[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 71 (Thursday, June 9, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 9, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                 THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of 
February 11, 1994, and June 8, 1994, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. 
McInnis] is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority 
leader.
  Mr. McINNIS. Mr. Speaker, Members, I want to speak this evening about 
a very sobering subject, about a very dark subject, about Korea. Korea 
is kind of like a grizzly bear. I am referring specifically to North 
Korea.
  Many have in the last few weeks read extensive media coverage on 
North Korea and the situation that we have on the Korean Peninsula. 
This is a situation that must be taken by every American citizen very, 
very seriously. It is a situation that directly involves 37,000 
American soldiers, and it involves probably 14,000 to 16,000 American 
civilians, and if a conflict were to break out on the Korean Peninsula, 
it would involve the entire world, not only from an economic point of 
view, but certainly the stability of peace in the world as we know it.
  So I would ask tonight that you bear with me as I discuss a little 
about Korea. We are going to talk for a few minutes about the history 
of Korea. We are going to talk about the politics of Korea. We are 
going to talk about the military readiness of Korea. We are going to 
talk about the nuclear situation over in Korea, and finally, talk about 
a few solutions.
  What direction should this country take in regard to North Korea?
  Let me start out by defining North Korea which, in my opinion, is a 
lot like a grizzly bear. I am from Colorado, and bears are a big thing 
back there. A grizzly bear, and grizzly, by the way, stands for the 
word horrible, the horrible bear. That is why the grizzly bear got its 
name.
  Grizzly bears are sometimes predictable and sometimes not so 
predictable, but there are some things you can do with the grizzly bear 
in order to judge that behavior the best that we know how.
  First of all, obviously you never pick on the cubs. Second of all, 
you prepare yourself for a confrontation if you are going up into the 
high country of Alaska or Canada where grizzly bears are known to roam. 
You prepare before you enter into those mountainous territories so you 
are not unprepared when the grizzly bear approaches.
  It has always been thought that the grizzly bear can sense fear. If 
the grizzly bear does not sense fear, the grizzly bear turns and runs. 
It the grizzly bear senses fear, you have got a real problem on your 
hands.
  Korea is not a whole lot different than that, North Korea, in my 
opinion.
  Now, to start this evening, let me mention a couple of articles that 
I think would be very helpful for the average Joe and average Jane out 
there that want to know a little more about what is happening in Korea.
  I thought Time magazine, June 13, 1994, had an excellent article. In 
addition to that, so that you have a geographical understanding of what 
North and South Korea are about and what military options might be 
available, I suggest that you look at the map contained in that July 13 
Time magazine article. In addition, I know that many of you may not 
subscribe to the Heritage Foundation, an excellent foundation here in 
Washington, but they have a memorandum. It is No. 224, memorandum No. 
224, called ``Defusing North Korea's Nuclear Threat.'' This is written 
by Darryl Plunk. Darryl Plunk is an expert in Korean matters.
  I know Darryl. In fact, I was in Korea. I just returned from Korea 
about a month ago. I spent time with Darryl over there. He is well 
respected. I think his article addresses very clearly the kind of 
challenge that we face on the Korean Peninsula.

  Both of those articles I would recommend to you for some very basic 
knowledge on what our situation is in Korea.
  Let us start out by looking at a little geography. To assist us here, 
I have brought down a map. As most of you know, South Korea is down on 
the southern end, obviously. It is divided by what is called the DMZ. 
The DMZ runs right along in this area. Above that is North Korea. North 
Korea is a very mountainous type of terrain. It has a lot of weather 
similar to the State of Colorado. Right now, however, the peninsula up 
there is going through the monsoon rains, North Korea.
  The access across the DMZ is limited. Again, that map in Time 
magazine lays that out very well for you.
  Up here on the northern end of North Korea the largest border on the 
peninsula is with the country of China. We are going to come back to 
China and discuss China a little more when we talk about economic 
sanctions.
  To give you a little history, North Korea is a dictatorship. In my 
opinion, it is a Communist dictatorship. I noticed the North Koreans 
have recently continued to refer to themselves as a socialist society. 
It is a clear Communist type of dictatorship in North Korea.
  The dictator in North Korea is a gentleman by the name of Kim Il-
song. Kim Il-song is estimated to be 82 or 83 years old, and he was 
installed into power by Josef Stalin in about the late 1940's.
  In 1950, in June 1950, much to the surprise of the United States 
Congress, much to the surprise of the President of the United States, 
President Truman, this dictator, Kim Il-song, who is the dictator that 
rules the country today, under the pretext of military exercises, 
launched a surprise attack against South Korea. There is no need to say 
much more about that attack, because we all know about the Korean war.
  Ironically it was never declared as a war. There were still 114,000 
fatalities from our country alone.
  So the same dictator that ordered it is the dictator we are having 
difficulties with today.
  Why do I bring that history up? It is important history to understand 
that this dictator has taken it upon himself before to immerse his 
people into a very intense war, and we cannot underestimate his 
courage, if you call it that, his insanity, if you call it that, or his 
just pure stubbornness, if you call it that, to launch a military 
attack.
  Now, let us move very briefly to the military comparisons between 
North and South Korea. Again, I do not mean to keep referring to that 
Time magazine article, but I think it is necessary, because that 
article is very simple and lays out some of these comparisons.

                                   1940

  When you look at the numbers of troops, North Korea outnumbers the 
South Koreans and American troops 2 to 1. Now, in South Korea we have a 
United Nations Command. We also have the U.S. forces. We have the South 
Korean forces. The combined command in the forces, the commanding 
general over there is a very competent, very capable, very tough 
general by the name of General Locke. I had the opportunity when I was 
in Korea to spend many hours with him and his staff. I came away from 
there feeling very confident about the military leadership we have got. 
If in fact we provide those military people with the necessary arsenal 
and tools to carry out their job.
  Now let me give you some comparisons. North Korea, 1,200,000 troops. 
South Korea and the United States, about 235,000 troops. South Korea 
has the probability of calling out reserves of 2 million more people; 
North Korea, the latest numbers I saw, has the potential of calling out 
6 million people in reserves. Main battle tanks: 3,700 in North Korea, 
and approximately 1,900 in South Korea. Artillery, 10,000--these are 
multiple rocket launchers--10,000 in North Korea, about 4,600 in South 
Korea. Air defense guns--and this is an important statistic--air 
defense guns and surface-to-air missiles, 18,000 in North Korea and 
about 1,500 in South Korea.
  Let us talk for a minute about the importance of air ballistic 
missiles.
  Korea does not need a nuclear missile to launch an attack against 
South Korea. In fact, I personally would be surprised if they used a 
nuclear weapon. My primary concern with North Korea is that they are 
going to sell these nuclear weapons. But they do not need a nuclear 
weapon to launch a very devastating, very deadly and horrible war on 
the Korean peninsula.
  Take a look: The most strategic point you have got in South Korea is 
the community of Seoul, the capital of South Korea. One-half, by the 
way, of the country's population; one-half of the country's gross 
national product; and less than 30 to 40 miles away from North Korean 
ballistic missiles.
  You do not need even more than one missile to launch into a city of 
15 million people to create a panic. Can you imagine a missile going 
off in the DMZ, landing in Seoul, the kind of panic it would wreak? In 
fact, I think panic is going to be our biggest problem if, in fact--and 
God forbid--but if we do have a military confrontation, panic will be 
our biggest problem. These ballistic missiles are located along the 
DMZ, several key areas up here, and they have a significant ballistic 
missile system.
  Now, a lot of people look at the Korean Peninsula, and we should all 
be justifiably proud about the job, the kind of operation we did in the 
Persian Gulf. Iraq was rumored to be this huge force that we would 
suffer huge casualties, that this was an army of might. The United 
States went into the Persian Gulf with the pride of our American 
people, our American service people, and we got a quick and decisive 
victory. Not so in Korea, not so at all.
  North Korea will have a real fighting force. It is ironic that 
several years ago the North Koreans tried to attack the Blue House, 
which is the same as our White House in the United States, the home of 
the president in South Korea. Twenty North Koreans, 20 North Koreans 
attacked the Blue House. They were completely surrounded very quickly. 
Those 20 North Koreans had no chance, absolutely no chance of survival 
except through surrender, no chance. And every one of those North 
Koreans fought to their death, even under those circumstances.
  This force has got a heavy militia. Now, we clearly have air 
superiority. North Korea has some of the most sophisticated tunnel 
systems in the world. They have a philosophy that the peninsula should 
be reunified. They have unaltered loyalty to their dictator, Kim Il-
song. By the way, Kim Il-song's son, about 52 or 53 years old, while 
the loyalty is not as intense for the son there is still a following of 
the father/son in North Korea.
  So this will be a force, and unlike the Persian Gulf, this will be, 
if the conflict occurs, a conflict in which we suffer immense 
casualties, which will require a tremendous amount of resources devoted 
to that peninsula to sustain that action or, hopefully not, but to 
retake the peninsula should the North Koreans be successful.
  Enough about the military issue; let us talk about the issue that has 
heated up and where we are today, let us talk about the nuclear issue. 
We have always been concerned about a nuclear arms race over in East 
Asia. East Asia is a very important economic center for the entire 
world. The security for eastern Asia has been provided primarily by the 
United States since the end of World War II. For the most part, that 
economic security blanket and military security blanket has provided a 
great deal of stability. East Asia has been fairly stable. Granted, we 
had the Vietnam war and so on, but I am talking about the Korean 
peninsula and Japan and Taiwan. We have seen very prosperous economies. 
The economy in South Korea is a tremendous economy. There is good 
leadership in South Korea. North Korea has a very, very poor economy.
  But the nuclear issue and what concerns us is that East Asia would 
get into a nuclear race. Several years ago we had a number of 
countries, well over 100, sign what is called the Nonproliferation 
Agreement. What that agreement calls for or prevents--hopes to prevent 
through the enforcement of an association called IAEA--remember those 
initials IAEA because you will hear those a lot as we talk about the 
nuclear issue.

  The Nonproliferation Agreement was a hope that we all had that we 
could stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and instead we could 
bring this world together as an economic center, so to speak, and that 
the wars and the fears of nuclear war or the fears of a nuclear weapon 
falling into the hands of a Third World country or a country without 
stability could be minimized.
  Well, the only way that the Nonproliferation Agreement works, 
obviously, is if the participants of the Nonproliferation Agreement 
agree with its terms. North Korea has refused over and over and over 
and over again to comply with the agreement that it signed on the 
Nonproliferation Agreement. Our President, in response to this 
noncompliance, in November of last year made a very clear statement to 
the North Koreans: ``You must never have''--excuse me, I am wrong; it 
is not, ``You must not,'' it is, ``You can never have a nuclear 
weapon.''
  Well, our President has spoken some very strong words. Remember my 
comparison to the grizzly bear? If you come face to face with a grizzly 
bear and you stand there and you look right at him, you do not have a 
gun, you have no choice, you stand and you look strong, the grizzly 
bear in all likelihood, unless you have a cub there, will walk away. 
But if the grizzly bear senses that you are going to back off, the 
grizzly bear knows weakness. It is the same thing with North Korea. 
North Korea understands two things: They understand strength, and they 
understand weakness. If you have a President who makes a strong 
statement, he needs to be able to back that statement up.
  Since November--and I am not trying to be partisan, because I think 
when we talk about foreign affairs, we have to lift ourselves above 
partisanship and worry about the welfare of this country and the 
welfare of the entire world. But since that November statement, our 
country has shown, in my opinion, a great deal of weakness in its 
negotiations with North Korea. Example: North Korea, we know, has about 
nine suspect sites for the development of nuclear weapons in Korea. 
Now, remember we have limited intelligence in North Korea. We really 
rely very heavily on satellite intelligence, and satellites, of course, 
cannot pick up what is going on on the ground. And we have to have good 
weather.
  North Korea is the most closed society in the world. It is very 
difficult to get ground intelligence out of North Korea. It is very 
difficult to do ground intelligence out of North Korea, very difficult 
to do this.
  So, of the nine sites, under the Nonproliferation Agreement a team 
from the IAEA is allowed to go in and inspect these sites. The North 
Koreans have said ``no,'' then they said ``yes,'' then they said 
``maybe,'' then they said ``no,'' then they said ``okay,'' then they 
said ``no,'' then they said ``come on over,'' then they said ``no,'' 
then they said ``come over and look at a couple of sites,'' then they 
said ``no.'' Then they said, ``Come on over, and we will let you look 
at seven sites, but not the two suspect sites.'' This last week, they 
said, ``You can never look at the two most highly suspect sites where 
you think we are developing nuclear weapons.''

                              {time}  1950

  I saw a comparison. It said it is kind of like walking through the 
customs when one comes into this country. Walk through customs, and 
tell the agent, ``Yeah, you can go ahead. I've got nine suitcases. You 
can go ahead and look at seven of them, but I'm going to point out to 
you which seven suitcases you can look at. The other two suitcases, 
which I pick, you can't look at.'' It is clearly flying in the face of 
the nonproliferation agreement, which is really much broader than the 
nonproliferation agreement, because we are talking about a country like 
Korea who soon will have the technology to do what Korea is doing, and, 
if we do not have an agreement that is enforceable, we will have an 
arms race throughout the world, an arms race that the next generation, 
the next generation, will have a very difficult time dealing with.
  So, this agreement means a lot more than just relationships between 
the United States and North Korea or South Korea and North Korea. It 
really talks about the beginning of an arms race.
  Let us talk about some of the ideas dealing with the failure of North 
Korea to comply with the nonproliferation agreement or the inspections. 
I say, ``First of all, if you look at North Korea, they always pay 
attention, as I said earlier, when you speak from a position of 
strength. We, unfortunately, in the last year and a half or couple of 
years have shown some weakness on foreign affairs in Haiti, in Somalia, 
in Bosnia, and in North Korea, and so the North Koreans, I think, 
believe they can play cat and mouse with us. In fact, I think they 
rather enjoy it. It's a very dangerous game, back to the grizzly bear. 
It's kind of like poking a grizzly bear when it's asleep. If it's in 
hibernation, and you're sure it's in hibernation, no problem. If it's 
not, you better watch out.''
  So, the nonagreement of North Korea and some of the options that are 
available to force them back into the agreement should be discussed. 
One of those is, and I hear it from my colleagues, and that is to take 
a preemptive strike. We know, for example, up here in Yongbyon, up in 
that area right in here, that there is a nuclear site up there, a 
nuclear reactor there. In fact, that is the one my colleagues have been 
reading a lot about where the rods have been removed in the last couple 
of weeks, and there are some that would suggest we take a preemptive 
strike, that we certainly have the capabilities to take that facility 
out.

  In my opinion a preemptive military strike would be crazy. It is not 
well thought out. A preemptive military strike against North Korea can 
assure us of one thing, and that is a war on the Korean peninsula, a 
war that will have devastating results, a war in which many of our 
37,000 troops and many of the thousands of subsequent troops that we 
sent over to Korea will lose their lives, will pay the ultimate price.
  So, a first strike is not a good option. Even if we carried out the 
first strike from a military point of view, it may not be successful if 
the key ingredients that we are tying to destroy are stored deep 
underground, and the probability is that they are stored deep 
underground. Even if we are successful, and we hit a nuclear facility, 
the unfortunate thing is, if we set loose radiation, the trade winds 
tend to go this direction, would go over Seoul--remember the population 
center of South Korea--and eventually make its way down over Tokyo and 
over Japan.
  So, Mr. Speaker, a first strike, preemptive strike against nuclear 
facilities, is not a good option in my opinion, will simply start a 
war.
  Well, what is the next thing?
  Well, we heard the President talked a lot in the last few weeks, and 
we heard some very educated scholars and some very well-learned people 
on Korea suggest economic sanctions. There are two factors for economic 
sanctions to work. First of all, China has to agree that it will not 
veto the economic sanctions in the United Nations Security Council; 
and, second of all, even if China does not veto those economic 
sanctions, that China will agree to enforce the economic sanctions.
  Remember I said earlier that North Korea is the most isolated country 
in the world. They do not have a lot of trade like the United States 
does, for example. They are not like Taiwan where they trade all over 
the world, or Japan. They trade primarily with one country, and that 
country is China.
  Here is the border. Remember we looked at the border earlier. If that 
border is not secure, if China does not exercise the economic sanctions 
along that border, then economic sanctions will cost this country tens 
of millions of dollars. We will have very minimal impact upon North 
Korea, and we will not accomplish what I think is the key goal.

  China in just the last couple weeks, the President, and this is 
incredible to me, the President, the Secretary of State, have said on 
and off again that China, they think they are going to get China to 
cooperate with us. China is not going to cooperate with economic 
sanctions. They are not going to let this occur. Just in the last week 
and a half or so ago China has said that North Korea are the, quote, 
blood brothers. Does that sound like the kind of talk that is going to 
get cooperation from China, especially after we have already given to 
them the most--favored-nation status so we really do not have much to 
swap with them?
  I do not think China wants to see a conflict on the Korean peninsula, 
but their relationship with North Korea goes deep. Remember we were 
about to overrun the Koreans when we finally launched our counterattack 
in the Korean war in 1950. The reason that it was stopped, the reason 
that the Korean war came to a stalemate, is because China dumped its 
troops in to face us from the north. China has a long history with 
North Korea, and they are not about to put that aside to assist the 
United States with economic sanctions.
  Now Japan is beginning to play a very important role in this. Many of 
my colleagues have probably heard the events of the last couple of days 
where Korea has come out and given a very clear warning to Japan:
  ``Back off. If you don't back off, we have got missiles that can hit 
your country's mainland.''
  This is more of a confrontation between the South and North than 
between the United States. We have a good ally in Japan. We have a good 
understanding with Japan. But look at the politics in Japan for a few 
minutes:
  First of all, there are about a half a million Korean citizens who 
are now living in Japan, and these descendants of Korea came from Japan 
over the years between, say, about 1910 and 1945, when Japan occupied 
the Korean peninsula and brought slave labor into Japan, and as a 
result there have been descendants through the generations. So, about 
500,000 Korean descendants live in Japan. They are very loyal to the 
Korean peninsula, and they send a great deal of money, about a billion 
dollars, estimated as high as $1.8 billion, in sympathetic money to 
Korea, to North Korea, every year.

  Now the Japanese, the leadership, as my colleagues know, they have 
had a lot of turmoil in their leadership, and it does not appear that 
that leadership is entirely stable. They are going through some very 
trying times. We have very capable leadership in Japan, but Japan is 
getting a little, I think, getting a little cautious about being 
involved in economic sanctions against North Korea.
  And Japan; we have said to Japan, ``Look, you, of anybody, ought to 
be concerned about this. You will be, if you're not already, well 
within the range of nuclear Korean missiles, and those Korean missiles 
could soon contain a nuclear warhead. You have got to participate with 
us. We have got to stop this before it gets out of hand.''
  But, Mr. Speaker, when it comes time to really do something about it, 
as I said earlier, Japan is very cautious. I think they are going to 
have a very difficult time stepping in there and telling their citizens 
who are Korean descendants that they can no longer send money to their 
families in North Korea.
  Well, what kind of options do we really have? We have talked a little 
about the history, we have talked about the military, we have talked 
about the consequences of a war on the Korean peninsula. If there were 
a military conflict in Korea, what kind of options do we have, and 
again I would refer my colleagues, I think, to Mr. Plunk's article, 
Heritage Foundation No. 224, and, by the way, it is dated June 2. 1994. 
It lays out some options. I would like to add a little to some of those 
options.
  First of all, Mr. Speaker, our President needs to be very strong in 
his message to the North Koreans. I believe that our message, our 
President, has to go further than he has gone. Now our Secretary of 
Defense, Mr. Perry, I think, has done a fairly commendable job in 
dealing with the North Korean situation since he has come into office. 
But it has to go above Mr. Perry. It has to go directly to the 
President. The President has told North Korea that their country would 
be destroyed as they know it.

                              {time}  2000

  I am not sure they take the President seriously. I do not think they 
took the President serious since November when he said they cannot 
really have a nuclear weapon and then flip-flopped around as to whether 
they should have one, a few of them are OK, or so forth.
  Our President needs to make it very, very clear that North Korea 
should not miscalculate what the intentions of the United States of 
America are. First of all, I think the President needs to assure North 
Korea that we would not take a preemptive strike against their country. 
But in the same statement the President needs to make unequivocally 
clear to North Korea that should North Korea launch an attack against 
South Korea and the United States that we will use whatever weapon in 
our arsenal is necessary to destroy their country. In other words, 
North Korea, a military conflict would be a gross and fatal 
miscalculation on your part.
  So we need a firm statement from the President. We need to be 
prepared militarily. Again, if you are going out into the mountains up 
in Alaska or Canada, into that high country, you need to be prepared. 
If you are prepared, you are not going to have any difficulty. North 
Korea understands strength. We have got an excellent command force over 
in Korea, the South Korean forces that I met with and commanding 
officers, I felt were very capable, but we need to shore up our 
defense. We need to immediately in our opinion begin to move more naval 
force into the area and I think we need to do this very prominently so 
that people see what is going on. I think we need to shore up our 
capability with our air superiority. I think that we have to have a 
carrier task force, an additional carrier task force moved into the 
area. I think that we have got to prepare our troops for war. And I 
think our troops are prepared. But I think that North Korea needs to 
get the message that should they decide to engage in a war, that the 
United States of America is not only ready for the war but ready to end 
the war very quickly on our terms.
  If you have a strong defense, I do not think there is any better way 
to stop a military conflict than that defense. It used to be in the 
cold war, we talked about deterrence and there is a difference between 
deterrence and defense. Deterrence is where, let us say there is a 
fellow named Mel. Mel is sitting out here and Mel has a missile and I 
have a missile. Now, Mel is smart enough to know that if he uses his 
missile against me, I can still use my missile against him. So Mel and 
I just kind of stay at arm's length with each other. That is called 
deterrence. Deterrence will not work in Korea. What will work in Korea 
is a strong, strong defense.

  I think what we need to do in addition is the President needs to make 
a personal trip. I think the President needs to visit China. I think 
the President needs to visit Japan. Now, the President found time to 
visit Oxford University.
  Mr. President, the most serious international problem that we have 
right now is Korea. The two most important allies that we have in Korea 
are Japan and China, and I support you 100 percent in working with 
those two partners. But maybe you ought to go sit down with them. Maybe 
you ought to tell them the importance of their cooperation in 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in east Asia. Maybe we ought to 
make it clear to Japan that it cannot continue to allow its citizens to 
send $1 billion or $2 billion a year to Korea if in turn they expect 
our young American soldiers to go over and be willing to give their 
lives in defense of Japan. I think that our President has got a lot of 
groundwork to cover. I think he is capable of doing it. There has been 
a lot of criticism about the President's military background. There has 
been a lot of criticism, and I happen to think a lot of this criticism 
is justified, on our President's weakness in foreign policy. But our 
President does have the capability to communicate and if ever there was 
a time for communication, if ever there was a time for us to get behind 
our President and hope that he could communicate in the clearest of 
terms, it is now on the Korean peninsula. To the people of this country 
and to my colleagues in here, this is a very, very critical situation. 
It is a situation that we cannot allow to continue without clear policy 
and a clear message and a showing of strength. We do not want a war on 
the Korean peninsula any more than you want to run into a wounded 
grizzly bear on a trail up in the mountains. You do not want that to 
happen.
  Finally, and let me conclude with this. One of the things that I 
think is very important for us is to approach North Korea and say, 
``What's up? We know you know what is going to happen if you continue 
to push these nuclear weapons. You have got a lot better future for 
your country and a lot better future for the people of your country if 
you join the market. Look at what has happened in Russia. Look how much 
China has improved. Look at your own blood brothers down in South 
Korea. Look what it's done to their economy when they come into a 
capitalized type of system. You don't have to change from communism to 
capitalism. Open up your doors. Open up your doors to the rest of the 
world. Stop your isolation. It is a win-win deal for you, North Korea, 
if you stop the isolation, come into the world, start trading with the 
world. You're going to have, North Korea, countries throughout the 
entire world giving you foreign aid. You're going to have countries 
throughout the entire world wanting to invest in your country, to put 
money into your country.''

  What is wrong with a country like North Korea when they have such 
isolation? Not long ago I had an opportunity to give some graduation 
speeches and I talked about the difference between an 18-year-old in 
North Korea who would probably never taste ice cream in his lifetime, 
has probably never seen a TV, certainly has never flown on an airplane 
unless it is a military aircraft, has never owned a car, probably has 
never driven a car, has never had an opportunity to go to department 
stores and pick out clothes, has never had an opportunity to go down 
and buy a soda pop or enjoy some of the finer points of life. Compare 
that with the South Korean 18-year-old, who has had those 
opportunities. Ice cream is abundant. TV's. Modern life. It is there. 
North Korea can provide that for its citizens and keep the hierarchy 
that it has. They can preserve that leadership. All that leadership has 
to do is open up to the rest of the world.
  I hope that that is what North Korea does. Every American should hope 
that that is what North Korea does. It would stop the proliferation at 
least starting on the Korean Peninsula. It would show that there is an 
effective way to deal with nuclear proliferation and military 
confrontation without missiles. I hope that is what happens. But we as 
a country must prepare that that may not be what happens. We as a 
country must be prepared not only for the best of times but for the 
worst of times. Right now the pendulum seems to be tipping toward the 
worst of times on the Korean Peninsula. Do not go to bed tonight 
thinking that there is going to be an attack tomorrow, but do go to bed 
tonight thinking about the consequences if there is an attack tomorrow 
and the importance of our President, of the leadership of this country, 
to step forward and make sure that a military confrontation on the 
Korean peninsula does not take place.

  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. McINNIS. Yes, I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from 
California.
  Mr. DORNAN. I did agree with your summation that people should not 
start to lose sleep over this but if you look at the columns of Charles 
Krauthammer, Bob Novak, some other very serious writers and analysts of 
what is happening here, we are approaching a most dangerous situation.
  We have been discussing informally, and I would like your opinion, 
Scott, that the power of our country is so overwhelmingly superior to 
any military force in North Korea, that maybe we should consider taking 
the 37,000-plus Americans that we have in harm's way if North Korea 
does, as some believe they already have, achieve the possession of a 
few nuclear weapons, that we should take our troops out, indicate to 
the South Koreans that they have to mobilize, which they have not yet 
done, to a state of heightened readiness, put a naval carrier battle 
group off each coast with every single Tomahawk-equipped supporting 
ship we could, throw in a few nuclear submarines, and tell North Korea, 
``Don't think for an instant because we've taken our men and women out 
of harm's way in South Korea that you could invade with impunity.''
  If they do, then repeat the Clinton administration threat, ``You are 
annihilated as a Nation''--even with conventional weapons we could do 
that--and it is absolute suicide for Kim Il-song and Kim Yung-il.

                              {time}  2010

  We should say this is the end of government as you know it. The 
peninsula will be united under democracy. There will be no China to 
come to your rescue, no unending supply of Soviet arms, no Soviet 
fighter pilots flying and instructing your air force.
  But what I am shuddering at, and I am only putting this out as food 
for thought, is one mistake, one miscalculation, and they put one 
nuclear weapon into the areas where our 8th Army headquarters are, and 
the entire Second Division could be wiped out. Then, of course, we 
would destroy them totally as a society and say why did we not get our 
people out of harm's way when we had a chance? That is just food for 
thought.
  Mr. McINNIS. To the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan], first of 
all, I think you are very capable, you are very knowledgeable in those 
subjects. I think you, probably more than any Member in the House here, 
you went to Somalia, you have been at these scenes and have a good 
understanding.
  My concern about your proposal is any indication we are withdrawing 
troops would be seen as a weakness, I think, by North Korea, even 
though at the same time, simultaneously, we bring Naval forces in, 
substantial Naval forces.
  I think what we have to do is in fact just the opposite. We do, as 
the gentleman from California has pointed out, do have 37,000 young 
American men and women over there in harm's way. I think we need to 
strengthen those forces. I think we need to send in additional forces, 
to say look, North Korea, you are not going to wipe out 37,000 troops. 
If you come at us, you are not going to win. You are not going to 
accomplish the goals you may be able to accomplish today. We will 
destroy you.
  But to the gentleman from California, I think your option makes a 
whole lot more sense than a lot of other options I have had. I am 
particularly pleased that the gentleman from California also agrees 
with me about the seriousness of this.
  Mr. DORNAN. If you would yield again, I would have never proposed 
such an idea, because the slightest withdrawal might be misinterpreted 
by them as weakness, if Mr. Clinton were not the Commander in Chief. 
What gives me pause about leaving these thousands of young Americans in 
harm's way is the track record of this foreign policy so far. That I 
think we could encourage him to put battle groups off those coasts, and 
to make good on a threat if they were to dare to move across the DMZ. 
But with this erratic track record and the disregard that people had 
for the military in Somalia, jerking away their Specter AC-130 Hercules 
gunships, and no armor for a rescue mission in there, I have been to 
this South Korean peninsula four times, to North Korea once, a visit to 
P'anmunjom, and I may try to go with some other Members. I would love 
to talk to you about it, to P'anmunjom this summer during our district 
work break. But I do not know what to make of the White House policy up 
to this point.
  When Charles Krauthammer writes as thoughtfully as he did, and I saw 
it in the overseas International Herald Tribune at D-day, Mike 
Bilirakis, one of our great Members from Florida, passed the article to 
me. We were on a KC-1230 where the noise was so bad you could not hear, 
we had headsets on, he said, ``What do you think?'' I just said, ``This 
is the major worry of our time.'' That is why I appreciate your very 
informative special order.
  Do you know what all these columnists are saying? We had better 
prepare the country for this serious situation. That is exactly what 
you are doing. You are responding to these thoughtful columnist's 
pleas. Where is the awareness of our country, of the dangerous 
situation we have gotten ourselves into through dilly-dallying and 
dithering around with this process over the last year?

  Mr. McINNIS. Thank you to the gentleman from California. Reclaiming 
my time, I think it is important for the people and for all of us to 
understand here, this is not a partisan discussion. This is a message 
of cooperation to the President of this country.
  Mr. President, the message needs to be clear: Tap the minds of people 
like Congressman Sam Johnson out of Texas, or Mr. Dornan out of 
California. We need to get our minds together. We need to have a clear 
policy. We need to have a policy we are going to stand by, and we need 
to prepare this country in case the worst occurs.
  As I have mentioned earlier, hopefully that is not a scenario we will 
see in the future. But if we are not prepared now, we are going to end 
up in a battle with the grizzly.

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