[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 74 (Tuesday, June 14, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 14, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                       THE NORTH KOREAN SITUATION

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Ms. Margolies-Mezvinsky). Under the 
Speaker's announced policy of February 11, 1994, and June 10, 1994, the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] is recognized during morning 
business for 5 minutes.
  Mr. McCOLLUM. Madam Speaker, I rise today to note that we are 
approaching an auspicious anniversary, one that is taking on a 
terrifying relevance. On June 25, 1950, 60,000 troops from North Korea 
crossed the 38th parallel, invaded South Korea and began the Korean 
war. It was a war that involved over 20 nations and cost millions of 
lives, including almost 34,000 Americans killed. Some have called the 
Korean war of 1950-53 the forgotten war, but Mr. Speaker, the memories 
are now beginning to recur.
  We face on the Korean Peninsula the most ominous developments. The 
unstable dictator Kim Il-sung, the very man who launched the 1950 
conflict, is passing the baton to this equally unstable son. Against 
this backdrop, North Korea is developing nuclear weapons, and indeed, 
as a Republican terrorism task force report that I am submitting to the 
record will show, may already have several weapons and the means to 
deliver them.
  In addition to all of this, the Pyongyang regime is playing a 
diplomatic cat and mouse game. First North Korea signs the nuclear 
nonproliferation treaty, then it threatens to withdraw from that very 
same treaty. First Pyongyang agrees to allow its nuclear facilities to 
be inspected, then it threatens to expel the inspectors already in 
North Korea and indeed it goes so far as to quit the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.
  Mr. Speaker, this is the most dangerous game, and it pains me to say 
that the danger has increased because of the actions of this Government 
and this administration. We have, as Churchill said, decided to be 
indecisive and to be resolute in our irresolution. First, we proclaimed 
that we would not allow North Korea to become a nuclear state, then we 
declared that we would permit the north to have a few weapons. We make 
threats and then back down with compromises and soothing words. And 
this follows a foreign policy pattern of vacillation and confusion by 
the Clinton administration all around the world. How can we expect the 
North Koreans to believe the President when he does talk tough?
  Mr. Speaker, American men, 30,000 strong, of the United States 2d 
infantry division, are sitting on the most precarious border in the 
world, and President Clinton vacillates and dithers, confusing our 
friends and encouraging our foes. My colleagues, this is not foreign 
policy, it is confusion and it must come to an end before it gets us 
into an unnecessary war.
  At the present time, the North Korean Armed Forces are on their 
highest war footing in 20 years. The Pyongyang regime has threatened 
that if we impose economic sanctions there will be war, and that Seoul, 
South Korea's Capital, will be turned into a sea of fire. Against this, 
the President has taken few concrete steps, and predictably, our 
allies, without our leadership, have been left in total and utter 
confusion. They are, and not without reason, unsure of our leadership 
and consequently the whole of Northwest Asia is in crisis.
  The President and the American people must review the facts. We have 
mutual security treaties with Japan and South Korea, as binding as 
those we have with our NATO allies. If either state is attacked, it 
must be considered, by this government, as an attack upon the United 
States. Mr. Speaker, the President and public must know, this is not an 
option, we are committed.
  Thus, we must insist that our allies adopt a course of action that is 
consistent with both their security needs and our treaty obligations. 
South Korea must be assured of our support and end its own diplomatic 
dance. The Seoul regime has tried appeasement and then a resolute 
stand. Now South Korea must be assured of our support and then 
encouraged to take a firm position. the concessions to North Korea must 
end and the Pyongyang regime warned that its threats will not go 
unanswered.
  We must also turn to our allies in Japan. We must tell them that the 
time for diplomatic sweet talk is over and that no amount of pacifism 
will protect them should North Korea gain a credible nuclear force. To 
that end, they must join with us in tough economic sanctions against 
the North and bring full diplomatic pressure to bear on the People's 
Republic of China to follow suit.
  I must also digress, at this moment, to make one more point.
  We face at this moment with our friends in Japan a great irony. As 
the Japanese Constitution now stands, the Japanese military, unless 
directly attacked, cannot support the United States in any action other 
than peacekeeping. This is absurd. Thus it is time for Japan to amend 
her Constitution, which was our handiwork, to allow her to join with us 
in defending the security of the Far East. I am mindful that this 
cannot be done overnight, that the pacifism of the Japanese people is 
deeply rooted in the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and I am 
mindful of the security implications of what I suggest.
  Nonetheless, it is time the other nations of the Far East realize 
that Japan is a great power and that she must play a role in the world 
equal to her economic might. We must assure them that a rearmed Japan--
a nation that already is the sixth largest military spender in the 
world--is no threat to their security. What is more, it is time that 
the Japanese people recognize that while we in the United States will 
always be their friend, it is their first obligation, and not ours, to 
defend their own country, or at least to stand beside us while we help 
defend them.
  In any case, that is for the future, for the moment we must deal with 
the crisis at hand. thus, we must begin to deploy stronger forces to 
South Korea. In the Persian Gulf war it took us nearly 6 months to 
deploy our forces. If North Korea should attack, particularly if she 
has nuclear weapons, we may not get that breathing space. Thus, we must 
move quickly to bolster our forces and organize our supply networks 
both so that our deterrent is credible and so that lives may be saved 
if it should come to war. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that we 
must prepare the American people for the possible use of tactical 
nuclear weapons by U.S. forces, though, of course, I hope it does not 
come to that.
  We must then warn North Korea that if she attacks, her forces will be 
defeated and her regime will not be allowed to survive. From that point 
on we must begin to demand that North Korea accept the regimen of the 
Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty or face the consequences of a slowly 
strangulating economy and ever tougher sanctions.
  Mr. Speaker, I quoted Winston Churchill once and I should like to do 
so again. That Great British statesman once said, ``We shall see how 
the counsels of prudence and restraints may become the prime agents of 
mortal danger; how the middle course adopted from desires for safety 
and a quiet life may be found to lead right to the bull's eye of 
disaster.'' It is time that our allies, and most of all our President, 
remember that terrible lesson, paid for with the blood of thousands of 
Americans, and begin, at last, to recognize the reality of the danger 
facing us in northwest Asia.
  Now I must add the footnote that we would not be in this terrible 
position if the Democrat leadership in Congress had not killed the 
Strategic Defense Initiatives of Presidents Reagan and Bush. With SDI 
we would have been able to shoot down nuclear missiles launched 
anywhere in the world, but we have no SDI and must look down the barrel 
of direct nuclear confrontation.

                  North Korea's New Ballistic Missiles

       A close examination of the North Korean involvement in the 
     ballistic missile development program in Iran, as well as the 
     record of the joint missile development effort between the 
     DPRK and the PRC, provides strong evidence that North Korean 
     ballistic missile technology is far more advanced than the 
     recent reports suggest. The following paper will briefly 
     outline the latest developments regarding North Korea's 
     missile program, placing an emphasis on the Chinese-North 
     Korean connection.
       The current DPRK ballistic missile program has four 
     distinct operational components (not counting the brief Sino-
     North Korean development of the DF-61 in 1975-76):
       1. Reverse engineering and modest modification of the basic 
     Soviet R-17E (SCUD-B)--the NK-SCUD-B and NK-SCUD-C.
       2. Major up-grading and improvement of the basic Soviet 
     design principles and technologies in medium-range SSMs--the 
     NoDong-1, NoDong-1 up-grade, and NoDong-2.
       3. A new generation of two-stage intermediate range 
     ballistic missiles largely based on integration of relatively 
     advanced, though fully proven, Chinese technology--the 
     TaepoDong-1 and TaepoDong-2, and;
       4. A new generation of multiple-stage long range ballistic 
     missiles based on the latest Russian and Chinese 
     technologies--the NoDong-X.


                            missile designs

       The NoDong family of SSMs represent a very straightforward 
     form of engineering technology. The NoDong-1 itself is a 
     direct outgrowth of basic NK-SCUD-C technology and has a 
     range of 1,000 km with an 800-1,000 kg warhead. Additionally, 
     the NoDong-1 was modified, mainly for use by Iran, to reach a 
     1,300 km range and to be equipped with a nuclear warhead.
       The NoDong-2 is the product of a several-phased development 
     of the NoDong-1. The current NoDong-2 is the result of 
     subsequent refinements of the basic model designed in order 
     to strengthen the missile-cone and increase the payload. 
     Consequently, the NoDong-2 has a range of over 1,500 km with 
     a 800-1,000 kg warhead, reaching up to 2,000 km with a 
     smaller warhead of 500-800 kg.
       By contrast, the TaepoDong family of SSMs are the first of 
     a new generation of two-stage SSMs that rely heavily on the 
     integration of relatively advanced Chinese technology. The 
     most significant components of this weapon are mainly pumps 
     for the clustered rocket engines and stage separation 
     technology. That said, the TaepoDong SSMs nevertheless 
     include largely test proven components of previous SSMs, both 
     Chinese and North Korean.
       The TaepoDong-1 has a range of over 2,000 km with a 1,000 
     kg warhead. According to JANE's, it is a combination of a 
     NoDong-1 [first stage] and a NK-SCUD-B/NK-SCUD-C [second 
     stage]. In comparison, the TaepoDong-2 has a range of over 
     3,500 km, and can carry a 1,000 kg warhead. According to 
     JANE's, the TaepoDong-2 is a 32m long SSM, and is a composite 
     derivative of the PRC's DF-3/CSS-2 missile and the NoDong-1, 
     but with a rounded nosecone. Given this technology, the 
     TaepoDong-2 with a small warhead of around 500 kg, can attain 
     ranges of up to 9,600 km, which puts it in the class of an 
     ICBM.
       Indeed, the TaepoDong family of SSMs are actually far more 
     sophisticated and lethal than is generally understood. This 
     stems from the fact that the TaepoDong is a byproduct of the 
     Iranian ballistic missile development program which has been 
     run jointly with North Korea and the People's Republic of 
     China since 1990 and is based in the city of Isfahan. In 
     fact, based on comparative analysis and judging from its 
     overall dimensions and estimated performance, the TaepoDong-1 
     appears to be a North Korean version of the Iranian Tondar-
     68.
       The Tondar-68 is based on Chinese and North Korean 
     technology, and is of two versions: The first with a range of 
     1,200-1,500 km, is capable of reaching Israel from launchers 
     inside Iran. The second, with a range of some 2,000 km, is 
     for wider theater use. The Tondar-68 is a two-stage weapon 
     based on a Chinese M-11 ballistic missile installed on top of 
     an Iran-700 missile, the latter itself being a derivative of 
     the North Korean NoDong-1
       In March 1991, Iran undertook two test launchings of the 
     Tondar-68 system over the Semnan desert. In the first test 
     launch the missile flew over 700 km, and in the second over 
     1,000 km. These two tests are believed, respectively, to have 
     been launches of prototypes of both the basic system 
     (Iran-700), as well as the complete multiple-stage 
     weapon--a Tondar-68 made of the Iran-700 and the M-11.
       Subsequently, in 1992, the PRC provided Iran technology for 
     the development of an intermediate-range ballistic missile, 
     including the production of an Iranian version of the M-11 in 
     Isfahan. Later, in January, 1994, a high level North Korean 
     military delegation visiting Iran reaffirmed the DPRK's 
     commitment to provide Iran with the latest missile 
     technologies.


                         the chinese connection

       The integration of the Chinese M-11 weapon into the 
     TaepoDong family of SSMs is of crucial significance. The M-
     11, classified as the DF-11 in the Chinese arsenal, is a new 
     ballistic missile introduced into operational service in the 
     late 1980s. Originally developed for tactical nuclear 
     warheads in the mid-1980s, the M-11 was fitted with both High 
     Explosive and Chemical warheads soon after its initial 
     introduction in order to make it marketable for export. The 
     first model of the M-11, with a 135 km range, was introduced 
     in 1988 and was soon modified into a ``SCUD substitute'' with 
     a range of 290-320 kms and a 500-800 kg warhead.
       The M-11 is a single stage SSM fueled with solid 
     propellant, 9 meters long with a 1 meter diameter and a 
     rounded-up top cone rather than a cylinder and cone as found 
     with the SCUD. This modified cone provides improved 
     aerodynamics and ballistic qualities. Additionally, the 
     original model M-11 has terminal guidance, including an 
     inertial mid-course guidance system, which insures vastly 
     improved accuracy. The integration of modern Global 
     Positioning System (GPS) technology known to have been 
     purchased by the DPRK and the PRC and installed in the 
     NoDong-1, should not be ruled out.
       Further, as it is solid fueled, the M-11 relies on fully 
     mobile Transporter Erector Launcher [TEL] vehicles, 
     specifically the Russian MAZ-543 TEL vehicle, and can be 
     reloaded and readied for launching in about 45 minues by a 
     crew of less than 10 troops. The PRC itself is also using the 
     M-11 as the upper stage in its development of a theater 
     ballistic missile called the M-11. Fully mobile, the M-11 is 
     a ``stretched M-11'' with two stages of solid fuel.
       The installation of the M-11 as the upper stage of the 
     TaepoDong family of SSMs drastically changes the capabilities 
     of the TaepoDong without altering its external appearance of 
     dimensions. This is significant because solid fuel missiles, 
     like the M-11, are easy to handle as upper stage components 
     since they are relatively simple to store, do not require 
     fueling, and are relatively insensitive to separation by 
     explosive-bolts.
       Furthermore, by using the M-11 rather than the NoDong-1 for 
     its upper stage, the TaepoDong gains dramatically increased 
     accuracy and range. (It is noteworthy that, according to 
     JANE's, the TaepoDong-2's upper stage is a NoDong-1 with a 
     rounded nosecone, a characteristic also of the M-11.)
       Further, the TaepoDong-1 is made of an M-11 missile 
     installed on top of a booster-derivative of the NoDong-1. 
     With this configuration, the TaepoDong-1's range of over 
     2,000 km with a 1,000 kg warhead remains unchanged, but the 
     accuracy improves markedly. Similarly, the TaepoDong-2 is an 
     M-11 installed on top of a booster-derivative of the DF-3/
     CSS-2. Again, the basic range of over 3,500 km with a 1,000 
     kg warhead remains unchanged. As discussed above, with the 
     TaepoDong-2's DF-3-based booster, the TaepoDong-2 can reach a 
     range of 9,600 km.


                              some history

       In assessing the likelihood of the availability of such 
     advanced Chinese strategic technologies to North Korea, it 
     should be emphasized that both countries have been 
     cooperating in missile production and development since the 
     early 1970s. Moreover, the DPRK and the PRC now closely 
     cooperate on the development of new missiles as a result of a 
     series of agreements reached in 1988 (and October 1991) for 
     the joint development of a new generation of weapons.
       Indeed, in 1988, the first delegation of 90 North Korean 
     ballistic missile experts was dispatched, pursuant to the 
     aforementioned agreement, to the PRC to work on these joint 
     missile projects. Most important among these projects was the 
     development of a MRV-equipped Medium Range Ballistic Missile 
     (MRBM), optimized for nuclear warheads, with a range of 800 
     km. A prototype of this MRBM was successfully test launched 
     in Yinchuan, China, in the Fall of 1991.
       Furthermore, in 1989-90, the DPRK dispatched some 230 
     additional military experts from its ground forces, navy and 
     air force to the Dalian base, on the Liaodong peninsula, for 
     study and cooperation in the development of various advanced 
     missile technologies, mainly ship-to-ship missiles, various 
     surface-to-surface missiles (ballistic and cruise), and 
     surface-to-air missiles. Later, in October 1991, during Kin 
     Il-Song's visit to China, the DPRK and the PRC reiterated 
     their commitment to the joint development of a ballistic 
     missile technology uniquely applicable for nuclear warheads, 
     especially MRVs and MIRVs.
       A major component of the 1991 agreement was Pyongyang's 
     decision to shop for advance missile technologies to up-grade 
     ballistic missiles in the USSR/CIS and share them with the 
     PRC. Further, in the late-1980s, USSR-DPRK cooperation 
     arrangements were expanded to include advanced SSMs. 
     Consequently, in June 1991, the USSR transferred at least 
     10 KY-3s [SCUD-Cs] to North Korea for use as samples in 
     the reverse engineering research that is crucial to 
     facilitating the production of advanced models of 
     ballistic missiles.
       Unlike the basic R-17 [SCUD-B], the KY-3 has a longer 
     range, solid fuel, and most importantly, a completely new 
     guidance system with ``pinpoint accuracy'' that can be 
     adapted to all types of SCUDs and their derivatives. The 
     availability of these technologies significantly enhances the 
     scientific-technological basis of the ballistic missile 
     industry of both North Korea and China. Indeed, the KY-3 
     technologies are ideal for integration into the M-11-type 
     ballistic missiles and would vastly improve their 
     performance.
       Thus, at present, with the Sino-Korean MRBM as an upper 
     stage, the PRC is developing a mobile intercontinental 
     ballistic missile capable of striking at the continental US. 
     This ICBM relies heavily on Soviet technology, mainly that of 
     the rail-based SS-24 and the vehicle-based SS-25 ICBMs. 
     Although the original range of the Soviet ICBMs is around 
     10,000 kms, the Chinese ICBM may have a shorter range and be 
     capable of carrying 8-10 MRVs. (It should also be added that 
     the October 1993 testing at the Lop Nor test site involved a 
     warhead, estimated at 70-90 kt, for the MRV.)
       The North Korean version of this Chinese strategic missile, 
     the NoDong-X, is a vast technological improvement over the 
     NoDong and TaepoDong SSMs. Indeed, in its development, the 
     DPRK also utilized the latest Russian technology obtained 
     from numerous Russian engineers and technicians working in 
     North Korea. Consequently, through miniaturization of the 
     warhead and adaptation of solid fuel, the NoDong-X, in its 
     initial form, may be capable of achieving a range of over 
     6,000 km. This would allow it to hit parts of the continental 
     US. Indeed, the Russian assessment is that the NoDong-X is 
     ``a long-range assault weapon.'' ROK's Deputy Prime Minister 
     Yi Yong-Tok also called the NoDong-X ``a strategic weapon.''
       Considering the intensity of the development work in the 
     PRC and the DPRK, the NoDong-X may be operational by 1996-97.
       Thus, any assessment of the TaepoDong family of SSMs must 
     be based on the premise that the upper stage is a derivative 
     of the M-11. It therefore appears quite likely that North 
     Korea possesses a weapon with far greater accuracy and 
     reliability than anything previously available to it.

                          ____________________