[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 71 (Thursday, June 9, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 9, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. DORGAN (for himself, Mr. Daschle, Mr. Campbell, Mr. 
        Durenberger, and Mr. Conrad):
  S. 2169. A bill to require the Secretary of Agriculture to conduct a 
study of cooperative marketing of United States and Canadian grain for 
export, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry.


          grain export cooperative marketing study act of 1994

  Mr. DORGAN. Madam President, I would like to introduce today, on 
behalf of myself, Senator Daschle, Senator Campbell, Senator 
Durenberger, and Senator Conrad, a bill that will require the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture to conduct a study. That, in itself, is not 
very exciting news, but I would like to describe why I think this 
legislation is important for our country.

  Many will know, especially those from my region of the country, about 
the substantial fight we have going on with Canada over grain trade. 
The Canadians are literally flooding this country with unfairly 
subsidized grain exports. It does not mean very much to anybody in this 
country, unless you are a farmer on the American side and you see 
unfair competition flooding in and you cannot compete with it. It means 
lower prices for you and less income.
  Farmers on the U.S. side fully expect our Government to take action 
to stop it. This administration, the Clinton administration, is taking 
action. We expect on July 1 to have something in place to begin 
restricting the flow of grain coming from Canada that is unfairly 
subsidized.
  Our trouble with grain imports comes from the United States-Canada 
Free-Trade Agreement, which was trumpeted as a major trade policy 
advancement that would link together our interests and the Canadians' 
interests. Of course, at least with respect to wheat and barley, it has 
not worked out that way.
  Let me first emphasize that we will solve this grain trade dispute, 
and then we will put it behind us. At that point the question is, then 
what? Business as usual? Or can we expect, on behalf of American 
farmers, to get some benefit out of the United States-Canada Free-Trade 
Agreement?
  Today, I am introducing a bill that is an attempt to explore whether 
we can chart new directions and find new opportunities after we have 
solved this grain trade dispute with Canada.
  It is interesting, if you take a look at our trade agreement with 
Canada and the North America Free Trade Agreement, one would expect 
some benefits from those agreements to flow to producers in our 
country.
  Well, those who are agricultural producers really do not get much 
benefit. What happens is you have two very dissimilar systems for 
marketing grain. The Canadians have a national Wheat Board, which is 
largely farmer-affiliated and quasi-governmental. And in our county we 
simply have a privately-controlled market which is controlled at the 
neck of the bottle by some very large grain firms. And those firms have 
no interest in changing the present system.
  But I want to propose that we take a look at a new approach. If you 
take a look at the United States and Canada together, our farmers, year 
after year, produce over 50 percent of all the wheat that is in the 
international export pipeline. We produce over 90 percent of the durum 
wheat that is in the international export pipeline. Together, if we 
jointly marketed our exports around the world, we could command a much 
better price for our farmers.
  Instead, we have a system in which American farmers are pitted 
against Canadian farmers and so we compete in international markets. 
Then the American and Canadian farmers do not get the income they 
should, and the big grain exporting firms are fat and happy and they 
are moving a lot of grain at low prices. They could care less what the 
farmers get.
  My bill is very simple. It asks the United States Department of 
Agriculture to analyze the feasibility of United States farmers and 
Canadian farmers joining together in a strategy to develop some kind of 
a North American grain board in which we could jointly market our grain 
around the world and command a better price for it. We certainly would 
have the bulk of the wheat. As I said, over 50 percent of the wheat in 
the international pipeline would come from us.
  If we joint market instead of competing against each other to drive 
up grain prices for both sides of farmers, we would, it seems to me, 
achieve something good for both countries and for farmers that live on 
both sides of the border.
  That is what this bill does. This bill says to the USDA, let us try 
to understand what we might do to jointly market our grain with Canada 
in the export markets around the world.
  Now, this problem is as old as almost any issue: How to market grain 
so that the farmers get a decent price.
  I represent a State that has a long border with Canada. Farmers on 
both sides of the border suffer the same kind of trouble. The fact is, 
we do not get enough income for the grain we produce.
  Again, most of this is very abstract to people. People do not 
understand what all this means.
  Consider Durum wheat. It is the wheat from which we produce semolina 
flour, from which we produce macaroni and pasta products. We do not 
think much about the price of the Durum wheat when we go to buy elbow 
macaroni at the grocery store. The fact is that farmers do not get much 
of the price of elbow macaroni.
  Durum wheat goes from $6 per bushel to $2, and back and forth. When 
you go into the grocery store after the farmer's price for Durum wheat 
has dropped from $5 to $3, do you think you will see a decrease in the 
price of elbow macaroni? Not on your life. It simply does not happen.
  The fact is, the farmers on both sides of the border are whip-sawed 
back and forth by the big food processors and large grain export firms. 
Although we command a major part of what is exported in wheat and Durum 
wheat, our farmers get too little.
  And the question is, could we extract more in the international 
marketplace to benefit our farmers and benefit our country? That is the 
purpose of this bill.
  I am joined by four Members of the Senate and hope that others will 
join me as well, and I expect that we will get from this study some 
good information from the Department of Agriculture. I look forward, if 
we can move this year, to a Department of Agriculture evaluation of how 
we would proceed to benefit American farmers in exporting their grain.
  Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2169

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. STUDY OF COOPERATIVE MARKETING OF UNITED STATES 
                   AND CANADIAN GRAIN.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement forced 
     the creation of a single North American grain market without 
     adjustments to harmonize the marketing system and relative 
     Federal commodity programs of the 2 nations;
       (2) trade conflicts between the United States and Canada 
     over grain trade have arisen, and continue to escalate since 
     the negotiation of the Agreement;
       (3) better harmony between the United States and Canadian 
     grain marketing system is needed;
       (4) Canadian producers have cooperatively marketed their 
     grain for 50 years, and have an established collective 
     marketing system;
       (5) United States producers should have the opportunity to 
     market their grain cooperatively when the producers find it 
     in their best interest; and
       (6) it is in the interest of harmonious trade with Canada, 
     and in the possible economic interests of United States grain 
     producers, to investigate the advantages and disadvantages of 
     marketing grain in a cooperative exporting venture with 
     Canada, and for the United States to discuss such a venture 
     with Canada.
       (b) Study.--The Secretary of Agriculture shall conduct a 
     study of cooperative marketing of United States and Canadian 
     grain for export. The study shall--
       (1) evaluate the desirability and feasibility of the United 
     States entering into negotiations with Canada to establish a 
     cooperative venture to conduct the marketing;
       (2) evaluate, as alternative marketing ventures, the 
     collective export marketing of durum wheat, barley, all 
     wheat, or all wheat and barley;
       (3) describe and evaluate the structures of collective 
     grain export marketing ventures that are most economically 
     advantageous to United States grain producers;
       (4) describe the changes in United States and Canadian law 
     that may be necessary to proceed with each of the marketing 
     ventures that are described in paragraphs (2) and (3), 
     including changes in United States law necessary to authorize 
     the Secretary to issue and amend marketing orders under 
     section 8c of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (7 U.S.C. 
     608c), reenacted with amendments by the Agricultural 
     Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, to facilitate the collective 
     marketing of grains; and
       (5) evaluate the likely effects of each venture on United 
     States commodity programs for grain and recommend necessary 
     and appropriate changes in the programs that would be--
       (A) most beneficial and profitable for grain producers;
       (B) least costly to the Federal Government; and
       (C) most harmonious with the marketing system and commodity 
     programs of Canada.
       (c) Report.--The Secretary shall report the results of the 
     study to Congress not later than August 15, 1995.
                                 ______

      By Mr. CONRAD:
  S. 2171. A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to waive 
the foreign country residence requirement with respect to foreign 
medical graduates; to the Committee on the Judiciary.


         immigration and nationality act amendment act of 1994

 Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, today I introduce legislation that 
will help increase the supply of physicians in rural America. Our 
Nation has spent the last year and a half debating about broad concepts 
like managed competition, shared responsibility, insurance reforms, and 
more. But while rural America, like the rest of our Nation, needs 
insurance reforms and relief from escalating health care costs, access 
to health care providers is also an extremely high priority.
  The State of North Dakota, along with many other States, has learned 
the necessity to turn every stone and explore every avenue in 
identifying providers who can care for our people. Many of my 
colleagues would find it difficult to believe that 85 percent of the 
counties in my State have been designated, either in part or in total, 
as health professional shortage areas.
  One way North Dakota's hospitals have found to augment their 
physician supply is through a process known as a J-1 visa waiver. We 
often have highly qualified foreign physicians who practice in our 
communities under a J-1 visa. Those visas allow international medical 
graduates to practice in the United States under an educational 
exchange program for as many as 7 years. When the visa expires, these 
physicians are required to return to their country of origin to fulfill 
a 2-year foreign residency requirement. But when a physician returns to 
fulfill the requirement, the community in which he or she has been 
practicing loses a needed medical professional.
  There is currently a process through which the 2-year requirement can 
be eliminated. That process is the so-called J-1 visa waiver. But the 
process is a mess. Under current law, a hospital facility in North 
Dakota that desperately needs a physician must find an interested 
Federal agency that is willing to state that the hospital resides in an 
area that needs a physician. Without such a finding by a Federal 
agency, no waiver may be granted.
  In practical terms, the current system is extremely inequitable. 
Certain parts of the country have developed mechanisms that enable them 
to snap up physicians through J-1 visa waivers almost at the drop of a 
hat. Other parts of our country have much more difficulty.
  In North Dakota, we have managed to help several communities obtain 
waivers for doctors who are now providing much needed access to health 
care to the people of my State. My office has worked or is working to 
help hospitals and clinics in and around several North Dakota 
communities--Oakes, Tioga, Minot, Lisbon, Langdon, Stanley, Center, and 
Elgin--obtain such physicians.
  But the requirement that an interested Federal agency declare the 
area to be in need of a physician creates enormous problems. The 
Department of Health and Human Services has historically been difficult 
to work with on this issue. Consequently, offices like mine have been 
required to work with other Federal agencies. The most logical agency, 
given its connection to rural America, is the Department of 
Agriculture. The Agriculture Department has been as responsive as 
possible, but is receiving more requests than it can handle. And quite 
frankly, there are other departments of the Federal Government, and of 
State governments, that are better equipped to make these 
determinations.

  Because of the difficulty of this process, one facility in North 
Dakota was forced to use the Coast Guard as an interested Federal 
agency. I was extremely pleased that the Coast Guard, which has a small 
station in LaMoure, was willing to assist the local community in 
obtaining a needed medical professional. But, Mr. President, when the 
Coast Guard has to be the agency to declare an area of North Dakota in 
need of a physician, something needs to change.
  The bill I am introducing today would allow an interested State 
agency to make the recommendations that until now could only be made by 
a Federal agency. Under my legislation, the Governor could simply 
designate a State agency--maybe the State health department or some 
other similar entity--to determine whether the situation in a 
particular community merited the use of an international medical 
graduate. This would provide a central place to which hospitals and 
other facilities that needed physicians could go to seek assistance. 
And it would relieve Federal agencies that are being increasingly 
burdened with requests coming from many facilities in many States of a 
burden that many agencies should not have to bear. My proposal would do 
nothing to alter the right of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service and the U.S. Information Agency to determine whether the waiver 
should be granted. And it would also ensure that the physician's 
country of origin would retain a right to object to the waiver if it 
had funded the physician's training through its own resources.
  In order to receive the waiver, a physician would be required to 
agree to serve the community for at least 3 years. If he or she failed 
to fulfill that commitment, the physician would be subject to immediate 
deportation. The physician would have to practice in a community that 
is short of physicians. And no more than 1,000 such slots would be 
available each year.
  My proposal is by no means the entire solution to our health care 
needs in rural America. We must do more to reform our graduate medical 
education system so that our Nation produces more primary care 
practitioners. And we must provide additional incentives for 
physicians, nurse practitioners, physician's assistants, and others to 
practice in rural America. But the proposal I am introducing today will 
make a very real contribution to augmenting the physician supply in 
rural areas that need qualified physicians.
                                 ______

      By Mr. COCHRAN:
  S. 2172. A bill to amend chapter 17 of title 28, United States Code, 
to provide that bankruptcy judges and magistrates may receive cost-of-
living adjustments to their annuities after ceasing the practice of 
law, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.


  Retired Bankruptcy Judges and Magistrates Annuities Cost-of-Living 
                         Adjustment Act of 1994

  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce a bill that 
will correct what I believe to be an unintended inequity in Public Law 
100-659, the Retirement and Survivors' Annuities for Bankruptcy Judges 
and Magistrates Act of 1988.
  That act provides that bankruptcy judges and magistrates are eligible 
to retire upon attaining the age of 65 with 14 years of service and 
receive an annuity which may be adjusted for future increases in the 
cost-of-living.
  The act also provides that a retired magistrate or bankruptcy judge 
may elect to practice law following retirement, but upon such an 
election, his or her annuity will be irrevocably frozen at the level in 
effect at that time.
  It is my understanding that this penalty of potential loss of cost-
of-living adjustments in a retiree's annuity was intended to discourage 
retired bankruptcy judges and magistrates from the post-retirement 
practice of law.
  Mr. President, the inequity in the law arises, in my view, from the 
irrevocable nature of the penalty. Even though the retired judge or 
magistrate may cease to practice law and return to a fully retired 
status, his or her annuity remains frozen and not subject to future 
cost-of-living adjustment.
  Mr. President, I believe that when a retired bankruptcy judge or 
magistrate ceases to practice law, their annuity should be restored to 
the same status as before the election was made. The bill I am 
introducing today will amend Public Law 100-659 to provide that upon 
the cessation of post-retirement law practice, annuities of retired 
bankruptcy judges and magistrates could once again be adjusted for 
future increases in the cost of living.
  The legislation is not retroactive and a retiree would not receive 
any benefit or adjustment in their annuities for cost-of-living 
increases that occurred during the time following retirement when they 
were engaged in the practice of law. It would apply only from the point 
at which the annuitant ceases to practice law and returns to a fully 
retired status.
                                 ______

      By Mr. ROTH (for himself and Mr. Lautenberg):
  S. 2173. A bill to improve the protection of intellectual property 
rights through the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements, and 
for other purposes; to the Committee on Finance.


          Intellectual Property Rights protection Act of 1994

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise to introduce legislation on an issue 
of great importance to our Nation's global competitiveness and 
innovative strength--the protection of U.S. intellectual property in 
overseas markets. This legislation builds on the recently concluded 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights--TRIPS Agreement--and establishes a post-Uruguay round 
strategy for expanding and improving intellectual property protection 
in major markets abroad where serious infringement and other problems 
exist. It is my intention to pursue this legislation in the context of 
implementing the Uruguay round, and I am pleased that Senator 
Lautenberg is joining me in this endeavor as a cosponsor of the bill.
  The vigorous pursuit of strong international protection of 
intellectual property is a longstanding and well-established trade 
policy objective of the United States. Such protection is essential to 
our competitive edge and economic growth because many of the goods and 
services in which we excel are founded on America's ability to create 
new ideas and invent new products. The lack of full intellectual 
property protection imposes an enormous burden on the U.S. economy in 
terms of lost, well-paying jobs, lost U.S. sales, and lost research and 
development opportunities. The increasing globalization of production 
and economic interdependence of the world economy has made this problem 
ever more urgent and acute.
  A few facts and figures underscore the gravity of the problems we 
face as leading owners of intellectual property rights. The lack of 
full patent protection, for example, costs the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry an estimated $5 billion per year, which, in turn, lowers R&D 
investment by $700 to $900 million on an annual basis. Our copyright 
industry, which includes computer software and entertainment products 
and leads the world in sales and exports, annually loses an estimated 
$15 to $17 billion from piracy and infringement. The costs to our 
economy are self-evident from just these few examples and underscore 
why effective and adequate protection of intellectual property is of 
supreme importance to our Nation.
  For at least a decade now, the United States has pursued a 
bilateral, protection of U.S. intellectual property. We have been most 
active on the bilateral front, particularly through our ``Special 301'' 
trade law. This law, which was enacted as part of the 1988 Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act, created an annual investigatory 
mechanism for identifying countries that deny adequate and effective 
protection of intellectual property or deny fair and equitable market 
access to U.S. persons that rely upon intellectual property protection. 
It has been a very useful and productive law which has resulted in 
raising intellectual property standards in several countries. As USTR 
general counsel, Ira Shapiro, recently testified, Special 301 has been 
``[p]erhaps the most useful statutory tool we have available to promote 
the protection of intellectual property * * *.'' This year's Special 
301 announcement underscores that point--37 countries were identified 
in varying degrees of seriousness as failing to provide adequate and 
effective intellectual property protection or market access to persons 
relying on intellectual property protection.

  The North American Free-Trade Agreement [NAFTA] exemplifies the 
success we have had regionally in securing major advances in Mexico's 
and Canada's intellectual property regimes. While not perfect, NAFTA, 
in fact, contains the highest standards of intellectual property 
protection and enforcement so far achieved in any international trade 
agreement.
  The TRIPS Agreement, which was recently concluded as part of the 
Uruguay round, is our latest accomplishment in pursuit of our trade 
strategy for intellectual property protection. It represents the main 
multilateral thrust of our strategy, and is a very significant 
accomplishment because it will establish relatively high standards on 
intellectual property protection in the over 115 members of the new 
World Trade Organization [WTO]. This new agreement will, in effect, 
provide a multilateral baseline of protection. Unfortunately, however, 
we did not achieve all of our negotiating objectives in this agreement, 
and we even agreed to some weakening of certain provisions in the final 
days of the negotiations.
  I am extremely disappointed that the agreement allows up to 10 years 
for developing countries to adopt the key provisions of the agreement. 
The TRIPS Agreement will actually prohibit for the next 5 to 10 years 
effective action against developing countries that haven't met 
their Uruguay round obligations. There are other serious gaps in the 
agreement, such as the lack of full national treatment for U.S. 
copyright holders.

  With the conclusion of both NAFTA and the Uruguay round, we have 
reached a turning point in our trade-related strategy for improving and 
expanding the protection of U.S. intellectual property in overseas 
markets. We must now develop and implement a post-Uruguay round 
strategy. Such a strategy should build on past successes by 
establishing higher levels of protection where necessary, rectifying 
problems in existing agreements, and eliminating specific cases of 
continued and egregious piracy of U.S. intellectual property wherever 
it might exist.
  The legislation I am introducing today will establish such a 
strategy. It contains several elements, some of which I would like to 
summarize briefly.
  The first element of this forward-looking strategy on the 
international protection of intellectual property is the need to 
clearly identify our Nation's principal international objectives in the 
post-Uruguay round era. One such objective must be to accelerate 
developing countries' full implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. We 
simply cannot afford to sit on our laurels and wait 10 years for 
important developing countries to fully implement this new multilateral 
regime for intellectual property protection. We also must go beyond the 
TRISP Agreement of baseline protection to attain higher levels of 
protection where necessary, particularly with respect to new and 
emerging technologies. This will require ongoing bilateral, regional, 
and multilateral efforts based on strong U.S. leadership. Another 
objective should be to ensure the United States is actively involved in 
the new WTO intellectual property regime; this requires, among other 
things, close monitoring of the way the regime is being implemented by 
all WTO member countries--agreements are worth very little if they are 
not fully implemented and enforced. These and other critically 
important objectives are set forth in the legislation I am introducing 
today.
  In pursuit of these important objectives, the legislation also makes 
certain essential changes to Special 301. These changes update and 
clarify Special 301 to take into account the new TRIPS Agreement and 
will ensure that Special 301 remains the viable and effective trade 
tool it has become.
  Another provision calls for the full adoption of the TRIPS Agreement 
and an expressed willingness to agree to even higher standards of 
intellectual property protection by any country that seeks to enter 
into a future free trade agreement with the United States.
  An additional key provision requires the U.S. Trade Representative 
[USTR] to develop and maintain a model intellectual property agreement, 
which will represent our Nation's negotiating objectives on 
intellectual property protection. The goal of this provision is to make 
certain we establish the highest and most comprehensive levels of 
protection in future intellectual property agreements. Neither NAFTA, 
or TRIPS, nor any other bilateral agreement we've negotiated to date 
offers an appropriate model for future negotiations. Technologies 
change and create new intellectual property problems and require new 
solutions. Establishing and updating periodically a model agreement 
will help assure that our negotiators secure the best possible 
protection overseas for U.S. owners of intellectual property rights.
  Mr. President, I have outlined briefly some of the key elements of 
this legislation. It already has the support of a broad-based coalition 
of leading U.S. companies, all of which depend on effective and 
adequate protection of intellectual property for their survival.
  I look forward to working with my colleagues and the executive branch 
to ensure that the critical issues raised in this legislation are 
adequately addressed in the Uruguay round implementing legislation.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill and 
additional material be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 2173

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 
                   OBJECTIVES.

       The principal objectives of the United States regarding 
     international protection of intellectual property rights 
     are--
       (1) to accelerate the full implementation of parts I, II, 
     and III of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
     Intellectual Property Rights (hereafter referred to as the 
     ``Agreement on TRIPS'');
       (2) to seek enactment and effective implementation by 
     foreign countries of standards for protection and enforcement 
     of intellectual property rights that supplement and 
     strengthen the standards and obligations contained in the 
     Agreement on TRIPS and the North American Free Trade 
     Agreement, including, but not limited to--
       (A) supplementing and strengthening such standards and 
     obligations through bilateral and multilateral agreements to 
     assure the protection of new and emerging technologies, and 
     new methods of transmission, distribution, and use, and
       (B) eliminating discrimination, unreasonable exceptions, or 
     preconditions with respect to the protection, enforcement, or 
     commercial enjoyment of the full economic benefits arising 
     from any use or exploitation of intellectual property rights;
       (3) to secure fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory market 
     access opportunities for United States persons holding 
     intellectual property rights, including rights that are 
     currently or that may later be granted by a foreign country 
     to its own nationals with respect to the use or exploitation 
     of intellectual property;
       (4) to take an active role in the development of the 
     intellectual property regime under the World Trade 
     Organization (hereafter referred to as the ``WTO''), 
     particularly with respect to monitoring implementation of the 
     regime by WTO members and use of the WTO dispute settlement 
     procedures;
       (5) to take an active role in the World Intellectual 
     Property Organization (hereafter referred to as the ``WIPO'') 
     and to ensure that the WIPO and the WTO work together in a 
     mutually supportive fashion;
       (6) to establish and maintain a Model Intellectual Property 
     Agreement which sets forth a high level of intellectual 
     property rights protection and to ensure that all future 
     international trade agreements entered into by the United 
     States are based on the Model Intellectual Property 
     Agreement;
       (7) to make protection of intellectual property rights a 
     priority factor for determining eligibility to participate in 
     future free trade agreements and the generalized system of 
     preferences;
       (8) to ensure that countries or fast-growing economic 
     entities that seek to accede to the WTO agree to full and 
     effective implementation of parts I, II, and III of the 
     Agreement on TRIPS and resolve any major outstanding 
     intellectual property-related issues of concern to the United 
     States prior to accession;
       (9) to require that United States diplomatic missions 
     abroad include intellectual property rights protection as a 
     priority objective of the mission; and
       (10) to take appropriate action, including the 
     establishment of technical cooperation committees, to 
     encourage and help foreign countries improve the protection 
     of intellectual property rights.

     SEC. 2. REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTRY INTO NEW FREE TRADE 
                   AGREEMENTS.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     law, the President may not negotiate any new free trade 
     agreement with a foreign country, unless the President first 
     determines that such country--
       (1) is fully implementing parts I, II, and III of the 
     Agreement on TRIPS, and
       (2) is willing to enter into an agreement with the United 
     States to provide intellectual property rights protection in 
     line with the protection set forth in the Model Intellectual 
     Property Agreement developed pursuant to section 6.
       (b) Upgrading Existing Free Trade Agreements.--If, after 
     the date of the enactment of this Act, the United States 
     enters into a free trade agreement with a foreign country 
     that provides greater protection of intellectual property 
     rights than a free trade agreement previously negotiated with 
     another country, the President shall seek to amend such 
     previously negotiated agreement to provide for such greater 
     protection of intellectual property rights.
       (c) Notice to Congressional Committees.--The President 
     shall provide written notice to the Committee on Finance of 
     the Senate and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House 
     of Representatives of--
       (1) any determination made under subsection (a), and
       (2) any progress made in amending a previously negotiated 
     free trade agreement under subsection (b).

     SEC. 3. IDENTIFICATION OF COUNTRIES THAT DENY ADEQUATE 
                   PROTECTION OR MARKET ACCESS FOR INTELLECTUAL 
                   PROPERTY RIGHTS.

       Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2242) is 
     amended--
       (1) in subsection (a)(1)--
       (A) by striking ``or'' at the end of subparagraph (A),
       (B) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (B) and 
     inserting ``or'', and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(C) deny the opportunity to enjoy on a nondiscriminatory 
     basis full commercial benefits associated with exercising 
     rights in protected works, fixations, or products embodying 
     protected works, and'';
       (2) in subsection (b), by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(4) In identifying a priority foreign country under 
     subsection (a) (1) and (2), the Trade Representative shall 
     take into account--
       ``(A) the history of intellectual property protection laws 
     and practices of the foreign country, including any past 
     identification of the country under such paragraphs (1) and 
     (2), and
       ``(B) the history of the efforts of the United States and 
     the responses of the foreign country to achieve adequate and 
     effective protection of intellectual property rights.''; and
       (3) in subsection (d)--
       (A) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:
       ``(2) A foreign country denies adequate and effective 
     protection of intellectual property rights, if--
       ``(A) the foreign country is not implementing parts I, II, 
     and III of the Agreement on TRIPS, or
       ``(B) in the case of a foreign country that is implementing 
     parts I, II, and III of the Agreement on TRIPS, or has 
     entered into any other bilateral, regional, or multilateral 
     agreement with respect to the United States, the foreign 
     country--
       ``(i) continues to deny adequate and effective opportunity 
     for persons who are not citizens or nationals of such foreign 
     country to secure, exercise, and enjoy full commercial 
     benefits with respect to intellectual property rights, or
       ``(ii) does not enforce rights relating to patents, process 
     patents, registered trademarks, copyrights and related 
     rights, trade secrets, and mask works.'';
       (B) by amending so much of paragraph (3) as precedes 
     subparagraph (A) to read as follows:
       ``(3) A foreign country denies fair and equitable market 
     access if the foreign country effectively denies access to a 
     market for a product protected by a patent, process patent, 
     registered trademark, copyright or related right, trade 
     secret, or mask work through the use of laws, procedures, or 
     regulations which--''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(4) A foreign country denies the opportunity to enjoy the 
     commercial benefits associated with exercising rights in 
     protected works, fixations, or products embodying protected 
     rights, if the foreign country grants access to methods of 
     distribution or collection of revenues generated from the use 
     or fixation of a product embodying protected rights, or any 
     other benefit relating to such works, fixations, or products 
     embodying protected rights, on terms more advantageous to its 
     own nationals than to nationals of another country.
       ``(5) The term `Agreement on TRIPS' means the Agreement on 
     Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights entered 
     into as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements resulting from 
     the multilateral trade negotiations conducted under the 
     auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.''.

     SEC. 4. EXPANSION OF TRADE SANCTIONS.

       (a) In General.--Section 301(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 
     (19 U.S.C. 2411(c)) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new paragraph:
       ``(7) The President is authorized to take such other action 
     with respect to the United States relations with a foreign 
     country as is necessary and appropriate to enforce the rights 
     of the United States under any trade agreement or to 
     eliminate an act, policy, or practice described in subsection 
     (a) or (b).''.
       (b) Unreasonable Acts, Policies, or Practices.--Section 
     301(d)(3)(B)(i)(II) of such Act (19 U.S.C. 
     2411(d)(3)(B)(i)(II)) is amended to read as follows:

       ``(II) provision of adequate and effective protection of 
     intellectual property rights, without regard to whether the 
     country is fully implementing parts I, II, and III of the 
     Agreement on TRIPS or the obligations of any other bilateral, 
     regional, or multilateral agreement, or''.

       (c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 301(d) of such Act (19 
     U.S.C. 2411(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(10) The term `Agreement on TRIPS' means the Agreement on 
     Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights entered 
     into as part of the Uruguay Round Agreements resulting from 
     the multilateral trade negotiations conducted under the 
     auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.''.

     SEC. 5. ELIGIBILITY FOR GSP TREATMENT.

       Section 504(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2464(b)) 
     is amended to read as follows:
       ``(b) Changed Circumstances and Identification Under 
     Section 182(a).--
       ``(1) In general.--The President shall, after complying 
     with the requirements of section 502(a)(2), withdraw or 
     suspend the designation of any country as a beneficiary 
     developing country if, after such designation, the President 
     determines--
       ``(A) that as the result of changed circumstances such 
     country would be barred from designation as a beneficiary 
     developing country under section 502(b), or
       ``(B) such country has been identified under section 182(a) 
     and, after completion of an investigation under title III, 
     such country has not implemented measures to eliminate the 
     reason for such country's identification under section 
     182(a)(1).

     Such country shall cease to be a beneficiary developing 
     country on the day on which the President issues an Executive 
     order or Presidential proclamation revoking his designation 
     of such country under section 502.
       ``(2) Redesignation.--Subject to the provisions of section 
     501, the President may redesignate a country as a beneficiary 
     developing country if--
       ``(A) such country's designation was withdrawn or suspended 
     pursuant to paragraph (1)(B), and
       ``(B) such country is taking action to eliminate the 
     reasons for which it was identified under section 
     182(a)(1).''.

     SEC. 6. MODEL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AGREEMENT.

       (a) In General.--The United States Trade Representative, in 
     consultation with appropriate United States Government 
     agencies and the private sector, shall--
       (1) develop and maintain a Model Intellectual Property 
     Agreement which contains provisions for a high level of 
     protection of intellectual property rights that supplement 
     and strengthen the standards and obligations contained in the 
     Agreement on TRIPS and the North American Free Trade 
     Agreement, and
       (2) review periodically the Model Intellectual Property 
     Agreement to ensure that it reflects adequate protection for 
     new and emerging technologies.
       (b) Use of Model.--The Model Intellectual Property 
     Agreement shall represent the negotiating objectives of the 
     United States in all international negotiations involving the 
     protection of intellectual property rights.

     SEC. 7. ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 
                   REPORT.

       Section 163(a)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 
     2213(a)(2)) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (J), and
       (2) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (K) 
     and inserting: ``, and
       ``(L) a review of the efforts undertaken during the 
     preceding calender year by each agency of the United States 
     in support of international protection of intellectual 
     property rights.''.

     SEC. 8. PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE 
                   SETTLEMENT.

       Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, the United States Trade Representative shall 
     develop and implement a procedure for interested persons from 
     the private sector to participate in the preparation for 
     dispute settlement proceedings which involve intellectual 
     property rights and with respect to which the United States 
     is a party.
                                  ____


                  S. 2173--Section-by-Section Summary

       Section 1. International Intellectual Property 
     Objectives.--Sets forth ten principal objectives regarding 
     the international protection of intellectual property rights. 
     Included among these objectives are the following: to 
     accelerate the full implementation of the Uruguay Round's 
     Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
     Rights (TRIPS Agreement); to negotiate international 
     agreements providing intellectual property protection greater 
     than that contained in the TRIPS Agreement and the NAFTA; to 
     play an active role in the development of the intellectual 
     property regime in the World Trade Organization (WTO); to 
     establish a Model Intellectual Property Agreement; and, to 
     ensure that countries seeking to accede to the WTO fully 
     implement the TRIPS Agreement as part of their terms of 
     accession.
       Section 2. Requirements for Entry Into New Free Trade 
     Agreements.--Requires a country to fully implement the TRIPS 
     Agreement and to be willing to enter into negotiations to 
     provide greater intellectual property protection than the 
     TRIPS Agreement prior to entering into free trade 
     negotiations with the United States. Encourages upgrading 
     previously-negotiated FTA provisions on intellectual property 
     when higher levels of protection are achieved in future 
     agreements.
       Section 3. Modifications to Special 301.--Clarifies and 
     updates Special 301 to take into account the TRIPS Agreement, 
     especially with regard to a country's lack of full and 
     effective implementation of the agreement's key provisions. 
     Also more clearly addresses the problem of discriminatory 
     treatment towards U.S. copyrights holders.
       Section 4. Changes to Section 301.--Allows discretionary 
     action under Section 301 against countries that have fully 
     implemented the TRIPS Agreement, but continue to deny 
     adequate and effective intellectual property protection. 
     Underscores that the President has existing authority to take 
     non-trade action in relation to a Section 301 and Special 301 
     investigation.
       Section 5. Eligibility for GSP Treatment.--Calls upon the 
     President to eliminate GSP treatment for a beneficiary 
     country which has been identified as a ``priority foreign 
     country'' under Special 301 and, after the completion of a 
     formal investigation, has not implemented measures to 
     eliminate the reason(s) for the identification. If such 
     country takes subsequent action to eliminate the reason(s) 
     for the Special 301 identification, GSP treatment may be 
     reinstated.
       Section 6. Establishment of a Model Intellectual Property 
     Agreement.--Requires the United States Trade Representative 
     (USTR) to develop and maintain a Model Intellectual Property 
     Agreement. The model agreement will provide a ``NAFTA-plus'' 
     level of intellectual property protection and will represent 
     U.S. negotiating objectives in future international trade 
     negotiations.
       Section 7. Annual Reporting Requirement on Intellectual 
     Property Protection.--Calls for including a review of U.S. 
     government efforts in support of international intellectual 
     property protection in the President's annual trade 
     agreements and trade policy report.
       Section 8. Private Sector Role in WTO Dispute Settlement 
     Process.--Requires the USTR to develop and implement a 
     procedure for interested private sector representatives to 
     participate in preparing for intellectual property-related 
     dispute settlement proceedings.

 Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I am pleased to be an original 
cosponsor of this bill to address a problem that costs American 
industry and workers billions of dollars every year: piracy of American 
intellectual property rights by foreign countries. The administration 
has placed an annual price tag on foreign piracy of American ideas and 
inventions at $50 billion. Every dollar lost to foreign violations 
undermines our economy and puts American jobs at risk.
  For many years I have been concerned about the inadequate protection 
of America's ideas and inventions. The bill Senator Roth and I are 
introducing today is intended to strengthen our laws and create greater 
incentives for the countries of the world to provide greater 
protection.
  Mr. President, the negotiators at the Uruguay round of the GATT 
achieved some real progress in the area of intellectual property 
rights. The round's agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights--commonly called the TRIPS Agreement--represents an 
important milestone in the pursuit of strong worldwide intellectual 
property protection. For the first time, it establishes important 
international intellectual property standards.
  Unfortunately, the agreement gives foreign countries a very long 
time--up to 11 years in some cases--to comply with those standards 
although the United States has only 1 year to come into compliance with 
the TRIPS obligations under the GATT.
  This bill is intended, in part, to bring countries into compliance in 
a more timely way. I know the administration shares our goal of 
securing greater protection. When I discussed this issue with USTR 
Kantor at a hearing last year in the Commerce, Justice, State 
Appropriations Subcommittee, he said the administration ``should look 
at the possibility of using every tool at its disposal to convince 
countries that they should protect intellectual property as well as 
investment as well as live up to their agreements in a way that would 
be beneficial not only to our workers and our business but beneficial 
to them if they expect to receive the kind of assistance that they have 
been receiving.'' I want to help the administration convince these 
countries to provide such protection in a timely way.
  I hope the Finance Committee will approve this proposal, in addition 
to one I, along with Senator Roth previously introduced on this issue, 
S. 2041, as part of the GATT implementing legislation.
                                 ______

      By Mr. AKAKA:
  S. 2174. A bill to provide for the administration of the Hawaiian 
Homes Commission Act, 1920, and for other purposes; to the Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources.


                    hawaiian home lands recovery act

  Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation which 
seeks to address longstanding land issues between the Federal 
Government and native Hawaiians.
  Since the introduction of westernization in the Hawaiian islands in 
1778, and the subsequent political and economic developments which 
followed, the native people of Hawaii suffered a steady deterioration 
in social and economic conditions.
  Congress responded by enacting legislation--the Hawaiian Homes 
Commission Act of 1920--to provide homestead opportunities so that 
native Hawaiians could once again enjoy their traditional lifestyle; 
203,000 acres were set aside for this purpose.
  From its inception in 1921, the Hawaiian Home Lands Program was 
destined to fail. The program, and the manner in which it was 
administered, is a case study on the failure of the Federal Government 
to safeguard the interests of native Hawaiians.
  A pattern of self-dealing and illegal land transfers by the Federal 
Government during Hawaii's territorial period has deprived native 
Hawaiians of housing, economic development, and the opportunity to 
achieve self-sufficiency. Territorial Governors, under orders from 
Washington, displayed gross negligence in the handling of assets 
entrusted to them, as well as a willful disregard for the interests of 
native Hawaiian beneficiaries.
  Between 1921 and 1959, the Federal Government, acting through the 
territorial Governor, systematically withdrew large portions of 
Hawaiian Home Lands. The most useful and productive lands were taken 
from Hawaiians by the Federal Government, leaving marginal lands, far 
from essential infrastructure, that often were too poor to support 
housing or agriculture.
  While the majority of these lands were returned in 1984, the Federal 
Government never provided compensation for lost use and currently 
retains the most valued parcels.
  To correct this injustice, the Hawaiian Home Lands Recovery Act would 
establish a process to restore or replace lands taken by the Federal 
Government that are still outstanding, as well as to provide for lost-
use compensation for lands already returned and those still held. Where 
return is not possible, the bill would transfer Federal land of equal 
value as a replacement.
  The bill would also set a deadline for the completion of recovery 
negotiations between the Secretary of the Interior, the State of 
Hawaii, and native Hawaiian beneficiaries.
  I look forward to working with my colleagues in resolving these 
longstanding issues.
                                 ______

      By Mr. LAUTENBERG (for himself, Mrs. Feinstein, and Mr. Graham):
  S. 2175. A bill to urge the renegotiation of prisoner transfer 
treaties in order to relieve overcrowding in Federal and State prisons; 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations.


                    the prisoner transfer equity act

 Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, there are thousands of criminal 
illegal aliens who are serving time in our State and Federal prisons. 
They contribute to prison overcrowding, and they cost the American 
taxpayers approximately $1.2 billion each year.
  These criminal illegal aliens have committed two strikes against us--
They have broken our immigration laws in coming here and they have been 
convicted of crimes once here in America.
  We should send criminal illegal aliens in our prisons back to their 
native countries to serve out their sentences. It is my hope that the 
legislation we are introducing today will begin this process.
  Today, I am introducing the Prisoner Transfer Equity Act. I am 
pleased to be joined by Senators Feinstein and Graham in this effort. 
This legislation will direct the President to renegotiate existing 
prisoner transfer treaties and enter into new treaties to have 
countries take back greater numbers of criminal illegal aliens who are 
currently serving time in our Federal and State prisons.
  While we have treaties with over 25 countries to do this, they are 
not working.
  This legislation gives the President and the Secretary of State a 
stick to increase the flow of criminal illegal aliens back to their 
native countries. This bill requires the President to withhold up to 10 
percent of a country's foreign aid if they do not make progress towards 
taking back more of their criminal illegal aliens.
  If the country does not receive foreign assistance, then the 
President is authorized to use other approaches, like trade sanctions.
  Let me be clear: the problem that we are confronting today is not 
legal immigration. As you know, I am the son of immigrants. I know 
first hand that immigrants have helped to make America great.
  The problem is what to do with illegal aliens who have committed 
crimes in our country and are serving time in our Federal and State 
prisons.
  They aren't here legally.
  They committed illegal acts.
  But punishing them costs U.S. taxpayers approximately $1.2 billion 
per year.
  Why should they serve their time here rather than in their own 
country--where their taxpayers must pick up the tab?
  Nationwide, there are an estimated 58,000 convicted criminal aliens 
currently in our prisons--21,000 in Federal prisons and 37,000 in State 
prisons. Many of these convicted criminal aliens are illegal aliens as 
opposed to legal aliens, but we do not have data on exactly how many. 
This legislation focuses on sending criminal illegal aliens back to 
their native countries.
  At the same time, there are only 2,500 Americans serving time in 
foreign prisons.
  This surplus of prisoners is not only a burden on the Federal prison 
system but the State systems as well. For example, the State of New 
Jersey has estimated that it costs approximately $35 million in one 
time capital costs and $12 million a year in operational costs to 
incarcerate approximately 485 convicted criminal aliens, many of whom 
are illegal aliens, who are now serving time in its prisons.
  Since 1977, the United States has entered into prisoner transfer 
treaties with over 25 countries. These treaties were designed not only 
to bring American citizens back here to serve out their time, but also 
to transfer criminal illegal aliens out of our prisons.
  These treaties have not solved our problems. Since 1977:
  The U.S. transferred approximately 1200 prisoners back to their 
native countries.
  But at the same time we took back 1,400 Americans serving time in 
foreign prisons. This has only added to our problem of prison 
overcrowding.
  Last week, Attorney General Reno announced that the Mexican 
government had agreed to take back 53 of its citizens back to serve out 
their sentences. I commend her for these efforts. However, this is just 
a drop in the bucket.
  The legislation that we are introducing should increase the numbers 
of criminal illegal aliens going back to their native countries by 
using the power of the purse--foreign aid--as a negotiation tool.
  It's not fair to ask taxpayers to bear the total cost of jailing 
criminal illegal aliens who have broken our laws twice--once by 
entering or staying in our country illegally and again by breaking our 
laws.
  I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this legislation and ask unanimous 
consent that the text of this bill be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2175

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Prisoner Transfer Equity 
     Act''.

     SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

       The purpose of this Act is to relieve overcrowding in 
     Federal and State prisons by providing for the transfer of 
     criminal aliens convicted of crimes in the United States back 
     to their native countries to serve the balance of their 
     sentences.

     SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The cost of incarcerating an illegal alien in a Federal 
     or State prison can cost as much as $25,000 per year.
       (2) There are approximately 58,000 convicted criminal 
     aliens serving in American prisons, including 37,000 
     convicted criminal aliens serving in State prisons and 21,000 
     convicted criminal aliens serving in Federal prisons.
       (3) Many of these convicted criminal aliens are also 
     illegal aliens, but the Immigration and Naturalization 
     Service does not have exact data on how many.
       (4) The combined cost to Federal and State governments for 
     the incarceration of convicted criminal aliens is 
     approximately $1,200,000,000, including--
       (A) for State governments, $760,000,000; and
       (B) for the Federal Government, $440,000,000.
       (4) There are approximately 2,500 American citizens serving 
     in prisons outside the United States.
       (5) The United States has entered into over 25 prisoner 
     exchange treaties. Since 1977, under these treaties, the 
     United States sent 1,200 prisoners to other counties but has 
     received 1,400 prisoners that it had to imprison. This has 
     added to United States prison overcrowding.

     SEC. 4. PRISONER TRANSFER TREATIES.

       No later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this 
     Act, the President should begin to negotiate prisoner 
     transfer treaties, or renegotiate existing prisoner transfer 
     treaties, with countries that currently have more prisoners 
     in United States prisons than there are United States 
     citizens in their prisons, to carry out the purpose of this 
     Act. The focus of these negotiations should be on the 
     transfer of illegal aliens who are serving in United States 
     prisons.

     SEC. 5. REPORT; WITHHOLDING OF ASSISTANCE.

       (a) Reports.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, and not later than March 30 each year 
     thereafter, the President shall submit a report to Congress 
     on the progress of negotiations undertaken under section 4 
     since the date of enactment of this Act or the date of 
     submission of the last report, as the case may be.
       (b) Withholding of Assistance.--Whenever--
       (1) a report submitted under subsection (a) indicates that 
     no progress has been made in negotiations under section 4 
     with a foreign country, and
       (2) the United States continues to maintain a surplus of 
     prisoners who are nationals of that country;

     then, for the remainder of the fiscal year, and each fiscal 
     year thereafter until progress is reported under subsection 
     (a), not less than one percent or more than 10 percent of 
     United States assistance allocated for that country (but for 
     this provision) shall be withheld from obligation and 
     expenditure for that country.

       (c) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``United 
     States assistance'' includes--
       (1) assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; 
     and
       (2) sales and sales financing under the Arms Export Control 
     Act.

     SEC. 6. WAIVER AUTHORITY.

       The President may waive the application of section 5(b) if 
     such an application would jeopardize relationships between 
     the United States and a foreign country that the President 
     determines to be in the national interest. Whenever the 
     President exercises the waiver authority of this section, the 
     President shall submit a statement in writing to Congress 
     setting forth the justification for the exercise of the 
     waiver.

     SEC. 7. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.

       For each country that does not receive United States 
     assistance and for which the conditions of sections 5(b)(1) 
     and 5(b)(2) apply, the President should use such diplomatic 
     offices and powers as may be necessary to make progress in 
     negotiating or renegotiating a prisoner transfer treaty.

     SEC. 8. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

       Nothing in this Act may be construed to alter or affect the 
     existing immigration, refugee, political asylum laws of the 
     United States nor any Federal, State, of local criminal laws.
 Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, Americans know about trade 
deficits, but we have another type of deficit, a prisoner deficit. The 
United States imports more foreign prisoners than we export. The size 
of this prisoner deficit is immense.
  There are now an estimated 58,000 convicted criminal aliens in U.S. 
prisons, many of whom are illegal aliens. These prisoners can fill 
almost 20 San Quentins. Meanwhile, there are only 2,500 American 
prisoners in foreign prisons.
  The bill Senator Lautenberg, Senator Graham, and I are presenting 
today takes important steps to address this prisoner deficit.
  Let me talk for a moment about the very serious problem of illegal 
immigration.
  California estimates that 18,000 illegal immigrants will be in 
California's prisons in the next year, at a cost of an estimated $375 
million. Los Angeles County estimates that 23,000 deportable prisoner 
aliens pass through its prison system annually, at a cost of $75 
million.
  The Federal Government ought to guarantee States do not have to pay 
the huge costs of incarcerating illegal immigrants.
  The Congressional Budget Office estimates that it would currently 
cost the Federal Government $600 million to reimburse States and 
localities for incarcerating criminal illegal aliens. Four States are 
suing the Federal Government for reimbursement of the costs incurred 
due to illegal aliens--for their education, health care, and 
incarceration.
  Since 1977, the United States and over 30 countries have entered into 
treaties to transfer foreign national prisoners, allowing the prisoners 
to return to their home countries to carry out the balance of their 
prison terms. These treaties not only allow prisoners to return to 
their homeland, but they also reduce the financial burden that is 
placed on countries who must bear the burden of incarcerating foreign 
nationals. Despite these treaties, we still have a surplus of foreign 
nationals in our prisons.
  The United States houses prisoners from over 55 nations, largely from 
Mexico, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Canada.
  While 30 countries have signed prisoner transfer treaties with the 
United States, only some 1,000 prisoners have been returned to their 
home country prisons since 1977. And, some 1,300 U.S. prisoners have 
been returned to the United States.
  Again, it is the criminal illegal alien that I am concerned with. 
That's why:
  First, I have worked with Attorney General Reno to tighten border 
patrol. And I closely monitor the progress the INS is making to improve 
the effectiveness of the border patrol.
  Second, I have also supported the Graham bill that would fully 
reimburse States for the costs of incarcerating illegal aliens. And, I 
am pushing for the Appropriations Committee to act on the 
administration's request to appropriate $350 million to the States to 
reimburse them for incarcerating illegal aliens.
  Third, I am working on my legislation and working with other Senators 
on legislation to improve border patrol and improve our alien 
deportation system.
  And, today, Senator Lautenberg and I are introducing the Prisoner 
Transfer Equity Act, to reduce the number of illegal alien criminals in 
our prisons. The Prisoner Transfer Equity Act asks the President to 
renegotiate existing prisoner transfer treaties and to begin 
negotiating treaties with countries that have not already agreed to 
participate in this international program.
  To encourage countries to enter into prisoner transfer treaty 
negotiations, our bill asks the President to withhold--until progress 
is made--up to 10 percent of a country's foreign aid.
  The States and Federal Government cannot sustain the costs of 
incarcerating illegal aliens. This legislation will start a process for 
improving the International Prisoner Transfer Program, which will help 
reduce the burden placed on our criminal justice system, and on the 
taxpayers, by the large number of criminal illegal aliens.
                                 ______

      By Mr. GRASSLEY:
  S. 2176. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to 
provide for a 5-year extension of the medicare-dependent, small, rural 
hospital payment provisions, and for other purposes; to the Committee 
on Finance.


     The Medicare Dependent Hospital Program Extension Act of 1994

 Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I am introducing today a bill to 
extend the Medicare Dependent Hospital Program for 5 years. I also 
intend to support, as part of the Senate Finance Committee's health 
system reform legislation, and expansion and modification of the 
Essential Access Community Hospital Program which would enable these 
hospitals to use the breathing space provided by an extension of the 
Medicare Dependent Hospital Program to modify and rescale their 
missions.
  My legislation would not extend the program as it was originally 
enacted by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989; rather it 
would extend for 5 years the provisions contained in the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993. That legislation provided reimbursement for 
these hospitals at 50 percent of the reimbursement authorized under the 
original law and ended the program as of October 1994. The OBRA `93 
provisions were originally introduced by Senator Dole and myself in the 
102d Congress as S. 3117. These provisions were included in H.R. 11, 
which was vetoed by President Bush. They were finally enacted in OBRA 
`93.
  The Medicare Dependent Hospital Program was originally designed to 
assist small--100 beds or less--rural hospitals with not less than 60 
percent of inpatient days or discharges attributable to Medicare.
  So, the hospitals benefiting from this program are small rural 
hospitals providing an essential point of access to hospital or 
hospital-based services in rural areas and small towns around Iowa.
  Obviously, as those of my colleagues who have followed and 
participated in our debates about the health care needs of rural areas 
know only too well, if we lose these hospitals, we will also have a 
hard time keeping physicians in those communities.
  When Senator Dole and I, with the help of Senator Bentsen, crafted 
the extension contained in OBRA `93, we assumed that the coterminous 
phasing out of the urban-rural differential would provide additional 
reimbursement for these hospitals that would make up for what might be 
lost by the phasing out of the Medicare Dependent Hospitals programs.
  That assumption was wrong. At least it was very wrong for Iowa. We 
have 44 hospitals in Iowa which fall in the Medicare dependent 
hospitals category. Twenty-five of those hospitals receive a higher 
reimbursement than they would if they used the regular reimbursement 
formula.
  When this program ceases in October this year, these 25 hospitals 
will lose a total of $3 million, according to estimates made by the 
Iowa Hospital Association. The losses for individual hospitals will 
vary from a low of $3,635 to a high of $248,000. Fourteen of these 
hospitals are projected to lose more than $100,000.
  Thirteen of these hospitals had negative operating margins in 1992. 
Those negative margins included whatever benefit these hospitals were 
realizing from the Medicare Dependent Hospital Program. Those negative 
operating margins varied from minus $13,000 to minus $726,000.
  So, obviously, if the projections are correct, those hospital with 
negative margins are going to have even larger negative margins. Worse, 
all but 10 of the hospitals will end up with negative margins. And the 
10 with positive margins will find those margins very substantially 
reduced.
  The bottom line is that many, probably most, of these hospitals are 
going to have a very difficult time continuing to exist when this 
program expires.
  Mr. President, in addition to introducing this bill and working for 
its passage, I am working with a group, convened by Senator Daschle, of 
other Senate Finance Committee members to develop a number of rural 
health initiatives that we hope can be included in the Finance 
Committee's health system reform plan.
  Among those initiatives is one which would expand and modify the 
Essential Access Community Hospital and Rural Primary Care Hospital 
Program. My hope is that this initiative, if enacted, would enable 
these Medicare dependent hospitals in Iowa to modify and rescale their 
operations so they could still qualify for participation in the 
Medicare Program but would not have to remain full-scale hospitals with 
the expensive overhead that entails.
  So, to repeat, an extension of the Medicare Dependent Hospital 
Program, together with an expansion and modification of the EACH/RPCH 
program, would enable these hospitals to modify their missions in a 
deliberate and nondisruptive way and continue to provide essential 
health care services in their communities.
                                 ______

      By Mr. LAUTENBERG:
  S. 2177. A bill to ensure effective congressional oversight of 
overseas military base support carried out by NATO host countries for 
the United States as payments-in-kind for release of United States 
overseas military facilities to such countries and to reduce the 
deficit; to the Committee on Armed Services.


                  residual value payments act of 1994

  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise to introduce a bill dealing 
with a problem I have been studying for many months: residual value 
payments. Now that may not sound interesting. But it sure is important. 
Because ``residual value'' refers to the money we are supposed to get 
from our Allies in exchange for the infrastructure we leave behind in 
Europe as we withdraw our troops and turn our bases over to host 
nations.
  The bill I am introducing today is intended to accomplish three 
goals. First, it would put the Senate on record as supporting 
negotiations which would result in residual value payments being made 
in cash rather than in-kind contributions. Second, it would ensure that 
any in-kind contributions are used as a substitute for American 
taxpayer dollars to pay for projects specifically requested in the 
defense budget. Third, it would guard against potential wasteful 
spending by requiring that only projects specifically authorized by 
Congress can receive in-kind contributions.
  Mr. President, the United States has invested $6.5 billion in the 
military infrastructure in NATO countries. As part of an overall plan 
to reduce United States troop strength in Europe from 323,432 in 1987 
to 100,000 by the end of 1996, the Pentagon announced plans to close or 
reduce our presence at 867 military sites overseas. Most of the 
military sites overseas announced for closure are in Europe, where 
America has already closed 434 military sites.
  When the United States closes bases in Europe, we bring our troops 
home, but we leave a valuable infrastructure--buildings, roads, sewers, 
and other physical improvements--behind. Through a series of residual 
value agreements, some Allies have agreed to pay the United States for 
the value of what we leave behind.
  Although our military drawdown has increased since 1990, our European 
Allies have been slow to provide residual value payments. So far, the 
United States has recouped only $33.3 million in cash, and most of that 
was recovered in 1989.
  Although we have already turned over 60 percent of the military sites 
scheduled for closure in Germany to that government, and although the 
value of those sites is estimated to be approximately $2.7 billion, the 
German Government has only budgeted $25 million this year to compensate 
the United States for its investment.
  Mr. President, in order to defend Europe, the American taxpayer 
invested billions in the infrastructure of NATO countries over the 
years. As we bring our troops home and turn over facilities to host 
nations, the American people deserve to be fairly compensated for the 
value of their investment in the defense of Europe.
  To establish a system for securing cash contributions, Congress 
created the Department of Defense military facility investment recovery 
account several yeas ago. Cash from residual value negotiations was to 
be deposited in the account, and the Congress was to subsequently 
appropriate those funds to meet DOD needs. Congress later gave the 
administration the authority to negotiate for in-kind contributions, 
recognizing that there might be times when the administration would be 
unable to recover contributions in cash.
  Mr. President, while I am aware that these negotiations are 
difficult, I believe the Department of Defense has too easily abandoned 
negotiations for cash in favor of in-kind contributions that the 
administration will too easily accept in-kind contributions from 
Germany, where the DOD now says our investment on facilities to be 
turned over is $2.7 billion.
  Although the American economy has been sagging, administration 
officials have continually sited German economic problems and political 
considerations as a reason to seek in-kind contributions. This same 
thinking pervades our burdensharing negotiations, and is why, I 
believe, the administration has been unable or unwilling to encourage 
the Allies to increase their cash contributions to cover a greater 
share of our overseas basing costs in Europe.
  In Germany and elsewhere, the administration ought to be tough in its 
negotiations on behalf of the American taxpayer. It ought press hard 
for cash. In-kind contributions should be accepted only as a last 
resort.
  To this end, the bill I am introducing today states that as a matter 
of policy, the administration should enter negotiations with each host 
nation with a presumption that payments to compensate the United States 
for our capital investment will be made in cash and deposited into the 
Department of Defense overseas military facility investment recovery 
account. It states that the administration should only enter into 
negotiations for in-kind payments as a last resort and only after 
negotiations for cash payments have finally failed.

  Mr. President, the bill I am introducing today would also create a 
stronger link to the budget process.
  Currently, there is no apparent connection between the 
administration's negotiations for in-kind contributions and the budget 
process. Although negotiations are underway for hundreds of millions of 
dollars worth of projects, the Pentagon is not required to return 
directly to the U.S. taxpayer's what it gets from other countries. In 
theory, what we get from them ought to be substitute for what we would 
have had to pay for ourselves. Instead, it appears that what we get 
from the Allies is added to what the Pentagon gets from us--and the net 
result is more spending overall and less spending under the direct 
control of the Congress.
  For example, in fiscal year 1995, the administration is asking the 
Congress to provide approximately $230 million for the NATO 
infrastructure account. Although the administration is seeking hundreds 
of millions and ultimately billions of in-kind contributions from our 
allies in Europe to cover residual value obligations, the allies are 
not being asked to apply those contributions to the NATO infrastructure 
account so the United States will need to contribute less.
  Nor are the allies being asked to offset the tens of millions of 
dollars worth of military construction projects the administration has 
asked the Congress to fund in Europe. Instead, they are being asked to 
pay for construction projects the Pentagon has decided are priorities 
completely outside the budget process.
  In Germany, for example, the administration has submitted a budget 
which asks the Congress to authorize and appropriate approximately $22 
million for military construction projects. Although residual value 
negotiations should generate hundreds of millions of dollars worth of 
in-kind contributions for military construction projects, the Pentagon 
is not asking the Germans to pay for any of the $22 million worth of 
projects it has identified as priority projects in the budget.
  Mr. President, if the administration secures in-kind contributions 
through residual value obligations, it ought to tell the Congress and 
the American people that we need to spend less on other programs--
military construction, NATO infrastructure, real property maintenance--
that the Pentagon has identified as priorities in the budget process. 
It ought to be an active partner in the effort to help reduce the 
deficit and return to the taxpayers some of their significant financial 
investment in Europe.
  To this end, the bill I am introducing would state that, as a matter 
of policy, to the extent that in-kind contributions are secured in lieu 
of cash payments, they should be used to directly offset costs that 
would otherwise be incurred by the Department of Defense.
  Under current law, the Pentagon is required to submit a written 
notice to the congressional defense committees containing a 
justification for entering into negotiations for payments-in-kind with 
the host country before it seeks in-kind contributions. The bill I am 
introducing today would require the Pentagon, at the same time it 
submits this justification, to identify the areas of the budget for 
overseas requirements--either the current year or in the upcoming 
year--that could be reduced if such in-kind contributions are secured. 
Finally, 30 days before the Pentagon enters into an agreement with a 
host country to accept an in-kind contribution, the bill would require 
the Pentagon to submit a rescission request, identify the areas of the 
budget for the upcoming year in which appropriations could be reduced 
as a result of in-kind contributions, or some combination of the two.
  The bill I am introducing today would also require a congressional 
authorization for military construction projects secured through in-
kind contributions.
  Mr. President, the Congress is required to approve military 
construction projects by law. It is not the role of the German 
Government or any foreign government to set our budget priorities. If 
residual value payments were secured in cash from the Allies, the 
Congress would authorize and appropriate those funds. The Congress 
should play the same role in approving military construction projects 
secured as in-kind contributions.

  There has been abuse in the system even with congressional oversight. 
Without congressional oversight and with billions of dollars worth of 
in-kind projects at stake, we do more than invite waste, fraud, and 
abuse--we virtually require it.
  Look at what happened at the Ramstein Air Base in Germany in the late 
1980's. In 1989 the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector 
General found that the Ramstein Air Base had inappropriately used 
taxpayer money at officers' clubs to buy a $6,800 snooker table, to buy 
party equipment--like cocktail, champagne, and wine glasses--and to 
upgrade the officers club.
  I'd like to keep Ramstein Air Base a unique example. I fear it will 
be all too common unless we get control over the use of the purposes 
for which in-kind contributions can be used.
  I am not, of course, arguing against giving our military the kind of 
facilities they deserve. That isn't the point. The point is simply that 
even with oversight, fraud can happen. Wasteful spending can slip 
through the cracks. The system can be abused. Imagine what could happen 
with little or no congressional oversight.
  My bill is intended to ensure the Congress will have oversight of the 
system in an effort to guard against wasteful spending. I want to 
ensure that tax dollars will not be inappropriately used on pool tables 
at officers' clubs. I want to be sure that the German Government will 
not be determining our budget priorities. To accomplish this goal and 
ensure appropriate oversight, the Congress needs to authorize all 
military construction projects, even if they are secured as in-kind 
contributions from the Allies for the billions they owe us.
  Mr. President, I urge colleagues to support this bill, and I ask 
unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 2177

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The United States has invested $6,500,000,000 in 
     military infrastructure in North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
     (NATO) countries.
       (2) As part of an overall plan to reduce United States 
     troop strength in Europe from 323,432 in 1987 to 100,000 by 
     the end of 1996, the Department of Defense plans to close or 
     reduce United States military presence at 867 military sites 
     overseas.
       (3) Most of the overseas military sites announced for 
     closure are in Europe where the United States has already 
     closed 434 such sites.
       (4) When the United States closes military sites in Europe, 
     the United States brings the military personnel home but 
     leaves buildings, roads, sewers, and other real property 
     improvements behind.
       (5) Through a series of so-called ``residual value'' 
     agreements, some allies have agreed to pay the United States 
     for the value of the real property improvements left behind.
       (6) Although the United States military drawdown has been 
     rapid since 1990, European allies have been slow to pay the 
     United States the residual value of the sites released by the 
     United States.
       (7) As of 1994, the United States has recouped only 
     $33,300,000 in cash, and most of that was recovered in 1989.
       (8) Although the United States has released to Germany over 
     60 percent of the military sites planned for closure by the 
     United States in that country and the current value of United 
     States facilities to be returned to the German government is 
     estimated at approximately $2,700,000,000, the German 
     government has budgeted only $25,000,000 for fiscal year 1994 
     for payment of compensation for the United States investment 
     in such improvements.

     SEC. 2. POLICY.

       It is the sense of Congress that--
       (1) the President should redouble efforts to recover the 
     value of the United States investment in the military 
     infrastructure of NATO countries;
       (2) the President should enter into negotiations with the 
     government of each NATO host country with a presumption that 
     payments to compensate the United States for the fair market 
     value of improvements will be made in cash and deposited in 
     the Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility 
     Investment Recovery Account;
       (3) the President should enter into negotiations for 
     payments-in-kind only as a last resort and only after 
     informing the Congress that negotiations for cash payments 
     have not been successful; and
       (4) to the extent that in-kind contributions are received 
     in lieu of cash payments in any fiscal year, the in-kind 
     contributions should directly offset costs that would 
     otherwise be incurred by the Department of Defense for 
     overseas base support that has been approved by Congress or 
     for overseas base support requested by the President in the 
     budget submitted to Congress for the succeeding fiscal year.

     SEC. 3. REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS RELATING TO PAYMENTS IN 
                   KIND.

       (a) Requirement for Justification for Negotiations for 
     Payments-in-Kind.--Subsection (e) of section 2921 of the 
     National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (10 
     U.S.C. 2687 note) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``Negotiations for Payments-
     in-Kind.--'';
       (2) by striking out ``a written notice'' and all that 
     follows and inserting in lieu thereof ``to the congressional 
     defense committees (and one additional copy to each of the 
     Subcommittees on Defense of the Committees on Appropriations 
     of the Senate and the House of Representatives) a written 
     notice regarding the intended negotiations.''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) The notice shall contain the following:
       ``(A) A justification for entering into negotiations for 
     payments-in-kind with the host country.
       ``(B) The types of benefit options to be pursued by the 
     Secretary in the negotiations.
       ``(C) The specific overseas base support activities (for 
     which funding has either previously been approved by Congress 
     or requested in the latest budget transmitted by the 
     President to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 
     31, United States Code) that could be curtailed, eliminated, 
     terminated, or withdrawn to reduce the amount of United 
     States overseas base support spending by an amount not less 
     than the fair market value of the improvements to be released 
     to the host country in exchange for the payments-in-kind.''.
       (b) Deficit Reduction Through Payments-in-Kind.--Such 
     section is amended by adding at the end the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(h) Deficit Reduction Through Payments-in-Kind.--(1)(A) 
     Not less than 30 days before the Secretary of Defense enters 
     into an agreement with a host country to accept from the host 
     country any improvement as a payment-in-kind, the President 
     shall--
       ``(i) submit to Congress a request for rescission of 
     appropriations for overseas base support;
       ``(ii) submit to Congress a message recommending a 
     reduction in the request for appropriations for overseas base 
     support that is set forth in the budget transmitted to 
     Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United 
     States Code, for the fiscal year that begins in the year that 
     the President submits the message to Congress; or
       ``(iii) a combination of actions under clauses (i) and 
     (ii).
       ``(B) The total amount of the reductions proposed to be 
     achieved in the proposed actions submitted pursuant to 
     subparagraph (A) in the case of a payment-in-kind of a host 
     country may not be less than the fair market value of the 
     improvements to be released to the host country in exchange 
     for such payment-in-kind.
       ``(2) The Secretary of Defense may not accept as a payment-
     in-kind any improvements to real property that, if undertaken 
     to be made by the Department of Defense, would be subject 
     to--
       ``(A) the requirement for authorization of appropriations 
     for military construction set forth in section 114(a)(6) of 
     title 10, United States Code, and
       ``(B) the requirement set forth in section 2802 of such 
     title, relating to authorization of military construction 
     projects by law,

     unless such improvements comprise a military construction 
     project that is authorized by law.''.
       (c) Overseas Base Support Defined.--Such section, as 
     amended by subsection (b), is further amended by adding at 
     the end the following new subsection:
       ``(i) Overseas base support Defined.--In subsections (e) 
     and (h), the term `overseas base support' means--
       ``(1) military construction (as defined in section 114(b) 
     of title 10, United States Code) outside the United States;
       ``(2) maintenance of real property outside the United 
     States for the Department of Defense; and
       ``(3) contributions for the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organization Infrastructure Program as provided in section 
     2806 of title 10, United States Code.''.

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