[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 76 (Thursday, June 16, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1994

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Chair. I rise in opposition to the pending 
amendment on toilets on small aircraft.
  Mr. President, this amendment would prevent air carriers from 
providing scheduled passenger service in an aircraft that carries 10 or 
more passengers unless the aircraft has a toilet facility for passenger 
use. Planes for which the type certificate has been approved prior to 
the effective date of this section would not be compelled to comply. 
But within 1 year, it is my understanding that aircraft would have to 
be provided with that facility.
  Perhaps to some on its face this amendment appears to be one which 
would provide for the convenience or even necessity of some airline 
passengers. I think with a rudimentary knowledge of the small aircraft 
business in America and the implications that this legislation would 
have on it, anyone who has a rudimentary knowledge of the average 
lengths of flights and the kinds of commuter services that are provided 
by small aircraft could not in their wildest dreams support this 
amendment. Anyone who has a clear understanding of the efforts that 
have been made by many Members of this body to provide essential air 
service to small communities and towns in America, to which this would 
be a significant barrier because of the increase in cost of the 
aircraft which then would be passed on obviously to the purchasers of 
the aircraft, who would then pass on that additional cost to the 
passengers who purchase the tickets, could not seriously consider this 
amendment.
  Mr. President, the average trip on a commuter aircraft, which would 
be the aircraft which fall under this amendment, is only 200 miles. The 
air flight time averages between 45 and 75 minutes. Of that time, the 
seat belt signs are deactivated, which allows the passenger to move 
around the aircraft, for a grand total of 20 minutes.
  Mr. President, I have ridden in my State on many small commuter 
aircraft.
  First of all, the flights even in a very large State, which mine is, 
are relatively short.
  Second of all, the very size of the aircraft themselves is inhibiting 
for a passenger to get up and move to the back of the aircraft, which I 
imagine would be the location of this facility.
  And third, it would require an enormous amount of agility to use this 
facility. For the additional space that would be taken up by the 
facility, of course, there would be a reduction in passenger seating 
unless, of course, the Senator from Ohio would contemplate using this 
facility for a dual purpose, which I doubt would attract too many 
purchasers of tickets.
  But the fact is that these small commuter airlines operate on a very, 
very, very thin profit margin. The most difficult business probably in 
America today, and I think I can prove this by statistics as to the 
number of very small commuter airlines that start up and file every 
year, is this business. And all of us in this body agree that we have 
an obligation to provide air service to people who live in rural areas 
as much as we can instead of the very convenient air service that is 
provided to people who live in large metropolitan areas.
  I am not clear, Mr. President, why we are seriously considering this 
amendment. One manufacturer, American Eagle, did include a toilet 
facility in the 19-seat airplane. They have found that the facility is 
rarely used. Passengers, as I mentioned, have little time to use the 
facilities and are reluctant to move about in smaller cabins. The cost 
to install a toilet facility would be between $16,000 to $77,000. Those 
costs clearly will be passed on to air carriers that are already paying 
high product liability expenses. And as I mentioned, air carriers would 
lose substantial income from the loss of seats, a 5 to 20 percent loss 
of passenger capacity--a 5 to 20 percent loss of passenger capacity.
  So what the ultimate result of this amendment would be is the loss of 
passenger service by commuter airliners because they could not afford 
it, increased ticket prices if they were there, and then those citizens 
of this great country of ours would be forced to use other means of 
transportation to get back and forth to their destinations, all of 
which would take a considerably greater length of time.
  So, Mr. President, as one who has been involved for many years in 
aviation issues, I hope that we will vote on this amendment quickly and 
defeat it resoundingly and go on to more serious issues, because this 
clearly would be another step in expanding what is already a very 
serious problem in America today, and that is the ability of small 
towns and cities and communities to have air service.
  I note the presence of the Senator from South Dakota, my friend, who 
has for years been committed to the issue of essential air service and 
trying to provide that air service to the citizens of the small towns 
and communities in the State of South Dakota as well as the Midwest. 
How you can possibly sustain that much-needed service when you increase 
the costs of an airplane unnecessarily between $16,000 and $77,000 and 
reduce the number of seats from 5 to 20 percent on these commuter 
airliners is, frankly, beyond me.
  I urge the Senator from Ohio to go for a ride on a couple of these 
airplanes, these small 10- to 19-passenger airplanes, and try to walk 
back in them, especially since, generally speaking, they are flying at 
a relatively low altitude. The conditions are cramped because they are 
commuter airliners and they are small. And then perhaps ask the 
commuter passengers if they would rather pay more for their ticket or 
would they rather have a toilet facility on board.
  It is pretty obvious what would be the answer.
  So I strongly oppose this amendment. I am sorry we are wasting the 
time of the Senate on it, and I hope we will dispense of it as soon as 
possible.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mathews). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, this bill has now been on the floor for 
over 1 week. I believe the number of amendments that are relevant to 
airline and airport matters is very limited. I think there are four 
outstanding controversial amendments that would be viewed in any way as 
being germane to the legislation that is before us.
  It is very important that we press on with this legislation, and it 
is my hope that somehow the Whitewater matter can be either agreed to 
or perhaps debated in connection with other legislation, and that we 
can get on with the issue at hand.
  I had hoped to make a tabling motion with respect to the toilet 
amendment that has been offered by Senator Metzenbaum. He is not on the 
floor right now, so I will not make such a motion. But it is my hope 
that we can get on with the bill.
  I point out to the Senate that time is of the essence. If this 
legislation is not enacted and signed into law by the President by June 
30, the result is that airport construction in this country comes to a 
halt. Therefore, we have to pass the bill. And when we pass the bill, 
it will then go to conference. I do not know how difficult or easy the 
conference will be.
  I would not necessarily assume that it would be a simple conference. 
There could be issues that are raised in that conference. It is now 
June 16, and we have to get on with the bill. Somehow I hope that the 
Whitewater matter will be worked out. It would be my hope that other 
unrelated amendments would not be offered to this legislation. Other 
bills are going to come through the Senate. Other matters are going to 
be before us to which we can offer our amendments and make our points. 
I simply hope that this bill is not one of them.
  Not seeing the Senator from Ohio on the floor right now, I will not 
immediately move to table the Senator's amendment, but I intend to do 
that in the very near future. My hope would be that we could proceed on 
the other airline and airport-related amendments and do so with 
dispatch and get this bill passed by the Senate this afternoon.


                Amendment No. 1798 to Amendment No. 1796

(Purpose: To enhance the preparedness of United States and South Korean 
                    forces in the Republic of Korea)

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1798 to amendment No. 1796.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  Mr. FORD. I object. I want to hear the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the amendment.
       At the end of the amendment; add the following:
       Whereas (1) President Clinton stated in November of 1993, 
     it is the official policy of the United States that North 
     Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb.
       (2) The United States seeks to compel North Korea, through 
     the imposition of sanctions or other means, to act in 
     accordance with its freely undertaken obligations under the 
     Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to abandon its efforts 
     to develop nuclear weapons.
       (3) North Korea has repeatedly threatened to withdraw from 
     the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has resisted efforts of 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct effective 
     inspections of its nuclear program and has stated that it 
     would consider the imposition of economic sanctions as a 
     declaration of war and has threatened retaliatory action.
       (4) The North Korean government has constructed and has 
     operated a reprocessing facility at Yongbyon solely designed 
     to convert spent nuclear fuel into plutonium with which to 
     make nuclear weapons. Further, the existence of this facility 
     and the development of these weapons gravely threatens 
     security in the region and increases the likelihood of 
     worldwide nuclear terrorism.
       (5) The Secretary of Defense stated that the United States 
     must act on the assumption that there will be some increase 
     in the risk of war if sanctions are imposed on North Korea.
       (6) It is incumbent on the United States to take all 
     necessary and appropriate action to ensure the preparedness 
     of United States and Republic of Korea forces to repel as 
     quickly as possible any attack from North Korea and to 
     protect the safety and security of United States and Republic 
     of Korea forces, as well as the safety and security of the 
     civilian population of the peninsula.
       (7) Neither the United States nor the Republic of Korea 
     have yet acted prudently to bring our forces to the optimum 
     level of preparedness to deter aggression from North Korea 
     or, in the event deterrence should fail, to repel any such 
     attack with the least loss of life and property possible.
       Now, therefore, be it resolved, that the United States 
     should immediately take all necessary and appropriate actions 
     to enhance the preparedness and safety of United States and 
     Republic of Korea forces to deter and, if necessary, repel an 
     attack from North Korea.

  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, the point I make here is that this is 
another amendment we have been dealing with now for a week, and it has 
nothing to do with airport improvement reauthorization bill. The 
Senator from Arizona knows very well that he has every right to do 
this, and I am not faulting him for what he is doing under the rules.
  But here is a bill, as Senator Danforth has said, and we need to get 
the bill passed. This bill has to go to conference, and we have to pass 
it again, and it has to go to the President for his signature before 
June 30. What we are doing is delaying, delaying, delaying, delaying 
the tens of millions of dollars that belongs to States. It belongs to 
them right now--entitlements. Entitlements are in this bill.
  This is a jobs bill. When you build runways, you start using brick, 
mortar and electricians. It is a jobs bill, and the construction season 
is just underway. We do not want to lose it.
  Again, I do not fault the Senator for doing what he wants to do. The 
rules are there. But this is the second amendment now that has nothing 
to do with the underlying piece of legislation. We get this and get 
this and get this. For 8 long months--and the Senator from Arizona 
knows, because he has been ranking member of the Aviation Committee; he 
understands the problems we have faced in trying to work out the 
agreement and bring the bill to this point. And now to find ourselves 
stymied by things other than the aviation community is a little bit 
exasperating.
  I want to protect the minority, and I do not want to change the 
rules, but I sure would like to change the attitude of some who want to 
put everything on a piece of legislation any time they want to. I hope 
that the Senator will not take too long and we can get a vote on this, 
or whatever is necessary. I suspect that there would be a lot of 
conversation on this. We may not finish it today. This is a bill that 
should have been finished last Friday. Tomorrow is Friday. This started 
a week ago today.
  So now we get into a big debate of whether the administration is 
right or wrong, or whether we have a solution or we do not. We can get 
into the water and muddy it up, and we will not be able to see the 
bottom side or up. And so I just say that it is exasperating. Every day 
we wait, somebody thinks of another amendment to put on this bill or 
another colloquy, or whatever it might be. I have put in more 
colloquies on this bill than Carter has liver pills.
  So, Mr. President, I just ask my colleagues to try to be as helpful 
on this bill as they can. I am trying to help them. There will be 
another bill coming. Try it on that one for once. Stay here Friday and 
Saturday and talk about it while I go home and try to tell my folks we 
are going to get a little something for the airports there. We have all 
these problems. If you want to stay around and talk about Korea Friday 
or Saturday and go to church Sunday morning and come back Sunday 
afternoon, that is alright with me. Get out the cots. That is alright 
with me. Let us get this bill out of here and get some movement and get 
something done, and we can start a jobs operation.
  Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, the underlying amendment is the 
Metzenbaum amendment, and the Metzenbaum amendment would require that 
small commercial aircraft would have to have toilets in new planes. If 
they are not new planes, people would have to be warned about it. I do 
not believe that requirement should be on this legislation. A lot of 
discussion has occurred about mandates of various kinds on the private 
sector and the limitations of new mandates. I view that as another idea 
for a mandate. I oppose that amendment.
  I appreciate the interest of the Senator from Arizona on the question 
of North Korea. It clearly is the most difficult foreign policy issue, 
the most challenging, and the most dangerous foreign policy issue that 
we have before us as a country right now, as a world. The acquisition 
of nuclear capability and the possibility of delivering that nuclear 
capability is truly threatening, particularly in the hands of North 
Korea. And the possibility of North Korea selling that capability, 
exporting them, is also something that is very, very threatening to the 
world. I think that the Senate should address itself to the question of 
North Korea. I do not believe that an unprinted second-degree amendment 
is the best way to do it on the floor of the Senate on a Thursday 
afternoon.
  I just do not think that. This is a matter that is very, very 
important. I am not sure we have thought out as a Senate precisely what 
our position should be or how it should be framed. We view sense-of-
the-Senate amendments, we view foreign policy initiatives that are 
reeled out on the floor of the Senate as matters that may be not of 
great import. But if anybody watches what we do, if anybody in the 
world watches what we do, it may be that other quarters in the world 
would view the wording of this legislation, this amendment, to be a 
matter of great significance.
  So it seemed to me whatever we do on the question of North Korea is 
something that we do very carefully and very cautiously. I just do not 
happen to believe that this is the form for doing it.
  So, the parliamentary situation now is that a tabling motion offered 
on Senator Metzenbaum's amendment would carry with it Senator McCain's 
amendment as well. That would seem to me to be a pretty good approach. 
I will withhold it now.
  I understand that the Republican leader is desirous of coming onto 
the floor, and I do not want to do anything to interfere with any 
strategy or prerogatives that he might have. But I would say to the 
Senate that this legislation has to be passed. I do not know of any 
Senator who wants airport construction to stop in this country, and it 
is time to get on with it. This Senator wants to do everything that he 
can to make sure that we do get on with the business of passing this 
legislation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, first of all, I say to the Senator from 
Missouri that, if he chooses to table this amendment, which will take, 
of course, the second-degree amendment with it, I intend to exercise my 
rights and reintroduce the amendment immediately following that and 
immediately following until there is a vote on this very important 
issue--in my view, believe it or not, I say to the Senator from 
Missouri, more important than an airport improvement package.
  Perhaps, as the Senator from Missouri has said, he and other Senators 
have not thought about this issue. I have thought about it a lot. I 
have thought about it for a long time. I believe I know a great deal 
about it. I think it is time that the Senate, including the Senator 
from Missouri, learned a lot more about it because we are literally on 
the brink of war in the case of North Korea. In case the Senator from 
Missouri does not know it, there are 38,000 American fighting men and 
women in South Korea and 80,000 dependents.
  As much as I want the Senator from Kentucky to bring home his little 
bit for the people of Kentucky that concerns him these days, I want to 
bring home something for the people who are stationed in Korea to let 
them know at least the Senate of the United States is concerned about 
their welfare and their security.
  Everyone has his or her priorities around this body. My priority 
right now is the security of this country.
  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
  Mr. McCAIN. I will not yield to the Senator. I will not yield to the 
Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. FORD. Since the Senator used my name I wanted to respond.
  Mr. McCAIN. I certainly did. And the Senator from Kentucky used my 
name, and I waited until I had the floor before I responded.
  So if the Senator from Missouri wishes to make a motion to table at 
this time, I would be glad to yield the floor and allow for that vote, 
but I want to assure the Senator from Missouri and the Senator from 
Kentucky that I intend to have this amendment discussed and debated. I 
think it can be done in a very short time.
  If the Senator from Missouri and the Senator from Kentucky would take 
the time to review this amendment, I think they would find that it is 
noncontroversial. Not only that, I would be more than agreeable to a 
time limit. I understand the frustration of both the Senator from 
Kentucky and the Senator from Missouri, but this amendment has not held 
up the workings and functions of this body. It has been the Whitewater 
issue which has delayed the passage of this bill.
  So I say to the Senator from Kentucky and the Senator from Missouri I 
will not take responsibility for that. I will not hold up the workings 
of the Senate. I will agree to a time agreement, but I will steadfastly 
maintain that the risk of war in Korea is more serious than an airport 
improvement bill, and it is time that the Senate of the United States 
discussed this very serious issue, which I intend to do.
  Now, I would like to offer to the Senator from Missouri at this time 
that, if he will choose to make his tabling motion now, I will be glad 
to bring up this amendment immediately following that vote. If not, I 
will proceed with the discussion of this amendment, which is, by the 
way, proposed by Senator Dole, the minority leader, and myself.
  So I ask the Senator from Missouri, without yielding my right to the 
floor, if he would like to make the tabling motion at this time.
  Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, will the Senator from Arizona yield 
for a question?
  Mr. McCAIN. After I receive a response from the Senator from 
Missouri, if he chooses to respond.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, I have been asked by the Republican 
staff to wait until Senator Dole comes on the floor, and I have agreed 
to do that. So until I hear from the Republican leader on this subject, 
I am not going to offer a motion at this time.
  Mr. McCAIN. I will be glad to respond to the question of the Senator 
from Ohio without yielding my right to the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, without addressing myself to the 
merits of the amendment of the Senator from Arizona, I am wondering 
whether or not all parties and purposes would not be better served if 
his amendment were offered as a separate amendment to this bill. 
Certainly he has a right to do that. The Senator has not thought of 
second degreeing or anything of the kind. It is sort of apples and--I 
do not know what else--monkey wrenches in the same amendment, and I am 
wondering whether he would not think that that would give him a much 
clearer up or down vote on this issue.
  Mr. McCAIN. I think the Senator from Ohio makes an excellent point. I 
will be more than happy to do so. That is why I offered the Senator 
from Missouri the opportunity to table the amendment. I have made my 
intentions clear to both the Senator from Kentucky and the Senator from 
Missouri. I intend to bring this amendment up if the amendment of the 
Senator from Ohio is tabled.
  So I would be more than happy to withdraw this second-degree 
amendment on the proviso that I bring it up immediately after the vote 
on this amendment without a second-degree. I do not care; they can 
bring it up after the vote on the tabling motion by the Senator from 
Missouri. If that is not agreeable, then we go ahead and discuss this 
amendment.
  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, if the Senator from Arizona will yield, I 
think that is the way I referred to him. He has the floor, and I would 
like to have an opportunity to enter into a colloquy with him, with his 
permission.
  Mr. McCAIN. I am pleased to enter into a colloquy.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, it is my understanding that one Senator from 
his side wishes to oppose the Metzenbaum so-called sanitary facilities, 
as the Senator did.
  Now, that means that if the Senator takes his amendment off, then we 
are still going to have a debate and a vote on that.
  One thing that bothers me about his amendment is it ought to have a 
special place rather than be wrapped up in an airport improvement 
reauthorization bill. It is expasperating seeing that probably no time 
agreement is going to be given and the Senator is offering a time 
agreement possibly with the feeling that no time agreement will be 
given.
  Mr. McCAIN. I say again to my friend from Kentucky, if he reads this 
amendment, it is noncontroversial and as a sponsor of the bill I would 
agree to a time limit. I am sure my colleagues would, too.
  Mr. FORD. I am trying to understand the Senator's amendment, and I am 
not the final authority nor is Senator Danforth. He was waiting for the 
Republican leader to come in before he made a motion. He agreed. And I 
am doing the same thing.
  But it just is a little bit exasperating to say that this is more 
important, it is overwhelming, and a little old airport reauthorization 
bill does not amount to anything compared with this. I agree with that, 
but I think it is wrong to wrap it up in this bill. There is something 
important about this bill because the Senator is putting his amendment 
on it.
  There ought to be some way that we bring that up and really do what 
is necessary as it relates to North Korea and give it the type of 
debate that is necessary.
  So that is the only point I was making. I am not downplaying North 
Korea. I would just like to say I think the Senator's wrapping it in 
this bill is proposing probably the wrong way to do it. I understand it 
is the wrong way as far as this bill is concerned.
  I am going to yield the floor.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, if I could continue the colloquy with the 
Senator from Kentucky, my point here is that--and, unfortunately, the 
Senator from Kentucky does not understand it--events are unfolding. I 
think it is important that the Senate of the United States express 
itself. I say to my friend from Kentucky events in Korea are unfolding 
in such a fashion that I think it is important that the Senate of the 
United States express itself, number one; and, number two, we all know 
what a sense-of-the-Senate resolution is. It is a message. It is a 
message concerning an issue of the sentiment of the U.S. Senate. 
Whether it is on the airport improvement bill or whether it is on the 
legislative appropriations bill is really not important. The fact is 
the U.S. Senate has debated and voted on an issue.
  So, Mr. President, again I ask the Senator from Missouri if he 
chooses to do that at this time or what he chooses to do.
  I yield to the Senator from Missouri.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
  Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, let me suggest the following: If the 
Senator would withdraw his amendment for the time being, I would then 
make a motion to table the amendment of the Senator from Ohio and the 
Senator from Arizona would be free to offer his amendment again.
  My own view is that the subject of North Korea is exceedingly 
important and that it should be dealt with in its own right. This is 
not the appropriate forum for doing it.
  But, as the Senator from Arizona has pointed out, he has every right 
in the world to offer this or any number of amendments to this 
legislation. I respect that. There is no way to stop it.
  I do not view this as a terribly controversial amendment. It is a 
sense of the Senate and it says that

       The United States should immediately take all necessary and 
     appropriate actions to enhance the preparedness and safety of 
     United States and Republic of Korea forces to deter and, if 
     necessary, repel an attack from North Korea.

  I do not know that anybody would vote against that, or even argue 
against it. It seems to me to be noncontroversial.
  So, as far as I am concerned, a time agreement would be fine after 
this.
  I hope that this is not going to be one of a whole series of 
amendments that people are going to be tripping over with on foreign 
policy. I think we are going to have an opportunity for a foreign 
policy debate on the floor of the Senate next week, and that seems to 
me to be the more appropriate occasion.
  But, I would say to the Senator from Arizona that if he would 
withdraw this second-degree amendment, I would then move to table the 
amendment of the Senator from Ohio and then it is up to the Senator 
from Arizona to do whatever he wants to do.
  Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Republican leader is recognized.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I would like to make a brief statement on 
the amendment that I have offered with Senator McCain.
  I do not see any problem with accommodating the managers here. The 
amendment is not offered to be controversial. We had a number of 
specific recommendations. Those were all taken out. I think what we are 
doing is, in effect, supporting what the President indicated to us 
yesterday, that this is a serious problem. It is a sense-of-the-Senate 
resolution that we pass from time to time.
  But I would like to make just a brief statement and then do whatever 
the Senator from Arizona wishes to do. It seems to me we could go ahead 
and get an agreement to offer it next and have a vote on it and then go 
ahead and do whatever you want with reference to the amendment by the 
Senator from Ohio [Mr. Metzenbaum].
  Mr. President, the crisis in the Korean Peninsula grows more 
dangerous every day. A year and half of negotiations and concessions 
was answered by North Korea: They destroyed evidence of their nuclear 
program. The International Atomic Energy Agency has been hindered, 
harassed, and rejected in its effort to monitor North Korea's 
compliance. After insulting the IAEA for months, North Korea has 
withdrawn from the agency.
  Finally, the administration has recognized that sanctions should be 
imposed. However, sanctions will be preceded by a grace period. 
Sanctions will also be limited to symbolic measures. Sanctions will be 
phased in. Cultural and sports exchanges will be banned, but an arms 
embargo on North Korea will not be enforced. While the United States 
enforces a total embargo on Haiti--which does not threaten American 
interests--we support only half-measures against North Korea. With this 
timid approach, it is easy to see why North Korea might think United 
States policy is based on bluff.
  Hard as it is to believe, there are some in the administration who 
still believe that North Korea is willing to negotiate away its nuclear 
capability. Clearly, North Korea is determined to build more nuclear 
weapons, and build more capable delivery systems. And clearly, North 
Korea will provide weapons to its friends in the international rogue's 
gallery: Libya, Iran, and Iraq.
  Time is not on the side of those who worry about these developments. 
Yet some in the administration seem to think this is all a big 
misunderstanding. Some think that this is all a miscalculation by North 
Korea than can be corrected with more negotiations and more 
concessions.

  Mr. President, it is not time for grace periods and half-measures--it 
is time for American leadership. It is time to act decisively to 
isolate North Korea and to reinforce deterrence on the Korean 
Peninsula. Former President Carter apparently received limited 
commitments that North Korea would not take more provocative steps, 
such as throwing IAEA inspectors out of the country. But that is no 
substitute for U.S. policy.
  There are legitimate differences over the best policy toward North 
Korea--how to halt its nuclear program before it threatens the world. 
There should be no difference, however, over the need to provide 
adequate equipment for United States and South Korean forces on the 
front line of a potential war. Sending Patriot missiles by sea is 
inadequate. American forces, and the forces of our allies, deserve the 
best equipment we can provide--in the type and amount necessary to 
defend against attack. We cannot risk a military disaster which could 
be avoided by providing appropriate equipment. We all remember what a 
difference armored vehicles could have made in Mogadishu last October.
  Some might argue that sending equipment to defend against possible 
aggression is provocative or war-monitoring. I remember the old adage: 
``If you want peace, prepare for war.'' No one in this country or in 
South Korea wants war in the Korean Peninsula. Some 50,000 Americans 
gave their lives in the last Korean war. But war may have been avoided 
in 1950 if Kim Il-song had not heard the American Secretary of State 
declare that Korea was outside the American defensive perimeter. And 
war may be avoided now be sending a clear signal that we are serious, 
that we will defend our forces if attacked, and that we will prevail if 
attacked.
  And remember, we have 37,000 Americans on the DMZ, so it is not that 
we do not have a fairly important and significant interest in that part 
of the world.
  The history of this century clearly shows that the best way to stop 
aggression is through firmness and strength, not through concessions 
and appeasement. And the best way to prevent war is to show be prepared 
to fight and win a war should deterrence fail.
  This amendment is a reasonable step to show the Senate's support for 
strengthening the capabilities of American and allied forces in South 
Korea. There is much more that needs to be done.
  China, South Korea, and Japan need to be brought into a solid 
coalition under American leadership. The issue of missile defense 
should be reexamined in light of the North Korean threat.
  But this amendment is an immediate step. It shows our support for 
Americans on the front line facing aggression.
  This amendment, I think, sends a signal. It supports what the 
President indicated to many of us yesterday and it shows the President 
we are behind necessary steps to protect Americans deployed overseas. I 
think it will receive unanimous support.
  I thank my colleague from Arizona for his leadership and also my 
colleague from Texas, Senator Gramm, who I believe is a cosponsor of 
the amendment.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Kansas and I 
appreciate very much his leadership on this very important issue.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that following the vote on the 
tabling amendment by the Senator from Missouri that it be in order for 
me to call up the sense-of-the-Senate amendment concerning North Korea.
  Mr. FORD. Could the Senator add the words, ``following disposition of 
the Metzenbaum amendment''? It may be it would not be tabled. I like 
the Senator's confidence, but around here it may not always be that 
way.
  Mr. McCAIN. I amend my unanimous-consent request in that fashion, Mr. 
President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Hearing none, it is so 
ordered.


               Vote on Motion to Table Amendment No. 1796

  Mr. DANFORTH. Mr. President, I move to table the Metzenbaum amendment 
and ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion of 
the Senator from Missouri [Mr. Danforth] to table the amendment of the 
Senator from Ohio [Mr. Metzenbaum]. The yeas and nays have been ordered 
and the clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Riegle] is 
necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Chamber 
who desire to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 93, nays 6, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 149 Leg.]

                                YEAS--93

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boren
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Danforth
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Faircloth
     Feingold
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Helms
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     Mathews
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thurmond
     Wallop
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                                NAYS--6

     Boxer
     Feinstein
     Metzenbaum
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Simon

                             NOT VOTING--1

       
     Riegle
       
  So the motion to lay on the table the amendment (No. 1796) was agreed 
to.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The absence of a quorum has been suggested. 
The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Lieberman). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask that Senator Bingaman be 
recognized to address the Senate as if in morning business for up to 5 
minutes, and that following his remarks Senator Domenici be recognized 
to address the Senate for up to 5 minutes as if in morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Hearing no objection, that will be the order.
  The Chair recognizes the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Bingaman].
  (The remarks of Mr. Bingaman and Mr. Domenici pertaining to the 
introduction of S. 2201 are located in today's Record under 
``Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Arizona [Mr. McCain], is recognized to offer an amendment.


                           Amendment No. 1799

 (Purpose: To enhance the preparedness of U.S. and South Korean forces 
                       in the Republic of Korea)

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], for himself, Mr. 
     Dole, Mr. Gorton, Mr. Pressler, Mr. Roth, Mr. Gramm, Mr. 
     Wallop, Mr. Nickles, Mr. Helms, Mrs. Kassebaum, Mr. Robb, and 
     Mr. Thurmond, proposes an amendment numbered 1799.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:


                                findings

       (1) President Clinton stated in November of 1993, it is the 
     official policy of the United States that North Korea cannot 
     be allowed to become a nuclear power.
       (2) The United States seeks to compel North Korea, through 
     the imposition of sanctions or other means, to act in 
     accordance with its freely undertaken obligations under the 
     Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to abandon its efforts 
     to develop nuclear weapons.
       (3) North Korea has repeatedly threatened to withdraw from 
     the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has resisted efforts of 
     the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct effective 
     inspections of its nuclear program, and has stated that it 
     would consider the imposition of economic sanctions as a 
     declaration of war and has threatened retaliatory action.
       (4) The North Korean government has constructed and has 
     operated a reprocessing facility at Yongbyon solely designed 
     to convert spent nuclear fuel into plutonium with which to 
     make nuclear weapons. Further, the existence of this facility 
     and the development of these weapons gravely threatens 
     security in the region and increases the likelihood of 
     worldwide nuclear terrorism.
       (5) The Secretary of Defense stated that the United States 
     must act on the assumption that there will be some increase 
     in the risk of war if sanctions are imposed on North Korea.
       (6) It is incumbent on the United States to take all 
     necessary and prudent action to ensure the preparedness of 
     United States and Republic of Korea forces to repel as 
     quickly as possible any attack from North Korea and to 
     protect the safety and security of United States and Republic 
     of Korea forces, as well as the safety and security of the 
     civilian population of the peninsula.
       It is the sense of the Senate that the United States should 
     immediately take all necessary and prudent actions to enhance 
     the preparedness and safety of United States and Republic of 
     Korea forces to deter and, if necessary, repel an attack from 
     North Korea.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send the amendment in behalf of Senator 
Dole and myself; additionally, in behalf of Senators Gorton, Pressler, 
Gramm, Wallop, Roth, Nickles, Helms, Kassebaum, Robb, and Thurmond.
  Mr. President, I am pleased to sponsor this resolution with the 
Republican leader, Senator Dole. North Korea's intentions to build a 
nuclear arsenal, no matter the cost, have become ever clearer in 
Pyongyang's numerous violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and in its increasingly bellicose language. The United States has no 
responsible alternative but to prepare for the worst, and make those 
improvements to the readiness of U.S. forces in Korea necessary to 
repel North Korean aggression quickly and with the least loss of life 
possible.
  This resolution signals the Senate's strong support for Defense 
Secretary Perry's prescription that the United States must act on the 
prudent assumption that the North Koreans are serious when they define 
the imposition of economic sanctions as an act of war.
  Unfortunately, it has become necessary for Congress to send a signal 
that the Clinton administration has thus far been reluctant to send: 
that neither threats of war from North Korea nor U.S. diplomatic 
imperatives will deter the United States from taking all necessary 
measures to ensure that 37,000 American troops and 80,000 dependents 
have all the means they require to defend their lives and our interests 
in Korea. That we have no already begun to make these improvements 
constitutes considerable negligence on the part of the Administration.
  Our resolution calls on the administration to immediately take 
prudent actions to enhance the preparedness of United States and South 
Korean forces to deter and, if necessary, to repel a North Korean 
attack. Adding to the urgency of the need for improvements to our 
force's readiness is the recognition that we lack adequate strategic 
lift capability. Therefore, we must initiate deployments well ahead of 
any anticipated military action.
  I believe these actions should include, but need not be limited to:
  First, increasing the readiness and alert posture of United States 
and South Korean forces;
  Second, deploying to South Korea additional troops from the United 
States;
  Third, deploying additional fighter aircraft squadrons and Apache 
helicopter squadrons to South Korea;
  Fourth, deploying a carrier battle group to the region;
  Fifth, prepositioning bombers and tankers in the region;
  Sixth, prepositioning additional stocks in the region;
  Seventh, enhancing intelligence collection and sharing with South 
Korea;
  Eighth, enhancing South Korean defenses with multiple launch rocket 
systems, counter artillery radars, anti-tank weapons, precision-guided 
munitions, and antimissile defenses; and
  Ninth, enhancing South Korea's defenses against chemical and 
biological weapons.
  These steps do not represent an exhaustive list of needed 
improvements to our readiness. But they would contribute substantially 
to protecting the men and women we have asked to stand post for us in 
Korea--assuring them that they will have sufficient reinforcements to 
complete their mission successfully and not be sacrificed to the 
fortunes of diplomacy.
  I am traveling to South Korea this evening for detailed briefings 
from United States and South Korean military commanders on the precise 
nature of the North Korean threat and on our ability to prevail should 
hostilities on the peninsula resume in the near term. After my return, 
I hope to provide my colleagues with a comprehensive picture of our 
readiness requirements in Korea.
  Mr. President, last November, President Clinton described United 
States policy toward the North Korean nuclear crisis clearly and 
correctly. He said that the United States would not tolerate North 
Korea's possession of nuclear weapons. With the exception of a few 
subsequent remarks by Secretary Perry, that was the last time our 
policy was well articulated.
  Since the President's November statement, his administration's policy 
has persistently suffered from two serious misperceptions: First, that 
the threat from North Korea is not yet a legitimate crisis; second, 
that time works to our advantage. Just last week, I heard senior 
administration officials reaffirm these mistakes in order to remove any 
sense of urgency about our efforts to secure a sanctions resolution 
from the Security Council, referring to the situation as not yet time 
sensitive.
  Mr. President, I can think of no crisis in a long while more acute or 
more time sensitive then the crisis we now confront on the Korean 
Peninsula. The discharged fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor, which 
contain enough plutonium for four to six nuclear weapons can be removed 
by the North Koreans at anytime from their cooling pond and diverted to 
the reprocessing facility for conversion into weapons grade plutonium. 
A huge new reactor capable of producing enough plutonium for up to a 
dozen nuclear weapons will be operational in early 1995.
  Pyongyang has already tested a ballistic missile, the NoDong 1, with 
a 1,000 kilometer range. Any day, they may test the NoDong 2 which has 
a 2,000 kilometer range and is capable of striking Tokyo. North Korea 
has acquired at least 40 and possibly 60 submarines from Russia which 
Jane's Defense Weekly contends can be modified to fire ballistic 
missiles.
  Mr. President, the situation we face today in Korea is grave. It will 
be worse tomorrow. It will become worse every day that North Korea is 
allowed to pursue its ambitions to become a nuclear power. A North 
Korea attack, which today is a very real threat, would be far more 
likely after Pyongyang acquires a substantial nuclear arsenal and the 
means of delivering their warheads to Tokyo.
  The danger will intensify even more if 82-year-old Kim Il Sung dies 
and his ruthless heir, Kim Jong Il, succeeds him as Great Leader. After 
all, it is Kim Jong Il who is believed to have ordered the 
assassination of half the South Korean cabinet, and to have ordered the 
destruction of a civilian airliner killing 150 innocent South Korean 
passengers.
  And yet, Mr. President, while the danger grows, while the crisis 
becomes more intractable, the United States waits. We wait to see 
whether or not the North Koreans will expel the last two IAEA 
inspectors from North Korea. We wait to see whether they will postpone 
their withdrawal from the IEA as a concession to former President 
Carter.
  We wait while administration officials circulate their draft 
resolution in the Security Council that contains only symbolic 
sanctions--cutoffs of cultural, scientific, and educational exchanges; 
the termination of a U.N. assistance program worth all of $15 million 
to North Korea; downgrading of diplomatic representations in Pyongynag, 
and a mandatory, but unenforced arms embargo. These sanctions will 
almost certainly fail to persuade Pyongyang to desist from further 
violations of the NPT. But we will wait some more, Mr. President, 
possibly for weeks, for the administration to ever so slowly bring this 
toothless resolution to a vote, and, with any luck, persuade China and 
Russia not to veto it.
  After the vote, we will wait again, for 30 days, before the sanctions 
go into effect while the United States foolishly extends a grace period 
to North Korea in the hope that it will succumb to the administration's 
soft pressure and limitless patience. Then we will wait some more to 
see if countries like Iran, Libya, and Iraq will cooperate in an arms 
embargo.
  We wait and wait and wait and wait endlessly for the administration 
to recognize the manifest failures of its diplomacy and cease its 
mindless devotion to the principle of ``if at first we fail to appease, 
then try, try again.''
  Let me reemphasize, Mr. President: it will take nearly 2 months for 
these sanctions to be imposed. By the time it takes for the 
administration to accept that these sanctions have not had the desired 
effect, North Korea could have converted the fuel discharged from the 
Yongbyon reactor into enough weapons grade plutonium for six additional 
nuclear bombs, and North Korea's huge new 240 megawatt reactor could be 
operational.
  Mr. President, let me divert from the subject of our resolution for a 
moment to briefly discuss a development relating to former President 
Carter's negotiations with Kim Il-song. Apparently, Kim Il-song has 
told President Carter that he will not expel the last two IAEA 
inspectors from North Korea ``so long as good faith efforts are being 
made jointly between the United States and Korea to resolve the entire 
nuclear problem.''
  Let us be clear about what President Carter has accomplished. It is 
certainly important that North Korea not expel the inspectors and 
destroy our remaining capacity to observe any future diversion of fuel. 
However, this assurance does not remedy the North Korean violation of 
the NPT which prompted the administration to seek sanctions against 
North Korea in the first place. The sanctions were necessitated by 
North Korea's discharge of all remaining fuel rods from the Yongbyon 
reactor in such a manner that it prevented the IAEA from sampling the 
fuel to determine how much fuel had been diverted in the past.
  Nothing in this recent announcement should cause the United States to 
back down from sanctions. Indeed, it only preserves the status quo, the 
unacceptable status quo. Until that violation is remedied by North 
Korea's willingness to come clean on its nuclear weapons program, 
sanctions--meaningful sanctions--should be imposed.
  Mr. President, I presume North Korea will not consider the imposition 
of sanctions as a ``good faith effort to resolve the nuclear crisis'' 
and will, accordingly, eject the two inspectors later. Surely, neither 
President Clinton nor former President Carter believes that North Korea 
has yet done anything to vitiate the need for sanctions.
  I am pleased that the inspectors will not be prevented from 
discharging their responsibilities at this time, but I am not so naive 
to consider this preservation of the status quo to be some kind of 
breakthrough or to believe for a moment that this will be North Korea's 
last word on the subject.
  Throughout these long months of bargaining with North Korea, we have 
repeatedly seen how little regard Pyongyang has for keeping its 
promises on this question. After the United States held direct 
negotiations with North Korea, North Korea promised to negotiate 
simultaneously with the United States, South Korea, and the IAEA. It 
later refused to negotiate with the IAEA and South Korea.
  After the United States held further talks with North Korea, and 
canceled Operation Team Spirit, North Korea agreed to allow thorough 
IAEA inspections of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. Subsequently, 
North Korea, at various times, refused access to nuclear waste sites, 
insisted on only night time inspections, abruptly terminated 
inspections, and refused to allow further inspections until the United 
States dropped its insistence on negotiations between North and South 
Korea.
  After the United States acceded to their demand, North Korea 
announced suddenly that it was shutting down its reactor for refueling, 
but promised to allow IAEA inspections of the defueling. When the IAEA 
then sought to take measurements from certain fuel rods of interest 
that would indicate North Korea's past diversion of fuel, North Korea 
commenced the defueling before inspectors arrived, refused them the 
access they sought, discharged all remaining fuel rods, and 
precipitated the current crisis.
  Mr. President, we should review very carefully all the details of 
North Korea's bad faith over the last 16 months, lest anyone be fooled 
into prematurely popping champagne corks over this latest promise made 
to President Carter.
  Now to return to the subject of our resolution: Mr. President, while 
the administration temporizes, and while North Korea seeks to obscure 
its intentions further, 37,000 Americans stand their post in Korea. 
They have not been reinforced, and they may not have sufficient means 
to deter a North Korean surprise attack. They will prevail in a 
conflict, but at a price that could have been lower had they been 
reinforced earlier.
  Mr. President, surely our colleagues will agree that the time to 
reverse this negligence has arrived.
  I understand the arguments that are arrayed in opposition to the 
precautions Senator Dole and I are calling for. North Korea, it is 
said, has learned the lessons of the gulf war. They will not allow us 
to mass our forces while the United States pursues its diplomatic 
objectives in the United Nations, and thereby deny them the critical 
element of their invasion plans--a massed, surprise attack. Reinforcing 
our troops would be simply too provocative an act; a provocation which 
would probably precipitate a preemptive invasion. Some suspect that 
they have already begun to implement their preemptive strike plans.
  For this reason, our South Korean allies are reluctant to agree to 
any substantial build up of our forces. I appreciate these concerns, 
Mr. President. Obviously, these are not easy decisions to make. But 
they are necessary ones.
  These same arguments were made by opponents of a defense build up in 
England and France in 1936, who argued that such a precaution would 
only provide a rationale for Nazi imperialism. These same arguments 
were made by our Middle Eastern allies, who feared that improving our 
military preparedness in the gulf would trigger an Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait.
  But the invasions came anyway, encouraged by the West's reluctance to 
deter them. If North Korea means to fight, they will not be dissuaded 
by our negligence to adequately prepare our forces to defeat them.
  With the exception of the slow deployment of Patriot missile 
batteries, and accelerated planning to reinforce in the event the North 
invades, we have done very little to send a strong, visible signal that 
we are prepared to repel their threatened aggression, and that we 
intend to see that the last battle of a second Korean war is fought in 
Pyongyang.
  Mr. President, I have recently received very distressing reports 
about the readiness of South Korean forces to defend their nation. I 
hope these reports are not true, but I intend to find out. As of this 
moment, however, South Korea must be made to understand that the United 
States intends to defend our troops and our interests in Korea by 
whatever means necessary.
  I do not mean to treat questions of Korean sovereignty lightly. I do 
not. I know that a second Korean war will be fought in their country, 
not ours, and that their capital is uniquely vulnerable to a North 
Korean artillery barrage. I have never been nor do I intend to become 
an Asia basher or someone who forgets that we have mutual interests 
that are well served by our strategic relations with Asian allies.
  But we have 37,000 troops there sworn to defend South Korea. South 
Korea must be equally dedicated to their protection or we will have 
little choice but to remove them from harm's way.
  Thirty-seven-thousand American troops are not sufficient to defend 
South Korea from an attack by over a million man army. We are relying 
on the readiness of South Korean forces. I would hope that the South 
Koreans recognize, as we do, the folly of not taking Kim I1 Sung at his 
word: that he means to fight, and fight ruthlessly. I would hope that 
South Korea now recognizes that there are a great many things it must 
do to prepare their forces; to counter North Korean advantages in 
artillery and manpower; to protect their capital, and to defend their 
people from the wages of war, like a chemical weapons attack, to the 
greatest extent possible.
  I have been somewhat encouraged by the apparent recent hardening of 
South Korea's attitude toward North Korea's violations of the NPT, and 
their call up of reserves for civil defense drills. But we except much 
more from Seoul in our mutual defense of that country, and we expect it 
now.
  I have on many occasions expressed opposition to administration 
foreign policies. But I have also refrained from supporting measures 
that would prospectively circumscribe or preclude Presidential 
leadership on foreign policy problems before his policies were 
developed and implemented.
  Regarding Korea, we have waited too long for evidence that the 
President intends to lead us in this crisis with the firm resolve that 
the situation demands. We have obligations to the 37,000 Americans 
stationed in Korea that can no longer be evaded for want of 
Presidential determination.
  This resolution is nonbinding. But it should signal to the 
administration and to Pyongyang that the people of the United States, 
and their elected representatives ultimately possess the resolve to see 
this crisis through to end; that we take their threats seriously, but 
are not paralyzed by fear; that the President was serious when he said 
the United States will not tolerate North Korea's possession of nuclear 
weapons; that the courage of the men and women whom we have asked to 
defend South Korea and our interests in Asia will be supported with all 
the means necessary for them to make North Korea pay dearly for the 
mistake of starting another war.
  In 1950, North Korea mistook American resolve. The consequences of 
their mistake were devastating. It is up to the President to ensure 
that they do not mistake our resolve again. This resolution should 
encourage the President to summon the resolve he needs to keep faith 
with that commitment. I urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on this amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. When the vote is taken, it will be by the yeas 
and nays.
  The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Nunn], is recognized.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, first, let me say I appreciate the Senator 
from Arizona's working with the majority leader, the Senator from 
Massachusetts, the Senator from Rhode Island, myself, and others to 
make certain changes in this amendment that I believe will make it 
acceptable for the Senate to vote on it in the near future.
  Second, while I agree with basically the thrust of the amendment, I 
do have to question the timing because former President Carter has just 
made announcements on CNN about his discussion with the leader of North 
Korea. He has another day or two there. I personally have not even had 
time to find out what he said on CNN yet. And that is one of the 
unfortunate things about the Senate. You can put an amendment on any 
time, any place, and the Senate has to come to grips with it 
immediately.
  But in the realm of foreign policy, that is a very difficult way to 
do business. To have the Senate speaking on a subject of this 
importance--even though I really agree with the thrust of what the 
Senator from Arizona has put forward--at this particular time is 
subject to being misinterpreted and subject to being, I think, even 
second guessed in the days ahead about events that may unfold. So the 
timing, to me, is questionable.
  But, of course, the Senator has the right to bring up an amendment 
any time he chooses to bring it up, and I know the Senator from Arizona 
is doing what he believes to be in the best interest of our national 
security, and I know he is doing what he believes to be in the best 
interest of our military forces in Korea. I have no doubt about that, 
having served with him and knowing his deep feeling and his sincere 
commitment to the well-being of our forces and to our overall national 
security.
  So, Mr. President, the Senate, I assume, will be voting on this 
today, and I think it is important that we understand a little 
background of where we are at this point in time. And I must add, 
again, that I have not heard the details except secondhand of what 
former President Carter himself has said in terms of his reports from 
North Korea.
  I would say, in general, from what I heard secondhand, that I will 
welcome the words from former President Carter. I think what he has 
said bears a great deal of close scrutiny here in terms of looking 
carefully at what has been said to him and what he has conveyed in many 
of his public announcements about the position of the leadership of 
North Korea.
  I do think there are some tough questions that have to be asked--the 
Senator from Arizona has already alluded to some of these--about what 
the North Koreans may be offering at this point in time.
  One tough question is, are they willing to freeze their program? Are 
they willing to say no more development of nuclear weapons, no more 
plutonium reprocessing? Are they willing to say they are not going to 
do any more reprocessing?
  Now, reprocessing is permitted under IAEA, and under the 
nonproliferation treaty it is not barred. But the North Koreans did 
agree with South Korea and signed a bilateral agreement whereby neither 
of those countries would engage in any reprocessing. They have never 
implemented that agreement, but it is certainly reasonable for us to 
ask them if they are willing to carry out their own commitment in 
regard to no reprocessing which can lead to the development of nuclear 
weapons.
  There are some tough questions that need to be asked, but I think 
former President Carter's visit there can be helpful in two ways.
  One way, as he is already doing, is to tell us a little bit about 
what the North Korean leadership is thinking, because this is a regime 
which is isolated, which is in many cases paranoid, and which is, of 
course, heavily armed and dug in and having an economic struggle. So it 
is a very dangerous situation.
  The other point that I think is important that I am sure former 
President Carter is conveying--I am hopeful this is the correct 
assumption--is the absolute firmness of the United States and our 
allies to stick to our position that North Korea must not and will not 
and cannot be permitted to become a nuclear power. I believe that this 
resolution does convey that.
  I would also say that I think the Senator from Arizona is correct in 
the fact that we need to make sure we take every prudent step to make 
absolutely clear that we are prepared-- we do not want a war--but that 
we are prepared and that we are going to do everything we can to 
protect our forces.
  The Senator from Indiana [Mr. Lugar], and I went to South Korea in 
January of this year. We issued a report on what we found there. I had 
a chance to engage in extensive discussions with our military leaders 
there, including our commander, General Luck, but not limited to him, 
with many of our military and intelligence people in South Korea.
  The bottom line of that visit, Mr. President, is that there were 
certain steps that needed to be taken to reinforce our military forces. 
Many of those steps needed to be taken even without the belligerent 
rhetoric that comes from North Korea. There are certainly deficiencies 
in our military that are being addressed, that were scheduled to be 
addressed even before the recent statements by North Korea, and that 
must continue to be addressed.
  It is important that these deficiencies be addressed in ways that do 
not lead the North Koreans to believe that we are about to launch a 
preemptive attack on their country or they are in jeopardy of an all-
out South Korean and American military invasion.
  We have to realize this is a regime that is isolated and paranoid. 
While we want to make sure they understand our firmness, our 
determination, and also our absolute commitment to defending South 
Korea, we do not want to take steps that would lead them to conclude 
that we are about to launch our own invasion of North Korea, which 
could, in turn, lead them to do some very foolish things in terms of 
their own military forces.
  Mr. President, the bottom line of all this is that I think it has to 
be made abundantly clear to the North Koreans they have three choices.
  One choice is an explosion choice. They can cause an explosion on 
that peninsula that can kill hundreds of thousands of people. In my 
view, if they exercise that choice, notwithstanding some military 
problems that we might face, the result would be total devastation of 
that regime and devastation of the North Korean part of the peninsula. 
Unfortunately, the result could also be the death of hundreds of 
thousands of people on both sides. So that is not the choice we hope 
they are exercising.
  The second choice is what I call the implosion choice. They can 
continue to defy the international community. They can continue to defy 
the IAEA. They can block inspection in their own country, and they can 
continue to be isolated economically. If they continue down that line, 
I think they are going to implode. It may not be next month, it may not 
be 2 months from now, but inevitably their economy will collapse, and 
at some point the people of North Korea are going to get fed up with 
having two meals a day and having one of the most inefficient and 
ineffective economies in the world. That is what I call the implosion 
choice.
  The third choice is one that we also have to make clear to them. This 
is that they can begin to cooperate with the international community. 
They can begin to comply with the nonproliferation treaty. They can 
begin to be part of the international community if they comply with 
their obligations not only in the nuclear area but also in refraining 
from exporting arms into volatile areas of the world and also 
commitments not to engage in terrorism, which they have certainly done 
in the past.
  That third choice is the one we hope they will take because I think 
any careful study of the military equation would leave one to conclude 
that the North Koreans cannot possibly prevail in any conflict and any 
serious conflict would result in devastation of their regime. We do not 
choose that, and I do not think anyone in this Senate wants that kind 
of war. We already had one war. We must make it absolutely clear to 
them that we are committed. I think this resolution does that. We must 
make it clear that we are going to take and are taking all the prudent 
steps that are required to make sure our own military forces, and urge 
the South Koreans to make sure their military forces, are fully 
prepared for any contingency.
  Mr. President, I think the changes that have been made in this 
amendment make it acceptable. I believe that if the Senate does vote on 
it today, it can be voted on with people being confident that it does 
truly reflect not only what we should be doing but, indeed, what we are 
already doing.
  Are we taking military steps now? The answer is, yes. Have we been 
taking military steps for the last several months? The answer is, yes. 
Are those steps everything we need to do? The answer is, no, not yet. 
But we are taking prudent steps.
  General Luck and his military commanders have laid out what they 
believe we need to do. They have laid out not only what they believe we 
need to do now, but they have laid out what we need to do each step of 
the way if we implement sanctions.
  I do not think anyone should make any mistake about it, particularly 
the North Koreans. If we go to the United Nations and if the United 
Nations votes for serious economic sanctions, then there are going to 
have to be other military steps taken, because the North Koreans have 
said implementing sanctions is an act of war.
  So if we are going to do the prudent thing, as this resolution calls 
for, then we are going to have to take certain military steps, as well 
as certain diplomatic and economic steps, and they have to be taken 
together.
  Mr. President, this should not be viewed by anyone as threatening. 
This resolution, as I see it, should be viewed as taking the kind of 
military steps that are essential to protect our own people and to send 
an unmistakable signal to North Korea that we are serious and that we 
are going to be prepared for any kind of action that may occur.
  Mr. President, at this point, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Rhode 
Island [Mr. Pell].
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, yesterday our Foreign Relations Committee 
was briefed by Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci, who is our 
principal negotiator with the North Koreans. In the course of that 
briefing, we heard nothing that would cause us great concern for the 
immediate future. There is nothing to warrant accelerating the drumbeat 
of war on the Korean Peninsula.
  We can be sure that as long as International Atomic Energy Agency 
[IAEA] inspectors remain at the Yongbyou nuclear installation we can be 
assured that fuel is not being diverted for nuclear weapons. If 
inspectors depart or are forced to leave, then we would have cause to 
be concerned.
  At this time, this resolution, as amended, demonstrates our concern 
and suggests that we should be careful, keep our powder dry, but there 
is no immediate cause for alarm.
  To paraphrase Winston Churchill, who once said ``Jaw, jaw is 
preferable to war, war'': ``wait, wait, is preferable to war, war.'' 
Dialog with the North Koreans should continue.
  The Senator from Arizona is a man of action. I understand he may be 
going there. I wish him bon voyage and success on his trip, if that is 
the case.
  But we should bear in mind that this is a very delicate time, with 
on-going negotiations, including discussions by former President Carter 
with the North Korean leadership. It is very important that the waters 
should not be roiled; that international calm be maintained.
  It is a delicate time. This resolution should not be misread by the 
North Koreans as a call to arms. It is an expression of our deep 
concern, a sign that we are following the situation closely, and a 
signal to the North Koreans to comply with their obligations under the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  As this resolution states, let us be prudent and prudence dictates 
further dialog.
  Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Kerry].
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I would like to join with the Senator from 
Georgia and the Senator from Rhode Island in thanking the Senator from 
Arizona, Senator McCain, for working with us to agree on language that 
we believe reflects a positive and prudent statement--I emphasize 
prudent statement--by the U.S. Senate.
  I would share a reservation expressed by Senator Nunn about the 
timing simply because there is a great deal going on that the public 
does not perceive. Diplomacy is, obviously, an extremely delicate art. 
It simply does not lend itself very well to the normal give and take 
and pull and tug of American politics. And often politics clouds the 
diplomatic effort and even sometimes restrains it or undoes certain 
aspects of it.
  I think that what we have arrived at in this amendment is a sensible 
consensus on the part of the Senate about steps that need to be 
reinforced--and I emphasize ``reinforced.''
  Though I join the Senator from Arizona in the concerns expressed in 
this amendment, I would personally distinguish some of the comments 
that he made in his own introductory comments which are beliefs that he 
feels but I do not believe are contained in the gravamen of the 
amendment itself.
  The Senator from Arizona used words like the administration 
temporizing, negligent generalities was expressed, that they must not 
be paralyzed by fear, a whole series of negative connotations with 
respect to the administration.
  I think it is important to point out, there is no temporizing and 
there is no equivocation with respect to the President's bottom line on 
North Korea. The President has said from the beginning and has 
reiterated on a number of occasions that North Korea cannot be 
permitted to become a nuclear power. That is the bottom line of this 
crisis, and that is the guiding policy that I think Democrats and 
Republicans alike share in.
  Now, a realistic and tempered analysis of the current crisis would 
suggest that those of us in the Senate and those of us who are 
concerned about our troops ought also to be concerned about the 
messages and signals that we send and how we send them. An isolated, 
paranoid regime like North Korea can just as easily make a misjudgment 
about what we are doing as they can make a misjudgment about what they 
ought to be doing or what they are doing.
  So I think it is wise not to give them the ability to be able to 
misinterpret our desires here. If they believe that we are going to 
attack no matter what, or if they believe we are going to back them 
into a corner no matter what, or if we offer them no opportunity to 
find some kind of a way of acceding to our demands, then we would have 
added to the crisis.
  I think those of us who have been to the briefings in the last few 
days feel broadly satisfied that a great deal is happening. We had a 
long briefing before the Intelligence Committee a couple of days ago. I 
happen to serve on that committee. The Senator from Arizona was not 
there. We had a long briefing yesterday with Secretary Gallucci on the 
subject of plans that are now going forward with a great opportunity to 
inquire about contingencies and options and preparatory measures.
  I think it is fair to say, without breaking any classification 
restrictions or without sending messages that the administration does 
not want to have sent at this time, that we are taking steps to 
guarantee that at least our own troops are secure, we are taking steps 
at this point in time to review every single option available to us, 
and we are taking steps at this time to guarantee that any option that 
is available to us will be able to be exercised within the necessary 
time period that that option would demand.
  I would say respectfully, to my friend from Arizona, that while the 
two inspectors are there and while they have not denied us the 
opportunity to continue to see what is happening in the cooling waters, 
while those rods are still not in a state of being unloaded and we can 
understand precisely what the level of reprocessing is, there is at 
this moment no danger under those circumstances of a nuclear breakout 
that would threaten us or the peninsula. So I think it is important for 
us to not create a situation where the most unwanted event happens 
because we take steps that are not prudent.
  I believe the administration is taking sensible measures to guarantee 
that our options are covered here, recognizing that there may well be 
in the weeks or months ahead, depending on what North Korea decides to 
do, a very serious and far-reaching decision with respect to preemptive 
measures that we might have to take to safeguard our own interests.
  This particular resolution, I think, expresses the appropriate 
concern of the U.S. Senate but simultaneously, I think, recognizes, 
does not deny, what the administration is already doing in this regard. 
So I would say this is an appropriate step for the U.S. Senate to take 
and is mindful that we have to be sensitive to what the administration 
is trying to do.
  I do not think that North Korea could conceivably misinterpret the 
bottom line that the President has set out in this crisis. It is 
clear--through the several emissaries, as well as their own ability to 
read almost every single public statement on this issue--that our 
bottom line is that this is serious, that it is a major crisis, and 
that they cannot be permitted to become a nuclear power. And the 
implications of their attempts at doing so are, as the Senator from 
Georgia said, extremely narrow in the options that it provides North 
Korea.
  This resolution adequately states our need to be prepared for those 
eventualities without, I think, sending signals of alarm or statements 
of an incendiary nature, that make matters worse than they might 
develop or might be anyway.
  I yield the floor.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Wellstone). The Chair recognizes the 
Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Exon].
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, the powers that be have spoken and I have no 
illusions whatsoever that the objections that are going to be raised by 
the Senator from Nebraska will be paid much attention to. Because 
another grand compromise has been quickly struck over a motion that has 
had no hearings, no public input, and very little consideration by most 
of the body except a hurried meeting on the floor between some of the 
powers that be to try and get rid of this particular amendment that is 
holding up the aviation bill that is before us.
  I do not for a moment intend to imply any bad motives to any of those 
who have taken part in the deliberations thus far. I simply say all too 
often when things of this nature come up, and in this case we are 
talking about the McCain-Dole amendment--and I believe that Senator 
McCain and Senator Dole generally are trying to get across a message 
that they have articulated in other various sources before we took this 
up on the floor of the Senate today. Simply stated, I agree with all of 
the concerns that all the previous speakers made with regard to the 
very, very serious situation--maybe more serious situation than we 
recognize--that exists with North Korea today. No one can possibly know 
what the outcome of that could be. But as one Senator who has been 
consulting with many Senators, consulting with many people in the 
executive branch, I have recognized that this is a flashpoint, and that 
very likely the people of the United States may not fully understand 
just how fully serious it is today. Maybe some of the good things that 
might come out in the debate on the Senate floor today, and I suspect 
eventual passage of this amendment, or resolution, will give everybody 
a good feeling. I do not for a moment underestimate, therefore, how 
serious this is.
  The question comes as to whether or not it is wise for Senators, 
without previous discussion or hearings, to rush to the floor of the 
Senate and on an aviation bill of all things, bring up such a 
fundamentally important matter with regard to the obligations--and 
solemn they are--that we have to our friends and allies, the South 
Koreans.
  How serious is that and how dedicated are we to that? I think history 
speaks for itself. When I came back from World War II we thought we had 
fought a war to end all wars. And 5 years after that, after dismantling 
our forces, we found ourselves in combat in North Korea--in South Korea 
and then later in North Korea. Here we are, 45 years later, considering 
the possibility--that is basically in the hands of a totalitarian North 
Korean Government--as to whether we will be called upon again.
  I believe--and I know we are receiving additional information on this 
tomorrow in closed session in the Armed Services Committee--that the 
President, the Joint Chiefs, the CINC's and all others, are taking and 
have taken appropriate action. We have sent, as everyone knows, Patriot 
missiles there. There was a lot of criticism when we sent the Patriot 
missiles over there by boat. There was criticism of the President on 
the floor of the Congress that it takes them too long to get over there 
by boat; we should fly them over there. Panic set in.
  I think the situation is extremely delicate but I do not think panic 
should set in. I simply ask my colleagues on the floor of the Senate to 
take a look at some of the situations that confront us, and maybe the 
downside of us acting in an approving fashion in the Senate on this 
particular amendment or resolution.
  The resolution itself is not very offensive and I suspect one of the 
reasons the White House, as I understand it, has signed on to this--and 
possibly some of the Democratic leadership--is that, good land, we sure 
do not want to get ourselves caught in a position of a Republican 
amendment being offered that calls for the proper defense of the troops 
and interests of the United States of America. Therefore we better go 
along. You go along, you see, with these things, to get along. I 
suggest that is not a very good way to develop foreign policy.
  Foreign policy under our Constitution is developed, and properly so, 
by the executive branch. And I have referenced earlier the fact that I 
have confidence in what the President and the military leadership are 
doing in this area today. But if you take a look at the rhetoric, the 
words behind this amendment that has been offered, you will see that 
the North Koreans, who will be looking at that, may get a different 
interpretation, unfortunately, from what the resolution itself says.
  We can study the resolution for the rest of the afternoon and the 
night and all day tomorrow. I think many lawyerlike things could be 
done, you know, to change a word here or a comma there. But I would 
simply say, let us also take a look at what has been said thus far in 
support of this matter. I have heard, unless I heard mistakenly, such 
statements as, ``prepare for war to protect the peace.'' I have heard 
citations of ``the best possible action would be to--'' ``The fact that 
the United States will not tolerate--'' Et cetera, et cetera, et 
cetera.
  I would simply say, and I am sure this statement will raise a few 
eyebrows, but I hope it will also open some ears to reason--I suggest, 
Mr. President, that this is a Gulf of Tonkin-type resolution that we 
are rushing into without fully understanding what we do.
  Once again, I say it is entirely appropriate, given the seriousness 
of the situation. If it is not a crisis situation now, it might be a 
crisis situation in the future. I simply say, why can we not refrain, 
why can we not hold back from rushing to the floor of the U.S. Senate 
to do something that has a good ring to it without fully understanding 
what the complications might be or what connotation the North Koreans 
might place on the adoption of this amendment?
  I have heard remarks like ``the United States will not tolerate.'' It 
seems to me as if those may be considered by some people warlike 
words--maybe not. I am not here to apologize for whatever action we 
might have to take in the future, but I suggest this is a time for us 
to allow the elected President of the United States to lead, to set 
policy, without us rushing to the floor with this type of an amendment.
  I guess you can put this in any context that you want, but it seems 
to me we should recognize that what we say in the resolution itself 
might not be objectionable, but what we have said in describing what 
that is doing and the ideas of several very influential Members of the 
U.S. Senate is quite another matter.
  Put this in any context that you want, but it is an instrument of 
bravado: We are going to stand up and we are going to tell you.
  It is like putting a chip on the shoulder of the United States Senate 
and United States Senators and, if not inviting, suggesting to the 
North Koreans: Go ahead and knock it off.
  Why can we not in this body resist the temptation to try to lead for 
the primary reason to show leadership, when there are times I think 
this body should show leadership and there are times when they should 
not?
  President Carter is there now. From the reports I have heard, 
essentially through the news media, it would indicate to me that at 
least the President may be making some progress.
  You will all remember, I think, a very distinguished minister from 
the United States was there a month or so ago. He did not get very far, 
but maybe Billy Graham laid some seeds to come home to help us.
  The President and the military are acting in what I believe to be an 
appropriate manner. They are consulting with our allies, in this case 
primarily the adjacent countries of South Korea and Japan. The 
President has brought the United Nations into the matter. I do not 
really believe that the United Nations or Japan or South Korea really 
care very much about what the United States Senate does on this 
resolution this afternoon. But, of course, it is only natural for the 
United States Senate to believe that people around the world are 
waiting with bated breath until we make some pontifical pronouncement.
  In closing, Mr. President, let me say: Be careful; look and listen to 
the language of some of those supporting this amendment. That language, 
in my opinion, belies the general, less warlike, more ambiguous 
language of the amendment or resolution itself.
  This amendment evidently is designed with the idea that the North 
Koreans will shiver in their boots when the United States Senate 
speaks. I suggest that might not be the case.
  I believe our action at this particular time, especially with the 
language that has been used in debate in support of this, despite the 
caveats from some Senators, I still think that this is a step in the 
wrong direction.
  I have no doubt, Mr. President, that the McCain-Dole amendment will 
become the law of the land. But I, for one, will vote against it for 
the reasons that I have expressed.
  I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the resolution of the Senator from Arizona 
has been significantly modified from an earlier version, particularly 
the elimination of paragraph 7, which was in an earlier version, and 
some other changes which have been made in it to make the language of 
the resolution, I believe, not only acceptable but a significant 
advance over the earlier version thereof.
  It is only the language of the resolution that I address rather than 
each of the comments of everybody that has spoken relative to it, 
because it is the language of the resolution which we are voting on, 
and it is only the language of the resolution which, if adopted, 
becomes part of the law of this land.
  It is not the rhetoric of the supporters of it, some supporters. 
Indeed, the rhetoric of some supporters of this resolution has been 
very cautious, very prudent, indeed. I point only to that to try to 
give some balance in terms of the rhetorical atmosphere that surrounds 
the resolution.
  The point of the resolution itself, I believe, with the changes which 
have been made in it, the resolution is, indeed, an acceptable 
resolution.
  I would, however, make two points.
  The first is that I think we should operate, in addition to the stick 
track, we should operate on a carrot track, as well, with North Korea. 
We should not only be prepared to respond in the event that they launch 
an attack--and that is what this resolution addresses; it is simply a 
preparedness to defend ourselves--but I think we also should seek out 
normalization of relationships with North Korea in exchange for their 
willingness, which is enforceable, not to become a nuclear power, and 
that we should pursue both avenues, not just the one avenue. President 
Carter is there, indeed, exploring both avenues, and I commend him on 
the work that he is doing because he is discussing the possibility, at 
least as a private citizen, that in addition for a more normal 
relationship with the rest of the world, that North Korea would give up 
any aspiration to become a nuclear power.
  It is that positive approach, in addition to the more negative 
approaches in terms of being prepared to respond to an attack, that I 
think is important. That positive approach is not included in the 
resolution. I wish it were. It focuses on the preparedness instead, but 
in terms of the language of the resolution, it does say we should take 
prudent steps to be prepared, and I think we should.
  I wish it had the positive side more focused in the resolution. It 
does not. Again, let us look at what the resolution does.
  It focuses on acting to become prepared, to act to enhance the 
preparedness and safety of our forces, to deter and, if necessary, 
repel an attack from North Korea. I find those unoffensive words and 
not warlike words. I find those words of caution, words of prudence. We 
should be prepared in the event of an attack. Indeed, North Korea has 
said that they would consider sanctions, any sanctions by the United 
Nations to constitute a declaration of war. And under those 
circumstances, we surely should be prepared in the event that North 
Korea launches the attack.

  But there is one aspect of this resolution about which I wanted to 
talk to the Senator from Arizona. I think he is off the floor and 
perhaps he could hear my words. I have already discussed an aspect of 
this resolution which I believe can be amended and would represent an 
improvement in the resolution if it were.
  In paragraph 6 of this resolution, it says that

       It is incumbent on the United States to take all necessary 
     and appropriate action to ensure the preparedness of the 
     United States and the Republic of Korea Forces to repel any 
     possible attack.
  We cannot ensure the preparedness of the Republic of Korea. We can 
assist, and we should. But only they can ensure their own preparedness. 
Too often in this whole scenario over the last few weeks and months we 
have read about South Korea in ways which would lead me to believe that 
they are not particularly prepared, nor are they going to become 
prepared adequately, to defend themselves. I have seen them blowing hot 
and cold over the last few weeks. I have seen them, at least their 
Foreign Minister, talk as though we are pushing them to defend 
themselves. We cannot ensure their defense. Only they can ensure their 
defense. We can act with them, as we should. We can assist them, as we 
should. But only they can act to ensure their own defense.
  So I have discussed this with my friend from Arizona, and it would 
seem to me that it would be an improvement for us to change the 
language in paragraph 6 so that the ensurance of preparedness of the 
United States and the Republic of Korea Forces is a joint effort on the 
part of us and Korea, not just our effort, and that we add some words 
at the end which is that we urge South Korea to act to enhance 
preparedness so that it is not just us acting unilaterally.
  They need to be a partner. We cannot force them to act. We cannot 
ensure their preparedness. They must act in their own defense and 
prepare themselves. We cannot do it for them. Again, we can assist 
them. We can participate with them. But we cannot drag them into it.
  So Senator Warner and I have drafted this amendment together and I 
have discussed this with the Senator from Arizona, that we offer a 
modification, an amendment to his amendment which would add language in 
paragraph 6 which would add the words ``Republic of Korea,'' so that it 
is both the United States and the Republic of Korea that need to take 
appropriate, prudent steps in our effort to defend our forces and add 
words in the therefore clause that we would be urging South Korea to do 
what we are urging ourselves to do, which is to take necessary, prudent 
actions to enhance the preparedness and safety of our forces. We now 
have the language prepared, but I do not know whether or not the 
Senator from Arizona has seen the language.
  Mr. McCAIN. I have seen it.


                           Amendment No. 1800

  Mr. LEVIN. If he has seen the language--and I understand from his 
nodding his head that he approves the language--I would send this 
amendment to the desk on behalf of myself and Senator Warner and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows.

       The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin] for himself and Mr. 
     Warner, proposes an amendment 1800 to amendment 1799.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  Mr. LEVIN. I think in this case it would just take 1 minute to read 
it and it may be useful. I thank the Senator.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       On page 2, line 5 after the word ``action'', insert the 
     following: ``to act together with the Republic of Korea''.
       On page 2, line 12, after the word ``States'', insert the 
     word ``forces''.
       Amend page 2, line 13 to read as follows: ``and urge and 
     assist the Republic of Korea to do likewise in order to deter 
     and, if necessary, repel an''.

  Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair, and I have just been handed a note that 
Senator Warner is on his way to the floor to speak briefly on our 
amendment. I want to ensure that he is added as a cosponsor to this 
amendment. We have worked together on the amendment and with Senator 
McCain as well. Senator Warner is very much anxious to speak on it. I 
would ask that he be added as cosponsor to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], 
with whom I work closely on many matters on the Armed Services 
Committee, and I join together to introduce this amendment. This 
amendment makes it absolutely clear that we are acting in concert with 
our South Korean allies to face this impending crisis on the Korean 
Peninsula.
  Together, for 45 years, the United States and the South Koreans have 
stood firmly against the North Korean treat. In those early difficult 
days of the Korean war in 1950, a solid bond was forged between our 
Armed Forces that still exists just as strongly today. This Senator 
served with the Marine Corps in Korea during that war. I do not want to 
see another bloody conflict in Korea.
  Hopefully, the diplomatic steps that are underway-by our former 
President, Jimmy Carter and others--along with the threat of sanctions 
will cause the North Korean regime to reconsider, to cease all actions 
to develop a nuclear weapons capability and to comply with the Non 
Proliferation Treaty and the requirements of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency.
  However, as long as the North Koreans continue their reckless 
attempts to develop nuclear weapons and their belligerent threats, we 
should take the necessary steps, along with the South Koreans, to 
ensure that the military forces from both our nations are at a high 
state of readiness and sufficiently reinforced to deter war if 
possible, or, if necessary, to win it surely and quickly with a minimal 
loss of life.
  I believe that the amendment introduced by the Senator from Michigan 
and myself makes it clear that the United States should immediately 
take all necessary and appropriate actions to enhance the preparedness 
and safety of our forces. The amendment also makes it clear that 
concurrently, we must urge and assist our South Korean allies in doing 
the same.
  Mr. President, I commend the Republican leader, Senator Dole, and the 
Senator from Arizona, Senator McCain, for introducing their amendment. 
I request that I be added as a cosponsor to their amendment.
  Mr. President, I wish to thank the Senator from Arizona for accepting 
the amendment which the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin] and I crafted 
together.
  I also think my colleague from Michigan, Senator Levin for his 
cooperation in the joint drafting of this amendment. It is always a 
pleasure to work with him.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there any further debate on the amendment? 
If not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  So the amendment (No. 1800) was agreed to.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. FORD. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. ROBB addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.
  Mr. ROBB. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I rise in support of the amendment that is currently 
under consideration by the Senate. I understand the concerns that were 
raised a few minutes ago by our distinguished colleague from Nebraska, 
but I think there is in this case a real sense of urgency that makes 
this a more compelling case than many of the amendments that we do 
consider from time to time that are not relevant or germane to the 
subject matter that is being discussed in the Chamber.
  Indeed, I think that it is one of those sense-of-the-Senate 
amendments that will receive a certain amount of national and 
international attention, and I think it is appropriate that it receive 
that attention.
  This matter has been brewing for over a year, some 16 months. As 
chairman of the East Asia Pacific Committee of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, and as a member of the Armed Services Committee--and I am 
the only Member of this body who happens to serve on those two 
committees--I have been very much concerned about developments in North 
Korea for quite some period of time. When I was last in that part of 
the world, I discussed at some length the concerns that I had with the 
leadership in Beijing, in Seoul, and in Tokyo. It was very clear that 
among all of the concerns that were on our plate for discussion, this 
was the one which most engaged the leaders then and has since.
  I have held several hearings, some open, some closed because they 
were classified, to discuss developments in this particular area. We 
had a hearing just yesterday called by the chairman of the full 
committee with Mr. Robert Gallucci, who is the principal negotiator on 
the U.S. side to discuss this issue even more. I believe that this 
particular sense-of-the-Senate resolution is appropriate. I think it is 
reasoned, and at least I hope it would gain some additional attention 
and support in the United States.
  I support our President. I support him particularly in his role as 
Commander in Chief. I think it is important in any of the great war and 
peace issues that we do everything possible to close ranks and keep 
those ranks as closed as possible in dealing with issues like this. But 
this is one of those issues where if we guessed wrong or if we made the 
wrong move and if the leadership in Pyongyang, whether it is Kim Il-
song, Kim Jong Il, or anyone else decides that they will test the 
resolve of either the South Korean Government in Seoul or the United 
States Government here in Washington, the consequences could be 
enormous.
  I do not want to sound alarmist, but I believe that if any hostile 
action were to be initiated by the north against the south, we would be 
engaged in a way that we simply could not extract ourselves in the near 
term. There is no question that in time the allied forces, being the 
South Koreans, the United States, Japan, hopefully China as an ally in 
this particular instance, and others would prevail, but in my judgment 
the number of casualties that we would suffer on day one would exceed 
all of the casualties that we have suffered in any hostile engagement 
since the end of the Vietnam war combined.
  Again, I do not attempt to be an alarmist. I simply underscore the 
importance of any conflict in this particular region. We understand the 
history. We understand the potential. We understand the kind of 
armament that is already in position north of the 38th Parallel that 
could be brought to bear immediately on Seoul and other areas.
  We understand that we have 38,000 U.S. troops that are stationed in 
this area, in addition to the recent additions of the Patriots, 
Apaches, and what have you. I think preparation is entirely 
appropriate. I think, in fact, that we would be remiss if we did not.
  It is not because I believe that the North is going to be so 
irrational as to test our will. But my concern is that this has dragged 
on for some 16 months, and in each case the North Koreans, both 
withdrawing from the NPT, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as from 
the North-South Agreement, have in effect stepped back from agreements 
into which they have entered, and said, ``What will you give us in 
return for a return to the status quo?'' That leaves us in a very 
difficult position to say the least.
  My principal concern is not that they will act irrationally in the 
near term--although, as I say, the consequences are enormous--but that 
it will destabilize the region.
  Right now, the United States provides the nuclear umbrella and the 
stabilizing force within this entire region. South Korea is not 
nuclear. Japan is not nuclear. And China has not pushed beyond its 
current nuclear capacity, and certainly not developed specifically 
because of any threat that is perceived in this area. But if this 
region is destabilized, there is no question in my mind that Seoul and 
Tokyo are going to have to revisit the question of whether or not they 
believe that the current umbrella that the United States provides--and 
it can be an honest broker in this region because it has no colonial 
ambitions--they are going to have to take another look at that. To the 
extent they do, China has to do the same thing.
  We then get into the realm of additional forward basing and other 
actions that will be extremely destabilizing in this area. And the only 
way that the North Koreans are likely to be able to get the kind of 
hard currency they are going to need in the international arena--
particularly if we start squeezing down even more--is through the 
export of weapons of mass destruction. The most likely buyers or 
purchasers of those weapons are in Tehran, in Baghdad and in Tripoli. 
And we will contribute to the further destabilization not only of the 
Eastern part of Asia and the Pacific, but the Middle East and the Near 
East as well, if we do not exercise the kind of resolve that, in my 
judgment, is necessary to send a very clear message--not a message that 
is designed to exit but a message that is designed to make certain that 
the North Koreans understand that we are prepared lest anything get out 
of control, and that we have the necessary will.
  It has always been my judgment, Mr. President, that if we demonstrate 
that we have sufficient military might, if we have the weapons, if we 
have the logistic support, if they are sufficiently trained, if they 
are well armed, well equipped, and well led, and if we also have a 
clear demonstration of the will to employ those forces if we have to 
under the kinds of circumstances that might make that appropriate, that 
the chance of actually having to deploy such forces goes down 
considerably.
  I think we are in a situation now after some 16 months of a lack of 
any real progress in this area that we need to demonstrate that we are 
at least prepared so that hopefully we will send a message to those in 
Pyongyang and elsewhere about the resolve of the United States in the 
fervent hope that we will not have to use or employ the forces that are 
available to us.
  Mr. President, thank you for the time. I thank the sponsors of this 
particular amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. GORTON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, once again the Senator from Arizona has 
sounded the alarm in connection with an issue with grave security 
concerns for the United States of America.
  Once again, there are many--both in this body and outside of this 
body--who wish that he had not sounded that alarm, who would prefer to 
ignore the crisis with which the United States and its allies around 
the world are faced.
  Nevertheless, I do not believe that this Nation is served well--or 
the Members of this body serve their Nation well--by ignoring twin 
dangers, twin dangers arising out of the actions of the North Korean 
Republic.
  The overwhelming danger, the overwhelming threat, presented by the 
course of actions which has been pursued by the Government of North 
Korea for at least a decade is if existing nuclear capacity and the 
very, very large nuclear weapon capacity which it threatens to create 
during the course of the balance of this decade with the possibility of 
not only destabilizing its own region and causing Japan, South Korea, 
the Republic of China on Taiwan to feel that they must build a nuclear 
capacity in return, but the very real possibility that North Korea can 
soon become an exporter of nuclear weapons to other outlaw nations, and 
perhaps even to terrorist organizations.
  It is exactly that threat which the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
is aimed. It is exactly at that threat that the International Atomic 
Energy Administration is designed to minimize. It is exactly that 
threat which the defiance of international norms on the part of North 
Korea has made so emerging. The short-range danger, however, is that 
North Korea may possibly mean what it says; that for us or for the 
United Nations to take any action, even an action with relatively minor 
sanctions, will be treated by North Korea as an act of war authorizing 
it, permitting it to attack our troops and the troops of the Republic 
of Korea to the south of the present demilitarized zone.
  It seems to me hardly necessary for us to debate the proposition that 
the United States and its ally, South Korea, should be prepared for 
that eventuality. Prepared for that eventuality clearly will lower, 
though will not eliminate, the existence of the threat itself. This 
resolution simply sets forth facts which are facts which cannot be 
argued and asks for that degree of preparation.
  I tend to believe that those sanctions are not likely to be effective 
in changing the conduct of North Korea. We do not have much of a record 
of successful sanctions in challenges of this nature. But I do agree 
with the administration that those sanctions are at least a necessary 
next step in the hope that they will be successful and without which we 
cannot follow on with a more decisive set policy.
  This is a place, Mr. President, in which I think support for the 
President of the United States is vitally important. There are many of 
us who have been critical of the way in which we have responded to 
North Korea during the course of the last year. But those criticisms at 
this point are irrelevant. We face a particular situation today. We 
face both a long-term and a short-term threat today. To give the 
President the ability, to give him the backing on a broad, nonpartisan 
basis to prepare us for an eventuality which we fervently hope will not 
take place, I think, is important for us to do as Americans, not as 
Republicans or Democrats but as Americans.
  I believe that it is important for us to pass on the message to the 
President, and if he acts decisively, and if he feels it is in the 
interest of the United States to speak out strongly and boldly in favor 
of the only course of action which can ensure nuclear peace throughout 
the world, that he is going to have the support of this body, whatever 
our past or future differences on other issues.
  From my perspective, at least, this resolution will be a help to the 
President in reaching decisions that I trust he has already decided are 
necessary, but in seeing to it that he has support as he moves forward, 
as our only effective leader in this regard, to deal with the gravest 
threat with which the United States has been faced in his 
administration or perhaps a considerably longer period than that, since 
the end of the cold war. I strongly advocate the passage of the 
resolution, as amended. I think the amendments have been constructive 
ones. I believe we should be as close to unanimous as possible in 
support of the McCain resolution.

  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming [Mr. Wallop] is 
recognized.
  Mr. WALLOP. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

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