[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 79 (Tuesday, June 21, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 21, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
CONFERENCE REPORT ON S. 24, INDEPENDENT COUNSEL REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 
                                  1994

  Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I 
call up House Resolution 439 and ask for its immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 439

       Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be 
     in order to consider the conference report to accompany the 
     bill (S. 24) to reauthorize the independent counsel law for 
     an additional 5 years, and for other purposes. All points of 
     order against the conference report and against its 
     consideration are waived.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Montgomery). The gentleman from South 
Carolina [Mr. Derrick] is recognized for 1 hour.
  (Mr. DERRICK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the 
customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], pending 
which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration 
of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.
  Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 439 provides for the consideration of 
the conference report on S. 24, the Independent Counsel Reauthorization 
Act of 1994. The rule waives all points of order against the conference 
report and against its consideration.
  Mr. Speaker, the conference report on S. 24 reauthorizes for 5 years 
the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act 
which would allow the appointment of special prosecutors to investigate 
alleged wrongdoing by top executive branch officials, including the 
President.

                              {time}  1250

  The conference report creates a specific category of coverage under 
the law for Members of Congress, allowing the Attorney General to use 
the independent counsel process with regard to allegations against 
Members if doing so would be in the public interest.
  The agreement would establish an extensive series of cost and 
administrative controls to restrain spending by the independent counsel 
and to ensure better oversight of their activities.
  In order to enforce cost controls, the conference report requires GAO 
to conduct a financial review of independent counsel expenditure 
statements at midyear, a full audit at year-end, and another full audit 
at termination of each independent counsel's office.
  The agreement further requires each independent counsel to designate 
an employee who will be responsible for certifying that expenses are 
reasonable and lawful, and who will be held liable for any improper 
spending.
  In addition, the conference report requires the General Services 
Administration to provide space for the independent counsel in Federal 
buildings, unless GSA determines that other arrangements would cost 
less.
  The conference report requires a review of the progress of the 
appointment of an independent counsel 2 years after that appointment 
and every year thereafter. In addition, the agreement requires an 
independent counsel to file a final report that includes reasons for 
not indicting individuals who are the subject of an investigation by 
the counsel.
  Finally, the conference report contains a provision that was not 
included in either the House or Senate bill that would allow Whitewater 
special prosecutor, Robert Fiske, to stay on as an independent counsel. 
Under the original act a Federal employee cannot be named as an 
independent counsel. The agreement gives the courts the option to 
retain Mr. Fiske if the issue of Whitewater becomes an independent 
counsel investigation.
   Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 439 is a fair rule that will expedite 
consideration of this important conference report. I urge my colleagues 
to support the rule and conference report.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, this is a bad bill and it is carried by a bad 
rule. More than 3 months ago, when this House first considered H.R. 
811, legislation authorizing the independent counsel, many of us urged 
this body to extend its mandatory provisions to Members of Congress. 
That debate came in the context of ongoing allegations about 
impropriety and abuse of office by certain Members on both sides of the 
aisle. Because of the way the majority maneuvered the rules of this 
House during that debate, we actually were never given a clean shot at 
insuring that Members of Congress would be directly accountable under 
an independent counsel law.
  Today, as we revisit this important issue, public concern about abuse 
of privilege, potential felonious activities and efforts at plea 
bargaining by one celebrated Member of the House has mounted to some 
new heights, I am sorry to say. But I doubt there is a newspaper or a 
TV station in this country that has failed to report in on that matter. 
People are simply fed up with the oft-repeated appearance of Members 
getting special treatment and avoiding accountability, whether it is 
exempting Congress from the laws it passes or whether it is extra-
generous health coverage or perhaps pension benefits or any other 
special consideration for Members. People are upset about it.
  Several weeks ago, as we discussed the legislation that funds the 
Congress, many of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle lamented 
what they see as Congress-bashing and grandstanding from Members 
seeking to reform this institution. But frankly, such cavalier 
dismissal of the legitimate concerns shared by hundreds of thousands of 
Americans, if not millions of American, at this point, is tantamount to 
shooting the messenger. The problem is not those of us who point out 
the perks, privileges, and special treatment for Members. The problem 
is that apparently some Members continue to believe they should be 
treated differently and live by different rules than the people we are 
all elected to serve.
  The alleged wrongdoing characterized by the 17-count indictment of 
the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means underscores the 
perception of arrogance of power and lack of respect for the rules that 
is hard to imagine, even by Congress' worst critics, and I must point 
out quickly at this juncture, that the chairman has been found guilty 
of nothing at this stage, but the damage to the House's credibility is 
real and we all know it.
  I am, therefore, truly disappointed that the bill before us today 
still fails to guarantee mandatory congressional coverage. By leaving 
the decision of invoking an independent counsel in cases involving 
Members of Congress up to the Attorney General, this bill invites 
conflict of interest. In the current case, the administration's 
enormous stake in the outcome of the ongoing investigation was clear to 
everybody in this country and much commented on in the media. The 
President even made a supportive public appearance for the Member in 
question in his home district. We are relieved that so far those 
responsible for seeing justice served have managed to avoid succumbing 
to political pressure, and we congratulate them for that. But why leave 
the door open for such a possibility? Why not mandate congressional 
coverage and remove the temptation for undue interference under this 
and future administrations? We have that opportunity.
  Mr. Speaker, today's rule waives all points of order against the 
independent counsel conference report. This is a very dangerous 
precedent. It is a way of doing business that does not allow complete 
deliberation and complete accountability. If we are going to do it here 
on a matter of this import, are we going to do it with things like 
health care, when we all know there is much at stake and we all know 
that we want a chance at the final product and not have something come 
out of a conference committee that has not been deliberated by either 
body and stuck in and protected with an ironclad protection as we have 
in this rule.
  While I am grateful to the gentleman from Texas, Chairman Brooks, for 
providing the Committee on Rules with the specific outline of the rules 
violations in this bill, I must object once again to a blanket waiver 
of the rules. There is no reason why the committee could not have 
granted specific rules waivers, if they were absolutely necessary. Why 
must we routinely discard all the standing rules of this House? I 
cannot answer that.
  Members should take an especially close look at one provision in this 
bill referred to by the gentleman from South Carolina, a measure that 
was in neither the original House version nor that of the other body. I 
refer to the language pertaining directly to Robert Fiske, the special 
counsel currently investigating Whitewater-Madison Guaranty situation. 
As currently written, this bill allows Mr. Fiske to be named an 
independent counsel, a seemingly harmless change of title that has 
potentially costly implications for American taxpayers. Because of a 
little-known distinction, people who are under investigation by an 
independent counsel but who are not indicted could seek reimbursement 
for their legal costs. This is not the case for those being 
investigated by a special counsel, which is what Mr. Fiske is today. So 
by passing this conference report, Members will be opening up the 
opportunity for those Whitewater participants currently under 
investigation by Mr. Fiske to recoup their legal bills.

  The big question is, who is liable for those fees should that 
eventuality arise? Is it the taxpayers? And if so, to whom would this 
retroactive change apply? And is there a limit to the liability?
  Have the same folks who brought us retroactive tax raises now been 
inspired to bring up retroactive relief for Whitewater participants at 
the taxpayers' expense? A fair question and one that deserves debate.
  All these questions must be carefully considered. I must remind 
Members that time and again this House rushes into things for which it 
is later sorry: Catastrophic health comes to mind, so do many other 
things.
  The taxpayers are usually the losers in that equation. I realize very 
well that the majority leadership has the power, they do have the 
power, to reserve the option to cover up misdoings. That seems to be an 
inside the beltway malady that can affect anyone in power in either 
party. But the public has spoken. They want Congress to obey the laws 
and play it by the rules. And an independent counsel helps make that 
happen, and it is, frankly, too bad that the Democratic leadership will 
not ensure that it happens with mandatory independent counsel cover for 
the Congress.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 3 
minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, there has been some concern 
that history might get distorted when Disney opens up its theme park. I 
do not share that. I have no objection there. But I will say this: If 
Disney's history is no more valid than what we have just heard from the 
gentleman from Florida, some of the critics will be vindicated.
  The gentleman was talking about going after Members of Congress. Let 
us be very clear. Why there was not an independent counsel in the case 
of the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means and why there was 
not an independent counsel in the case of the ranking member of the 
Committee on Appropriations, the senior Republican.

                              {time}  1300

  George Bush did not want one. The law that was in effect when the 
investigation was begun of the chairman of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, the law that was in effect when the senior Republican in the 
Committee on Appropriations was indicted, allowed the Attorney General, 
George Bush's appointee, to name an independent counsel if he wanted to 
do that.
  George Bush's Attorney General, Mr. Barr, said:

       No, I do not think there should be an independent counsel 
     if we are investigating the senior Republican on the 
     Committee on Appropriations. I do not think there should be 
     an independent counsel if we are investigating the chairman 
     of the Committee on Ways and Means.

  As a matter of fact, Mr. Speaker, the independent counsel law was in 
effect for the 12 years of Republican administrations immediately 
preceding. About a dozen Members of Congress were indicted, and in no 
case did Edwin Meese or William Barr or Richard Thornburgh or William 
French Smith, the four Republican Attorneys General, ever use their 
unchallenged authority to name an independent counsel.
  People who think that it is a terrible thing that there was not 
automatically an independent counsel when a Member of Congress was 
indicted should complain to the four Republican Attorneys General who 
declined to do that. As a matter of fact, pointing to someone who has 
been indicted without an independent counsel as proof that you need an 
independent counsel to get an indictment seems to me to strain logic 
even beyond where it often gets bent in these rules debates.
  Mr. Chairman, the fact is that Members have been indicted and they 
have been convicted and they have been exonerated. This is simply a 
mistaken argument.
  As a matter of fact, Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Florida argued 
two ways, one, that Members of Congress get a great favor if they are 
not covered by the independent counsel statute and, two, the President 
and others in the Whitewater thing will be given a great favor if they 
are covered by the independent counsel law. He said, ``Look, if you 
cover these people by the independent counsel, you might pay their 
legal fees.''
  Members can plead the alternative in court, but I do not think one 
should be allowed to argue in the alternative in a congressional 
debate. Which is it, a special favor to cover someone under independent 
counsel, or is it a special perk not to be under the independent 
counsel?
  The fact is that this law, passed originally by Democrats under a 
Democratic President, opposed by Republicans, filibustered to death by 
Republicans in the Senate, that is why we have Mr. Fiske, because 
Republicans in the Senate filibustered this law to death at the end of 
the Bush administration. They were tired of honest investigations.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, Democrats under a Democratic President are 
restoring the law.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], a senior member of the Committee on 
the Judiciary.
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, in response to the remarks of the gentleman 
from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank], there are real divisions on the wisdom 
or the constitutionality of an independent counsel. I do not blame 
anybody for thinking it is not a constitutional office.
  Personally, I support the concept of independent counsel. I was 
present at the creation, back in 1978, when we put this together. I 
thought it was appropriate then and I think it is appropriate now.
  What I do regret, Mr. Speaker, is that we did not take this 
opportunity to make it a better statute, because it is not a Republican 
administration that will be the object of any activities that may or 
may not ensue. I think we had the opportunity to have some 
accountability. We had the opportunity to broaden the coverage to 
include Congress in an effective way. We really have not done that. We 
have nibbled around the edges.
  Mr. Speaker, I think the most egregious aspect of this rule, which 
after all is what we are talking about, is the fact that we are waiving 
a point of order about something that was not a conferenceable issue.
  Mr. Speaker, what the conference has done is taken the law, which 
says--and I quote from section 593 of title 28, United States Code, 
subparagraph (b)(2): ``The division of the court may not appoint as an 
Independent Counsel any person who holds an office of profit or trust 
under the United States.'' That is now Mr. Fiske, who is the special 
counsel, not the independent counsel, although, interestingly enough, 
he is being paid from the independent counsel's indefinite 
appropriation.
  All independent counsels have a diamond-studded platinum credit card, 
without limit, so the Justice Department is not going to have his 
salary taken out of their appropriation. However, we have waived that 
in the conference; that is, in the rule, to permit Mr. Fiske, should 
the three-judge court decide, and should the Attorney General petition 
for an independent counsel--and I shall not hold my breath--to appoint 
Mr. Fiske.
  Mr. Speaker, the objection to those amendments we offered to the bill 
to make it a better bill, a more effective bill, they were rejected as 
interfering with the independence of the court, but of course now, by 
suggesting indirectly that Mr. Fiske be the independent counsel, it 
seems to be the maximum interference with the court.
  However, one aspect of this should be considered, Mr. Speaker. If, 
indeed, Mr. Fiske is appointed independent counsel and takes over the 
investigation of matters that he is now investigating, attorneys fees 
may be paid out of the independent counsel's indefinite appropriation; 
whereas if he remains special counsel, answerable to Janet Reno, each 
person who is investigated and indicted or whatever has to pay their 
own attorneys fees. That may be the real reason for this waiver.
  Mr. Speaker, I had no real problem with the waiver, as a matter of 
fact, because there may be some good, solid reasons why Mr. Fiske, if 
it is determined to appoint an independent counsel, at least he will 
have the case in hand. He will not have to relearn things, which a new 
person might.
  However, Mr. Speaker, if we are going to breach the rules of 
procedure by permitting the adoption of something that was in neither 
bill, and was not conferenceable, that same magnanimity, that same 
flexibility ought to have been granted to us so we could again revisit 
some of the things we wanted to put in the bill to make it more 
effective, like some meaningful accountability, like congressional 
coverage, like classified material provisions, including penalties for 
its mishandling. None of those requests were granted. The majority got 
just what they wanted and the minority got a warm handshake.
  For that reason, Mr. Speaker, I am unenthusiastic about this rule, 
and will vote ``no.''
  Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 5 
minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant], the chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the 
Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Speaker, I think it is regrettable that, in my view, 
while knowing better, Members will stand on this floor and assert that 
somehow or another a provision which was inserted for a very practical 
reason may have been brought to us due to any type of a sinister motive 
on the part of any Member or of the administration. The simple fact is, 
due to a Republican filibuster in the Senate, we could not pass the 
independent counsel law, which had been actually and timely acted upon 
by this body last year. So when the Whitewater matter came up, there 
was no independent counsel statute on the books and accordingly, the 
Attorney General appointed a special counsel.
  The special counsel has done a great deal of work. The special 
counsel, by the way, is a member of the other party. It only makes 
sense that if we are going to pass the independent counsel statute 
again, that it be written in such a way so that if--if the court so 
chooses, this same person can be appointed independent counsel, rather 
than starting all over again with someone else.
  There is absolutely nothing in this rule and nothing in this bill 
that in any fashion whatsoever enhances the ability of the President to 
reclaim attorneys fees or ask for reimbursement of attorneys fees at 
the end of the process, any more than he otherwise would be able to do.
  I think it is a great mistake on the part of the minority to stand on 
the floor and not so subtly hint that there is some ulterior motive 
when there is none. I do not think it matches, in my view, the 
reputation for integrity or the abilities of the gentleman from Florida 
[Mr. Goss], who first made this assertion.
  Mr. GEKAS. Will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BRYANT. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I say to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
Bryant] that he piqued my interest when he said that the question of 
attorneys fees as to the President is not relevant here.
  Would the gentleman respond to this question: If we did not adopt an 
independent counsel and simply allowed the Fiske persona to pursue the 
special counsel trail that he is now on, would attorneys fees be 
payable to any target of that investigation?
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Speaker, no, they would not.
  Mr. GEKAS. Is it not true, Mr. Speaker, that the independent counsel 
statute which the gentleman wants to adopt with this special language 
does, if the gentleman will continue to yield, retroactively seek to 
cover attorneys fees for the White House?
  Mr. BRYANT. It most clearly is not retroactive in any respect 
whatsoever.
  Mr. GEKAS. If the gentleman will continue to yield, I am not saying 
retroactive, but that is, it would put into play attorneys fees for 
White House would-be or actual targets; is that correct?
  Mr. BRYANT. It does not put them into play.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I ask the gentleman what is the purpose of 
the act?
  Mr. BRYANT. It is completely irrelevant, Mr. Speaker. The purpose of 
the language is to permit Mr. Fiske to be named as independent counsel 
and to continue his work, rather than having to get into a situation 
where he might have another appointed independent counsel.

                              {time}  1310

  It has nothing whatsoever to do with attorney's fees.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, if we 
decided not to pass an independent counsel statute at all, could not 
Mr. Fiske continue to work as special counsel and the will of the 
Congress be met by the fact that he is continued as special counsel?
  Mr. BRYANT. Certainly. The gentleman is correct.
  Mr. GEKAS. Then why go through the independent counsel syndrome in 
order to bring Mr. Fiske on board again if it would not be for the 
substantial difference that exists, namely, attorney's fees?
  Mr. BRYANT. There is a no requirement in this bill that Mr. Fiske be 
named the independent counsel, but the way it is written with this new 
provision, he could be named as independent counsel. That is the 
purpose of it.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, what 
special powers would be given to him he does not have now if we go into 
independent counsel other than the question of attorney's fees? What 
other powers would he have?
  Mr. BRYANT. First, the question of attorney's fees would not come 
into play even in that case. But this bill does not appoint Mr. Fiske 
independent counsel. It simply removes his ineligibility for 
appointment as independent counsel. That is all it does. Because the 
law says we cannot appoint someone on the Federal payroll. Mr. Fiske is 
actually from the private sector. He is only on the Federal payroll 
temporarily as special counsel. All we are doing is removing his 
disability. That is all this bill does.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, do we 
need to have Mr. Fiske become eligible for independent counsel?
  Mr. BRYANT. I certainly think it is a reasonable option in order that 
we might not repeat the entire process with a new independent counsel. 
Of course it makes sense, not to repeat the entire process.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I cannot conjure up my thoughts into a 
picture of why independent counsel would come into play if the special 
counsel could not consider it his.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time to conclude my remarks, I 
just simply say in good faith, and I think it is very clear to Members 
on the other side, this provision was put in here for a very practical 
purpose, so we would not have to go through a repetitive process. It 
does not in any way enhance anyone's ability to reclaim attorney's fees 
whatsoever. I urge the Members to vote for the rule. It is a reasonable 
rule, it is a very good bill, and let us move forward today and break 
this impasse.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas], the 
ranking member of the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and 
Governmental Relations.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time, and I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I say to my friend, the gentleman from Texas, 
I certainly do not intend any sinister connotations. It was simply 
informational. It seems to me under the independent counsel statute 
those people that are targets of investigation who are not indicted are 
entitled, and I think they ought to be entitled, to reimbursement for 
their attorney's fees. I would have gone further and said people that 
are indicted but are found not guilty or who win on appeal ought to 
have their attorney's fees paid. I am not against that and I do not 
think it is sinister. I just think the Members are entitled to know 
there is a difference between independent counsel appointed by the 
court where attorney's fees are allowable and special counsel which is 
now Mr. Fiske's title where attorney's fees are not. That is my 
information.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GEKAS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] makes 
a compelling point with which I completely agree. The point is, though, 
that there is nothing in this bill that permits the claiming of 
attorney's fees retroactively for what has already taken place.
  Mr. HYDE. I did not say that. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. 
Gekas] did.
  Mr. BRYANT. Second, the other point is this: It is very clear to 
everyone that there was no motive behind this provision other than to 
make it easy to make Mr. Fiske independent counsel. Nobody cares about 
the payment of attorney's fees.
  Mr. HYDE. I do not charge any sinister motives at all. The 
``sinister'' was your word and I thought a little overdone.
  Mr. BRYANT. It came from the other side and I felt it necessary to 
respond to it.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I now seize back what is left of my time.
  Mr. Speaker, I would join with the gentleman from Texas or with 
anyone else to create a special statute now to empower any special 
counsel, like Mr. Fiske is now, to also account for attorney's fees for 
those targets who are not indicted. That would be the proper way to 
proceed to finally dispose of the attorney's fees situation once and 
for all. That is the proper way to go. It still smacks of suspicious 
motivation to insert the Fiske language in the independent counsel 
statute which we are now considering.
  Who believes or wants Mr. Fiske to become independent counsel? 
Because the gentleman from Texas and others say that is the only reason 
we have this language in, so that he can become independent counsel. 
Who is begging for that? Why do we need that, if he is conducting an 
investigation, has the witnesses before him, has subpoena powers, has 
discovery powers, has all the powers that independent counsel would 
have to continue investigation?
  As a matter of fact, Mr. Barr, who has been mentioned here, did have 
special counsel on at least one occasion, perhaps two, in which the 
work was completed without any thought of independent counsel, which 
was anathema to him, which I acknowledge. He did not like the concept 
of independent counsel. But here we cannot remove the suspicion that 
pervades the sentence that is included in this statute beyond the scope 
of the conference, beyond the scope of what the House did, beyond the 
scope of what the Senate did in debating independent counsel but as an 
afterthought was added to allow this special language for the special 
prosecutor to be converted into independent counsel. That appalls me.
  I wanted to say this. When the bill was moving through the House, I 
and others tried mightily to include Members of Congress as primary 
targets, as mandatory targets, as everyone knows. I was greatly 
disappointed that that was not included, because even though the 
gentleman from Massachusetts made a sparkling oration here about that, 
he did not account for something that is very special to him in 
previous debates on many other subjects before the Committee on the 
Judiciary, namely, the appearance of conflict, the appearance of 
favoritism. It appears to the American people if we do not put Members 
of Congress as possible targets of independent counsel that, indeed, we 
are trying to cover something. But that is a moot issue now.
  I was willing to come to the floor when this conference came, knowing 
that we were defeated in our efforts to go on with the business. I was 
not even going to object to this bill. I was happy that the proposed 
statute includes a favorite subject matter of mine to which the 
gentleman from Texas agreed and helped me insert in the subcommittee 
deliberations; that is, a yearly report to the Congress of the doings 
of the independent counsel. That was a very good concept and it made 
this bill much better than it ever was. I was tempted to support it, 
notwithstanding my disappointment about the failure to include Members 
of Congress as targets.
  Now Mr. Fiske comes in, whose work I endorse and who I want to 
succeed in his investigation, he comes in and poisons the atmosphere, 
that language does, by making me doubtful and worried about the 
manipulation of the independent counsel statute to address a subject 
which never came up until the last minute and which still is not a 
problem to be corrected in this devious manner. Rather, I want the 
gentleman from Texas to sit with me and craft a bill to amend whatever 
statute is required to allow special counsel to take into consideration 
attorney's fees but not go do end around the independent counsel 
statute.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GEKAS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Speaker, I would like to make it very clear to the 
gentleman that this bill does not appoint Mr. Fiske as independent 
counsel. But it does provide in the event the Attorney General receives 
the information necessary to make her seek an independent counsel from 
the three Republican judges on that panel, they will be able if they 
choose to do so to make it Mr. Fiske. They do not have to, but they 
would be able to choose him. That is all it does.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton].
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me the time.
  Mr. Speaker, one of the things that has concerned me over the past 
several months is the objectivity of the special counsel.
  Mr. Fiske was a friend and an associate in several cases in New York 
with Bernie Nussbaum, who was the right-hand man of President Clinton 
at the White House. Mr. Nussbaum has since departed for a number of 
reasons, but he and Mr. Fiske were close. As a matter of fact, Mr. 
Fiske, the special counsel investigating Whitewater, asked Lawrence 
Walsh, who was investigating Iran-Contra, to appoint Mr. Nussbaum as 
assistant or associate counsel.

                              {time}  1320

  That shows there is a pretty close tie.
  Mr. Fiske recommended now-FBI Director Louis Freeh to be the head of 
the FBI to the White House, and Bernie Nussbaum, and Louis Freeh was 
appointed, and he is probably a good appointment, that once again shows 
a close tie to the White House, Bernie Nussbaum and Mr. Fiske.
  Finally, Mr. Fiske and his law firm represented the International 
Paper Co. that sold hundreds acres for hundreds of thousands of dollars 
to the Whitewater Development Corp. His law firm and he represented the 
International Paper Co. that sold land to the Whitewater Development 
Corp. which he is investigating.
  Now, I am not claiming there is something sinister here, but there at 
least is the appearance, the appearance of possible impropriety.
  We come to this special provision that you are talking about now that 
will allow him not only to be the special counsel but to be appointed 
independent counsel. It appears to me this is done for a purpose, to 
make sure Mr. Fiske is rolled over into the independent counsel role in 
the event that this investigation and, in any event, that this law is 
passed. It is going to waive the prohibition against him possibly being 
appointed independent counsel.
  Now, maybe there is nothing to all of this, but to the American 
people who know all the facts, they know that Mr. Fiske was tied to Mr. 
Nussbaum, not once, twice, but several times. They know that he and his 
firm represented the International Paper Co. that sold land to 
Whitewater, and he is investigating this.
  There certainly is a cloud over this investigation, and to take away 
the prohibition which would allow Mr. Fiske not only to be special 
counsel but to become independent counsel would lead some to believe 
that maybe this is a way to mask the facts so that the public never 
knows what the heck went on with Whitewater.
  In addition to that, there have been in recent days and weeks 
allegations raised and the possibility raised that some members of this 
administration in the White House may have been involved in laundering 
drug money through the Lasater firm, to three or four banks, one of 
which is in the Cayman Islands. I am not talking about the possibility 
that Patsy Thomasson down there, who was the chief financial officer 
for Lasater & Co. when he was indicted and convicted of drug 
trafficking in Arkansas, when $665 million in State bonds were sold by 
Lasater during that time, that this should be investigated as well.
  Now, what I would like to see happen is for the independent counsel 
to investigate this. Now, if Mr. Fiske is rolled from special counsel 
into the independent counsel, there is a very good possibility that he 
and Janet Reno will say, ``Hey, wait a minute, we do not want to 
investigate allegations of possible money laundering and drug 
trafficking. They are not relevant to Whitewater.'' But that should be 
investigated. We should have a full investigation of that as well as 
Whitewater.
  I am just saying that the appearance, the appearance of possible 
impropriety by the investigation is something that I do not think we 
should allow to happen. It should be clean and aboveboard.
  I know my colleagues are going to say, ``Well, he is a Republican. 
There is no question about his allegiance.'' I think that begs the 
issue. It begs the issue, because he was tied to Nussbaum. He did 
recommend Nussbaum to the special counsel in the Iran/Contra 
investigation. He did recommend Louis Freeh to be head of the FBI. He 
did represent International Paper Co.
  I just think this is something that we should not allow to happen.
  This special counsel I do not believe should be rolled over into the 
special counsel statute, and I know that is what you guys are trying to 
do. I think it is very, very clear.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Speaker, the independent counsel is chosen by a 
three-judge panel, all three of which are Republicans. The case you 
just made against Mr. Fiske you can make to that court. We are not 
deciding that there today. We are simply saying, though, that if the 
court chooses to do so it might make Mr. Fiske independent counsel 
since it would seem reasonable he be able to continue.
  Second, I would just point out that this grand conspiracy you just 
alleged apparently has no residence in the U.S. Senate, which approved 
this conference report unanimously without even taking a record vote on 
the matter.
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Reclaiming my time, I am talking about the 
appearance, the appearance of possible impropriety.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Armey], chairman of the Republican 
Conference.
  Mr. ARMEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to the rule.
  When we began considering this authorization, I thought we would 
actually address some of the fundamental problems of the independent 
counsel law. However, many of the concerns raised by Members on this 
side of the aisle were ignored or swept under the rug. Now we are about 
to vote on a bill which puts us back at square 1 with no real reform of 
the independent counsel law in sight.
  Mr. Speaker, the conference report does virtually nothing to extend 
the independent counsel law to cover Members of Congress or to bring 
financial accountability to the independent counsel's office, and it 
does absolutely nothing to limit the scope or duration of 
investigations, prevent frivolous inquiries, or correct past abuses and 
deter future corruption except in the case of Mr. Fiske and Whitewater, 
should that agreement be consummated.
  In short, we have before us a bill long on style and very short on 
substance.
  I encourage my colleagues to defeat the rule, send this back to the 
drawing board, see if we cannot come back with a more substantive 
proposition that can leave the American people no doubt that we are 
once more engaged in some aspect of the Whitewater whitewash.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, a lot has been said here today about who is going to pay 
on this Whitewater thing, and whether this is a good idea. But this is 
a not conferenceable item that has been talked about.
  I am sorry to say the debate apparently got into using words like 
``sinister'' and ``suspicious'' and so forth when it went to that 
question of motivations of Members of Congress. I do not think that 
those are appropriate words, and certainly my motivations for raising 
this question go more to the issues of straightening out what the 
implications are of this type of provision. I want to make sure we do 
not have unintended negative consequences on our legislation.
  I think to say that people are not concerned about the costs of legal 
defense these days, of Members of Congress and the executive branch 
both, belies the reality. In fact, people are. I have just been handed 
a New York Times article. It appears that the White House is planning 
to solicit money for legal aid. And it refers to several Members of 
Congress in this article, who have been really hurt trying to pay 
defense costs, defending themselves against various allegations. This 
is a very relevant subject for all of us, and it is one that deserves a 
little further debate rather than coming in as a not conferenceable 
item that was not debated either in this House or the other body.
  I do not think it is sinister to suggest that we ought to have 
deliberative democracy working on an issue that is this important. I 
suspect that the value of a good debate here would not only allow the 
will and the wisdom of the Members to shine forth, but I also think it 
would let the sun shine in on a little bit of what is going on here. 
This is an area where every time we try and hide from the public or 
anybody in the administration tries to reserve information, there is an 
upcry, and the media gets it, and we have yet another scandal.
  I guess the question I would ask is: If this is such a good idea that 
we provide this provision to go from special counsel to independent 
counsel, then why was it not debated in the House or in the other body? 
I mean, why are we suddenly doing this at the last minute?
  I admit there appears to be pluses and minuses to this issue after 
listening to gentlemen on our side and the other side of the aisle as 
well. And I am not convinced that I understand fully what all the 
implications will be.

                              {time}  1330

  I do not like to have to vote on legislation when there is the 
opportunity to do better. I suspect that that is the way many Members 
are going to feel on this. I think the other issue that is before us 
today is: We have talked a lot about policing ourselves in this body 
and doing as good a job as we can. Actually, we are not the judges of 
whether we police ourselves very well. The American people are the 
judges of that. And the American people are sending a pretty strong 
message out there that says they do not think we are doing a very good 
job of that. They seem to be saying to us:

       You know, maybe it wouldn't be a bad idea if we did mandate 
     an independent counsel position for Members of Congress as 
     well as members of the executive branch.

  It seems to me that is a very, very fair debate and a very, very fair 
proposition to take up. It is one, sadly, that again we are not going 
to reach because of the rule that we are working under this day.
  It is for that reason that I am going to urge that we defeat this 
rule. Let's go back to the drawing boards and try to straighten out 
this question of legal fees and who is going to be liable for them. 
Let's straighten out this question of why we should not make Members of 
Congress subject to the mandate of an independent counsel.
  This is going to be one more of those questions that Members are 
going to have to answer as they go back about their business in the 
months ahead, saying, ``Why did Congress exempt itself again from 
coverage by an independent counsel?''
  That just is not going to play well.
  Mr. Speaker, at this point I have no more speakers and no more 
requests for time on this side, and I yield back the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield as 
much time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Texas 
[Mr. Brooks], the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary.
  (Mr. BROOKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BROOKS. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, let me first say I want to thank the gentleman from 
South Carolina [Mr. Derrick] for managing this rule and for his 
longtime service on the Committee on Rules and say that we in this 
House, both Democrats and Republicans, will miss him.
  Mr. Speaker, you will note Members are rising and applauding.
  Mr. Speaker, the conference report on S. 24, the Independent Counsel 
Reauthorization Act, closely parallels the bill as it passed the House 
of Representatives. The Committee on Rules graciously granted the rule 
on the conference report to deal with three extraneous matters. 
Noncontroversial, but nongermane, language is included in the 
conference report at the insistence of the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee conferees, both Democrats and Republicans, and with the 
acquiescence of the House Government Operations Committee, which has 
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
  That language, based on an amendment added to the Senate bill by the 
gentleman from Arizona [Mr. McCain], requires an annual White House 
personnel report. We did not think that was too bad, and we thought you 
might even approve of that. The conference report also includes 
noncontroversial transition provisions which were not in the House- or 
Senate-passed bills, to describe how changes in the underlying statute 
would be applied in the case of two ongoing statutory investigations 
that began before the statute expired on December 15, 1992.
  One of the transition provisions permits, but of course does not 
require, the court to consider Mr. Fiske, who presently serves as a 
regulatory independent counsel appointed by Attorney General Reno, as a 
possible, as a possible candidate to be appointed by the court as 
statutory independent counsel.
  All of the transition provisions were unanimously agreed to by the 
Senate Democratic and Republican conferees and by a rollcall vote of 
the entire conference report by the House conferees.
  And may I point out, and I point this out to my friend, the gentleman 
from Florida [Mr. Goss], who is a man with a core of decency, sometimes 
obscured by rhetoric, but I want you to think about this: Mr. Dole, who 
is the minority leader over in the Senate, and Mr. Cohen, as ranking 
Republican on the Senate committee, both endorsed the Fiske amendment 
as a reasonable, responsible operation. And the bill passed by voice 
vote in the Senate.
  And you might as well understand that I am not going to appoint 
Fiske. I do not care whether they appoint him or not. The question is, 
he should be eligible? And if they wanted to appoint Fiske, if they 
wanted to do it, just have him resign the day before and appoint him.
  You know, there is a way to skin the cat if you are determined to do 
it.
  The legitimate, decent way is to make it possible.
  If the Attorney General recommends him, if the three-judge court, 
made up primarily of Republican judges, decides that they want to 
appoint him and they make the decision alone, not you, not me, not 
Janet Reno, not the President, not anybody in this building; they make 
the decision, they issue the guidelines, the parameters of what they 
expect him to do.
  They do that. I do not do that. The Judiciary Committee does not do 
that. The Government Operations Committee does not do that. The Rules 
Committee does not do that. The three-judge panel does it. And they 
will continue to do it as I think they should.
  So, I thank the distinguished chairman and members of the Committee 
on Rules for their work, and urge my colleagues to adopt this rule.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BROOKS. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Florida, a man 
with a core of decency.
  Mr. GOSS. A court of decency?
  Mr. BROOKS. A core--c-o-r-e.
  Mr. GOSS. A core? Well, I appreciate that.
  I appreciate the gentleman yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, let me say that the articulate and clear explanation the 
gentleman from Texas has given about this particular provision would 
undoubtedly be of great benefit to all of the membership, and it should 
have been debated on this floor because I think the chairman very well 
could have convinced most of the Members that it was a good idea.
  But we are going into this blind. Not all of the Members have had the 
opportunity to talk to those distinguished Members of the other body or 
the chairman of the committee, about all of the provisions of this. We 
have had a lot of queries on this side.
  Our point, when we are talking about the rule, is that it is better 
to do this in the deliberative process, in the sunshine, through the 
committees and through debate on the floor, rather than shut it out in 
the Rules Committee and deal with a nonconferenceable item this way.
  I think the gentleman would probably prevail on his point.
  I do not see the need to protect it except for that rule.
  I wish we had brought this in at the beginning of the process, is all 
that I can say.
  Mr. BROOKS. If we had thought about it, we would have put it in the 
bill on the House side.
  Mr. GOSS. Well, we thought--if it is such a great idea, why did we 
not do it?
  Mr. BROOKS. We did not think about it at the time.
  Mr. GOSS. OK, that is a fair answer.
  Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, I 
yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on 
the resolution.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Montgomery). The question is on the 
resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently, a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 243, 
nays 171, not voting 20, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 257]

                               YEAS--243

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (NJ)
     Andrews (TX)
     Applegate
     Bacchus (FL)
     Baesler
     Barca
     Barcia
     Barlow
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Byrne
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Condit
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     Darden
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Frank (MA)
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hochbrueckner
     Holden
     Hoyer
     Hughes
     Hutto
     Inslee
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klein
     Klink
     Kopetski
     Kreidler
     LaFalce
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Lehman
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Long
     Lowey
     Maloney
     Mann
     Manton
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCloskey
     McCurdy
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Roemer
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sangmeister
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Schenk
     Schroeder
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shepherd
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (IA)
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stupak
     Swift
     Synar
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Unsoeld
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Washington
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Wheat
     Whitten
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                               NAYS--171

     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus (AL)
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Clinger
     Coble
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Fish
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gekas
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Grandy
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Horn
     Houghton
     Huffington
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Kasich
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kyl
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (FL)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Manzullo
     McCandless
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Myers
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paxon
     Petri
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Ramstad
     Ravenel
     Regula
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Santorum
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Sensenbrenner
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sundquist
     Swett
     Talent
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Torkildsen
     Upton
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Weldon
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--20

     Bentley
     Carr
     Chapman
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     Dornan
     Frost
     Furse
     Grams
     Lloyd
     McCollum
     Mfume
     Michel
     Mineta
     Schumer
     Shaw
     Slattery
     Solomon
     Towns
     Valentine

                              {time}  1401

  The Clerk announced the following pair:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Mineta for, with Mr. Grams against.

  So the resolution was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 439, I call up 
the conference report on the Senate bill (S. 24), to reauthorize the 
independent counsel law for an additional 5 years, and for other 
purposes.
  The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the conference report 
is considered as having been read.
  (For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of 
May 19, 1994, at page H3697.)
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barlow). The gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
Brooks] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks].
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. BROOKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, last Congress the Independent Counsel Act 
died a less than honorable death--the result of bludgeoning and being 
held hostage by some Republicans who viewed a ``good government'' 
mechanism somehow as the enemy rather than as a trusted watchman. In 
the face of unrelenting hostility by the previous Republican 
administration--including the threat of a Senate filibuster--the law 
lapsed on December 15, 1992. Certainly, that was unfitting treatment 
for one of the few truly novel enhancements to our constitutional 
democracy in the 20th century. I am happy that many of the once ardent 
opponents of the statute have now experienced a change of heart in the 
past year and now embrace reauthorizing the statute.
  The conference committee on S. 24 reported back to us a product that 
closely parallels the bill as it passed the House of Representatives. I 
might note that the House and Senate language on coverage of Members of 
Congress were virtually identical, and the express language covering 
Members of Congress is retained in this conference report.
  As I noted during the rule debate, noncontroversial language 
mandating an annual White House personnel report to Congress is 
included in this conference report at the insistence of the Senate 
Government Affairs Committee conferees--both Democrats and Republicans. 
The conference report also includes noncontroversial transition 
provisions dealing with the application of the new provisions to the 
two ongoing statutory investigations begun before the statute expired 
on December 15, 1992.
  One of the transition provisions permits--but, in no way requires--
the court to consider the present regulatory Whitewater independent 
counsel appointed by Attorney General Reno as a possible candidate to 
be appointed by the court as a statutory independent counsel--should 
such an independent counsel be requested under this statute.
  All of these transition provisions were unanimously agreed to by the 
Senate Democratic and Republican conferees, and by a rollcall vote on 
the entire conference report by the House conferees. In fact, the 
conference report was adopted by voice vote in the other body on May 
24, 1994.
  I heartily thank the distinguished House and Senate conferees for 
their fine work on this conference report, and I am proud to be 
associated in this work with them.
  In conclusion, we have a fine conference report reflecting the will 
of the House of Representatives. As my colleagues will recall, 
President Clinton has always supported the reauthorization of the 
independent counsel statute. He is waiting to sign this conference 
report. I urge Members to take the final step needed to send it on to 
him by voting ``aye.''
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, the American people should know very clearly that what 
we are about to do is to reauthorize, if the bill should pass, if the 
conference report should pass, reauthorize, come back into the picture, 
independent counsel. The American public will remember the horrendous 
experiences we have had with some of the previous independent counsel 
who have spent millions of dollars, one up to near $50 million over a 
long period of time, spending the taxpayer's money, to come to 
inconclusive decisions or decisions that later became obsolete and 
moot. Millions of dollars were spent by independent counsel. Knowing 
that that was the case, many Republicans on this side refused to 
acknowledge the necessity for an independent counsel of the type that 
we had before, the freewheeling, free spending, unquartered kinds of 
independent counsel that seem to make the scene around here.
  But now this new independent counsel statute that has been brought 
before us takes some salutory steps, and I am willing to acknowledge 
that.

                              {time}  1410

  As a matter of fact, pride of authorship prompts me to say that this 
bill is better than anyone before it because it carries one of my 
provisions. That provision is good for the American public. It says 
that an independent counsel every year must give a report to the 
Congress of what that counsel is attempting to do or is doing.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GEKAS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, does the gentleman think we should have kept 
that in like we did, or is he against it now?
  Mr. GEKAS. No. I am saying that that is a salutary provision and 
makes this bill better than the last one. Now I have to be convinced to 
vote for it.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr Speaker, did the gentleman vote for the last one?
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, we are now in a position 
to say, my gosh, even if this bill is better than the last one before, 
reluctant as we might be because of the fallacies of the past 
independent counsel to consider that this would be a good bill, now we 
have some other flaws leaping out at us that make it impossible for 
many of us to support this legislation. And that is the Fiske fix to 
which the chairman referred in his opening remarks as being a mere 
transition type of language that facilitates the possibility of 
appointing the present Special Counsel Fiske as an independent counsel.
  We do not need Fiske to become independent counsel, do we? I have 
asked that question rhetorically and practically with everyone.
  If Mr. Fiske goes about his duties as special counsel, the Congress 
will have an opportunity to review his work and to thank him for his 
services when he completes his investigation and concludes it. Why do 
we need him to be in the wings to be created independent counsel? Who 
has asked for that? Whose motivation brings this language to the bill? 
Why are we so interested in having Mr. Fiske line up as a possibility 
of being appointed as independent counsel? He will not have any extra 
powers. He will have the power of subpoena, powers of discovery, all 
the lawyer-like devices that are available to him will not be expanded 
under the independent counsel.
  There is only one difference. And that has to be explained by the 
proponents of this legislation to the satisfaction of the Members of 
the Congress of the American public. And that is this. Under the 
present special counsel authorization that Mr. Fiske has, if a member 
of the White House staff or the President or the First Lady should 
become the targets of investigation and those investigations do not 
merit an indictment against the President or the First Lady or any 
other member of the White House, then they will sigh a sigh of relief, 
but then they will have to pay their attorney's fees if they hired an 
attorney for any stage of these proceedings. And that is the special 
counsel purview of the authorization that he has.

  Now, now we tell the American public, get this, if this bill, this 
conference report passes, the independent counsel language takes over 
and then, because of the language that we slipped in here, Mr. Fiske is 
designated and appointed as independent counsel, lo and behold, it is 
possible that under the current language of the independent counsel, 
now defunct and the new language of the independent counsel bill about 
to be passed, the attorney's fees for such targets can be paid, 
application for those attorney's fees can be made to the Court for 
reimbursement.
  That is a devious way to get around the now seeming prohibition 
against attorney's fees being paid by the taxpayers for members of the 
White House who might be under investigation.
  I tell Members here and now, and I told the gentleman from Texas 
during the debate on the bill, I am willing, if the Congress feels it 
is necessary, to work with him to create a special statute now to amend 
the special counsel and to give Mr. Fiske directly, through his 
investigation, the power to entertain attorney's fees for targets of 
investigation under his authorization, but not to left-handedly do an 
end run around the entire process by putting this Fiske fix into the 
independent counsel language. It taints the whole thing. It poisons the 
atmosphere. Use all the metaphors and facsimiles we can, it stinks. It 
has the scent of suspicion about it, and we ought to be careful.
  Here we are now. I wanted to support this because it has my language 
in it for yearly audits, yearly reports to the Congress, which is a 
very good provision. And I wanted to support it notwithstanding the 
fight that we put up, many of us on this side, to include Members of 
Congress as targets of a possible investigation. But I am willing to 
live with the will of the Congress that says we cannot have Members of 
Congress as similar targets to members of the Executive. I think it is 
wrong, but I am willing to live with that. But I will not live with the 
stench of this language that no one has explained satisfactorily on the 
question of attorney's fees and the so-called transition to independent 
counsel.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  It is time to put to rest, once and for all, the strange allegation 
just heard that the so-called transition rule relating to Mr. Fiske is 
a ploy to permit retroactive reimbursement of attorneys fees to those 
persons now the subject of his current regulatory independent counsel 
investigation. The notion of such retroactivity is a red herring, pure 
and simple. It is not true.
  Under the terms of the independent counsel statute, attorney fee 
reimbursement is available only for expenses incurred during an 
investigation conducted pursuant to the statute, under 28 U.S.C. 
593(F), the operative words are:

       Upon the request of an individual who is the subject of an 
     investigation conducted by an independent counsel pursuant to 
     this chapter . . . the. . . court may . . . award . . . those 
     reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by that individual during 
     that investigation. . .

  The Court, not the gentleman and not me, not the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Burton], not the gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish], not 
the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], nobody we know, the Court, 
three-judge, Republican court may award those reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred by that individual during the investigation.
  Thus, when Congress revives the independent counsel statute, it 
revives this rule about the award of attorneys fees; and that rule is 
clear that no award of attorneys fees incurred prior to the appointment 
of an independent counsel by the special court is permitted.
  Let us also keep in mind that there is no guarantee of getting 
attorney's fees incurred during an independent counsel regime either. 
The basic standard for recovery of attorney's fees under the 
independent counsel law remains the same. If the matter would have been 
investigated by the Department of Justice in the absence of the 
independent counsel statute, there generally is no basis for such a 
recovery. And, by requiring the court to seek the views of both the 
Justice Department and the independent counsel on any fee requests 
received, and that is the law, the conference report makes it harder 
for independent counsel subject to obtain fees, even when they have to 
be granted by the court.
  Ultimately, the availability of attorney's fees is up to the special 
court, the panel court, it is their judgment, to decide based on the 
facts involved in each fee request. But the terms of the law are very 
strict. And, I believe it beyond question that the issue of Mr. Fiske's 
eligibility to be an independent counsel has no bearing whatsoever on 
the outcome of any possible award of attorney's fees.

                              {time}  1440

  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield to my distinguished friend, the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
  Mr. GEKAS. Is it not true, Mr. Speaker, I ask the gentleman who has 
just yielded to me, is it not true that if Special Counsel Fiske were 
to continue through his present authorization, to the conclusion of his 
investigation, that no attorneys fees whatsoever would be authorized 
under his work or under the statute that has authorized his work?
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, that is the law.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, that is the end of that question. If the 
gentleman will continue to yield, is it not true that prospectively, 
any new independent counsel undertaking a new investigation can, under 
that authorization, be empowered to grant applications for attorneys 
fees?
  Mr. BROOKS. I am sorry, would the gentleman repeat that?
  Mr. GEKAS. Let me rephrase that. If we adopt the conference report 
reauthorizing independent counsel, is it not true, Mr. Speaker, that at 
least prospectively thereafter, a new independent counsel having been 
appointed.
  Mr. BROOKS. By the court.
  Mr. GEKAS. That the reauthorization would allow attorneys fees 
applications to be made?
  Mr. BROOKS. It will allow them to be made, but they must go to the 
court, and the court will decide whether or not they get them.
  Mr. GEKAS. We understand that, Mr. Speaker.
  Mr. BROOKS. That has been the law before.
  Mr. GEKAS. Is it not possible, then, Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman 
will yield further, that what the prohibition is under the present 
special counsel authorization, that no attorneys fees can be paid 
members of the White House for any type of lawyers fees they incurred, 
that that can be changed when the same individual, Mr. Fiske, would 
become independent counsel prospectively for any further allegations 
that might be made against White House personnel?
  Mr. BROOKS. It must be during the tenure of that independent counsel, 
Mr. Speaker. We cannot reach backward to the case 2 years ago.
  Mr. GEKAS. I asked prospectively, once Fiske----
  Mr. BROOKS. Prospectively, if one is eligible.
  Mr. GEKAS. If the gentleman will yield further, Mr. Speaker, so that 
at least for prospective attorneys fees, the independent counsel will 
be able to allow recompense for that, where it could not under special 
counsel.
  Mr. BROOKS. He cannot allow anything. It is allowed only if the court 
agrees.
  Mr. GEKAS. I am talking about----
  Mr. BROOKS. It could occur. It could happen.
  Mr. GEKAS. If the gentleman will continue to yield, I was talking 
about the independent counsel statute, not special counsel himself, or 
independent counsel, but the answer is clear, if special counsel under 
this present system does his work, no attorneys fees can be paid.
  Mr. BROOKS. That is correct.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Fish].
  (Mr. FISH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. FISH. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his generosity in 
yielding time to me.
  Mr. Speaker, I have been a proponent and supporter of the independent 
counsel law from the time of its first enactment in 1978. I still 
support the concept of an independent counsel statute. This law stands 
as a symbol that the American system of justice should not, and does 
not, allow preference or favoritism to those serving in high public 
office. It is intended to ensure that personal or institutional 
conflicts of interest will not impede an impartial investigation, when 
there is specific and credible evidence that wrongdoing involving 
covered officials may have occurred.
  But, having said that, I must admit that I am not pleased with many 
of the provisions in this conference report. The independent counsel 
law expired in December 1992. As this lengthy time frame indicates, 
Congress has had ample opportunity to study the operational history of 
this law and to make some badly needed changes in this statute. 
Unfortunately, despite our efforts on this side of the aisle, Congress 
has not taken full advantage of this opportunity.

  There is no question but that prior independent counsel 
investigations have highlighted a number of serious shortcomings in 
this law. Questions have been raised about the excessive cost of these 
investigations, the lack of accountability once an independent counsel 
is appointed, and the open-ended nature of these investigations. Many 
have expressed concern about certain actions that have been taken under 
the auspices of this law that raise serious due process and legal 
fairness questions.
  The bill we have before us purports to deal with some of these 
serious and fundamental problems. But, in my estimation, it fails to 
address these issues in an effective manner. Despite the use of 
promising subtitles like ``Cost Controls,'' S. 24 actually allows 
independent counsel to continue to enjoy virtually unlimited budgets. 
The expenses of all independent counsel will continue to be paid out of 
a permanent indefinite appropriation and, thus, remain totally outside 
of the scrutiny of the annual appropriations process. Nothing in the 
final version of the bill changes this unusual funding mechanism--a 
policy choice made by Congress in December, 1987--which is at the core 
of the accountability and cost problems we face in this law.
  Based upon the most recent cost figures provided to us, the total 
cost for the 13 investigations conducted to date under the independent 
counsel statute is in excess of $63,800,000 and $40 million of this was 
spent on 1 investigation. When we last considered this legislation--as 
H.R. 811--in the House of Representatives in February, my good friend 
and colleague, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] offered the 
Republican substitute which, among other things, would have subjected 
each independent counsel to the annual appropriations process 2 years 
after they were appointed. This approach, it seems to me, would strike 
a fair balance between the need for independence on the part of the 
special prosecutor with the very legitimate congressional oversight 
concerns about the open-ended nature and expense of these 
investigations. Under the Hyde proposal each independent counsel would 
have 2 years to demonstrate whether further investigation--and 
funding--was warranted. Unfortunately, this excellent idea was not 
adopted.
  Also, this legislation continues a number of statutory loopholes that 
allow each independent counsel far too much discretion with respect to 
the expenditure of taxpayer dollars. For example, S. 24 directs each 
independent counsel to comply with Justice Department policies 
respecting expenditures of funds ``except to the extent that compliance 
would be inconsistent with the purposes of this chapter.'' This 
exception language is far too broad--far too generous. Under it, each 
independent counsel is his or her own judge as to whether a particular 
expenditure is consistent with the purposes of this law or not.
  Similarly, this legislation will require that the administrative arm 
of the judicial branch of our Government continue to provide 
administrative support and guidance--primarily, disbursement and 
accounting functions--for the various independent counsels. The 
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts has been providing these services 
for some years under an informal agreement with the Justice Department. 
Many have questioned the logic and propriety of this arrangement, since 
an independent counsel performs a prosecutorial, executive branch 
function, not a judicial one. Section 3 of the bill amends section 
594(l) of title 28 prohibiting the Administrative Office from 
disclosing ``information related to an independent counsel's 
expenditures, personnel, or administrative acts or arrangements'' 
without prior approval from the relevant independent counsel. So, an 
agency of the judicial branch is prohibited from disclosing any 
information about the activities it undertakes on behalf of the 
independent counsel. To say the least, this is an unusual provision and 
one that is not particularly encouraging from an accountability and 
cost control standpoint. Does this provision mean, for example, that a 
House or Senate Appropriations Subcommittee could not request relevant 
expenditure figures from the Administrative Office? What does this 
provision do to the ability of the General Accounting Office to obtain 
accurate cost information?
  When the House considered this measure back on February 9, I offered 
an amendment which was adopted as part of the House version of this 
legislation. It reflected my concern about the existing statutory 
language dealing with the salaries that can be paid to the employees of 
the various independent counsel. Under my amendment, adopted by this 
House just a few months ago, no more than two employees of the 
independent counsel were to be compensated at a rate equivalent to that 
paid at level V of the executive schedule--that is, $108,200. All other 
employees would be subject to a salary ceiling equivalent to the basic 
pay for GS-15 employees--that is, $86,589. Now, the conference report 
comes back, with no opportunity for input from me on this matter, 
providing that all employees of an independent counsel may be paid up 
to the level of ES-4 of the senior executive schedule, with a District 
of Columbia locality adjustment. What this translates to mean is that 
persons hired by an independent counsel could potentially receive up to 
$111,838 annually. This result is an odd way to achieve cost controls 
and is not consistent with the intent of the Fish amendment as adopted 
by this House.

  Another problem that has received attention is the fact that national 
security information and classified documents have been mishandled, 
lost, and inappropriately disclosed during an independent counsel's 
investigation. The Republican substitute provided that it would be 
grounds for the removal of an independent counsel for good cause, if he 
or she violated Federal laws or regulations governing the maintenance, 
use, and disclosure of classified information. Failure to follow such 
procedures could subject an independent counsel to penalties under 18 
U.S.C. 798. The proposal was not adopted. Instead, the conference 
report provides that ``(A)n independent counsel shall comply with 
guidelines and procedures used by the (Justice) Department in the 
handling and use of classified material.'' But, once again, the 
ultimate judge of compliance will be each independent counsel himself 
or herself. The bill provides no sanction for the failure to follow 
such guidelines and procedures. If there is no sanction specified in 
this law--what standard will be applied and who will oversee possible 
violations?
  Repeatedly during this debate, I have argued that each independent 
counsel should be required to follow established Justice Department 
policies and procedures regarding criminal prosecutions. From a due 
process, constitutional rights standpoint, it is simply not appropriate 
or fair that independent counsel are permitted to establish a different 
set of prosecutorial rules and standards than those followed by all 
other Federal prosecutors in this country. What does S. 24 do to 
resolve this problem? It amends section 594(f) of title 28 to say that 
an independent counsel ``shall, except to the extent that to do so 
would be inconsistent with the purposes of this chapter, comply'' with 
Justice Department policies in the enforcement of criminal laws. When, 
logically would it be inconsistent with the purposes of the independent 
counsel law to follow the time-tested rules and procedures followed in 
every other Federal criminal prosecution? Each independent counsel 
stands in the shoes of a Federal prosecutor. They stand in for the 
Attorney General, for the Criminal Division and for the U.S. attorneys 
in a specific case. In the course of these often-high visibility 
investigations, they should act wholly consistent with the same rules 
governing prosecutorial behavior in all other Federal criminal cases. 
This ensures consistency, fairness, and protects due process rights.
  I would mention that S. 24 does provide for the division of the court 
to review every 2 years whether or not the termination of an 
independent counsel is appropriate. I have been a strong supporter of 
the idea that the division of the court, which appoints each 
independent counsel, should regularly revisit their decision and make a 
determination whether or not further investigation is justified. 
Unfortunately, however, the amendment in the bill to section 596(b)(2) 
does not go quite far enough. That is, before termination of an 
investigation, the court will have to decide that ``all matters within 
the prosecutorial jurisdiction of such independent counsel * * * have 
been completed or so substantially completed'' that the matter 
essentially is resolved. The ``all matters'' language makes it 
difficult for the division of the court to make a termination finding 
in many cases, particularly where the initial grant of jurisdiction to 
an independent counsel may have been a broad one. So, while the 
division of the court will revisit an appointment every 2 years, I am 
far from certain that this will result in significant reductions in the 
length of these investigations. The language is too deferential to 
assure that there will be no further waste of the taxpayers' money.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, S. 24 includes a provision that was not 
contained in either the House bill nor the Senate bill. This provision 
waives that portion of the law which prohibits the division of the 
court from appointing ``any person who holds any office of profit or 
trust under the United States.'' 28 U.S.C. 593(c)(2). Thus, it would 
remove a statutory barrier that would prevent the court from selecting 
Robert B. Fiske Jr., the special counsel in the Madison Guaranty 
Savings & Loan Association case--that is, ``Whitewater''--if the 
attorney general seeks the appointment of an independent counsel in the 
same case. This idea does not trouble me from an efficiency and 
continuity standpoint. However, Members should recognize that this 
provision does have implications as to whether persons being 
investigated by Mr. Fiske may eventually have their attorneys' fees 
reimbursed under the applicable provisions of a reauthorized 
independent counsel law. This proposal has never been the subject of 
hearings, has not previously been voted on by this body, and clearly 
was beyond the scope of the Conference Committee.

  In conclusion, we had a genuine chance to establish effective cost 
controls, to assure greater accountability on the part of independent 
counsel, and to protect national security documents and classified 
information. Unfortunately, we have done very little to realize these 
goals. Mr. Speaker, this statute will be reauthorized for another 5 
years but the likelihood is that Congress will have to revisit these 
same problems again in 1999. We have missed an opportunity to craft a 
significantly better independent counsel law and that is very 
unfortunate. I am disappointed by our failure to turn a good idea into 
a good law.

                              {time}  1430

  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, one of my favorite sayings coined by John 
Greenleaf Whittier is, ``Of all sad words of tongue or pen, the saddest 
are these, it might have been.''
  Mr. Speaker, we might have had a very good statute here about a very 
important subject, namely, the inevitable conflicts of interest that 
arise in political affairs. I do understand increasingly as I get older 
that the struggle for freedom many times is a struggle over weaning 
Government, that the Government, because it is wielding public power, 
does not always do it in the public interest. The Government is made up 
of individuals who can be as susceptible to the foibles of human nature 
as anybody else and the experience of the Lawrence Walsh independent 
counsel adventure which went on some 6 years and cost beyond $35 
million, because that does not include what was spent by the Government 
in complying with his requests, we ought to have learned something 
about the abuses of power and for the future tried to restrain this 
office within proper bounds, but we have not done so. The glaring 
faults of the old law that has expired remains subject to some little 
minor tinkering which will not make a great deal of difference.
  I want to go on record as saying I support the concept of an 
independent counsel. I am well aware of the conflicts that can arise in 
the executive but they can also arise in the congressional branch of 
Government, and I think we need an independent counsel statute. So I am 
going to vote for this statute although with mixed feelings, because I 
think the abuses that we saw in the previous years are still incipient 
and latent within the four corners of this statute.
  Most egregious is the lack of accountability as far as tax dollars 
are concerned. The independent counsel is the only creature known to 
American Government who is above and beyond the normal restraints of 
any other governmental agency. The soldiers in Desert Storm had to rely 
on an appropriation from Congress for their food, for their little 
tents, for their ammunition. The FBI as it goes about investigating 
crime must rely on congressional appropriation. So must the court that 
appoints the independent counsel. So must the National Institutes of 
Health. There is not an operation, a function, an agency in Government 
that does not depend on congressional appropriation. But not the 
independent counsel, an unlimited credit card, diamond studded, made of 
platinum that goes and goes and goes like Tennyson's brook, without an 
end.

  Mr. Speaker, what we wanted was some modicum of accountability. We 
offered an amendment that said, ``You can get more than any number of 
bites at the apple you want, but after 2 years, then you go through the 
appropriations process. You show what you spent, then ask for what you 
need and you will get it.'' Some cost accountability.
  No, we still have an independent counsel that is the beneficiary of a 
permanent, limitless, endless, boundless appropriation.
  I will grant Members, there is a gesture at accountability, because 
under the new law, there will be appointed an independent certifying 
officer, and he is to screen out, or she, screen out unnecessary 
expenditures. But note that this independent certifying officer is 
appointed by the independent counsel. His only real discretion is on 
travel. So we have an inspector general of sorts without any teeth. It 
is like an efficiency expert without a computer. No congressional 
coverage. The Attorney General must find it in the public interest 
before an independent counsel can be appointed for a Congressman.
  Classified matter. We have the horrible story of the previous 
independent counsel's office having classified information in a 
suitcase when they went out to the west coast to take the deposition of 
Ronald Reagan, and then one of the lawyers tossed it to a red cap at 
the corner at LAX Airport and it was never seen again. Never seen 
again. It was not reported for a matter of several weeks.
  It seems to me we should require the independent counsel to observe 
regulations concerning classified information. Yes, the new version 
says he should comport with regulations. But no penalty. The amendment 
was offered said it was grounds for dismissal from office failing to 
follow the regulations.
  The jurisdiction of the independent counsel. The last independent 
counsel had a hunting license to go from Alaska to Key West looking for 
anything and everything, without limit, without let, without hindrance. 
We thought we ought to spell out a little bit the jurisdiction of the 
independent counsel so as to avoid the hunting license and the fishing 
license with an unlimited bank account. No, it was not to be.
  Mr. Speaker, I am still going to vote for this bill, but with little 
enthusiasm.
  Mr. Speaker, in 1978, as a member of the Criminal Justice 
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, I was involved in the 
enactment of the first Federal special prosecutor law. That law, of 
course, is now commonly referred to as the Independent Counsel Act. I 
was--you might say--present at the creation. I believed then, as I 
believe now, that a properly structured independent counsel law can 
play a positive role in our system of government.
  But time and experience have shown that this is a law in dire need of 
comprehensive change--real reform. Since this statute went into effect 
in 1979, it has proven to be far too costly and one that grants far too 
much discretion to those appointed to serve under its authority. The 
very title ``special prosecutor'' carries with it a certain serious 
aura. It certainly is a term that makes for dramatic headlines and is 
easily adaptable for the lead story on the nightly news.
  But, there is a sobering reality beyond the headlines and, sometimes, 
it is a reality that should concern us. This is a law that can be, and 
has been used as a tool of political retribution. It is a law that 
permits an independent counsel, once appointed, virtually unlimited 
power and provides that counsel with unlimited financial resources with 
which to pursue his or her probe. Our experience under this law has, at 
times, demonstrated that constitutional due process rights are not 
always well protected under the current statutory structure.
  Consequently, when the authorization for this law expired in December 
1992, I believed it was high time to rethink as well as to reauthorize. 
We now find ourselves in June 1994--so we certainly have had plenty of 
time to review the history and to make the necessary changes and 
reforms in this law. Unfortunately, we have not done so. The conference 
report (S. 24) before this House merely purports to make the needed 
reforms. The reforms that will be cited by some of my Judiciary 
Committee colleagues are really illusory. The language of this bill is 
replete with exceptions--escape hatches--which will continue to permit 
an independent counsel too much discretion with taxpayer funds and too 
much power with respect to the rights of innocent persons.
  Allow me to quickly summarize where changes are needed and where S. 
24 falls far short.
  No change in congressional coverage: Under the conference version, 
Members of Congress are not automatically covered. There is no 
mandatory coverage. Instead, coverage of Members of Congress would 
continue to be a discretionary decision by the Attorney General. There 
is a new public interest test to determine applicability, but the 
bottom line is that Members of Congress are not specifically included 
as covered persons under the law.
  Illusory cost controls: The conference version does not change the 
fundamental fact that all independent counsel are the beneficiaries of 
a permanent indefinite appropriation. What this means is that the 
funding for these various investigations has no limit--it is an open-
ended, unrestrained expense account. So much for the cost controls 
referred to by my colleagues on the other side of the aisle.
  During House consideration in February, I offered a comprehensive 
substitute bill that would have made each independent counsel subject 
to the annual appropriations process after the first 2 years of their 
investigation. Unfortunately, that compromise proposal was not adopted. 
Thus, independent counsel will continue to receive a never-ending, 
limitless source of funding. Interestingly enough, the Department of 
Justice has already decided to fund Mr. Robert B. Fiske's regulatory 
special counsel entity under this same indefinite appropriation.

  Similarly, the conference version does not place significant limits 
on the salaries of the independent counsel's staff. Further, 
reimbursement for commuting expenses will now be limited to a mere 18 
months. Why should it take a year and half to decide whether or not 
such an assignment deserves one's full-time attention? S. 24 also says 
that an independent counsel shall comply with the established policies 
of the Justice Department respecting expenditures--but then says: 
``except to the extent that compliance would be inconsistent with the 
purposes of this chapter.'' Guess who gets to decide whether or not 
compliance would be inconsistent with this law? Each independent 
counsel--himself or herself. Thus, we provide this court-appointed 
official a diamond-studded platinum credit card with no limits 
whatsoever.
  Treatment of classified information: Another item of particular 
importance to me as a former member of the Select Committee on 
Intelligence is the treatment of classified information. New language 
will appear in the law stating that ``[A]n independent counsel shall 
comply with guidelines and procedures used by the [Justice] Department 
in the handling and use of classified material.'' Unfortunately, unlike 
the substitute which I offered on the House floor, the new law will be 
silent as to what sanctions would apply if an independent counsel 
unlawfully discloses or otherwise misuses classified material. I 
believe that such irresponsible actions should be grounds for removal 
of an independent counsel. There have been a number of documented 
abuses regarding the handling and treatment of classified information 
in the recent past, and tough penalties should apply.
  No precise definition of jurisdiction: The conference committee 
version also makes no change in the language of the law dealing with 
the responsibility of the division of the court to specifically define 
the jurisdiction of an independent counsel's inquiry. Broad, vague 
grants of jurisdictional authority to independent counsel have been a 
key problem with this law in the past. For Congress to leave this 
provision unchanged will have direct implications for the future cost 
of these investigations and potential unfairness to innocent persons 
dragged into these investigations.
  Unfortunately, many of the reforms I have advocated were beyond the 
scope of the conference. This is true because they were not contained 
in either the House or Senate bill. But that is also true, I would 
note, of section 7(h) which is in the conference report. Section 7(h) 
specifically deals with the regulatory special counsel, Robert B. 
Fiske, Jr., waiving a provision that would otherwise bar his 
appointment as an independent counsel in the Madison Guaranty Savings & 
Loan case. See: 28 U.S.C. Sec. 593(b)(2). Again, this provision was not 
in either bill. Its inclusion sends a signal to the division of the 
court that the appointment of Mr. Fiske under a newly reauthorized 
independent counsel law would be OK with Congress. While there is a 
logic of continuity and efficiency to this singular waiver, it 
nevertheless raises questions as to whether we are interfering with the 
independence and discretion of the court in this case. Also, some have 
speculated that attorneys' fees can only be awarded if a statutory 
independent counsel is appointed, because no such authority exists in 
the case of a special counsel. See: 28 U.S.C. Sec. 515; 28 CFR 
Sec. Sec. 600.1-.5.
  Obviously, the final conference version of this legislation is a 
disappointment to me. Congress had the opportunity to respond to the 
legitimate criticisms and concerns that have been raised by State and 
Federal prosecutors, by lawyers and law professors and--most 
importantly--by the American taxpayer. This reauthorization bill simply 
fails to make the needed reforms. The very existence of the independent 
counsel law signifies the principle that no one should be above the 
law. We had the opportunity to ensure that those individuals who are 
appointed to serve as independent counsel are not above the law either. 
Unfortunately, we have failed to do so.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa 
[Mr. Leach].
  (Mr. LEACH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, I agree with some of the concerns articulated by my 
distinguished colleagues, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] and 
the gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish], but I would stress that while 
imperfect, this bill should be supported. In so doing, I would also 
like to stress that from talks with a large number of Members, that I 
think it is fair to say that it is the expectation that there is a 
decent prospect that the Justice Department will recommend to the court 
that the existing special counsel be turned into an independent 
counsel. However one votes on this bill, it is not intended as a vote 
of confidence or no confidence in this particular special counsel.
  Mr. Speaker, in my judgment Mr. Fiske is an honorable man doing a 
very honorable job. I would stress that with regard to a change in 
status, there is no expectation that I know of in this body that the 
Justice Department would want to recommend to the court a midstream 
change in counsel. It would be the expectation as far as I know that 
this particular counsel might have his status changed, but not his role 
and that there would not be any curtailment of his existing mandate.
  Finally, with regard to the issue that some have raised, quite 
understandably, about the cost of legal fees, I can only say that I 
think it is appropriate for any President to have the highest quality 
legal representation. There is precedent with other special counsels, 
particularly under the Reagan administration, for such legal fees to be 
provided, but even if there was no precedent, the only decent thing for 
a legislative body is to authorize and allow the finest legal 
representation for the President of the United States.
  Mr. Speaker, I do support this measure. I wish frankly some 
Republican amendments had been looked at more carefully in the 
Committee on the Judiciary, but given the circumstances this is the 
right action to take at this particular time.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute to reiterate for the 
benefit of the gentleman from Iowa that I, too, favor an 
institutionalization, a statutory methodology by which the President of 
the United States could seek reimbursement for attorney's fees when 
under some circumstances he would be investigated and found not to be 
indicted.

                              {time}  1440

  What I object to is the unclear, cloudy, suspicious way in which this 
problem may be addressed through this legislation. That is the only 
thing, and the gentleman from Iowa should be certain of that.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to my colleague, the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Burton].
  (Mr. BURTON of Indiana asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I would like to tell my 
colleagues a story.
  A fellow came to my office about 2 or 3 weeks ago, and his name was 
Dennis Patrick. Mr. Patrick was a fellow who used to be, I think, the 
youngest circuit court clerk or youngest court clerk in his county in 
Kentucky. He had a friend named, I believe, Steve Love, who was 
connected with the Lasater brokerage firm in Arkansas.
  Mr. Love invited him to come on a trip with him, on a jet plane. It 
was like the rich and famous. He went on this jet plane on a trip, 
where he went deep sea fishing. During this trip, Mr. Love said that 
this Lasater & Co. firm wanted to make a deal with him where he would 
get $20,000 a month without any investment, just because they wanted 
him to open an account and help them with some brokerage operations 
down there.
  Well, $20,000 a month with no investment sounded pretty good to this 
fellow. But he did not think it was going to come to pass. About a 
month later he got a call from Mr. Love, who said, ``Come on down to 
Little Rock, because we are going to give you $21,000 as the first 
installment on your account.'' He said he would have roller-bladed down 
there for that kind of money. He went down to Arkansas, and a little 
naive, I might add. He went down and got $21,000. The money was 
deposited, I believe, in the First American Bank down there.
  He went over there and signed some papers. That was the last he heard 
about that until about 6 months or 8 months later, I guess, two people 
from the firm came to his place in Kentucky, and they inadvertently, he 
said, or maybe on purpose, left a file folder with some transaction 
slips, and these transaction slips showed that in 1985 and 1986 there 
was between $60 and $109 million of bonds transferred through his 
account to Mr. Lasater's account and other accounts in three banks, one 
in the Cayman Islands.
  He became very concerned about this, because he knew nothing of these 
transactions.
  The financial officer in charge of Lasater & Co. was a lady named 
Patsy Thomasson, and she knew all about the financial transactions 
going on in his firm. So he was concerned maybe they were doing 
something like possibly laundering drug money, because Mr. Lasater was 
being investigated for drug trafficking in Arkansas, and during the 
time he was being investigated for drug trafficking in Arkansas, the 
Governor of Arkansas, then Mr. Bill Clinton, gave him $665 million in 
State bonds to be sold, from which Mr. Lasater made $1.3 million.
  To make a long story short, Mr. Lasater was convicted of drug 
trafficking, got 2\1/2\ years in jail, but he only spent 6 months in a 
halfway house. Then his conviction was commuted by Governor Clinton.
  During the time he was in the halfway house, Mrs. Thomasson, over at 
the White House now, conducted all of his business activities, and 
during 1985 and 1986, as I said, between $60 and $109 million went 
through his account without his knowledge.
  There is some question about where that money came from, especially 
in view of the fact Mr. Lasater was convicted of drug trafficking.
  Incidentally, I must tell you that Mr. Patrick, after he started 
asking questions about this, they tried to kill him three times. This 
is not only documented. The men that tried to kill him were convicted 
and went to jail. They tried to kill him three times. So somebody, he 
believes, was trying to cover up his questions about the money going 
through this account. As I said before, the chief personnel officer at 
the White House, Patsy Thomasson, was chief financial officer of that 
firm at that time.

  I wrote to Mr. Fiske asking him to expand the Whitewater 
investigation into possible laundering of drug money through the 
Lasater account, or through the Lasater company, and through Mr. 
Patrick's account. And I also asked that Mrs. Thomasson be 
investigated, because she was the chief financial officer and would 
have been aware of all of these transactions.
  I have not yet heard from Mr. Fiske. However, the reason I am taking 
the floor right now is to inform the House that if we pass this 
independent counsel statute, as I believe we are going to today, and if 
Mr. Fiske declines to expand the Whitewater investigation into the 
possible laundering of drug money, then I will ask whoever is appointed 
independent counsel to investigate these allegations, these 
possibilities, because if $60 to $109 million in drug money was 
laundered and somebody at the White House may have been involved, it 
most certainly should be investigated by the special counsel.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant].
  (Mr. BRYANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Speaker, the conference report on S. 24, the 
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, very closely tracks 
House Resolution 811, which passed the House earlier this year by a 
vote of 356 to 56. Like the House-passed bill, the conference report 
reauthorizes the independent counsel for 5 years and maintains the 
basic structure of the act which expired, unfortunately, in December 
1992. Even though we were prepared to pass it, it was killed by virtue 
of, in effect, a filibuster coming from the other side.
  We have persisted. We have acted as rapidly as we possibly could, and 
we have brought it back to be passed again.
  The independent counsel law required the Attorney General to review 
credible and specific allegations of serious wrongdoing by high 
executive-branch officials and to seek the appointment of independent 
counsel to investigate the allegations if the Attorney General 
determined that further investigation was warranted.
  The conference report also preserves the Attorney General's 
discretionary authority to seek appointment of an independent counsel 
to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by anybody else covered by 
Federal criminal law if the case may result in a personal, financial, 
or political conflict of interest for officials of the Justice 
Department.
  It also follows the House-passed bill by putting in place strong 
rules and procedures to prevent wasteful spending. I am concerned that 
we have not fully satisfied the concerns expressed by the gentleman 
from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], because he has participated in this process 
in very good faith. We have, however, taken, in my view, steps that go 
as far as we possibly can go without compromising the independence of 
the counsel. Specifically we have required a specific employee be 
assigned to the duty of certifying the expenditures and to certifying 
that they are reasonable and in accordance with law.
  To comply also with established policies of the Department of Justice 
regarding the expenditures of any funds, it is his obligation and 
obligation of the independent counsel, and he must also follow the same 
Federal laws and regulations that apply to travel by employees of all 
executive branch agencies.
  We have gone a very long way in attempting to address the concerns of 
a number of Members with regard to the ability of the independent 
counsel to spend, but it is more important that he be independent than 
that we cover every possible abuse and prevent every possible abuse in 
the future.

  To insure that the new rules are followed, the conference report 
would require independent counsel as well to submit annual reports of 
expenditures to the Congress. I think we have gone as far as we could 
possible go, and also maintain the independence of this independent 
counsel.
  The conference report also places further restrictions on the 
salaries that are paid to individuals who are employed by independent 
counsel employees, and it amends the act to provide an explicit 
category of coverage for Members of Congress.
  Now, I regret the points that have been made earlier. But this House 
and the other body specifically voted to adopt the provision that is in 
this bill which allows the Attorney General to exercise her discretion 
to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel with regard to a 
Member of Congress. She would be able to use the independent counsel 
process with regard to a Member of Congress whenever she determined 
that it was in the public interest for her to do so.
  With this change, any confusion that may exist about whether Members 
of Congress are covered by the law is ended once and for all.
  The agreement also contains a number of provisions that were in the 
Senate bill but not in the House bill. It would lengthen, for example, 
for 15 to 30 days as the period of time allowed for the Attorney 
General's initial review of allegations, and deletes from the act the 
requirement that the independent counsel state the reasons for not 
indicting anyone who is under investigation.
  It includes a nongermane provision regarding requiring the White 
House to report annually on personnel employed in the executive office 
of the President, that was sought by Members from the other side.
  It also includes a number of transition provisions as well that deal 
with existing independent counsel that are presently operating and 
takes account of the fact that the conversion of this statute to their 
situation requires a few provisions which are not controversial.

                              {time}  1450

  Finally, I would simply respond to the many statements that have been 
made with regard to attorneys fees and so forth by saying once again 
this conference report was approved by a unanimous vote of the other 
body. Surely the Senator from Iowa, Mr. Dole, as minority leader, 
surely Mr. Stevens, as a member of the conference, surely Mr. Cohen, as 
a member of the conference, are diligent enough and dedicated enough to 
have spotted any indication of any of the conspiratorial motives that 
might have lain behind the adoption of this provision had they existed. 
They did not exist.
  Simply put, we want the three-judge court to have the option, if it 
chooses to do so, to convert Mr. Fiske from a special counsel to an 
independent counsel. But that decision will be made by the three-judge 
court, not by the passage of this statute.
  This is a historic statute that has served this country well. We have 
attempted to make it a little bit better and to reenact it in order 
that the country might know that high public officials who may be so 
personally close to the Attorney General that we could not reasonable 
expect them to be treated in the same way that every other American is 
going to be treated, will be treated the same way every other American 
is treated by an independent counsel that is able to act in the public 
interest.
  I urge the Members to vote in favor of the approval of the conference 
report.
  Ms. FURSE. Mr. Speaker, as I was the last time the House considered 
this legislation, I am concerned about provisions in this bill which 
set a different standard for Congress and the executive branch. While 
executive branch officials are subject to the provisions of S. 24, 
there is no requirement in this legislation that credible evidence of 
wrongdoing by a Member of Congress will be investigated by the Justice 
Department or a third party.
  Action is needed to restore the public's faith in Congress. Although 
I believe it could go further, I will support this legislation because 
Members of Congress are explicitly listed as possible subjects of 
independent counsel investigations. I do so, however, reiterating the 
fact that Congress must at all times avoid setting a different standard 
for itself.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I 
move the previous question on the conference report.
  The previous question was ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Barlow). The question is on the 
conference report.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently, a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 317, 
nays 105, not voting 12, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 258]

                               YEAS--317

     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (NJ)
     Andrews (TX)
     Applegate
     Bacchus (FL)
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (LA)
     Barca
     Barcia
     Barlow
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Byrne
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Castle
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Condit
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     Darden
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Dornan
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Ehlers
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Everett
     Farr
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Fish
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Furse
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Grandy
     Green
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hochbrueckner
     Hoekstra
     Holden
     Horn
     Hoyer
     Huffington
     Hughes
     Hutto
     Hyde
     Inslee
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klein
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kopetski
     Kreidler
     LaFalce
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lehman
     Levin
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lightfoot
     Lipinski
     Long
     Lowey
     Maloney
     Mann
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCandless
     McCloskey
     McCrery
     McCurdy
     McDade
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKeon
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Meyers
     Mfume
     Mica
     Miller (CA)
     Miller (FL)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Morella
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Oberstar
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Oxley
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Penny
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Reed
     Regula
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Ridge
     Roemer
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Roukema
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sangmeister
     Santorum
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schenk
     Schiff
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shepherd
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Snowe
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stupak
     Swett
     Swift
     Synar
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Unsoeld
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weldon
     Wheat
     Whitten
     Williams
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zimmer

                               NAYS--105

     Abercrombie
     Archer
     Armey
     Baker (CA)
     Ballenger
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Bentley
     Bliley
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Brown (CA)
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Coble
     Combest
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     DeLay
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Emerson
     Ewing
     Fields (TX)
     Gekas
     Gingrich
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Grams
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoke
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Istook
     Johnson, Sam
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Kolbe
     Kyl
     Lewis (FL)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Livingston
     Lucas
     Machtley
     McCollum
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Michel
     Moorhead
     Murphy
     Myers
     Nussle
     Packard
     Paxon
     Petri
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Ravenel
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Royce
     Schaefer
     Sensenbrenner
     Shuster
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sundquist
     Talent
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wilson
     Zeliff

                             NOT VOTING--12

     Carr
     Chapman
     DeFazio
     Frost
     Lloyd
     Mineta
     Obey
     Pelosi
     Slattery
     Solomon
     Valentine
     Washington

                              {time}  1514

  Messrs. KINGSTON, THOMAS of Wyoming, GOODLING, ISTOOK, HERGER, and 
ROYCE changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
  Mr. BLUTE changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
  So the conference report was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________