[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 71 (Thursday, June 9, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: June 9, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 431 and rule 
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, 
H.R. 4301.

                              {time}  1039


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill (H.R. 4301) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995 
for military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe 
military personnel strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for other 
purposes, with Mr. Barca, Chairman pro tempore, in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose on 
Wednesday, June 8, 1994, amendment No. 67 printed in part 1 of House 
Report 103-520 offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] had been 
disposed of.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 431, it is now in order to debate the 
subject of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] will be recognized for 15 
minutes and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] will be 
recognized for 15 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, we now begin debate on a very important 
and serious issue, the nature of America's relationship and activities 
in Bosnia. There will be two amendments before the body, the McCloskey 
amendment in which, unilaterally, the United States would lift its 
participation in the arms embargo against Bosnia, would authorize up to 
$200 million in aid and trainers to train Bosnian soldiers on using the 
equipment.
  There will also then be a second amendment, the Hamilton amendment, 
which would urge the President to consult with NATO ane the United 
Nations regarding means of defending Bosnia which might include lifting 
the arms embargo, sets United States policy as one of achieving a 
peaceful negotiated settlement, commits the United States to work 
collectively to achieve these goals.
  In the final moments that I have, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make 
the following points:
  In this gentleman's opinion, the McCloskey amendment approach, to 
lift the arms embargo unilaterally, threatens to destroy an entire 
range of international agreements and efforts in which the United 
States has a vital interest. At a time when we are attempting to bring 
international resolve and a possible embargo to prevent nuclear weapons 
proliferation in North Korea, we would send a signal that anyone could 
opt out of that regime.
  At a time when we are trying to sort through the endgame of war in 
Iraq and bring about positive changes and prevent a renewed escalation 
of the arms buildup and bloodletting there, we would threaten those 
efforts.
  At a time when we would have succeeded in achieving a cease fire in 
Bosnia, we will throw all that away as nations collectively to respect 
the embargo throughout the former Yugoslavia, including Serbia. And 
finally, there is no doubt in this gentleman's mind, Mr. Chairman, and 
I hope by the end of this debate that my colleagues will agree, we must 
not unilaterally lift out embargo and place ourselves as a participant 
in the battle. It will bring more death and destruction and will result 
in the defeat of our goals and those of our allies.
  I caution all of my colleagues to listen carefully, participate in 
this discussion and debate. And I hope that at the end of the day they 
will vote correctly.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes.
  (Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, as with most issues associated with the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the question of whether to lift the 
current arms embargo is complex. No one knows precisely how lifting the 
embargo against the Moslem forces will affect the attitudes and actions 
of the warring parties. One thing is certain, however. Policies we are 
considering today are certain to have an impact on the safety of 
peacekeepers--particularly United States peacekeepers--that may be 
deployed to keep the peace in Bosnia in the future. Therefore, we need 
to carefully consider the long-term consequences of the policies we 
will be voting on today.
  Shortly after taking office, President Clinton committed to deploying 
as many as 25,000 United States military personnel to Bosnia to serve 
as peacekeepers in the event of a negotiated political settlement. I 
opposed this commitment at the time and I oppose it now. Nonetheless, 
if deployed, these peacekeeping forces will inevitably be asked to 
separate and disarm the parties, deter, and respond to military 
attacks, and ensure compliance with territorial settlements. We ought 
to factor these elements of the President's longer range commitment to 
deploy U.S. troops into our deliberations here today on shorter range 
policy options.
  Mr. Chairman, the United States experience in Somalia taught us that 
peacekeepers seeking to mediate a civil war cannot take sides and not 
expect to be attacked by one or more parties involved in the conflict. 
Once the mission of U.S. forces evolved from ensuring the free flow of 
humanitarian aid to capturing General Aideed, the United States became 
a combatant and the peacekeepers' motto, ``Take no sides, make no 
enemies,'' no longer applied. The results were tragically fatal and, 
unfortunately, should have been predictable.
  In the case of Bosnia, the United States is already perceived by the 
Bosnian Serbs not as a neutral power concerned with keeping the peace, 
but instead, as a backer of the Bosnian Government. The President's May 
1993 proposal to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Moslems and to 
carry out air attacks on Bosnian Serb targets--the short-lived ``lift 
and strike'' policy--as well as the more recent bombing of Bosnian Serb 
positions in and around Gorazde by United States aircraft this part 
April, are rightly or wrongly perceived by the Bosnian Serbs and others 
as evidence of a pro-Moslem bias in United States policy.
  Thus, a direct consequence of unilaterally or multilaterally lifting 
the arms embargo in the near term could be to compound the potential 
danger faced by any United States military personnel dispatched to 
Bosnia as part of a peacekeeping force in the future. Any remaining 
illusion of United States neutrality would disappear if we continue 
down a course that increasingly aligns the United States with the 
Bosnian Government.
  Therefore, under any circumstance I believe the House has an 
obligation to recognize that endorsing a policy that overtly embraces 
the Bosnian Moslem cause ought to simultaneously render null and void 
the President's commitment to deploy up to 25,000 United States troops 
as impartial peacekeepers anytime in the future. Perceived as pro-
Moslem, future U.S. military personnel are more likely to be vulnerable 
targets than effective peackeepers.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder].
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time 
to me. I just hope every one here listens intently to this debate.
  I rise in support of the Hamilton amendment. I think it is the 
correct one. But listen to the coalition here. The gentleman from South 
Carolina [Mr. Spence] and the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] 
agree on this.
  Why do they agree on this? Be very careful. It sounds wonderful to 
say we are going to lift the embargo, but to do that, we are doing that 
unilaterally, whereas we put the embargo on with our allies. And they 
are going to shake their head and say, there they go again, acting like 
the Lone Ranger.
  The Hamilton amendment goes at it the right way. It says that the 
President should work to get the United Nations to raise the embargo 
the United Nations put on. The other piece of this scares me a lot, 
too. There is $200 million in there this time for trainers. But in the 
Vietnam war they were often called advisers. Once you get people in 
doing this, it is very easy to keep pulling and pulling and pulling 
more folks into that war.
  I hope that we start thinking, in this post-cold-war period, about 
how we are going to interact with our allies. When the NATO 
parliamentarians got together, many of the generals who have been in 
Bosnia pleaded with us to work out that structure. Because you had 
people on the ground under U.N. command and suddenly you had NATO 
deciding to do its own show with air bombings that put the guys on the 
ground in trouble as they were taken and kidnapped.
  What they were really saying is, we need someone to be there and 
coordinate the international structures so that we are not putting each 
other in jeopardy and at risk.
  What would be even worse is if not only international structures are 
going off doing their own thing, that people who belong to those 
international organizations like ourselves feel they can vote in the 
international organization one way and then unilaterally change it 
later.
  Please support the Hamilton amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Gilman].
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, the continuing tragedy of the conflict in 
Bosnia is one that should shame all who profess to believe in the 
principles of nonaggression, peaceful settlement of disputes, and 
collective security. The failure of the international community to 
defend the new State of Bosnia, whose borders and territorial integrity 
it recognized when it admitted Bosnia into the United Nations, is one 
for which we all share culpability.
  That Bosnia has been subject to aggression from a neighboring State 
whose ambition is to annex most of the territory within the 
internationally recognized borders of Bosnia should be beyond question 
in this body. Also beyond question is the fact that in Bosnia the most 
basic and fundamental rules of the international system have been 
trampled on. If we have learned nothing else from the past 60 years we 
surely understand that aggression unanswered invites further 
aggression.
  There are good reasons why America's Armed Forces should not become 
directly involved in the conflict on the ground in Bosnia. But none of 
those reasons excuses us from illegally, under the guise of a Security 
Council resolution, depriving the Government and people of Bosnia of 
the means to defend themselves and the borders of their country.
  We have seen the results of the weak, vacillating policies that have 
guided the West's actions concerning the Bosnian conflict. More than 
200,000 people killed and millions more driven from their homes, 
tortured, and maimed. We have seen the perennial peace talks over the 2 
years in London, Geneva, and elsewhere which, while allowing known war 
criminals to legitimize themselves by sitting at the table with some of 
our finest statesmen, have produced nothing in the way of peace or even 
pointed to a settlement other than to carve up the Bosnian nation.
  And what of the present peace framework now being negotiated? How 
long would a people forcefully driven from their homes, who have had 
loved ones killed, maimed, or tortured, abide by a settlement which 
rewards those who have committed these atrocities? What prospect for 
peace and stability in the Balkans would this kind of settlement really 
hold? What precedent would it set in other regions where ethnic groups 
are dissatisfied with present borders? I can only wonder at the naivety 
of those who suggest that this kind of peace is the best the Bosnian 
people, and the international community can hope for.
  I also remind my colleagues that the administration has committed the 
Armed Forces of this country to help enforce a settlement that the 
parties ``agree to'' at the negotiating table. I ask my colleagues 
``What kind of settlement will the Government of Bosnia enter into if 
it cannot adequately defend itself?'' Do we wish to see the Bosnians 
sign an agreement out of duress, which leaves them not even enough 
territory for a reasonable hope of a viable state, or do we wish them 
to enter into an agreement confident that it is the very best they can 
achieve, having been given the means to fight for their country?
  The humanitarian efforts led by the United Nations in Bosnia have 
involved many courageous men and women and have undoubtedly saved many 
lives. But when compared to the specific mandates of numerous Security 
Council resolutions, these efforts are anemic and fall woefully short 
of the words and intent of the Security Council. Instead of 
spotlighting the strength of the international community's will, the 
work of UNPROFOR has only served to demonstrate our lack of resolve by 
exposing us to the calculated insults and manipulations of thugs and 
bullies.
  We are also constantly reminded by the opponents of the right of the 
Bosnians to self-defense that our European allies oppose the measure we 
are about to debate. I will concede that some of the leadership in 
those countries with whom the United States stood shoulder-to-shoulder 
during the dark days of the Second World War have voiced opposition, 
but the public in Europe believes that present policies in Bosnia have 
failed. What is clear now is the urgent need for strong U.S. 
leadership.
  It is past the time to adopt a new approach in Bosnia. An approach 
that will make more equal the military equation which to date has 
produced only further violence, death, misery, and despair among the 
Bosnian people. Opponents of allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves 
contend that more weapons will only produce more violence. To this 
argument, I say that a Bosnian military capable of adequately 
responding to aggression will be both a deterrent to further violence 
and an incentive for earnest efforts at the negotiating table. On the 
other hand, a weak and poorly armed Bosnian military only invites 
cynicism at the negotiating table while it sharpens the appetite of 
Bosnia's neighbor for further conquest.
  There is still time to rescue Bosnia from the legacy of failed policy 
and a shameful lack of resolve on the part of the United States and our 
friends in Europe. International law and morality is on our side. What 
we need now is firmness and constancy of purpose. The aggressors in 
Bosnia must pay a price. It is time to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.
  I urge our colleagues to support the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer 
amendment and to defeat the Hamilton amendment.

                              {time}  1050

  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to my 
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his kindness in 
allowing me to speak on this.
  Mr. Chairman, do we not learn anything from the past? Remember 
Vietnam? Remember the Gulf of Tonkin? Remember how we got involved with 
that issue? True, we would be providing equipment and training and 
trainers. What difference was that between our initial involvement in 
Vietnam? We called them advisors.
  Mr. Chairman, I am chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Forces 
and Personnel of the Committee on Armed Services. I have been speaking 
for quite some time about the shortfall of necessary military personnel 
to fulfill our role and our mission in defending and being successful 
in two major regional conflicts, and here we drain off $200 million in 
military services and people in uniform who should be devoting their 
time and energies in defending the interests of the United States of 
America.
  Further, this lifts the embargo. It does something, lifting the 
embargo against Bosnia, unilaterally. Anyone else can unilaterally lift 
the embargoes. Do we want it done on Iraq? Do we want it done on Libya? 
It undermines.
  If we want to unilaterally break U.N. resolutions, we will have no 
standing to demand compliance by anyone else with other United States 
resolutions. It infuriates our allies. We are their leader. We are the 
leader in NATO. We are the only superpower in this world. If we violate 
the embargo, we infuriate our own allies, especially Britain, Canada, 
France, who have troops on the ground, unlike us, and who fear this 
action will cause a resumption of the war with their troops stuck in 
between.
  Mr. Chairman, I oppose the McCloskey amendment. I am for the Hamilton 
amendment.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Solomon].
  Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, for 3 years now, we have had dithering in the Balkans. 
The vacuum of leadership in Western policy there has led only to 
slaughter.
  A disastrous one-sided slaughter, perpetrated by a Communist 
dictatorship that inherited the preponderance of the Yugoslav Armed 
Forces.
  This is totally unacceptable. For both strategic and moral reasons, 
we must lift this arms embargo, now.
  There are several reasons to do this.
  First, we must, especially given what is occurring in Korea right 
now, restore American credibility, which has suffered several blows 
recently, and nowhere more so than in Bosnia.
  Our vacillating policy must have the Serb aggressors laughing at us.
  Worse, we have let our stated favored policy--lifting the embargo--be 
vetoed in Paris and Moscow, sending a message of weakness to the whole 
world.
  Only by having the courage of our stated convictions will we have 
credibility.
  Further, by assuming a morally equivalent posture in Bosnia, what 
kind of message do we send to would-be imperialists in countries like 
Russia, and we ought to see what is going on there. I just returned 
from there.
  Finally, Mr. Speaker, on strategy.
  Everybody knows that Serbian imperialists dream of a Greater Serbia. 
We can see it on the maps on the walls of their offices.
  Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia means a war that 
could drag in Albania, Bulgaria, and two NATO allies--Greece and 
Turkey--on opposing sides. That is a problem for us, a big problem.
  This is potentially far more harmful to NATO unity than any tiff that 
might ensue if we lift the embargo on Bosnia unilaterally.
  And of course, morally speaking, this embargo is unconscionable. It 
should have been declared null and void over 2 years ago under a 
different administration.
  And the only reason it hasn't is because of an absence of leadership. 
That responsibility, like it or not, devolves to us.
  Vote ``yes'' on McCloskey-Gilman and ``no'' on Hamilton.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman 
from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
  (Mr. McCLOSKEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, before getting into a somewhat formal 
statement, I would like to say that to some degree, the debate so far 
is being characterized by erroneous information, particularly as to our 
involvement. We are involved in the sense that the United States and 
the West generally has been involved in imposing an illegal and immoral 
arms embargo on an increasingly decimated and victimized Bosnian 
population.
  Secondarily, the provision says that any military equipment from the 
United States is discretionary with the President. That would have to 
be provided at the request of the Bosnian Government, and at the 
discretion of the President. It does not mandate at all any particular 
military involvement.
  The main key to this amendment is to basically lift an illegal and 
immoral arms embargo on a besieged people who, by Western edict, and 
what right have we had to do that, have not been allowed to defend 
themselves.
  As we all know, this genocidal course in Bosnia was preceded by the 
Serbian aggression in Croatia, where tens of thousands lost their lives 
under the auspices of UNPROFOR. In Croatia the Serbs still control some 
30 percent of Croatian territory, and no Croatians have been allowed to 
return to their homes.

  In a short time we will be debat- ing McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer, 
which I might say has very broad-based and distinguished leadership, 
including people like the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], the 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior], the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. 
Hoyer], and in its essence it states that we tried an illegal and 
immoral arms embargo for 2 years. It is wrong, it has not worked, and 
it must change.
  Mr. Chairman, I would note that an overwhelming part, nearly all U.N. 
Member-states, have voted to lift the arms embargo. Only several 
parties on the U.N. Security Council want to go on with that policy, 
particularly, namely Britain, France, and Russia. We know what their 
actions and values have been in regard to this war.
  Mr. Chairman, today we will have every reason in the world why 
lifting the arms embargo is a bad step, but if the British, the French, 
and the Russians want to callously and cravenly lead the world down 
this path, why should we trip along? With the Bosnian-Croatian 
alliance, which was substantially the result of American leadership, 
the Government of Bosnia is a little stronger, but they are massively 
overwhelmed by Serbian heavy weapons, with ratios of like 9 and 10 to 
12, and thousands in particular pieces of equipment.

                              {time}  1100

  As Prime Minister Silajdzic told me yesterday, their defense against 
Serb forces is Kalishnikov rifles and a few pieces of heavy equipment, 
particularly tanks that they have captured from the Serbs.
  If Members want to know about Serb intentions and the importance of 
this amendment today, the official Serbian news agency for the Bosnian 
Serbs, and I also believe according to NPR this morning, Tanjug said 
the 4-week cease-fire is a farce. Their intentions at the end of this 
are to open up and obliterate the Bosnian people. We know what the 
Serbs have done. We are talking about a greater Serbia, ongoing Serbian 
aggression in the Balkans and the fact that the blood of hundreds of 
thousands of innocent Bosnians is on our hands, we at least have a 
chance to say, ``no more. You shed this immoral policy.''
  I ask Members to please do this, vote for McCloskey-Gilman.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding me the 
time.
  I want to urge my colleagues to proceed with extraordinary caution in 
this debate, and I think the sound and reasoned conclusion to come to 
in this is to support Chairman Hamilton's alternative to the McCloskey-
Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, everybody knows this is an extremely complicated 
situation and it is a heck of a lot easier to say what we should not do 
than to come up with a magic prescription for success in this part of 
the world. But I believe that acting unilaterally in order to satisfy 
our very understandable and humane desire to do something about Bosnia, 
lifting the embargo unilaterally could and likely would seriously 
damage our U.S. foreign policy and security interests.
  The rift, more than a rift, that would occur between the United 
States and our NATO and European Community allies, I think, is 
predictable and serious. But, additionally, and really uppermost in my 
mind as a member of the Committee on Intelligence, there are the 
implications that unilateral action in this instance would have in 
other areas of the world that are of paramount importance to the United 
States and our security interests.
  If we move unilaterally in this instance, what credibility does the 
United States retain in insisting in other areas on maintaining 
multilateral U.N.-enforced sanctions? How do we surmount that argument 
with respect to Iraq where there are pressures to again circumvent and 
undermine the multilateral sanctions regime? How do we move forward to 
deal with the North Korean situation if we have essentially pulled the 
plug on a systematic multilateral approach in this instance? The answer 
is, we won't and we can't. And the further conclusion is that Mr. 
Hamilton's amendment charts by far the wiser course.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
New York [Ms. Molinari].
  (Ms. MOLINARI asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Ms. MOLINARI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, let us be clear, the war in Bosnia goes on whether we 
see it on the television or not. The rapes are continuing, the shelling 
of innocent lives goes on, and concentration camps throughout the 
region still have an open-for-business shingle hanging outside.
  Let us be clear: The United Nations has failed these people. Now it 
is time for the United States to give the Bosnians the only thing they 
have ever asked, the ability to defend themselves and their families.
  Let me be clear. By ending the arms embargo, we can in good 
conscience keep American ground troops out of the region, if in fact we 
conclude that we still have a national conscience left.
  I urge my colleagues not to echo the leadership disasters of Great 
Britain, not to seek to emulate the leadership and moral imperatives of 
France, and I certainly urge my colleagues not to seek as our goal to 
placate the Russians. Our goal is to restore international order, to 
send messages to other would-be dictators in the world that at least 
the United States will not stand by and, yes, our goal is to save a few 
more innocent lives in an area called Bosnia.
  My colleagues, this will not go away. We must give them the ability 
to defend themselves and to survive this bloody war with an ounce of 
integrity. It is within our grasp today.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
  First I would like to say to my distinguished colleague, the 
gentlewoman from New York, that in the context of the debate on the 
amendment, we will be more than happy to address the gentlewoman's 
arguments in substance. The issues are not nearly so simplistic as have 
been articulated in the well of the House.
  Mr. Chairman, let me finally in a few seconds set the record 
straight. I am in agreement with the gentleman from Indiana who 
indicated that the McCloskey amendment does not mandate military aid, 
but I believe that my distinguished colleague from New York [Mr. 
Gilman] perhaps misspoke himself when he indicated that the bill was 
permissive on the issue of lifting the embargo. I would suggest that it 
does indeed mandate the lifting of the embargo. In the relevant part of 
the amendment entitled ``Termination of the Arms Embargo,'' it states 
as follows:
  ``The President shall'' and I underscore shall for the purposes of 
emphasis, ``terminate U.S. arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina upon the receipt from the Government of a request for 
assistance in exercising the right of self-determination under article 
51 of the U.N. Charter.'' I just wanted to clarify that.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of the 
Committee on Armed Services for yielding me the time.
  Mr. Chairman, let me observe today that I think the choice before us 
is really quite a clear one. The amendment sponsored by my friends, the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey], the gentleman from New York 
[Mr. Gilman], the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior], and the 
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer], directs the President to lift the 
embargo unilaterally on the former Yugoslavia, but it is not just that. 
They also authorize the President to spend up to $200 million in 
military aid to Bosnia, thus starting a new foreign aid program.
  Mr. Chairman, in my judgment this amendment has a lot of risks for 
the United States. I think as we just heard a moment ago in the 
briefings given to us by administration officials, that the McCloskey 
amendment, if it becomes law, would certainly torpedo the peace talks, 
it would intensify and prolong the fighting, it would jeopardize the 
humanitarian relief, it would Americanize the war, and it would 
certainly encourage others to break U.N. sanctions in other parts of 
the world. It would create very serious problems between ourselves and 
our NATO allies and between ourselves and Russia.
  Mr. Chairman, I think the amendment if it becomes law would ensure 
that the war will continue, and it certainly will increase the risk of 
U.S. involvement in that area.
  The amendment that I will offer, the Hamilton amendment, allows for 
the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia by the collective action of 
the U.N. Security Council. It protects the flexibility and supports the 
President's efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement, and it really 
leaves all of our options open, military, diplomatic, including the 
lifting of the arms embargo. It focuses on a collective economic, 
political, military and diplomatic effort to move all of the parties 
toward a negotiated settlement. With all of the problems that the 
diplomats are now having with respect to that settlement, significant 
progress has been made and is being made toward that settlement.
  Mr. Chairman, the Hamilton amendment will certainly enhance the 
defense of Bosnia through coordination with close allies and with 
Russia. It calls on the President working closely with NATO and the 
United Nations to support continued NATO collective enforcement actions 
in Bosnia. And, of course, it calls on the President to consult very 
closely with the Congress.
  Mr. Chairman, I think the important thing here for Members to 
understand is that the choice before us today is very, very clear. The 
McCloskey amendment, I think, takes us down the road to more war. It 
takes us down the road to more direct American military involvement in 
Bosnia. The Hamilton amendment, we stay firmly on the path toward a 
peace settlement.
  Mr. Chairman, I will be spelling out some of these arguments in more 
detail as the debate progresses.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire as to the balance of time 
remaining on both sides of the aisle?
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Fields of Louisiana). The gentleman 
from California [Mr. Dellums] has 3 minutes remaining and the gentleman 
from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield my remaining 1\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].

                              {time}  1120

  Mr. McCLOSKEY. I thank the distinguished gentleman for yielding to 
me.
  Mr. Chairman, we are going to have more time to talk about this, but 
basically I would note that it is the serious opinion of many, many 
scholars, including at least some lawyers in the Department of State, 
that the so-called arms embargo on Bosnia is illegal on its face.
  How can the West tell a sovereign country, a sovereign people, a 
sovereign nation that they cannot defend themselves? If they do do 
that, they have to provide--and this is in the U.N. documents--adequate 
defense and protection. No one can say we have provided adequate 
defense and protection.
  A better analogy would be that the United Nations, the world 
community right now is in the process of enforcing an arms embargo 
against the Kurdish people being victimized by Iraqi forces and 
aggression, moving into the Kurdish areas of Iraq and that region.
  The Government and people of Bosnia have committed no infraction of 
the U.N. Charter. If anyone is an innocent victim in all of this, it is 
the Bosnians, who, I might note, involve all ethnic factions and 
peoples--Jews, Croatians, Moslems, and Serbs. There are hundreds of 
thousands of Serbs, Mr. Chairman, who want no part of Karadjic and 
Milosevic.
  Maintaining an arms embargo against the Bosnians is unjust, as it 
punishes the Bosnian people when they have done nothing other than to 
assert their defense in full accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations. We allegedly says they are a sovereign nation. We should act 
as such and conduct our diplomacy as such.
  Again, I thank the gentleman for the time.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, in order to conclude general debate on 
this side of the aisle, I yield the balance of the time to our 
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. 
Richardson].
  (Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, along with two members of the Committee 
on Intelligence, I just got back from Haiti, where we saw how House 
vote sent terrible signals to the Haitian military rulers; basically, 
the signal being that the United States had no policy, that we did not 
have resolve, that we were sending mixed messages. That is why I am 
opposing the McCloskey amendment today, although it is well-intended 
and supported by some leaders on this issue for whom I have enormous 
respect.
  If we adopt this amendment, we are going contrary to what the 
President of the United States wants.
  The President has sent a letter opposing this amendment. What lifting 
the embargo unilaterally would do, is prolong, widen, and intensify the 
war. But what it will also do is Americanize this war. We will become 
deeply involved in this conflict.
  Remember what the American people are saying about the Bosnias, about 
the Haitis, about the Somalias; they are saying, ``Be careful, be 
careful about using American troops, be careful about getting in and 
not being able to get out.''
  Lifting the embargo unilaterally ill cause our British and French 
allies to leave Bosnia, destroying the U.N. relief effort, which now 
feeds 2 out of 3 Bosnians. The United States is going to take the blame 
and the heat.
  Lifting the embargo unilaterally would jeopardize other U.N. 
sanctions against Iraq, Libya, Haiti, and Serbia. Lifting the embargo 
unilaterally is going to damage our interests, our foreign policy 
interests, because it is going to cause a rift between us and our NATO 
allies and with Russia.
  The Hamilton amendment, in my judgment, is a lot better. It focuses 
on collective economic, political, military, and diplomatic efforts. It 
protects the President's flexibility. It aims to enhance the defense of 
Bosnia through coordination with close United States allies and with 
Russia. It calls on the President, working closely with NATO and the 
United Nations, to support continued NATO collective enforcement 
actions in Bosnia, including the use of air strikes. It calls on the 
President to consult closely with Congress on further actions in 
Bosnia.
  Again, Mr. Chairman, the authors of the McCloskey amendment are 
leaders on this issue, and this amendment is a product of a lot of 
frustration. I have felt in the past that perhaps unilateral action 
should be taken. But at this particular juncture when the President 
needs all the flexibility he can muster, when our foreign policy has 
been under siege, and when you have the President having gone to our 
European allies to state our policy, adopting an amendment like this 
would send exactly the wrong signal.
  On Haiti, we sent an unfortunate signal. By passing this amendment, 
we would send another bad signal.
  The McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment should be defeated 
because: Lifting the embargo unilaterally would prolong, widen, and 
intensify the war and drag the United States, alone, into it; lifting 
the embargo unilaterally will put us on the slippery slope of direct 
United States military intervention in Bosnia by involving United 
States forces in delivering the weapons, training the Moslems, and 
rescuing UNPROFOR forces caught in the crossfire; lifting the embargo 
unilaterally will cause our British and French allies to leave Bosnia 
destroying the U.N. relief effort--which now feeds two out of three 
Bosnians. The United States will take the blame; lifting the embargo 
unilaterally would jeopardize other U.N. sanctions--including those 
against Iraq, Libya, Haiti, and Serbia; lifting the embargo 
unilaterally would damage U.S. foreign policy interests. It will cause 
a rift between the United States and its NATO allies, and with Russia.
  The Hamilton substitute allows for lifting of the U.N. arms embargo 
by U.N. Security Council agreement.
  The Hamilton amendment should be supported because: Its focus is on 
collective economic, political, military, and diplomatic efforts to 
move all parties toward a negotiated settlement of the Bosnian 
conflict; it protects the President's flexibility. It leaves all of our 
options--military and diplomatic including lifting the arms embargo--
open; it aims to enhance the defense of Bosnia through coordination 
with close United States allies and with Russia--while keeping the 
focus on the peace process; it calls on the President, working closely 
with NATO and the United Nations, to support continued NATO collective 
enforcement actions in Bosnia, including use of airstrikes; it calls on 
the President to consult closely with Congress on further actions in 
Bosnia.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Hamilton amendment on 
Bosnia. The amendment calls for the President to work through NATO and 
the United Nations to enhance Bosnia's defense and to end the war.
  This amendment makes sense. It calls for a responsible and rational 
policy based, not only on our national interest, but also on what is 
best for those who seek peace and an end to the horrible bloodshed in 
Bosnia. Today, especially in light of the recently announced cease-
fire, we must not act rashly or unilaterally.
  Nonetheless, I understand the frustration and desire  we all share to 
act to end the slaughter in Bosnia. But our job to act responsibly, 
looking at the unintended consequences of our actions as well as the 
results we hope for.

  We must pass the Hamilton amendment and defeat the McCloskey-Gilman 
amendment. To act unilaterally to lift the arms embargo will have a 
number of negative results--it will prolong and intensify the war; it 
will Americanize the war in various ways: The U.S. will become 
responsible for rescuing and protecting UNPROFOR, the U.N. force now on 
the ground in Bosnia; we, as a nation, will become responsible for 
Bosnia's fate, potentially encouraging the Serbs to overrun the eastern 
enclaves and other isolated Bosnian outposts. At that point, only 
massive U.S. bombing or the threat of invasion could counter or prevent 
the Serb attack; American troops would be drawn into the war through 
the delivery of weapons, the need to keep supply lines open, and to 
train the Bosnians and, then, to protect our advisors; finally, the 
United States would then need to fill the gaps, providing relief to the 
Bosnians after a probable U.N. pullout.
  Mr. Chairman, this is the kind of vote that puts our hearts and our 
heads in competition. We all feel in our hearts the need to act to stop 
the bloodshed, the warfare, and the starvation. But we need to listen 
to our heads, to move toward the same goals but to do it in a way that 
won't cause more harm, more bloodshed, or more starvation. Vote for the 
Hamilton amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Fields of Louisiana). All time has 
expired.
  Pursuant to House Resolution 431, it is now in order to consider the 
amendments printed in part 3 of House Report 103-520 relating to Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, which shall be considered in the following order: (1) 
By Representative McCloskey, Gilman, Bonior, or Hoyer; and (2) by 
Representative Hamilton.
  If more than one of the amendments is adopted, only the last to be 
adopted shall be considered as finally adopted and reported to the 
House.
  It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in part 3 of 
House Report 103-520.


                   amendment offered by mr. mccloskey

  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. McCloskey: Page 308, after line 
     24, insert the following new title:

             Title XII--Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense

     SEC. 1201. SHORT TITLE.

       This title may be cited as the ``Bosnia and Herzegovina 
     Self-Defense Act of 1994''.

     SEC. 1202. FINDINGS.

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) For the reasons stated in section 520 of the Foreign 
     Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 
     (Public Law 103-236), the Congress has found that continued 
     application of an international arms embargo to the 
     Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina contravenes that 
     Government's inherent right of individual or collective self-
     defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and 
     therefore is inconsistent with international law.
       (2) Before deploying United States Armed Forces to defend 
     the territorial integrity and political independence of 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina, or to enforce United Nations mandates 
     in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States should seek to 
     permit the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to obtain the 
     means necessary to exercise its inherent right of self-
     defense.

     SEC. 1203. TERMINATION OF ARMS EMBARGO.

       (a) Termination.--The President shall terminate the United 
     States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina upon receipt from that Government of a request 
     for assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under 
     Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
       (b) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``United 
     States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina'' means the application to the Government of 
     Bosnia and Herzegovina of--
       (1) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and published in the 
     Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58 F.R. 33322) under the 
     heading ``Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to 
     Yugoslavia''; and
       (2) any similar policy being applied by the United States 
     Government as of the date of receipt of the request described 
     in subsection (a) pursuant to which approval is denied for 
     transfers of defense articles and defense services to the 
     former Yugoslavia.

     SEC. 1204. PROVISION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

       (a) Policy.--The President should provide appropriate 
     military assistance to the Government of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina upon receipt from that Government of a request 
     for assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under 
     Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
       (b) Authorization of Military Assistance.--
       (1) Drawdown authority.--If the Government of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina requests United States assistance in exercising 
     its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United 
     Nations Charter, the President is authorized to direct the 
     drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the 
     Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of 
     Defense, and military education and training in order to 
     provide assistance to the Government of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina. Such assistance shall be provided on such terms 
     and conditions as the President may determine.
       (2) Limitation on value of transfers.--The aggregate value 
     (as defined in section 664(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
     of 1961) of defense articles, defense services, and military 
     education and training provided under this subsection may not 
     exceed $200,000,000.
       (3) Expiration of authorization.--The authority provides to 
     the President in paragraph (1) expires at the end of fiscal 
     year 1995.
       (4) Limitation on activities.--Members of the United States 
     Armed Forces who perform defense services or provide military 
     education and training outside the United States under this 
     subsection may not perform any duties of a combatant 
     nature, including any duties related to training and 
     advising that may engage them in combat activities.
       (5) Reports to congress.--Within 60 days after any exercise 
     of the authority of paragraph (1) and every 60 days 
     thereafter, the President shall report in writing to the 
     Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro 
     tempore of the Senate concerning the defense articles, 
     defense services, and military education and training being 
     provided and the use made of such articles, services, and 
     education and training.
       (6) Reimbursement.--(A) Defense articles, defense services, 
     and military education and training provided under this 
     subsection shall be made available without reimbursement to 
     the Department of Defense except to the extent that funds are 
     appropriated pursuant to subparagraph (B).
       (B) There are authorized to be appropriated to the 
     President such sums as may be necessary to reimburse the 
     applicable appropriation, fund, or account for the value (as 
     defined in section 664(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961) of defense articles, defense services, or military 
     education and training provided under this subsection.

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of 
Tuesday, May 24, 1994, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey] will 
be recognized for 30 minutes, and a Member in opposition will be 
recognized for 30 minutes.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
offered by my colleague.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] 
will be recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer], a real battler for justice as to 
the Bosnians and the Balkans.
  Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, nobody has fought harder on this issue than the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
  Mr. Chairman, we are about to make an important decision in voting on 
the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment. It is more than 
a vote on whether we will or will not lift the arms embargo on Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. It is a vote on whether we will act according to 
important international principles, the right to self-defense. It is a 
vote on whether we will ensure that countries are not rewarded for 
violating international principles through forceful changing of 
borders, aggression, and, yes, genocide.
  Let us not stand silent, let us not dissemble, let us not say as the 
gentleman from New Mexico has said, that it is not now time. That is 
what we said in the thirties: it is not time to confront aggression, it 
is not time to stand up for principles, it is not time to say enough of 
killing, enough of taking property by force, enough of ethnic 
cleansing, enough.
  This is a vote on principle. It is not some slick foreign policy 
``let's deal.'' We have been trying to deal with the Europeans for 2 
years, and they have not acted. It was the policy of the Bush 
administration to say that we will, in fact, have the Europeans take 
the lead. That, my friends, was 2\1/2\ million refugees ago. That, my 
friends, was 200,000 deaths ago.
  Have there been more deaths in other parts of the world? There have 
been. Should we be concerned about those? Of course.
  But, ladies and gentlemen of this House, let us not continue to send 
mixed, ambivalent messages, let us say clearly even if the United 
States will not become more involved, we will not stand aside while the 
Bosnians stand defenseless.
  Would, if it were other Europeans--not just Moslems--being 
terrorized, would we stand silent? Would we stand aside and say, 
``Well, we enforced and imposed an embargo 2 years ago on all of 
Yugoslavia, on the theory that we would not exacerbate the situation?''

                              {time}  1120

  Mr. Chairman, the fact of the matter is that one party got all the 
arms that the Yugoslav Army had, and they have used those arms against 
those less able to defend themselves than the aggressors.
  Our own State Department, that now does not want to act, has said 
that the leaders of the Serbs is a war criminal, both in Belgrade and 
in Bosnia, Milosevic, and Karadzic. This is not something on which our 
State Department has minced words.
  I hope that this House, whether it be the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs or the Committee on Armed Services, and I hope that the Members 
of this House, as I hope the American public, will say to those who 
would perpetrate aggression and genocide, that America will not stand 
idly by while that occurs. Had we said that in the midthirties, would 
we have had the tragedy at Omaha Beach? I am not sure; none of us is 
sure.
  But the lesson of history clearly is that aggression and genocide 
will occur if we stand aside, and stand slient, and stand idle, and say 
over and over again, ``Now is not the time; maybe tomorrow and tomorrow 
and tomorrow will be the time to act in the face of aggression, in the 
face of genocide, in the face of war crimes, but now, now is not the 
time.''
  Let us pass this amendment. Let us say that America is going to at 
least allow Bosnia to defend itself. Let us take that small step, not 
the deploying of American troops, not the deploying of American force, 
but at least this small moral step:
  ``Bosnians, you can defend yourselves, and we will assist you at 
least in that step.''
  And let us then reject the Hamilton amendment which says, on the 
other hand, we will remain with the status quo 2\1/2\ million refugees 
later and 200,000 deaths later.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished 
colleague, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, let us make sure we know what the issue is 
today. This is an issue whereby we are putting American soldiers in 
harm's way.
  Do not be misled.
  It is interesting to hear the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer], 
our friend and colleague, speak on this resolution and ignore a major 
part of the language that is in this bill, in this amendment, and that 
language is to provide United States military personnel to train and 
advise Bosnians in Bosnia concerning combat. This is a repeat of what 
went on in Vietnam years ago.
  I ask my colleagues, Haven't we learned our lesson from that? How 
many American lives as advisers will be taken? How many lives as 
advisers in American uniforms were taken in Vietnam? Do we know the 
quagmire in which we are involving ourselves?
  Mr. Chairman, this is not just an arms embargo lifting. It is putting 
American soldiers in uniform, who we cannot afford to do away with in 
our national strategy, into harm's way.
  And where does that put us in relation to our allies? The French? The 
Canadians? The British who have troops on the ground there? We are in 
essence taking sides, and advising, providing military equipment to put 
them in harm's way as well.
  I say to my colleagues, let's think about what we are doing today. 
This is a very dangerous thing. Let us not get carried away with 
emotion. Let us not undermine ourselves in our objectives. This 
undermines ourselves in Iraq, in Libya, as well as elsewhere.
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may 
consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief; just a couple of key points:
  For the second time to Mr. Skelton, really, the analogy is really not 
quagmire or Vietnam. The analogy really is Europe, fascist aggression 
and the likes of Chamberlain telling Hitler, ``You can have what you 
want.''
  As even Mr. Talbot said this morning, the Serbs, as he knows, have 
committed international aggression. He says they are building a greater 
Serbia. There are problems pending in Kosovo, Macedonia, problems with 
Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria; just name it. The message is right now: If we 
do not do something, if we not shed our hands of this policy, that the 
Serbs can continue to get away with it.
  But particularly again, I say to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. 
Skelton], this bill, this piece of legislation, says nothing about 
mandating any arms or equipment. It leaves it up to the President, 
totally at the discretion of the President, which allegedly, since Bill 
Clinton, President Bill Clinton, told me 2 weeks ago in Air force One 
that the arms embargo should be lifted, the problem is multilaterality. 
But, as far as that aspect, that discretion on the part of the 
President, any kind of commitment to any precipice that we cannot 
retreat back from, that is simply not the case.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. WALKER. Am I not correct that the amendment specifically says 
that American forces cannot provide training and advising activities 
that may engage them in combat?
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Nothing can be done without the express authorization 
of the President as to equipment or anything else.
  Mr. WALKER. As I understand it, does the amendment not say, 
``limitation on activities,'' and, as I understand it, it says:

       Members of the United States Armed Forces who perform 
     defense services or provide military education and training 
     outside the United States, under this subsection may not 
     perform any duties of a combatant nature, including any 
     duties related to training and advising that may engage them 
     in combat activities.

  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman pointing that 
out. We should keep the debate going as to what the facts are.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].
  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California 
[Mr. Dellums] for yielding this time to me.
  First of all, let me just say that I certainly understand why many of 
my colleagues in this body are ready to support the McCloskey 
amendment. The people of Bosnia have suffered very much in a tragic 
war. We in the West have been unable to stop it up to this point, and, 
as I have heard so many of my colleagues say, we simply have to do 
something. And I think many of my colleagues look upon the McCloskey 
amendment as a relatively cost-free, risk-free way of participating, if 
my colleagues would, in this war, and I have no doubt at all that they 
are utterly and completely sincere in their views. But I just want to 
say that I think the adoption of the McCloskey amendment will drag us 
much closer to war.

                              {time}  1130

  Now, I think these are the consequences that will flow if the 
McCloskey amendment is adopted. First of all, it is going to intensify 
the war. If we promise the Moslems arms, promise the Bosnian Government 
arms, they are going to have very little incentive to negotiate; they 
will have every incentive to fight. If we arm the Moslems, the Bosnian 
Government, the Serbs will move quickly to crush the Moslems before 
they can receive the weapons. No one disagrees with that point. Witness 
after witness in our committee and in discussions have said to those 
who want to lift the embargo that it will intensify the war and will 
increase the killing.
  The second point or the second risk is that UNPROFOR will leave, and 
that will jeopardize humanitarian assistance. There is not any doubt 
about that. The French Prime Minister, the French Foreign Minister, and 
the British Foreign Minister have all indicated that they are going to 
pull out the UNPROFOR if we have a unilateral lifting of the embargo. 
Why would they not? They have suffered very greatly here, and their 
troops, not American troops, would be at risk. They have already 
suffered many casualties, and they do not want to suffer any more 
casualties. They will move UNPROFOR out.
  UNPROFOR today feeds two of every three Bosnians. It has been an 
extremely successful program under extraordinary difficult 
circumstances, and they will be gone. They will be gone.
  Another consequence is--and our administration officials have 
reiterated this today--is that the peace process comes to an end. Sure, 
there are problems with the peace process, enormous problems, but 
progress is being made day by day, inch by inch. If we vote to lift 
this embargo unilaterally, the peace negotiations fall apart. The 
President has told us that.
  Let me quote the President's letter: ``U.S. action to lift the 
embargo would bring the peace process to an end.'' That is the 
President's judgment. It brings the peace process to an end.
  Another risk, of course, is Balkan instability. Who can tell what 
would happen here? But among the successes--and they have been few, I 
have to acknowledge--among the successes so far has been that we have 
contained this conflict. There have been horrible events in Bosnia, no 
question about that, but we have contained the conflict. If we lift 
this embargo, all kinds of things begin to happen. It could reignite 
the war in Croatia, and it risks an explosion in Albania and in Kosovo. 
It could spill out into the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. 
So we risk instability in the Balkans.
  Another consequence is that it harms U.S. ties if we lift this 
embargo unilaterally. Let us look at NATO. Some of us heard what the 
administration people said this morning, that if we lift this embargo 
unilaterally, the future of NATO is at risk because this is the first 
post-cold-war challenge to NATO. We will be walking away from NATO. We 
will be walking away from Britain and from France, and we will be on 
our own. We certainly will have a serious rift with Russia, with 
unpredictable consequences by the nationalist elements in Russia, and 
those who oppose Boris Yeltsin will be strengthened.
  If we lift this embargo, another risk, of course, is that we 
undermine U.N. sanctions. The United States voted for this embargo. It 
is a solemn commitment of the United States, and if we unilaterally 
break our word and lift the embargo, why should we expect any other 
nation to keep their word on a national commitment? We break a U.N. 
sanction, we do no care about Saddam Hussein, so go ahead and give him 
materials. Many nations want to do that now. We break the U.N. 
sanctions, we do not care about Libyan terrorism, so go ahead and 
supply and trade with Libya. We break the U.N. sanctions, we do not 
care about Haitian democracy. How can we gain support for sanctions on 
Haiti or Serbian aggression or North Korea?

  Now, there have been some legal arguments made here that the 
McCloskey amendment supporters assert that continuing the embargo on 
Bosnia violates the right of self-defense. But may I suggest that that 
interpretation is wrong. Article 51 does not provide the necessary 
authority to allow the United States to unilaterally lift the embargo. 
It states that members' rights to ``individual or collective self-
defense'' must not ``affect the authority of an responsibility of the 
Security Council.''
  That is the next sentence. They only read the first sentence. We 
undermine the U.N. Security Council's ability to act if we claim a 
higher right to simply disregard U.N. Security Council action.
  The next point is that the McCloskey amendment begins a new foreign 
aid program, and it is an open-ended foreign aid program. With $200 
million, it would make the Bosnian Government the fifth largest 
recipient of United States foreign aid on the military side. And 
moreover, the Defense Department estimates that providing that $200 
million could require between 1,500 and 2,400 additional personnel to 
train. And if, of course, they are attacked, they have to have force 
protection.
    
    
  If the Serbs then target UNPORFOR, American forces will be called 
upon to rescue them. If our allies pull out troops, the fighting 
intensifies, and we will be called to help. We will be called upon to 
send weapons in, and we will be called upon for U.S. troops to help 
keep the delivery routes open. But in a larger sense, we become 
responsible for Bosnia's fate.
  Bosnia becomes a client. Our prestige and our power will have to be 
used to assure a Bosnian victory. We cannot go at it halfway.
  Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by simply saying that I know the 
frustrations here. They are very, very deep. It is important to see the 
progress that has been made. Despite the setbacks, we and our allies 
now have come together. We have contained the conflict, we have reduced 
the killing, and in recent months there has been an end to the siege of 
Sarajevo and Tuzla. There has been a peace agreement between the 
Moslems and the Croats in Bosnia. There has been a formal cease-fire 
between Crotian Government and the Serbs in Croatia. There has been a 
dramatic reduction in the level of fighting, and as of yesterday, with 
all it fragility, there is a 1-month cease-fire throughout Bosnia. And 
as the President stated in Europe yesterday, a wider war has been 
avoided and hundreds of lives have been saved.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to oppose the McCloskey amendment.
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time 
remains on both sides?
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Richardson). The gentleman from Indiana 
[Mr. McCloskey] has 22\1/2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums] has 18 minutes remaining.
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli] a subcommittee chairman of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and a man of knowledge and force.
  Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. 
There is not a Member of this House in their own lives that did not 
look in their parents' eyes and say, tell me about the holocaust. Tell 
me why it is the world sat silent.
  There is not a Member of this House who does not remember during the 
carnage in Cambodia, how we said to ourselves, we wish that there was 
something we could have done. But it just was not to be.
  This debate is about many things. But, more than anything, it is 
about this: What are you, my friends, going to say to your children and 
their children's children, when they say to you, where was America? 
When the villages were razed, women were raped, a Moslem people were 
subjected to genocide? Where were you, America? With those in Europe 
who would argue the legal restrictions, the need to stand together, or 
with the victims, where America always is when America is right?
  The compelling logic of the Moslem people is overwhelming. What is it 
they want? They want to survive. They are not asking for our blood or 
our lives. They want to fight to defend their own families.
  I know it is a change of policy. What could be more of a compelling 
argument for this amendment? The policy has failed. And this 
legislative body at its best, if it is honest with itself, will stand 
apart and say it was tried. But the idea of an embargo on a poor 
impoverished people, while allowing a military force under the same 
rules in Serbia, was an imbalance that was bound to create the 
situation. Allow ourselves to escape from it.
  Now we are told that there are legal precedents. There will be 
complications. Well, you decide. Do you want to look at history with 
your own children and say you were respecting precedents, or you were 
standing for justice? This amendment is justice.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
  (Mr. COMBEST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, it might appear this is an easy vote, give 
the Bosnian Moslems the right to arm themselves and fight. If it were 
that easy, I would be supporting it. I predict that while it may not 
seem to be difficult today, in the future many may find this vote 
haunting them. I hope that if this measure passes and actions are taken 
accordingly, my position is proven wrong because if I am proven right, 
it will mean that Americans have lost their lives. Mr. Chairman, there 
are too many uncertainties.
  This amendment makes it clear what we are to do. We are to ``go it 
alone.'' We unilaterally provide arms. Where are the weapons to come 
from? How long will it take to supply them and train for their use? 
And, who trains them? The more independent our role the more American 
sons and daughters are placed in Bosnia and in harm's way.
  What happens if--in recognizing the potential problems of the Moslems 
being armed--the Serbs launch an all-out preemptive strike in an 
attempt to end the conflict prior to the Moslems' ability to strike 
back? What happens to the Americans who we have stationed there in 
their new role? What do we do then? How much further are we brought 
into this confict?
  Some military leaders on the scene have observed that an end to the 
arms embargo months ago would have been a different story. But ending 
that embargo now would create havoc.
  Mr. Chairman, the American people have never lost their resolve for 
peace and freedom. But they do expect that before our soldiers are 
placed in danger, every possibility has been predetermined and plans 
have been made. That is not the case in this instance and until such 
plans have been outlined and we realize the potential American 
involvement and ultimately the possible American loss, I cannot support 
the proposal.
  To the proponents, the question must be posed--do you support the 
introduction of Americans in Bosnia? The answer to that is yes; let us 
say so and make it very clear that is what we are voting on. Members 
supporting this amendment had better consider this vote as a call for 
the intervention of American sons and daughters on the ground in 
Bosnia.
  Several years ago when the House considered the authority to go to 
war in the gulf, I did not cast my vote blindly as a disinterested 
bystander. At that time, my son went to work everyday in the Marine 
uniform and it was almost certain he would go to the gulf. I supported 
that effort then and today I am totally convinced that was the right 
decision.
  I do not share the same conviction regarding American involvement in 
Bosnia today. Until we know the specific result of our actions and 
until we have planned for the potential reactions to our actions I 
would not vote to send my son to Bosnia, and I will not vote to send 
yours.
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my dear friend and 
a real courageous worker on this issue, the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Olver].
  Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I think one of the most ironic parts of this debate is 
that at this very time, we have just finished commemorating 50 years 
since D-day, and that epic struggle against fascism which the Second 
World War represented. And one of the features of that war, which will 
remain indelible through history, is that feature which was the most 
widespread genocide occurring over a whole continent, an effort to 
obliterate a whole people and a whole culture. Yet we are now in the 
process of denial of self-defense of a people that is being subjected 
to genocide.
  I do not think there is anybody who denies that this is an effort at 
genocide on the part of the Serb Chetniks. There are Roman Catholic 
Churches and Moslem Mosques which have been destroyed. The whole of the 
religious infrastructure for the two other religions that the Slavic 
people in Bosnia represent, great and beautiful edifices dynamited, 
cultural centers destroyed, museums, obliteration of a whole culture is 
being attempted, along with the concentration camps that we had, the 
indiscriminate slaughter of all ages of people because of their 
religion, the millions of refugees that have been created in that 
process.
  The most basic right that people have is the right on the part of 
individuals and nations, the right of self-defense. Personal law, U.S. 
law, moral law, Biblical law, international law, all allows for the 
right of self-defense, except in Bosnia. Except in Bosnia, where there 
is a defense instead of a denial of that right of self-defense and 
weaponry to do that on the part of the people involved.
  This is the only instance in 50 years of the U.N. history where 
direct U.N. action, deliberate U.N. action, helped and served the 
aggressor, made the genocide worse. Bosnia, and Croatia before Bosnia, 
both of them U.N. members, have been embargoed against even defensive 
weapons, while Serbia for 3 years supplied arms and men and all kinds 
of supplies and its own troops to grab as much land in an aggression in 
Bosnia. As much land as possible has been taken.
  It has been a process of kill or drive out all the people that 
possibly could be killed or driven out, depending particularly on their 
religion. The embargo is illegal and immortal, and ought to be lifted. 
It is a violation of the U.N. Charter.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha].
  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, let me talk about the practical side of 
lifting the embargo and the problems I have with the U.S. unilaterally 
lifting the embargo.
  All of us have seen this tragedy unfold. Not long ago I was in 
Sarajevo, and I stood on the spot in the central marketplace where the 
mortar round hit and killed so many people, and they talked about the 
terrible tragedy that is going on in Bosnia.
  General Rose, the U.N. ground commander, took me all through the area 
in Sarajevo particularly, and talked about the difficulty that the 
United Nations has on the ground.
  For instance, in close air support, the hillsides are heavily 
vegetated. A tank moves back and forth, and is difficult to spot. Also, 
there is often cloud cover that greatly complicates air missions. So 
people who think you could easily expand the bombing and significantly 
affect military events on the ground are inaccurate. It's not an easy 
proposition.
  General Rose told me that with the military situation that has 
developed, this is the very time in which negotiations must be stressed 
to end this ongoing tragedy. There is some momentum here.

                              {time}  1150

  He said that certain actions taken by the United States could 
interrupt the momentum toward a settlement and prolong the fighting on 
the ground if we raise false hopes.
  For instance, he said that every time the United States makes a 
strong statement we encourage one party or the other to institute a 
military action. He said, ``every time that happens, it endangers my 
U.N. people on the ground.'' He said:

       You don't have anybody on the ground participating in this 
     action, and your statements precipitate military action that 
     endangers people on the ground.

  He said:

       I implore you to go back and tell the President of the 
     United States to negotiate with the Russians and with the ECa 
     settlement, and do it as quickly as possible. There is a 
     window of opportunity right now to try to settle this very 
     desperate, tragic situation.

  I said, ``What about lifting the embargo?''
  He said:

       Here is the problem. Both sides have arms. One side may 
     have more heavy equipment than the other, but regarding the 
     Muslims that do not have the heavy equipment, the only people 
     that could supply it is the United States. There is nobody 
     else in the world that could supply that equipment. And to do 
     it, you would have to fight your way through if you took it 
     through on the ground.

  We see what happens when we get involved in that kind of a match. It 
escalates to the point where the United States is drawn in. We become 
the enemy.
  The Somalia, which was a fairly primitive military situation, the 
United States thought it was going to go into Somalia and we would 
control the situation completely. We became the enemy. They killed a 
number of American service people trying to provide humanitarian aid, 
with all the good intentions in the world.
  All of us have good intentions. All of us would like to see the 
fighting stopped, but what we would be doing is forcing one side or the 
other to take action against us.

  A Stinger missile will fire and shoot down a C-130, or whatever type 
airlift airplane it happens to be, very easily. If they have hand-held 
missiles, believe me, they will shoot down American aircraft. The 
United Nations will not be able to maintain a presence in that area if 
we go too far.
  For instance, when we went into Sarajevo, anybody who thinks that 
area is not controlled by the Serbs is wrong. We went through three 
checkpoints. They made us get out of the automobile. The Commander said 
to me, ``Look at the hillsides. They can shoot us anytime they want 
to.''
  We sit back here and we can watch television and we can say how 
wonderful it is for the United States to take action in this particular 
situation, but if you are in Sarajevo or in Gorazde and you are serving 
with the U.N. forces, a unilateral lifting of the embargo means the 
U.N. forces and the United States are taking sides. It would be a 
tragic mistake for the United States to do so. We would lose our 
neutrality and our ability to broker a settlement.
  Mr. Chairman, I would urge the Members of this Congress to vote 
against the amendment offered by my good friend, the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the ranking member of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. He is a primary coauthor of this 
amendment, and I am so much in his debt.
  (Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the McCloskey-
Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment to end the arms embargo of Bosnia because 
we have been witnessing aggression and genocide in Bosnia on a scale 
not witnessed in Europe since the worst days of World War II.
  Inaction in the face of this barbarism is not an option. We must take 
action to end this tragedy in Bosnia.
  Let us no longer accept the fiction as we have in the past 2 years 
that all that is required is a little more patience--just a few more 
weeks to give the diplomats time to negotiate a settlement. For 2 years 
we have been patiently awaiting a negotiated settlement. But all that 
such waiting has brought to Bosnia is more death and destruction.
  Regrettably, it is anticipated that the latest cease-fire will be no 
different than past cease-fires. The Bosnian Serbs have already 
publicly indicated that they intend to resume fighting within 30 days.
  Bosnia cannot afford more patience.
  If we agree that we will wait no longer and that we must do 
something, there really are only two options.
  One is to end the arms embargo so that the people of Bosnia can 
acquire the wherewithal to defend themselves. The McCloskey-Gilman 
amendment will do precisely that.
  The other option would be to send United States forces into Bosnia to 
end the aggression and genocide.
  It appears that the administration has already started us down the 
road to direct U.S. military involvement. What were the United States 
airstrikes around Gorazde, and our shooting down of three Serbian 
aircraft, but the first step onto the slippery slope to direct United 
States military involvement? This is why the references we've heard 
today to Vietnam are misplaced. It is the administrations's current 
policy that will drag us into a Vietnam-style Quagmire, not lifting the 
arms embargo.

  The substitute to the McCloskey-Gilman amendment originally offered 
by Chairman Hamilton at least had the virtue of acknowledging that 
direct U.S. military involvement is the alternative to lifting the arms 
embargo. The original Hamilton substitute contains an authorization 
under the War Powers Resolution for our United States Armed Forces to 
engage in hostilities while conducting air operations in Bosnia. It 
also contemplated the deployment of United States ground forces in 
Bosnia.
  The original Hamilton amendment was withdrawn and replaced by the 
weaker language which we will vote on later today. The obvious reason 
for this switch is that there was not sufficient support in the House 
for the original language.
  And that is instructive. If there isn't support for the real 
alternative to lifting the embargo--if his House and the American 
people are not going to favor direct United States military 
involvement--then a vote against the McCloskey-Gilman amendment is in 
fact a vote to do nothing about the aggression and genocide in Bosnia.
  And that, to my mind, is a morally untenable position to take.
  There should be no question about whether ending the embargo will 
make a difference in Bosnia.
  The Bosnian government has repeatedly asked us to take this step, 
knowing better than anyone else what ending the embargo will mean--both 
the risks it will entail and the opportunities. The Bosnians have 
repeatedly stated that this is the single most important step we can 
take to help them to resist the aggression and genocide now being 
inflicted upon them.
  It has been the Clinton policy for over a year to end the arms 
embargo. Surely he would not have adopted this policy if there was any 
truth to the opposition's arguments.
  The President's policy would make no sense if there were no way to 
get weapons into Bosnia; or if the Bosnian Government forces could not 
be trained to use the weapons; or if getting the weapons into Bosnia 
would not make any difference in turning back the aggression and 
genocide. To suggest these things is to suggest that the President's 
policy over the past year has been at best seriously misguided, and at 
worst a cruel joke--a cynical ploy to buy more time while more people 
die.
  The only difference between the McCloskey-Gilman amendment and the 
President's policy is that our amendment would implement the policy 
unilaterally, without waiting for the U.N. Security Council to formally 
rescind the embargo.
  Our amendment calls on the United States to provide leadership in the 
face of the moral crisis in Bosnia.
  Opponents of the amendment are telling us we should wait for the 
United Nations to provide leadership.
  I fear if we do that we will be waiting for a long time.
  The McCloskey-Gilman amendment relies on Bosnia's right under article 
51 of the U.N. Charter to defend itself against aggression as the legal 
basis for unilaterally ending the embargo. Those who contend that 
Bosnia's right to defend itself has been extinguished by the action the 
United Nations has taken to date do not fully understand article 51.
  Bosnia is not compelled to stand by and allow itself to be 
annihilated because 2\1/2\ years ago the United Nations decided to 
impose an arms embargo on a country that no longer exists. We are not 
compelled to stand by, allowing that annihilation to occur.
  As for the claim that our opting out of the arms embargo of Bosnia 
will invite other countries to opt out of U.N. embargoes we support, 
such as that of Iraq, all I can say is that those situations are 
entirely different. It is absurd to suggest that there is no difference 
between Bosnia, which is the victim of continuing aggression, and Iraq, 
which was the perpetrator of aggression. There can be no equating 
Bosnia with Iraq.
  In fact, there is no need for us to continue debating the question of 
international law presented by the arms embargo. The Congress already 
has had that debate and reached a decision. We already have found that 
continued application of the U.N. arms embargo to the Government of 
Bosnia violates article 51 of the U.N. Charter and is illegal under 
international law.
  That finding was contained in section 520 of the recently passed 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act. That section went on to urge the 
President to unilaterally terminate U.S. participation in the arms 
embargo.
  The McCloskey-Gilman amendment will implement the advice we so 
recently gave the President. In addition, it will authorize--but not 
require--the President to provide up to $200 million in military 
assistance by way of drawdowns from Defense Department stocks. Those 
drawdowns can be made without increasing our budget deficit.
  Mr. Chairman, I submit we can make a difference in Bosnia, by voting 
in support of the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, the timekeeper has now 
corrected the amount of time, and this gentleman has 10 minutes 
remaining, rather than 13 minutes, am I not correct?
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. That is correct.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I would indicate to my distinguished 
colleague that it would be the intention of this gentleman to close the 
debate.
  Further, as I understand it, under the rules, this gentleman has the 
right to close debate. Am I not correct, Mr. Chairman?
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman is correct, he has the right 
to close debate.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I would ask, is the distinguished 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] saying that he is going to have 
one 10-minute speaker in conclusion?
  Mr. DELLUMS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish].
  Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding time to me. 
Mr. Chairman, I rise today to strongly urge my colleagues to support 
the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment, which provides for the 
immediate and unilateral lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
  Let us once and for all dispel the myth that all sides are equal in 
what some still attempt to portray as a civil war. Our irresolute 
policy to date has only encouraged violence and ethnic cleansing. In 
short, Mr. Chairman, alternatives to lifting the arms embargo have not 
worked.
  For over 2 years we have witnessed the ravages of aggression and 
genocide in Bosnia. Over 200,000 people are dead or missing and 
presumed dead; 85 percent of this total were civilians, and perhaps 
most staggering is the fact that nearly as many children have died as 
have combatants.
  Against this backdrop, it is unconscionable that we continue to deny 
the Bosnians the opportunity to obtain the necessary means to defend 
themselves. The continued imposition of an arms embargo against Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, a sovereign nation, in the face of a well-armed 
aggressor is reprehensible and should end without further delay. Mr. 
Chairman, we are already a year later. As for taking sides, Elie Wiesel 
observes ``Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim.''
  Mr. Chairman, the Bosnians have demonstrated their determination and 
courage to defend their country and all that it stands for. Their Prime 
Minister has asked for our help. I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' 
on the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment which calls for the kind 
of resolute action required to pave the way for a truly just and 
lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia. At the same time, I urge 
rejection of the Hamilton amendment which effectively endorses the 
failed status quo.

                              {time}  1200

  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Kansas [Mr. Glickman], the distinguished chairman of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence, who has been following the Balkan 
conflict intensely.
  (Mr. GLICKMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the position of the 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey] and I very much respect my 
colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, but the fact of the matter 
is this amendment is not inconsistent with negotiation and settlement. 
It actually strengthens the ability of the United States to have 
influence in the United Nations in getting the parties together.
  I think from a standpoint of negotiation, it makes sense. But there 
is the old expression ``Actions speak louder than words.'' The world 
has spoken against the atrocities and brutality in the Balkans but has 
done nothing about it. They look to us.
  Mr. Chairman, I have traveled a lot in my role as chairman of the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the world still looks to 
us. They say it is great other countries are involved in the Balkans, 
but only one nation has the moral leverage, the moral ability to 
influence the world and the power to stand behind it and get something 
done, and that is the Americans.
  Mr. Chairman, we have got to act like a moral leader, not just talk 
like a moral leader, and this is a good place to begin.
  It was the Italian poet Dante who said, ``The darkest place in hell 
is reserved for those who in a period of moral crisis claim 
neutrality.''
  Mr. Chairman, it is time for us to stop being neutral about 
atrocities, about killing of people based upon the color of their skin 
or who they are or what they believe in. It is time for America to 
stand up. We can do it with this amendment.
  There is some risk in terms of the increased arms in the region, but 
nothing ventured without some risk will ever make any difference to 
anybody, anyway. We not only owe it to the people in the Balkans but we 
owe it to people around the world who are facing atrocities based upon 
who they are or where they were born or what they believe in that 
America will not allow this to continue.
  Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment and I hope it passes.
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
New York [Mr. Nadler].
  Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, we are told that we are dealing with 
ancient ethnic quarrels here that we cannot hope to fathom. The truth 
of the matter is that we are dealing with a classic case of aggression 
across an international border, against a member state of the United 
Nations, plus the instigation of domestic insurgency, not very 
different from what we faced in Kuwait.
  We have twice before this century had immoral arms embargoes. In the 
1930's when the Fascists revolted in Spain, we had an arms embargo 
against the loyalists while Hitler and Mussolini armed the Fascists. In 
1948 we had an arms embargo against Israel, and thank God to the 
Czechoslovaks who supplied arms so that the seven invading armies did 
not succeed.
  Now we are imposing an arms embargo against the victims of aggression 
and the victims of genocide while the aggressors have plenty of arms. 
We are told that lifting the arms embargo might lead to greater 
bloodshed. That is like saying that we should not have let the 
defenders of the Warsaw ghetto have arms against the Nazis.
  Mr. Chairman, I am a member of the Holocaust Memorial Council. I have 
many victims of the Holocaust in my district. We always say never 
again, we must learn never again, but it is happening again, and what 
are we doing about it? At least let us arm the Bosnians. This amendment 
unfortunately does not do that. The amendment simply lifts the arms 
embargo and leaves everything else up to the discretion of the 
President. But let the Bosnians defend themselves against the Fascist 
aggressors. Let those aggressors pay a price.
  We are told lifting the arms embargo could lead to destruction of the 
peace negotiations. What peace negotiations? As I look at them, they 
are simply trying to have a fig leaf for the surrender of land made 
free of Bosnians to the Serbian aggressors. We might as well be telling 
the Czechoslovaks to cede the Sudetenland to the Germans or telling 
England in 1940 to lay down its arms, leaving the Nazis supreme in 
Europe.
  Let us erase the stain of neutrality with regard to genocide. Let us 
erase the stain of complicity with regard to genocide. Let us end this 
embargo which is the handmaiden of genocide.
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman 
from New York [Ms. Slaughter].
  Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Chairman, the debate that should have taken place 
about 2 years ago at the end of the cold war was what was the United 
Nations going to be? We have sent in again to this conflagration in 
former Yugoslavia people dressed in suits and blue helmets and we have 
watched as they have been totally ineffective. Imagine what it was like 
for them to have been escorting the Vice President of Bosnia to the 
airport, in a United Nations carrier which was stopped on the street, 
the back door opened and the man shot to death in front of them. Time 
after time we have watched convoys of food and medical supplies be 
turned back because the Serbs would not let them go on where they were 
needed.
  I received a letter myself from a surgeon in a Sarajevo Serbian 
hospital, ``Please tell your President we are operating in the dark, in 
the cold. We have no ability to sterilize the instruments, we have no 
antiseptic, no antibiotics. We are using hacksaws to cut off limbs.'' 
While we have watched this for 3 years one side has been pounding the 
other, the other side being unarmed by U.N. decree.
  The President of Bosnia was here not long ago, he looked us all right 
in the eye and he said, ``Whether you like it or not, America, you have 
the moral imperative. You have always stood for that, you have always 
said you have it and now it is time for you to use it. You cannot get 
away from it and you cannot escape it.''
  Mr. Chairman, until we decide what the United Nations is going to be, 
whether they will really be able to prepare to keep the peace, it is 
time for us to follow what human rights organizations and most of us 
here believe has to be done and that is lift the embargo. Thousands of 
innocent people have been murdered and we just let it happen. It is 
indecent, inhumane, and we must not prevent people from protecting 
themselves. Verbal communication did nothing. The United States said at 
one point they were going to drop food in this area no matter what 
anybody thought about it. At that moment the Serbs began to rush to New 
York to the United Nations to talk. But did we pay any attention to 
that? No.
  One day we have a compelling interest but the next day we do not. We 
have dithered back and forth with our allies making the case over and 
over, since we have no troops on the ground, we literally have nothing 
to say there. Lift the embargo and let us insist that the U.N. 
peacekeepers be equipped and trained to do their work.
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Wilson].
  Mr. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, it was said earlier in the debate that the great 
problem with lifting this embargo would be that it would somehow 
Americanize this war and it would somehow place America in the position 
of taking a position.
  I would just like to say that in a war as brutal and vicious as this 
one where there is destruction of churches, where people are forced to 
leave their land, where there are death camps again 50 years later, 
there are death camps, I have seen the victims of the rape camps 
myself. There is ethnic cleansing. There is genocide. This is good 
versus evil, and if we do not want to Americanize this, then what do we 
want to Americanize? We have to stand for something.
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to my dear friend, the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Hastings].
  (Mr. HASTINGS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my support for 
the McCloskey/Bonior/Gilman/Hoyer amendment to lift the arms embargo on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  The 2-year-long embargo has done little toward ending either the war 
or the atrocities committed against the Bosnian Moslems. Two years 
worth of international diplomacy have achieved almost nothing. And 
during this 2-year peace process/negotiating period, more than 200,000 
Moslems have been slaughtered.
  If we are not interested in sending in our own troops to end the 
conflict we can at least ensure that this besieged minority has the 
ability to defend itself. Two years worth of one tactic is enough: It 
is clear that diplomacy alone is not working.
  I have heard the argument that if we lift the arms embargo we will 
intensify the warfare rather than end the warfare. That by providing 
arms to the Moslems we will enable them to launch a full-scale war 
against the Serbs. I admit that this might, in fact, be true.
  But the alternative is to continue to allow one side to slaughter 
another. We have watched this happen for the past 2 years and we all 
know that it will continue despite diplomacy.
  We come to this well every day to decry the holocaust, to express 
outrage about Rwanda, to complain that people are hungry and homeless 
and sick and poor. We complain about all of these things, yet most of 
us probably feel that we are powerless to help. Well we are not 
powerless to help. People are being killed in Bosnia. If we can't help 
end the war we can at least help the Moslems help themselves.
  I do not want to be responsible for the deaths of hundreds of 
thousands of people. But neither can I stand by and watch hundreds of 
thousands of people die because of the status quo. Support the 
McCloskey amendment.
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher].

                              {time}  1210

  Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, we have heard a lot of talk today 
about America becoming involved in a conflict so far away from our 
shores.
  Let us note that if we do not permit victims to defend themselves, we 
are more likely to get involved in sending our troops into conflicts 
like the Balkans. We do not want to Americanize this war. What we want 
to do is permit the people who are being victimized and slaughtered to 
be able to defend themselves. What could be better than that?
  We should end this immoral arms embargo. It is immoral because it 
treats the victims and aggressors alike in the end that will drag in 
America's troops if, indeed, those people cannot defend themselves.
  This policy has led to genocide, because it has left the aggressor 
with a monstrous advantage.
  We are being told America cannot act. Well, America can act. We 
should be the leaders of the free world.
  The new world order has turned into a nightmare of bungling, 
indecision, and cowardice. We must end this immoral arms embargo so 
victims can defend themselves, and the United States does not have to 
send troops everywhere in the world.
  Please, vote yes for McCloskey-Gilman.
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Engel].
  Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, it is said that Nero fiddled while Rome burned. For the 
past 2 years, we have been fiddling while the people of Bosnia have 
burned.
  I do not want to know about diplomatic niceties. I know 2 years ago 
we should have been doing what I hope we are about to do now.
  I went to Skopje. I met with these people. They told us atrocities 
that you just cannot believe.
  If this were 2 years ago, perhaps there would be time for diplomatic 
niceties. But there is not time anymore.
  If we will not help them, if we will not defend the people of Bosnia, 
let us let them defend themselves.
  Vote to lift the arms embargo.
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, in conclusion as to our side on this 
very important debate, I yield 4 minutes, the remainder of our time, to 
the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior], a Member for whom I hold 
massive esteem, a man whose great courage and integrity cannot be 
exaggerated.
  Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, we have heard a lot of hopeful talk this 
morning about the Bosnian cease-fire that was signed yesterday.
  We have been told that the Geneva Agreement is the beginning of a new 
round of peace talks.
  Well, let me read to you a quote from somebody we have not heard from 
yet in this debate.
  Let me read you what the Bosnian Serb Government had to say this 
morning about the 1-month cease-fire they agreed to just yesterday.
  Through their news agency, the Bosnian Serb leaders said, and I 
quote:

       The Geneva Agreement is merely a 1-month calm before an 
     unprecedented storm and a prelude to total conflict. After 
     that it will become clear to one and all that there is no 
     formula according to which two victors can emerge from this 
     war.

  That is what the Bosnian Serb leaders themselves had to say about 
their cease-fire.
  We have heard time and time again on this floor today that now is not 
the time to act in Bosnia.
  That now is not the time to lift the arms embargo.
  That we must be patient and wait to act.
  Well, I agree, Mr. Chairman. Now is not the best time to act. The 
truth is, we should have acted a long time ago.
  But for over 2 years, we just sat back and waited.
  Waited as tens of thousands of innocent civilians were starved in 
mass concentration camps.
  Waited as thousands of young girls were systematically raped by 
Serbian soldiers.
  Waited as Serb snipers in places like Gorazde and Sarajevo gunned 
down innocent children in cold blood.
  And now opponents of this amendment are asking us to wait a little 
longer.
  Mr. Chairman, how many innocent people have to die in Bosnia before 
we do something about it?
  Are 200,000 dead Bosnians enough? Are 16,000 slaughtered children 
enough? That is how many have died in the past 2 years.
  How many times can we turn our heads and pretend we just don't see?
  There have been over two dozen ceasefires the past 2 years. The peace 
process has started and stalled countless times. We have watched the 
Serbs break agreement after agreement. And still we have done nothing.
  Nothing, as Serb aggression has run unchecked as Serb tanks have 
rolled through the Bosnian countryside, taking town after town, village 
after village, and still they kept coming, turning Bosnia into a 
modern-day Sudetenland.
  And the worst part, Mr. Chairman, is that the Bosnian people have had 
to face it all with both arms tied behind their backs, because the arms 
embargo we enforce has denied them the very weapons they need to defend 
themselves.
  There are those who say we should not lift the arms embargo today 
because it will involve us in the war.
  But let us be honest: We are already involved in the war.
  By keeping this embargo in place for so long, not only have we forced 
the Bosnian people to fight tanks and mortars with guns and knives but 
we have helped tilt the balance of the war in favor of Serbian 
aggression.
  To have imposed the arms embargo in the first place was 
incomprehensible. But to have kept it in place for so long, after so 
much suffering, is utterly shameful.
  Mr. Chairman, the people of Bosnia are not asking us to send in 
troops.
  They are not asking us to defend them.
  They are simply asking for the right to defend themselves.
  And we have no right to deny them that.
  By passing this amendment today, we will simply extend to Bosnia that 
right which is guaranteed to every other sovereign national under the 
U.N. Charter--the right to self-defense, and the even more fundamental 
right to self-determination.
  It is time the Serbs learn that the world will not stand for its 
aggression.
  To those who say that lifting the embargo will disrupt the peace 
process, I say you are wrong: Lifting the embargo will not weaken the 
peace process, it will strengthen it.
  The reason peace talks have failed the past 2 years is because the 
Serbs have had no reason to negotiate. They face no opposition on the 
battlefield, so they have had no incentive to stay at the negotiating 
table.
  We woke up this morning to headlines of a new cease-fire and hope for 
peace in Bosnia.
  But within hours after those headlines appeared, before the ink was 
even dry, the Bosnian Serbs disavowed the agreement and threatened to 
unleash an ``unprecedented storm * * * a total conflict.''
  Let us never forget that we have been down this same road before.
  Just 4 months ago, in early February, we applauded a cease-fire in 
Sarajevo. But a few hours later, we mourned as a shell ripped through a 
Sarajevo market, killing 68 innocent civilians.
  Just 2 months ago, we welcomed three separate cease-fires in Gorazde. 
But then we watched in horror as Serb snipers used homeless families 
for target practice, and Serb shells rained down on children lying in 
hospital beds.
  More than two dozen times the past 2 years, we have seen cease fires 
broken and peace talks fail.
  By our actions here today, we can and must strengthen the cause for 
peace.
  Mr. Chairman, we began this week by remembering one of the proudest 
days in our history.
  Schoolchildren all across America learned how 50 years ago, their 
grandparents saved the world from tyranny and genocide.
  But 50 years from now, schoolchildren will study this time.
  And they will look back and wonder where American leadership was when 
genocide reared its ugly head again.
  They will want to know why we sat back and watched children be 
slaughtered and families torn apart.
  They will want to know why the U.S. Navy blockaded the shores of 
Bosnia so arms could not enter and innocent people could not defend 
themselves.
  And somehow, the excuses that there were barriers too difficult to 
overcome or that we could not get our allies to go along with us will 
seem empty. We have a chance to change some of that here today.
  Fifty years after the world said ``never again''; now is our time to 
stand up to tyranny and genocide in the world. And we cannot wait any 
longer.
  Because if we do not, if we do not lift this embargo and at least let 
the people of Bosnia defend themselves, then the blood of Bosnia is not 
just on the hands of the Serbs.
  It is on all of us.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time for 
the purposes of concluding debate on this issue.
  Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, let me make several 
observations.
  First, good and decent human beings have arisen in the well of the 
House on both sides of this aisle, people whom I respect with a great 
sense of sincerity.
  Second, Mr. Chairman, there have been a number of eloquent and 
articulate, compelling, and compassionate statements made during the 
course of this debate.
  Third, Mr. Chairman, what should not be negotiable, debatable, or 
discussible is that all of us believe that the killing and the dying 
should end.
  The question before us is how to do it. And, second, does the action 
contemplated in the amendment before the body take us to that place?
  There have been a number of brilliant statements, Mr. Chairman, but 
let me look specifically at what this amendment does and whether it 
takes us to the goal and objective that has been eloquently spoken by a 
number of people in the well.
  This amendment unilaterally, Mr. Chairman, and I underscore for the 
purposes of emphasis, unilaterally, the United States would lift its 
participation in the arms embargo against Bosnia, and it would 
authorize up to $200 million in aid and the trainers to train Bosnian 
soldiers on using the equipment.

                              {time}  1220

  So, Mr. Chairman, all of us want to end the killing and the dying. 
This is unilateral lifting of the embargo. This is a complex issue. 
This gentleman has thought long and hard on this matter, and I would 
like to share with you, Mr. Chairman, the significant reasons why I 
believe this is going down the wrong path.
  No. 1, it violates the first rule of peacekeeping, Mr. Chairman. With 
this vote, we would effectively become Bosnia's allies. We would 
violate the cardinal rule of peacekeeping, ``Choose no sides, make no 
enemies.''
  Mr. Chairman, we are the last peg standing, we are the great 
superpower. We must learn as a Nation how to engage in peacekeeping, 
peacemaking, peace enforcement. We must not continue to drag the 
baggage of the cold war into the post-cold war activity. Choose no 
sides, make no enemies.
  Mr. Chairman, this would harm multilateral efforts generally, 
including Korea. This would harm multinational efforts generally, 
including our current effort at bringing the world community in line 
with bringing sanctions against North Korea for violating its 
obligations under the nonproliferation regime. We ought to at least try 
to present some cogent, consistent strategy and face to the world.
  Third, lifting unilaterally weakens other embargoes. Mr. Chairman, 
any time the world comes together on a multinational basis to impose an 
arms embargo, we ought to walk gently and cautiously before we 
unilaterally engage in lifting the embargo. If we would lift the 
embargo on Bosnia unilaterally, what would stop other nations who could 
move to lift other embargoes such as those on Iraq and Libya? We would 
lose the moral high ground on this issue, Mr. Chairman, a moral and 
legal basis for seeking to enforce these embargoes.
  What happens, Mr. Chairman, down the road a little further when some 
other nation decides to step outside of internationally imposed arms 
embargo and we rise to great moral heights and say, ``Why are you doing 
this?'' The response would be, ``Why are you attempting to raise this 
question with us? When it served your purposes, you stepped outside of 
the multinational embargo.''
  The issue here is not whether you lift or do not lift, this amendment 
deals with unilateralism, and you have got to address that issue.
  Mr. Chairman, fourth, it would remove our leverage with Serbia. Our 
unilateral lifting of the embargo on Bosnia would give the green light 
to others to ignore the embargo on Serbia. One would have to be a fool 
or naive, Mr. Chairman, to assume that lifting this embargo takes place 
in a vacuum. One action causes another reaction. We do not live in a 
vacuum.
  Mr. Chairman, reacting to an action taken on this matter by the other 
body, the Russian Duma has already voted that it would be its sense 
that Russia should unilaterally lift sanctions on Serbia. While their 
actions will not implement such a policy, I am trying to point out that 
it shows the problem.
  Next, I believe it would increase the bloodshed. Providing arms to 
Bosnia really solves nothing. But it will certainly increase the 
bloodshed. In the months before the Bosnians master the weaponry that 
we give them, the Serbs may attack all out and overrun still more 
Moslem territory. If the Serbs fail to do so, the Bosnians would likely 
use the weapons to try to settle scores. Either way, there will be more 
bloodletting.
  Mr. Chairman, make no mistake about it, you do not walk away from 
this action with clean hands. There is blood. And this action, in my 
opinion, increases the potential of that. We ought to be about bringing 
people to the negotiating table. Those who have written in support of 
this, who are articulate spokespersons for a peaceful, diplomatic 
solution to the problems must understand that simply lifting the 
embargo and stepping away is not a neutral act, it is not an act that 
does not stain you with the same kind of blood because of the 
disincentive.
  Mr. Chairman, I believe that it would derail the newly established 1-
month ceasefire and the possibility for an agreement on an even longer 
ceasefire. We ought to be about ceasefires, to try to stop the killing 
and the dying and the maiming.
  It would infuriate our allies: If we violate the embargo, we 
infuriate our own allies, especially Britain, Canada, and France, who 
have troops on the ground, unlike us, Mr. Chairman, and who fear this 
action will cause the resumption of war, with their troops stuck in 
between. Our allies have clearly warned us for months that we will be 
blamed for the deaths of their sons if we violate the embargo. We 
cannot turn a deaf ear to this, Mr. Chairman. We would not, if the shoe 
were on the other foot, want them to turn a deaf ear to us.
  Mr. Chairman, humanitarian effort could be stymied: The European 
troops on the ground in Bosnia allow humanitarian relief to get 
through. If we lift the embargo and the European troops are fired upon, 
we can expect them to pull out, thereby effectively ending humanitarian 
relief effort and leading us to a swift increase in civilian deaths. 
Make no mistake about it.
  Our allies may press us for further military actions. Let me explain. 
Before our angry allies withdraw, they may press us for further 
military actions to support their troops who may be withdrawing under 
fire. That must be contemplated. This would almost certainly include an 
escalation in air strikes flown by U.S. pilots, an action which could 
further entangle us in the war and would likely cause greater 
casualties.
  Aside from that, the likelihood is that it is also a distinct 
possibility that we would be called upon to put American troops on the 
ground as a short-term defense of our withdrawing allies. We would 
almost be bound to respond positively, considering that it is our 
unilateral lift that placed them in harm's way in the first place. Such 
an involvement would certainly cause a serious risk of casualties and 
would so completely engage us in the fighting as to remove almost any 
possibility that we could play a role as an active broker for a 
negotiated solution. Mr. Chairman, that is the role of a great 
superpower.
  It would likely kill more Bosnians. Let me further explain. This 
action would not save the Bosnians and may end up killing more. The 
Serbian reaction will likely be to resume the war immediately, before 
arms can be delivered and Bosnians can be trained to handle them. I 
would make a note, Mr. Chairman: It is not rifles and mortars that the 
Bosnians need, but tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers. It 
will take weeks and months to provide individual Bosnian troops with 
the skills on these weapons. Based upon our own training experiences, 
it would probably take more than a year for the Bosnians to learn the 
unit skills needed to employ them effectively.
  Having set this train in motion, we will be morally responsible for 
the fate of the Bosnians. If the butchering resumes during this 
extended period of training, will the supporters of this amendment be 
willing to send U.S. troops to save the Bosnians from a fate worse than 
they face now?
  It would seem to me that it would then become a moral imperative to 
do so. So, we are locked in, Mr. Chairman.
  Further, it sucks us deeper into the quagmire. Some have spoke to 
this. If $200 million is insufficient to turn the tide, what do we do 
then? Will we use unilateral air power to save the Bosnians if they are 
being overwhelmed?
  Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Olver). The gentleman is recognized for 
an additional 5 minutes.
  Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the Chairman and would like to conclude my 
comments.
  Would we use unilateral air power to save the Bosnians if they are 
being overwhelmed? If that does not work, will we send in ground 
troops? Or will we say, ``Nice try,'' but leave the Bosnians to fate?
  This could further endanger American lives. Let me further explain. 
This amendment authorizes us to train Bosnian troops in Bosnia, thereby 
increasing the threat to American troops. This makes us more an ally of 
the Bosnians, an escalation of taking sides.
  The goal should be to seek a ceasefire. Mr. Chairman, brilliant 
comments notwithstanding, this is a war and intervention amendment, not 
a peace or peacekeeping amendment. It has those implications. We should 
continue to build on recent successes that brought an end to the sieges 
at Tuzla, Sarajevo and Garazde, to end the shelling and to continue to 
support this 1-month ceasefire with the hope that it would increase.

                              {time}  1230

  Mr. Chairman, this amendment, in my opinion, is a disincentive to 
negotiate. It provides no incentive for the Bosnian Government to seek 
a negotiated settlement. In fact, the Bosnian Government could view 
this as an opportunity to launch offensive operations to regain 
territory in line with their three territorial imperatives.
  Mr. Chairman, the Bosnians have three territorial imperatives. They 
are land locked by virtue of their fighting on the ground. They need to 
go south to the Adriatic Sea, north to the Danube River, and east to 
Sarajevo. By virtue of their coalition with the Croats, they now have 
access to the Adriatic Sea for trade and economic purposes. They do not 
have access to Sarajevo, the capital, nor to the Danube River for 
economic and trade purposes.
  These matters, it seems to me, can be solved at the negotiating 
table, not on the battlefield. By lifting the embargo, Mr. Chairman, it 
becomes a disincentive to move to the table to stop the killing because 
then you give greater weapons, greater potential for greater fighting 
and greater struggling prior to coming to the table. The result is more 
people dying and more deaths.
  We ought to be about negotiation. We ought to be, as a great nation, 
about trying to move people in that direction so those matters can be 
dealt with.
  Mr. Chairman, it undercuts diplomatic efforts, and that has already 
been addressed, and I would not go further than that, but let me, in 
the closing part of it, try to respond to this reference to the right 
of self-determination. It has been raised on several occasions, but I 
would suggest to my colleagues that it has been taken out of context.
  Proponents say we should support this amendment because the U.N. 
Charter gives every country the right to self-determination. They quote 
article 51:
  ``Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
self-defense.''
  But, Mr. Chairman, that is only the first sentence of this article. 
The second sentence says:
  ``Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right shall not 
in any way affect the authority of the Security Council to take * * *'' 
et cetera, et cetera, ``such action as it deems necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.''
  I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that this completely alters the 
meaning, so it is not about simply reading sentence No. 1. It is 
reading it in total context, and those in these Chambers who are 
students of evolution of the United Nations and the evolution of this 
proposition with respect to the right of self-defense must, on the 
basis of intellectual honesty, read that matter in its total 
perspective.
  The intent of the U.N. Charter is in favor of collective measures for 
defense. Self-defense is most relevant in periods prior to collective 
actions, which in this case the Security Council has already taken. The 
U.N. Allies, allied course of collective actions, sanctions safe zones, 
humanitarian assistance, and a course of negotiation as the best course 
of defense in Bosnia.
  Proponents also imply that the Security Council only placed the 
embargo on Bosnia accidentally because it voted on the embargo in 1991, 
before the full collapse of Yugoslavia. But since then the Security 
Council has reaffirmed the embargo on Bosnia again and again.
  Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, with all of these arguments I am 
concluding, and all of my colleagues have listened carefully to this 
debate, but I say, ``Take action based upon the complexity of this 
matter.''
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Olver). The gentleman from South 
Carolina [Mr. Spence] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, for purposes of debate only, I yield 2 
minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, it is always a stimulating experience to hear 
the learned gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] speak on any 
subject, particularly on this one. I would just like to respond to a 
few of the things he said.
  ``Choose no sides.'' That is the first rule of peacemaking. The 
first, most famous chooser of no sides was named Pontius Pilate, and he 
is legendary.
  ``I don't see any moral high ground,'' another good phrase in 
treating aggressor and victim identically. It seems to me the doctrine 
of moral equivalence ought to have gone out with the end of the cold 
war. That was Paul Warnke's idea of the Soviets and the United States 
being two hamsters on a treadmill.
  Unilateralism. Let me tell my colleagues, ``When Israel took out the 
nuclear reactor in Iraq, the whole world suffered from terminal 
ambivalence. They deplored the violation of protocol, and secretly they 
loved it. They loved it.'' Unilateralism, yes, blessed unilateralism.
  I suggest that there are all kinds of peace, and peacemaking is 
wonderful, but the peace of the morgue, the peace of the jailhouse, is 
not to be suffered, and America is too important and too moral a 
country to aver its eyes from genocide and ethnic cleansing, and so I 
hope and pray that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana 
[Mr. McCloskey] is adopted, and the subsequent amendment, about which I 
will have more to say later, is defeated.
  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. HYDE. If I have any time remaining, it is a pleasure to yield to 
the gentleman.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Illinois 
[Mr. Hyde] has expired.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dellums].
  Mr. DELLUMS. First, I would like to thank the gentleman from Illinois 
[Mr. Hyde], my colleague, for his very generous remarks.
  Second, Mr. Chairman, I simply say to my colleague that I believe the 
role of peacekeeper in the post-cold war world is very important. What 
I was simply trying to suggest is that at the point where we take 
sides, or make enemies, we no longer become credible as a peacekeeper 
trying to bring all parties to the table. Once we choose sides we are 
no longer credible as a peacekeeper, and I am simply suggesting that 
the role of the peacekeeper is a vital and important role and an 
increasing responsibility we are going to be called upon to perform as 
the world moves toward the 21st century.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. HYDE. One must always in justice be able to distinguish the 
aggressor from those aggressed against.
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, for purposes of debate only, I yield 2 
minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf].
  [Mr. WOLF addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in 
the Extensions of Remarks.]
  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as I have remaining to 
the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Olver). The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. 
McCloskey] is recognized for 1 minute.
  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very much for 
yielding his time to me.
  In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I think we have had a fine debate here 
on all sides of this issue, but as to the extended statements of the 
distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I think the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] knows as well as everyone that 
there is a moral responsibility at certain levels to violate an unjust 
law. We are saying that this arms embargo is unjust, it is illegal, it 
is immoral, and it is really nonbinding as a matter of humanitarian 
sense. That is common sense on its face.
  Again this provision commits no troops. It remains discretionary with 
the President. In essence, it does nothing more in that area than the 
President has the right to do now.
  I would note, with all this talk about the embargo, that there is no 
embargo, there is no interdiction, and there is nothing being forced 
with all those armed supplies and, yes, personnel going from Serbia 
into Bosnia.
  Mr. Chairman, I ask the Members to vote yes on McCloskey-Gilman and 
vote no on Hamilton in the ensuing debate.
  Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Chairman, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness 
is not only an American dream, but a universal aspiration. For 2 years, 
the Bosnian Moslems have been denied the right to make that dream come 
true. Serbian aggression has been relentless even while negotiations 
were in progress. Ending the arms embargo will finally allow the 
Bosnians to defend themselves--a right no one should be denied. The 
embargo, which violates international law, will be rectified by the 
McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment. By enabling the Bosnians with 
a means to fight their aggressors, the need to send United States 
troops will be unnecessary. As the situation now stands, the United 
States, by enforcing the embargo, has already intervened. It is time to 
make this intervention a positive one. To stand by and allow Serbia to 
continue committing these atrocities is barbaric. With a country whose 
policy includes rape as an act of war, it is imperative that this 
aggression be stopped. The Bosnian Government has put the number of 
casualties at 220,000, with the number of women raped totaling between 
35,000 to 50,000 and those who have been displaced at 1.25 million.
  It is a depravity indeed that we as Americans, living according to a 
constitution which clearly defines our inalienable rights to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, are forcing the Bosnians to live 
a life worse than death.
  Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in reluctant opposition to the 
amendment. I understand and deeply admire the intent of those offering 
this amendment. It is difficult to view the ongoing carnage in Bosnia 
and not want to do something to help.
  But the ramifications of this amendment, no matter how well intended, 
go beyond just arming the Bosnians. This debate must be based on the 
cold, hard reality of the current situation and not on emotion. 
Approval of this amendment would effect other ongoing U.N. embargo's, 
change the relationship between the United States and Russia and 
possibly put American troops at risk.
  I simply do not see how this House could take action to unilaterally 
lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and then expect other nations to honor 
U.N. embargo's on Haiti, Iraq, Libya, and one day North Korea.
  Further, policy changes like this do not occur in a vacuum. Surely 
Russia, with its ethnic ties to Serbia, could not be expected to 
maintain its embargo if we do not maintain ours.
  Finally, I am concerned that lifting the embargo puts us on the 
slippery slope toward full scale intervention. The Department of 
Defense has concluded the type of weapons the Bosnians need could not 
be shipped without the willingness of other nations. Those supplying 
the weapons would themselves be exposed to enemy fire. And which nation 
would supply the training needed to effectively use the weapons?
  If you believe that lifting the embargo is the only fair thing to do, 
then I urge you to support the Hamilton amendment.
  Let me say this in conclusion. A no vote to this amendment should not 
be construed as support of the Clinton policy. It has been a disaster 
of a policy, born in the minds of people who always think they can have 
it both ways. This President has failed to demonstrate to the American 
people why intervention in Bosnia is a national interest. I will not 
support this amendment nor will I support American troops as 
peacekeepers in Bosnia.
  But this House should also not attempt to have it both ways. Lifting 
the arms embargo is not a solution, it just makes us feel better. If 
you are not prepared to demonstrate our national interest in Bosnia, if 
you are not prepared to act on that interest, then I believe you should 
support a negotiated peace and stop leading the Bosnians on.
  Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to the McCloskey 
amendment. Like all of my colleagues, I have been horrified to watch 
the violence and turmoil that have marked the brutal civil war in 
Bosnia, and I have been deeply saddened by the tragic loss of life that 
has occurred there. I strongly believe the United States must do all it 
can to end this terrible war and bring peace to this troubled region.
  However, I do not believe that by lifting the arms embargo 
unilaterally, the United States will be promoting a peaceful resolution 
of this terrible conflict. The peace talks in Bosnia are currently at a 
fragile stage. By lifting the embargo unilaterally, the United States 
may undermine any possibility of achieving a diplomatic solution to the 
conflict. Moreover, by introducing new arms into the region the United 
States would effectively widen and intensify the war, increasing the 
killing and destruction in this already devastated area. Attempting to 
level the killing fields is not the key to peace in Bosnia.
  We must decide as a nation whether we want to work with the 
international community or against it. The United States agreed to 
impose an arms embargo on this region as a member of the United 
Nations. We did not decide to impose the embargo unilaterally, and we 
did not impose it against our will. If we pass the McCloskey amendment, 
we will be telling the world that we will participate in multilateral 
sanctions only when it is convenient for us. This would set an 
extremely dangerous precedent by sending the message that compliance 
with United Nations resolutions is not mandated, but optional.
  In a Dear Colleague letter on this matter, the distinguished chairman 
of the Foreign Affairs Committee dramatically illustrated the danger of 
the United States acting unilaterally to lift the arms embargo. In the 
words of the chairman,

       Just last [month], the Russian Duma voted overwhelmingly to 
     lift economic sanctions against Serbia if the United States 
     lifts the arms embargo. Turkey has complained bitterly about 
     the arms it suffers through the sanctions against Iraq. It 
     could easily use the U.S. unilateral action as justification 
     to lift Iraq sanctions unilaterally. Compliance with the 
     Haiti sanctions already has been called into question; how 
     can the United States argue against the Dominican Republic's 
     actions if we do the same elsewhere?

  If the United States, as the world's only superpower, chooses to 
ignore international law, how can we rightfully expect other nations to 
comply? Why should other countries observe sanctions against North 
Korea, Libya, or Iraq if the United States ignores those in the former 
Yugoslavia?
  Let's work to end the war in Bosnia, but let's do it in conjunction 
with the international community, and without widening the war and 
increasing the killing. Please join me in voting ``no'' on the 
McCloskey amendment.
  Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the McCloskey 
amendment, and against the Hamilton amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, one of the most memorable moments of my first term in 
office was to listen to Elie Wiesel's speech at the dedication of the 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, just 1 mile from this Chamber.
  Who can forget when Mr. Wiesel turned to President Clinton and said 
``Something, anything must be done to stop the bloodshed (in Bosnia), 
Mr. President, it will not stop unless we stop it.''
  Well, the time has come--today--for this House to do something to try 
to put an end to the suffering and the slaughter in Bosnia.
  I reject the argument that lifting the embargo will intensify the 
war.
  In the first place, this really hasn't been a war at all. This 
conflict has consisted of wanton attacks on the civilian populations of 
a sovereign state that has been unable to defend itself.
  As our distinguished colleague Steny Hoyer has pointed out, the 
number of children killed is roughly the same as the number of 
combatants.
  And, by allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves, we will decrease 
the possibility that U.S. troops will have to be sent in to enforce a 
shaky peace agreement.
  Mr. Chairman, in 1948, another infant country recognized by the 
United States, the State of Israel, was the victim of an unjust 
international arms embargo.
  Just as the Serbs inherited the weapons of the dissolved 
Yugoslavian Government, the Arab nations that surrounded and attacked 
Israel were armed to the teeth with the weapons left by the departing 
British.

  It wasn't until the Czech Government broke the embargo and began 
shipping some arms to Israel that the balance of power tilted slightly 
and Israel was able to fight back and ultimately win its war of 
independence.
  In 1948, an international arms embargo almost destroyed the fledgling 
State of Israel.
  In 1994, another embargo is contributing to the slaughter of 
innocents in another independent State.
  Let's take a stand today to stop the bloodshed. Support the McCloskey 
amendment.
  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, the war in Bosnia has raged for more than 2 
years now. Over the past 26 months, we have heard reports and seen 
pictures of massive human suffering, organized rape and murder, 
deliberate targeting of innocent, unarmed civilians, and the 
unconscionable practice of ethnic cleansing. Two hundred thousand 
Bosnians have died in the fighting, 2 million have been forced from 
their homes and now are refugees, and 70 percent of Bosnia is occupied 
by Serb forces. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has called the 
war in the former Yugoslavia ``the conflict from hell.'' I agree with 
him.
  I do not agree, however, with the current policy of denying the 
Bosnians the right to defend themselves in the face of such relentless 
and brazen Serb aggression. I do not agree that the best the United 
States can do is hope all sides accept a fundamentally unjust peace 
agreement which will, in all likelihood, fall apart. And I do not agree 
that the United States should condone an embargo which permits the 
Serbs to wage a systematic and ruthless genocide on the people of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  Mr. Chairman, history is filled with examples where the action of one 
country, or of even one person, changed the course of events which 
followed. The French, during the Revolutionary War, aided the American 
colonists against the British. Without French support, the United 
States might still be under British control. President Roosevelt, 
during World War II, instituted the Lend-Lease Program to help the 
British fight off Hitler. Without United States help, Britain may have 
fallen and the Nazi Party today would be Europe's only political party. 
The United States, in the 1980's, armed the mujahidin in Afghanistan 
against Soviet invaders. Without these arms, the Afghan rebels would 
not have been able to triumph over the Soviets.
  Mr. Chairman, our past teaches us that critical moments in world 
history require decisive action. The war in Bosnia requires a decisive 
response. Will historians write that if the United States had lifted 
the arms embargo, the disaster in Bosnia would have been avoided? I 
urge my colleagues to support the McCloskey amendment.
  Ms. DELAUTO. Mr. Chairman, we've waited long enough. The people of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina have waited long enough. They've held on through 
years of unimaginable suffering. Through mass rapes and executions. 
Through the endless Serb bombardments. Through the violations of 
countless U.N. safe zones.
  They have struggled through this against staggering odds. Ill armed, 
ill equipped, haggard, and hungry, they have fought off the advances of 
their aggressors through sheer courage and determination. We all know. 
We have seen them countless times on television footage. Holding on to 
what is left of their country. What is left of their families.
  And in all of this they have asked precious little. They want simply 
to defend themselves. But they can do little against the far better 
armed Serbs unless they have a chance to arm themselves. Yet the arms 
embargo against the former Yugoslavia prevents that. It keeps in place 
the overwhelming advantage in arms and equipment that Serb forces had 
when the hostilities began.
  We cannot allow this to continue. To tie the hands of the victims of 
a new and horrific assault on the moral sensibilities of mankind--
ethnic cleansing. Support the McClosky amendment. Give the Government 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina the chance to defend itself. It is the very 
least we can do.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I am voting today for the McCloskey 
amendment to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian 
Government. The United States must send a clear message to the Serbs 
that we expect their full cooperation at the negotiating table and will 
not tolerate their continued aggression against the Bosnian people.
  It is clear that talk alone has not brought about peace. For 2 years, 
the United States and other democratic nations have worked for a 
negotiated settlement. Recently, the negotiations in Geneva have again 
raised hopes that a political settlement may be reached. The fact 
remains that 2 years of negotiations have failed to stop Serbian 
aggression and the horror of ethnic cleansing. More than 200,000 
Bosnians have died over the past 2 years. We must do more to stop the 
killing.
  Passage of the McCloskey amendment will keep the pressure on the 
Serbs to end their campaign of aggression. The United States must make 
it unmistakably clear that we expect the Serbs to agree to a fair peace 
settlement.
  I urge the House to adopt the McCloskey amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.


                             recorded vote

  Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 244, 
noes 178, not voting 17, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 222]

                               AYES--244

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews (NJ)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bilbray
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Boucher
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Bunning
     Burton
     Byrne
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Cardin
     Carr
     Castle
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Coppersmith
     Costello
     Cox
     Coyne
     Crapo
     Danner
     de la Garza
     de Lugo (VI)
     DeLauro
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dingell
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Engel
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Fingerhut
     Fish
     Ford (MI)
     Ford (TN)
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Gallo
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gingrich
     Glickman
     Goodlatte
     Goss
     Grams
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hansen
     Hastings
     Hayes
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inhofe
     Istook
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kennelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klein
     Klink
     Klug
     Kolbe
     Kyl
     LaFalce
     Lambert
     Lancaster
     Lantos
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Levy
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (FL)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     Long
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Machtley
     Maloney
     Manton
     Margolies-Mezvinsky
     Markey
     Martinez
     McCandless
     McCloskey
     McCurdy
     McDermott
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McKeon
     McMillan
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Menendez
     Meyers
     Mfume
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Mink
     Molinari
     Mollohan
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Myers
     Nadler
     Neal (MA)
     Neal (NC)
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Paxon
     Payne (NJ)
     Peterson (MN)
     Pickett
     Pickle
     Pombo
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Pryce (OH)
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Ravenel
     Regula
     Ridge
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Romero-Barcelo (PR)
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rush
     Santorum
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schenk
     Schiff
     Schumer
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Sharp
     Shaw
     Shays
     Skeen
     Slattery
     Slaughter
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Snowe
     Solomon
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Swett
     Swift
     Talent
     Tanner
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas (CA)
     Thomas (WY)
     Thompson
     Thurman
     Torricelli
     Traficant
     Upton
     Vento
     Volkmer
     Walker
     Walsh
     Waters
     Weldon
     Wheat
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Yates
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                               NOES--178

     Andrews (ME)
     Andrews (TX)
     Applegate
     Archer
     Armey
     Bacchus (FL)
     Bachus (AL)
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Barca
     Barrett (WI)
     Bateman
     Bentley
     Bevill
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blackwell
     Borski
     Brewster
     Brooks
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Buyer
     Canady
     Cantwell
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clement
     Clinger
     Collins (IL)
     Combest
     Condit
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Cramer
     Crane
     Cunningham
     Darden
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLay
     Dellums
     Derrick
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Duncan
     Durbin
     Edwards (CA)
     Edwards (TX)
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fields (TX)
     Filner
     Flake
     Fowler
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gonzalez
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Green
     Hall (TX)
     Hamburg
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Herger
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoagland
     Hochbrueckner
     Houghton
     Hughes
     Hutto
     Inglis
     Inslee
     Jacobs
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (GA)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, Sam
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Knollenberg
     Kreidler
     LaRocco
     Lehman
     Lightfoot
     Lloyd
     Mann
     Manzullo
     Matsui
     Mazzoli
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McKinney
     Meek
     Michel
     Miller (CA)
     Mineta
     Minge
     Moakley
     Montgomery
     Murphy
     Murtha
     Norton (DC)
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Orton
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Penny
     Peterson (FL)
     Petri
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Rangel
     Reed
     Reynolds
     Richardson
     Roemer
     Rose
     Rostenkowski
     Roth
     Roukema
     Rowland
     Roybal-Allard
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sangmeister
     Sarpalius
     Schroeder
     Scott
     Shepherd
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Smith (IA)
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (OR)
     Spence
     Stark
     Stokes
     Strickland
     Studds
     Stupak
     Synar
     Taylor (MS)
     Thornton
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Underwood (GU)
     Unsoeld
     Valentine
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Vucanovich
     Watt
     Waxman
     Williams
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wyden

                             NOT VOTING--17

     Barlow
     Collins (MI)
     Faleomavaega (AS)
     Foglietta
     Grandy
     Huffington
     Jefferson
     Kopetski
     Morella
     Portman
     Royce
     Sundquist
     Tauzin
     Towns
     Tucker
     Washington
     Whitten

                              {time}  1307

  The Clerk announced the following pair:
  On this vote:

       Miss Collins of Michigan for, with Mr. Tucker against.

  Messrs. PENNY, BILIRAKIS, GENE GREEN of Texas, HANCOCK, and DUNCAN 
changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. BUNNING, Mrs. CLAYTON, and Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi changed 
their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                          personal explanation

  Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably detained on the Senate 
side. Therefore, I missed rollcall No. 222. Had I been here, I would 
have voted ``yes.''

                          ____________________