will 
become a transitional system leading to work. At the same time, he has 
structured the reforms in a way that is practical and workable.
  To me ``ending welfare as we know it'' does not mean mindlessly 
slashing welfare programs to save tax dollars. It means alleviating 
poverty and welfare dependency, not just for welfare recipients, but 
for the ``working poor.'' And most importantly, it means a long-term 
commitment to putting poor Americans to work and helping them resolve 
the circumstances that made them poor in the first place.
  We must help the growing numbers of welfare dependent individuals. 
They must be given a chance, and strongly helped and encouraged to 
enter the economic mainstream of this country. Work and responsibility 
must be rewarded in the welfare system and a refusal to live by the 
rules that working people live by ought not to be rewarded.
  President Clinton's plan says that after a period of 2 years AFDC 
recipients should no longer be eligible for welfare payments. Instead 
they should be placed in jobs in the private sector or, where 
necessary, into community service jobs. Welfare would be transformed 
into a temporary program for individuals who will soon be returning to 
the work force. Those who aren't willing to work or go through job 
training could no longer receive benefits forever.
  The proposal will also reinforce the concept of parental 
responsibility by toughening the enforcement of child-support 
obligations and holding absent fathers responsible for their fair share 
of supporting the children that they bring into the world.
  Last year we started the process of reforming welfare by expanding 
and simplifying the Earned Income Tax Credit. This will help working 
families stay out of poverty and, as the President has promised to do, 
make work pay. Health care reform is also a critical piece of 
comprehensive welfare reform. Right now, too many poor Americans are 
forced with the loss of health insurance should they choose to take a 
job and get off of welfare. This penalty for working needs to be 
eliminated and we are well on the road to making the needed changes.
  Welfare reform legislation should be looked at as one of the critical 
pieces of an overall domestic agenda that will help all working 
families, all of those too often forgotten Americans who work hard and 
play by the rules. Other major pieces of this agenda include the crime 
bill, which is now in conference, and the $500 billion dollar deficit 
reduction bill we passed last year, which has succeeded in keeping 
interest rates down so that millions of Americans have been able to 
refinance their mortgages and keep a little bit more of their own hard-
earned money. Inflation is also down and job creation is on the rise.
  Reaching a consensus on how to solve this problem won't be easy. In 
past welfare reform efforts, conservatives have argued for less 
spending on welfare without making fundamental changes in how welfare 
works. Liberals have, too often, simply argued for more resources 
without making fundamental changes either.
  The arguments have mostly been over less of the same or more of the 
same. This is too simple--the existing welfare system needs to be 
replaced with a work-based social policy that reinforces mainstream 
values by rewarding individual initiative, expanding opportunities for 
self-sufficiency and, in return, demanding responsible behavior on the 
part of recipients.
  The proposal that President Clinton has sent us would achieve these 
goals and he is to be commended for his commitment to this vital issue. 
He has sent us a bill that contains the vital elements of real reform 
and I, for one, am eager to get started on it.
 Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I rise today as a proud cosponsor of 
President Clinton's welfare reform bill. I see it as an excellent 
starting point to what I hope will prove to be a constructive debate. I 
wanted to take this opportunity to share with my colleagues a statement 
I delivered when the President unveiled his proposal last week:
  For me, the entire debate over welfare reform orbits this one word, 
responsibility: Our responsibility as teenagers not to bring kids into 
the world if we can't care for them; our responsibility as fathers not 
to walk away from the kids we do create; our responsibility as adults 
to work and earn a paycheck; our responsibility as a private sector to 
create jobs; and our responsibility as a government to help people on 
welfare find their way to those jobs.
  It is time for all of us to meet these responsibilities. It is time 
for all of us to save the children who are suffering today because we 
haven't.


                        personal responsibility

  When I think about the importance of responsibility, I think of a 
young woman I met in Bridgeport, CT, when I was touring the Private 
Industry Council job training program there. I spoke with a welfare 
mother sitting behind a computer terminal, trying to learn a trade. I 
asked her why she was there, why she was working so hard to find a job 
rather than simply staying on welfare.
  She paused for a while after I asked the question and then looked me 
straight in the eye: ``Mr. politician,'' she said, ``I've got a 4- and 
a 5-year-old at home, and I want them to see a parent going to work in 
the morning. That's something I never saw growing up.''
  This woman understood responsibility. She was taking responsibility 
for her life, and she was taking responsibility for her children's 
lives.
  As we embark on this process, I hope we will remember that welfare 
reform shouldn't just be a campaign slogan or the title of an issue 
brief. Welfare reform should be about people, and in the case of aid to 
families with dependent children [AFDC] most of those people are 
children. In fact, AFDC was created almost 60 years ago for the 
principle purpose of assisting needy children without fathers.
  While our society has changed dramatically since that time, the 
purpose of the program has not. Two-thirds of welfare recipients today 
are children. If the system fails, it fails their parents--but more 
than anything else, it fails their kids.


                          failing our children

  That is what's happening today. We--all of us--are failing our 
children. This point has been driven home in recent months with the 
release of a couple of studies that painted a devastating portrait of 
young America:
  A report I requested from the General Accounting Office showed that 
the number of poor children under the age of 6 in America increased by 
more than 25 percent during the 1980's.
  These numbers are worse in urban areas: Forty-seven percent of young 
children living in the capital of my own State of Connecticut are poor, 
making Hartford the American city with the second-highest child poverty 
rate.
  Another study by the Carnegie Foundation found that one in four young 
children is poor.
  I don't know of anyone who could look at statistics like these and 
not recognize that something is seriously wrong in America--and that 
our childern are being punished for it.


                         stop pointing fingers

  It is time for everyone to stop pointing the finger of blame at 
someone else for this state of affairs.
  Liberals must stop blaming something amorphous they call society. 
Conservatives must stop blaming mythical individuals called welfare 
queens. And people on welfare must stop blaming others for 
circumstances they can personally take the initiative to change.
  I want to emphasize that the President's announcement today does not 
represent the end of a process, but only a beginning. This is a highly 
complex issue, and we don't want to leap before we look.
  With that caveat in mind, I think the President's plan includes a 
number of valuable provisions. Work requirements, time limits and 
better linkages to job training programs are all ideas worthy of 
serious and careful consideration.


                     strong child support provision

  I am especially pleased about the strong child support enforcement 
component of the President's plan. The poverty rate for single-parent 
families headed by women is nearly 33 percent. This compares to a 
poverty rate of under 8 percent for two-parent families.
  The lack of child support is a major cause of poverty among single-
parent families in this country, and too often those families going 
without support end up on welfare. The link between lack of child 
support and poverty is clear, as the Census Bureau illustrated when it 
estimated that between 1984 and 1986 approximately half a million 
children fell into poverty after their fathers left home.
  The President's proposal contains some valuable tools to change this 
situation and demand that absent fathers step up to the plate and take 
responsibility for their children. I was pleased that the President 
incorporated a number of provisions from child support legislation I 
introduced earlier this year.


                             TEEN PREGNANCY

  The President's initiative also recognizes that reducing teen 
pregnancy is integral to cutting into welfare dependency. Between 1960 
and 1988, the percentage of births in America to unmarried mothers rose 
from 5 percent to 26 percent, and the poverty rate for children raised 
in such settings is terrible--for children of single Hispanic mothers 
the rate approaches 75 percent.
  We must state in clear, unmistakable terms to teenage boys and girls 
that they best not create a life unless they are willing to take 
responsibility for that life. The President envisions a concerted, 
national campaign to achieve that end.


                               CHILD CARE

  Finally, the President's plan contains a modest child care component. 
The lack of quality, affordable child care is often the most serious 
obstacle to young women's efforts to enter the work force--and to stay 
in the work force once they get there.
  I am pleased that the administration recognized this fact by 
including child care in its proposal and by making provisions of the 
child care and development block grant that I authored in 1990 the 
standard for Federal child care. But I am concerned about the modest 
scope of this provision. By including only a very limited expansion of 
child care for the working poor, the President's plan may very well be 
penny wise but pound foolish when it comes to child care.
  We may save money in the short run by not providing more generous 
child care benefits, but lose money down the road if women who have 
successfully made the transition from welfare to work go back to 
welfare after a year due to a lack of affordable, quality child care.
  I do understand the daunting fiscal pressures the administration 
faced in drafting this plan, and I want to reiterate that, taken as a 
whole, it is a creative and constructive proposal. In the months ahead, 
we will be carefully examining each part of the proposal, and I look 
forward to working with my colleagues on this exciting endeavor.


                               CONCLUSION

  This country, so great and strong, the most productive economic power 
in the world, surely has the will and the know how to end welfare 
dependency. When we are finished with this process, I hope we will 
demand more of everyone in this country. I hope we will demand that 
each and every American accept responsibility for his or her actions. I 
hope we will demand that our children not be raised in intolerable 
conditions.
  I know one thing: That the American people are demanding that we 
reform welfare and that we do it right. We have a responsibility as 
elected representatives to respond to that demand, and I am eager to 
roll up my sleeves and get started.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I support President Clinton's efforts to 
reform the welfare system and make it a program that encourages 
productive work instead of habitual welfare dependency.
  Genuine welfare reform means job training and education that provide 
mothers on welfare with the opportunity to enter the workplace and earn 
a living wage. Genuine welfare reform means providing adequate child 
care, so that mothers can leave home for work and know that their 
children will be safe. It means passing health reform, so that no 
mother feels the need to stay on welfare in order to get health care 
for her children.
  President Clinton's plan for reforming the welfare system includes 
all of these essential components. It is a genuine effort to improve 
this troubled program, and I am proud to cosponsor it.
  The 2-year time limit on welfare benefits and the work requirements 
are important features of this plan. The real problem with the work 
requirements is likely to be making enough jobs available. Welfare 
reform won't work if there is no job at the end of reform.
  The 2-year time limit provides adequate time to make job training and 
other assistance available, while also ensuring that welfare does not 
become a way of life. The decision to apply the limit at the outset 
only to welfare recipients 25 years old or younger is sensible. 
Federal, State, and local governments will be overwhelmed if they have 
to provide job training, child care, and job opportunities for everyone 
on welfare. The first priority is to help young mothers avoid welfare 
dependency.
  In general, I also support the sanctions and disincentives in the 
President's plan. Sanctions are appropriate for those who do not 
fulfill their obligation to attend job training sessions, seek work, or 
meet the other work requirements. However, I oppose the family cap--
measures that aim at the mother but hit the child are not the answer to 
welfare dependency.
  I look forward to effective action by Congress to achieve these 
reforms. Our goal is to turn the welfare system into a helping hand, 
and end the handout it was become for far too many.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a fact sheet, legislative 
specifications, and a copy of the bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record.

                                                   N O T I C E                                                  
                                                                                                                
             Incomplete record of Senate proceedings. Except for concluding business which follows,             
  today's Senate proceedings will be continued in Part II of the Congressional Record, Issue No. 79, datelined  
                                                 June 21, 1994.                                                 
                                                                                                                
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