[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 72 (Friday, June 10, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 10, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                CONTAINING NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR THREATS

  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, North Korea's refusal to comply with its 
obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has provoked a 
grave international crisis. No one should doubt the seriousness of the 
situation or the gravity of its test of the mettle of President Clinton 
and his foreign policy team. The critical nature of the dilemma, 
however, should not be aggravated by loose talk and false bravado.
  For the past several years, under both President Bush and President 
Clinton, the objectives of the United States and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] have been: first, to determine North 
Korea's past nuclear weapons activities, and second, to limit future 
North Korean weapons development.
  It has become clear that North Korea's objective has been to use 
their apparent nuclear weapons program to gain political legitimacy in 
the West, principally the United States, while rebuffing pressure from 
the international community to end their nuclear program.
  North Korea does not want its nuclear past exposed. Its decision to 
change fuel rods in its 5-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon at this 
time and in an accelerated fashion, precluded IAEA analysis, was 
evidently intended to keep its nuclear past cloaked in mystery. Without 
proper examination of the fuel rods during their withdrawal from the 
reactor, international experts cannot verify if North Korea withdrew 
plutonium at an earlier period.
  We must presume the worst as long as we do not know what North Korea 
has done in the past. That worst, at a minimum, means as reported in 
the press one to two nuclear weapons.
  North Korea may now consider that it has the best of both worlds. 
Because we do not know the extent of its nuclear arsenal, we must 
assume it has one, thus gaining for North Korea the attention it so 
obviously craves. It has served their purpose of ending their more than 
40 years of diplomatic isolation. There is nothing North Korea may fear 
more than being ignored.
  For several months, the United States has held talks with North Korea 
to seek their agreement to nuclear inspections by IAEA officials. I 
have always preferred talk to conflict, and I supported this effort, 
although it has not thus far achieved its stated objectives. But we 
must also recognize that the United States is not the only 
interlocutor. Regional states such as China, South Korea, and Japan all 
have a role as well as the United Nations, including the U.N. Command 
in South Korea.
  In addition to the obvious threat of conflict including the use of 
nuclear weapons, there are three reasons why we must remain vigilant:
  An active North Korean nuclear weapons program may provoke a similar 
response by South Korea and Japan, both of whom have remained out of 
the nuclear arms race;
  Such a program could eventually lead North Korea to export nuclear 
weapons to terrorists or to rogue countries such as Libya and Iran, as 
North Korea now does with its conventional weapons; and
  North Korea's nuclear program combined with its expanded missile 
program may result in a potential nuclear threat to the United States.
  I am concerned that regional states do not appear to have a 
sufficient fear of North Korea's nuclear program. Japan is reportedly 
reluctant to have an embargo placed on North Korea and hesitates to 
curb financial remittances by Koreans residing in Japan to North Korea, 
although these transactions may add close to $2 billion annually to the 
North's reserves. While South Korea appears more concerned than Japan, 
they are also reluctant to provoke a confrontation which would risk a 
conflict, or to increase tension that could hurt their economic 
prosperity.
  North Korea is not the only country with the potential to threaten 
nuclear terrorism. We urgently need to develop practical means to 
enforce our admirable commitment to restrain the international 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  The eventual threat posed by the North Korean development of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear 
warheads has been monitored closely by the United States, and needs to 
be factored now in our strategic defense planning.
  Given the dire consequences of another war on the Korean peninsula, 
nuclear or conventional, I believe there are a number of measures that 
we should take now. These include:

  Suspending bilateral talks at any level between the United States and 
North Korea. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.N. 
Command in South Korea should be the principal interlocutors with the 
North until such time North Korean deeds match their promises in terms 
of compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
  Reassessing the American military force structure in South Korea and 
Japan;
  Moving ahead with Japan to build a theater missile defense system in 
the region;
  Reassessing South Korean defensive capabilities to establish that 
they are sufficient to meet the North's threat, and to verify that 
their forces continue to complement United States forces in South 
Korea, under U.N. Command;
  Working with our allies on international efforts to end trafficking 
in weapons of mass destruction. It is time to use all the means at our 
disposal to shred the veil of hypocrisy that now covers the world arms 
trade; and
  Taking such measures, either through the United Nations or with our 
allies, to enforce economic sanctions on North Korea, particularly to 
constrain international financial transactions.
  I hope that such measures would bring North Korea to its senses. If 
they do, and if the regime is prepared to come out of its self-imposed 
isolation, then there is a real possibility that peace and stability in 
the region can be enhanced. But they may not and I would say with all 
seriousness that we must prepare the American people for the 
possibility that force may need to be used at some time in the future 
to ensure our own national security, as well as that of South Korea and 
other countries in the region.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

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