[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 71 (Thursday, June 9, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 9, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                          PERSONAL EXPLANATION

  Mr. PORTMAN. Mr. Chairman, I missed today's vote on the McCloskey-
Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment. Had I been in attendance, I would have 
voted ``aye.''
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment 
No. 2 printed in part 3 of House Report 103-520.


                   amendment offered by mr. hamilton

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Hamilton: Page 308, after line 24, 
     add the following:

                       TITLE XII--PEACE IN BOSNIA

     SEC. 1201. PURPOSE OF UNITED STATES EFFORTS.

       The focus of United States bilateral and multilateral 
     economic, political, military, and diplomatic efforts should 
     be to move all parties toward a negotiated peaceful 
     settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina that 
     provides for a viable Bosnian state.

     SEC. 1202. MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE DEFENSE OF BOSNIA.

       (a) Renewed and Additional United Nations and Allied 
     Actions.--The President, working with the North Atlantic 
     Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations Security 
     Council and pursuant to the Security Council's authority to 
     adopt measures for the maintenance and restoration of 
     international peace and security, should take such steps as 
     are necessary to enhance the ability of the people of Bosnia 
     to contribute effectively to their defense, including by--
       (1) continued collective enforcement actions carried out in 
     connection with NATO; and
       (2) securing additional authorization to enhance Bosnian 
     self-defense, which may include suspension of, or a limited 
     exception to, the international arms embargo with respect to 
     Bosnia-Herzegovina.
       (b) Consultations.--After consulting with permanent members 
     of the United Nations Security Council on the status of 
     current NATO and United Nations efforts to achieve the 
     purposes described in section 1201 and further measures that 
     might be taken to achieve these purposes, the President 
     should:
       (1) advise the Congress on the measures taken by the United 
     Nations Security Council to maintain international peace and 
     security within the meaning of Article 51 of the United 
     Nations Charter with respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina; and
       (2) consult with the Congress on the further actions that 
     would be useful to address the serious situation prevailing 
     in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of Tuesday, May 24, 
1994, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] will be recognized for 
30 minutes, and a Member opposed will be recognized for 30 minutes.
  The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] is opposed to the 
amendment, and will be recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, the House has just adopted the McCloskey 
amendment, which lifts the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally. The 
question now rises on the Hamilton amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, let us be very clear with respect to the procedure 
here. We are operating under the king of the hill procedure. If my 
amendment is adopted, it, of course, prevails. If it is defeated, then 
we go back to the McCloskey amendment.
  Madam Chairman, I say to my colleagues who voted for the McCloskey 
amendment, and who favor lifting the embargo, that my amendment 
provides a better way to do it. We can accomplish the goal without the 
negative impacts of the McCloskey amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, if we are serious about helping the Bosnian cause, if 
we are serious about lifting the arms embargo and helping the Bosnian 
Moslems defend themselves, we should do it multilaterally in the 
context of the United Nations, and with, not against, our NATO allies.
  My amendment leaves open the option, Madam Chairman, of lifting the 
arms embargo, but it also recognizes the critical need to work 
multilaterally with our allies and with the Russians in order to 
achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict.
  My amendment is very clear that the focus of U.S. policy should be to 
move the parties toward a negotiated settlement, and not toward war. 
The approach that I propose in this amendment I think has several 
advantages over the McCloskey amendment.
  First of all, the Hamilton amendment helps the peace process, it does 
not torpedo it, since all of the major parties to the peace process 
would have to approve lifting the arms embargo.
  We have heard again and again from the President and from all of his 
top advisers and all of our people who have been involved in the 
negotiations that lifting this embargo unilaterally will undercut, will 
destroy the peace process at the very point when this peace process is 
making progress. Admittedly, it is fragile, but progress is being made.
  The Hamilton amendment will assure that humanitarian aid goes 
forward. We have had a lot of problems in Bosnia, and humanitarian aid 
has not always flowed smoothly, but the fact of the matter is that two 
out of three Bosnians today depend on that humanitarian aid.
  Mr. Chairman unilaterally lifting the embargo means that the French 
and the British and probably the Canadians will pull their troops out. 
The humanitarian effort will come to an end. We will have to take 
responsibility for it. The advantage of my amendment is that it ensures 
that humanitarian aid continues.

  If the United States unilaterally lifts the embargo, as we voted a 
moment ago, the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia will surely collapse. The 
Hamilton amendment builds on the work that has been done with our 
allies in NATO, and it has been a tough, tortuous path, I have to 
acknowledge that, but it builds on the relationship we have created 
with Russia, moving toward a peace settlement.
  Unilaterally lifting that embargo will damage our relations with key 
allies a crucial time. The advantage of my amendment is that we 
continue to work with our allies.
  Does anybody believe that we are going to solve the problem in Bosnia 
unilaterally? Does anybody believe that we are going to solve the 
problem in Bosnia today without our European allies? Does anybody 
believe we can solve the problems in Bosnia today without the help of 
the Russians who are so close to the Serbs? I think not.
  Madam Chairman, the Hamilton amendment will also have the advantage 
of ensuring that all current U.N. sanctions will remain in effect. If 
we go back to the McCloskey amendment, all of those sanctions against 
Libya, against Iraq, the sanctions against Haiti, the sanctions now in 
place against Serbia, the sanctions that may become in place in North 
Korea will be jeopardized.
  My amendment will protect all current U.N. sanctions, and the 
sanctions I have recited, I think all in this room would agree are very 
much in the American national interest.

                              {time}  1310

  The Hamilton amendment will assure that we do not suddenly and 
without careful debate involve the United States in a massive new 
foreign aid program. The McCloskey amendment provides for an open-
ended, very large military program of foreign assistance. My amendment 
does not have that. Their amendment is a down payment on a new military 
aid program which our Department of Defense says would go to at least 
$3 billion and would require 1,400 to 1,500 to 2,500 American personnel 
in Bosnia. If we vote for the Hamilton amendment, we are voting for the 
best opportunity to end this war that we have had for 3 years. I know 
it is delicate, I know it is fragile, but we have the best chance to 
stop the killing.
  My friends on the other side of this question like to take the moral 
high ground, and I have not the slightest doubt that they are acting 
from the very best of motivations. But I am unwilling to concede the 
moral high ground to them. We are trying to stop the killing. That is 
what we are trying to do. Surely that is moral, is it not? All people 
say that if we lift this embargo, we are going to intensify the war, 
and by intensifying the war, that is another way of saying we are going 
to be killing a lot more people. I do not concede the moral high 
ground. This peace process is moving forward. Agreement has just been 
reached on a month-long cease-fire. We hope it will lead to a more 
durable cease-fire. We all know that we are at a very critical point.
  The choice we have before us, then, remains very stark. Allowing the 
McCloskey amendment to stand is going to be a signal from this Congress 
that we want the war to go forward. Adopting the Hamilton amendment 
will say that we want a negotiated peace.
  I urge my colleagues with one of the most important foreign policy 
votes of this session surely, I urge my colleagues to take a very 
careful look at this, look at the impact the McCloskey amendment would 
have on the American national interest and vote, of course, according 
to their best judgment, and I hope that judgment will be a ringing 
``aye'' on the Hamilton amendment.
  Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Madam Chairman, I just fail to see what is moral about 
disarming one side in a combat. I have trouble rationalizing that.
  Madam Chairman, In our time we have seen the phrase ``ethnic 
cleansing'' enter the vocabulary of hate--a description even Hitler 
would have been proud of. Serbians have used rape on a massive scale as 
a cruel instrument of terror. In the surrounded enclave of Gorazde, the 
civilian population was subjected to relentless shelling by Serbian 
artillery which targeted the municipal hospital and the headquarters of 
humanitarian relief organizations, killing scores of innocent people.
  Bosnia's map is a constantly shifting mosaic of desperate enclaves--a 
land-locked archipelago that is home to the most beleaguered of 
humanity. Heavily armed Serb invaders continue to slaughter defenseless 
men, women, and children, without the slightest hesitation or remorse. 
It is a one-sided war that grinds on unmercifully.
  President Clinton argues that the United States cannot lift the 
embargo unilaterally, but must bow to the will of the U.N. Security 
Council, which remains immovable. Where is U.S. leadership? We are in a 
time of endless palaver, paralysis, indecision, and no follow-through.
  The President and his Secretary of State have repeatedly stated that 
they favor lifting the arms embargo on bleeding and shell-shocked 
Bosnia. However, both cite U.N. Security Council resolutions as 
immovable obstacles to that end. I believe this is a fundamental 
misreading of the situation. In July 1991, our Government launched a 
policy of preventing the transfer of all weapons and related equipment 
to Yugoslavia. In January 1992, the U.N. Security Council adopted 
Resolution 727 applying the embargo to any successor States emerging 
from Yugoslavia. While these actions were designed to still the 
conflict, they instead denied arms to Bosnian Moslems facing already 
heavily armed Serbian--and later Croatian--aggressors. The ensuing 
slaughter goes on, unabated.
  It seems, under this administration, we are losing--or have already 
lost--the capability and the inclination to form our own U.S. foreign 
policy, and instead have become an element--a mere element--of U.N. 
policy.
  This subservience was made shockingly clear when 15 Americans died 
from friendly fire over Iraq this April and the Vice President offered 
his condolences to ``the families of those who died in the service of 
the United Nations.''
  The United Nations indeed. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter 
acknowledges every country's inherent right of self-defense. To deny 
Bosnia that right is immoral and a failure of leadership on our part. 
If defending yourself is only just, we are now obstructing justice by 
keeping in place this immoral embargo.
  We cannot call ourselves the leader of the free world with a straight 
face any more.
  We see unspeakable inhumanity and we are reduced to shrugging our 
shoulders, furrowing our brows, and folding our arms. This embargo must 
be lifted. We cannot let timid and paralyzed nations and self-important 
U.N. bureaucrats prevent us from doing what we know is both right, and 
in our own self-interest.
  Lifting the embargo will also reduce the likelihood that American 
military personnel will be called upon to risk their lives in Bosnia. 
Let Bosnians defend Bosnia rather than putting our military forces into 
the fray under the control of incompetent U.N. bureaucrats, as this 
administration seems eager to do.
  The Hamilton amendment is entitled ``Peace in Bosnia.'' It states 
that the purpose of all United States efforts in Bosnia should be to 
support a ``negotiated peaceful settlement of the conflict.'' But, the 
only peace it offers is the peace of the graveyard. It provides not one 
incentive to the Serbs to negotiate seriously a just settlement of the 
conflict. Instead, it calls for more of the same: consultations with 
the U.N. Security Council and, oh yes, negotiations. It tacitly 
endorses the Clinton administration's strategy to pressure the Bosnian 
Government to accept the dismemberment of its country. Peace at any 
price is more than the Bosnian Government is willing to accept, and we 
ought to reject it too.
  The Hamilton amendment is not a ringing endorsement of freedom and 
the right of self-defense--it is an invitation to high tea at the 
United Nations. Let us send our regrets. Support McClosky-Gilman-
Bonior-Hoyer and reject Hamilton.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Johnston], the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Africa.
  Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Madam Chairman, I appear here in somewhat of 
an ambivalent position because I feel the embargo should be lifted but 
I do not think it should be lifted unilaterally, and I have expressed 
my opinions in the past to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey], 
and my frustration of what is going on in this country.
  The Europeans told us 3 years ago that Yugoslavia was a European 
matter and that we should stay out of it. Then, when I went to the NATO 
conference 1\1/2\ years ago, they said, ``Why aren't you invading?'' We 
cannot do this unless we are willing to assume the sole responsibility 
for the events in Bosnia, the United States. We cannot do this unless 
we are willing to abandon our European allies that are there.
  How can the President appear before the French Parliament and say, 
``Please keep your forces there,'' and then the next day for us to 
unilaterally pull out from the embargo and go in there and jeopardize 
all these people's lives? We cannot do this unless we are willing to 
threaten the viability of international sanctions, as the chairman 
said, on Haiti, on Iraq, and in 2 weeks probably the President will go 
to the United Nations and say we should have an international embargo 
on North Korea, and they turn around and say, how can we unilaterally 
pull out of the sanctions on this country of Bosnia?

                              {time}  1320

  You cannot do this unless you are willing to unilaterally remove 
yourself from leadership that brought us the gulf war victory. Unless 
we are willing to risk all of these things, we must act in a 
multilateral basis. We must support the Hamilton amendment.
  The United States is legally bound, now, listen to this, by the 
United Nations Charter, article 25, approved by international treaty 
and approved by the U.S. Senate, to support and enforce U.N. Security 
Council resolutions. Are we ready to abandon the foundation for all 
multilateral sanctions? Are we ready to abandon multilateral leadership 
and be the sole policeman of the world?
  These are the things that are at stake.
  I am frustrated, as I said earlier. But I think that this is a 
serious mistake legally and in the international community to 
unilaterally pull out of this. We must support the Hamilton amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Gilman].
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Madam Chairman, the House has just taken a courageous 
step. We have voted to do something about the aggression and genocide 
in Bosnia by unilaterally ending the arms embargo of that country.
  Now the House is being invited by Mr. Hamilton essentially to reverse 
itself.
  The Hamilton amendment is instant oatmeal. Members now are being 
asked to take back the vote they have just cast and vote against ending 
the embargo, by voting for another amendment that pretends to do 
something about the arms embargo but which in fact is designed to keep 
the embargo in place.
  Under the king-of-the-hill procedure contained in the rule, a vote 
for the Hamilton substitute is a vote to supersede the just-passed 
McCloskey-Gilman amendment. Unlike the McCloskey-Gilman amendment, 
which ends the arms embargo once and for all, the Hamilton substitute 
says only that the President should talk to the United Nations about 
ending the embargo.
  I submit, the President has been doing just that for over a year and 
with nothing to show for it.
  Let there be no mistake about this: the Hamilton substitute keeps the 
arms embargo in place.
  If the House votes to approve the Hamilton amendment after having 
just passed the McCloskey-Gilman amendment, the House will have made a 
colossal flip-flop.
  The American people are watching. The victims of aggression and 
genocide in Bosnia are waiting. Let us not flip-flop. I urge my 
colleagues to stand by their prior vote and vote down the Hamilton 
substitute.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Mississippi [Mr. Taylor].
  Mr. TAYLOR of Mississippi. Madam Chairman, I hope that the Members 
with the many pursuits and the many requests on their time are taking 
the time to listen to this debate. Because I think it is one that has 
extremely far-reaching consequences.
  I have never been to Yugoslavia, nor have I been Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. But as a member of the Committee on Armed 
Services, I have had the opportunity to hear a former commander of U.N. 
troops in Yugoslavia and to visit personally with a former Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff of our Nation.
  A little over a year ago, a General MacKenzie, a Canadian in charge 
of NATO forces in Yugoslavia, came before the Committee on Armed 
Services and summed up his remarks by saying, ``Ladies and gentlemen, 
you have three serial killers. One has killed 15, one has killed 10, 
and one has killed 5, and I do not buy the argument that we need to 
rush in and save the one who has killed 5.'' That is a quote from 
General MacKenzie before the Committee on Armed Services.
  Later that year, based on those disturbing words, I cornered the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, when this same 
Congress a year and a half ago was considering military intervention in 
Yugoslavia. I said, ``General Powell, should we get involved militarily 
in the former Yugoslavia?'' Being the good general that he is, he 
dodged the question. So I repeated the question, because again, it is 
not his job to make foreign policy. After four attempts, Colin Powell, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, ``No. We should not get 
involved in the former Yugoslavia.''
  Ladies and gentlemen, Colin Powell may well be the standard-bearer 
for the minority party in 2 years for President. He was a great 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He did a wonderful job.
  He went on to say that there are 10 years' worth of weapons in the 
former Yugoslavia that are there right now with the embargo. There are 
plenty of weapons in the former Yugoslavia.
  Giving weapons to one side, taking sides as the chairman of the 
Committee on Armed Services has pointed out, putting American lives at 
risk is not going to help.
  Let me go one step further and say that I have heard a rumor on the 
House floor today that some people are supporting lifting the ban 
because they want to embarrass the administration. Let me, as the 
Democrat who has the worst voting record with this administration, say 
something, that I hope anyone who votes for this lifting of the ban in 
order to embarrass the administration, if one American life is lost, 
has the courage to go see the family of that service person who comes 
home in a body bag and say, ``I am sorry you lost your child, but I 
wanted to embarrass our President.'' That is no way to run our country. 
And those fine young men and women who serve our country right now who 
practice airdrops in the dark, who spend months at sea in submarines, 
they deserve better than that.
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. King].
  Mr. KING. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Madam Chairman, Members of this House, I rise in strong opposition to 
the Hamilton amendment.
  For the past 3 years Serbia has carried out brutal, naked aggression 
and genocide against the people of Bosnia, and tragically the West has 
done nothing.
  Indeed, if we look at it, it is almost a tragic replay of the 1930's 
when Hitler was taking the Rhineland, Austria, Sudetenland, finally 
Czechoslovakia, and in each instance, the world leaders, specifically 
Neville Chamberlain, would say, ``This is the last act of aggression. 
And besides, if we took any action, it would upset the peace process.'' 
The same argument is being made today.
  The fact is the peace process has not worked. The fact is that the 
innocent people of Bosnia are being decimated and destroyed by the 
Serbian war machine. We are doing nothing. Unfortunately, both the 
previous administration and this administration are sending out 
terribly mixed signals. On one day we will bomb, light bombing of 
Serbian installations. The next day the President says we are not 
taking sides.
  We should take sides, because this is a clear moral issue. If the 
United States is to stand for anything in the post-cold-war era, it 
should stand for standing up and resisting aggression.
  This amendment is titled ``Peace in Bosnia.'' It reminds me of the 
Roman historian Tacitus who said, ``They gave us a desert and called it 
peace.'' The Serbs are giving us a desert of war in Bosnia, and we are 
calling it peace.
  It is time to stand up for our principles. It is time for the United 
States to show leadership. It is time to send a message to the world we 
will no longer allow aggression to go unchecked.
  The only action the West has taken is to deny weapons to those who 
are under attack themselves. How can this ever be justified morally? No 
wonder the leaders in Korea do not take us seriously when they see what 
a mixed message we are sending.
  I would just ask all of my colleagues who voted for the McCloskey 
amendment to vote ``no'' on the Hamilton amendment. If you do not, you 
will be sending the same mixed and confusing signal that this 
administration has been sending day after day.
  Madam Chairman, I ask my colleagues to vote ``no.''
  Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Madam Chairman, on behalf of the committee 
chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana 
[Mr. Roemer].
  (Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. ROEMER. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of the Hamilton 
amendment for three reasons.
  But I also have a great deal of respect for the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. McCloskey], who has been so knowledgeable and has so much 
passion on this issue and has visited the country so many times.
  I support the resolution offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. 
Hamilton] for three reasons. First of all, Madam Chairman, we have been 
celebrating for the past 2 weeks Normandy and D-day, and we have read 
and we have heard about Juno and Sword beaches, of Utah and Omaha.

                              {time}  1330

  That was leadership, ladies and gentlemen, United States leadership 
with our allies, the Canadians and the British. That was the consummate 
definition of leadership; not doing it alone, but leading others, 
compelling others to be involved in the liberation of a continent.
  So I think when we talk about leadership, we do not just talk about 
unilateral leadership, we talk about multilateral leadership and 
alliances and convincing others on the merits to get involved.
  Second, timing: We have a historic agreement between the warring 
parties. Will it hold? There are no assurances that it will hold, we 
are not certain that it is going to hold, but if we are as cynical, as 
skeptical about the Middle East or South Africa, then we would not have 
seen some of the miracle that has occurred, especially in South Africa, 
if we had been so skeptical about what might happen in that country.
  Third, I think when we have heard from so many on the Republican side 
about micromanagement, about telling the President he must do A, B, C, 
especially under President Bush, I think it is only fair to apply the 
same standard here and not tie President Clinton's hands in this 
manner.
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].
  (Mr. McCURDY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. McCURDY. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Hamilton amendment.
  For 3 years we have pretended that the war in Bosnia is a civil war, 
rather than a war of Serb aggression.
  For 3 years we have pretended that negotiations would bring an end to 
that aggression.
  For 3 years we have somehow persuaded ourselves that we should deny 
arms to the Bosnian Government even as its people were systematically 
massacred and driven from their land.
  It is time to end the charade that is our Bosnia policy.
  For me, the issue we face today is a simple one. The embargo is 
wrong. It was wrong when it entered into force. It is wrong today.
  As long as we continue to abide by this embargo, we insult the 
principle that is the very cradle of our Nation: The principle that, if 
it so decides, a people has the right to declare independence and build 
for itself a new future, a sovereign future, a future on its own terms 
and according to its own values.
  Our forefathers invoked this principle over 200 years ago to justify 
the independence of the young United States.
  The brave Bosnian people are desperately attempting to invoke that 
same principle today.
  And the question for us is simple: Will we stand for them, or against 
them?
  Our history, our values, our consciences allow only one answer. Vote 
against the Hamilton amendment.
  Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Madam Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to 
the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
  Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Madam Chairman, I would like to engage the Chair in a colloquy.
  I am concerned that the language of section 1202 of the gentleman's 
amendment might imply a war powers authorization to the President for 
the use of United States military force in Bosnia. I would like for the 
gentleman to clarify that issue.
  Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Madam Chairman, will the distinguished 
gentleman yield?
  Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
  Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I 
thank the distinguished chairman for his inquiry.
  It is not my intention in offering the amendment to imply any war 
power authorization for United States military force to act in Bosnia. 
This subsection of the amendment would only have the Congress advise 
the President that he should continue to work with the United Nations 
and with NATO on collective measures to achieve our policy goals on 
Bosnia.
  Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for that clarification.
  Madam Chairman, with that clarification, I would like to make a few 
points. First, as I understand the Hamilton amendment, it calls upon 
the President to work multilaterally to find a peacefully negotiated 
solution. I read this amendment, as provided in section 1, that the 
clear policy of the U.S. Government is to seek a peaceful negotiated 
settlement. This is why I can support the amendment, especially in 
light of the colloquy I have just had with my distinguished colleague.
  In the current environment, where a cease-fire negotiation has 
progressed to achieve a 1-month cease-fire with the possibility of even 
a further extension of cease-fire, this would reiterate our commitment 
to seeking such solutions which are the only effective way, as I 
perceive it, to halt the bloodshed and to end the conflict.
  It takes steps in a multilateral concept that would meet our overall 
current policy and national security commitments. It preserves 
flexibility during a period of negotiation, it protects recent goals, 
and finally it requires congressional consultation in this matter.
  In the closing remarks, I would like to divert from just a specific 
consideration of the Hamilton amendment and say to all of my colleagues 
here that you delude yourselves when you believe that there is some 
midcourse that does not require a major commitment. If you want to end 
the killing and the dying, then whether I agree or not, at least I can 
respect the intellectual integrity of the position that says, ``We want 
to go into Bosnia to wage war.'' That is a legitimate position. I 
oppose it. I believe that we ought to aggressively go in and try to 
help wage peace, to bring them to the negotiating table.
  But, Madam Chair, you delude yourself when you believe that there is 
some way that you can, on a neutral basis, with clean hands, back into 
this situation. We should not be foolish or naive in that respect. 
Lifting the embargo is a commitment, but at least you ought to try to 
do it with your eyes open. But this midground that says we are neither 
fish nor fowl is bizarre in the extreme.
  If you want to go in and end the killing by more killing and war, 
that is one thing. That is one thing. If you want to end the killing 
peacefully, as this gentleman chooses to do, then you take that course. 
But this midrange, this sort of a political stance that says, ``I don't 
have any stains on my hands, that I can sort of neutrally walk through 
this and say that I am saving lives,'' does not make sense. At the end 
of the day, going down this road is a road to war.
  What the Hamilton amendment is attempting to do is to put at a 
minimum tying the international community's hands and say that it is 
the policy of this Nation to try to find a peaceful negotiated 
settlement. We are the last peg standing in the post-cold-war world. 
Our responsibility ought to be to achieve peace, not encourage war.
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Virginia [Mr. Moran].
  Mr. MORAN. I thank the distinguished gentleman.
  I would say to my respected colleague, the chairman of the Committee 
on Armed Services, that he deludes himself if he thinks that this 
Nation can maintain a pacifist stance in light of the unlawful 
aggression that we see in Bosnia. You delude yourself if you think that 
we can avoid having to take a position between right and wrong, having 
to stand up against--when we know that something is right, we have to 
stand up for our principle even if it involves risk.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Madam Chairman, as a matter of personal privilege, would 
the gentleman yield? The gentleman invoked this gentleman's name.
  Will the gentleman yield to me?
  Mr. MORAN. I did not invoke the gentleman's name, but I have some 
things to say, and I do not want to--I did listen for 15 minutes to the 
chairman.
  Mr. DELLUMS. This gentleman did not personalize the debate, either.
  Mr. MORAN. Well, go ahead, Mr. Chairman, I will ask for more time.
  Mr. DELLUMS. That is all right.
  I yield back to the gentleman. I am simply saying let us fight on the 
merits, not personal issues.
  Mr. MORAN. The chairman is quite correct, and I accept his remarks.
  Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. MORAN. But I will say to my colleagues that there will be a time 
throughout our history when we have to stand up and make a decision 
between what is right and wrong and when we have to take some risk.

                              {time}  1340

  Assuming a position of neutrality at a time of moral crisis is not a 
virtue, and we should be ashamed if we do not have the wherewithal and 
the will to stand up and take a position. Bosnia is fighting to 
maintain a multiethnic democracy. Two years ago, almost 25 months ago, 
Admiral Border recommended, when Dubrovnik was being shelled, that we 
sink the two war ships because this was pure unlawful aggression, and 
it would continue unless we take a stance, and the previous 
administration chose not to, and this is where we are today.
  Madam Chairman, if we continue to avoid conflict, avoid risk, avoid 
making a decision between right and wrong, we will be in worse shape 2 
years from now. Madam Chairman, the people listening to this should 
understand that Bosnia, while we have no immediate strategic interest, 
no particular economic interest, we have a principled interest.
  I ask my colleagues, ``Do you know what the Prime Minister of Bosnia 
is? Muslim, as is the majority of the country. But the representative 
of the Presidency is Serbian, the Speaker of the Parliament is 
Croatian, and the Bosnian Ambassador to the United States is Jewish.'' 
This is a multiethnic democracy trying to survive. They are besieged by 
unlawful aggression.
  The concept of a greater Serbia; we know it is wrong. We have to 
stand up for principle. Defeat the Hamilton amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Rohrabacher].
  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Madam Chairman, this body just voted to lift the 
embargo. This vote would undermine that moral stand. It is time to lift 
the immoral embargo that has led to the bloodshed and genocide of 
Croatians and Bosnian Moslems.
  Whose idea was this embargo in the first place? Does anyone really 
remember that? I remember whose idea it was. It was the Serbians' idea 
in the first place. We accepted an idea that was proposed by the 
Government of Yugoslavia when it was dominated by the Serbians, and now 
that they got their embargo, once they had it, once we put their idea 
into place, the tanks begin to roll, and the artillery begin to fire. 
The aggressor, by this embargo, was left with a total advantage in 
artillery and tanks.
  That advantage is what caused this situation to degenerate into 
genocide and to degenerate into the worst bloodletting and killing of 
noncombatants that we have seen in decades. Madam Chairman, it time to 
lift the immoral embargo. It is time for the United States to provide 
some leadership.
  They say that we will be doing this alone. Well, no, we will not be 
alone. We will be on the side of women and children and not combatants 
who now cannot defend themselves because we have put the victim and the 
aggressor in the same category. That is immoral. It is an immoral 
embargo; it is time to lift the immoral embargo.
  Madam Chairman, the United States has always stood, always stood, for 
principle. When we stand for this wishy-washy type of situation which 
we cannot take interest in, we are afraid to get involved, we will be 
dragged into this because what will happen is situations like this will 
be permitted to go from a situation of crisis into a catastrophe 
because innocent people are not permitted to have the weapons to defend 
themselves. If innocent people cannot defend themselves, eventually 
American troops will be dragged in.
  Madam Chairman, we should lift the immoral embargo and permit the 
victims to defend themselves. This is the American way.
  Mr. JOHNSTON of Florida. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the 
distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Houghton], a former member 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
  (Mr. HOUGHTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HOUGHTON. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
Johnston] for yielding this time to me.
  Madam Chairman, I hate to go against my leader over here, the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], but I am afraid I am going to 
have to, and also the gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] who, I am 
sure, will be very unhappy with what I am about to say, but I agree 
with the Hamilton amendment. I think it hits the issue headon and it 
does not put us all out there by ourselves. That is very, very 
important.
  There is a tremendous amount of frustration here. As my colleagues 
know, we see the killing going on, we want to lift the embargo, we do 
not want to sit on the sidelines, obviously we want to exert some 
leadership. But despite this frustration, Madam Chairman, we have got 
to recognize that an awful lot of people would like to throw this thing 
right in our lap and say, ``Go to it, U.S.A. You can handle it.'' And 
then where are we?
  Our first responsibility is to ourselves, and we realize we cannot do 
anything we want, although we may want it internally. I say to my 
colleagues, ``Once you decide to work with the allies, you have got to 
work with the allies because, if you don't, then when you need them, 
where are they?''
  So now the two sides have agreed. They are going to sit down 
tomorrow, and U.N. mediators are going to be able to try to work out a 
long-term peace.
  Now one can say, ``Well, we have had other agreements, and they have 
collapsed.'' Why? Because there have been no provisions for 
enforcement, but what is the alternative? Do we go it alone? Do we want 
to be out there by ourselves? Do we forget the embargo? Do we split the 
allies? Do we widen the conflict?
  Sadly, despite our strength and our basic feeling, a sort of Kennedy-
esque strength, wherever there is a right, we are going to correct that 
wrong.
  I say to my colleagues, ``Please let's be part of the world. Our 
heart says, `Let's vote down the Hamilton amendment.' Our head says, 
`Yes, support it,' and I will go with my head.''
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
New York [Ms. Molinari].
  Ms. MOLINARI. Madam Chairman, there has been some concern that, if 
the United States acts to unilaterally end the arms embargo, then other 
nations will lift sanctions against other countries such as Haiti, 
Iraq, Libya. We will not enforce sanctions against North Korea. Let us 
think about this for a minute.
  Haiti, Iran, Libya, Iraq, North Korea. Bosnia? What did Bosnia do to 
get sanctioned along with the rest of those criminal governments? My 
colleagues, they sought democracy, they sought freedom from communism, 
hardly a justifiable comparison of nations in our American response.
  ``Bosnia, trust the United Nations,'' says the Hamilton amendment 
this time. ``Forget the violated no fly zone; Bosnia, forget the 
violated ceasefires; Bosnia, forget the bombardment of the safe areas, 
forget the over 40 broken United Nations resolutions. This time trust 
the United Nations to defend you as you seek democracy.'' The Hamilton 
amendment would encourage us all to trust those same U.N. 
decisionmakers who over 15 months ago promised a war crimes tribunal 
and to date has not appointed a prosecutor or investigated one case of 
criminality, not one.
  I plead with my colleagues and say, ``If you are sickened by seeing 
footage of 6-year-old children being slaughtered as they sleep, or 72-
year-old women who are victims of rapes, and if you do not want to send 
American troops into Bosnia to end these atrocities, and you can no 
longer trust the United Nations to do the right thing, there is only 
one thing left. End the arms embargo. It is time for America to summon 
the courage to act, even, by God, if no one else in this world will.''
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Virginia [Mr. Wolf].
  (Mr. WOLF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  [Mr. WOLF addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in 
the Extensions of Remarks.]
  Mr. PETERSON of Florida. Madam Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to 
the distinguished gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Oberstar], a member of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
  Mr. OBERSTAR. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the time.
  Madam Chairman, I have studied and followed events in the former 
Yugoslavia and since the breakup probably all my life. I was raised 
Slovenian of an immigrant family in northern Minnesota. I know some of 
the language. I know a lot of the people and the peoples that live in 
the land of the South Slavs.
  There are bitter rivalries, ancient hatreds, a divisiveness built on 
a religious diversity, diversity in the way they write their language, 
diversity in the way they speak the language of the South Slavs, 
complexities of geography, and a history of suffering.
  We use the word, ``decimate,'' with somewhat reckless abandon, but in 
World War II the peoples of Yugoslavia were decimated. One million, 
seven hundred thousand of a population of 17 million died, most at the 
hands of the Germans but a very large number at the hands of internal 
war and conflict. What is going on today is an extension of conflicts 
that arose during World War II and that go back deep into ancient 
history.
  Our role has been kind of a stop-and-start role. We have not managed 
the policy of post-Tito Yugoslavia and the South Slav peoples very 
well. One thing we did that was effective was to commit to air strikes. 
I was an early advocate of taking that action. This was not done when 
it should have been done back in the Bush administration, and it was 
not done when it should have been done in this administration, but when 
it was done, it was effective.

  This embargo and the conflict over Bosnia were centered around the 
reality that in Tito's Yugoslavia was the arms production center of 
Yugoslavia and the Serbs wanted to get hold of the arms production 
area, and the reason the conflict has continued as long as it has is 
that the Bosnians learned how and knew how to make arms and are still 
doing it, and they have persisted.
  If we lift the embargo, more arms will pour into the Serbs, but the 
real question is, where do the arms come from for the Bosnians, from 
Iraq, from outside sources, or from the United States? The whole burden 
then devolves upon the United States. We become the one that broke the 
embargo, and then it is our problem to resolve it.
  Are we prepared to send in ground forces? Not this body. I do not see 
the spine, I do not see the steel rod in the back here to send in 
ground forces. I do not see much of a steel rod or backbone in this 
body to send in air strikes either.
  So we must decide today whether we must keep the embargo in place and 
avoid sending troops in and keep America's commitment to other 
countries to act multilaterally rather than unilaterally.
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Madam Chairman, first, I think this body 
is out to vote against the Hamilton amendment because it would be very 
inconsistent with the vote we just cast for the McCloskey amendment, 
and we just ought as a matter of institutional policy to try to keep to 
an absolute minimum the number of times we really look silly. I know 
sometimes it is unavoidable, but I do not see why we would want to 
venture into it voluntarily, and there is simply no rational way to be 
for both positions.
  Second, I think the best way to get peace is in fact to offer the 
Bosnians a chance to buy arms. You do not break up a fight by grabbing 
one guy's arms. In fact, what we are trying to do here is bring peace.
  As long as there is an imbalance, the Serbs are more likely to 
persevere, and there is the argument that says, ``No, if you're for 
peace, you should never send one side arms.'' But let us think of a 
situation in which there is one side which we believe to be morally 
correct in a fight, one side which we think is threatened with 
aggression and where we decide that the best way to bring a secure 
peace is to sell arms. I am talking about Israel. The two models seems 
to be very similar. With regard to the Middle East, most of us believe 
that making American arms and other arms available to Israel has in 
fact meant less likelihood of war because potential aggressions were 
deterred by that armament.
  The Serbs have shown a healthy respect for arms on the other side. 
Despite what the Pentagon predicted, air strikes have been a deterrent 
to the Serbs. So will sending in weapons. The question is not whether 
there will be negotiations. Ultimately there will be. The question is, 
from what relative positions of strength will the two sides negotiate?
  The arms embargo gives the Serbs an unearned advantage. Lifting the 
arms embargo makes it much more likely first, that there will be 
negotiations right away, and second, that they will eventuate fairly.
  Madam Chairman, I believe that lifting a one-sided embargo--and this 
is a one-sided embargo because it affects only one side--lifting that 
is the best way to bring about peace.
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Horn].
  (Mr. HORN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HORN. Madam Chairman, I have great respect for the chairman of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, but I ask my colleagues to vote 
against his amendment.
  During this morning's briefing on Bosnia, I listened with close 
attention to the words of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the acting Secretary of State. I must 
confess that I had a definite feeling throughout that hour-long 
session. That feeling is one that many in the British Parliament must 
have felt when Prime Minister Chamberlain came back from meeting with 
Herr Hitler at Munich. It was a feeling of disgust.
  I want the Members to know that this is a bipartisan feeling of 
disgust, because I felt the same way during the Bush administration 
when that President--just as the current President--failed to take the 
initiative when we could have nipped a lot of this problem in the bud.
  Those who argue for multilateral removal of the arms embargo are 
telling us it will never be removed. It should be obvious to all that 
the Security Council of the United Nations will never remove that 
embargo. It is not going to be removed. If we pass the Hamilton 
amendment, we are signing the death warrant for Bosnia. So much for 
multilateralism.
  We have heard a lot about peace in Bosnia and how near it is. But 
what kind of peace is it? It is the peace of the dead and the 
conquered,
  In terms of military from this country having to go to Bosnia, no one 
is talking about that. The Bosnians are not talking about that. What 
they are saying is, ``We would like some arms so we can defend our men, 
women, and children,'' and they deserve those arms.

                              {time}  1400

  This problem should have been handled by our intelligence community 
the way we handled the Afghanistan problem when Afghanistan was 
occupied by the Soviet Union. We armed those freedom fighters. They 
drove the world's second superpower out of Afghanistan.
  Madam Chairman, we should not continue to think disgusting things 
about the policy of this country, regardless of who occupies the 
administration. What we should do is vote against the Hamilton 
amendment and sustain the McCloskey-Gilman amendment.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Chairman, I yield myself 2\1/2\ minutes.
  Madam Chairman, I yield myself these 2\1/2\ minutes for making a 
comment. The statement has been often made on the floor today that the 
Bosnian-Moslems are defenseless. I think it is probably accurate to say 
that at one time they were defenseless. But may I also suggest that 
that statement now is very, very much out of date.
  They received nearly $2 billion in arms last year. Prior to the 
recent agreement that was signed between the Moslems and the Croats in 
March, the very well-armed Bosnian forces had the Croats on the run. 
And the military situation today in Bosnia, for anybody that is 
following it closely, knows that it has been static for months. There 
have been small gains and small losses by both sides. But what very 
clearly it is not, it is not a situation today where the Bosnian-
Moslems are at a huge disadvantage and are defenseless.
  Now, second, we have had the statement made very frequently here that 
lifting the embargo will level the playing field in Bosnia. A lot of 
judgments can be made about that, but let us be clear about where our 
U.S. military is. Their judgment is categorical. The judgment is that 
unilateral lifting of the embargo will not level the playing field. 
And, most assuredly, $200 million additional foreign aid assistance 
from the United States to the Bosnian-Moslems will not be sufficient. 
It should also be made clear that our military people believe that if 
you have that program, one of the options would involve 1,500 to 2,400 
American military personnel on the ground, and they would have to be, 
of course, protected, which means additional troops.
  One other point has been made, and I want to be as candid about this 
as I can. The statement has been made that it is not possible to lift 
the embargo multilaterally. I think that is an accurate statement as of 
today. The Security Council, however, imposed the embargo, and the 
Security Council can lift the embargo.
  Only when the peace efforts have been exhausted can we win the 
necessary international support to lift the embargo. So long as those 
peace efforts are going forward, I think it is correct to say that it 
cannot be lifted multilaterally. If the peace negotiations fail, then I 
think the multilateral lifting of the embargo would be achieved.
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Schumer].
  (Mr. SCHUMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SCHUMER. Madam Chairman, I think that this is one of the most 
difficult proposals that we will have to vote on, and I have been 
thinking a great deal about it. I would say in terms of the practical 
arguments, does this help the Bosnians or not, we can hear both sides 
on that. But ultimately you have to listen to the Bosnians themselves. 
They believe it will.
  So we can rationalize and debate, but the people who are asking for 
our help and who have been slaughtered say that it will help them. Who 
are we to judge that it will not?
  The real argument that throws me back a little by the supporters of 
this resolution is the one made with eloquence by the chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the chairman of the Committee on Armed 
Services, and that is, shall we break our international agreements? How 
will this affect not Bosnia, but future agreements, where others want 
to break them and we say ``Don't.'' And they will say, ``But you did it 
here.''
  That is a very difficult argument to overcome. But I think we are 
thrown back to thinking about the Nuremberg laws, and to thinking about 
when is it a citizen's responsibility, whether we be citizens in this 
chamber or citizens on the streets and somewhere in the world 
community, about when it is proper and appropriate to say that world 
law has allowed such horror and such havoc to occur, allowed it to 
occur, but that we must not stick with it? And that in each 
legislator's case in terms of this resolution and the treaties that it 
involves, must be to say to himself or herself that every so often, 
very rarely, not lightly, heavily, in fact, we must sometimes say that 
those international agreements and treaties have allowed such misery 
and such destitution to occur, that we must ignore them, even knowing 
the consequences that will occur down the road.
  My colleagues, this is such a case. I urge defeat of the Hamilton 
amendment so the McCloskey amendment can stand.
  Mr SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Madam Chairman, I appreciate the time.
  Madam Chairman, obviously it is with a sincere sense of qualms that I 
am ever at odds with my distinguished chairman, Mr. Hamilton, on an 
issue of significant importance such as this.
  But I would just to some degree echo other speakers and say for once 
in our lives, please, let us not try to have it both ways. We really 
cannot be both for the McCloskey amendment and the Hamilton amendment. 
The McCloskey-Gilman amendment tells the President, as far as our 
participation, the arms embargo should be lifted as to Bosnia.
  Regardless of what has been said in previous debates, it commits no 
troops, no equipment. It is all at the discretion of the President. It 
is not an open-ended commitment, as the chairman said in his earlier 
remarks.
  I would note also that it was interesting to hear from the gentleman 
from Minnesota [Mr. Oberstar] with his Slovenian antecedents, and see 
Mr. Oberstar oppose this resolution to in essence lift the arms embargo 
because we all know, when the Serbs went into Slovenia, they left in 9 
days, and there are no Slovenians being tortured, raped, or otherwise 
being oppressed by Serbs, because they were run out by an armed 
citizenry.
  Also it really beggars the imagination to compare besieged Bosnia, as 
the great gentlewoman from New York, [Ms. Molinari] referred to along 
the lines of Iraq and Korea and what not.
  What sins have the Bosnians committed? All they ask for is the right 
to defend themselves. They are not really asking for the United States 
to be the Lone Ranger and come to their rescue. We should assert more 
leadership. Yes, there should be air strikes.
  But one thing we should not be doing, Mr. President, is to 
participate, as was reported today, in a real politic to break up 
Bosnia, a state which we say is sovereign, which the United Nations 
says is sovereign, and say yes, Serbia, you can add this to a greater 
Serbia.
  Please vote no on the Hamilton amendment. Let us have a clear voice 
for once.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Madam Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the 
distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. 
Gephardt].
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Kennelly). The gentleman from Missouri 
is recognized for 4 minutes.
  (Mr. GEPHARDT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GEPHARDT. Madam Chairman, I rise to favor the amendment by the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], and I rise with a great respect 
for the Members who have supported the McCloskey amendment and the 
Members who want us to defeat this amendment. All of them who have 
spoken, and not spoken, like all of us, want the violence to end. They 
want children to be saved. They want the genocide to end. And that is 
the issue. The issue is not what we are trying to do; the issue is how 
to get there. And I argue that if we continue what we have been trying 
to do, we have the best chance to achieve peace.

                              {time}  1410

  That is what we have been doing: Peace, the end of war, the end of 
violence. It has not been an easy path. The sides are unequal, the 
desire for violence is great, the hatreds and feelings are age-old and 
historic. It is not so easy to do this, but with ups and downs, we have 
been lurching forward to greater peace. By lifting the embargo 
unilaterally, I argue we will have an increase in violence necessarily, 
and we will have the end of the efforts at peace.
  I talked to Mr. Hunter, who is the Ambassador to NATO, today, and he 
said there is no doubt in his mind that if the embargo is unilaterally 
lifted by the United States, that the European countries will pull out 
in a moment, as quickly as they can, the entire peacekeeping apparatus 
which is on the ground today.
  Some will argue that if we can even the sides and get military 
equipment in on the side of the Moslems, that will bring about a 
greater move towards peace, that that will end the war. I do not 
believe that. I believe it will increase the war making, and then we 
will be asking the question on this floor, should we send in more, 
should we become more involved, should we be using more air power, and 
even should we be introducing troops on the ground to be in the war 
itself, trying to bring it to an end.
  I do not think there is anyone in our country who is prepared to 
answer those questions in the positive. So with the greatest respect 
for the people here today who are advocating the lifting of this 
embargo, I urge Members to vote for this resolution.
  As we look at this, let us remember that we have accomplished a lot 
here. This awful war has not expanded to Macedonia, to Kosovo, to other 
places in the region. It has been contained, to the extent it has been 
contained. We have made progress to bringing about peace.
  We are in a new world, and we truly do not know how to do this yet. I 
think we must continue what we have started. We must continue to stand 
for peace. We must continue to stand with the people who are trying to 
bring about a negotiated settlement, which is beginning to go forward 
as we speak in this Chamber today.
  Madam Chairman, I urge Members to vote for this amendment. Stay the 
course and let us bring about peace and not war.
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield my remaining time to the 
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer].
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer] is 
recognized for 2\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. HOYER. Madam Chairman, this has been a serious and important 
debate, as my friend, the gentleman from the Committee on Armed 
Services, says so often. It is a debate about the new world order, as 
the majority leader has just said. It is a debate about what that new 
world order is.
  However, I suggest that there is an old, old historical lesson, and 
that is the lesson that tyrants never respond to weakness. Tyrants 
throughout history have responded to dissembling and conflicting 
messages by further aggression, further genocide, further killing, 
further breaking of international law.
  Madam Chairman, my friend, the majority leader, who has no closer 
ally on this floor than I, as I would suggest, nor does the President, 
who is my friend and who I respect, but on this issue we disagree. The 
majority leader raises the question how to get there. Yes, he focuses 
on the essence of the issue that confronts us, how to get there.
  For 2 years now, perhaps 3, we have looked the aggressor in the eye 
and said, ``If you go a step further, we will take definitive action.'' 
They took two steps and we backed up three. It is inevitable in that 
scenario that the aggressor will continue, because he does not see the 
consequences of his action.
  Haris Silajdzic, the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, says:

       We are under assault. You must not give us help in the 
     sense of sending people, but do not continue to prevent us 
     from defending ourselves.

  We are now ready to vote. Let us not, my friends in this House, once 
again say to the aggressor, to the individual branded by our 
Government, by our State Department, as a war criminal, let us not say 
to him, ``This day, once again, we backed down.'' Let us not say, ``We 
were pretending when we voted for McCloskey.''
  Let us continue to stand for principle. Let us continue to stand for 
strength. Let us continue to stand for the principles in almost every 
international document which say that we will confront aggression and 
genocide where we find it. Vote ``no'' on Hamilton.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Madam Chairman, we have come to the end of a very significant and 
very important debate. This gentleman walked into these Chambers nearly 
24 years ago, against the backdrop of the Vietnam war. I was elected to 
come here to raise my voice in the name of peace, not an easy thing to 
do in 1971, when the overwhelming majority of my colleagues were 
supporting the prosecution of the war in Vietnam.
  I say that as a prelude to making these comments. My colleague who 
just preceded me in the well pointed out the need for strength. With 
that I do not disagree. What I would argue, as vociferously and as 
eloquently as I can, is that peace is also strength.
  The fallacy is that some way our strength only lies in our capacity 
to kill and to maim, that in some way strength is in tanks and 
armaments and bombs and missiles. There is strength and power in the 
willingness to negotiate, in the ability to come together around the 
negotiating table to find a political solution to a problem.
  Too often in these Chambers peace has been a weak idea. Too often war 
and killing has been seen as a strengthening idea. However, I would 
assert in the first few moments of my discussion that peace is also a 
strong idea, and one should not have to back away from the desire to 
attempt to wage peace in a situation where people are dying.
  My second point, it is very clear that all of us in these Chambers, 
from left, right, and center, both sides of the aisle, want to stop the 
killing and the maiming. The point of it is, How do we do it?
  I said earlier to the point of redundancy, if there are Members here 
who say, ``We want to commit American troops to wage war in Bosnia,'' 
that is a position; or those of us who say, ``We want to attempt to 
aggressively try to wage peace to end it,'' that is also a legitimate 
position.
  However, Madam Chairman, to assume that the only position left for a 
great Nation like the United States is to say, ``Lift the embargo and 
let them engage in self defense,'' I would submit that that in and of 
itself is an impotent act, because it says that we have no capacity on 
the international stage, in the world community, to bring our 
significant power and moral persuasion and political persuasion and 
economic capability to a situation to try to end the killing and the 
dying short of war.
  My colleagues are misguided who believe that the only thing we can do 
is slide backwards into war. That is what lifting this embargo is all 
about. If you are going to confront it, confront it cleanly, confront 
it up front, confront it head on; but to assume that the only thing you 
can say is ``Well, here are some weapons, you go kill yourselves 
further, you go die further,'' that is not the only posture we can 
take. We can aggressively attempt to mobilize the world community, to 
try to bring the world together in the context of Bosnia to try to 
solve the problems finally.

                              {time}  1420

  Madam Chairman, I hope to leave these Chambers some day with my 
integrity as a peace advocate intact, but it is not easy when people 
are dying to be a peace advocate. It is not easy to do it when people 
are not dying. It takes some heart, it takes some courage, it takes 
some dignity, it takes some integrity to stand up and say peace, 
nonviolence, negotiation, peaceful settlement, bringing people to the 
table is a way to end the killing. It is bizarre in the extreme to 
think that we can end killing by aggressively pursuing more killing. 
This is not an incentive for peace, this is not an incentive for 
negotiation. For those who think unilateral lifting of the arms embargo 
is anything other than an effort at war and an effort at intervention, 
they are deluding themselves.
  Mr. Chairman, at a bare minimum, the Hamilton amendment needs to be 
accepted because it respects multinationalism in a world that is 
becoming increasingly multinational, but finally it embraces the notion 
that America's goal in that region of the world is to find a peaceful 
way to solve that problem.
  Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Madam Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior].
  Mr. BONIOR. Madam Chairman, I thank my friend, the gentleman from 
South Carolina, for yielding.
  I thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle. The people of 
America should know that this has not been a partisan debate. Far from 
it. People from both sides of the aisle share common views on this 
issue.
  I would say to my friend, the gentleman from California who has 
spoken with great eloquence and a differing point of view from my own, 
that he has been and still is one of the great champions of peace in 
this institution. Nobody can deny that. Nobody can take that away from 
him. I am proud that I have stood with him for the 18 years that I have 
served in this institution on virtually every one of his efforts. But 
there comes a time, as my other friend who just talked has mentioned, 
that peace at any price is not acceptable. It is not acceptable.
  Madam Chairman, I wish the approach embodied in this amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Indiana would work.
  I wish it would end the killing and stop the war.
  But I think most of us know deep down in our heart that it won't.
  And we know that for one reason: because it has not worked for the 
past 2 years.
  The approach embodied in this amendment, not the amendment itself but 
the same approach, peace at any price, has led to 200,000 dead, 16,000 
kids being slaughtered and 2 million homeless the past 2 years.
  If you think the people of Bosnia should continue to go unarmed and 
outgunned, vote for this amendment.
  This amendment is nothing more than an endorsement of the status quo.
  But if you believe the United States has to show strong leadership in 
times of great moral crisis, and it is a time of great moral crisis;
  If you believe the Bosnians have a right to defend themselves;
  If you really believe the arms embargo must be lifted, then vote 
against this amendment, because the McCloskey amendment we already 
passed is the only measure that will truly help the people of Bosnia 
defend themselves.
  Madam Chairman, we began this debate thinking and mentioning, many of 
us on the floor this afternoon, about the week past, remembering one of 
the proudest days in our history.
  Schoolchildren all across America learned how 50 years ago, their 
grandparents saved the world from tyranny and genocide.
  But 50 years from now, schoolchildren will study this time. And they 
will look back and wonder where American leadership was when genocide 
reared its ugly head again.
  They will want to know why we sat back and watched children be 
slaughtered and families torn apart.
  They will want to know why the United States Navy blockaded the 
shores of Bosnia so arms could not enter and innocent people could not 
defend themselves.
  Madam Chairman, this body took a courageous stand to lift the arms 
embargo. We must not falter now. We must not send mixed signals. It is 
time for clear and consistent leadership. I urge my colleagues to vote 
``no'' on the Hamilton amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Kennelly). The question is on the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. DELLUMS. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 181, 
noes 242, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 223]

                               AYES--181

     Abercrombie
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (TX)
     Applegate
     Armey
     Bacchus (FL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Barca
     Barcia
     Barlow
     Barrett (WI)
     Bateman
     Bentley
     Bevill
     Bilirakis
     Blackwell
     Borski
     Brewster
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Buyer
     Canady
     Cantwell
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clement
     Clinger
     Collins (IL)
     Combest
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Cramer
     Cunningham
     Darden
     Deal
     DeFazio
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Evans
     Farr
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Ford (MI)
     Fowler
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gonzalez
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Green
     Hall (TX)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hastert
     Hefner
     Herger
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hochbrueckner
     Houghton
     Hughes
     Hutto
     Inglis
     Inslee
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, Sam
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Kreidler
     LaFalce
     Lambert
     LaRocco
     Leach
     Lehman
     Lewis (FL)
     Lightfoot
     Lloyd
     Long
     Mann
     Manzullo
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McKinney
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Montgomery
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Norton (DC)
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Orton
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Penny
     Peterson (FL)
     Petri
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Roemer
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Roth
     Roukema
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sangmeister
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Scott
     Shepherd
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (OR)
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stupak
     Synar
     Tanner
     Taylor (MS)
     Thornton
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Underwood (GU)
     Unsoeld
     Valentine
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Vucanovich
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Whitten
     Williams
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Yates

                               NOES--242

     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews (NJ)
     Archer
     Bachus (AL)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bilbray
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burton
     Byrne
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cardin
     Carr
     Castle
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Crane
     Crapo
     Danner
     de la Garza
     de Lugo (VI)
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dingell
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (TX)
     Fingerhut
     Fish
     Flake
     Ford (TN)
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Glickman
     Goodlatte
     Goss
     Grams
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastings
     Hayes
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inhofe
     Istook
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kasich
     Kennelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klein
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kyl
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Levin
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Maloney
     Manton
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Martinez
     McCandless
     McCloskey
     McCurdy
     McDermott
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Meyers
     Mfume
     Mica
     Michel
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Morella
     Myers
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Paxon
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Ravenel
     Regula
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Romero-Barcelo (PR)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rush
     Santorum
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schenk
     Schiff
     Schumer
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shaw
     Shays
     Skeen
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Swett
     Swift
     Talent
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Upton
     Volkmer
     Walker
     Walsh
     Weldon
     Wheat
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Boucher
     Collins (MI)
     Condit
     Faleomavaega (AS)
     Foglietta
     Grandy
     Hefley
     Huffington
     Jefferson
     Kopetski
     Royce
     Slattery
     Sundquist
     Towns
     Tucker
     Washington

                              {time}  1447

  The Clerk announced the following pair:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Tucker for, with Mr. Towns against.

  Mr. RIDGE and Ms. ESHOO changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. LEACH changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
Goss].
  (Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GOSS. Madam Chairman, I would ask why are we having another vote 
on Haiti today? There has been no change in the Goss amendment which 
passed this House on May 24. Is it because the vote is too close, as 
some have implied on the other side of the aisle? I say to that, 
``Nonsense.'' The Goss amendment passed 223 to 201, a 22-vote margin in 
a House that passed one of the biggest tax bills ever by 1 vote and the 
assault weapons ban by 2. That does not add up. Has the situation in 
Haiti changed? Yes, it has, for the worse. Especially in terms of human 
misery, as was predicted under the President's plan: More sanctions 
equal more suffering equal more refugees, and undeniably that is the 
situation. Has the President's policy produced positive, tangible 
results in Haiti? No, it has not, other than enriching the thugs in 
Haiti via the black market and stimulating the reinstatement of the 
Macoutes of Duvalier's day.

                              {time}  1450

  Other than stimulating the reinstatement of the Ton-Tons Macoutes of 
Duvalier's day, other than further intensifying the deep political 
divisions of that country, other than subsidizing the Ukrainian cruise 
ship industry, other than investing more United States taxpayers' 
dollars in infrastructure of Caicos and Turks Islands than many 
congressional districts will receive this year, other than taking on 
the relocation of an additional 3,000 Haitian refugees, other than the 
inducement of deals, as yet uncovered, that were likely made with the 
Jamaicans and the Dominican Republic, and other than spending money--
and nobody knows how much yet--but boy, are we spending a lot of money 
for ships, and sanctions and for processing stations in various places 
around the Caribbean, why are we having this vote? What is this about?
  Madam Chairman, I think what a reasonable observer might conclude is 
that it is because the President of the United States wants to invade 
Haiti, if not with Congress' blessing, then with Congress' silence.
  If the Goss amendment fails today, Members should understand that it 
is worse than saying nothing about Haiti. It is a serious flipflop on 
our foreign policy, and it does send a message.
  Supporting the Goss amendment, voting yes on that, is the only way 
for Members to stay on record in opposition to United States military 
intervention in Haiti. That is what this is about.
  In addition to saying no to the military intervention, the Goss 
amendment is a nonbinding, nonbinding recommendation for an alternative 
approach to the President's plan. It is arguably a better approach in 
several terms. It does not punish the poorest of Haitians by offtarget 
embargoes as we are seeing now under the President's plan. In fact, 
Madam Chairman, it enables the provision of humanitarian relief and 
refuge for those in genuine political danger on Haitian territory in 
nearby Haiti, on the Ile de Gonave.
  Second, the Goss plan does not require that anybody risk their life 
on the high seas to get to Ile de Gonave. It is only a 15 to 20 mile 
crossing. One does not have to go way down here to Jamaica, or way up 
here to some other island, or way off here to Miami.
  Third, instead of putting American soldiers in harm's way to somehow 
create democracy at the point of a gun; the President's plan calls on 
us to do that; the Goss plan paves the way for long-term democracy and 
economic stability in Haiti by providing the opportunity to reestablish 
the administration that was properly elected several years ago. The 
moral boost across the country would be incalculable and immeasurably 
positive if President Aristide did indeed return to Haitian soil in Ile 
de Gonave.
  Under the President's policy, today it is the Haitian people who are 
suffering, and it is not the Haitian military. Today and tomorrow it is 
the American taxpayers who are going to foot an ever-increasing bill, 
and tomorrow it could be United States personnel who are in harm's way 
while invading Haiti.
  Vote yes, once again, on the Goss amendment. It is cheaper, more 
compassionate, and it is safer.

             Copy of Rollcall Vote on Goss Haiti Amendment


             (in the committee of the whole, may 24, 1994)

       The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--
     ayes 223, noes 201, not voting 14, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 197]

                               YEAS--223

     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews (NJ)
     Archer
     Armey
     Bacchus (FL)
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Beilenson
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Byrne
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Clinger
     Coble
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Cooper
     Coppersmith
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Darden
     Deal
     Dickey
     Dingell
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gekas
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Grams
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Houghton
     Huffington
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hutto
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, Sam
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klein
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kyl
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (FL)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     Lloyd
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Martinez
     McCandless
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McCurdy
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Meyers
     Michel
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Murphy
     Myers
     Nussle
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Ramstad
     Ravenel
     Regula
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Roth
     Roukema
     Rowland
     Royce
     Sangmeister
     Sarpalius
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Sensenbrenner
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stump
     Sundquist
     Swett
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Thurman
     Torkildsen
     Torricelli
     Upton
     Valentine
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Weldon
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                               NAYS--201

     Abercrombie
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (TX)
     Applegate
     Barca
     Becerra
     Berman
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Bonior
     Borski
     Brooks
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carr
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     de la Garza
     de Lugo (VI)
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hochbrueckner
     Hoyer
     Hughes
     Inslee
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kopetski
     Kreidler
     LaFalce
     Lambert
     LaRocco
     Lehman
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Long
     Lowey
     Maloney
     Mann
     Margolies-
       Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCloskey
     McDermott
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Mica
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Norton (DC)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Pickle
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Roemer
     Romero-Barcelo
       (PR)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schenk
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shepherd
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slattery
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stupak
     Swift
     Synar
     Taylor (MS)
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Torres
     Towns
     Traficant
     Tucker
     Underwood (GU)
     Unsoeld
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Wheat
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--14

     Barlow
     Barrett (WI)
     DeLay
     Faleomavaega
       (AS)
     Fish
     Gibbons
     Grandy
     Horn
     Neal (NC)
     Ortiz
     Santorum
     Stark
     Washington
     Whitten
  Mr. SPENCE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Arizona [Mr. Kyl].
  Mr. KYL. Madam Chairman, make no mistake about it. This revote on the 
Goss amendment is about whether the United States should militarily 
intervene in Haiti. This House answered that question in the negative 
less than 2 weeks ago. To vote otherwise today is to flipflop and send 
a very dangerous message to everyone around this world.
  Madam Chairman, the Goss amendment says there should be no 
intervention unless there is a clear and present danger to U.S. 
citizens or U.S. interests, and, my colleagues, let me read the exact 
language that we would be repudiating if we support the revote today.
  It is the sense of Congress that the United States should not 
undertake any military action directed against the mainland of Haiti 
unless the President first certifies to the Congress that a clear and 
present danger to the citizens of the United States or U.S. interests 
require such action.
  Now who in this House would disagree with that simple test?
  I suggest, Madam Chairman, that we should not flipflop. The U.S. 
interests always come first. We should never, never take any military 
action unless there is a clear reason to do so. If we intervene in 
Haiti today, we would be put in the business of running Haiti for the 
foreseeable future. The last time the U.S. military was sent there, 
Madam Chairman, we stayed 19 years. It could get to be a lot like 
Somalia.
  Here are just some of the questions we should be answering before we 
get into this kind of situation:
  In the event of an invasion, what are the planned rules of engagement 
and disengagement?
  Is there a timetable?
  Are there clear rules about the use of deadly force?
  Besides Cedras and Michel Francois, how many so-called elitists would 
have to be neutralized or removed?
  How long do we stay?
  How many dollars of war damage and alleged war damage will the U.S. 
taxpayers have to pay out to our friendly neighboring country to 
recover from our invasion?
  If we can justify intervention in Haiti today, there is literally no 
limit to where the U.S. troops would be sent tomorrow.
  I say to my colleagues,

       Pick your crisis: Bosnia, Sudan, Rwanda, Liberia. We could 
     be involved in endless crises. Military force should only be 
     used as a last resort, not as a substitute for real foreign 
     policy.

  Madam Chairman, I urge a rejection of the revote on the Goss 
amendment.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Kennelly). The gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Madam Chairman and members of the committee, my 
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], asked 
the question: Why is this vote being reconsidered? I choose to answer.
  No. 1, because I think the House was ill advised when it took the 
action it did several days ago.
  No. 2, that the debate was a short debate on the substantive issue.
  No. 3, Madam Chairman, I believe that a number of my colleagues acted 
and voted out of confusion and perhaps even ignorance.

                              {time}  1500

  So at this time, I would like to state the case, allow my colleagues 
to move beyond their confusion, beyond their ignorance, and also, Madam 
Chairman, time and circumstances have overcome this amendment. Let me 
argue those points.
  The Goss amendment was adopted nearly 2 weeks ago, and the events in 
the last 2 weeks have made that amendment unnecessary. So I ask many of 
my colleagues here who voted for that amendment, to consider now voting 
against the amendment. It is not necessary. The United States has 
reached an agreement to process Haitian refugees off the coast of 
Jamaica and other islands, making the amendment moot.
  Second point I would make: The Goss amendment, Madam Chairman, and 
hear me on this, would require the United States to use military force 
to seize an island off the Haitian coast and maintain that island for 
refugee processing.
  Why do I say that? This is not American soil. This is Haitian soil. 
It is occupied by a number of Haitian military people now. So it would 
require military force. I do not think that is what we want to do.
  Third, the amendment would require, and we received this from the 
Defense Department and others, extensive logistical and engineering 
commitments by the U.S. military, costly infrastructure investments by 
American taxpayers.
  Let me summarize. The Goss amendment, Madam Chairman, is unnecessary. 
I ask my colleagues who voted for it to now vote against it.
  Number two, it would entangle the United States military in Haiti at 
this moment, seizing an island. We should not be about that. I ask them 
to vote against it for that reason.
  Finally, it would be extremely costly to the American taxpayer to do 
this. Time, circumstances, and events have overcome these matters.
  Finally, let me say to my colleagues, particularly those of you on 
this side of the aisle, let me make a personal plea to you. There are 
very few times when this gentleman has asked a number of you to give us 
a vote. Many of you have marched into the well and said this is the 
fairest person you have worked with. I work with all of you in this 
Chamber of a daily basis on a host of issues, never asking you for 
anything. I ask you on this one to give us a vote to defeat the Goss 
amendment. It was ill-conceived and ill-advised.
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from New Mexico.
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Madam Chairman, over the Memorial Day recess, I 
joined members of the House Intelligence Committee on an official 
factfinding mission to Haiti. I had the opportunity to view first hand 
the destruction that has been wrought on that country by a belligerent 
band of military thugs headed by General Cedras. Madam Chairman, it is 
a certainty that the horrible disrepair of our Caribbean neighbor will 
only worsen as long as the military junta continues to rule.
  Madam Chairman, on May 24, the House considered a sense-of-Congress 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss]. That 
amendment required the President to certify to Congress that clear and 
present danger to citizens of the United States or United States 
interest existed prior to the United States undertaking any military 
action, and to establish a temporary safehaven on the Haitian island of 
Ile de La Gonave for Haitian refugees escaping economic and political 
hardships on the mainland of Haiti. Madam Chairman, I opposed the 
amendment then and will oppose it today when the House reconsiders it.
  Madam Chairman, the Clinton administration's new policy on Haitian 
refugees makes the Goss amendment unnecessary. That policy provides for 
both ship-board and land-based processing for refugees. To date, the 
Department of Defense has chartered two Ukrainian ships for the ship-
board processing, and the administration has worked out an agreement 
with Jamaica to permit ships to anchor off the shores of Kingston for 
further processing. Additionally, the administration has secured the 
participation of the United Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees.
  Returning Haitian refugees to Ile de la Gonave is to return them to 
Haiti. Ile de la Gonave is a 280-square mile island just west of Port-
au-Prince. Ile de la Gonave is Haitian territory. Thus, the Goss 
amendment represents a retreat to the old Bush administration-initiated 
policy of returning Haitian refugees to Haiti without the benefit of 
any determination of their refugee status.

  Additionally, Madam Chairman, the requirement that the President make 
certain certifications to the Congress prior to committing U.S. forces 
to Haiti is being used by General Cedras to consolidate his hold on 
power and the military reign of terror. Mr. Chairman, in the aftermath 
of the withdrawal of the Harlan County, the Haitian military does not 
believe that the U.S. has any resolve to commit any forces. The option 
to use force must remain open and unabated so that the Haitian military 
will know that the United States supports democracy and will not stand 
idly by in the wake of criminal anarchy in Haiti.
  Madam Chairman, the administration's policy on Haiti represents a 
constructive effort to restore democracy to that Caribbean nation. This 
policy should be given every opportunity to succeed without the 
Congress tying the administration's hands in removing from its 
diplomatic arsenal the threat of military force. Madam Chairman, I urge 
my colleagues to oppose the Goss amendment when it is considered by the 
House this afternoon.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Kennelly). The question is on the 
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, 
was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
  Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. 
Mazzoli) having assumed the chair, Mrs. Kennelly, Chairman pro tempore 
of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 
4301) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for military 
activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe military 
personnel strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for other purposes, 
pursuant to House Resolution 431, she reported the bill back to the 
House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is 
ordered.
  Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee 
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the 
Whole?
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a separate vote on the so-called 
Goss amendment regarding Haiti.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is a separate vote demanded on any other 
amendment?
  The Clerk will report the amendment on which a separate vote has been 
demanded.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment: At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), 
     add the following:

     SEC. 1038. UNITED STATES POLICY ON HAITI.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
       (1) the 1990 presidential election in Haiti was deemed to 
     be both free and democratic;
       (2) a military coup toppled the duly elected government in 
     1991;
       (3) the process to restore democratic rule in Haiti agreed 
     to at Governor's Island has stalled;
       (4) the economic crisis in Haiti is worsening; and
       (5) the people of Haiti are preparing in mass numbers to 
     leave their country to seek economic and political refuge 
     overseas.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress--
       (1) that the United States should not undertake any 
     military action directed against the mainland of Haiti unless 
     the President first certifies to Congress that a clear and 
     present danger to citizens of the United States or United 
     States interests requires such action; and
       (2) that the United States should work with the 
     Organization of American States and the United Nations--
       (A) to establish a temporary safe haven on the Haitian 
     island of Ile de la Gonave for Haitian refugees escaping 
     economic and political hardship on the mainland of Haiti;
       (B) to assist in providing humanitarian assistance and visa 
     processing for such refugees in such safe haven; and
       (C) to assist the legitimate Haitian government in 
     establishing the long-term stability of democracy in Haiti.

  Mr. DELLUMS (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from California?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the amendment.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 195, 
noes 226, not voting 13, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 224]

                               AYES--195

     Allard
     Andrews (NJ)
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Beilenson
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Clinger
     Coble
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Cooper
     Coppersmith
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Darden
     Deal
     DeLay
     Dickey
     Dingell
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Fish
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gekas
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Grams
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hayes
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson, Sam
     Kasich
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kyl
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (FL)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     Lloyd
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Manzullo
     McCandless
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McCurdy
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Meyers
     Michel
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Myers
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paxon
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Ramstad
     Ravenel
     Regula
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Roth
     Roukema
     Rowland
     Santorum
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Sensenbrenner
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stump
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Torkildsen
     Upton
     Valentine
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Weldon
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                               NOES--226

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (TX)
     Applegate
     Bacchus (FL)
     Barca
     Barcia
     Barlow
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Bonior
     Borski
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Byrne
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carr
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     de la Garza
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Flake
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hochbrueckner
     Holden
     Hoyer
     Hughes
     Hutto
     Inslee
     Jacobs
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Kreidler
     LaFalce
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Lehman
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Long
     Lowey
     Maloney
     Mann
     Manton
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCloskey
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Mica
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Peterson (FL)
     Pickle
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Roemer
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sangmeister
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Schenk
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shepherd
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (IA)
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stupak
     Swett
     Swift
     Synar
     Taylor (MS)
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Unsoeld
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Wheat
     Whitten
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--13

     Collins (MI)
     Foglietta
     Grandy
     Huffington
     Jefferson
     Klein
     Kopetski
     Royce
     Slattery
     Sundquist
     Towns
     Tucker
     Washington

                              {time}  1525

  Ms. MARGOLIES-MEZVINSKY changed her vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. BAESLER changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The question is on the 
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, 
was agreed to.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third 
reading of the bill.
  The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was 
read the third time.


                motion to recommit offered by mr. michel

  Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit with 
instructions
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
  Mr. MICHEL. I am in its present form, Mr. Speaker.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to 
recommit.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Mr. Michel moves to recommit the bill H.R. 4301 to the 
     Committee on Armed Services with instructions to report the 
     same back to the House forthwith with the following 
     amendment:
       At the end of title X (page 277, after line 2), insert the 
     following new section:

     SEC.   . LIMITATION ON PLACING UNITED STATES FORCES UNDER 
                   OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF A FOREIGN NATIONAL 
                   ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

       (a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsections (b) and 
     (c), funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the 
     Department of Defense may not be obligated or expended for 
     activities of any element of the Armed Forces that after the 
     date of the enactment of this Act is placed under the 
     operational control of a foreign national acting directly on 
     behalf of the United Nations for the purpose of international 
     peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar 
     activity that is authorized by the Security Council under 
     chapter VI or VII of the United Nations Charter.
       (b) Exception for Presidential Certification.--(1) 
     Subsection (a) shall not apply in the case of a proposed 
     placement of United States Armed Forces under such 
     operational control if the President, not less than 15 days 
     before the date on which such operational control is to 
     become effective (or as provided in paragraph (2)), meets the 
     requirements of subsection (d).
       (2) If the President certifies to Congress that an 
     emergency exists that precludes the President from meeting 
     the requirements of subsection (d) 15 days before placing 
     United States Armed Forces under such operational control, 
     the President may place such forces under such operational 
     control and meet the requirements of subsection (d) in a 
     timely manner, but in no event later than 48 hours after such 
     operational control becomes effective.
       (c) Exception for Authorization by Law.--Subsection (a) 
     shall not apply in the case of a proposed placement of United 
     States Armed Forces under such operational control if the 
     Congress specifically authorizes by law placing United States 
     forces under such operational control.
       (d) Presidential Certifications.--The requirements referred 
     to in subsection (b)(1) are that the President submit to 
     Congress the following:
       (1) Certification by the President that--
       (A) such an operational control arrangement is necessary to 
     protect national security interests of the United States;
       (B) the commander of any unit of the Armed Forces proposed 
     for placement under the operational control of a foreign 
     national acting directly on behalf of the United Nations will 
     at all times retain the right--
       (i) to report independently to superior United States 
     military authorities; and
       (ii) to decline to comply with orders judged by the 
     commander to be illegal, militarily imprudent, or beyond the 
     mandate of the mission to which the United States agreed with 
     the United Nations, until such time as that commander 
     receives direction from superior United States military 
     authorities with respect to the orders that the commander has 
     declined to comply with; and
       (C) the United States will retain the authority to withdraw 
     United States Armed Forces from the proposed operation at any 
     time and to take any action it considers necessary to protect 
     those forces if they are engaged.
       (2) A report setting forth the following:
       (A) A description of the national security interest that 
     requires the placement of United States forces under the 
     operational control of a foreign national acting directly on 
     behalf of the United Nations.
       (B) The mission of the United States forces involved.
       (C) The expected size and composition of the United States 
     forces involved.
       (D) The incremental cost to the United States of 
     participation in the United Nations operation by the United 
     States forces which are proposed to be placed under the 
     operational control of a foreign national.
       (E) The precise command and control relationship between 
     the United States forces involved and the United Nations 
     command structure.
       (F) The precise command and control relationship between 
     the United States forces involved and the commander of the 
     United States unified command for the region in which those 
     United States forces are to operate.
       (G) The extent to which the United States forces involved 
     will rely on non-United States forces for security and self-
     defense and an assessment on the ability of those non-United 
     States forces to provide adequate security to the United 
     States forces involved.
       (H) The timetable for complete withdrawal of the United 
     States forces involved.
       (e) Classification of Report.--A report under subsection 
     (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form and, if 
     necessary, in classified form.
       (f) Exception for Small Forces.--This section does not 
     apply in a case in which fewer than 100 members of the Armed 
     Forces are participating in a particular United Nations 
     operation or activity.
       (g) Exception for Ongoing Operation.--This section does not 
     apply in the case of activities of the Armed Forces in 
     Macedonia pursuant to United Nations Security Council 
     Resolutions 795, adopted December 11, 1992, and 842, adopted 
     June 18, 1993, as part of the United Nations force designated 
     as the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).
       (h) Interpretation.--Nothing in this section may be 
     construed as authority for the President to use United States 
     Armed Forces in any operation or as authority for the 
     President to place elements of the Armed Forces under the 
     operational control of a foreign national.

  Mr. MICHEL (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent 
that the motion to recommit be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Illinois?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, my motion to recommit this defense 
authorization bill with instructions would establish limits on the 
subordination of U.S. Armed Forces to the operational control of a 
foreign national acting on behalf of the United Nations.
  The limits embodied in this amendment would be in effect unless:
  No. 1, the President certifies to Congress the necessity of such 
command and control arrangement in order to protect U.S. national 
security interests or;
  No. 2, Congress specifically authorizes such a command and control 
arrangement.
  Mr. Speaker, the amendment would also require a report detailing the 
planned circumstances for such command and control.
  Let me try to put this in some context, if I might.
  Last year the House narrowly rejected a similar amendment. The 
argument at that time was that the amendment was premature and the 
issue was still under discussion in the administration.
  Now the issue is no longer academic. A few weeks ago, President 
Clinton signed presidential decision directive 25 explicitly embracing 
the placement of U.S. forces under foreign operational control.
  This amendment does not overturn such a policy but places prudent 
limits on it.
  I think this command and control question is appropriate because at 
the heart of our defense authorization bill is a larger question for 
our country:
  Does the administration's defense budget give us command and control 
over our Nation's destiny in the world?
  I personally have come to the reluctant and troubling conclusion that 
the answer is no.
  The level and quality of defense provided in this bill is not 
credible when matched against the challenges our Armed Forces might 
face.

                              {time}  1530

  And history teaches us that a loss of credibility in the field of 
national security policy can be a prelude to the loss of lives on the 
field of battle. Inadequate resources in combination with inconsistent 
foreign policies and divided by confusion about peacekeeping operations 
are an equation for disaster.
  U.S. forces have historically fought alongside forces of friendly 
nations in many battles. The D-day celebration reminded us of this 
fact: British, French, Canadian, and other troops contributed to our 
total victory. But when our men and women are killed on the 
battlefield, they do not die in the service of the United Nations, as 
one high-level administration official put it earlier this year.
  They die in the service of the United States of America. Now, this is 
not just a semantic difference. It is a real difference. It is the 
difference between clear principles of American interests and values 
and vague rhetoric about multilateralism.
  Questions about the national security of the United States and the 
direction of our Armed Forces in the field cannot be adequately 
addressed with earnest rhetoric, good intentions, or policy papers. 
That is why this amendment by way of the motion to recommit with 
instructions is so necessary.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues in the House to vote yes on the 
motion. A yes vote will be seen at home and around the world as an 
unmistakable sign that the United States will definitely retain command 
and control of our troops except in circumstances and under guidelines 
outlined in this amendment, and perhaps it will be the beginning of the 
road back to a national security policy emphasizing our Nation's 
interests and values sustained by sufficient resources and truly 
commanded and controlled by our Nation's leaders.
  Again, I would urge my colleagues to vote to recommit this bill and 
report it back forthwith with the amendment that I have outlined in my 
motion.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion.
  Mr. Speaker and Members of the House, this motion to recommit was 
offered last year and defeated.
  Last year I rose in opposition to the motion suggesting to my 
colleagues that the substantive nature of the policy contained in the 
motion to recommit was so extraordinarily important with such 
incredible potential implications down the road that we should not 
embrace the policy of a 10-minute debate on a motion to recommit. We 
said, rather, let the committee of jurisdiction look at this issue 
substantively and at some point in the future attempt to bring back to 
this body some policy recommendations with respect to the substantive 
nature of what is involved in the motion to recommit.
  I would say to you, Mr. Speaker and Members of this body, that the 
Committee on Armed Services has, indeed, begun to look at this issue. 
Witnesses have talked back with us on this issue. But we have been 
placed on an incredibly fast track to bring this bill to the floor 
before Memorial Day, something never done in the 20-some years this 
gentleman has been in the House.
  The time constraints and the pressure on this committee, with all of 
the full range of issues that we are dealing with, were so 
extraordinary that we have not had an opportunity to walk substantively 
through the total implications. We have not come to any resolution on 
this significant issue.
  We are in a post-cold-war environment. As I have said earlier, there 
are no post-cold-war experts. We are all bumping our heads against a 
new reality.
  You cannot just willy-nilly step out here making policy statements 
without having some carefully considered rationale for why you are 
taking those positions and what the implications are all about.
  I continue to ask you, my colleagues, to reject this motion to 
recommit. Allow us to address this issue. We promise you continued 
hearings and some kind of effort that will ultimately lead toward a 
policy decision with respect to this significant issue.
  I have talked with the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton], and in 
a moment I will yield to him for the purposes of underscoring what I 
have said about a commitment to do just that.
  But let me, for these few moments, read at least in part a letter 
signed by General Shalikashvili, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 
Secretary of Defense, Mr. Perry, written to me:

       We have serious concerns about the amendment offered to the 
     National Defense Authorization Act severely limiting the 
     operational effectiveness of U.S. armed forces when engaged 
     with other forces in a U.N. operation.
       Americans frequently have served and are serving today 
     under foreign operational control. In NATO and in Korea, 
     American military personnel serve under allied commanders 
     every day. Military leaders view unity of command as a 
     fundamental issue. It is an essential ingredient in achieving 
     victory at an acceptable cost.
       During Operation Desert Storm an entire brigade of the 82nd 
     Airborne Division was under French operational control. This 
     arrangement improved the efficiency of combat operations and 
     helped reduce American casualties,

an important issue, Mr. Speaker.

       Certainly, we support the concept that U.S. forces must 
     serve under the ablest commanders, but with clear and 
     effective command-and-control arrangements in place. However, 
     we disagree with the inference of the proposed amendment that 
     foreign commanders in U.N. operations cannot effectively 
     operate American forces when the President decides it is 
     appropriate to make such arrangements.
       Our military officers are not about to recommend to the 
     Nation's leaders that troops be placed under a commander who 
     lacks military skills, competence, and judgment.
       The language of the amendment seems to assume otherwise.

  The letter goes on, but I would finally conclude, ``In sum, we 
believe this proposed legislation is ill-advised and potentially 
harmful to the execution of military operations.
  ``We urge that the House of Representatives not approve this 
legislation.'' It is signed by the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield briefly to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. 
Skelton], the subcommittee chair who deals with personnel issues.
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, I wish to reiterate what the chairman said.
  This whole area involving United Nations or peacekeeping issues is 
far more complicated and complex than the issue allows it to be.
  This amendment does not differentiate between chapter 6, 
peacekeeping; chapter 7, peacemaking; or combat. We intend to have 
hearings, extensive hearings, on this very difficult and complex issue, 
and hopefully we will have excellent legislation to put forward in next 
year's bill.
  We are rushing to judgment, and we might very well make a mistake if 
this is adopted.
  Mr. DELLUMS Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to defeat the motion to 
recommit.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). Without objection, the 
previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the noes appeared to have it.
  Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 185, 
nays 237, not voting 12, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 225]

                               YEAS--185

     Allard
     Applegate
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus (AL)
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bateman
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Brewster
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Castle
     Clinger
     Coble
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Cooper
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Fish
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gekas
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Grams
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hoagland
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Istook
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Kasich
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kyl
     Lazio
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (FL)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Manzullo
     McCandless
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McCurdy
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Meyers
     Mica
     Michel
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Moorhead
     Morella
     Myers
     Nussle
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paxon
     Petri
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Ramstad
     Ravenel
     Regula
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Santorum
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Sensenbrenner
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Talent
     Tauzin
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Torkildsen
     Traficant
     Upton
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Weldon
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                               NAYS--237

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (NJ)
     Andrews (TX)
     Bacchus (FL)
     Baesler
     Barca
     Barcia
     Barlow
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Byrne
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carr
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Collins (IL)
     Condit
     Conyers
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     Darden
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Flake
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hochbrueckner
     Holden
     Hoyer
     Hughes
     Hutto
     Inslee
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klein
     Klink
     Kreidler
     LaFalce
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Leach
     Lehman
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lloyd
     Long
     Lowey
     Maloney
     Mann
     Manton
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCloskey
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Roemer
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sangmeister
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Schenk
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shepherd
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (IA)
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stupak
     Swett
     Swift
     Synar
     Tanner
     Taylor (MS)
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Unsoeld
     Valentine
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Waters
     Watt
     Waxman
     Wheat
     Whitten
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--12

     Collins (MI)
     Foglietta
     Grandy
     Huffington
     Jefferson
     Kopetski
     Royce
     Slattery
     Sundquist
     Towns
     Tucker
     Washington

                              {time}  1559

  Mr. PORTER and Mr. BREWSTER changed their vote from ``nay'' to 
``yea.''
  So the motion to recommit was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, first, I want to commend Chairman Dellums 
for his commitment to fairness, a commitment that has truly allowed 
bipartisanship to work during our deliberations on the Armed Services 
Committee--I have no complaints about the process.
  As I said at the outset of House consideration of this bill, it is 
not a bad bill if you are able to consider it in isolation from the 
broader context of the President's dramatic reductions in the defense 
budget. This bill contains many provisions that I support such as: A 
full 2.6 percent pay raise instead of the President's proposal of only 
1.6 percent. A readjustment next fiscal year of the schedule on which 
military retirees receive their COLA's to make it consistent with other 
Federal civilian retirees. An explicit prohibition against the 
administration's proposal to use the defense budget to fund billions of 
dollars worth of United Nations peacekeeping costs.
  Unfortunately, the broader context of President Clinton's 6-year plan 
to cut defense by $156 billion outweighs and overwhelms any specific 
provisions of the bill. Of these $156 billion in cuts, only 10 percent 
have actually been enacted and the bill before us represents only an 
additional 10 percent. When you consider all of the people, 
modernization, infrastructure and general readiness problems we are 
beginning to encounter after less than 20 percent of the Clinton cuts 
have been acted on, how can the services possibly absorb the remaining 
80 percent--approximately $126 billion--in the next 4 years and not 
self-destruct?
  As I have said on many occasions, I believe that the President's 
defense cuts, following on the heels of a steady decline in defense 
spending since the mid-1980's, ignore the lessons of our sorry history 
of post-conflict demobilization this century and will once again cause 
irreparable harm to our national and our economic security.
  Specific provisions notwithstanding, the bottom line is that this 
bill is an endorsement of the President's agenda to dramatically reduce 
the defense budget. It represents another step down a road I believe is 
fundamentally at odds with the ability of the United States to protect 
and promote its national interests in the post-cold war world. After 
weighing the many specifics I support versus the broader context of the 
Clinton defense plan which I oppose, I am unable, in good conscience, 
to support final passage of this bill and will therefore, reluctantly 
vote ``no.''
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Mazzoli). The question is on the passage 
of the bill.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 260, 
noes 158, not voting 16, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 226]

                               AYES--260

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (NJ)
     Andrews (TX)
     Applegate
     Bacchus (FL)
     Baesler
     Barlow
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Bliley
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Byrne
     Cantwell
     Cardin
     Carr
     Castle
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clement
     Clyburn
     Coleman
     Condit
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Danner
     Darden
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Dooley
     Durbin
     Edwards (TX)
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Fingerhut
     Flake
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Fowler
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gallegly
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gilman
     Glickman
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hastings
     Hayes
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hobson
     Hochbrueckner
     Holden
     Horn
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hughes
     Hutto
     Inslee
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klein
     Klink
     Kreidler
     LaFalce
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     LaRocco
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lloyd
     Long
     Lowey
     Machtley
     Mann
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Martinez
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCloskey
     McCurdy
     McDade
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Mfume
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moran
     Morella
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Poshard
     Price (NC)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Ravenel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Ridge
     Roemer
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sangmeister
     Sarpalius
     Sawyer
     Schenk
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shepherd
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (NJ)
     Snowe
     Spratt
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Swett
     Swift
     Synar
     Tanner
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Tejeda
     Thomas (CA)
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Unsoeld
     Upton
     Valentine
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Waters
     Watt
     Weldon
     Wheat
     Whitten
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Yates

                               NOES--158

     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus (AL)
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barca
     Barcia
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bentley
     Bereuter
     Bilirakis
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bunning
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Clinger
     Coble
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (IL)
     Combest
     Cox
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cunningham
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards (CA)
     Ehlers
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Fish
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Gallo
     Gekas
     Gillmor
     Gingrich
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Grams
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Inhofe
     Istook
     Johnson, Sam
     Johnston
     Kasich
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kyl
     Leach
     Levy
     Lewis (FL)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Livingston
     Lucas
     Maloney
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     McCandless
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     Meyers
     Mica
     Michel
     Miller (FL)
     Molinari
     Moorhead
     Myers
     Nadler
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Paxon
     Petri
     Pombo
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Roth
     Roukema
     Sanders
     Santorum
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Sensenbrenner
     Shaw
     Shays
     Skeen
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (OR)
     Smith (TX)
     Solomon
     Spence
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stump
     Talent
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas (WY)
     Torkildsen
     Vento
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Waxman
     Wolf
     Wyden
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--16

     Clayton
     Collins (MI)
     Foglietta
     Grandy
     Huffington
     Jefferson
     Kaptur
     Kopetski
     Lehman
     Royce
     Slattery
     Strickland
     Sundquist
     Towns
     Tucker
     Washington

                              {time}  1618

  So the bill was passed.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The title of the bill was amended so as to read: ``A bill to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 for military activities 
of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for 
defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel 
strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other 
purposes.''
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          ____________________