[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 72 (Friday, June 10, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 10, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                          GETTING RWANDA WRONG

 Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, Herman Cohen, the former Assistant 
Secretary of State for Africa in the Bush administration, recently had 
a column in the Washington Post on the Rwanda situation.
  I described the response of this administration and the Bush 
administration to Bosnia as ``anemic'' and, I regret to say, the 
response to Rwanda has been the same.
  The op-ed piece by Herman ``Hank'' Cohen outlines what a sensible 
policy should be.
  I ask that the Herman Cohen article be entered into the Record. I 
also ask unanimous consent that the letter sent by Senator James 
Jeffords and myself to President Clinton on Rwanda be inserted into the 
Record. We sent this letter after talking to the Canadian general in 
charge of the U.N. military operation in Rwanda.
  One of the points that Herman Cohen makes in his column is that the 
United Nations has to be modified so that it can move quickly on the 
world emergencies.
  I could not agree more.
  I urge my colleagues, who may have been out of town when the Herman 
Cohen op-ed piece appeared in the Washington Post, to read it now.
  The material follows:

                [From the Washington Post, June 3, 1994]

                          Getting Rwanda Wrong

                           (By Herman Cohen)

       American policy on Rwanda is difficult to understand. 
     Statements made by Madeleine Albright, the U.S. ambassador to 
     the United Nations, indicate that Rwanda is viewed as a 
     traditional peace-keeping problem, when it is really a ``Call 
     911!'' problem. Traditional peace-keeping calls for a 
     negotiated cease-fire followed by the arrival of lightly 
     armed multilateral forces who monitor and observe. Rwanda, on 
     the other hand, is a case of planned, systematic murder of 
     men, women and children who happen to belong to a particular 
     group--the Tutsi.
       Both the self-proclaimed government of Rwanda, which has 
     armed the death squads who are doing the ethnic killing, and 
     the rebel Rwanda Patriotic Front fighters, do not want to 
     stop fighting until they can finish the genocide or dominate 
     militarily. Waiting to intervene until there is ``progress 
     toward a cease-fire,'' in Albright's words, is like a doctor 
     telling a heart attack victim, ``Take two aspirins, and call 
     me in the morning.'' Giving one or both of the fighting 
     groups in Rwanda a veto on international intervention is the 
     height of folly. If anything is going to destroy the 
     credibility of the international community in the area of 
     conflict resolution, the American policy is going to do it.
       The Rwandan crisis has all of the characteristics of a 
     situation requiring urgent action:
       Rwanda is inflicting emotional and financial pain on the 
     world community. Let's face it, whatever we do in Rwanda, 
     there will be a bill to pay one way or another.
       Rwanda has become simultaneously a failed state and a 
     delegitimized state. It has failed because the previous 
     government has self-destructed into semi-anarchy. It is 
     delegitimized because the new self-proclaimed government is 
     by definition a pariah because of its determination to 
     exterminate an entire ethnic group.
       A significant population is at risk. Indeed, in areas 
     controlled by the death squads, the Tutsi have essentially 
     been wiped out. Genocide is qualitatively a lot worse than 
     any of the normal human rights situations we worry about 
     around the globe--China, for example.
       For the above three reasons, the appropriateness of 
     international intervention could not be more apparent. The 
     fighting is clearly not susceptible to an early cease-fire, 
     and even if a cease-fire could be arranged, the endangered 
     populations would still be endangered wherever there are 
     death squads still roaming the countryside.
       In addition to the demand that a cease-fire be on hand 
     before the dispatch of troops, the United States is making 
     matters worse by insisting that any U.N. troops work from the 
     outside to protect Rwandans fleeing the fighting in camps in 
     the border areas. That tactic would only increase the number 
     of refugees spilling over into neighboring countries, which 
     cannot handle the ones already there. The only way what is 
     left of the Tutsi population can be saved is for troops to 
     work from the center so that death squads will be intimidated 
     into melting into the general population.
       By standing in the way of African troops intervening in 
     Rwanda under ``combat'' terms of engagement, the United 
     States is effectively imposing upon the Security Council the 
     same rule that it applies to itself. That is to say, the 
     administration sees no vital American interest engaged in 
     Rwanda, and therefore does not want U.N. troops to have a 
     muscular mandate even though African troops would be willing 
     to take on such a difficult and dangerous assignment. Is the 
     U.S. government worried that such an operation would 
     constitute a slippery slope to eventual American troop 
     involvement if the military situation gets worse rather than 
     better? With such a ``what if'' policy, the United Nations is 
     effectively paralyzed from doing anything except traditional 
     peace-keeping, which is exactly where it was during the Cold 
     War.
       It may be too late to save the Tutsi of Rwanda. After three 
     weeks of systematic killing that must be called ``genocide,'' 
     we can probably only learn some lessons for the ``new world 
     order,'' which seems to be eluding us.
       First, we should remember that while five big powers in the 
     Security Council can veto action, they cannot force the 
     Security Council to take action. That takes nine votes. When 
     the Americans sought Security Council approval for military 
     action against Iraq after it invaded Kuwait, a majority vote 
     was not ensured. The non-aligned members of the council were 
     dubious at first. Thanks to the hard work and support of 
     Ethiopia and Zaire, the council voted to use force against 
     Iraq. After the current wimpish approach to the genocide in 
     Rwanda, will the three African Security Council votes be with 
     us in the future when we need support for an action we 
     consider to be in America's vital interest? It may not be a 
     sure thing.
       Second, Rwanda and Bosnia appear to be setting a new ugly 
     pattern in post-Cold War politics. Small groups of determined 
     fanatics are willing to ride a wave of hatred and ethnic fear 
     in order to obtain power or remain in power regardless of the 
     human cost. Former communists in Serbia are now ethnic 
     nationalists. Hutu extremists in Rwanda saw democracy coming 
     and decided that genocide was the price to pay for remaining 
     in power. Where there is a history of ethnic animosity, it 
     only takes a simple ``Kill them before they kill us'' to set 
     off the powder keg. International inaction in Rwanda and 
     insufficient action in Bosnia are sending a signal to nasty 
     people everywhere: ``You can get away with it now.''
       Finally, the United States and other important powers 
     should start working to give the United Nations the ability 
     to put out fires while they are still smoldering. The U.N. 
     secretary general proposed such a rapid reaction capability 
     in the ``Agenda for Peace'' proposal of July, 1992, which has 
     so far received very little attention. If the Agenda for 
     Peace cannot be implemented throughout the world, why not 
     start it at least in Africa?
       At the opening of the Holocaust Museum, President Clinton 
     pledged that ``we will never allow another Holocaust.'' 
     Another Holocaust may have just slipped by, hardly noticed.
                                  ____

                                                      U.S. Senate,


                               Committee on Foreign Relations,

                                     Washington, DC, May 13, 1994.
     President William J. Clinton,
     White House,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. President: We are concerned about the continuing 
     disaster in Rwanda, and the failure of the international 
     community to halt or even diminish the slaughter taking place 
     there.
       We have been consulting with those who work with the 
     refugee community including a Rwandan who barely escaped from 
     the disaster; General Romeo Dallaire, the Canadian military 
     leader in charge of the remnant of United Nations troops in 
     the capital city of Kigali; and others.
       We suggest the following action be considered immediately 
     and acted upon swiftly:
       1. The United States should send a signal to the present 
     government, such as it is, and to those who rebel, that a 
     government which does not strive to halt the civil war, 
     eliminate the massacres, and assist in getting food to hungry 
     people, regardless of ethnic background, will not receive 
     assistance from the United States, and we will encourage the 
     community of nations to follow a similar policy.
       2. The United States should take steps to discourage the 
     importation of arms into Rwanda.
       3. The United States should press the United Nations 
     Security Council to immediately approve an increase in 
     authorized UN force levels of the United Nations Assistance 
     Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR). General Dallaire, the UN forces 
     commander in Rwanda, has indicated that a minimum of 5,000 
     troops would be necessary to ensure a credible UN presence. 
     He believes a force of 8,000 would effectively achieve the 
     desired results. The force should have the mandate to (a) 
     stop the massacres; (b) protect civilians throughout the 
     country; and (c) facilitate the delivery of humanitarian 
     assistance. General Dallaire believes a force of that size 
     could effectively achieve the desired result. Obviously there 
     are risks, but an end to the slaughter is not possible 
     without this action. These can be primarily African-nation 
     troops, though some non-African troops should participate.
       The United States should assist the United Nations with 
     finances and provide some basic equipment to some of the less 
     well equipped forces.
       Delays, or simply doing nothing, are not acceptable 
     substitutes for a foreign policy of leadership. Human life is 
     at stake, and swift and sound decision-making is needed.
       We request that you ask your top military and diplomatic 
     personnel to immediately analyze the soundness of our 
     proposals, and to report back to you quickly so that timely 
     action can be taken.
           Sincerely,
     Paul Simon,
       U.S. Senator.
     Jim Jeffords,
       U.S. Senator.

                          ____________________