[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 71 (Thursday, June 9, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: June 9, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
PERSONAL EXPLANATION
Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I missed today's vote on the McCloskey-
Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment. Had I been in attendance, I would have
voted ``aye.''
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment
No. 2 printed in part 3 of House Report 103-520.
amendment offered by mr. hamilton
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Hamilton: Page 308, after line 24,
add the following:
TITLE XII--PEACE IN BOSNIA
SEC. 1201. PURPOSE OF UNITED STATES EFFORTS.
The focus of United States bilateral and multilateral
economic, political, military, and diplomatic efforts should
be to move all parties toward a negotiated peaceful
settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina that
provides for a viable Bosnian state.
SEC. 1202. MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE DEFENSE OF BOSNIA.
(a) Renewed and Additional United Nations and Allied
Actions.--The President, working with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations Security
Council and pursuant to the Security Council's authority to
adopt measures for the maintenance and restoration of
international peace and security, should take such steps as
are necessary to enhance the ability of the people of Bosnia
to contribute effectively to their defense, including by--
(1) continued collective enforcement actions carried out in
connection with NATO; and
(2) securing additional authorization to enhance Bosnian
self-defense, which may include suspension of, or a limited
exception to, the international arms embargo with respect to
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
(b) Consultations.--After consulting with permanent members
of the United Nations Security Council on the status of
current NATO and United Nations efforts to achieve the
purposes described in section 1201 and further measures that
might be taken to achieve these purposes, the President
should:
(1) advise the Congress on the measures taken by the United
Nations Security Council to maintain international peace and
security within the meaning of Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter with respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina; and
(2) consult with the Congress on the further actions that
would be useful to address the serious situation prevailing
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of Tuesday, May 24,
1994, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] will be recognized for
30 minutes, and a Member opposed will be recognized for 30 minutes.
The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] is opposed to the
amendment, and will be recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, the House has just adopted the McCloskey
amendment, which lifts the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. The
question now rises on the Hamilton amendment.
Mr. Chairman, let us be very clear with respect to the procedure
here. We are operating under the king of the hill procedure. If my
amendment is adopted, it, of course, prevails. If it is defeated, then
we go back to the McCloskey amendment.
Madam Chairman, I say to my colleagues who voted for the McCloskey
amendment, and who favor lifting the embargo, that my amendment
provides a better way to do it. We can accomplish the goal without the
negative impacts of the McCloskey amendment.
Mr. Chairman, if we are serious about helping the Bosnian cause, if
we are serious about lifting the arms embargo and helping the Bosnian
Moslems defend themselves, we should do it multilaterally in the
context of the United Nations, and with, not against, our NATO allies.
My amendment leaves open the option, Madam Chairman, of lifting the
arms embargo, but it also recognizes the critical need to work
multilaterally with our allies and with the Russians in order to
achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict.
My amendment is very clear that the focus of U.S. policy should be to
move the parties toward a negotiated settlement, and not toward war.
The approach that I propose in this amendment I think has several
advantages over the McCloskey amendment.
First of all, the Hamilton amendment helps the peace process, it does
not torpedo it, since all of the major parties to the peace process
would have to approve lifting the arms embargo.
We have heard again and again from the President and from all of his
top advisers and all of our people who have been involved in the
negotiations that lifting this embargo unilaterally will undercut, will
destroy the peace process at the very point when this peace process is
making progress. Admittedly, it is fragile, but progress is being made.
The Hamilton amendment will assure that humanitarian aid goes
forward. We have had a lot of problems in Bosnia, and humanitarian aid
has not always flowed smoothly, but the fact of the matter is that two
out of three Bosnians today depend on that humanitarian aid.
Mr. Chairman unilaterally lifting the embargo means that the French
and the British and probably the Canadians will pull their troops out.
The humanitarian effort will come to an end. We will have to take
responsibility for it. The advantage of my amendment is that it ensures
that humanitarian aid continues.
If the United States unilaterally lifts the embargo, as we voted a
moment ago, the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia will surely collapse. The
Hamilton amendment builds on the work that has been done with our
allies in NATO, and it has been a tough, tortuous path, I have to
acknowledge that, but it builds on the relationship we have created
with Russia, moving toward a peace settlement.
Unilaterally lifting that embargo will damage our relations with key
allies a crucial time. The advantage of my amendment is that we
continue to work with our allies.
Does anybody believe that we are going to solve the problem in Bosnia
unilaterally? Does anybody believe that we are going to solve the
problem in Bosnia today without our European allies? Does anybody
believe we can solve the problems in Bosnia today without the help of
the Russians who are so close to the Serbs? I think not.
Madam Chairman, the Hamilton amendment will also have the advantage
of ensuring that all current U.N. sanctions will remain in effect. If
we go back to the McCloskey amendment, all of those sanctions against
Libya, against Iraq, the sanctions against Haiti, the sanctions now in
place against Serbia, the sanctions that may become in place in North
Korea will be jeopardized.
My amendment will protect all current U.N. sanctions, and the
sanctions I have recited, I think all in this room would agree are very
much in the American national interest.
{time} 1310
The Hamilton amendment will assure that we do not suddenly and
without careful debate involve the United States in a massive new
foreign aid program. The McCloskey amendment provides for an open-
ended, very large military program of foreign assistance. My amendment
does not have that. Their amendment is a down payment on a new military
aid program which our Department of Defense says would go to at least
$3 billion and would require 1,400 to 1,500 to 2,500 American personnel
in Bosnia. If we vote for the Hamilton amendment, we are voting for the
best opportunity to end this war that we have had for 3 years. I know
it is delicate, I know it is fragile, but we have the best chance to
stop the killing.
My friends on the other side of this question like to take the moral
high ground, and I have not the slightest doubt that they are acting
from the very best of motivations. But I am unwilling to concede the
moral high ground to them. We are trying to stop the killing. That is
what we are trying to do. Surely that is moral, is it not? All people
say that if we lift this embargo, we are going to intensify the war,
and by intensifying the war, that is another way of saying we are going
to be killing a lot more people. I do not concede the moral high
ground. This peace process is moving forward. Agreement has just been
reached on a month-long cease-fire. We hope it will lead to a more
durable cease-fire. We all know that we are at a very critical point.
The choice we have before us, then, remains very stark. Allowing the
McCloskey amendment to stand is going to be a signal from this Congress
that we want the war to go forward. Adopting the Hamilton amendment
will say that we want a negotiated peace.
I urge my colleagues with one of the most important foreign policy
votes of this session surely, I urge my colleagues to take a very
careful look at this, look at the impact the McCloskey amendment would
have on the American national interest and vote, of course, according
to their best judgment, and I hope that judgment will be a ringing
``aye'' on the Hamilton amendment.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HYDE. Madam Chairman, I just fail to see what is moral about
disarming one side in a combat. I have trouble rationalizing that.
Madam Chairman, In our time we have seen the phrase ``ethnic
cleansing'' enter the vocabulary of hate--a description even Hitler
would have been proud of. Serbians have used rape on a massive scale as
a cruel instrument of terror. In the surrounded enclave of Gorazde, the
civilian population was subjected to relentless shelling by Serbian
artillery which targeted the municipal hospital and the headquarters of
humanitarian relief organizations, killing scores of innocent people.
Bosnia's map is a constantly shifting mosaic of desperate enclaves--a
land-locked archipelago that is home to the most beleaguered of
humanity. Heavily armed Serb invaders continue to slaughter defenseless
men, women, and children, without the slightest hesitation or remorse.
It is a one-sided war that grinds on unmercifully.
President Clinton argues that the United States cannot lift the
embargo unilaterally, but must bow to the will of the U.N. Security
Council, which remains immovable. Where is U.S. leadership? We are in a
time of endless palaver, paralysis, indecision, and no follow-through.
The President and his Secretary of State have repeatedly stated that
they favor lifting the arms embargo on bleeding and shell-shocked
Bosnia. However, both cite U.N. Security Council resolutions as
immovable obstacles to that end. I believe this is a fundamental
misreading of the situation. In July 1991, our Government launched a
policy of preventing the transfer of all weapons and related equipment
to Yugoslavia. In January 1992, the U.N. Security Council adopted
Resolution 727 applying the embargo to any successor States emerging
from Yugoslavia. While these actions were designed to still the
conflict, they instead denied arms to Bosnian Moslems facing already
heavily armed Serbian--and later Croatian--aggressors. The ensuing
slaughter goes on, unabated.
It seems, under this administration, we are losing--or have already
lost--the capability and the inclination to form our own U.S. foreign
policy, and instead have become an element--a mere element--of U.N.
policy.
This subservience was made shockingly clear when 15 Americans died
from friendly fire over Iraq this April and the Vice President offered
his condolences to ``the families of those who died in the service of
the United Nations.''
The United Nations indeed. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
acknowledges every country's inherent right of self-defense. To deny
Bosnia that right is immoral and a failure of leadership on our part.
If defending yourself is only just, we are now obstructing justice by
keeping in place this immoral embargo.
We cannot call ourselves the leader of the free world with a straight
face any more.
We see unspeakable inhumanity and we are reduced to shrugging our
shoulders, furrowing our brows, and folding our arms. This embargo must
be lifted. We cannot let timid and paralyzed nations and self-important
U.N. bureaucrats prevent us from doing what we know is both right, and
in our own self-interest.
Lifting the embargo will also reduce the likelihood that American
military personnel will be called upon to risk their lives in Bosnia.
Let Bosnians defend Bosnia rather than putting our military forces into
the fray under the control of incompetent U.N. bureaucrats, as this
administration seems eager to do.
The Hamilton amendment is entitled ``Peace in Bosnia.'' It states
that the purpose of all United States efforts in Bosnia should be to
support a ``negotiated peaceful settlement of the conflict.'' But, the
only peace it offers is the peace of the graveyard. It provides not one
incentive to the Serbs to negotiate seriously a just settlement of the
conflict. Instead, it calls for more of the same: consultations with
the U.N. Security Council and, oh yes, negotiations. It tacitly
endorses the Clinton administration's strategy to pressure the Bosnian
Government to accept the dismemberment of its country. Peace at any
price is more than the Bosnian Government is willing to accept, and we
ought to reject it too.
The Hamilton amendment is not a ringing endorsement of freedom and
the right of self-defense--it is an invitation to high tea at the
United Nations. Let us send our regrets. Support McClosky-Gilman-
Bonior-Hoyer and reject Hamilton.
Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Florida [Mr. Johnston], the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee
on Africa.
Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Madam Chairman, I appear here in somewhat of
an ambivalent position because I feel the embargo should be lifted but
I do not think it should be lifted unilaterally, and I have expressed
my opinions in the past to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey],
and my frustration of what is going on in this country.
The Europeans told us 3 years ago that Yugoslavia was a European
matter and that we should stay out of it. Then, when I went to the NATO
conference 1\1/2\ years ago, they said, ``Why aren't you invading?'' We
cannot do this unless we are willing to assume the sole responsibility
for the events in Bosnia, the United States. We cannot do this unless
we are willing to abandon our European allies that are there.
How can the President appear before the French Parliament and say,
``Please keep your forces there,'' and then the next day for us to
unilaterally pull out from the embargo and go in there and jeopardize
all these people's lives? We cannot do this unless we are willing to
threaten the viability of international sanctions, as the chairman
said, on Haiti, on Iraq, and in 2 weeks probably the President will go
to the United Nations and say we should have an international embargo
on North Korea, and they turn around and say, how can we unilaterally
pull out of the sanctions on this country of Bosnia?
{time} 1320
You cannot do this unless you are willing to unilaterally remove
yourself from leadership that brought us the gulf war victory. Unless
we are willing to risk all of these things, we must act in a
multilateral basis. We must support the Hamilton amendment.
The United States is legally bound, now, listen to this, by the
United Nations Charter, article 25, approved by international treaty
and approved by the U.S. Senate, to support and enforce U.N. Security
Council resolutions. Are we ready to abandon the foundation for all
multilateral sanctions? Are we ready to abandon multilateral leadership
and be the sole policeman of the world?
These are the things that are at stake.
I am frustrated, as I said earlier. But I think that this is a
serious mistake legally and in the international community to
unilaterally pull out of this. We must support the Hamilton amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
New York [Mr. Gilman].
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Madam Chairman, the House has just taken a courageous
step. We have voted to do something about the aggression and genocide
in Bosnia by unilaterally ending the arms embargo of that country.
Now the House is being invited by Mr. Hamilton essentially to reverse
itself.
The Hamilton amendment is instant oatmeal. Members now are being
asked to take back the vote they have just cast and vote against ending
the embargo, by voting for another amendment that pretends to do
something about the arms embargo but which in fact is designed to keep
the embargo in place.
Under the king-of-the-hill procedure contained in the rule, a vote
for the Hamilton substitute is a vote to supersede the just-passed
McCloskey-Gilman amendment. Unlike the McCloskey-Gilman amendment,
which ends the arms embargo once and for all, the Hamilton substitute
says only that the President should talk to the United Nations about
ending the embargo.
I submit, the President has been doing just that for over a year and
with nothing to show for it.
Let there be no mistake about this: the Hamilton substitute keeps the
arms embargo in place.
If the House votes to approve the Hamilton amendment after having
just passed the McCloskey-Gilman amendment, the House will have made a
colossal flip-flop.
The American people are watching. The victims of aggression and
genocide in Bosnia are waiting. Let us not flip-flop. I urge my
colleagues to stand by their prior vote and vote down the Hamilton
substitute.
Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Mississippi [Mr. Taylor].
Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Madam Chairman, I hope that the Members
with the many pursuits and the many requests on their time are taking
the time to listen to this debate. Because I think it is one that has
extremely far-reaching consequences.
I have never been to Yugoslavia, nor have I been Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. But as a member of the Committee on Armed
Services, I have had the opportunity to hear a former commander of U.N.
troops in Yugoslavia and to visit personally with a former Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff of our Nation.
A little over a year ago, a General MacKenzie, a Canadian in charge
of NATO forces in Yugoslavia, came before the Committee on Armed
Services and summed up his remarks by saying, ``Ladies and gentlemen,
you have three serial killers. One has killed 15, one has killed 10,
and one has killed 5, and I do not buy the argument that we need to
rush in and save the one who has killed 5.'' That is a quote from
General MacKenzie before the Committee on Armed Services.
Later that year, based on those disturbing words, I cornered the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, when this same
Congress a year and a half ago was considering military intervention in
Yugoslavia. I said, ``General Powell, should we get involved militarily
in the former Yugoslavia?'' Being the good general that he is, he
dodged the question. So I repeated the question, because again, it is
not his job to make foreign policy. After four attempts, Colin Powell,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, ``No. We should not get
involved in the former Yugoslavia.''
Ladies and gentlemen, Colin Powell may well be the standard-bearer
for the minority party in 2 years for President. He was a great
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He did a wonderful job.
He went on to say that there are 10 years' worth of weapons in the
former Yugoslavia that are there right now with the embargo. There are
plenty of weapons in the former Yugoslavia.
Giving weapons to one side, taking sides as the chairman of the
Committee on Armed Services has pointed out, putting American lives at
risk is not going to help.
Let me go one step further and say that I have heard a rumor on the
House floor today that some people are supporting lifting the ban
because they want to embarrass the administration. Let me, as the
Democrat who has the worst voting record with this administration, say
something, that I hope anyone who votes for this lifting of the ban in
order to embarrass the administration, if one American life is lost,
has the courage to go see the family of that service person who comes
home in a body bag and say, ``I am sorry you lost your child, but I
wanted to embarrass our President.'' That is no way to run our country.
And those fine young men and women who serve our country right now who
practice airdrops in the dark, who spend months at sea in submarines,
they deserve better than that.
Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
New York [Mr. King].
Mr. KING. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Madam Chairman, Members of this House, I rise in strong opposition to
the Hamilton amendment.
For the past 3 years Serbia has carried out brutal, naked aggression
and genocide against the people of Bosnia, and tragically the West has
done nothing.
Indeed, if we look at it, it is almost a tragic replay of the 1930's
when Hitler was taking the Rhineland, Austria, Sudetenland, finally
Czechoslovakia, and in each instance, the world leaders, specifically
Neville Chamberlain, would say, ``This is the last act of aggression.
And besides, if we took any action, it would upset the peace process.''
The same argument is being made today.
The fact is the peace process has not worked. The fact is that the
innocent people of Bosnia are being decimated and destroyed by the
Serbian war machine. We are doing nothing. Unfortunately, both the
previous administration and this administration are sending out
terribly mixed signals. On one day we will bomb, light bombing of
Serbian installations. The next day the President says we are not
taking sides.
We should take sides, because this is a clear moral issue. If the
United States is to stand for anything in the post-cold-war era, it
should stand for standing up and resisting aggression.
This amendment is titled ``Peace in Bosnia.'' It reminds me of the
Roman historian Tacitus who said, ``They gave us a desert and called it
peace.'' The Serbs are giving us a desert of war in Bosnia, and we are
calling it peace.
It is time to stand up for our principles. It is time for the United
States to show leadership. It is time to send a message to the world we
will no longer allow aggression to go unchecked.
The only action the West has taken is to deny weapons to those who
are under attack themselves. How can this ever be justified morally? No
wonder the leaders in Korea do not take us seriously when they see what
a mixed message we are sending.
I would just ask all of my colleagues who voted for the McCloskey
amendment to vote ``no'' on the Hamilton amendment. If you do not, you
will be sending the same mixed and confusing signal that this
administration has been sending day after day.
Madam Chairman, I ask my colleagues to vote ``no.''
Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Madam Chairman, on behalf of the committee
chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana
[Mr. Roemer].
(Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ROEMER. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of the Hamilton
amendment for three reasons.
But I also have a great deal of respect for the gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. McCloskey], who has been so knowledgeable and has so much
passion on this issue and has visited the country so many times.
I support the resolution offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr.
Hamilton] for three reasons. First of all, Madam Chairman, we have been
celebrating for the past 2 weeks Normandy and D-day, and we have read
and we have heard about Juno and Sword beaches, of Utah and Omaha.
{time} 1330
That was leadership, ladies and gentlemen, United States leadership
with our allies, the Canadians and the British. That was the consummate
definition of leadership; not doing it alone, but leading others,
compelling others to be involved in the liberation of a continent.
So I think when we talk about leadership, we do not just talk about
unilateral leadership, we talk about multilateral leadership and
alliances and convincing others on the merits to get involved.
Second, timing: We have a historic agreement between the warring
parties. Will it hold? There are no assurances that it will hold, we
are not certain that it is going to hold, but if we are as cynical, as
skeptical about the Middle East or South Africa, then we would not have
seen some of the miracle that has occurred, especially in South Africa,
if we had been so skeptical about what might happen in that country.
Third, I think when we have heard from so many on the Republican side
about micromanagement, about telling the President he must do A, B, C,
especially under President Bush, I think it is only fair to apply the
same standard here and not tie President Clinton's hands in this
manner.
Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
(Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. McCURDY. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Hamilton amendment.
For 3 years we have pretended that the war in Bosnia is a civil war,
rather than a war of Serb aggression.
For 3 years we have pretended that negotiations would bring an end to
that aggression.
For 3 years we have somehow persuaded ourselves that we should deny
arms to the Bosnian Government even as its people were systematically
massacred and driven from their land.
It is time to end the charade that is our Bosnia policy.
For me, the issue we face today is a simple one. The embargo is
wrong. It was wrong when it entered into force. It is wrong today.
As long as we continue to abide by this embargo, we insult the
principle that is the very cradle of our Nation: The principle that, if
it so decides, a people has the right to declare independence and build
for itself a new future, a sovereign future, a future on its own terms
and according to its own values.
Our forefathers invoked this principle over 200 years ago to justify
the independence of the young United States.
The brave Bosnian people are desperately attempting to invoke that
same principle today.
And the question for us is simple: Will we stand for them, or against
them?
Our history, our values, our consciences allow only one answer. Vote
against the Hamilton amendment.
Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Madam Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to
the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the
gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
Madam Chairman, I would like to engage the Chair in a colloquy.
I am concerned that the language of section 1202 of the gentleman's
amendment might imply a war powers authorization to the President for
the use of United States military force in Bosnia. I would like for the
gentleman to clarify that issue.
Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Madam Chairman, will the distinguished
gentleman yield?
Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I
thank the distinguished chairman for his inquiry.
It is not my intention in offering the amendment to imply any war
power authorization for United States military force to act in Bosnia.
This subsection of the amendment would only have the Congress advise
the President that he should continue to work with the United Nations
and with NATO on collective measures to achieve our policy goals on
Bosnia.
Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for that clarification.
Madam Chairman, with that clarification, I would like to make a few
points. First, as I understand the Hamilton amendment, it calls upon
the President to work multilaterally to find a peacefully negotiated
solution. I read this amendment, as provided in section 1, that the
clear policy of the U.S. Government is to seek a peaceful negotiated
settlement. This is why I can support the amendment, especially in
light of the colloquy I have just had with my distinguished colleague.
In the current environment, where a cease-fire negotiation has
progressed to achieve a 1-month cease-fire with the possibility of even
a further extension of cease-fire, this would reiterate our commitment
to seeking such solutions which are the only effective way, as I
perceive it, to halt the bloodshed and to end the conflict.
It takes steps in a multilateral concept that would meet our overall
current policy and national security commitments. It preserves
flexibility during a period of negotiation, it protects recent goals,
and finally it requires congressional consultation in this matter.
In the closing remarks, I would like to divert from just a specific
consideration of the Hamilton amendment and say to all of my colleagues
here that you delude yourselves when you believe that there is some
midcourse that does not require a major commitment. If you want to end
the killing and the dying, then whether I agree or not, at least I can
respect the intellectual integrity of the position that says, ``We want
to go into Bosnia to wage war.'' That is a legitimate position. I
oppose it. I believe that we ought to aggressively go in and try to
help wage peace, to bring them to the negotiating table.
But, Madam Chair, you delude yourself when you believe that there is
some way that you can, on a neutral basis, with clean hands, back into
this situation. We should not be foolish or naive in that respect.
Lifting the embargo is a commitment, but at least you ought to try to
do it with your eyes open. But this midground that says we are neither
fish nor fowl is bizarre in the extreme.
If you want to go in and end the killing by more killing and war,
that is one thing. That is one thing. If you want to end the killing
peacefully, as this gentleman chooses to do, then you take that course.
But this midrange, this sort of a political stance that says, ``I don't
have any stains on my hands, that I can sort of neutrally walk through
this and say that I am saving lives,'' does not make sense. At the end
of the day, going down this road is a road to war.
What the Hamilton amendment is attempting to do is to put at a
minimum tying the international community's hands and say that it is
the policy of this Nation to try to find a peaceful negotiated
settlement. We are the last peg standing in the post-cold-war world.
Our responsibility ought to be to achieve peace, not encourage war.
Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from Virginia [Mr. Moran].
Mr. MORAN. I thank the distinguished gentleman.
I would say to my respected colleague, the chairman of the Committee
on Armed Services, that he deludes himself if he thinks that this
Nation can maintain a pacifist stance in light of the unlawful
aggression that we see in Bosnia. You delude yourself if you think that
we can avoid having to take a position between right and wrong, having
to stand up against--when we know that something is right, we have to
stand up for our principle even if it involves risk.
Mr. DELLUMS. Madam Chairman, as a matter of personal privilege, would
the gentleman yield? The gentleman invoked this gentleman's name.
Will the gentleman yield to me?
Mr. MORAN. I did not invoke the gentleman's name, but I have some
things to say, and I do not want to--I did listen for 15 minutes to the
chairman.
Mr. DELLUMS. This gentleman did not personalize the debate, either.
Mr. MORAN. Well, go ahead, Mr. Chairman, I will ask for more time.
Mr. DELLUMS. That is all right.
I yield back to the gentleman. I am simply saying let us fight on the
merits, not personal issues.
Mr. MORAN. The chairman is quite correct, and I accept his remarks.
Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. MORAN. But I will say to my colleagues that there will be a time
throughout our history when we have to stand up and make a decision
between what is right and wrong and when we have to take some risk.
{time} 1340
Assuming a position of neutrality at a time of moral crisis is not a
virtue, and we should be ashamed if we do not have the wherewithal and
the will to stand up and take a position. Bosnia is fighting to
maintain a multiethnic democracy. Two years ago, almost 25 months ago,
Admiral Border recommended, when Dubrovnik was being shelled, that we
sink the two war ships because this was pure unlawful aggression, and
it would continue unless we take a stance, and the previous
administration chose not to, and this is where we are today.
Madam Chairman, if we continue to avoid conflict, avoid risk, avoid
making a decision between right and wrong, we will be in worse shape 2
years from now. Madam Chairman, the people listening to this should
understand that Bosnia, while we have no immediate strategic interest,
no particular economic interest, we have a principled interest.
I ask my colleagues, ``Do you know what the Prime Minister of Bosnia
is? Muslim, as is the majority of the country. But the representative
of the Presidency is Serbian, the Speaker of the Parliament is
Croatian, and the Bosnian Ambassador to the United States is Jewish.''
This is a multiethnic democracy trying to survive. They are besieged by
unlawful aggression.
The concept of a greater Serbia; we know it is wrong. We have to
stand up for principle. Defeat the Hamilton amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Rohrabacher].
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Madam Chairman, this body just voted to lift the
embargo. This vote would undermine that moral stand. It is time to lift
the immoral embargo that has led to the bloodshed and genocide of
Croatians and Bosnian Moslems.
Whose idea was this embargo in the first place? Does anyone really
remember that? I remember whose idea it was. It was the Serbians' idea
in the first place. We accepted an idea that was proposed by the
Government of Yugoslavia when it was dominated by the Serbians, and now
that they got their embargo, once they had it, once we put their idea
into place, the tanks begin to roll, and the artillery begin to fire.
The aggressor, by this embargo, was left with a total advantage in
artillery and tanks.
That advantage is what caused this situation to degenerate into
genocide and to degenerate into the worst bloodletting and killing of
noncombatants that we have seen in decades. Madam Chairman, it time to
lift the immoral embargo. It is time for the United States to provide
some leadership.
They say that we will be doing this alone. Well, no, we will not be
alone. We will be on the side of women and children and not combatants
who now cannot defend themselves because we have put the victim and the
aggressor in the same category. That is immoral. It is an immoral
embargo; it is time to lift the immoral embargo.
Madam Chairman, the United States has always stood, always stood, for
principle. When we stand for this wishy-washy type of situation which
we cannot take interest in, we are afraid to get involved, we will be
dragged into this because what will happen is situations like this will
be permitted to go from a situation of crisis into a catastrophe
because innocent people are not permitted to have the weapons to defend
themselves. If innocent people cannot defend themselves, eventually
American troops will be dragged in.
Madam Chairman, we should lift the immoral embargo and permit the
victims to defend themselves. This is the American way.
Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Houghton], a former member
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
(Mr. HOUGHTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HOUGHTON. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr.
Johnston] for yielding this time to me.
Madam Chairman, I hate to go against my leader over here, the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], but I am afraid I am going to
have to, and also the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] who, I am
sure, will be very unhappy with what I am about to say, but I agree
with the Hamilton amendment. I think it hits the issue headon and it
does not put us all out there by ourselves. That is very, very
important.
There is a tremendous amount of frustration here. As my colleagues
know, we see the killing going on, we want to lift the embargo, we do
not want to sit on the sidelines, obviously we want to exert some
leadership. But despite this frustration, Madam Chairman, we have got
to recognize that an awful lot of people would like to throw this thing
right in our lap and say, ``Go to it, U.S.A. You can handle it.'' And
then where are we?
Our first responsibility is to ourselves, and we realize we cannot do
anything we want, although we may want it internally. I say to my
colleagues, ``Once you decide to work with the allies, you have got to
work with the allies because, if you don't, then when you need them,
where are they?''
So now the two sides have agreed. They are going to sit down
tomorrow, and U.N. mediators are going to be able to try to work out a
long-term peace.
Now one can say, ``Well, we have had other agreements, and they have
collapsed.'' Why? Because there have been no provisions for
enforcement, but what is the alternative? Do we go it alone? Do we want
to be out there by ourselves? Do we forget the embargo? Do we split the
allies? Do we widen the conflict?
Sadly, despite our strength and our basic feeling, a sort of Kennedy-
esque strength, wherever there is a right, we are going to correct that
wrong.
I say to my colleagues, ``Please let's be part of the world. Our
heart says, `Let's vote down the Hamilton amendment.' Our head says,
`Yes, support it,' and I will go with my head.''
Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
New York [Ms. Molinari].
Ms. MOLINARI. Madam Chairman, there has been some concern that, if
the United States acts to unilaterally end the arms embargo, then other
nations will lift sanctions against other countries such as Haiti,
Iraq, Libya. We will not enforce sanctions against North Korea. Let us
think about this for a minute.
Haiti, Iran, Libya, Iraq, North Korea. Bosnia? What did Bosnia do to
get sanctioned along with the rest of those criminal governments? My
colleagues, they sought democracy, they sought freedom from communism,
hardly a justifiable comparison of nations in our American response.
``Bosnia, trust the United Nations,'' says the Hamilton amendment
this time. ``Forget the violated no fly zone; Bosnia, forget the
violated ceasefires; Bosnia, forget the bombardment of the safe areas,
forget the over 40 broken United Nations resolutions. This time trust
the United Nations to defend you as you seek democracy.'' The Hamilton
amendment would encourage us all to trust those same U.N.
decisionmakers who over 15 months ago promised a war crimes tribunal
and to date has not appointed a prosecutor or investigated one case of
criminality, not one.
I plead with my colleagues and say, ``If you are sickened by seeing
footage of 6-year-old children being slaughtered as they sleep, or 72-
year-old women who are victims of rapes, and if you do not want to send
American troops into Bosnia to end these atrocities, and you can no
longer trust the United Nations to do the right thing, there is only
one thing left. End the arms embargo. It is time for America to summon
the courage to act, even, by God, if no one else in this world will.''
Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Virginia [Mr. Wolf].
(Mr. WOLF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
[Mr. WOLF addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in
the Extensions of Remarks.]
Mr. PETERSON of Florida. Madam Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to
the distinguished gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Oberstar], a member of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Mr. OBERSTAR. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the time.
Madam Chairman, I have studied and followed events in the former
Yugoslavia and since the breakup probably all my life. I was raised
Slovenian of an immigrant family in northern Minnesota. I know some of
the language. I know a lot of the people and the peoples that live in
the land of the South Slavs.
There are bitter rivalries, ancient hatreds, a divisiveness built on
a religious diversity, diversity in the way they write their language,
diversity in the way they speak the language of the South Slavs,
complexities of geography, and a history of suffering.
We use the word, ``decimate,'' with somewhat reckless abandon, but in
World War II the peoples of Yugoslavia were decimated. One million,
seven hundred thousand of a population of 17 million died, most at the
hands of the Germans but a very large number at the hands of internal
war and conflict. What is going on today is an extension of conflicts
that arose during World War II and that go back deep into ancient
history.
Our role has been kind of a stop-and-start role. We have not managed
the policy of post-Tito Yugoslavia and the South Slav peoples very
well. One thing we did that was effective was to commit to air strikes.
I was an early advocate of taking that action. This was not done when
it should have been done back in the Bush administration, and it was
not done when it should have been done in this administration, but when
it was done, it was effective.
This embargo and the conflict over Bosnia were centered around the
reality that in Tito's Yugoslavia was the arms production center of
Yugoslavia and the Serbs wanted to get hold of the arms production
area, and the reason the conflict has continued as long as it has is
that the Bosnians learned how and knew how to make arms and are still
doing it, and they have persisted.
If we lift the embargo, more arms will pour into the Serbs, but the
real question is, where do the arms come from for the Bosnians, from
Iraq, from outside sources, or from the United States? The whole burden
then devolves upon the United States. We become the one that broke the
embargo, and then it is our problem to resolve it.
Are we prepared to send in ground forces? Not this body. I do not see
the spine, I do not see the steel rod in the back here to send in
ground forces. I do not see much of a steel rod or backbone in this
body to send in air strikes either.
So we must decide today whether we must keep the embargo in place and
avoid sending troops in and keep America's commitment to other
countries to act multilaterally rather than unilaterally.
Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Madam Chairman, first, I think this body
is out to vote against the Hamilton amendment because it would be very
inconsistent with the vote we just cast for the McCloskey amendment,
and we just ought as a matter of institutional policy to try to keep to
an absolute minimum the number of times we really look silly. I know
sometimes it is unavoidable, but I do not see why we would want to
venture into it voluntarily, and there is simply no rational way to be
for both positions.
Second, I think the best way to get peace is in fact to offer the
Bosnians a chance to buy arms. You do not break up a fight by grabbing
one guy's arms. In fact, what we are trying to do here is bring peace.
As long as there is an imbalance, the Serbs are more likely to
persevere, and there is the argument that says, ``No, if you're for
peace, you should never send one side arms.'' But let us think of a
situation in which there is one side which we believe to be morally
correct in a fight, one side which we think is threatened with
aggression and where we decide that the best way to bring a secure
peace is to sell arms. I am talking about Israel. The two models seems
to be very similar. With regard to the Middle East, most of us believe
that making American arms and other arms available to Israel has in
fact meant less likelihood of war because potential aggressions were
deterred by that armament.
The Serbs have shown a healthy respect for arms on the other side.
Despite what the Pentagon predicted, air strikes have been a deterrent
to the Serbs. So will sending in weapons. The question is not whether
there will be negotiations. Ultimately there will be. The question is,
from what relative positions of strength will the two sides negotiate?
The arms embargo gives the Serbs an unearned advantage. Lifting the
arms embargo makes it much more likely first, that there will be
negotiations right away, and second, that they will eventuate fairly.
Madam Chairman, I believe that lifting a one-sided embargo--and this
is a one-sided embargo because it affects only one side--lifting that
is the best way to bring about peace.
Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Horn].
(Mr. HORN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HORN. Madam Chairman, I have great respect for the chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, but I ask my colleagues to vote
against his amendment.
During this morning's briefing on Bosnia, I listened with close
attention to the words of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the acting Secretary of State. I must
confess that I had a definite feeling throughout that hour-long
session. That feeling is one that many in the British Parliament must
have felt when Prime Minister Chamberlain came back from meeting with
Herr Hitler at Munich. It was a feeling of disgust.
I want the Members to know that this is a bipartisan feeling of
disgust, because I felt the same way during the Bush administration
when that President--just as the current President--failed to take the
initiative when we could have nipped a lot of this problem in the bud.
Those who argue for multilateral removal of the arms embargo are
telling us it will never be removed. It should be obvious to all that
the Security Council of the United Nations will never remove that
embargo. It is not going to be removed. If we pass the Hamilton
amendment, we are signing the death warrant for Bosnia. So much for
multilateralism.
We have heard a lot about peace in Bosnia and how near it is. But
what kind of peace is it? It is the peace of the dead and the
conquered,
In terms of military from this country having to go to Bosnia, no one
is talking about that. The Bosnians are not talking about that. What
they are saying is, ``We would like some arms so we can defend our men,
women, and children,'' and they deserve those arms.
{time} 1400
This problem should have been handled by our intelligence community
the way we handled the Afghanistan problem when Afghanistan was
occupied by the Soviet Union. We armed those freedom fighters. They
drove the world's second superpower out of Afghanistan.
Madam Chairman, we should not continue to think disgusting things
about the policy of this country, regardless of who occupies the
administration. What we should do is vote against the Hamilton
amendment and sustain the McCloskey-Gilman amendment.
Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Chairman, I yield myself 2\1/2\ minutes.
Madam Chairman, I yield myself these 2\1/2\ minutes for making a
comment. The statement has been often made on the floor today that the
Bosnian-Moslems are defenseless. I think it is probably accurate to say
that at one time they were defenseless. But may I also suggest that
that statement now is very, very much out of date.
They received nearly $2 billion in arms last year. Prior to the
recent agreement that was signed between the Moslems and the Croats in
March, the very well-armed Bosnian forces had the Croats on the run.
And the military situation today in Bosnia, for anybody that is
following it closely, knows that it has been static for months. There
have been small gains and small losses by both sides. But what very
clearly it is not, it is not a situation today where the Bosnian-
Moslems are at a huge disadvantage and are defenseless.
Now, second, we have had the statement made very frequently here that
lifting the embargo will level the playing field in Bosnia. A lot of
judgments can be made about that, but let us be clear about where our
U.S. military is. Their judgment is categorical. The judgment is that
unilateral lifting of the embargo will not level the playing field.
And, most assuredly, $200 million additional foreign aid assistance
from the United States to the Bosnian-Moslems will not be sufficient.
It should also be made clear that our military people believe that if
you have that program, one of the options would involve 1,500 to 2,400
American military personnel on the ground, and they would have to be,
of course, protected, which means additional troops.
One other point has been made, and I want to be as candid about this
as I can. The statement has been made that it is not possible to lift
the embargo multilaterally. I think that is an accurate statement as of
today. The Security Council, however, imposed the embargo, and the
Security Council can lift the embargo.
Only when the peace efforts have been exhausted can we win the
necessary international support to lift the embargo. So long as those
peace efforts are going forward, I think it is correct to say that it
cannot be lifted multilaterally. If the peace negotiations fail, then I
think the multilateral lifting of the embargo would be achieved.
Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
New York [Mr. Schumer].
(Mr. SCHUMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SCHUMER. Madam Chairman, I think that this is one of the most
difficult proposals that we will have to vote on, and I have been
thinking a great deal about it. I would say in terms of the practical
arguments, does this help the Bosnians or not, we can hear both sides
on that. But ultimately you have to listen to the Bosnians themselves.
They believe it will.
So we can rationalize and debate, but the people who are asking for
our help and who have been slaughtered say that it will help them. Who
are we to judge that it will not?
The real argument that throws me back a little by the supporters of
this resolution is the one made with eloquence by the chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the chairman of the Committee on Armed
Services, and that is, shall we break our international agreements? How
will this affect not Bosnia, but future agreements, where others want
to break them and we say ``Don't.'' And they will say, ``But you did it
here.''
That is a very difficult argument to overcome. But I think we are
thrown back to thinking about the Nuremberg laws, and to thinking about
when is it a citizen's responsibility, whether we be citizens in this
chamber or citizens on the streets and somewhere in the world
community, about when it is proper and appropriate to say that world
law has allowed such horror and such havoc to occur, allowed it to
occur, but that we must not stick with it? And that in each
legislator's case in terms of this resolution and the treaties that it
involves, must be to say to himself or herself that every so often,
very rarely, not lightly, heavily, in fact, we must sometimes say that
those international agreements and treaties have allowed such misery
and such destitution to occur, that we must ignore them, even knowing
the consequences that will occur down the road.
My colleagues, this is such a case. I urge defeat of the Hamilton
amendment so the McCloskey amendment can stand.
Mr SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Madam Chairman, I appreciate the time.
Madam Chairman, obviously it is with a sincere sense of qualms that I
am ever at odds with my distinguished chairman, Mr. Hamilton, on an
issue of significant importance such as this.
But I would just to some degree echo other speakers and say for once
in our lives, please, let us not try to have it both ways. We really
cannot be both for the McCloskey amendment and the Hamilton amendment.
The McCloskey-Gilman amendment tells the President, as far as our
participation, the arms embargo should be lifted as to Bosnia.
Regardless of what has been said in previous debates, it commits no
troops, no equipment. It is all at the discretion of the President. It
is not an open-ended commitment, as the chairman said in his earlier
remarks.
I would note also that it was interesting to hear from the gentleman
from Minnesota [Mr. Oberstar] with his Slovenian antecedents, and see
Mr. Oberstar oppose this resolution to in essence lift the arms embargo
because we all know, when the Serbs went into Slovenia, they left in 9
days, and there are no Slovenians being tortured, raped, or otherwise
being oppressed by Serbs, because they were run out by an armed
citizenry.
Also it really beggars the imagination to compare besieged Bosnia, as
the great gentlewoman from New York, [Ms. Molinari] referred to along
the lines of Iraq and Korea and what not.
What sins have the Bosnians committed? All they ask for is the right
to defend themselves. They are not really asking for the United States
to be the Lone Ranger and come to their rescue. We should assert more
leadership. Yes, there should be air strikes.
But one thing we should not be doing, Mr. President, is to
participate, as was reported today, in a real politic to break up
Bosnia, a state which we say is sovereign, which the United Nations
says is sovereign, and say yes, Serbia, you can add this to a greater
Serbia.
Please vote no on the Hamilton amendment. Let us have a clear voice
for once.
Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the
distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr.
Gephardt].
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Kennelly). The gentleman from Missouri
is recognized for 4 minutes.
(Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GEPHARDT. Madam Chairman, I rise to favor the amendment by the
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], and I rise with a great respect
for the Members who have supported the McCloskey amendment and the
Members who want us to defeat this amendment. All of them who have
spoken, and not spoken, like all of us, want the violence to end. They
want children to be saved. They want the genocide to end. And that is
the issue. The issue is not what we are trying to do; the issue is how
to get there. And I argue that if we continue what we have been trying
to do, we have the best chance to achieve peace.
{time} 1410
That is what we have been doing: Peace, the end of war, the end of
violence. It has not been an easy path. The sides are unequal, the
desire for violence is great, the hatreds and feelings are age-old and
historic. It is not so easy to do this, but with ups and downs, we have
been lurching forward to greater peace. By lifting the embargo
unilaterally, I argue we will have an increase in violence necessarily,
and we will have the end of the efforts at peace.
I talked to Mr. Hunter, who is the Ambassador to NATO, today, and he
said there is no doubt in his mind that if the embargo is unilaterally
lifted by the United States, that the European countries will pull out
in a moment, as quickly as they can, the entire peacekeeping apparatus
which is on the ground today.
Some will argue that if we can even the sides and get military
equipment in on the side of the Moslems, that will bring about a
greater move towards peace, that that will end the war. I do not
believe that. I believe it will increase the war making, and then we
will be asking the question on this floor, should we send in more,
should we become more involved, should we be using more air power, and
even should we be introducing troops on the ground to be in the war
itself, trying to bring it to an end.
I do not think there is anyone in our country who is prepared to
answer those questions in the positive. So with the greatest respect
for the people here today who are advocating the lifting of this
embargo, I urge Members to vote for this resolution.
As we look at this, let us remember that we have accomplished a lot
here. This awful war has not expanded to Macedonia, to Kosovo, to other
places in the region. It has been contained, to the extent it has been
contained. We have made progress to bringing about peace.
We are in a new world, and we truly do not know how to do this yet. I
think we must continue what we have started. We must continue to stand
for peace. We must continue to stand with the people who are trying to
bring about a negotiated settlement, which is beginning to go forward
as we speak in this Chamber today.
Madam Chairman, I urge Members to vote for this amendment. Stay the
course and let us bring about peace and not war.
Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield my remaining time to the
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer].
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer] is
recognized for 2\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. HOYER. Madam Chairman, this has been a serious and important
debate, as my friend, the gentleman from the Committee on Armed
Services, says so often. It is a debate about the new world order, as
the majority leader has just said. It is a debate about what that new
world order is.
However, I suggest that there is an old, old historical lesson, and
that is the lesson that tyrants never respond to weakness. Tyrants
throughout history have responded to dissembling and conflicting
messages by further aggression, further genocide, further killing,
further breaking of international law.
Madam Chairman, my friend, the majority leader, who has no closer
ally on this floor than I, as I would suggest, nor does the President,
who is my friend and who I respect, but on this issue we disagree. The
majority leader raises the question how to get there. Yes, he focuses
on the essence of the issue that confronts us, how to get there.
For 2 years now, perhaps 3, we have looked the aggressor in the eye
and said, ``If you go a step further, we will take definitive action.''
They took two steps and we backed up three. It is inevitable in that
scenario that the aggressor will continue, because he does not see the
consequences of his action.
Haris Silajdzic, the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, says:
We are under assault. You must not give us help in the
sense of sending people, but do not continue to prevent us
from defending ourselves.
We are now ready to vote. Let us not, my friends in this House, once
again say to the aggressor, to the individual branded by our
Government, by our State Department, as a war criminal, let us not say
to him, ``This day, once again, we backed down.'' Let us not say, ``We
were pretending when we voted for McCloskey.''
Let us continue to stand for principle. Let us continue to stand for
strength. Let us continue to stand for the principles in almost every
international document which say that we will confront aggression and
genocide where we find it. Vote ``no'' on Hamilton.
Mr. DELLUMS. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of
words.
Madam Chairman, we have come to the end of a very significant and
very important debate. This gentleman walked into these Chambers nearly
24 years ago, against the backdrop of the Vietnam war. I was elected to
come here to raise my voice in the name of peace, not an easy thing to
do in 1971, when the overwhelming majority of my colleagues were
supporting the prosecution of the war in Vietnam.
I say that as a prelude to making these comments. My colleague who
just preceded me in the well pointed out the need for strength. With
that I do not disagree. What I would argue, as vociferously and as
eloquently as I can, is that peace is also strength.
The fallacy is that some way our strength only lies in our capacity
to kill and to maim, that in some way strength is in tanks and
armaments and bombs and missiles. There is strength and power in the
willingness to negotiate, in the ability to come together around the
negotiating table to find a political solution to a problem.
Too often in these Chambers peace has been a weak idea. Too often war
and killing has been seen as a strengthening idea. However, I would
assert in the first few moments of my discussion that peace is also a
strong idea, and one should not have to back away from the desire to
attempt to wage peace in a situation where people are dying.
My second point, it is very clear that all of us in these Chambers,
from left, right, and center, both sides of the aisle, want to stop the
killing and the maiming. The point of it is, How do we do it?
I said earlier to the point of redundancy, if there are Members here
who say, ``We want to commit American troops to wage war in Bosnia,''
that is a position; or those of us who say, ``We want to attempt to
aggressively try to wage peace to end it,'' that is also a legitimate
position.
However, Madam Chairman, to assume that the only position left for a
great Nation like the United States is to say, ``Lift the embargo and
let them engage in self defense,'' I would submit that that in and of
itself is an impotent act, because it says that we have no capacity on
the international stage, in the world community, to bring our
significant power and moral persuasion and political persuasion and
economic capability to a situation to try to end the killing and the
dying short of war.
My colleagues are misguided who believe that the only thing we can do
is slide backwards into war. That is what lifting this embargo is all
about. If you are going to confront it, confront it cleanly, confront
it up front, confront it head on; but to assume that the only thing you
can say is ``Well, here are some weapons, you go kill yourselves
further, you go die further,'' that is not the only posture we can
take. We can aggressively attempt to mobilize the world community, to
try to bring the world together in the context of Bosnia to try to
solve the problems finally.
{time} 1420
Madam Chairman, I hope to leave these Chambers some day with my
integrity as a peace advocate intact, but it is not easy when people
are dying to be a peace advocate. It is not easy to do it when people
are not dying. It takes some heart, it takes some courage, it takes
some dignity, it takes some integrity to stand up and say peace,
nonviolence, negotiation, peaceful settlement, bringing people to the
table is a way to end the killing. It is bizarre in the extreme to
think that we can end killing by aggressively pursuing more killing.
This is not an incentive for peace, this is not an incentive for
negotiation. For those who think unilateral lifting of the arms embargo
is anything other than an effort at war and an effort at intervention,
they are deluding themselves.
Mr. Chairman, at a bare minimum, the Hamilton amendment needs to be
accepted because it respects multinationalism in a world that is
becoming increasingly multinational, but finally it embraces the notion
that America's goal in that region of the world is to find a peaceful
way to solve that problem.
Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Madam Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior].
Mr. BONIOR. Madam Chairman, I thank my friend, the gentleman from
South Carolina, for yielding.
I thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle. The people of
America should know that this has not been a partisan debate. Far from
it. People from both sides of the aisle share common views on this
issue.
I would say to my friend, the gentleman from California who has
spoken with great eloquence and a differing point of view from my own,
that he has been and still is one of the great champions of peace in
this institution. Nobody can deny that. Nobody can take that away from
him. I am proud that I have stood with him for the 18 years that I have
served in this institution on virtually every one of his efforts. But
there comes a time, as my other friend who just talked has mentioned,
that peace at any price is not acceptable. It is not acceptable.
Madam Chairman, I wish the approach embodied in this amendment
offered by the gentleman from Indiana would work.
I wish it would end the killing and stop the war.
But I think most of us know deep down in our heart that it won't.
And we know that for one reason: because it has not worked for the
past 2 years.
The approach embodied in this amendment, not the amendment itself but
the same approach, peace at any price, has led to 200,000 dead, 16,000
kids being slaughtered and 2 million homeless the past 2 years.
If you think the people of Bosnia should continue to go unarmed and
outgunned, vote for this amendment.
This amendment is nothing more than an endorsement of the status quo.
But if you believe the United States has to show strong leadership in
times of great moral crisis, and it is a time of great moral crisis;
If you believe the Bosnians have a right to defend themselves;
If you really believe the arms embargo must be lifted, then vote
against this amendment, because the McCloskey amendment we already
passed is the only measure that will truly help the people of Bosnia
defend themselves.
Madam Chairman, we began this debate thinking and mentioning, many of
us on the floor this afternoon, about the week past, remembering one of
the proudest days in our history.
Schoolchildren all across America learned how 50 years ago, their
grandparents saved the world from tyranny and genocide.
But 50 years from now, schoolchildren will study this time. And they
will look back and wonder where American leadership was when genocide
reared its ugly head again.
They will want to know why we sat back and watched children be
slaughtered and families torn apart.
They will want to know why the United States Navy blockaded the
shores of Bosnia so arms could not enter and innocent people could not
defend themselves.
Madam Chairman, this body took a courageous stand to lift the arms
embargo. We must not falter now. We must not send mixed signals. It is
time for clear and consistent leadership. I urge my colleagues to vote
``no'' on the Hamilton amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Kennelly). The question is on the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. DELLUMS. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 181,
noes 242, not voting 16, as follows:
[Roll No. 223]
AYES--181
Abercrombie
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (TX)
Applegate
Armey
Bacchus (FL)
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Barca
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (WI)
Bateman
Bentley
Bevill
Bilirakis
Blackwell
Borski
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Buyer
Canady
Cantwell
Chapman
Clay
Clement
Clinger
Collins (IL)
Combest
Conyers
Cooper
Cramer
Cunningham
Darden
Deal
DeFazio
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Dicks
Dixon
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Ehlers
Emerson
Evans
Farr
Fields (LA)
Filner
Ford (MI)
Fowler
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Goodling
Gordon
Green
Hall (TX)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Hancock
Hastert
Hefner
Herger
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hochbrueckner
Houghton
Hughes
Hutto
Inglis
Inslee
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, Sam
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kleczka
Kreidler
LaFalce
Lambert
LaRocco
Leach
Lehman
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Lloyd
Long
Mann
Manzullo
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McKinney
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Montgomery
Murphy
Murtha
Norton (DC)
Nussle
Oberstar
Orton
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Petri
Pomeroy
Poshard
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Roemer
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roth
Roukema
Rowland
Roybal-Allard
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Schroeder
Scott
Shepherd
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Smith (IA)
Smith (MI)
Smith (OR)
Spratt
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stupak
Synar
Tanner
Taylor (MS)
Thornton
Torkildsen
Torres
Underwood (GU)
Unsoeld
Valentine
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Vucanovich
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Whitten
Williams
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Yates
NOES--242
Ackerman
Allard
Andrews (NJ)
Archer
Bachus (AL)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Becerra
Beilenson
Bereuter
Berman
Bilbray
Bishop
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Bunning
Burton
Byrne
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Cardin
Carr
Castle
Clayton
Clyburn
Coble
Coleman
Collins (GA)
Coppersmith
Costello
Cox
Coyne
Crane
Crapo
Danner
de la Garza
de Lugo (VI)
DeLauro
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dingell
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Engel
English
Eshoo
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fazio
Fields (TX)
Fingerhut
Fish
Flake
Ford (TN)
Frank (MA)
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Gallegly
Gallo
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Glickman
Goodlatte
Goss
Grams
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hansen
Harman
Hastings
Hayes
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Hoyer
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inhofe
Istook
Johnson, E. B.
Kasich
Kennelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Klein
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kyl
Lancaster
Lantos
Laughlin
Lazio
Levin
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
Lowey
Lucas
Machtley
Maloney
Manton
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Markey
Martinez
McCandless
McCloskey
McCurdy
McDermott
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Meyers
Mfume
Mica
Michel
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Mollohan
Moorhead
Moran
Morella
Myers
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Neal (NC)
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Paxon
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pickle
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Ravenel
Regula
Ridge
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Ros-Lehtinen
Rush
Santorum
Saxton
Schaefer
Schenk
Schiff
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sharp
Shaw
Shays
Skeen
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Swett
Swift
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Thompson
Thurman
Torricelli
Traficant
Upton
Volkmer
Walker
Walsh
Weldon
Wheat
Wilson
Wolf
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOT VOTING--16
Boucher
Collins (MI)
Condit
Faleomavaega (AS)
Foglietta
Grandy
Hefley
Huffington
Jefferson
Kopetski
Royce
Slattery
Sundquist
Towns
Tucker
Washington
{time} 1447
The Clerk announced the following pair:
On this vote:
Mr. Tucker for, with Mr. Towns against.
Mr. RIDGE and Ms. ESHOO changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. LEACH changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr.
Goss].
(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GOSS. Madam Chairman, I would ask why are we having another vote
on Haiti today? There has been no change in the Goss amendment which
passed this House on May 24. Is it because the vote is too close, as
some have implied on the other side of the aisle? I say to that,
``Nonsense.'' The Goss amendment passed 223 to 201, a 22-vote margin in
a House that passed one of the biggest tax bills ever by 1 vote and the
assault weapons ban by 2. That does not add up. Has the situation in
Haiti changed? Yes, it has, for the worse. Especially in terms of human
misery, as was predicted under the President's plan: More sanctions
equal more suffering equal more refugees, and undeniably that is the
situation. Has the President's policy produced positive, tangible
results in Haiti? No, it has not, other than enriching the thugs in
Haiti via the black market and stimulating the reinstatement of the
Macoutes of Duvalier's day.
{time} 1450
Other than stimulating the reinstatement of the Ton-Tons Macoutes of
Duvalier's day, other than further intensifying the deep political
divisions of that country, other than subsidizing the Ukrainian cruise
ship industry, other than investing more United States taxpayers'
dollars in infrastructure of Caicos and Turks Islands than many
congressional districts will receive this year, other than taking on
the relocation of an additional 3,000 Haitian refugees, other than the
inducement of deals, as yet uncovered, that were likely made with the
Jamaicans and the Dominican Republic, and other than spending money--
and nobody knows how much yet--but boy, are we spending a lot of money
for ships, and sanctions and for processing stations in various places
around the Caribbean, why are we having this vote? What is this about?
Madam Chairman, I think what a reasonable observer might conclude is
that it is because the President of the United States wants to invade
Haiti, if not with Congress' blessing, then with Congress' silence.
If the Goss amendment fails today, Members should understand that it
is worse than saying nothing about Haiti. It is a serious flipflop on
our foreign policy, and it does send a message.
Supporting the Goss amendment, voting yes on that, is the only way
for Members to stay on record in opposition to United States military
intervention in Haiti. That is what this is about.
In addition to saying no to the military intervention, the Goss
amendment is a nonbinding, nonbinding recommendation for an alternative
approach to the President's plan. It is arguably a better approach in
several terms. It does not punish the poorest of Haitians by offtarget
embargoes as we are seeing now under the President's plan. In fact,
Madam Chairman, it enables the provision of humanitarian relief and
refuge for those in genuine political danger on Haitian territory in
nearby Haiti, on the Ile de Gonave.
Second, the Goss plan does not require that anybody risk their life
on the high seas to get to Ile de Gonave. It is only a 15 to 20 mile
crossing. One does not have to go way down here to Jamaica, or way up
here to some other island, or way off here to Miami.
Third, instead of putting American soldiers in harm's way to somehow
create democracy at the point of a gun; the President's plan calls on
us to do that; the Goss plan paves the way for long-term democracy and
economic stability in Haiti by providing the opportunity to reestablish
the administration that was properly elected several years ago. The
moral boost across the country would be incalculable and immeasurably
positive if President Aristide did indeed return to Haitian soil in Ile
de Gonave.
Under the President's policy, today it is the Haitian people who are
suffering, and it is not the Haitian military. Today and tomorrow it is
the American taxpayers who are going to foot an ever-increasing bill,
and tomorrow it could be United States personnel who are in harm's way
while invading Haiti.
Vote yes, once again, on the Goss amendment. It is cheaper, more
compassionate, and it is safer.
Copy of Rollcall Vote on Goss Haiti Amendment
(in the committee of the whole, may 24, 1994)
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--
ayes 223, noes 201, not voting 14, as follows:
[Roll No. 197]
YEAS--223
Ackerman
Allard
Andrews (NJ)
Archer
Armey
Bacchus (FL)
Bachus (AL)
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barcia
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Beilenson
Bentley
Bereuter
Bevill
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Boucher
Brewster
Browder
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Byrne
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Castle
Clinger
Coble
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cooper
Coppersmith
Cox
Cramer
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Danner
Darden
Deal
Dickey
Dingell
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Emerson
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Gallegly
Gallo
Gekas
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Grams
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hayes
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Houghton
Huffington
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hutto
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, Sam
Kaptur
Kasich
Kim
King
Kingston
Klein
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kyl
Lancaster
Lantos
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Lucas
Machtley
Manton
Manzullo
Martinez
McCandless
McCollum
McCrery
McCurdy
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
McNulty
Meyers
Michel
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moorhead
Morella
Murphy
Myers
Nussle
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Ramstad
Ravenel
Regula
Ridge
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Roth
Roukema
Rowland
Royce
Sangmeister
Sarpalius
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Smith (IA)
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stump
Sundquist
Swett
Talent
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Thurman
Torkildsen
Torricelli
Upton
Valentine
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Weldon
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NAYS--201
Abercrombie
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (TX)
Applegate
Barca
Becerra
Berman
Bishop
Blackwell
Bonior
Borski
Brooks
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Chapman
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
de la Garza
de Lugo (VI)
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dixon
Dooley
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Fingerhut
Flake
Foglietta
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Geren
Glickman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hochbrueckner
Hoyer
Hughes
Inslee
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson, E.B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klink
Kopetski
Kreidler
LaFalce
Lambert
LaRocco
Lehman
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Long
Lowey
Maloney
Mann
Margolies-
Mezvinsky
Markey
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCloskey
McDermott
McKinney
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Mica
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Murtha
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Norton (DC)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Penny
Pickle
Pomeroy
Poshard
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Roemer
Romero-Barcelo
(PR)
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sawyer
Schenk
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Shepherd
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slattery
Slaughter
Spratt
Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stupak
Swift
Synar
Taylor (MS)
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Torres
Towns
Traficant
Tucker
Underwood (GU)
Unsoeld
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Wheat
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOT VOTING--14
Barlow
Barrett (WI)
DeLay
Faleomavaega
(AS)
Fish
Gibbons
Grandy
Horn
Neal (NC)
Ortiz
Santorum
Stark
Washington
Whitten
Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Arizona [Mr. Kyl].
Mr. KYL. Madam Chairman, make no mistake about it. This revote on the
Goss amendment is about whether the United States should militarily
intervene in Haiti. This House answered that question in the negative
less than 2 weeks ago. To vote otherwise today is to flipflop and send
a very dangerous message to everyone around this world.
Madam Chairman, the Goss amendment says there should be no
intervention unless there is a clear and present danger to U.S.
citizens or U.S. interests, and, my colleagues, let me read the exact
language that we would be repudiating if we support the revote today.
It is the sense of Congress that the United States should not
undertake any military action directed against the mainland of Haiti
unless the President first certifies to the Congress that a clear and
present danger to the citizens of the United States or U.S. interests
require such action.
Now who in this House would disagree with that simple test?
I suggest, Madam Chairman, that we should not flipflop. The U.S.
interests always come first. We should never, never take any military
action unless there is a clear reason to do so. If we intervene in
Haiti today, we would be put in the business of running Haiti for the
foreseeable future. The last time the U.S. military was sent there,
Madam Chairman, we stayed 19 years. It could get to be a lot like
Somalia.
Here are just some of the questions we should be answering before we
get into this kind of situation:
In the event of an invasion, what are the planned rules of engagement
and disengagement?
Is there a timetable?
Are there clear rules about the use of deadly force?
Besides Cedras and Michel Francois, how many so-called elitists would
have to be neutralized or removed?
How long do we stay?
How many dollars of war damage and alleged war damage will the U.S.
taxpayers have to pay out to our friendly neighboring country to
recover from our invasion?
If we can justify intervention in Haiti today, there is literally no
limit to where the U.S. troops would be sent tomorrow.
I say to my colleagues,
Pick your crisis: Bosnia, Sudan, Rwanda, Liberia. We could
be involved in endless crises. Military force should only be
used as a last resort, not as a substitute for real foreign
policy.
Madam Chairman, I urge a rejection of the revote on the Goss
amendment.
Mr. DELLUMS. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Kennelly). The gentleman from
California [Mr. Dellums] is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. DELLUMS. Madam Chairman and members of the committee, my
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], asked
the question: Why is this vote being reconsidered? I choose to answer.
No. 1, because I think the House was ill advised when it took the
action it did several days ago.
No. 2, that the debate was a short debate on the substantive issue.
No. 3, Madam Chairman, I believe that a number of my colleagues acted
and voted out of confusion and perhaps even ignorance.
{time} 1500
So at this time, I would like to state the case, allow my colleagues
to move beyond their confusion, beyond their ignorance, and also, Madam
Chairman, time and circumstances have overcome this amendment. Let me
argue those points.
The Goss amendment was adopted nearly 2 weeks ago, and the events in
the last 2 weeks have made that amendment unnecessary. So I ask many of
my colleagues here who voted for that amendment, to consider now voting
against the amendment. It is not necessary. The United States has
reached an agreement to process Haitian refugees off the coast of
Jamaica and other islands, making the amendment moot.
Second point I would make: The Goss amendment, Madam Chairman, and
hear me on this, would require the United States to use military force
to seize an island off the Haitian coast and maintain that island for
refugee processing.
Why do I say that? This is not American soil. This is Haitian soil.
It is occupied by a number of Haitian military people now. So it would
require military force. I do not think that is what we want to do.
Third, the amendment would require, and we received this from the
Defense Department and others, extensive logistical and engineering
commitments by the U.S. military, costly infrastructure investments by
American taxpayers.
Let me summarize. The Goss amendment, Madam Chairman, is unnecessary.
I ask my colleagues who voted for it to now vote against it.
Number two, it would entangle the United States military in Haiti at
this moment, seizing an island. We should not be about that. I ask them
to vote against it for that reason.
Finally, it would be extremely costly to the American taxpayer to do
this. Time, circumstances, and events have overcome these matters.
Finally, let me say to my colleagues, particularly those of you on
this side of the aisle, let me make a personal plea to you. There are
very few times when this gentleman has asked a number of you to give us
a vote. Many of you have marched into the well and said this is the
fairest person you have worked with. I work with all of you in this
Chamber of a daily basis on a host of issues, never asking you for
anything. I ask you on this one to give us a vote to defeat the Goss
amendment. It was ill-conceived and ill-advised.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from New Mexico.
Mr. RICHARDSON. Madam Chairman, over the Memorial Day recess, I
joined members of the House Intelligence Committee on an official
factfinding mission to Haiti. I had the opportunity to view first hand
the destruction that has been wrought on that country by a belligerent
band of military thugs headed by General Cedras. Madam Chairman, it is
a certainty that the horrible disrepair of our Caribbean neighbor will
only worsen as long as the military junta continues to rule.
Madam Chairman, on May 24, the House considered a sense-of-Congress
amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss]. That
amendment required the President to certify to Congress that clear and
present danger to citizens of the United States or United States
interest existed prior to the United States undertaking any military
action, and to establish a temporary safehaven on the Haitian island of
Ile de La Gonave for Haitian refugees escaping economic and political
hardships on the mainland of Haiti. Madam Chairman, I opposed the
amendment then and will oppose it today when the House reconsiders it.
Madam Chairman, the Clinton administration's new policy on Haitian
refugees makes the Goss amendment unnecessary. That policy provides for
both ship-board and land-based processing for refugees. To date, the
Department of Defense has chartered two Ukrainian ships for the ship-
board processing, and the administration has worked out an agreement
with Jamaica to permit ships to anchor off the shores of Kingston for
further processing. Additionally, the administration has secured the
participation of the United Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees.
Returning Haitian refugees to Ile de la Gonave is to return them to
Haiti. Ile de la Gonave is a 280-square mile island just west of Port-
au-Prince. Ile de la Gonave is Haitian territory. Thus, the Goss
amendment represents a retreat to the old Bush administration-initiated
policy of returning Haitian refugees to Haiti without the benefit of
any determination of their refugee status.
Additionally, Madam Chairman, the requirement that the President make
certain certifications to the Congress prior to committing U.S. forces
to Haiti is being used by General Cedras to consolidate his hold on
power and the military reign of terror. Mr. Chairman, in the aftermath
of the withdrawal of the Harlan County, the Haitian military does not
believe that the U.S. has any resolve to commit any forces. The option
to use force must remain open and unabated so that the Haitian military
will know that the United States supports democracy and will not stand
idly by in the wake of criminal anarchy in Haiti.
Madam Chairman, the administration's policy on Haiti represents a
constructive effort to restore democracy to that Caribbean nation. This
policy should be given every opportunity to succeed without the
Congress tying the administration's hands in removing from its
diplomatic arsenal the threat of military force. Madam Chairman, I urge
my colleagues to oppose the Goss amendment when it is considered by the
House this afternoon.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Kennelly). The question is on the
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended,
was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Mazzoli) having assumed the chair, Mrs. Kennelly, Chairman pro tempore
of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R.
4301) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for military
activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military
personnel strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for other purposes,
pursuant to House Resolution 431, she reported the bill back to the
House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the
Whole?
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a separate vote on the so-called
Goss amendment regarding Haiti.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is a separate vote demanded on any other
amendment?
The Clerk will report the amendment on which a separate vote has been
demanded.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment: At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2),
add the following:
SEC. 1038. UNITED STATES POLICY ON HAITI.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
(1) the 1990 presidential election in Haiti was deemed to
be both free and democratic;
(2) a military coup toppled the duly elected government in
1991;
(3) the process to restore democratic rule in Haiti agreed
to at Governor's Island has stalled;
(4) the economic crisis in Haiti is worsening; and
(5) the people of Haiti are preparing in mass numbers to
leave their country to seek economic and political refuge
overseas.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress--
(1) that the United States should not undertake any
military action directed against the mainland of Haiti unless
the President first certifies to Congress that a clear and
present danger to citizens of the United States or United
States interests requires such action; and
(2) that the United States should work with the
Organization of American States and the United Nations--
(A) to establish a temporary safe haven on the Haitian
island of Ile de la Gonave for Haitian refugees escaping
economic and political hardship on the mainland of Haiti;
(B) to assist in providing humanitarian assistance and visa
processing for such refugees in such safe haven; and
(C) to assist the legitimate Haitian government in
establishing the long-term stability of democracy in Haiti.
Mr. DELLUMS (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 195,
noes 226, not voting 13, as follows:
[Roll No. 224]
AYES--195
Allard
Andrews (NJ)
Archer
Armey
Bachus (AL)
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Beilenson
Bentley
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Boucher
Brewster
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Castle
Clinger
Coble
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cooper
Coppersmith
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Danner
Darden
Deal
DeLay
Dickey
Dingell
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Emerson
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Fish
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Gallegly
Gallo
Gekas
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Grams
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hayes
Hefley
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, Sam
Kasich
Kim
King
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kyl
Lazio
Leach
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Lucas
Machtley
Manzullo
McCandless
McCollum
McCrery
McCurdy
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
McNulty
Meyers
Michel
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moorhead
Morella
Myers
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Paxon
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Ramstad
Ravenel
Regula
Ridge
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Roth
Roukema
Rowland
Santorum
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stump
Talent
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Torkildsen
Upton
Valentine
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Weldon
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOES--226
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (TX)
Applegate
Bacchus (FL)
Barca
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Blackwell
Bonior
Borski
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Byrne
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Chapman
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
de la Garza
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dixon
Dooley
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Fingerhut
Flake
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Glickman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hochbrueckner
Holden
Hoyer
Hughes
Hutto
Inslee
Jacobs
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klink
Kreidler
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Laughlin
Lehman
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Long
Lowey
Maloney
Mann
Manton
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCloskey
McDermott
McHale
McKinney
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Mica
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Murphy
Murtha
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Neal (NC)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Pickle
Pomeroy
Poshard
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Roemer
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Schenk
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Shepherd
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stupak
Swett
Swift
Synar
Taylor (MS)
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torres
Torricelli
Traficant
Unsoeld
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Wheat
Whitten
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOT VOTING--13
Collins (MI)
Foglietta
Grandy
Huffington
Jefferson
Klein
Kopetski
Royce
Slattery
Sundquist
Towns
Tucker
Washington
{time} 1525
Ms. MARGOLIES-MEZVINSKY changed her vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. BAESLER changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The question is on the
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended,
was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
motion to recommit offered by mr. michel
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit with
instructions
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. MICHEL. I am in its present form, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Michel moves to recommit the bill H.R. 4301 to the
Committee on Armed Services with instructions to report the
same back to the House forthwith with the following
amendment:
At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the
following new section:
SEC. . LIMITATION ON PLACING UNITED STATES FORCES UNDER
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF A FOREIGN NATIONAL
ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
(a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsections (b) and
(c), funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the
Department of Defense may not be obligated or expended for
activities of any element of the Armed Forces that after the
date of the enactment of this Act is placed under the
operational control of a foreign national acting directly on
behalf of the United Nations for the purpose of international
peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar
activity that is authorized by the Security Council under
chapter VI or VII of the United Nations Charter.
(b) Exception for Presidential Certification.--(1)
Subsection (a) shall not apply in the case of a proposed
placement of United States Armed Forces under such
operational control if the President, not less than 15 days
before the date on which such operational control is to
become effective (or as provided in paragraph (2)), meets the
requirements of subsection (d).
(2) If the President certifies to Congress that an
emergency exists that precludes the President from meeting
the requirements of subsection (d) 15 days before placing
United States Armed Forces under such operational control,
the President may place such forces under such operational
control and meet the requirements of subsection (d) in a
timely manner, but in no event later than 48 hours after such
operational control becomes effective.
(c) Exception for Authorization by Law.--Subsection (a)
shall not apply in the case of a proposed placement of United
States Armed Forces under such operational control if the
Congress specifically authorizes by law placing United States
forces under such operational control.
(d) Presidential Certifications.--The requirements referred
to in subsection (b)(1) are that the President submit to
Congress the following:
(1) Certification by the President that--
(A) such an operational control arrangement is necessary to
protect national security interests of the United States;
(B) the commander of any unit of the Armed Forces proposed
for placement under the operational control of a foreign
national acting directly on behalf of the United Nations will
at all times retain the right--
(i) to report independently to superior United States
military authorities; and
(ii) to decline to comply with orders judged by the
commander to be illegal, militarily imprudent, or beyond the
mandate of the mission to which the United States agreed with
the United Nations, until such time as that commander
receives direction from superior United States military
authorities with respect to the orders that the commander has
declined to comply with; and
(C) the United States will retain the authority to withdraw
United States Armed Forces from the proposed operation at any
time and to take any action it considers necessary to protect
those forces if they are engaged.
(2) A report setting forth the following:
(A) A description of the national security interest that
requires the placement of United States forces under the
operational control of a foreign national acting directly on
behalf of the United Nations.
(B) The mission of the United States forces involved.
(C) The expected size and composition of the United States
forces involved.
(D) The incremental cost to the United States of
participation in the United Nations operation by the United
States forces which are proposed to be placed under the
operational control of a foreign national.
(E) The precise command and control relationship between
the United States forces involved and the United Nations
command structure.
(F) The precise command and control relationship between
the United States forces involved and the commander of the
United States unified command for the region in which those
United States forces are to operate.
(G) The extent to which the United States forces involved
will rely on non-United States forces for security and self-
defense and an assessment on the ability of those non-United
States forces to provide adequate security to the United
States forces involved.
(H) The timetable for complete withdrawal of the United
States forces involved.
(e) Classification of Report.--A report under subsection
(c) shall be submitted in unclassified form and, if
necessary, in classified form.
(f) Exception for Small Forces.--This section does not
apply in a case in which fewer than 100 members of the Armed
Forces are participating in a particular United Nations
operation or activity.
(g) Exception for Ongoing Operation.--This section does not
apply in the case of activities of the Armed Forces in
Macedonia pursuant to United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 795, adopted December 11, 1992, and 842, adopted
June 18, 1993, as part of the United Nations force designated
as the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).
(h) Interpretation.--Nothing in this section may be
construed as authority for the President to use United States
Armed Forces in any operation or as authority for the
President to place elements of the Armed Forces under the
operational control of a foreign national.
Mr. MICHEL (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent
that the motion to recommit be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Illinois?
There was no objection.
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, my motion to recommit this defense
authorization bill with instructions would establish limits on the
subordination of U.S. Armed Forces to the operational control of a
foreign national acting on behalf of the United Nations.
The limits embodied in this amendment would be in effect unless:
No. 1, the President certifies to Congress the necessity of such
command and control arrangement in order to protect U.S. national
security interests or;
No. 2, Congress specifically authorizes such a command and control
arrangement.
Mr. Speaker, the amendment would also require a report detailing the
planned circumstances for such command and control.
Let me try to put this in some context, if I might.
Last year the House narrowly rejected a similar amendment. The
argument at that time was that the amendment was premature and the
issue was still under discussion in the administration.
Now the issue is no longer academic. A few weeks ago, President
Clinton signed presidential decision directive 25 explicitly embracing
the placement of U.S. forces under foreign operational control.
This amendment does not overturn such a policy but places prudent
limits on it.
I think this command and control question is appropriate because at
the heart of our defense authorization bill is a larger question for
our country:
Does the administration's defense budget give us command and control
over our Nation's destiny in the world?
I personally have come to the reluctant and troubling conclusion that
the answer is no.
The level and quality of defense provided in this bill is not
credible when matched against the challenges our Armed Forces might
face.
{time} 1530
And history teaches us that a loss of credibility in the field of
national security policy can be a prelude to the loss of lives on the
field of battle. Inadequate resources in combination with inconsistent
foreign policies and divided by confusion about peacekeeping operations
are an equation for disaster.
U.S. forces have historically fought alongside forces of friendly
nations in many battles. The D-day celebration reminded us of this
fact: British, French, Canadian, and other troops contributed to our
total victory. But when our men and women are killed on the
battlefield, they do not die in the service of the United Nations, as
one high-level administration official put it earlier this year.
They die in the service of the United States of America. Now, this is
not just a semantic difference. It is a real difference. It is the
difference between clear principles of American interests and values
and vague rhetoric about multilateralism.
Questions about the national security of the United States and the
direction of our Armed Forces in the field cannot be adequately
addressed with earnest rhetoric, good intentions, or policy papers.
That is why this amendment by way of the motion to recommit with
instructions is so necessary.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues in the House to vote yes on the
motion. A yes vote will be seen at home and around the world as an
unmistakable sign that the United States will definitely retain command
and control of our troops except in circumstances and under guidelines
outlined in this amendment, and perhaps it will be the beginning of the
road back to a national security policy emphasizing our Nation's
interests and values sustained by sufficient resources and truly
commanded and controlled by our Nation's leaders.
Again, I would urge my colleagues to vote to recommit this bill and
report it back forthwith with the amendment that I have outlined in my
motion.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion.
Mr. Speaker and Members of the House, this motion to recommit was
offered last year and defeated.
Last year I rose in opposition to the motion suggesting to my
colleagues that the substantive nature of the policy contained in the
motion to recommit was so extraordinarily important with such
incredible potential implications down the road that we should not
embrace the policy of a 10-minute debate on a motion to recommit. We
said, rather, let the committee of jurisdiction look at this issue
substantively and at some point in the future attempt to bring back to
this body some policy recommendations with respect to the substantive
nature of what is involved in the motion to recommit.
I would say to you, Mr. Speaker and Members of this body, that the
Committee on Armed Services has, indeed, begun to look at this issue.
Witnesses have talked back with us on this issue. But we have been
placed on an incredibly fast track to bring this bill to the floor
before Memorial Day, something never done in the 20-some years this
gentleman has been in the House.
The time constraints and the pressure on this committee, with all of
the full range of issues that we are dealing with, were so
extraordinary that we have not had an opportunity to walk substantively
through the total implications. We have not come to any resolution on
this significant issue.
We are in a post-cold-war environment. As I have said earlier, there
are no post-cold-war experts. We are all bumping our heads against a
new reality.
You cannot just willy-nilly step out here making policy statements
without having some carefully considered rationale for why you are
taking those positions and what the implications are all about.
I continue to ask you, my colleagues, to reject this motion to
recommit. Allow us to address this issue. We promise you continued
hearings and some kind of effort that will ultimately lead toward a
policy decision with respect to this significant issue.
I have talked with the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton], and in
a moment I will yield to him for the purposes of underscoring what I
have said about a commitment to do just that.
But let me, for these few moments, read at least in part a letter
signed by General Shalikashvili, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
Secretary of Defense, Mr. Perry, written to me:
We have serious concerns about the amendment offered to the
National Defense Authorization Act severely limiting the
operational effectiveness of U.S. armed forces when engaged
with other forces in a U.N. operation.
Americans frequently have served and are serving today
under foreign operational control. In NATO and in Korea,
American military personnel serve under allied commanders
every day. Military leaders view unity of command as a
fundamental issue. It is an essential ingredient in achieving
victory at an acceptable cost.
During Operation Desert Storm an entire brigade of the 82nd
Airborne Division was under French operational control. This
arrangement improved the efficiency of combat operations and
helped reduce American casualties,
an important issue, Mr. Speaker.
Certainly, we support the concept that U.S. forces must
serve under the ablest commanders, but with clear and
effective command-and-control arrangements in place. However,
we disagree with the inference of the proposed amendment that
foreign commanders in U.N. operations cannot effectively
operate American forces when the President decides it is
appropriate to make such arrangements.
Our military officers are not about to recommend to the
Nation's leaders that troops be placed under a commander who
lacks military skills, competence, and judgment.
The language of the amendment seems to assume otherwise.
The letter goes on, but I would finally conclude, ``In sum, we
believe this proposed legislation is ill-advised and potentially
harmful to the execution of military operations.
``We urge that the House of Representatives not approve this
legislation.'' It is signed by the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.
Mr. Speaker, I yield briefly to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr.
Skelton], the subcommittee chair who deals with personnel issues.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I wish to reiterate what the chairman said.
This whole area involving United Nations or peacekeeping issues is
far more complicated and complex than the issue allows it to be.
This amendment does not differentiate between chapter 6,
peacekeeping; chapter 7, peacemaking; or combat. We intend to have
hearings, extensive hearings, on this very difficult and complex issue,
and hopefully we will have excellent legislation to put forward in next
year's bill.
We are rushing to judgment, and we might very well make a mistake if
this is adopted.
Mr. DELLUMS Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to defeat the motion to
recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). Without objection, the
previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 185,
nays 237, not voting 12, as follows:
[Roll No. 225]
YEAS--185
Allard
Applegate
Archer
Armey
Bachus (AL)
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Bentley
Bereuter
Bilirakis
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Brewster
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Castle
Clinger
Coble
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cooper
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Emerson
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Fish
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Gallegly
Gallo
Gekas
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Grams
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hefley
Herger
Hoagland
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Houghton
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Istook
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Kasich
Kim
King
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kyl
Lazio
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
Lucas
Machtley
Manzullo
McCandless
McCollum
McCrery
McCurdy
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
McNulty
Meyers
Mica
Michel
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moorhead
Morella
Myers
Nussle
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Paxon
Petri
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Ramstad
Ravenel
Regula
Ridge
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Santorum
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Torkildsen
Traficant
Upton
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Weldon
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NAYS--237
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (NJ)
Andrews (TX)
Bacchus (FL)
Baesler
Barca
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Berman
Bevill
Bilbray
Bishop
Blackwell
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Byrne
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Chapman
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Collins (IL)
Condit
Conyers
Coppersmith
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
Darden
de la Garza
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Dooley
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Fingerhut
Flake
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Glickman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings
Hayes
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hochbrueckner
Holden
Hoyer
Hughes
Hutto
Inslee
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klein
Klink
Kreidler
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Laughlin
Leach
Lehman
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lloyd
Long
Lowey
Maloney
Mann
Manton
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCloskey
McDermott
McHale
McKinney
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Murphy
Murtha
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Neal (NC)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pickle
Pomeroy
Poshard
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Roemer
Rose
Rostenkowski
Rowland
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Schenk
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Shepherd
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Spratt
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stupak
Swett
Swift
Synar
Tanner
Taylor (MS)
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torres
Torricelli
Unsoeld
Valentine
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Wheat
Whitten
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOT VOTING--12
Collins (MI)
Foglietta
Grandy
Huffington
Jefferson
Kopetski
Royce
Slattery
Sundquist
Towns
Tucker
Washington
{time} 1559
Mr. PORTER and Mr. BREWSTER changed their vote from ``nay'' to
``yea.''
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, first, I want to commend Chairman Dellums
for his commitment to fairness, a commitment that has truly allowed
bipartisanship to work during our deliberations on the Armed Services
Committee--I have no complaints about the process.
As I said at the outset of House consideration of this bill, it is
not a bad bill if you are able to consider it in isolation from the
broader context of the President's dramatic reductions in the defense
budget. This bill contains many provisions that I support such as: A
full 2.6 percent pay raise instead of the President's proposal of only
1.6 percent. A readjustment next fiscal year of the schedule on which
military retirees receive their COLA's to make it consistent with other
Federal civilian retirees. An explicit prohibition against the
administration's proposal to use the defense budget to fund billions of
dollars worth of United Nations peacekeeping costs.
Unfortunately, the broader context of President Clinton's 6-year plan
to cut defense by $156 billion outweighs and overwhelms any specific
provisions of the bill. Of these $156 billion in cuts, only 10 percent
have actually been enacted and the bill before us represents only an
additional 10 percent. When you consider all of the people,
modernization, infrastructure and general readiness problems we are
beginning to encounter after less than 20 percent of the Clinton cuts
have been acted on, how can the services possibly absorb the remaining
80 percent--approximately $126 billion--in the next 4 years and not
self-destruct?
As I have said on many occasions, I believe that the President's
defense cuts, following on the heels of a steady decline in defense
spending since the mid-1980's, ignore the lessons of our sorry history
of post-conflict demobilization this century and will once again cause
irreparable harm to our national and our economic security.
Specific provisions notwithstanding, the bottom line is that this
bill is an endorsement of the President's agenda to dramatically reduce
the defense budget. It represents another step down a road I believe is
fundamentally at odds with the ability of the United States to protect
and promote its national interests in the post-cold war world. After
weighing the many specifics I support versus the broader context of the
Clinton defense plan which I oppose, I am unable, in good conscience,
to support final passage of this bill and will therefore, reluctantly
vote ``no.''
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The question is on the passage
of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 260,
noes 158, not voting 16, as follows:
[Roll No. 226]
AYES--260
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (NJ)
Andrews (TX)
Applegate
Bacchus (FL)
Baesler
Barlow
Bateman
Becerra
Beilenson
Berman
Bevill
Bilbray
Bishop
Blackwell
Bliley
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Byrne
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Castle
Chapman
Clay
Clement
Clyburn
Coleman
Condit
Conyers
Cooper
Coppersmith
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
Darden
de la Garza
Deal
DeLauro
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Dooley
Durbin
Edwards (TX)
Emerson
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Fingerhut
Flake
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Fowler
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gallegly
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gilman
Glickman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Harman
Hastings
Hayes
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hobson
Hochbrueckner
Holden
Horn
Houghton
Hoyer
Hughes
Hutto
Inslee
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Kanjorski
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klein
Klink
Kreidler
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Laughlin
Lazio
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lloyd
Long
Lowey
Machtley
Mann
Manton
Manzullo
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCloskey
McCurdy
McDade
McDermott
McHale
McKinney
McMillan
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Morella
Murphy
Murtha
Neal (MA)
Neal (NC)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pickle
Pomeroy
Porter
Poshard
Price (NC)
Quillen
Quinn
Rahall
Rangel
Ravenel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Ridge
Roemer
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Rostenkowski
Rowland
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sangmeister
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Schenk
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Shepherd
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Smith (NJ)
Snowe
Spratt
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Stupak
Swett
Swift
Synar
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Tejeda
Thomas (CA)
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torres
Torricelli
Traficant
Unsoeld
Upton
Valentine
Velazquez
Visclosky
Volkmer
Waters
Watt
Weldon
Wheat
Whitten
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wynn
Yates
NOES--158
Allard
Archer
Armey
Bachus (AL)
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barca
Barcia
Barrett (NE)
Barrett (WI)
Bartlett
Barton
Bentley
Bereuter
Bilirakis
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Clinger
Coble
Collins (GA)
Collins (IL)
Combest
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
DeFazio
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Edwards (CA)
Ehlers
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Fish
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Gallo
Gekas
Gillmor
Gingrich
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Grams
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hefley
Herger
Hoekstra
Hoke
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Istook
Johnson, Sam
Johnston
Kasich
Kim
King
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kyl
Leach
Levy
Lewis (FL)
Lewis (KY)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
Lucas
Maloney
Margolies-Mezvinsky
McCandless
McCollum
McCrery
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
Meyers
Mica
Michel
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moorhead
Myers
Nadler
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Paxon
Petri
Pombo
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Ramstad
Regula
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Roth
Roukema
Sanders
Santorum
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shays
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Solomon
Spence
Stark
Stearns
Stump
Talent
Taylor (NC)
Thomas (WY)
Torkildsen
Vento
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Waxman
Wolf
Wyden
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOT VOTING--16
Clayton
Collins (MI)
Foglietta
Grandy
Huffington
Jefferson
Kaptur
Kopetski
Lehman
Royce
Slattery
Strickland
Sundquist
Towns
Tucker
Washington
{time} 1618
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The title of the bill was amended so as to read: ``A bill to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for military activities
of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for
defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel
strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other
purposes.''
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________