[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 71 (Thursday, June 9, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: June 9, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 431 and rule
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill,
H.R. 4301.
{time} 1039
in the committee of the whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of
the bill (H.R. 4301) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1995
for military activities of the Department of Defense, to prescribe
military personnel strengths for fiscal year 1995, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Barca, Chairman pro tempore, in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose on
Wednesday, June 8, 1994, amendment No. 67 printed in part 1 of House
Report 103-520 offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich] had been
disposed of.
Pursuant to House Resolution 431, it is now in order to debate the
subject of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] will be recognized for 15
minutes and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] will be
recognized for 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums].
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, we now begin debate on a very important
and serious issue, the nature of America's relationship and activities
in Bosnia. There will be two amendments before the body, the McCloskey
amendment in which, unilaterally, the United States would lift its
participation in the arms embargo against Bosnia, would authorize up to
$200 million in aid and trainers to train Bosnian soldiers on using the
equipment.
There will also then be a second amendment, the Hamilton amendment,
which would urge the President to consult with NATO ane the United
Nations regarding means of defending Bosnia which might include lifting
the arms embargo, sets United States policy as one of achieving a
peaceful negotiated settlement, commits the United States to work
collectively to achieve these goals.
In the final moments that I have, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make
the following points:
In this gentleman's opinion, the McCloskey amendment approach, to
lift the arms embargo unilaterally, threatens to destroy an entire
range of international agreements and efforts in which the United
States has a vital interest. At a time when we are attempting to bring
international resolve and a possible embargo to prevent nuclear weapons
proliferation in North Korea, we would send a signal that anyone could
opt out of that regime.
At a time when we are trying to sort through the endgame of war in
Iraq and bring about positive changes and prevent a renewed escalation
of the arms buildup and bloodletting there, we would threaten those
efforts.
At a time when we would have succeeded in achieving a cease fire in
Bosnia, we will throw all that away as nations collectively to respect
the embargo throughout the former Yugoslavia, including Serbia. And
finally, there is no doubt in this gentleman's mind, Mr. Chairman, and
I hope by the end of this debate that my colleagues will agree, we must
not unilaterally lift out embargo and place ourselves as a participant
in the battle. It will bring more death and destruction and will result
in the defeat of our goals and those of our allies.
I caution all of my colleagues to listen carefully, participate in
this discussion and debate. And I hope that at the end of the day they
will vote correctly.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes.
(Mr. SPENCE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, as with most issues associated with the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the question of whether to lift the
current arms embargo is complex. No one knows precisely how lifting the
embargo against the Moslem forces will affect the attitudes and actions
of the warring parties. One thing is certain, however. Policies we are
considering today are certain to have an impact on the safety of
peacekeepers--particularly United States peacekeepers--that may be
deployed to keep the peace in Bosnia in the future. Therefore, we need
to carefully consider the long-term consequences of the policies we
will be voting on today.
Shortly after taking office, President Clinton committed to deploying
as many as 25,000 United States military personnel to Bosnia to serve
as peacekeepers in the event of a negotiated political settlement. I
opposed this commitment at the time and I oppose it now. Nonetheless,
if deployed, these peacekeeping forces will inevitably be asked to
separate and disarm the parties, deter, and respond to military
attacks, and ensure compliance with territorial settlements. We ought
to factor these elements of the President's longer range commitment to
deploy U.S. troops into our deliberations here today on shorter range
policy options.
Mr. Chairman, the United States experience in Somalia taught us that
peacekeepers seeking to mediate a civil war cannot take sides and not
expect to be attacked by one or more parties involved in the conflict.
Once the mission of U.S. forces evolved from ensuring the free flow of
humanitarian aid to capturing General Aideed, the United States became
a combatant and the peacekeepers' motto, ``Take no sides, make no
enemies,'' no longer applied. The results were tragically fatal and,
unfortunately, should have been predictable.
In the case of Bosnia, the United States is already perceived by the
Bosnian Serbs not as a neutral power concerned with keeping the peace,
but instead, as a backer of the Bosnian Government. The President's May
1993 proposal to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Moslems and to
carry out air attacks on Bosnian Serb targets--the short-lived ``lift
and strike'' policy--as well as the more recent bombing of Bosnian Serb
positions in and around Gorazde by United States aircraft this part
April, are rightly or wrongly perceived by the Bosnian Serbs and others
as evidence of a pro-Moslem bias in United States policy.
Thus, a direct consequence of unilaterally or multilaterally lifting
the arms embargo in the near term could be to compound the potential
danger faced by any United States military personnel dispatched to
Bosnia as part of a peacekeeping force in the future. Any remaining
illusion of United States neutrality would disappear if we continue
down a course that increasingly aligns the United States with the
Bosnian Government.
Therefore, under any circumstance I believe the House has an
obligation to recognize that endorsing a policy that overtly embraces
the Bosnian Moslem cause ought to simultaneously render null and void
the President's commitment to deploy up to 25,000 United States troops
as impartial peacekeepers anytime in the future. Perceived as pro-
Moslem, future U.S. military personnel are more likely to be vulnerable
targets than effective peackeepers.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished
colleague, the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder].
Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time
to me. I just hope every one here listens intently to this debate.
I rise in support of the Hamilton amendment. I think it is the
correct one. But listen to the coalition here. The gentleman from South
Carolina [Mr. Spence] and the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums]
agree on this.
Why do they agree on this? Be very careful. It sounds wonderful to
say we are going to lift the embargo, but to do that, we are doing that
unilaterally, whereas we put the embargo on with our allies. And they
are going to shake their head and say, there they go again, acting like
the Lone Ranger.
The Hamilton amendment goes at it the right way. It says that the
President should work to get the United Nations to raise the embargo
the United Nations put on. The other piece of this scares me a lot,
too. There is $200 million in there this time for trainers. But in the
Vietnam war they were often called advisers. Once you get people in
doing this, it is very easy to keep pulling and pulling and pulling
more folks into that war.
I hope that we start thinking, in this post-cold-war period, about
how we are going to interact with our allies. When the NATO
parliamentarians got together, many of the generals who have been in
Bosnia pleaded with us to work out that structure. Because you had
people on the ground under U.N. command and suddenly you had NATO
deciding to do its own show with air bombings that put the guys on the
ground in trouble as they were taken and kidnapped.
What they were really saying is, we need someone to be there and
coordinate the international structures so that we are not putting each
other in jeopardy and at risk.
What would be even worse is if not only international structures are
going off doing their own thing, that people who belong to those
international organizations like ourselves feel they can vote in the
international organization one way and then unilaterally change it
later.
Please support the Hamilton amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Gilman].
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, the continuing tragedy of the conflict in
Bosnia is one that should shame all who profess to believe in the
principles of nonaggression, peaceful settlement of disputes, and
collective security. The failure of the international community to
defend the new State of Bosnia, whose borders and territorial integrity
it recognized when it admitted Bosnia into the United Nations, is one
for which we all share culpability.
That Bosnia has been subject to aggression from a neighboring State
whose ambition is to annex most of the territory within the
internationally recognized borders of Bosnia should be beyond question
in this body. Also beyond question is the fact that in Bosnia the most
basic and fundamental rules of the international system have been
trampled on. If we have learned nothing else from the past 60 years we
surely understand that aggression unanswered invites further
aggression.
There are good reasons why America's Armed Forces should not become
directly involved in the conflict on the ground in Bosnia. But none of
those reasons excuses us from illegally, under the guise of a Security
Council resolution, depriving the Government and people of Bosnia of
the means to defend themselves and the borders of their country.
We have seen the results of the weak, vacillating policies that have
guided the West's actions concerning the Bosnian conflict. More than
200,000 people killed and millions more driven from their homes,
tortured, and maimed. We have seen the perennial peace talks over the 2
years in London, Geneva, and elsewhere which, while allowing known war
criminals to legitimize themselves by sitting at the table with some of
our finest statesmen, have produced nothing in the way of peace or even
pointed to a settlement other than to carve up the Bosnian nation.
And what of the present peace framework now being negotiated? How
long would a people forcefully driven from their homes, who have had
loved ones killed, maimed, or tortured, abide by a settlement which
rewards those who have committed these atrocities? What prospect for
peace and stability in the Balkans would this kind of settlement really
hold? What precedent would it set in other regions where ethnic groups
are dissatisfied with present borders? I can only wonder at the naivety
of those who suggest that this kind of peace is the best the Bosnian
people, and the international community can hope for.
I also remind my colleagues that the administration has committed the
Armed Forces of this country to help enforce a settlement that the
parties ``agree to'' at the negotiating table. I ask my colleagues
``What kind of settlement will the Government of Bosnia enter into if
it cannot adequately defend itself?'' Do we wish to see the Bosnians
sign an agreement out of duress, which leaves them not even enough
territory for a reasonable hope of a viable state, or do we wish them
to enter into an agreement confident that it is the very best they can
achieve, having been given the means to fight for their country?
The humanitarian efforts led by the United Nations in Bosnia have
involved many courageous men and women and have undoubtedly saved many
lives. But when compared to the specific mandates of numerous Security
Council resolutions, these efforts are anemic and fall woefully short
of the words and intent of the Security Council. Instead of
spotlighting the strength of the international community's will, the
work of UNPROFOR has only served to demonstrate our lack of resolve by
exposing us to the calculated insults and manipulations of thugs and
bullies.
We are also constantly reminded by the opponents of the right of the
Bosnians to self-defense that our European allies oppose the measure we
are about to debate. I will concede that some of the leadership in
those countries with whom the United States stood shoulder-to-shoulder
during the dark days of the Second World War have voiced opposition,
but the public in Europe believes that present policies in Bosnia have
failed. What is clear now is the urgent need for strong U.S.
leadership.
It is past the time to adopt a new approach in Bosnia. An approach
that will make more equal the military equation which to date has
produced only further violence, death, misery, and despair among the
Bosnian people. Opponents of allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves
contend that more weapons will only produce more violence. To this
argument, I say that a Bosnian military capable of adequately
responding to aggression will be both a deterrent to further violence
and an incentive for earnest efforts at the negotiating table. On the
other hand, a weak and poorly armed Bosnian military only invites
cynicism at the negotiating table while it sharpens the appetite of
Bosnia's neighbor for further conquest.
There is still time to rescue Bosnia from the legacy of failed policy
and a shameful lack of resolve on the part of the United States and our
friends in Europe. International law and morality is on our side. What
we need now is firmness and constancy of purpose. The aggressors in
Bosnia must pay a price. It is time to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.
I urge our colleagues to support the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer
amendment and to defeat the Hamilton amendment.
{time} 1050
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to my
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his kindness in
allowing me to speak on this.
Mr. Chairman, do we not learn anything from the past? Remember
Vietnam? Remember the Gulf of Tonkin? Remember how we got involved with
that issue? True, we would be providing equipment and training and
trainers. What difference was that between our initial involvement in
Vietnam? We called them advisors.
Mr. Chairman, I am chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Forces
and Personnel of the Committee on Armed Services. I have been speaking
for quite some time about the shortfall of necessary military personnel
to fulfill our role and our mission in defending and being successful
in two major regional conflicts, and here we drain off $200 million in
military services and people in uniform who should be devoting their
time and energies in defending the interests of the United States of
America.
Further, this lifts the embargo. It does something, lifting the
embargo against Bosnia, unilaterally. Anyone else can unilaterally lift
the embargoes. Do we want it done on Iraq? Do we want it done on Libya?
It undermines.
If we want to unilaterally break U.N. resolutions, we will have no
standing to demand compliance by anyone else with other United States
resolutions. It infuriates our allies. We are their leader. We are the
leader in NATO. We are the only superpower in this world. If we violate
the embargo, we infuriate our own allies, especially Britain, Canada,
France, who have troops on the ground, unlike us, and who fear this
action will cause a resumption of the war with their troops stuck in
between.
Mr. Chairman, I oppose the McCloskey amendment. I am for the Hamilton
amendment.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Solomon].
Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
Mr. Chairman, for 3 years now, we have had dithering in the Balkans.
The vacuum of leadership in Western policy there has led only to
slaughter.
A disastrous one-sided slaughter, perpetrated by a Communist
dictatorship that inherited the preponderance of the Yugoslav Armed
Forces.
This is totally unacceptable. For both strategic and moral reasons,
we must lift this arms embargo, now.
There are several reasons to do this.
First, we must, especially given what is occurring in Korea right
now, restore American credibility, which has suffered several blows
recently, and nowhere more so than in Bosnia.
Our vacillating policy must have the Serb aggressors laughing at us.
Worse, we have let our stated favored policy--lifting the embargo--be
vetoed in Paris and Moscow, sending a message of weakness to the whole
world.
Only by having the courage of our stated convictions will we have
credibility.
Further, by assuming a morally equivalent posture in Bosnia, what
kind of message do we send to would-be imperialists in countries like
Russia, and we ought to see what is going on there. I just returned
from there.
Finally, Mr. Speaker, on strategy.
Everybody knows that Serbian imperialists dream of a Greater Serbia.
We can see it on the maps on the walls of their offices.
Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia means a war that
could drag in Albania, Bulgaria, and two NATO allies--Greece and
Turkey--on opposing sides. That is a problem for us, a big problem.
This is potentially far more harmful to NATO unity than any tiff that
might ensue if we lift the embargo on Bosnia unilaterally.
And of course, morally speaking, this embargo is unconscionable. It
should have been declared null and void over 2 years ago under a
different administration.
And the only reason it hasn't is because of an absence of leadership.
That responsibility, like it or not, devolves to us.
Vote ``yes'' on McCloskey-Gilman and ``no'' on Hamilton.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
(Mr. McCLOSKEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, before getting into a somewhat formal
statement, I would like to say that to some degree, the debate so far
is being characterized by erroneous information, particularly as to our
involvement. We are involved in the sense that the United States and
the West generally has been involved in imposing an illegal and immoral
arms embargo on an increasingly decimated and victimized Bosnian
population.
Secondarily, the provision says that any military equipment from the
United States is discretionary with the President. That would have to
be provided at the request of the Bosnian Government, and at the
discretion of the President. It does not mandate at all any particular
military involvement.
The main key to this amendment is to basically lift an illegal and
immoral arms embargo on a besieged people who, by Western edict, and
what right have we had to do that, have not been allowed to defend
themselves.
As we all know, this genocidal course in Bosnia was preceded by the
Serbian aggression in Croatia, where tens of thousands lost their lives
under the auspices of UNPROFOR. In Croatia the Serbs still control some
30 percent of Croatian territory, and no Croatians have been allowed to
return to their homes.
In a short time we will be debat- ing McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer,
which I might say has very broad-based and distinguished leadership,
including people like the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy], the
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior], the gentleman from Maryland [Mr.
Hoyer], and in its essence it states that we tried an illegal and
immoral arms embargo for 2 years. It is wrong, it has not worked, and
it must change.
Mr. Chairman, I would note that an overwhelming part, nearly all U.N.
Member-states, have voted to lift the arms embargo. Only several
parties on the U.N. Security Council want to go on with that policy,
particularly, namely Britain, France, and Russia. We know what their
actions and values have been in regard to this war.
Mr. Chairman, today we will have every reason in the world why
lifting the arms embargo is a bad step, but if the British, the French,
and the Russians want to callously and cravenly lead the world down
this path, why should we trip along? With the Bosnian-Croatian
alliance, which was substantially the result of American leadership,
the Government of Bosnia is a little stronger, but they are massively
overwhelmed by Serbian heavy weapons, with ratios of like 9 and 10 to
12, and thousands in particular pieces of equipment.
{time} 1100
As Prime Minister Silajdzic told me yesterday, their defense against
Serb forces is Kalishnikov rifles and a few pieces of heavy equipment,
particularly tanks that they have captured from the Serbs.
If Members want to know about Serb intentions and the importance of
this amendment today, the official Serbian news agency for the Bosnian
Serbs, and I also believe according to NPR this morning, Tanjug said
the 4-week cease-fire is a farce. Their intentions at the end of this
are to open up and obliterate the Bosnian people. We know what the
Serbs have done. We are talking about a greater Serbia, ongoing Serbian
aggression in the Balkans and the fact that the blood of hundreds of
thousands of innocent Bosnians is on our hands, we at least have a
chance to say, ``no more. You shed this immoral policy.''
I ask Members to please do this, vote for McCloskey-Gilman.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished
colleague, the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs].
Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding me the
time.
I want to urge my colleagues to proceed with extraordinary caution in
this debate, and I think the sound and reasoned conclusion to come to
in this is to support Chairman Hamilton's alternative to the McCloskey-
Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment.
Mr. Chairman, everybody knows this is an extremely complicated
situation and it is a heck of a lot easier to say what we should not do
than to come up with a magic prescription for success in this part of
the world. But I believe that acting unilaterally in order to satisfy
our very understandable and humane desire to do something about Bosnia,
lifting the embargo unilaterally could and likely would seriously
damage our U.S. foreign policy and security interests.
The rift, more than a rift, that would occur between the United
States and our NATO and European Community allies, I think, is
predictable and serious. But, additionally, and really uppermost in my
mind as a member of the Committee on Intelligence, there are the
implications that unilateral action in this instance would have in
other areas of the world that are of paramount importance to the United
States and our security interests.
If we move unilaterally in this instance, what credibility does the
United States retain in insisting in other areas on maintaining
multilateral U.N.-enforced sanctions? How do we surmount that argument
with respect to Iraq where there are pressures to again circumvent and
undermine the multilateral sanctions regime? How do we move forward to
deal with the North Korean situation if we have essentially pulled the
plug on a systematic multilateral approach in this instance? The answer
is, we won't and we can't. And the further conclusion is that Mr.
Hamilton's amendment charts by far the wiser course.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from
New York [Ms. Molinari].
(Ms. MOLINARI asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. MOLINARI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time.
Mr. Chairman, let us be clear, the war in Bosnia goes on whether we
see it on the television or not. The rapes are continuing, the shelling
of innocent lives goes on, and concentration camps throughout the
region still have an open-for-business shingle hanging outside.
Let us be clear: The United Nations has failed these people. Now it
is time for the United States to give the Bosnians the only thing they
have ever asked, the ability to defend themselves and their families.
Let me be clear. By ending the arms embargo, we can in good
conscience keep American ground troops out of the region, if in fact we
conclude that we still have a national conscience left.
I urge my colleagues not to echo the leadership disasters of Great
Britain, not to seek to emulate the leadership and moral imperatives of
France, and I certainly urge my colleagues not to seek as our goal to
placate the Russians. Our goal is to restore international order, to
send messages to other would-be dictators in the world that at least
the United States will not stand by and, yes, our goal is to save a few
more innocent lives in an area called Bosnia.
My colleagues, this will not go away. We must give them the ability
to defend themselves and to survive this bloody war with an ounce of
integrity. It is within our grasp today.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
First I would like to say to my distinguished colleague, the
gentlewoman from New York, that in the context of the debate on the
amendment, we will be more than happy to address the gentlewoman's
arguments in substance. The issues are not nearly so simplistic as have
been articulated in the well of the House.
Mr. Chairman, let me finally in a few seconds set the record
straight. I am in agreement with the gentleman from Indiana who
indicated that the McCloskey amendment does not mandate military aid,
but I believe that my distinguished colleague from New York [Mr.
Gilman] perhaps misspoke himself when he indicated that the bill was
permissive on the issue of lifting the embargo. I would suggest that it
does indeed mandate the lifting of the embargo. In the relevant part of
the amendment entitled ``Termination of the Arms Embargo,'' it states
as follows:
``The President shall'' and I underscore shall for the purposes of
emphasis, ``terminate U.S. arms embargo on the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina upon the receipt from the Government of a request for
assistance in exercising the right of self-determination under article
51 of the U.N. Charter.'' I just wanted to clarify that.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. Hamilton], chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of the
Committee on Armed Services for yielding me the time.
Mr. Chairman, let me observe today that I think the choice before us
is really quite a clear one. The amendment sponsored by my friends, the
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey], the gentleman from New York
[Mr. Gilman], the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior], and the
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer], directs the President to lift the
embargo unilaterally on the former Yugoslavia, but it is not just that.
They also authorize the President to spend up to $200 million in
military aid to Bosnia, thus starting a new foreign aid program.
Mr. Chairman, in my judgment this amendment has a lot of risks for
the United States. I think as we just heard a moment ago in the
briefings given to us by administration officials, that the McCloskey
amendment, if it becomes law, would certainly torpedo the peace talks,
it would intensify and prolong the fighting, it would jeopardize the
humanitarian relief, it would Americanize the war, and it would
certainly encourage others to break U.N. sanctions in other parts of
the world. It would create very serious problems between ourselves and
our NATO allies and between ourselves and Russia.
Mr. Chairman, I think the amendment if it becomes law would ensure
that the war will continue, and it certainly will increase the risk of
U.S. involvement in that area.
The amendment that I will offer, the Hamilton amendment, allows for
the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia by the collective action of
the U.N. Security Council. It protects the flexibility and supports the
President's efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement, and it really
leaves all of our options open, military, diplomatic, including the
lifting of the arms embargo. It focuses on a collective economic,
political, military and diplomatic effort to move all of the parties
toward a negotiated settlement. With all of the problems that the
diplomats are now having with respect to that settlement, significant
progress has been made and is being made toward that settlement.
Mr. Chairman, the Hamilton amendment will certainly enhance the
defense of Bosnia through coordination with close allies and with
Russia. It calls on the President working closely with NATO and the
United Nations to support continued NATO collective enforcement actions
in Bosnia. And, of course, it calls on the President to consult very
closely with the Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I think the important thing here for Members to
understand is that the choice before us today is very, very clear. The
McCloskey amendment, I think, takes us down the road to more war. It
takes us down the road to more direct American military involvement in
Bosnia. The Hamilton amendment, we stay firmly on the path toward a
peace settlement.
Mr. Chairman, I will be spelling out some of these arguments in more
detail as the debate progresses.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire as to the balance of time
remaining on both sides of the aisle?
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Fields of Louisiana). The gentleman
from California [Mr. Dellums] has 3 minutes remaining and the gentleman
from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence].
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield my remaining 1\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
{time} 1120
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I thank the distinguished gentleman for yielding to
me.
Mr. Chairman, we are going to have more time to talk about this, but
basically I would note that it is the serious opinion of many, many
scholars, including at least some lawyers in the Department of State,
that the so-called arms embargo on Bosnia is illegal on its face.
How can the West tell a sovereign country, a sovereign people, a
sovereign nation that they cannot defend themselves? If they do do
that, they have to provide--and this is in the U.N. documents--adequate
defense and protection. No one can say we have provided adequate
defense and protection.
A better analogy would be that the United Nations, the world
community right now is in the process of enforcing an arms embargo
against the Kurdish people being victimized by Iraqi forces and
aggression, moving into the Kurdish areas of Iraq and that region.
The Government and people of Bosnia have committed no infraction of
the U.N. Charter. If anyone is an innocent victim in all of this, it is
the Bosnians, who, I might note, involve all ethnic factions and
peoples--Jews, Croatians, Moslems, and Serbs. There are hundreds of
thousands of Serbs, Mr. Chairman, who want no part of Karadjic and
Milosevic.
Maintaining an arms embargo against the Bosnians is unjust, as it
punishes the Bosnian people when they have done nothing other than to
assert their defense in full accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations. We allegedly says they are a sovereign nation. We should act
as such and conduct our diplomacy as such.
Again, I thank the gentleman for the time.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, in order to conclude general debate on
this side of the aisle, I yield the balance of the time to our
distinguished colleague, the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr.
Richardson].
(Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, along with two members of the Committee
on Intelligence, I just got back from Haiti, where we saw how House
vote sent terrible signals to the Haitian military rulers; basically,
the signal being that the United States had no policy, that we did not
have resolve, that we were sending mixed messages. That is why I am
opposing the McCloskey amendment today, although it is well-intended
and supported by some leaders on this issue for whom I have enormous
respect.
If we adopt this amendment, we are going contrary to what the
President of the United States wants.
The President has sent a letter opposing this amendment. What lifting
the embargo unilaterally would do, is prolong, widen, and intensify the
war. But what it will also do is Americanize this war. We will become
deeply involved in this conflict.
Remember what the American people are saying about the Bosnias, about
the Haitis, about the Somalias; they are saying, ``Be careful, be
careful about using American troops, be careful about getting in and
not being able to get out.''
Lifting the embargo unilaterally ill cause our British and French
allies to leave Bosnia, destroying the U.N. relief effort, which now
feeds 2 out of 3 Bosnians. The United States is going to take the blame
and the heat.
Lifting the embargo unilaterally would jeopardize other U.N.
sanctions against Iraq, Libya, Haiti, and Serbia. Lifting the embargo
unilaterally is going to damage our interests, our foreign policy
interests, because it is going to cause a rift between us and our NATO
allies and with Russia.
The Hamilton amendment, in my judgment, is a lot better. It focuses
on collective economic, political, military, and diplomatic efforts. It
protects the President's flexibility. It aims to enhance the defense of
Bosnia through coordination with close United States allies and with
Russia. It calls on the President, working closely with NATO and the
United Nations, to support continued NATO collective enforcement
actions in Bosnia, including the use of air strikes. It calls on the
President to consult closely with Congress on further actions in
Bosnia.
Again, Mr. Chairman, the authors of the McCloskey amendment are
leaders on this issue, and this amendment is a product of a lot of
frustration. I have felt in the past that perhaps unilateral action
should be taken. But at this particular juncture when the President
needs all the flexibility he can muster, when our foreign policy has
been under siege, and when you have the President having gone to our
European allies to state our policy, adopting an amendment like this
would send exactly the wrong signal.
On Haiti, we sent an unfortunate signal. By passing this amendment,
we would send another bad signal.
The McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment should be defeated
because: Lifting the embargo unilaterally would prolong, widen, and
intensify the war and drag the United States, alone, into it; lifting
the embargo unilaterally will put us on the slippery slope of direct
United States military intervention in Bosnia by involving United
States forces in delivering the weapons, training the Moslems, and
rescuing UNPROFOR forces caught in the crossfire; lifting the embargo
unilaterally will cause our British and French allies to leave Bosnia
destroying the U.N. relief effort--which now feeds two out of three
Bosnians. The United States will take the blame; lifting the embargo
unilaterally would jeopardize other U.N. sanctions--including those
against Iraq, Libya, Haiti, and Serbia; lifting the embargo
unilaterally would damage U.S. foreign policy interests. It will cause
a rift between the United States and its NATO allies, and with Russia.
The Hamilton substitute allows for lifting of the U.N. arms embargo
by U.N. Security Council agreement.
The Hamilton amendment should be supported because: Its focus is on
collective economic, political, military, and diplomatic efforts to
move all parties toward a negotiated settlement of the Bosnian
conflict; it protects the President's flexibility. It leaves all of our
options--military and diplomatic including lifting the arms embargo--
open; it aims to enhance the defense of Bosnia through coordination
with close United States allies and with Russia--while keeping the
focus on the peace process; it calls on the President, working closely
with NATO and the United Nations, to support continued NATO collective
enforcement actions in Bosnia, including use of airstrikes; it calls on
the President to consult closely with Congress on further actions in
Bosnia.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Hamilton amendment on
Bosnia. The amendment calls for the President to work through NATO and
the United Nations to enhance Bosnia's defense and to end the war.
This amendment makes sense. It calls for a responsible and rational
policy based, not only on our national interest, but also on what is
best for those who seek peace and an end to the horrible bloodshed in
Bosnia. Today, especially in light of the recently announced cease-
fire, we must not act rashly or unilaterally.
Nonetheless, I understand the frustration and desire we all share to
act to end the slaughter in Bosnia. But our job to act responsibly,
looking at the unintended consequences of our actions as well as the
results we hope for.
We must pass the Hamilton amendment and defeat the McCloskey-Gilman
amendment. To act unilaterally to lift the arms embargo will have a
number of negative results--it will prolong and intensify the war; it
will Americanize the war in various ways: The U.S. will become
responsible for rescuing and protecting UNPROFOR, the U.N. force now on
the ground in Bosnia; we, as a nation, will become responsible for
Bosnia's fate, potentially encouraging the Serbs to overrun the eastern
enclaves and other isolated Bosnian outposts. At that point, only
massive U.S. bombing or the threat of invasion could counter or prevent
the Serb attack; American troops would be drawn into the war through
the delivery of weapons, the need to keep supply lines open, and to
train the Bosnians and, then, to protect our advisors; finally, the
United States would then need to fill the gaps, providing relief to the
Bosnians after a probable U.N. pullout.
Mr. Chairman, this is the kind of vote that puts our hearts and our
heads in competition. We all feel in our hearts the need to act to stop
the bloodshed, the warfare, and the starvation. But we need to listen
to our heads, to move toward the same goals but to do it in a way that
won't cause more harm, more bloodshed, or more starvation. Vote for the
Hamilton amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Fields of Louisiana). All time has
expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 431, it is now in order to consider the
amendments printed in part 3 of House Report 103-520 relating to Bosnia
and Herzegovina, which shall be considered in the following order: (1)
By Representative McCloskey, Gilman, Bonior, or Hoyer; and (2) by
Representative Hamilton.
If more than one of the amendments is adopted, only the last to be
adopted shall be considered as finally adopted and reported to the
House.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in part 3 of
House Report 103-520.
amendment offered by mr. mccloskey
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. McCloskey: Page 308, after line
24, insert the following new title:
Title XII--Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense
SEC. 1201. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Bosnia and Herzegovina
Self-Defense Act of 1994''.
SEC. 1202. FINDINGS.
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) For the reasons stated in section 520 of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995
(Public Law 103-236), the Congress has found that continued
application of an international arms embargo to the
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina contravenes that
Government's inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and
therefore is inconsistent with international law.
(2) Before deploying United States Armed Forces to defend
the territorial integrity and political independence of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, or to enforce United Nations mandates
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States should seek to
permit the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to obtain the
means necessary to exercise its inherent right of self-
defense.
SEC. 1203. TERMINATION OF ARMS EMBARGO.
(a) Termination.--The President shall terminate the United
States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina upon receipt from that Government of a request
for assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
(b) Definition.--As used in this section, the term ``United
States arms embargo of the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina'' means the application to the Government of
Bosnia and Herzegovina of--
(1) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and published in the
Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58 F.R. 33322) under the
heading ``Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to
Yugoslavia''; and
(2) any similar policy being applied by the United States
Government as of the date of receipt of the request described
in subsection (a) pursuant to which approval is denied for
transfers of defense articles and defense services to the
former Yugoslavia.
SEC. 1204. PROVISION OF UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE.
(a) Policy.--The President should provide appropriate
military assistance to the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina upon receipt from that Government of a request
for assistance in exercising its right of self-defense under
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
(b) Authorization of Military Assistance.--
(1) Drawdown authority.--If the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina requests United States assistance in exercising
its right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter, the President is authorized to direct the
drawdown of defense articles from the stocks of the
Department of Defense, defense services of the Department of
Defense, and military education and training in order to
provide assistance to the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Such assistance shall be provided on such terms
and conditions as the President may determine.
(2) Limitation on value of transfers.--The aggregate value
(as defined in section 664(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961) of defense articles, defense services, and military
education and training provided under this subsection may not
exceed $200,000,000.
(3) Expiration of authorization.--The authority provides to
the President in paragraph (1) expires at the end of fiscal
year 1995.
(4) Limitation on activities.--Members of the United States
Armed Forces who perform defense services or provide military
education and training outside the United States under this
subsection may not perform any duties of a combatant
nature, including any duties related to training and
advising that may engage them in combat activities.
(5) Reports to congress.--Within 60 days after any exercise
of the authority of paragraph (1) and every 60 days
thereafter, the President shall report in writing to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro
tempore of the Senate concerning the defense articles,
defense services, and military education and training being
provided and the use made of such articles, services, and
education and training.
(6) Reimbursement.--(A) Defense articles, defense services,
and military education and training provided under this
subsection shall be made available without reimbursement to
the Department of Defense except to the extent that funds are
appropriated pursuant to subparagraph (B).
(B) There are authorized to be appropriated to the
President such sums as may be necessary to reimburse the
applicable appropriation, fund, or account for the value (as
defined in section 664(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961) of defense articles, defense services, or military
education and training provided under this subsection.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of
Tuesday, May 24, 1994, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey] will
be recognized for 30 minutes, and a Member in opposition will be
recognized for 30 minutes.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment
offered by my colleague.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums]
will be recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer], a real battler for justice as to
the Bosnians and the Balkans.
Mr. HOYER. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
Mr. Chairman, nobody has fought harder on this issue than the
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
Mr. Chairman, we are about to make an important decision in voting on
the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment. It is more than
a vote on whether we will or will not lift the arms embargo on Bosnia
and Herzegovina. It is a vote on whether we will act according to
important international principles, the right to self-defense. It is a
vote on whether we will ensure that countries are not rewarded for
violating international principles through forceful changing of
borders, aggression, and, yes, genocide.
Let us not stand silent, let us not dissemble, let us not say as the
gentleman from New Mexico has said, that it is not now time. That is
what we said in the thirties: it is not time to confront aggression, it
is not time to stand up for principles, it is not time to say enough of
killing, enough of taking property by force, enough of ethnic
cleansing, enough.
This is a vote on principle. It is not some slick foreign policy
``let's deal.'' We have been trying to deal with the Europeans for 2
years, and they have not acted. It was the policy of the Bush
administration to say that we will, in fact, have the Europeans take
the lead. That, my friends, was 2\1/2\ million refugees ago. That, my
friends, was 200,000 deaths ago.
Have there been more deaths in other parts of the world? There have
been. Should we be concerned about those? Of course.
But, ladies and gentlemen of this House, let us not continue to send
mixed, ambivalent messages, let us say clearly even if the United
States will not become more involved, we will not stand aside while the
Bosnians stand defenseless.
Would, if it were other Europeans--not just Moslems--being
terrorized, would we stand silent? Would we stand aside and say,
``Well, we enforced and imposed an embargo 2 years ago on all of
Yugoslavia, on the theory that we would not exacerbate the situation?''
{time} 1120
Mr. Chairman, the fact of the matter is that one party got all the
arms that the Yugoslav Army had, and they have used those arms against
those less able to defend themselves than the aggressors.
Our own State Department, that now does not want to act, has said
that the leaders of the Serbs is a war criminal, both in Belgrade and
in Bosnia, Milosevic, and Karadzic. This is not something on which our
State Department has minced words.
I hope that this House, whether it be the Committee on Foreign
Affairs or the Committee on Armed Services, and I hope that the Members
of this House, as I hope the American public, will say to those who
would perpetrate aggression and genocide, that America will not stand
idly by while that occurs. Had we said that in the midthirties, would
we have had the tragedy at Omaha Beach? I am not sure; none of us is
sure.
But the lesson of history clearly is that aggression and genocide
will occur if we stand aside, and stand slient, and stand idle, and say
over and over again, ``Now is not the time; maybe tomorrow and tomorrow
and tomorrow will be the time to act in the face of aggression, in the
face of genocide, in the face of war crimes, but now, now is not the
time.''
Let us pass this amendment. Let us say that America is going to at
least allow Bosnia to defend itself. Let us take that small step, not
the deploying of American troops, not the deploying of American force,
but at least this small moral step:
``Bosnians, you can defend yourselves, and we will assist you at
least in that step.''
And let us then reject the Hamilton amendment which says, on the
other hand, we will remain with the status quo 2\1/2\ million refugees
later and 200,000 deaths later.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished
colleague, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, let us make sure we know what the issue is
today. This is an issue whereby we are putting American soldiers in
harm's way.
Do not be misled.
It is interesting to hear the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Hoyer],
our friend and colleague, speak on this resolution and ignore a major
part of the language that is in this bill, in this amendment, and that
language is to provide United States military personnel to train and
advise Bosnians in Bosnia concerning combat. This is a repeat of what
went on in Vietnam years ago.
I ask my colleagues, Haven't we learned our lesson from that? How
many American lives as advisers will be taken? How many lives as
advisers in American uniforms were taken in Vietnam? Do we know the
quagmire in which we are involving ourselves?
Mr. Chairman, this is not just an arms embargo lifting. It is putting
American soldiers in uniform, who we cannot afford to do away with in
our national strategy, into harm's way.
And where does that put us in relation to our allies? The French? The
Canadians? The British who have troops on the ground there? We are in
essence taking sides, and advising, providing military equipment to put
them in harm's way as well.
I say to my colleagues, let's think about what we are doing today.
This is a very dangerous thing. Let us not get carried away with
emotion. Let us not undermine ourselves in our objectives. This
undermines ourselves in Iraq, in Libya, as well as elsewhere.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief; just a couple of key points:
For the second time to Mr. Skelton, really, the analogy is really not
quagmire or Vietnam. The analogy really is Europe, fascist aggression
and the likes of Chamberlain telling Hitler, ``You can have what you
want.''
As even Mr. Talbot said this morning, the Serbs, as he knows, have
committed international aggression. He says they are building a greater
Serbia. There are problems pending in Kosovo, Macedonia, problems with
Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria; just name it. The message is right now: If we
do not do something, if we not shed our hands of this policy, that the
Serbs can continue to get away with it.
But particularly again, I say to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr.
Skelton], this bill, this piece of legislation, says nothing about
mandating any arms or equipment. It leaves it up to the President,
totally at the discretion of the President, which allegedly, since Bill
Clinton, President Bill Clinton, told me 2 weeks ago in Air force One
that the arms embargo should be lifted, the problem is multilaterality.
But, as far as that aspect, that discretion on the part of the
President, any kind of commitment to any precipice that we cannot
retreat back from, that is simply not the case.
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. McCLOSKEY. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. WALKER. Am I not correct that the amendment specifically says
that American forces cannot provide training and advising activities
that may engage them in combat?
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Nothing can be done without the express authorization
of the President as to equipment or anything else.
Mr. WALKER. As I understand it, does the amendment not say,
``limitation on activities,'' and, as I understand it, it says:
Members of the United States Armed Forces who perform
defense services or provide military education and training
outside the United States, under this subsection may not
perform any duties of a combatant nature, including any
duties related to training and advising that may engage them
in combat activities.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman pointing that
out. We should keep the debate going as to what the facts are.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Hamilton].
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California
[Mr. Dellums] for yielding this time to me.
First of all, let me just say that I certainly understand why many of
my colleagues in this body are ready to support the McCloskey
amendment. The people of Bosnia have suffered very much in a tragic
war. We in the West have been unable to stop it up to this point, and,
as I have heard so many of my colleagues say, we simply have to do
something. And I think many of my colleagues look upon the McCloskey
amendment as a relatively cost-free, risk-free way of participating, if
my colleagues would, in this war, and I have no doubt at all that they
are utterly and completely sincere in their views. But I just want to
say that I think the adoption of the McCloskey amendment will drag us
much closer to war.
{time} 1130
Now, I think these are the consequences that will flow if the
McCloskey amendment is adopted. First of all, it is going to intensify
the war. If we promise the Moslems arms, promise the Bosnian Government
arms, they are going to have very little incentive to negotiate; they
will have every incentive to fight. If we arm the Moslems, the Bosnian
Government, the Serbs will move quickly to crush the Moslems before
they can receive the weapons. No one disagrees with that point. Witness
after witness in our committee and in discussions have said to those
who want to lift the embargo that it will intensify the war and will
increase the killing.
The second point or the second risk is that UNPROFOR will leave, and
that will jeopardize humanitarian assistance. There is not any doubt
about that. The French Prime Minister, the French Foreign Minister, and
the British Foreign Minister have all indicated that they are going to
pull out the UNPROFOR if we have a unilateral lifting of the embargo.
Why would they not? They have suffered very greatly here, and their
troops, not American troops, would be at risk. They have already
suffered many casualties, and they do not want to suffer any more
casualties. They will move UNPROFOR out.
UNPROFOR today feeds two of every three Bosnians. It has been an
extremely successful program under extraordinary difficult
circumstances, and they will be gone. They will be gone.
Another consequence is--and our administration officials have
reiterated this today--is that the peace process comes to an end. Sure,
there are problems with the peace process, enormous problems, but
progress is being made day by day, inch by inch. If we vote to lift
this embargo unilaterally, the peace negotiations fall apart. The
President has told us that.
Let me quote the President's letter: ``U.S. action to lift the
embargo would bring the peace process to an end.'' That is the
President's judgment. It brings the peace process to an end.
Another risk, of course, is Balkan instability. Who can tell what
would happen here? But among the successes--and they have been few, I
have to acknowledge--among the successes so far has been that we have
contained this conflict. There have been horrible events in Bosnia, no
question about that, but we have contained the conflict. If we lift
this embargo, all kinds of things begin to happen. It could reignite
the war in Croatia, and it risks an explosion in Albania and in Kosovo.
It could spill out into the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia.
So we risk instability in the Balkans.
Another consequence is that it harms U.S. ties if we lift this
embargo unilaterally. Let us look at NATO. Some of us heard what the
administration people said this morning, that if we lift this embargo
unilaterally, the future of NATO is at risk because this is the first
post-cold-war challenge to NATO. We will be walking away from NATO. We
will be walking away from Britain and from France, and we will be on
our own. We certainly will have a serious rift with Russia, with
unpredictable consequences by the nationalist elements in Russia, and
those who oppose Boris Yeltsin will be strengthened.
If we lift this embargo, another risk, of course, is that we
undermine U.N. sanctions. The United States voted for this embargo. It
is a solemn commitment of the United States, and if we unilaterally
break our word and lift the embargo, why should we expect any other
nation to keep their word on a national commitment? We break a U.N.
sanction, we do no care about Saddam Hussein, so go ahead and give him
materials. Many nations want to do that now. We break the U.N.
sanctions, we do not care about Libyan terrorism, so go ahead and
supply and trade with Libya. We break the U.N. sanctions, we do not
care about Haitian democracy. How can we gain support for sanctions on
Haiti or Serbian aggression or North Korea?
Now, there have been some legal arguments made here that the
McCloskey amendment supporters assert that continuing the embargo on
Bosnia violates the right of self-defense. But may I suggest that that
interpretation is wrong. Article 51 does not provide the necessary
authority to allow the United States to unilaterally lift the embargo.
It states that members' rights to ``individual or collective self-
defense'' must not ``affect the authority of an responsibility of the
Security Council.''
That is the next sentence. They only read the first sentence. We
undermine the U.N. Security Council's ability to act if we claim a
higher right to simply disregard U.N. Security Council action.
The next point is that the McCloskey amendment begins a new foreign
aid program, and it is an open-ended foreign aid program. With $200
million, it would make the Bosnian Government the fifth largest
recipient of United States foreign aid on the military side. And
moreover, the Defense Department estimates that providing that $200
million could require between 1,500 and 2,400 additional personnel to
train. And if, of course, they are attacked, they have to have force
protection.
If the Serbs then target UNPORFOR, American forces will be called
upon to rescue them. If our allies pull out troops, the fighting
intensifies, and we will be called to help. We will be called upon to
send weapons in, and we will be called upon for U.S. troops to help
keep the delivery routes open. But in a larger sense, we become
responsible for Bosnia's fate.
Bosnia becomes a client. Our prestige and our power will have to be
used to assure a Bosnian victory. We cannot go at it halfway.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by simply saying that I know the
frustrations here. They are very, very deep. It is important to see the
progress that has been made. Despite the setbacks, we and our allies
now have come together. We have contained the conflict, we have reduced
the killing, and in recent months there has been an end to the siege of
Sarajevo and Tuzla. There has been a peace agreement between the
Moslems and the Croats in Bosnia. There has been a formal cease-fire
between Crotian Government and the Serbs in Croatia. There has been a
dramatic reduction in the level of fighting, and as of yesterday, with
all it fragility, there is a 1-month cease-fire throughout Bosnia. And
as the President stated in Europe yesterday, a wider war has been
avoided and hundreds of lives have been saved.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to oppose the McCloskey amendment.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time
remains on both sides?
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Richardson). The gentleman from Indiana
[Mr. McCloskey] has 22\1/2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from
California [Mr. Dellums] has 18 minutes remaining.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Torricelli] a subcommittee chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and a man of knowledge and force.
Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
There is not a Member of this House in their own lives that did not
look in their parents' eyes and say, tell me about the holocaust. Tell
me why it is the world sat silent.
There is not a Member of this House who does not remember during the
carnage in Cambodia, how we said to ourselves, we wish that there was
something we could have done. But it just was not to be.
This debate is about many things. But, more than anything, it is
about this: What are you, my friends, going to say to your children and
their children's children, when they say to you, where was America?
When the villages were razed, women were raped, a Moslem people were
subjected to genocide? Where were you, America? With those in Europe
who would argue the legal restrictions, the need to stand together, or
with the victims, where America always is when America is right?
The compelling logic of the Moslem people is overwhelming. What is it
they want? They want to survive. They are not asking for our blood or
our lives. They want to fight to defend their own families.
I know it is a change of policy. What could be more of a compelling
argument for this amendment? The policy has failed. And this
legislative body at its best, if it is honest with itself, will stand
apart and say it was tried. But the idea of an embargo on a poor
impoverished people, while allowing a military force under the same
rules in Serbia, was an imbalance that was bound to create the
situation. Allow ourselves to escape from it.
Now we are told that there are legal precedents. There will be
complications. Well, you decide. Do you want to look at history with
your own children and say you were respecting precedents, or you were
standing for justice? This amendment is justice.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
(Mr. COMBEST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, it might appear this is an easy vote, give
the Bosnian Moslems the right to arm themselves and fight. If it were
that easy, I would be supporting it. I predict that while it may not
seem to be difficult today, in the future many may find this vote
haunting them. I hope that if this measure passes and actions are taken
accordingly, my position is proven wrong because if I am proven right,
it will mean that Americans have lost their lives. Mr. Chairman, there
are too many uncertainties.
This amendment makes it clear what we are to do. We are to ``go it
alone.'' We unilaterally provide arms. Where are the weapons to come
from? How long will it take to supply them and train for their use?
And, who trains them? The more independent our role the more American
sons and daughters are placed in Bosnia and in harm's way.
What happens if--in recognizing the potential problems of the Moslems
being armed--the Serbs launch an all-out preemptive strike in an
attempt to end the conflict prior to the Moslems' ability to strike
back? What happens to the Americans who we have stationed there in
their new role? What do we do then? How much further are we brought
into this confict?
Some military leaders on the scene have observed that an end to the
arms embargo months ago would have been a different story. But ending
that embargo now would create havoc.
Mr. Chairman, the American people have never lost their resolve for
peace and freedom. But they do expect that before our soldiers are
placed in danger, every possibility has been predetermined and plans
have been made. That is not the case in this instance and until such
plans have been outlined and we realize the potential American
involvement and ultimately the possible American loss, I cannot support
the proposal.
To the proponents, the question must be posed--do you support the
introduction of Americans in Bosnia? The answer to that is yes; let us
say so and make it very clear that is what we are voting on. Members
supporting this amendment had better consider this vote as a call for
the intervention of American sons and daughters on the ground in
Bosnia.
Several years ago when the House considered the authority to go to
war in the gulf, I did not cast my vote blindly as a disinterested
bystander. At that time, my son went to work everyday in the Marine
uniform and it was almost certain he would go to the gulf. I supported
that effort then and today I am totally convinced that was the right
decision.
I do not share the same conviction regarding American involvement in
Bosnia today. Until we know the specific result of our actions and
until we have planned for the potential reactions to our actions I
would not vote to send my son to Bosnia, and I will not vote to send
yours.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my dear friend and
a real courageous worker on this issue, the gentleman from
Massachusetts [Mr. Olver].
Mr. OLVER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I think one of the most ironic parts of this debate is
that at this very time, we have just finished commemorating 50 years
since D-day, and that epic struggle against fascism which the Second
World War represented. And one of the features of that war, which will
remain indelible through history, is that feature which was the most
widespread genocide occurring over a whole continent, an effort to
obliterate a whole people and a whole culture. Yet we are now in the
process of denial of self-defense of a people that is being subjected
to genocide.
I do not think there is anybody who denies that this is an effort at
genocide on the part of the Serb Chetniks. There are Roman Catholic
Churches and Moslem Mosques which have been destroyed. The whole of the
religious infrastructure for the two other religions that the Slavic
people in Bosnia represent, great and beautiful edifices dynamited,
cultural centers destroyed, museums, obliteration of a whole culture is
being attempted, along with the concentration camps that we had, the
indiscriminate slaughter of all ages of people because of their
religion, the millions of refugees that have been created in that
process.
The most basic right that people have is the right on the part of
individuals and nations, the right of self-defense. Personal law, U.S.
law, moral law, Biblical law, international law, all allows for the
right of self-defense, except in Bosnia. Except in Bosnia, where there
is a defense instead of a denial of that right of self-defense and
weaponry to do that on the part of the people involved.
This is the only instance in 50 years of the U.N. history where
direct U.N. action, deliberate U.N. action, helped and served the
aggressor, made the genocide worse. Bosnia, and Croatia before Bosnia,
both of them U.N. members, have been embargoed against even defensive
weapons, while Serbia for 3 years supplied arms and men and all kinds
of supplies and its own troops to grab as much land in an aggression in
Bosnia. As much land as possible has been taken.
It has been a process of kill or drive out all the people that
possibly could be killed or driven out, depending particularly on their
religion. The embargo is illegal and immortal, and ought to be lifted.
It is a violation of the U.N. Charter.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha].
Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, let me talk about the practical side of
lifting the embargo and the problems I have with the U.S. unilaterally
lifting the embargo.
All of us have seen this tragedy unfold. Not long ago I was in
Sarajevo, and I stood on the spot in the central marketplace where the
mortar round hit and killed so many people, and they talked about the
terrible tragedy that is going on in Bosnia.
General Rose, the U.N. ground commander, took me all through the area
in Sarajevo particularly, and talked about the difficulty that the
United Nations has on the ground.
For instance, in close air support, the hillsides are heavily
vegetated. A tank moves back and forth, and is difficult to spot. Also,
there is often cloud cover that greatly complicates air missions. So
people who think you could easily expand the bombing and significantly
affect military events on the ground are inaccurate. It's not an easy
proposition.
General Rose told me that with the military situation that has
developed, this is the very time in which negotiations must be stressed
to end this ongoing tragedy. There is some momentum here.
{time} 1150
He said that certain actions taken by the United States could
interrupt the momentum toward a settlement and prolong the fighting on
the ground if we raise false hopes.
For instance, he said that every time the United States makes a
strong statement we encourage one party or the other to institute a
military action. He said, ``every time that happens, it endangers my
U.N. people on the ground.'' He said:
You don't have anybody on the ground participating in this
action, and your statements precipitate military action that
endangers people on the ground.
He said:
I implore you to go back and tell the President of the
United States to negotiate with the Russians and with the ECa
settlement, and do it as quickly as possible. There is a
window of opportunity right now to try to settle this very
desperate, tragic situation.
I said, ``What about lifting the embargo?''
He said:
Here is the problem. Both sides have arms. One side may
have more heavy equipment than the other, but regarding the
Muslims that do not have the heavy equipment, the only people
that could supply it is the United States. There is nobody
else in the world that could supply that equipment. And to do
it, you would have to fight your way through if you took it
through on the ground.
We see what happens when we get involved in that kind of a match. It
escalates to the point where the United States is drawn in. We become
the enemy.
The Somalia, which was a fairly primitive military situation, the
United States thought it was going to go into Somalia and we would
control the situation completely. We became the enemy. They killed a
number of American service people trying to provide humanitarian aid,
with all the good intentions in the world.
All of us have good intentions. All of us would like to see the
fighting stopped, but what we would be doing is forcing one side or the
other to take action against us.
A Stinger missile will fire and shoot down a C-130, or whatever type
airlift airplane it happens to be, very easily. If they have hand-held
missiles, believe me, they will shoot down American aircraft. The
United Nations will not be able to maintain a presence in that area if
we go too far.
For instance, when we went into Sarajevo, anybody who thinks that
area is not controlled by the Serbs is wrong. We went through three
checkpoints. They made us get out of the automobile. The Commander said
to me, ``Look at the hillsides. They can shoot us anytime they want
to.''
We sit back here and we can watch television and we can say how
wonderful it is for the United States to take action in this particular
situation, but if you are in Sarajevo or in Gorazde and you are serving
with the U.N. forces, a unilateral lifting of the embargo means the
U.N. forces and the United States are taking sides. It would be a
tragic mistake for the United States to do so. We would lose our
neutrality and our ability to broker a settlement.
Mr. Chairman, I would urge the Members of this Congress to vote
against the amendment offered by my good friend, the gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from New York [Mr. Gilman], the ranking member of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs. He is a primary coauthor of this
amendment, and I am so much in his debt.
(Mr. GILMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the McCloskey-
Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment to end the arms embargo of Bosnia because
we have been witnessing aggression and genocide in Bosnia on a scale
not witnessed in Europe since the worst days of World War II.
Inaction in the face of this barbarism is not an option. We must take
action to end this tragedy in Bosnia.
Let us no longer accept the fiction as we have in the past 2 years
that all that is required is a little more patience--just a few more
weeks to give the diplomats time to negotiate a settlement. For 2 years
we have been patiently awaiting a negotiated settlement. But all that
such waiting has brought to Bosnia is more death and destruction.
Regrettably, it is anticipated that the latest cease-fire will be no
different than past cease-fires. The Bosnian Serbs have already
publicly indicated that they intend to resume fighting within 30 days.
Bosnia cannot afford more patience.
If we agree that we will wait no longer and that we must do
something, there really are only two options.
One is to end the arms embargo so that the people of Bosnia can
acquire the wherewithal to defend themselves. The McCloskey-Gilman
amendment will do precisely that.
The other option would be to send United States forces into Bosnia to
end the aggression and genocide.
It appears that the administration has already started us down the
road to direct U.S. military involvement. What were the United States
airstrikes around Gorazde, and our shooting down of three Serbian
aircraft, but the first step onto the slippery slope to direct United
States military involvement? This is why the references we've heard
today to Vietnam are misplaced. It is the administrations's current
policy that will drag us into a Vietnam-style Quagmire, not lifting the
arms embargo.
The substitute to the McCloskey-Gilman amendment originally offered
by Chairman Hamilton at least had the virtue of acknowledging that
direct U.S. military involvement is the alternative to lifting the arms
embargo. The original Hamilton substitute contains an authorization
under the War Powers Resolution for our United States Armed Forces to
engage in hostilities while conducting air operations in Bosnia. It
also contemplated the deployment of United States ground forces in
Bosnia.
The original Hamilton amendment was withdrawn and replaced by the
weaker language which we will vote on later today. The obvious reason
for this switch is that there was not sufficient support in the House
for the original language.
And that is instructive. If there isn't support for the real
alternative to lifting the embargo--if his House and the American
people are not going to favor direct United States military
involvement--then a vote against the McCloskey-Gilman amendment is in
fact a vote to do nothing about the aggression and genocide in Bosnia.
And that, to my mind, is a morally untenable position to take.
There should be no question about whether ending the embargo will
make a difference in Bosnia.
The Bosnian government has repeatedly asked us to take this step,
knowing better than anyone else what ending the embargo will mean--both
the risks it will entail and the opportunities. The Bosnians have
repeatedly stated that this is the single most important step we can
take to help them to resist the aggression and genocide now being
inflicted upon them.
It has been the Clinton policy for over a year to end the arms
embargo. Surely he would not have adopted this policy if there was any
truth to the opposition's arguments.
The President's policy would make no sense if there were no way to
get weapons into Bosnia; or if the Bosnian Government forces could not
be trained to use the weapons; or if getting the weapons into Bosnia
would not make any difference in turning back the aggression and
genocide. To suggest these things is to suggest that the President's
policy over the past year has been at best seriously misguided, and at
worst a cruel joke--a cynical ploy to buy more time while more people
die.
The only difference between the McCloskey-Gilman amendment and the
President's policy is that our amendment would implement the policy
unilaterally, without waiting for the U.N. Security Council to formally
rescind the embargo.
Our amendment calls on the United States to provide leadership in the
face of the moral crisis in Bosnia.
Opponents of the amendment are telling us we should wait for the
United Nations to provide leadership.
I fear if we do that we will be waiting for a long time.
The McCloskey-Gilman amendment relies on Bosnia's right under article
51 of the U.N. Charter to defend itself against aggression as the legal
basis for unilaterally ending the embargo. Those who contend that
Bosnia's right to defend itself has been extinguished by the action the
United Nations has taken to date do not fully understand article 51.
Bosnia is not compelled to stand by and allow itself to be
annihilated because 2\1/2\ years ago the United Nations decided to
impose an arms embargo on a country that no longer exists. We are not
compelled to stand by, allowing that annihilation to occur.
As for the claim that our opting out of the arms embargo of Bosnia
will invite other countries to opt out of U.N. embargoes we support,
such as that of Iraq, all I can say is that those situations are
entirely different. It is absurd to suggest that there is no difference
between Bosnia, which is the victim of continuing aggression, and Iraq,
which was the perpetrator of aggression. There can be no equating
Bosnia with Iraq.
In fact, there is no need for us to continue debating the question of
international law presented by the arms embargo. The Congress already
has had that debate and reached a decision. We already have found that
continued application of the U.N. arms embargo to the Government of
Bosnia violates article 51 of the U.N. Charter and is illegal under
international law.
That finding was contained in section 520 of the recently passed
Foreign Relations Authorization Act. That section went on to urge the
President to unilaterally terminate U.S. participation in the arms
embargo.
The McCloskey-Gilman amendment will implement the advice we so
recently gave the President. In addition, it will authorize--but not
require--the President to provide up to $200 million in military
assistance by way of drawdowns from Defense Department stocks. Those
drawdowns can be made without increasing our budget deficit.
Mr. Chairman, I submit we can make a difference in Bosnia, by voting
in support of the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, the timekeeper has now
corrected the amount of time, and this gentleman has 10 minutes
remaining, rather than 13 minutes, am I not correct?
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. That is correct.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I would indicate to my distinguished
colleague that it would be the intention of this gentleman to close the
debate.
Further, as I understand it, under the rules, this gentleman has the
right to close debate. Am I not correct, Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman is correct, he has the right
to close debate.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I would ask, is the distinguished
gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] saying that he is going to have
one 10-minute speaker in conclusion?
Mr. DELLUMS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish].
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today to strongly urge my colleagues to support
the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment, which provides for the
immediate and unilateral lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Let us once and for all dispel the myth that all sides are equal in
what some still attempt to portray as a civil war. Our irresolute
policy to date has only encouraged violence and ethnic cleansing. In
short, Mr. Chairman, alternatives to lifting the arms embargo have not
worked.
For over 2 years we have witnessed the ravages of aggression and
genocide in Bosnia. Over 200,000 people are dead or missing and
presumed dead; 85 percent of this total were civilians, and perhaps
most staggering is the fact that nearly as many children have died as
have combatants.
Against this backdrop, it is unconscionable that we continue to deny
the Bosnians the opportunity to obtain the necessary means to defend
themselves. The continued imposition of an arms embargo against Bosnia
and Herzegovina, a sovereign nation, in the face of a well-armed
aggressor is reprehensible and should end without further delay. Mr.
Chairman, we are already a year later. As for taking sides, Elie Wiesel
observes ``Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim.''
Mr. Chairman, the Bosnians have demonstrated their determination and
courage to defend their country and all that it stands for. Their Prime
Minister has asked for our help. I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes''
on the McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment which calls for the kind
of resolute action required to pave the way for a truly just and
lasting peace in the former Yugoslavia. At the same time, I urge
rejection of the Hamilton amendment which effectively endorses the
failed status quo.
{time} 1200
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Kansas [Mr. Glickman], the distinguished chairman of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, who has been following the Balkan
conflict intensely.
(Mr. GLICKMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I strongly support the position of the
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey] and I very much respect my
colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, but the fact of the matter
is this amendment is not inconsistent with negotiation and settlement.
It actually strengthens the ability of the United States to have
influence in the United Nations in getting the parties together.
I think from a standpoint of negotiation, it makes sense. But there
is the old expression ``Actions speak louder than words.'' The world
has spoken against the atrocities and brutality in the Balkans but has
done nothing about it. They look to us.
Mr. Chairman, I have traveled a lot in my role as chairman of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the world still looks to
us. They say it is great other countries are involved in the Balkans,
but only one nation has the moral leverage, the moral ability to
influence the world and the power to stand behind it and get something
done, and that is the Americans.
Mr. Chairman, we have got to act like a moral leader, not just talk
like a moral leader, and this is a good place to begin.
It was the Italian poet Dante who said, ``The darkest place in hell
is reserved for those who in a period of moral crisis claim
neutrality.''
Mr. Chairman, it is time for us to stop being neutral about
atrocities, about killing of people based upon the color of their skin
or who they are or what they believe in. It is time for America to
stand up. We can do it with this amendment.
There is some risk in terms of the increased arms in the region, but
nothing ventured without some risk will ever make any difference to
anybody, anyway. We not only owe it to the people in the Balkans but we
owe it to people around the world who are facing atrocities based upon
who they are or where they were born or what they believe in that
America will not allow this to continue.
Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment and I hope it passes.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
New York [Mr. Nadler].
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, we are told that we are dealing with
ancient ethnic quarrels here that we cannot hope to fathom. The truth
of the matter is that we are dealing with a classic case of aggression
across an international border, against a member state of the United
Nations, plus the instigation of domestic insurgency, not very
different from what we faced in Kuwait.
We have twice before this century had immoral arms embargoes. In the
1930's when the Fascists revolted in Spain, we had an arms embargo
against the loyalists while Hitler and Mussolini armed the Fascists. In
1948 we had an arms embargo against Israel, and thank God to the
Czechoslovaks who supplied arms so that the seven invading armies did
not succeed.
Now we are imposing an arms embargo against the victims of aggression
and the victims of genocide while the aggressors have plenty of arms.
We are told that lifting the arms embargo might lead to greater
bloodshed. That is like saying that we should not have let the
defenders of the Warsaw ghetto have arms against the Nazis.
Mr. Chairman, I am a member of the Holocaust Memorial Council. I have
many victims of the Holocaust in my district. We always say never
again, we must learn never again, but it is happening again, and what
are we doing about it? At least let us arm the Bosnians. This amendment
unfortunately does not do that. The amendment simply lifts the arms
embargo and leaves everything else up to the discretion of the
President. But let the Bosnians defend themselves against the Fascist
aggressors. Let those aggressors pay a price.
We are told lifting the arms embargo could lead to destruction of the
peace negotiations. What peace negotiations? As I look at them, they
are simply trying to have a fig leaf for the surrender of land made
free of Bosnians to the Serbian aggressors. We might as well be telling
the Czechoslovaks to cede the Sudetenland to the Germans or telling
England in 1940 to lay down its arms, leaving the Nazis supreme in
Europe.
Let us erase the stain of neutrality with regard to genocide. Let us
erase the stain of complicity with regard to genocide. Let us end this
embargo which is the handmaiden of genocide.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman
from New York [Ms. Slaughter].
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Chairman, the debate that should have taken place
about 2 years ago at the end of the cold war was what was the United
Nations going to be? We have sent in again to this conflagration in
former Yugoslavia people dressed in suits and blue helmets and we have
watched as they have been totally ineffective. Imagine what it was like
for them to have been escorting the Vice President of Bosnia to the
airport, in a United Nations carrier which was stopped on the street,
the back door opened and the man shot to death in front of them. Time
after time we have watched convoys of food and medical supplies be
turned back because the Serbs would not let them go on where they were
needed.
I received a letter myself from a surgeon in a Sarajevo Serbian
hospital, ``Please tell your President we are operating in the dark, in
the cold. We have no ability to sterilize the instruments, we have no
antiseptic, no antibiotics. We are using hacksaws to cut off limbs.''
While we have watched this for 3 years one side has been pounding the
other, the other side being unarmed by U.N. decree.
The President of Bosnia was here not long ago, he looked us all right
in the eye and he said, ``Whether you like it or not, America, you have
the moral imperative. You have always stood for that, you have always
said you have it and now it is time for you to use it. You cannot get
away from it and you cannot escape it.''
Mr. Chairman, until we decide what the United Nations is going to be,
whether they will really be able to prepare to keep the peace, it is
time for us to follow what human rights organizations and most of us
here believe has to be done and that is lift the embargo. Thousands of
innocent people have been murdered and we just let it happen. It is
indecent, inhumane, and we must not prevent people from protecting
themselves. Verbal communication did nothing. The United States said at
one point they were going to drop food in this area no matter what
anybody thought about it. At that moment the Serbs began to rush to New
York to the United Nations to talk. But did we pay any attention to
that? No.
One day we have a compelling interest but the next day we do not. We
have dithered back and forth with our allies making the case over and
over, since we have no troops on the ground, we literally have nothing
to say there. Lift the embargo and let us insist that the U.N.
peacekeepers be equipped and trained to do their work.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Wilson].
Mr. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the
time.
Mr. Chairman, it was said earlier in the debate that the great
problem with lifting this embargo would be that it would somehow
Americanize this war and it would somehow place America in the position
of taking a position.
I would just like to say that in a war as brutal and vicious as this
one where there is destruction of churches, where people are forced to
leave their land, where there are death camps again 50 years later,
there are death camps, I have seen the victims of the rape camps
myself. There is ethnic cleansing. There is genocide. This is good
versus evil, and if we do not want to Americanize this, then what do we
want to Americanize? We have to stand for something.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to my dear friend, the
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Hastings].
(Mr. HASTINGS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my support for
the McCloskey/Bonior/Gilman/Hoyer amendment to lift the arms embargo on
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The 2-year-long embargo has done little toward ending either the war
or the atrocities committed against the Bosnian Moslems. Two years
worth of international diplomacy have achieved almost nothing. And
during this 2-year peace process/negotiating period, more than 200,000
Moslems have been slaughtered.
If we are not interested in sending in our own troops to end the
conflict we can at least ensure that this besieged minority has the
ability to defend itself. Two years worth of one tactic is enough: It
is clear that diplomacy alone is not working.
I have heard the argument that if we lift the arms embargo we will
intensify the warfare rather than end the warfare. That by providing
arms to the Moslems we will enable them to launch a full-scale war
against the Serbs. I admit that this might, in fact, be true.
But the alternative is to continue to allow one side to slaughter
another. We have watched this happen for the past 2 years and we all
know that it will continue despite diplomacy.
We come to this well every day to decry the holocaust, to express
outrage about Rwanda, to complain that people are hungry and homeless
and sick and poor. We complain about all of these things, yet most of
us probably feel that we are powerless to help. Well we are not
powerless to help. People are being killed in Bosnia. If we can't help
end the war we can at least help the Moslems help themselves.
I do not want to be responsible for the deaths of hundreds of
thousands of people. But neither can I stand by and watch hundreds of
thousands of people die because of the status quo. Support the
McCloskey amendment.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from California [Mr. Rohrabacher].
{time} 1210
Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, we have heard a lot of talk today
about America becoming involved in a conflict so far away from our
shores.
Let us note that if we do not permit victims to defend themselves, we
are more likely to get involved in sending our troops into conflicts
like the Balkans. We do not want to Americanize this war. What we want
to do is permit the people who are being victimized and slaughtered to
be able to defend themselves. What could be better than that?
We should end this immoral arms embargo. It is immoral because it
treats the victims and aggressors alike in the end that will drag in
America's troops if, indeed, those people cannot defend themselves.
This policy has led to genocide, because it has left the aggressor
with a monstrous advantage.
We are being told America cannot act. Well, America can act. We
should be the leaders of the free world.
The new world order has turned into a nightmare of bungling,
indecision, and cowardice. We must end this immoral arms embargo so
victims can defend themselves, and the United States does not have to
send troops everywhere in the world.
Please, vote yes for McCloskey-Gilman.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the distinguished
gentleman from New York [Mr. Engel].
Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, it is said that Nero fiddled while Rome burned. For the
past 2 years, we have been fiddling while the people of Bosnia have
burned.
I do not want to know about diplomatic niceties. I know 2 years ago
we should have been doing what I hope we are about to do now.
I went to Skopje. I met with these people. They told us atrocities
that you just cannot believe.
If this were 2 years ago, perhaps there would be time for diplomatic
niceties. But there is not time anymore.
If we will not help them, if we will not defend the people of Bosnia,
let us let them defend themselves.
Vote to lift the arms embargo.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, in conclusion as to our side on this
very important debate, I yield 4 minutes, the remainder of our time, to
the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior], a Member for whom I hold
massive esteem, a man whose great courage and integrity cannot be
exaggerated.
Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Chairman, we have heard a lot of hopeful talk this
morning about the Bosnian cease-fire that was signed yesterday.
We have been told that the Geneva Agreement is the beginning of a new
round of peace talks.
Well, let me read to you a quote from somebody we have not heard from
yet in this debate.
Let me read you what the Bosnian Serb Government had to say this
morning about the 1-month cease-fire they agreed to just yesterday.
Through their news agency, the Bosnian Serb leaders said, and I
quote:
The Geneva Agreement is merely a 1-month calm before an
unprecedented storm and a prelude to total conflict. After
that it will become clear to one and all that there is no
formula according to which two victors can emerge from this
war.
That is what the Bosnian Serb leaders themselves had to say about
their cease-fire.
We have heard time and time again on this floor today that now is not
the time to act in Bosnia.
That now is not the time to lift the arms embargo.
That we must be patient and wait to act.
Well, I agree, Mr. Chairman. Now is not the best time to act. The
truth is, we should have acted a long time ago.
But for over 2 years, we just sat back and waited.
Waited as tens of thousands of innocent civilians were starved in
mass concentration camps.
Waited as thousands of young girls were systematically raped by
Serbian soldiers.
Waited as Serb snipers in places like Gorazde and Sarajevo gunned
down innocent children in cold blood.
And now opponents of this amendment are asking us to wait a little
longer.
Mr. Chairman, how many innocent people have to die in Bosnia before
we do something about it?
Are 200,000 dead Bosnians enough? Are 16,000 slaughtered children
enough? That is how many have died in the past 2 years.
How many times can we turn our heads and pretend we just don't see?
There have been over two dozen ceasefires the past 2 years. The peace
process has started and stalled countless times. We have watched the
Serbs break agreement after agreement. And still we have done nothing.
Nothing, as Serb aggression has run unchecked as Serb tanks have
rolled through the Bosnian countryside, taking town after town, village
after village, and still they kept coming, turning Bosnia into a
modern-day Sudetenland.
And the worst part, Mr. Chairman, is that the Bosnian people have had
to face it all with both arms tied behind their backs, because the arms
embargo we enforce has denied them the very weapons they need to defend
themselves.
There are those who say we should not lift the arms embargo today
because it will involve us in the war.
But let us be honest: We are already involved in the war.
By keeping this embargo in place for so long, not only have we forced
the Bosnian people to fight tanks and mortars with guns and knives but
we have helped tilt the balance of the war in favor of Serbian
aggression.
To have imposed the arms embargo in the first place was
incomprehensible. But to have kept it in place for so long, after so
much suffering, is utterly shameful.
Mr. Chairman, the people of Bosnia are not asking us to send in
troops.
They are not asking us to defend them.
They are simply asking for the right to defend themselves.
And we have no right to deny them that.
By passing this amendment today, we will simply extend to Bosnia that
right which is guaranteed to every other sovereign national under the
U.N. Charter--the right to self-defense, and the even more fundamental
right to self-determination.
It is time the Serbs learn that the world will not stand for its
aggression.
To those who say that lifting the embargo will disrupt the peace
process, I say you are wrong: Lifting the embargo will not weaken the
peace process, it will strengthen it.
The reason peace talks have failed the past 2 years is because the
Serbs have had no reason to negotiate. They face no opposition on the
battlefield, so they have had no incentive to stay at the negotiating
table.
We woke up this morning to headlines of a new cease-fire and hope for
peace in Bosnia.
But within hours after those headlines appeared, before the ink was
even dry, the Bosnian Serbs disavowed the agreement and threatened to
unleash an ``unprecedented storm * * * a total conflict.''
Let us never forget that we have been down this same road before.
Just 4 months ago, in early February, we applauded a cease-fire in
Sarajevo. But a few hours later, we mourned as a shell ripped through a
Sarajevo market, killing 68 innocent civilians.
Just 2 months ago, we welcomed three separate cease-fires in Gorazde.
But then we watched in horror as Serb snipers used homeless families
for target practice, and Serb shells rained down on children lying in
hospital beds.
More than two dozen times the past 2 years, we have seen cease fires
broken and peace talks fail.
By our actions here today, we can and must strengthen the cause for
peace.
Mr. Chairman, we began this week by remembering one of the proudest
days in our history.
Schoolchildren all across America learned how 50 years ago, their
grandparents saved the world from tyranny and genocide.
But 50 years from now, schoolchildren will study this time.
And they will look back and wonder where American leadership was when
genocide reared its ugly head again.
They will want to know why we sat back and watched children be
slaughtered and families torn apart.
They will want to know why the U.S. Navy blockaded the shores of
Bosnia so arms could not enter and innocent people could not defend
themselves.
And somehow, the excuses that there were barriers too difficult to
overcome or that we could not get our allies to go along with us will
seem empty. We have a chance to change some of that here today.
Fifty years after the world said ``never again''; now is our time to
stand up to tyranny and genocide in the world. And we cannot wait any
longer.
Because if we do not, if we do not lift this embargo and at least let
the people of Bosnia defend themselves, then the blood of Bosnia is not
just on the hands of the Serbs.
It is on all of us.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time for
the purposes of concluding debate on this issue.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, let me make several
observations.
First, good and decent human beings have arisen in the well of the
House on both sides of this aisle, people whom I respect with a great
sense of sincerity.
Second, Mr. Chairman, there have been a number of eloquent and
articulate, compelling, and compassionate statements made during the
course of this debate.
Third, Mr. Chairman, what should not be negotiable, debatable, or
discussible is that all of us believe that the killing and the dying
should end.
The question before us is how to do it. And, second, does the action
contemplated in the amendment before the body take us to that place?
There have been a number of brilliant statements, Mr. Chairman, but
let me look specifically at what this amendment does and whether it
takes us to the goal and objective that has been eloquently spoken by a
number of people in the well.
This amendment unilaterally, Mr. Chairman, and I underscore for the
purposes of emphasis, unilaterally, the United States would lift its
participation in the arms embargo against Bosnia, and it would
authorize up to $200 million in aid and the trainers to train Bosnian
soldiers on using the equipment.
{time} 1220
So, Mr. Chairman, all of us want to end the killing and the dying.
This is unilateral lifting of the embargo. This is a complex issue.
This gentleman has thought long and hard on this matter, and I would
like to share with you, Mr. Chairman, the significant reasons why I
believe this is going down the wrong path.
No. 1, it violates the first rule of peacekeeping, Mr. Chairman. With
this vote, we would effectively become Bosnia's allies. We would
violate the cardinal rule of peacekeeping, ``Choose no sides, make no
enemies.''
Mr. Chairman, we are the last peg standing, we are the great
superpower. We must learn as a Nation how to engage in peacekeeping,
peacemaking, peace enforcement. We must not continue to drag the
baggage of the cold war into the post-cold war activity. Choose no
sides, make no enemies.
Mr. Chairman, this would harm multilateral efforts generally,
including Korea. This would harm multinational efforts generally,
including our current effort at bringing the world community in line
with bringing sanctions against North Korea for violating its
obligations under the nonproliferation regime. We ought to at least try
to present some cogent, consistent strategy and face to the world.
Third, lifting unilaterally weakens other embargoes. Mr. Chairman,
any time the world comes together on a multinational basis to impose an
arms embargo, we ought to walk gently and cautiously before we
unilaterally engage in lifting the embargo. If we would lift the
embargo on Bosnia unilaterally, what would stop other nations who could
move to lift other embargoes such as those on Iraq and Libya? We would
lose the moral high ground on this issue, Mr. Chairman, a moral and
legal basis for seeking to enforce these embargoes.
What happens, Mr. Chairman, down the road a little further when some
other nation decides to step outside of internationally imposed arms
embargo and we rise to great moral heights and say, ``Why are you doing
this?'' The response would be, ``Why are you attempting to raise this
question with us? When it served your purposes, you stepped outside of
the multinational embargo.''
The issue here is not whether you lift or do not lift, this amendment
deals with unilateralism, and you have got to address that issue.
Mr. Chairman, fourth, it would remove our leverage with Serbia. Our
unilateral lifting of the embargo on Bosnia would give the green light
to others to ignore the embargo on Serbia. One would have to be a fool
or naive, Mr. Chairman, to assume that lifting this embargo takes place
in a vacuum. One action causes another reaction. We do not live in a
vacuum.
Mr. Chairman, reacting to an action taken on this matter by the other
body, the Russian Duma has already voted that it would be its sense
that Russia should unilaterally lift sanctions on Serbia. While their
actions will not implement such a policy, I am trying to point out that
it shows the problem.
Next, I believe it would increase the bloodshed. Providing arms to
Bosnia really solves nothing. But it will certainly increase the
bloodshed. In the months before the Bosnians master the weaponry that
we give them, the Serbs may attack all out and overrun still more
Moslem territory. If the Serbs fail to do so, the Bosnians would likely
use the weapons to try to settle scores. Either way, there will be more
bloodletting.
Mr. Chairman, make no mistake about it, you do not walk away from
this action with clean hands. There is blood. And this action, in my
opinion, increases the potential of that. We ought to be about bringing
people to the negotiating table. Those who have written in support of
this, who are articulate spokespersons for a peaceful, diplomatic
solution to the problems must understand that simply lifting the
embargo and stepping away is not a neutral act, it is not an act that
does not stain you with the same kind of blood because of the
disincentive.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that it would derail the newly established 1-
month ceasefire and the possibility for an agreement on an even longer
ceasefire. We ought to be about ceasefires, to try to stop the killing
and the dying and the maiming.
It would infuriate our allies: If we violate the embargo, we
infuriate our own allies, especially Britain, Canada, and France, who
have troops on the ground, unlike us, Mr. Chairman, and who fear this
action will cause the resumption of war, with their troops stuck in
between. Our allies have clearly warned us for months that we will be
blamed for the deaths of their sons if we violate the embargo. We
cannot turn a deaf ear to this, Mr. Chairman. We would not, if the shoe
were on the other foot, want them to turn a deaf ear to us.
Mr. Chairman, humanitarian effort could be stymied: The European
troops on the ground in Bosnia allow humanitarian relief to get
through. If we lift the embargo and the European troops are fired upon,
we can expect them to pull out, thereby effectively ending humanitarian
relief effort and leading us to a swift increase in civilian deaths.
Make no mistake about it.
Our allies may press us for further military actions. Let me explain.
Before our angry allies withdraw, they may press us for further
military actions to support their troops who may be withdrawing under
fire. That must be contemplated. This would almost certainly include an
escalation in air strikes flown by U.S. pilots, an action which could
further entangle us in the war and would likely cause greater
casualties.
Aside from that, the likelihood is that it is also a distinct
possibility that we would be called upon to put American troops on the
ground as a short-term defense of our withdrawing allies. We would
almost be bound to respond positively, considering that it is our
unilateral lift that placed them in harm's way in the first place. Such
an involvement would certainly cause a serious risk of casualties and
would so completely engage us in the fighting as to remove almost any
possibility that we could play a role as an active broker for a
negotiated solution. Mr. Chairman, that is the role of a great
superpower.
It would likely kill more Bosnians. Let me further explain. This
action would not save the Bosnians and may end up killing more. The
Serbian reaction will likely be to resume the war immediately, before
arms can be delivered and Bosnians can be trained to handle them. I
would make a note, Mr. Chairman: It is not rifles and mortars that the
Bosnians need, but tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers. It
will take weeks and months to provide individual Bosnian troops with
the skills on these weapons. Based upon our own training experiences,
it would probably take more than a year for the Bosnians to learn the
unit skills needed to employ them effectively.
Having set this train in motion, we will be morally responsible for
the fate of the Bosnians. If the butchering resumes during this
extended period of training, will the supporters of this amendment be
willing to send U.S. troops to save the Bosnians from a fate worse than
they face now?
It would seem to me that it would then become a moral imperative to
do so. So, we are locked in, Mr. Chairman.
Further, it sucks us deeper into the quagmire. Some have spoke to
this. If $200 million is insufficient to turn the tide, what do we do
then? Will we use unilateral air power to save the Bosnians if they are
being overwhelmed?
Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Olver). The gentleman is recognized for
an additional 5 minutes.
Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the Chairman and would like to conclude my
comments.
Would we use unilateral air power to save the Bosnians if they are
being overwhelmed? If that does not work, will we send in ground
troops? Or will we say, ``Nice try,'' but leave the Bosnians to fate?
This could further endanger American lives. Let me further explain.
This amendment authorizes us to train Bosnian troops in Bosnia, thereby
increasing the threat to American troops. This makes us more an ally of
the Bosnians, an escalation of taking sides.
The goal should be to seek a ceasefire. Mr. Chairman, brilliant
comments notwithstanding, this is a war and intervention amendment, not
a peace or peacekeeping amendment. It has those implications. We should
continue to build on recent successes that brought an end to the sieges
at Tuzla, Sarajevo and Garazde, to end the shelling and to continue to
support this 1-month ceasefire with the hope that it would increase.
{time} 1230
Mr. Chairman, this amendment, in my opinion, is a disincentive to
negotiate. It provides no incentive for the Bosnian Government to seek
a negotiated settlement. In fact, the Bosnian Government could view
this as an opportunity to launch offensive operations to regain
territory in line with their three territorial imperatives.
Mr. Chairman, the Bosnians have three territorial imperatives. They
are land locked by virtue of their fighting on the ground. They need to
go south to the Adriatic Sea, north to the Danube River, and east to
Sarajevo. By virtue of their coalition with the Croats, they now have
access to the Adriatic Sea for trade and economic purposes. They do not
have access to Sarajevo, the capital, nor to the Danube River for
economic and trade purposes.
These matters, it seems to me, can be solved at the negotiating
table, not on the battlefield. By lifting the embargo, Mr. Chairman, it
becomes a disincentive to move to the table to stop the killing because
then you give greater weapons, greater potential for greater fighting
and greater struggling prior to coming to the table. The result is more
people dying and more deaths.
We ought to be about negotiation. We ought to be, as a great nation,
about trying to move people in that direction so those matters can be
dealt with.
Mr. Chairman, it undercuts diplomatic efforts, and that has already
been addressed, and I would not go further than that, but let me, in
the closing part of it, try to respond to this reference to the right
of self-determination. It has been raised on several occasions, but I
would suggest to my colleagues that it has been taken out of context.
Proponents say we should support this amendment because the U.N.
Charter gives every country the right to self-determination. They quote
article 51:
``Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
self-defense.''
But, Mr. Chairman, that is only the first sentence of this article.
The second sentence says:
``Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right shall not
in any way affect the authority of the Security Council to take * * *''
et cetera, et cetera, ``such action as it deems necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security.''
I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that this completely alters the
meaning, so it is not about simply reading sentence No. 1. It is
reading it in total context, and those in these Chambers who are
students of evolution of the United Nations and the evolution of this
proposition with respect to the right of self-defense must, on the
basis of intellectual honesty, read that matter in its total
perspective.
The intent of the U.N. Charter is in favor of collective measures for
defense. Self-defense is most relevant in periods prior to collective
actions, which in this case the Security Council has already taken. The
U.N. Allies, allied course of collective actions, sanctions safe zones,
humanitarian assistance, and a course of negotiation as the best course
of defense in Bosnia.
Proponents also imply that the Security Council only placed the
embargo on Bosnia accidentally because it voted on the embargo in 1991,
before the full collapse of Yugoslavia. But since then the Security
Council has reaffirmed the embargo on Bosnia again and again.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, with all of these arguments I am
concluding, and all of my colleagues have listened carefully to this
debate, but I say, ``Take action based upon the complexity of this
matter.''
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Olver). The gentleman from South
Carolina [Mr. Spence] is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, for purposes of debate only, I yield 2
minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, it is always a stimulating experience to hear
the learned gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] speak on any
subject, particularly on this one. I would just like to respond to a
few of the things he said.
``Choose no sides.'' That is the first rule of peacemaking. The
first, most famous chooser of no sides was named Pontius Pilate, and he
is legendary.
``I don't see any moral high ground,'' another good phrase in
treating aggressor and victim identically. It seems to me the doctrine
of moral equivalence ought to have gone out with the end of the cold
war. That was Paul Warnke's idea of the Soviets and the United States
being two hamsters on a treadmill.
Unilateralism. Let me tell my colleagues, ``When Israel took out the
nuclear reactor in Iraq, the whole world suffered from terminal
ambivalence. They deplored the violation of protocol, and secretly they
loved it. They loved it.'' Unilateralism, yes, blessed unilateralism.
I suggest that there are all kinds of peace, and peacemaking is
wonderful, but the peace of the morgue, the peace of the jailhouse, is
not to be suffered, and America is too important and too moral a
country to aver its eyes from genocide and ethnic cleansing, and so I
hope and pray that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana
[Mr. McCloskey] is adopted, and the subsequent amendment, about which I
will have more to say later, is defeated.
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HYDE. If I have any time remaining, it is a pleasure to yield to
the gentleman.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Illinois
[Mr. Hyde] has expired.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
California [Mr. Dellums].
Mr. DELLUMS. First, I would like to thank the gentleman from Illinois
[Mr. Hyde], my colleague, for his very generous remarks.
Second, Mr. Chairman, I simply say to my colleague that I believe the
role of peacekeeper in the post-cold war world is very important. What
I was simply trying to suggest is that at the point where we take
sides, or make enemies, we no longer become credible as a peacekeeper
trying to bring all parties to the table. Once we choose sides we are
no longer credible as a peacekeeper, and I am simply suggesting that
the role of the peacekeeper is a vital and important role and an
increasing responsibility we are going to be called upon to perform as
the world moves toward the 21st century.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. One must always in justice be able to distinguish the
aggressor from those aggressed against.
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, for purposes of debate only, I yield 2
minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf].
[Mr. WOLF addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in
the Extensions of Remarks.]
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as I have remaining to
the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Olver). The gentleman from Indiana [Mr.
McCloskey] is recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very much for
yielding his time to me.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I think we have had a fine debate here
on all sides of this issue, but as to the extended statements of the
distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I think the
gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] knows as well as everyone that
there is a moral responsibility at certain levels to violate an unjust
law. We are saying that this arms embargo is unjust, it is illegal, it
is immoral, and it is really nonbinding as a matter of humanitarian
sense. That is common sense on its face.
Again this provision commits no troops. It remains discretionary with
the President. In essence, it does nothing more in that area than the
President has the right to do now.
I would note, with all this talk about the embargo, that there is no
embargo, there is no interdiction, and there is nothing being forced
with all those armed supplies and, yes, personnel going from Serbia
into Bosnia.
Mr. Chairman, I ask the Members to vote yes on McCloskey-Gilman and
vote no on Hamilton in the ensuing debate.
Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Chairman, life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
is not only an American dream, but a universal aspiration. For 2 years,
the Bosnian Moslems have been denied the right to make that dream come
true. Serbian aggression has been relentless even while negotiations
were in progress. Ending the arms embargo will finally allow the
Bosnians to defend themselves--a right no one should be denied. The
embargo, which violates international law, will be rectified by the
McCloskey-Gilman-Bonior-Hoyer amendment. By enabling the Bosnians with
a means to fight their aggressors, the need to send United States
troops will be unnecessary. As the situation now stands, the United
States, by enforcing the embargo, has already intervened. It is time to
make this intervention a positive one. To stand by and allow Serbia to
continue committing these atrocities is barbaric. With a country whose
policy includes rape as an act of war, it is imperative that this
aggression be stopped. The Bosnian Government has put the number of
casualties at 220,000, with the number of women raped totaling between
35,000 to 50,000 and those who have been displaced at 1.25 million.
It is a depravity indeed that we as Americans, living according to a
constitution which clearly defines our inalienable rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, are forcing the Bosnians to live
a life worse than death.
Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in reluctant opposition to the
amendment. I understand and deeply admire the intent of those offering
this amendment. It is difficult to view the ongoing carnage in Bosnia
and not want to do something to help.
But the ramifications of this amendment, no matter how well intended,
go beyond just arming the Bosnians. This debate must be based on the
cold, hard reality of the current situation and not on emotion.
Approval of this amendment would effect other ongoing U.N. embargo's,
change the relationship between the United States and Russia and
possibly put American troops at risk.
I simply do not see how this House could take action to unilaterally
lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and then expect other nations to honor
U.N. embargo's on Haiti, Iraq, Libya, and one day North Korea.
Further, policy changes like this do not occur in a vacuum. Surely
Russia, with its ethnic ties to Serbia, could not be expected to
maintain its embargo if we do not maintain ours.
Finally, I am concerned that lifting the embargo puts us on the
slippery slope toward full scale intervention. The Department of
Defense has concluded the type of weapons the Bosnians need could not
be shipped without the willingness of other nations. Those supplying
the weapons would themselves be exposed to enemy fire. And which nation
would supply the training needed to effectively use the weapons?
If you believe that lifting the embargo is the only fair thing to do,
then I urge you to support the Hamilton amendment.
Let me say this in conclusion. A no vote to this amendment should not
be construed as support of the Clinton policy. It has been a disaster
of a policy, born in the minds of people who always think they can have
it both ways. This President has failed to demonstrate to the American
people why intervention in Bosnia is a national interest. I will not
support this amendment nor will I support American troops as
peacekeepers in Bosnia.
But this House should also not attempt to have it both ways. Lifting
the arms embargo is not a solution, it just makes us feel better. If
you are not prepared to demonstrate our national interest in Bosnia, if
you are not prepared to act on that interest, then I believe you should
support a negotiated peace and stop leading the Bosnians on.
Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to the McCloskey
amendment. Like all of my colleagues, I have been horrified to watch
the violence and turmoil that have marked the brutal civil war in
Bosnia, and I have been deeply saddened by the tragic loss of life that
has occurred there. I strongly believe the United States must do all it
can to end this terrible war and bring peace to this troubled region.
However, I do not believe that by lifting the arms embargo
unilaterally, the United States will be promoting a peaceful resolution
of this terrible conflict. The peace talks in Bosnia are currently at a
fragile stage. By lifting the embargo unilaterally, the United States
may undermine any possibility of achieving a diplomatic solution to the
conflict. Moreover, by introducing new arms into the region the United
States would effectively widen and intensify the war, increasing the
killing and destruction in this already devastated area. Attempting to
level the killing fields is not the key to peace in Bosnia.
We must decide as a nation whether we want to work with the
international community or against it. The United States agreed to
impose an arms embargo on this region as a member of the United
Nations. We did not decide to impose the embargo unilaterally, and we
did not impose it against our will. If we pass the McCloskey amendment,
we will be telling the world that we will participate in multilateral
sanctions only when it is convenient for us. This would set an
extremely dangerous precedent by sending the message that compliance
with United Nations resolutions is not mandated, but optional.
In a Dear Colleague letter on this matter, the distinguished chairman
of the Foreign Affairs Committee dramatically illustrated the danger of
the United States acting unilaterally to lift the arms embargo. In the
words of the chairman,
Just last [month], the Russian Duma voted overwhelmingly to
lift economic sanctions against Serbia if the United States
lifts the arms embargo. Turkey has complained bitterly about
the arms it suffers through the sanctions against Iraq. It
could easily use the U.S. unilateral action as justification
to lift Iraq sanctions unilaterally. Compliance with the
Haiti sanctions already has been called into question; how
can the United States argue against the Dominican Republic's
actions if we do the same elsewhere?
If the United States, as the world's only superpower, chooses to
ignore international law, how can we rightfully expect other nations to
comply? Why should other countries observe sanctions against North
Korea, Libya, or Iraq if the United States ignores those in the former
Yugoslavia?
Let's work to end the war in Bosnia, but let's do it in conjunction
with the international community, and without widening the war and
increasing the killing. Please join me in voting ``no'' on the
McCloskey amendment.
Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the McCloskey
amendment, and against the Hamilton amendment.
Mr. Chairman, one of the most memorable moments of my first term in
office was to listen to Elie Wiesel's speech at the dedication of the
Holocaust Memorial Museum, just 1 mile from this Chamber.
Who can forget when Mr. Wiesel turned to President Clinton and said
``Something, anything must be done to stop the bloodshed (in Bosnia),
Mr. President, it will not stop unless we stop it.''
Well, the time has come--today--for this House to do something to try
to put an end to the suffering and the slaughter in Bosnia.
I reject the argument that lifting the embargo will intensify the
war.
In the first place, this really hasn't been a war at all. This
conflict has consisted of wanton attacks on the civilian populations of
a sovereign state that has been unable to defend itself.
As our distinguished colleague Steny Hoyer has pointed out, the
number of children killed is roughly the same as the number of
combatants.
And, by allowing the Bosnians to defend themselves, we will decrease
the possibility that U.S. troops will have to be sent in to enforce a
shaky peace agreement.
Mr. Chairman, in 1948, another infant country recognized by the
United States, the State of Israel, was the victim of an unjust
international arms embargo.
Just as the Serbs inherited the weapons of the dissolved
Yugoslavian Government, the Arab nations that surrounded and attacked
Israel were armed to the teeth with the weapons left by the departing
British.
It wasn't until the Czech Government broke the embargo and began
shipping some arms to Israel that the balance of power tilted slightly
and Israel was able to fight back and ultimately win its war of
independence.
In 1948, an international arms embargo almost destroyed the fledgling
State of Israel.
In 1994, another embargo is contributing to the slaughter of
innocents in another independent State.
Let's take a stand today to stop the bloodshed. Support the McCloskey
amendment.
Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, the war in Bosnia has raged for more than 2
years now. Over the past 26 months, we have heard reports and seen
pictures of massive human suffering, organized rape and murder,
deliberate targeting of innocent, unarmed civilians, and the
unconscionable practice of ethnic cleansing. Two hundred thousand
Bosnians have died in the fighting, 2 million have been forced from
their homes and now are refugees, and 70 percent of Bosnia is occupied
by Serb forces. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has called the
war in the former Yugoslavia ``the conflict from hell.'' I agree with
him.
I do not agree, however, with the current policy of denying the
Bosnians the right to defend themselves in the face of such relentless
and brazen Serb aggression. I do not agree that the best the United
States can do is hope all sides accept a fundamentally unjust peace
agreement which will, in all likelihood, fall apart. And I do not agree
that the United States should condone an embargo which permits the
Serbs to wage a systematic and ruthless genocide on the people of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Mr. Chairman, history is filled with examples where the action of one
country, or of even one person, changed the course of events which
followed. The French, during the Revolutionary War, aided the American
colonists against the British. Without French support, the United
States might still be under British control. President Roosevelt,
during World War II, instituted the Lend-Lease Program to help the
British fight off Hitler. Without United States help, Britain may have
fallen and the Nazi Party today would be Europe's only political party.
The United States, in the 1980's, armed the mujahidin in Afghanistan
against Soviet invaders. Without these arms, the Afghan rebels would
not have been able to triumph over the Soviets.
Mr. Chairman, our past teaches us that critical moments in world
history require decisive action. The war in Bosnia requires a decisive
response. Will historians write that if the United States had lifted
the arms embargo, the disaster in Bosnia would have been avoided? I
urge my colleagues to support the McCloskey amendment.
Ms. DELAUTO. Mr. Chairman, we've waited long enough. The people of
Bosnia and Herzegovina have waited long enough. They've held on through
years of unimaginable suffering. Through mass rapes and executions.
Through the endless Serb bombardments. Through the violations of
countless U.N. safe zones.
They have struggled through this against staggering odds. Ill armed,
ill equipped, haggard, and hungry, they have fought off the advances of
their aggressors through sheer courage and determination. We all know.
We have seen them countless times on television footage. Holding on to
what is left of their country. What is left of their families.
And in all of this they have asked precious little. They want simply
to defend themselves. But they can do little against the far better
armed Serbs unless they have a chance to arm themselves. Yet the arms
embargo against the former Yugoslavia prevents that. It keeps in place
the overwhelming advantage in arms and equipment that Serb forces had
when the hostilities began.
We cannot allow this to continue. To tie the hands of the victims of
a new and horrific assault on the moral sensibilities of mankind--
ethnic cleansing. Support the McClosky amendment. Give the Government
of Bosnia and Herzegovina the chance to defend itself. It is the very
least we can do.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I am voting today for the McCloskey
amendment to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian
Government. The United States must send a clear message to the Serbs
that we expect their full cooperation at the negotiating table and will
not tolerate their continued aggression against the Bosnian people.
It is clear that talk alone has not brought about peace. For 2 years,
the United States and other democratic nations have worked for a
negotiated settlement. Recently, the negotiations in Geneva have again
raised hopes that a political settlement may be reached. The fact
remains that 2 years of negotiations have failed to stop Serbian
aggression and the horror of ethnic cleansing. More than 200,000
Bosnians have died over the past 2 years. We must do more to stop the
killing.
Passage of the McCloskey amendment will keep the pressure on the
Serbs to end their campaign of aggression. The United States must make
it unmistakably clear that we expect the Serbs to agree to a fair peace
settlement.
I urge the House to adopt the McCloskey amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 244,
noes 178, not voting 17, as follows:
[Roll No. 222]
AYES--244
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allard
Andrews (NJ)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barcia
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Becerra
Beilenson
Bereuter
Berman
Bilbray
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonior
Boucher
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Bunning
Burton
Byrne
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Cardin
Carr
Castle
Clayton
Clyburn
Coble
Coleman
Collins (GA)
Coppersmith
Costello
Cox
Coyne
Crapo
Danner
de la Garza
de Lugo (VI)
DeLauro
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dingell
Dooley
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Dunn
Engel
English
Everett
Ewing
Fawell
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Fingerhut
Fish
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Frank (MA)
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Gallegly
Gallo
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Glickman
Goodlatte
Goss
Grams
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hansen
Hastings
Hayes
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Holden
Horn
Hoyer
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inhofe
Istook
Johnson, E. B.
Kaptur
Kasich
Kennelly
Kim
King
Kingston
Klein
Klink
Klug
Kolbe
Kyl
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
Laughlin
Lazio
Leach
Levin
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lewis (GA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
Livingston
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Machtley
Maloney
Manton
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Markey
Martinez
McCandless
McCloskey
McCurdy
McDermott
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
McNulty
Meehan
Menendez
Meyers
Mfume
Mica
Miller (FL)
Mink
Molinari
Mollohan
Moorhead
Moran
Myers
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Neal (NC)
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Paxon
Payne (NJ)
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pickle
Pombo
Porter
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Ravenel
Regula
Ridge
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Ros-Lehtinen
Rush
Santorum
Sawyer
Saxton
Schaefer
Schenk
Schiff
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sharp
Shaw
Shays
Skeen
Slattery
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Swett
Swift
Talent
Tanner
Taylor (NC)
Tejeda
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Thompson
Thurman
Torricelli
Traficant
Upton
Vento
Volkmer
Walker
Walsh
Waters
Weldon
Wheat
Wilson
Wolf
Wynn
Yates
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOES--178
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (TX)
Applegate
Archer
Armey
Bacchus (FL)
Bachus (AL)
Baesler
Baker (CA)
Barca
Barrett (WI)
Bateman
Bentley
Bevill
Bilirakis
Bishop
Blackwell
Borski
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Buyer
Canady
Cantwell
Chapman
Clay
Clement
Clinger
Collins (IL)
Combest
Condit
Conyers
Cooper
Cramer
Crane
Cunningham
Darden
Deal
DeFazio
DeLay
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Dicks
Dixon
Duncan
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Ehlers
Emerson
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fields (TX)
Filner
Flake
Fowler
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Goodling
Gordon
Green
Hall (TX)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Hancock
Harman
Hastert
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hochbrueckner
Houghton
Hughes
Hutto
Inglis
Inslee
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, Sam
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kennedy
Kildee
Kleczka
Knollenberg
Kreidler
LaRocco
Lehman
Lightfoot
Lloyd
Mann
Manzullo
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McKinney
Meek
Michel
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Moakley
Montgomery
Murphy
Murtha
Norton (DC)
Nussle
Oberstar
Orton
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Petri
Pomeroy
Poshard
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Roemer
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roth
Roukema
Rowland
Roybal-Allard
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Sarpalius
Schroeder
Scott
Shepherd
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Smith (IA)
Smith (MI)
Smith (OR)
Spence
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stupak
Synar
Taylor (MS)
Thornton
Torkildsen
Torres
Underwood (GU)
Unsoeld
Valentine
Velazquez
Visclosky
Vucanovich
Watt
Waxman
Williams
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
NOT VOTING--17
Barlow
Collins (MI)
Faleomavaega (AS)
Foglietta
Grandy
Huffington
Jefferson
Kopetski
Morella
Portman
Royce
Sundquist
Tauzin
Towns
Tucker
Washington
Whitten
{time} 1307
The Clerk announced the following pair:
On this vote:
Miss Collins of Michigan for, with Mr. Tucker against.
Messrs. PENNY, BILIRAKIS, GENE GREEN of Texas, HANCOCK, and DUNCAN
changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. BUNNING, Mrs. CLAYTON, and Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi changed
their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
personal explanation
Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably detained on the Senate
side. Therefore, I missed rollcall No. 222. Had I been here, I would
have voted ``yes.''
____________________